Afghanistan

HL Deb 25 March 2002 vol 633 cc75-133

7.17 p.m.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

rose to move, That this House takes note of developments in Afghanistan and the fight against global terrorism.

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, over the past few months, the House has heard a great deal about the deployment of British troops to Afghanistan. The events of the past week, however, justify our careful attention to the subject. Following the Statement made by the Secretary of State for Defence in another place last Monday and the subsequent Adjournment debate on Wednesday, I am delighted to take the opportunity to open the debate this evening.

I thank noble Lords on both Front Benches opposite and the Convenor of the Cross Benches for their kind understanding that I must leave during the debate, before my noble friend Lord Bach winds up. I must catch a plane to fulfil an official engagement overseas tomorrow. I thank everybody warmly for their understanding on that point.

It has been recognised, ever since the terrible events of 11th September, that the struggle against international terrorism will be long and multi-faceted, embracing diplomatic, financial, economic and humanitarian aspects, as well as military. In the case of Afghanistan, we are working to secure peace and stability for a country that has, for far too long, been ravaged by war.

I shall remind your Lordships of the United Kingdom's objectives in the war against terrorism. They remain as declared on 16th October last year: to do everything possible to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism; to deter states from supporting, harbouring or acting complicitly with international terrorist groups; to contribute to the reintegration of Afghanistan as a responsible member of the international community; and to maintain a positive political agenda of engagement with Arab countries and the Muslim world.

The United Kingdom's commitment to the campaign against international terrorism is as strong today as it was when those objectives were declared. We continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States—our friend and ally—and all other members of the coalition against terrorism. We must remember the other countries that took part in the operation earlier this month against the Taliban and Al'Qaeda—Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France and Norway. There are also 18 nations contributing to the International Assistance Force in Kabul.

It is important to bear in mind that the struggle to defeat international terrorism is not over. Osama bin Laden and many other leaders of the Al'Qaeda terrorist network have still to be brought to justice. They and their supporters are still a threat.

In opening the debate in another place last Wednesday, the Secretary of State for Defence made three points to set the context before discussing the detail of deployments of British troops in Afghanistan. First, we are right to act in Afghanistan. The terrorist attacks in the United States last September were only possible because Osama bin Laden and Al'Qaeda had been able to draw on the support and the shelter offered by the Taliban regime. Had we done nothing, there was no doubt that bin Laden and his accomplices would have carried out further attacks: attacks perhaps by now even on the United Kingdom. We were right to act in self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. We were right to act to prevent Osama bin Laden and Al'Qaeda from posing a continuing terrorist threat. We were right to act to break the links between Afghanistan and international terrorism and to reintegrate Afghanistan as a responsible member of the international community to ensure that those links are not established again.

Secondly, the action that the international community has taken has been remarkably successful. Afghanistan is now a very different country. The decision to deploy considerable military force against the terrorists and their supporters has been vindicated. Osama bin Laden and his Al'Qaeda network have been dealt a heavy blow; only remnants remain of the Taliban, whose support was so important for Al'Qaeda. The decision to deploy the International Security Assistance Force, ISA F, to Kabul to help the interim authority to maintain security in the capital has also been vindicated.

Afghanistan is beginning to return to normality. Commercial life is returning to market stalls, which are full of food; people are out on the street; life is gradually getting back to normal. The Afghan New Year celebrations of this weekend were marked by the sight of kites flying over the capital, with dancing, displays of agricultural machinery and farm produce competitions—more akin to a British village fete than a country recovering from the ravages of war. Let us not forget as well the effect that this has had on the women of Afghanistan: schoolgirls returning to school last Saturday; women students once again attending Kabul University; the wearing of the burqa by choice, not obligation; and women joining in the voice of government.

Thirdly, British forces have played a vital role in this success. British forces have a reputation around the world for their skill and professionalism. Time and again, they have made a massive contribution to bringing stability to the world's trouble spots. Afghanistan is the latest example. We take immense pride in all that they do and in the credit that they bring to the United Kingdom. I wish to take this opportunity to note our appreciation of the widespread support within this House for the work that the British forces have done in Afghanistan and for the work that they will continue to do.

Almost an entire generation of Afghans has known nothing but war, poverty, insecurity, terrorism, drugs and refugee movements. Millions of Afghans have suffered appalling privations, but their resilience is extraordinary. Her Majesty's Government are determined to help make the future better than the past. We have a responsibility to help and we also have a direct national interest to do so.

In the first place, we want the Bonn agreement to succeed. The early signs are encouraging. In particular, we welcome the way in which Chairman Karzai and his fellow interim ministers are working energetically to provide effective administration. Over time, the interim administration should become increasingly broad-based and representative. That is why, for example, we are helping to fund the work of the new Loya Jirga commission, which will decide the rules and arrangements for the meeting of the Grand Assembly in June.

Secondly, we are trying to combat poverty. At Tokyo, we announced an additional pledge of £200 million over five years. In addition, we have already provided £60 million since September last year to UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs for immediate humanitarian and emergency aid.

Thirdly, insecurity: as is well known, the United Kingdom is leading the International Security Assistance Force. What is less well known, however, is that we have also begun training the new national army of Afghanistan and provided communications equipment for use by the Kabul police.

On drugs, we have begun work with the new government in Kabul to counter the cultivation, trafficking and consumption of heroin. The problem is urgent, as a substantial poppy crop is forecast for harvest next month. However, I wish to stress that it is wrong to make the connection, as some have done, between this harvest and the fall of the Taliban. The seeds for this year's harvest were sown many months ago, well before the interim administration took over. We have told the Afghans that we are willing to help with crop substitution—seeds, fertilisers, tools—and support for alternative livelihoods. We are also recommending to the interim administration that they should consider punitive action against farmers who fail to comply with the ban.

We are also looking at ways to enable Afghan refugees now living in Iran, Pakistan and elsewhere, as well as internally displaced persons, to return to their homes.

Let me turn now to the International Security Assistance Force. British armed forces have played a significant role leading the ISAF in Kabul. This force is helping the Afghan interim authority to provide a secure and stable environment in Kabul and is contributing in a major way to creating an atrr osphere of law and order. This is particularly important as the Afghan people take the next step along the path agreed in Bonn in December towards the emergency Loya Jirgah on 6 June.

As this House is aware, the United Kingdom agreed to take on the leadership of this force from its inception for a limited period of time. It was a job that had to be done, and it had to be done well, if the Bonn agreement was to have the best possible chance of success. The United Kingdom was particularly well placed to do this. Our Armed Forces had the right capabilities and experience in expeditionary operations and rapid deployments. We knew that we could provide effective command structures and key equipment to get a force in and up and running in the timescale required, and we were right to take on this responsibility.

Turkey has indicated an interest in taking over as lead nation of the ISAF, and we are in detailed discussions on this with Turkey. Good progress has been made during a series of both diplomatic and military technical discussions with the Turks over the last few weeks, and we are hopeful of an announcement on hand-over of the leadership in the very near future.

Turkey will need continuing contributions of troops from other nations. Certainly the United Kingdom will continue to have troops in ISAF after we have handed over the lead. We have promised Turkey that this will be the case, and other nations have done so as well.

That does not, however, change our determination to draw down the number of British troops deployed as part of ISAF. Progress in securing wider international participation in the force is going well. We had, for example, the welcome arrival last week of the German brigadier to take over command of the Kabul Multinational Brigade, the ISAF subordinate headquarters, which until now has been provided by the headquarters of 16 Air Assault Brigade. This will enable us to withdraw a number of British troops and is a real demonstration of international co-operation. Similarly, confirmation from the Czechs last week of their offer of a field hospital for ISAF is very welcome.

As for the wider future of ISAF, the House will know that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 permits the force to remain in Kabul for six months, that is, until 20 June. The resolution may well be renewed, extending the duration of ISAF's deployment. Certainly it is clear that such a force will have a continuing role to play in bringing security to Kabul and its immediate surroundings, particularly over the period during and immediately following the Loya Jirgah.

Before I move on to talk about the deployment of 45 Commando Group announced last Monday, I wish to underline our commitment to the continuing success of ISAF. Our deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan is entirely separate from ISAF, and neither this nor the transfer of our role as lead nation will change the strength of our commitment. The force has done great work, not only in patrolling the streets of Kabul, important though that is, but also by helping to train the first battalion of the new Afghan National Guard, as well as helping with such basic needs as the organisation of rubbish collection and an ambulance service. Those are all vital services which help to ensure the future stability of Afghanistan.

The deployment of 45 Commando Group to Afghanistan—

Lord King of Bridgwater

My Lords, before the noble Baroness moves on from discussing ISAF, it has been widely reported that, aside from the additional contribution of troops for which Turkey is looking, it is also seeking a substantial financial contribution to its costs. The United Kingdom is being invited to contribute a significant amount to those costs. Can the noble Baroness confirm whether that is the case? If so, presumably it will come out of the contingency reserve.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, I believe that that is under discussion at the moment. My right honourable friend said in the media yesterday that discussions are being held because Turkey will have to consider how it will pay for the deployment. Whether that contribution will come from the contingency reserve I expect will be, as is always the case, a matter for protracted discussion between government departments. However, I am sure that the noble Lord's intervention on the matter will be noted in the appropriate quarters.

The deployment of 45 Commando Group to Afghanistan is entirely consistent with our campaign objectives that I highlighted at the beginning of my address. Since the military campaign began, we have made clear our determination to act to prevent Osama bin Laden and Al'Qaeda from posing a continuing terrorist threat. That is why British forces have been involved in operations on the ground in Afghanistan for some months now.

As the Secretary of State for Defence emphasised in another place last Wednesday, we have also made clear that the military advice is that rooting out the remaining elements of Al'Qaeda will take time. This has been a constant theme of our statements since the early days of the military deployment. Contrary to what many commentators have been reporting, the Government have never said that this was going to be a quick fix. Indeed, I recall making the point about how long this would take on the second Statement we made following the dreadful events of September 11th. Certainly, while Al'Qaeda ceased to exist as a coherent force some months ago and the Taliban regime has long since been removed from power, there are still pockets of resistance.

As the recent US-led Operation Anaconda has demonstrated, elements of Al'Qaeda and the Taliban regime remain in Afghanistan, hidden away in the remoter areas of the country. We must deal with these. The threat of attack from these groups and individuals remains high. If we do not deal with them, they would threaten all that the Afghan people and their supporters in the international community have achieved so far. They would certainly work to retain Afghanistan as a base for training and organising terrorism. And, left to regroup, there is no doubt that Al'Qaeda and its supporters would continue to pose a direct threat to states outside Afghanistan, including to the United Kingdom.

That is why we are deploying 45 Commando Group with the clear mission to assist the United States troops to search out and defeat the remaining elements of Al'Qaeda and Taliban terrorists. It is simply continuing the work that we began last October. In no sense is this "mission creep". In such situations, everyone always wants to know the details of the mission. But let me be clear that we are not going to describe exactly what is to happen next, as to do so puts knowledge and information into the hands of those opposed to us who would jeopardise the safety of our troops. We would simply put into the hands of potential adversaries that which they must not have.

Estimates have been made as to the length of the deployment: of the order of three months. Nonetheless, we must be clear that military action in difficult terrain against a determined enemy is dependent on many unknown factors. Our exit strategy is simple: we will leave when the task is completed.

Equally important is the need to have a clear chain of command. The 3 Commando Brigade headquarters will be based at Bagram airport, alongside the United States operational command of Operation Enduring Freedom under Major General Hagenbeck, Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division. 45 Commando Group command and control is entirely separate to that of ISAF, and is integrated in the United States command system, for active operations in the country. 45 Commando has a long history of operating and training alongside US forces—including in northern Iraq and Kosovo. Furthermore, there is full operational interoperability of communications available, as it has been throughout our operations in Afghanistan.

Let me be clear as well on the availability of close air support for British forces. We must recognise that complete air supremacy is available in Afghanistan. Therefore at any time during the conflict the marines will be able to call upon a formidable array of air support. The expert military advice is that there is no need to augment coalition air power with our own strike aircraft in support of this particular deployment. The Royal Marines possess highly skilled forward air controllers who train regularly with United States forces.

Finally, the situation that our forces find themselves in Afghanistan is one with distinct roles: security assistance by ISAF and war-fighting by 45 Commando is by no means unique. Other nations which have contributed troops to ISAF are in exactly the same situation: Denmark, France, Germany and Norway have all sent ground forces to participate in Operation Anaconda, while other elements of their armed forces remain in Kabul under General McColl.

The decision to deploy 45 Commando Group to Afghanistan underlines our determination to continue the action against terrorism and to assist with Afghanistan's reintegration into the world community as a responsible and valued member. It is not a decision that has been taken lightly and is one that has been taken in the full knowledge of the dangers inherent in the mission. I am sure that all Members of the House will wish to join me in wishing our forces every success in the difficult job that they are undertaking and in sending a message of support to members of all three of the armed services and their families. I beg to move.

Moved, That this House takes note of developments in Afghanistan and the fight against global terrorism.—(Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean.)

7.36 p.m.

Lord Howell of Guildford

My Lords, noble Lords will be extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for enabling us to hold this debate on developments in Afghanistan and also on the wider scene of the campaign against global terrorism. We understand that her duties require the noble Baroness to fly away tonight. We wish her a safe journey.

I should like to make absolutely clear at the outset that on this side we offer our total support for the Royal Marines in their unenviable and tough task, and for the deployment of 45 Commando Group into the rugged, cold and mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. It is an inhospitable and pitiless part of the world. However, they are marvellously equipped and well-trained forces and we join the noble Baroness in sending them good wishes in fulfilling their task.

Therefore, in raising certain policy issues tonight, and indeed in holding this debate, and the debate pressed for and secured by my colleagues in another place, never let it be said by anyone, and certainly not by anyone in the Armed Forces, that while they are risking their lives, back over here the politicians are differing and divided on deployment and operational purposes. We are not. We are absolutely with them and we send them our warmest support and good wishes.

Nevertheless, here at home some lessons must be learnt and certain questions have arisen. I believe that there are two lessons which in particular I wish to address. First, we have learnt, perhaps to some people's surprise, that Al'Qaeda and the Taliban forces are by no means defeated. Secondly, the way in which the Government reach crucial decisions—and there will be more decisions to take since this is a continuing, long-lasting and expanding war against terrorism that will operate in a number of countries, not only Afghanistan—seems a little sudden and disturbing. I want to elaborate on that in a moment because both in the nation's interests and in the war against global terrorism, in the future we shall need to see these things running a little more smoothly.

I shall deal first with the question of Al'Qaeda not yet being defeated. I have listened to the assurances of the noble Baroness and it is right to note that she has been saying certain things all along. Because of that, anything that I have to say by way of criticism, will she please duck since it is not aimed at her; rather it is aimed at others who are not in this place. I do not think that they have given quite such a clear impression.

On 9th January, the Prime Minister said: The Taliban is defeated and Al'Qaeda scattered". That gave the general impression that that was it—the war in Afghanistan was over and we could turn our minds to other matters, particularly the question of humanitarian help and nation building in Afghanistan. In a pamphlet rushed out the other day, the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, wrote: Having defeated the Taliban, the international community faces new imperatives". These seem to be somewhat premature statements which underline the dangers of instant authorship. I am not sure that they are entirely consistent with the view that the Government have been warning all along that Al'Qaeda is not defeated and that there are pockets of resistance—probably very deep pockets—which will continue to cause considerable difficulties and challenges, as they already have to the American forces who have been trying to tackle them and as they will, in very strong form, to our brave troops who are already arriving at Bagram.

Those who rush to say that it is all over—that the Al'Qaeda and the Taliban are finished—have forgotten an important maxim; that is, that in a guerrilla or unorthodox war, the terrorist wins if he does not lose. By contrast, a conventional army—and in the natural course of events we have to mount conventional armies or, at any rate, armies based on conventional structures—loses if it does not win decisively. I do not wish to make any comparison with the past difficulties in Vietnam, but the lesson gradually learnt in Vietnam was that one could not search for or achieve the goal of victory by conducting operations in the pattern of past conventional wars.

It is absolutely crucial to understand the point that one does not finish with a terrorist operation merely by imposing on it the outward trappings of defeat. The infection continues, the battles continue, the pockets fester, the terrorists live to fight another day and survive rather than being wiped out.

We have heard Ministers say—indeed, the noble Baroness said it today—that 45 Commando will return when the task is complete; when the commanding officers judge that the job has been done. When will that be? How will we know when to declare victory? How will we know that the matter is dealt with and in hand? The more realistic and more candid viewpoint that we should he hearing from the Government is that these matters will be very hard to call an end to; that there will be great difficulty in establishing whether the fire of terrorism has been put out, if it ever can be put out.

When he speaks later, my noble friend Lord Vivian will address operational questions with his usual skill, particularly the question of air cover, to which the noble Baroness referred, and to what extent relying on American air cover—which I totally accept is complete-is an entirely satisfactory pattern. We hope that it is—we are grateful for the reassurances that it is—but the matter needs probing. These issues will inevitably cause problems in the very difficult terrain in which the troops will be operating.

However, leaving that aside, the plain fact is that by April of this year the United Kingdom will have more troops on the ground in Afghanistan than the United States. We are left with an uneasy feeling that Operation Anaconda and Operation Veritas could become a war without a clear end; without a moment when it can be declared, "It is all right. We can stop now and bring the boys home". We have that worry and we seek reassurance on that aspect of our operations in Afghanistan.

Let me turn now to the International Security Assistance Force, on which the noble Baroness has given the House some useful information. The question that hangs in the air there too is: when will our obligations end? It was supposed to be the end of April. Last week, Ministers in another place were telling us that Turkey was just about to come to the point of agreement on taking over ISAF. I have listened in vain and scanned the newspapers since then, but I have not seen any sign of an agreement. I have seen a sign of the proposed bill, a matter rightly raised by my noble friend Lord King. Apparently 300 million US dollars is required from somewhere—possibly from the pockets of British and American taxpayers—for Turkey to consider this matter.

But, even if that has been discussed, the general point of principle that command of ISAF will be taken over by Turkey at the end of April has not been established. Indeed, it is now being conceded by Ministers that ISAF will remain under British command for a number of further months. Until when we do not know.

This is against a background with two worrying aspects. First, it is possible—again we would welcome reassurance that it is unlikely—that ISAF armed forces could be confused with operational forces by an enemy that may not have clear information and by terrorists, and thus become a soft target. That is one danger. The second danger we can see developing all the time. The internal situation in Afghanistan is not yet completely stable; the warlords are at each other; and the country is divided by languages and by divisions which have been there for decades, if not centuries.

There is also the question of how the king fits into this story. It may be that he will get back in time—his return has been delayed—and the Loya Jirgah will go ahead as planned. I hope it will. But what role have we taken in encouraging the king to play this obviously vital part? My impression is that. United Kingdom officialdom has somewhat ignored the king and not given him the primacy and importance which, despite his great age, he clearly has in these matters. We should like to know more about that.

As I mentioned earlier, another point has arisen over the past few days; that is, how did we get to where we are and how were the decisions made? To an outsider—and, of course, on this side of the House we are outside the inner processes of decision making—it looks as though the decision to deploy came in a back-to-front way. First, there was the week-end authorisation following an extremely urgent request from the Americans; then there was the action and the Statement; and then, in the middle of last week, there was the parliamentary debate which was secured after pressure from my honourable friends and colleagues in another place. It was not offered by the Government. It must be noted—I think this was a major mistake—that the Prime Minister was not able to attend that debate on the biggest deployment of troops since the Gulf War. One should think of the effect that it will have on their families. It is quite wrong that the Prime Minister was away attending to other matters. I gather it was to discuss foxhunting.

Of course the executive has the authority to act. In opposition, one always likes to put on a little pressure of the kind that Parliament must decide before the Government act, but I concede that real life is not like that. The executive has the authority to authorise deployments, but we must at least be assured—Parliament does not govern but it monitors those who do govern—that these decisions are taken by our system of collective Cabinet government by which all Ministers are bound. Can the Minister reassure the House that, although apparently there was not time for broader debate and discussion in Parliament before the decision was made, the Cabinet was formally and properly consulted over the weekend and that Secretaries of State were assembled and consulted in the proper constitutional way?

In my experience at the time of the Falklands expedition, that is what happened. Every Cabinet Minister round the table was asked for their opinion on whether the expeditionary force to the Falklands should proceed. Of course, there was also an inner Cabinet, but that is what happened. Did that also happen in this case? Or did the Prime Minister consult the full Cabinet on this significant and important deployment? We should like a reassurance that the proper procedures were observed.

I raise these matters because, in a way, they have implications for the next phase in the campaign against global terrorism and how decisions on that will be taken. We know that Al'Qaeda is a world-wide operation, and that it probably has access to chemical and biological weapons. Although we are not sure of the full picture, we know that these may have been supplied by the one man who used them in 1988; namely, Saddam Hussein. People are now asking: if the next phase of the campaign is to be against Iraq, what is the proof of his involvement in terrorist activity?

We must all ask, as I suspect the noble Baroness and other Ministers are asking: how much proof do people want? I believe that it is agreed between all parties that a dossier of information, like the previous dossier on Al'Qaeda and Afghanistan, would be extremely valuable. But some people are going further and saying that we must have a justification in the form of some action. I hope that that is not the view of Church leaders and others, but it seems to be implying that, until something terrible happens—another "9/11"— we cannot have any justification for mobilising attempts to get rid of Saddam Hussein. That would be a very wrong way of thinking. It would be the height of folly. Every expression of that kind increases the danger for all of us and increases the confidence of the monster in Baghdad.

We need also to establish what was briefly discussed at Question Time today; namely, whether additional UN cover is needed for any actions against Iraq. The UN Charter says that self-defence is allowed against armed attack. The trouble is that, in an age of terrorism and the assault on the World Trade Centre, that kind of language does not fit the need.

There is a long and arduous set of operations ahead. The Ministry of Defence has rightly put out a document, the "new chapter", warning us that a new sequence, a new approach against terrorism, will be needed: prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt, destroy. On this side of the House, we do not ask for operational details, but we do need to be reassured that realism prevails. We need the Government to spell out, frankly and candidly—possibly more candidly than they have hitherto—the nature of the enormous dangers ahead and the sacrifices that everyone will have to make to face up to them.

7.52 p.m.

Baroness Williams of Crosby

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for staying behind to open the debate, for which we are all extremely grateful. I wish her not only a safe journey but a successful outcome to the policy discussions when she gets there. I only hope that she will find a few minutes to plunge into the "wine dark sea" and enjoy it before she has to return to yet another set of debates in this House.

Perhaps I may add to the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford. It is clear that the nature of the request from the United States for a particular group of British soldiers is itself an astonishing tribute to their international reputation—one which I believe they will carry on their banners, as they rightly should, as they enter an extraordinarily difficult phase of what has been an extraordinarily difficult war.

Perhaps I may say in passing that I wish that the Government had managed at least privately to consult Opposition leaders in the two Houses before the deployment of troops was announced. I understood from American reports that the Pentagon seems to have known about the possibility of the deployment a couple of days before it was announced in Parliament. Had such discussions taken place, we might have warned against the exuberance of No. 10 in suggesting that there was an advanced biological weapons laboratory in a cave in Afghanistan—a statement which has now had to be broadly taken back in the light of the American dismissal of that particular report.

I am in complete agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, on one question. I completely exonerate, as he did, our own Minister—whose sensitivity and knowledge would prevent her from falling into such a trap. However, there have been a number of reports in the newspapers, both in this country and in the United States, to suggest that something close to complete victory was very near in Afghanistan. I have always felt that to be a dangerous approach to take on any issue of terrorism.

It is not merely that there are disturbing signs of the ability of the Al'Qaeda network, and even of some Taliban fighters, to regroup and reassert themselves in many remote parts, particularly of eastern Afghanistan. It is also becoming clear that in the troubled eastern provinces—the Pashtun provinces—of Afghanistan, they have the same advantage as obtained for a long time in relation to the IRA: namely, the ability to disappear into a neighbouring country, which officially, and indeed formally, was deeply opposed to terrorism—that is undoubtedly the case with the Government of Pakistan, as it always was with the Government of the Republic of Ireland— but where there was a certain public response, at least in some periods of the war against terrorism, which made it easy for terrorists simply to disappear into the background of that neighbouring country.

If we are honest, we have to remark on the troubling fact that, in the Pashtun provinces, many of whose tribes cross a border which is not very well protected, there is a real problem in regard to the ability of terrorist groups to disappear, then to reappear, to regroup, and then to cross back into the country. We should be less than honest if we did not recognise that as a complicating factor in the attempt to stamp out terrorism in Afghanistan.

It is clear, as the Minister has said on more than one occasion, that this is likely to be a long, hard war, even in Afghanistan itself. It is certainly not yet over. It is certainly likely to demand a commitment and perseverance which we cannot possibly try to dismiss. It is wiser for all of those engaged in the battle against terrorism to recognise that this is a profound and long battle, and one in which attacking the roots as well as the symptoms is of first importance.

That leads me to say a word or two about the roots. On these Benches, we perceive the work of 1SAF, the security force in Afghanistan, to be inescapably bound up with the military response. The one without the other could lead to our winning the war and losing the peace. It is that danger which profoundly troubles many of us.

ISAF is still, as far as one can tell, on a pretty uncertain base. The Minister said nothing to suggest that that statement is false. The mandate under which ISAF serves lasts until June. It has already been indicated that Mr Brahimi, on behalf of the United Nations, will seek an extension of the mandate. I was glad that the Minister did not in any way doubt that there would be a probable attempt to extend the mandate, or that in effect it would be unlikely that the British leadership position could be passed over as soon as next month.

There have been many questions about the Turks, who have expressed their willingness in certain circumstances and under certain conditions to take over the leadership. But as the noble Lord, Lord King, has indicated, it is clear that the Turks have not yet completed—this has now gone on for several days—their own negotiation as to the conditions on which they would be willing to take over.

The latest report suggests that the United States would be willing to put up as much as £180 million; but of that sum, £160 million would be listed under the heading of financial and economic help to Turkey, and only £20 million as a contribution towards the 300 million dollars caught up in the maintenance of ISAF over the necessary period. To say the least, that is somewhat unsatisfactory. ISAF is as important as the military deployment; it is at least of equal importance. Therefore, it is essential for the United States, the United Kingdom and other members of the coalition to perceive the way to maintain that force; and—dare I say it? —we all know that the extent of the force is wholly inadequate. It extends only to Kabul. It is clear that in other parts of the country the warlords are already beginning to reassert themselves.

The most frightening outcome of a war in which thousands of men and women have lost their lives in trying to defeat terrorism would be a situation in which Afghanistan returned to forms of civil war, which we know well breed terrorism. The Taliban came in on the back of the last civil war in Afghanistan and could easily come in on the back of the next.

I have one or two questions about ISAF. First, how far is it serving alongside some elements of the Northern Alliance? I told the Minister earlier that I would raise the question of General Fahim's activities in Kabul. He is continuing to patrol—and, indeed, to control—areas of the capital. Outside the capital the situation is even more troubling, as warlords begin to reassert their control over what had been their traditional tribal areas, as happened recently in Khost. It is disturbing, but not surprising, that Klaus Peter Klaiber, the European Union envoy to Afghanistan, said only recently that the rebuilding aid that was intended to be financed by the European Union will, in large part, not be made available until some form of stability and peace obtains in Afghanistan far outside the capital. It is still difficult to see how that situation will be reached.

I have one other comment about ISAF. I am troubled by the American attitude, which appears to be increasingly that the United States does the fighting—for which it is unquestionably extremely well equipped—with a few exceptions, such as the request for 45 Commando, and the rest of the coalition does the clearing up. That is not a happy or attractive division of responsibility. It is very important that the United States remains committed to ISAF and that it is seen to be so and says that it is so, even though its secondment of troops to ISAF is more limited than that of the United Kingdom or some of the other countries within the structure. In that context, I should like ISAF to be within the broad envelope of NATO, because that would give it credibility that it may not always have.

My noble friend Lord Roper will address some of the issues of overstretch, which have to be very much on our minds because of the heavy demands already being made on British forces. At a time when the United States defence budget equals the budget of the next 15 largest countries in the world—I shall repeat that because it is so amazing; it equals the budget of the next 15 largest countries in the world—the United States is in a position to call the quits, if you like, in a way that nobody else is.

That brings me to my final point. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, mentioned the possibility of the widening of the war. That is a point at which he and I part company to a considerable extent. The Liberal Democrats believe that any issue of widening the war must be subject to discussion and broad agreement within the coalition. In that context, we cannot avoid mentioning the response that Vice-President Cheney received on his visit around the Middle East, which began with him making clear that he believed that Iraq was the single greatest threat that should concern the coalition and ended with his recognition that the Middle East was far more central to the concerns of many members of the coalition than was Iraq.

It is undoubtedly true that so great is the power of the United States, particularly its military power, that it might be able to put huge pressure on those governments to declare themselves in favour of an extension of the war. However, what frightens me—and I think that this frightens many of us—is that eventually persuading, pressurising or otherwise pushing the governments of the Arab states into saying that they would be willing to go along with an extension of the war is not synonymous with carrying the streets and souks of the Arab people, where it is troubling to see the steady rise in support for opposition to the United States and her activities and the rising level of support for the Palestinian intifada.

In conclusion, the Liberal Democrats believe that it would be politically wise to seek a United Nations resolution before any widening of the war might take place. We believe that the first priority must go to completing the war in Afghanistan before any extension is seriously considered. Finally, we believe strongly that it is of crucial importance to maintain the coalition, not least because the war against terrorism may go on for many years to come. The coalition can be maintained only by listening to it, taking note of what it has to say and shaping policies along lines that will attract a consensus among countries that concern themselves with opposition to terrorism and care about the principle of a free and democratic society.

8.6 p.m.

Lord Craig of Radley

My Lords, I too welcome this opportunity to take stock of the situation in Afghanistan. As 45 Commando, Royal Marines, prepare to go into the mountains there, I join in wishing them well. Their experience of training in difficult terrain will stand them in good stead, although even they will find the high altitudes a tough and breath-taking experience.

I expect that the task they face is clearer to them than it is to those of us who rely on the media and the briefings and public comments by government Ministers and spokesmen. The Government's original immediate objectives, broadly stated by the Foreign Secretary soon after the attacks in the United States, were to bring Osama bin Laden and other Al'Qaeda leaders to justice, to prevent Al'Qaeda posing a continuing terrorist threat and to persuade and, if necessary, force the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to help to achieve those objectives.

The Taliban as a government are no more, but from what has been said about the role of 45 Commando, it appears that the opposition in the Shah-i-Kot mountains consists of remnants of Taliban and Al'Qaeda. They are, a series of small pockets of resistance".—[Official Report, Commons, 20/3/02; col. 341.], to quote from the speech of Mr Hoon in the other place last Wednesday. Even allowing for the difficult terrain, "small pockets" implies that the task is not such a difficult one, but from what we have seen and learnt about the American experience earlier this year in Operation Anaconda, the pockets seem sizeable and determined. Perhaps the House can be told whether there is a significant difference between the opposition that 45 Commando will face and that which the United States forces had to face during Operation Anaconda. Meanwhile, the Al'Qaeda leadership is still at large.

As always in conflict, we must look ahead to the next stages. It is not yet clear what is to happen next in Afghanistan. The matrix of mountain caverns and remote areas along the 900-mile border with Pakistan will not be easy to police and guard. More likely it will be impossible. If the opposition decides to melt away over the borders, are we going to be allowed in principle to go after them? It is unrealistic to expect that all opposition will be killed or captured. We should do well to remember that the operations that we are now engaging in are not the classic confrontation of standing forces and nation states. We are facing more of an insurgency-type threat—one that will not rely on fixed bases, will choose its own targets, will be absolutely ruthless, will take no prisoners except perhaps as hostages and will not stand to fight it out against a superior force. The battles in the Afghan mountains are being fought by tribesmen who know their ground well and who are natural fighters, as our troops more than a century ago and more recently the Soviets learnt to their cost.

All our experience of insurgency-type activity teaches us that until there is a successful and accurate flow of intelligence, the terrorists will have the upper hand more often than not. We have learned, too, even in territory that is familiar to us—such as in Northern Ireland or previously in Borneo or Malaya—that it takes a long time to develop the flow of good intelligence and reliably to assess the raw information which may be collected. How much more difficult it will be to get that right in Afghanistan, where for the past 30 years one form of instability has been heaped upon another and our knowledge of the terrain and the reliability of the various factions is not that well developed.

I noted that Mr Hoon has repeated that the commitment of 45 Commando and the supporting units was taken, following a formal request from the United States".—[0fficial Report, Commons, 20/03/02: col. 344.] That is an interesting formulation. It could imply that we were not so keen to become involved or that at that stage we did not volunteer to take part. Experience in the Gulf conflict with our American friends laid great emphasis on the political value, as well as the military one, of our contribution to the coalition forces. First, air and naval forces, then ground units, and then more such were asked for by the United States. I therefore take it that fielding ground forces alongside the United States ones in Afghanistan is as much a political gesture as anything—although that is not to underestimate 45 Commando's operational contribution.

Experience with political gestures is that they have a relatively short shelf life. Before long, if there is still conflict, further gestures are called for. I hope and believe that the Government will have taken that on board. There seems to be every likelihood that, as the Chief of the Defence Staff said, we are in for the long haul. The Minister has reminded us of that fact again today. So we must expect a series of further calls to participate in the on-going operations. That brings me to the other point that I should like to make.

The United States Government, once they had determined to take the fight to the terrorists, and recognising that that would be a long and demanding task, were quick to announce that they would be massively increasing their defence and related budgets. It really served to underline their commitment. I do not have any feel for what additional expenditures the United States has already made, but even if it is still only small, the message that came across was loud and clear.

I contrast that with the posture of Her Majesty's Government. We have had many fine expressions of resolve and determination from Secretaries of State and from the Prime Minister himself, and I believe that they are totally sincere and committed to playing as decisive a part as possible in this long-running campaign. But when we look to the substance of what has been happening in recent weeks in the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence, a rather bleaker picture unfolds. I shall list but a few of the real cuts, not enhancements, in our front-line posture.

One such cut is the disbandment of 5 Tornado Air Defence Squadron. The decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier FA2s from service by 2006 and changes to the planned Joint Force Harriers will lead to both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force losing one squadron. The fleet's air defence capability will be much reduced. The loss of half a dozen warships in the Falklands conflict, when air defences were overstretched, was a bitter lesson which seems to have been forgotten. Indeed, there must be some doubt as to whether the Fleet Air Arm will be able to sustain itself until the new carriers are available for it. The Hercules Reserve Squadron, No 57, which until now has been the operational conversion unit in peacetime, is also to disappear. Moreover, we have read a variety of articles about the lack of funds to support troop training in Canada and to keep HMS "Fearless" going. I could go on.

In peacetime one expects budgets to be tight and economies sought to contain expenditure. Indeed, throughout all my time in the Cold War, when we strove to provide a deterrent posture but would never seriously have been able to sustain conventional operations for more than a very few days, the arguments were well understood and accepted. Today, the whole scene has changed. The Strategic Defence Review, even without its new chapter, envisages expeditionary operations. However, as the cuts and other factors I have mentioned indicated, that vision is seriously under-resourced.

We are mounting a whole variety of expeditionary activities. We are occasionally at war. We are fighting and firing off ordnance. We are at risk of considerable operational losses, and we are supporting activity—sometimes at many times the normal peacetime rates for which we have budgeted—in many different parts of the world. Moreover, each and every one of these deployments and commitments has a massively long back-up of personnel and logistics support. Indeed, there can be a tendency to overlook what all this entails. It is not just the cost of the support units which now have to be bolstered by the compulsory call-up of reservists. There is a need for additional spares in the pipeline to ensure that the front line has what it needs when it is needed. We rightly concern ourselves about the lives of the troops and other service men and women who we expect to fight for us. However, we must not put them in the way of danger only for them to find that their ability to fight is curtailed, or worse, because batteries for their radios or fuses for their weapons or whatever are not to hand.

I was horrified to read in the new chapter of the Strategic Defence Review discussion paper that the Government are taking credit for announcing, a significant additional investment of £100 million to meet urgent operational requirements". I deplore the use of the word investment for such operational necessities. Buying fuel for my car to get me to hospital is not an investment. The spin brigade, I suppose, think that "investment" is a feel-good word while "expenditure" is not.

The real point is that if we are to commit forces to operations way beyond those that are described as peace keeping or training, in which we could lose considerable amounts of equipment, let alone lives, it is no longer reasonable to think that we can pare everything to the bone but somehow by means of an urgent investment make good what has been lost. The battle will not wait for factories to turn out the new kit. More likely, we shall have to give up what we are trying to do or see casualties mount because our troops are unable to defend themselves properly. It is high time, if the Government wish to be a global player with our Armed Forces, to change the ways in which we used to budget and finance the forces, and to be much more ready to provide the resources needed in all theatres and in the home base from which our forces are committed. Unless we do that and more realistically fund our defence strategy and postures, or cut our commitments, we shall enter into the last-chance saloon and a military disaster may overtake us.

8.18 p.m.

Lord Desai

My Lords, I join other noble Lords in wishing our troops good luck and safe return. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Howell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that it is a tribute to the quality of our fighting forces that they have been invited at very short notice to join operations in the part of Afghanistan where fighting continues.

I have some problems, however, with the way in which people have started to criticise the decision. Although I do not know the constitutional basis of the decision, I see it as a continuation of previous decisions. When we committed ourselves to fighting the war against terrorism, and specifically when we committed ourselves to fighting in Afghanistan, first we sent troops to fight and then we joined the ISAF. Now, we are taking this action. I do not see the stark break that other noble Lords see in this major event, for which we need special conventions.

The noble Lord, Lord Howell, gave the analogy of the Falklands War. I would rather compare this situation to the Gulf War. As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, reminded the House, the United States has requested additional troops on two or three occasions. Unless my memory fails me, I do not believe that there was a special Cabinet session, or consultation or a debate on that matter.

We must be realistic. The war will go on for a long time and it will not be an easy war to fight—no war is easy. Public opinion, which is not friendly towards what we are doing, has flip-flopped. This war started less than six months ago, and people said, "This will he so difficult; we shall be fighting through the winter; lots of people will die; there will be starvation; and we shall have many losses". That did not happen. One part of the war was fought relatively quickly. As many noble Lords have pointed out, that has not meant that the war is over. The ground war phase is over and it has now moved to a guerrilla phase.

I do not believe the analogy of Vietnam is correct. The crucial difference is that the people of North Vietnam liked their government, and the people of South Vietnam did not like theirs, therefore the American approach did not have good global support. That is not the case in Afghanistan. We have the support of the Northern Alliance; we have achieved a situation in which a government is in power; the Taliban, as a government, has been destroyed; and, without appearing to he too optimistic, that phase of the war was successfully fought. We are now in another phase of the war and we have to adapt to the conditions.

When will the war end? It is difficult to say when a guerrilla war will end. Sometimes guerrilla wars appear to go on forever. I am not an expert on such matters, but the guerrilla warfare fought by Che Guevara in Bolivia was a guerrilla war fought by an outstanding guerrilla warrior. That Bolivian war, which also took place in mountainous conditions, came to an end. It is possible that a time will come when, for two or three months, our troops are not attacked. Then we could pass the baton to the local Afghan troops and retire.

A crucial point in that respect is that we have to secure two kinds of co-operation. First we must be quite sure that the local warlords, however much they fight among themselves, do not use their intelligence to harm our troops, especially those fighting in the mountains. How can we secure their co-operation? Whether or not they agree with Mr Karzai and after all we have done for them, they should be on our side, or at least not fighting against us. Will the warlords help us rather than fight us?

The role of Pakistan is crucial. Pakistan is a haven to which the guerrillas can escape. In Pakistan more people are being recruited by the guerrillas; and Pakistan holds so much intelligence and support that our troops could use to capture those who may be escaping. In all those respects I believe that we should provide Pakistan with an important role and give it support.

There will be deaths. We must be prepared for casualties from such an operation. We should be up front about A and ensure that proper care is taken of the families of soldiers who are to risk life and limb. Also we should not spin that story. We have gone to Afghanistan for a good reason but lives will be lost. Those lives will appear valueless if we do not support the objective for which our troops are fighting.

8.26 p.m.

Lord King of Bridgwater

My Lords, I support the Government in the decision they have taken on the need to continue the campaign against Al'Qaeda and the Taliban. I certainly recognise that this is a campaign in which there may well be casualties, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Desai. No one should under-rate the seriousness of the decision that the Government have taken, for which they seek the support of this House, the other place and the country. If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars". We hope that it will be just small pockets, but at the moment we have no confidence. As the noble and gallant Lord. Lord Craig, made clear, we cannot be confident at this stage that that is true. What is clear is that it is vital to continue the campaign to sustain the present government in Afghanistan. Otherwise, the risks of that being undermined are great. They are likely to need considerable support for some time.

I was struck by the analogy that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, drew with Ireland and Northern Ireland. I learned something about Pakistan: that there is a large area that appears to be outside the control of any government. With her well known modesty, she referred to it as a somewhat less well guarded frontier. My understanding is that the control is practically non-existent. Most of the tribes are quite unaware of where the frontier lies. That is a wonderful resource for any terrorist organisation.

It appears to me that it is essential to sustain the present government during this period and military support will be needed for that purpose. In a wider sense, it is vital to sustain the credibility of the action that is being taken by the United States and by the coalition. If it were seen to fail, there would be serious consequences around the world. My noble friend Lord Howell, in an excellent contribution, put the matter extremely well in saying that terrorists win if they do not lose. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Desai, asked how we will know when we have won. That will be a real challenge.

While I support the Government. I recognise that the situation is not going according to plan. The Government cannot necessarily be criticised for that because we are dealing with extremely difficult issues. The least surprising announcement ever made is that Mr Brahimi has asked for an extension for ISAF. I do not believe that anyone thought that a cut-off point of the end of June had any credibility whatever. I make a small prediction that Mr Brahimi's extension will, in due course, be subject to a further extension as the problems continue. I hope that the Minister can reassure me on that matter. I understand that For very good reasons his colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, has had to leave, but she presented a cheerful approach to the situation in Afghanistan.

I understand that the situation in Kabul is far from easy at present and is extremely worrying. Clearly if we move to the situation which the noble Lord, Lord Desai, regarded as a logical progression rather than a major move forward, it is contrary to my understanding about military doctrine. One does not muddle up peacekeeping and war fighting. The reality—my noble friend Lord Howell referred to it—is that those to whom we are opposed, those whom we are trying to kill in the mountains by destroying terrorist hideouts, will have friends and allies around the cities. We have heard of terrorist incidents and attempted incidents in those areas. The softest targets will be the same nationalities seen in their peacekeeping role. Steps will have to be taken to ensure greater protection for those involved in the peacekeeping rather than the war fighting role.

Clearly, this is not the Battle of Waterloo in which people form fixed squares and fight to the last man. The classic guerrilla activity is now being adopted. As would be expected. The challenge in dealing with that is very real. Yet it is vital that an impetus is maintained. If it is thought that the coalition is not working, that is the most vivid recruiting signal to many disaffected people who are very sympathetic to Al'Qaeda and likely to flock to join the banner. I do not know whether the Government have any intelligence—I doubt whether we have—as to how many recruits are coming to join in the activities of Al'Qaeda and the Taliban. We have reports of some. I have no idea how valid the reports are and how great the numbers.

In the current situation, my first demand on the Government, the coalition and the United States is that there is need now for a most sustained hearts-andminds campaign about our objectives internally in Afghanistan and externally around the world, about why we are there, and the actions that we take. Reference has been made to the Gulf War by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley. The challenge is to maintain the respectability of our activities, with the risk of the accident of the ill-guided bomb, of civilian casualties, and of outrages which can be exploited by the opposition and could do enormous damage and gain yet more recruits for Al'Qaeda and the Taliban. That is an essential element in the support for our marine commandos and others involved in the military campaign, both war fighting and peacekeeping.

As part of the hearts-and-minds campaign, there is need for the advertisement of the early and continuing evidence of the merits of peace. That needs to be continually repeated and hammered out. The Minister referred to the village fete, with kite flying, markets, souks and the other signs of life returning to normality. All that is good but it needs propagating and continual advertisement to persuade people that this is the better way. Maximum support for the coalition and for the United Nations approach is important. There have been increasing signs of the United States losing patience with some of its allies and some members of the coalition.

The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, referred to the massive scale of the military capability of the United States. I add one statistic. I refer to the total sum of the 15 other countries. I believe that I am right in saying that the increase in the defence budget announced by President Bush as a result of the present situation is larger than the total UK defence budget. I may be corrected, but the figure shows the scale.

On the military challenges, we have moved from phase one—the air campaign with high-level bombing and unmanned vehicles with their amazing technology. In the end there were bound to be troops on the ground. That becomes much more dangerous and more challenging. We know that the Taliban and Al'Qaeda said that they were looking forward to that. If they could survive the onslaught from the sky, they would get people down on what they saw as their level playing field. It is a real challenge. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, referred to high altitude. Some of the territory in which the forces will work may be almost outside the ceiling of some of the helicopters and other support. I am not sure whether that is true. But Bagram at 7,000 feet forms a kind of low base. If the forces are up in some of the high mountains there is the challenge of acclimatisation. I see that two of my former constituents who are marine commandos in 45 Commando are moving from the shore level of Minehead in Somerset. They will find themselves in the high altitude of Afghanistan. That will surely be a challenge in terms of resources, numbers available and the ability to rotate and replace. There will have to be a significant period of acclimatisation at high altitudes before the troops become available for high mountain activity. That is an extra challenge that they face.

I do not know what intelligence we have about whether there are small pockets or many large and well-equipped pockets of forces and the scale of new recruits. In asking our forces to undertake these challenges, it is our duty to provide them with the best possible intelligence. I hope that the Minister will be able to give guidance on these points. Everyone in this House has great pride in our forces. We know that they will not let us down. If they have not been trained at the altitudes they will have to face in Afghanistan, albeit they have mountain training, they will be very challenged. They must not be exploited. I always feel that it is easy for Ministers—I could sometimes be accused—to pray in aid the quality of our forces and their ready availability for any charge that we as Ministers lay upon them. But they are not supermen. They must not be expected to undertake unreasonable and challenging tasks. They must be given every possible support in undertaking this work.

It will not be easy for them. It is an exceptionally difficult deployment. I am not clear whether we shall now work in a coalition with Afghan forces or whether NATO forces will undertake the charges on their own with Afghan forces in some support role. There are obvious benefits if we can work with local Afghan forces. But it is clear that the culture of those Afghan forces is not the same as what one might call the western armies. There has already been reference to the role of the war lords and their sometimes different objectives. That is a particularly challenging problem they have to face.

Military action in Afghanistan may not be the end of the threat of terrorism that the world faces but it is an important first step. Perhaps I may say a word about what the next steps may be. It is clear that what I considered the premature discussion of an involvement with Iraq has faded somewhat into the background as the difficulties that we face in Afghanistan have become more apparent. I am not sure that the Americans at this stage entirely share that view. Some of us had the pleasure of meeting the Vice President, Dick Cheney, on his repeat tour. Noble Lords will recall that before the Gulf War, after the invasion of Kuwait, he made the same tour round the countries of the Gulf. I have no doubt that the welcome he received, although polite and courteous, was not quite as forthcoming as it had been after the invasion of Kuwait 10 or 11 years ago in terms of the readiness of the countries to respond. We therefore need to ensure that if we are to move on, we move from secure achievement, and we need to be sure that in Afghanistan we have an established government in a secure situation, on which we can then build the continuing fight against terrorism.

I welcome today's debate. The Government are entitled to ask for our support. I certainly give mine. I accept, as was said in another place, that in giving our support we take a measure of responsibility for the decisions that the Government have taken. But that means that we are taking the Government's decisions on trust. I believe that in return we are entitled to expect from the Government the fullest possible information on the progress of this campaign, its successes, its setbacks, if any. If we give that support and take that measure of responsibility, we are entitled to feel that we are being properly informed at all times.

8.41 p.m.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick

My Lords, it is surely right that this House should yet again debate developments in Afghanistan and the fight against global terrorism. Indeed, it is probably too long since we last did so. It is too easy to take one's eye off the ball and allow the rush of events, the fads of the media circus, to prescribe the daily agenda, causing one to overlook all the unfinished business both in Afghanistan and in the wider war against terrorism.

Last week's Statement about the decision to send the Royal Marines to Afghanistan was probably a wake-up call, a reminder that the images of a rapid and relatively casualty-free victory were too good to be true. If we allowed Afghanistan to drift away into the margins of our political consciousness, it could well return and bite us again, as it previously did.

However, resisting complacency does not mean for one moment that we should not dwell on some of the things that have gone right: first, a military campaign that led to the speedy overthrow of the Taliban and the destruction of Al'Qaeda's Afghan network of training camps and safe havens, and that at a relatively low cost in lives; secondly, a massive famine averted.

It is now difficult to remember the estimates of mass starvation with which we were bombarded last autumn. Sometimes we were even told that it was all the fault of those taking the action following 11th September. If that action had not been taken, if the Taliban had continued to rule in Afghanistan, many more people would have died of starvation than actually did. Thirdly, the freeing of a whole people from oppression and from discrimination against women which had characterised the role of the Taliban. It is difficult not to feel joy and some pride in the images o f children—including, for the first time, girls—returning to schools in Kabul, refurbished with British aid and protected by British peacekeepers. Fourthly, the marshalling of a great coalition—not just a military coalition but a coalition of peacekeepers and aid donors, in which we, our European partners and the UN have played a worthy role under US leadership.

The list of unfinished tasks remains much longer than the list of accomplishments, and the precariousness of what has already been achieved is not in doubt. The threat from the Taliban and from the remnants of Al'Qaeda is clearly real and far more difficult to cope with than when they were holding fixed and easily-identifiable positions. Afghanistan remains dominated by warlords whose past record leaves no room for believing that they will now work together for the common good just because we ask them to do so. The economy hardly exists and will not for several years be able, unassisted, to support the structure of a state. There is no tradition of democracy on which to fall back. If it is to exist at all, it will have to be built from the ground up. The bad habit of Afghanistan's neighbours meddling in its affairs may temporarily have been stilled, but it has certainly not been banished.

Therefore, the task for the United Nations and the coalition is massive. If we do not give the United Nations sustained political support or provide the resources needed to do the job, that task cannot in any way be successfully accomplished.

One of the top priorities must surely be to continue the work of political reconstruction that began with the Bonn Conference and the successful constitution of a provisional government. As the Minister reminded us, Loya Jirgah is only a few months away, and it is crucial that it should lead to a more solidly - based, more representative and more legitimate government. Only if the Afghans themselves take on the task of reconstructing their country will it work. Afghanistan is not a country in which outsiders can for long call the tune without taking risks themselves and without undermining the credibility of those they support. That, surely, is one lesson of history that we should not forget.

So far, the involvement of the Pashtun in the work of government has been less wholehearted and less widespread than is necessary, if lasting stability is to be achieved. Afghanistan cannot be successfully ruled by a non-Pashtun government, nor by one that has only a token Pashtun involvement or lacks the support of the Pashtun tribes. The building up of the Pashtun dimension of the government is a major task for the months ahead.

Another, less immediate but no less pressing, task is to lay the foundations for an end to the meddling of Afghanistan's neighbours in its affairs and, reciprocally, for an end to Afghanistan's meddling in their affairs. Such meddling has been endemic for generations—indeed for centuries—and it has brought nothing but strife, instability and suffering to Afghanistan and its neighbours. What is needed is an international convention with the full mandatory backing of the UN Security Council and its permanent members, which would commit Afghanistan's neighbours to the policy and practice of nonintervention and which would similarly commit Afghanistan, thus recognising the Durand Line as its border with Pakistan and forswearing any reversion to the ill-fated Pashtunistan venture of earlier years.

Would it not make sense for Britain to give a lead in championing such a convention? I should like to hear the Minister's reaction to that suggestion.

If one looks more widely at the war on terrorism, it is only honest to admit that some of the sharp focus, the burning sense of urgency and the unity of purpose, which was so evident in the early months after 11th September, have been lost. The first signs of divided counsels have made their appearance. On one side of the Atlantic, rather strident voices are raised, questioning why international co-operation is needed at all, why one should pay attention to the views of others, why anything is needed beyond the strength of America's formidable right arm. In my opinion, those are short-sighted views, which ignore the fact that the war against terrorism is not simply a military operation, in which victory is sure to go to the militarily stronger and better equipped side. It is a war whose civilian dimensions, denying havens to terrorists, denying them access to finance and weapons, pooling police work, intelligence and other matters, require the active and willing co-operation of the widest possible international coalition. That is one view on one side of the Atlantic.

On this side of the Atlantic, partly in response to those same strident voices, doubts have emerged about the next stage of the war against terrorism, about the unilateral trend of US leadership. Yet, if one thinks about it, the challenge that we all faced last December has not gone away; nor has it diminished, except in a very temporary way; nor has it been superseded by some other, greater threat. Now that we know more about the scope of Al'Qaeda's ambitions and its world-wide network and better understand how difficult it is, in an age of globalisation, to counter its activities effectively, we need to be more united and more determined, not less so.

On no issue have divided counsels been more evident than over the handling of Iraq. On none, therefore, is it more necessary to close ranks and to try to find a policy response which maximises the pressure of the international community on a regime with whom no one from one side of the political spectrum to the other, no one from one region of the world to another, has the slightest sympathy.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq has broken a whole range of international obligations in relation to the elimination of its programmes for acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Whether or not he was in some way linked to Al"Qaeda or to the events of last September remains obscure; but it is in any case not the whole story about his involvement with terrorism. What has Saddam Hussein been doing since 1991 to fulfil the obligation under the ceasefire resolution that he should avoid support of any kind for terrorism or terrorist acts? What has he done since last September to implement the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1373 which laid the foundations of the campaign against terrorism?

All those are pressing and legitimate matters which need to be put to the Iraqi regime without more delay, and to which its response will be a determining factor in future developments. That is why I urge the Government to work with our partners in the Security Council to bring forward a new resolution which would at the same time require Iraq to re- admit UN weapons inspectors and to fulfil their obligations in the war against terrorism. It would also ensure that the sanctions regime was reshaped so as to bear down more effectively on Iraq's weapons programmes and military ambitions and less harshly on its long-suffering people. One would hope that a resolution of that nature could unite the international community, not divide it, as does the present debate about early military action against Iraq.

I should like to end a little closer to home. It has been suggested that the Prime Minister and the Government should be spending less time and effort on those overseas challenges; that in some way Britain is overreaching and overestimating its role in world affairs; that we should be giving absolute priority to our many pressing domestic challenges. I do not agree. Much of the comment seems to me shot through with traces of isolationism and little Englandism. It overlooks the fact that if middle-ranking powers such as Britain, which have global interests and global responsibilities, opt out, then we really will be in a unipolar world with the United States calling all the shots and the gap between them and their principal European allies, both in capability and in policy, steadily widening.

I believe that that would not be in our interest, nor in that of Europe, nor, for that matter, in that of the United States. So I welcome the lead the Government have given in the war against terrorism both in Afghanistan and more widely, and I would encourage them to continue to do so.

8.52 p.m.

Lord Eden of Winton

My Lords, the noble Lord. Lord Hannay, speaks with great authority based on his long experience. I hope that I may be able to pick up on one or two of his points during my remarks.

It is just over six months since the horrendous events of llth September. I am sure that all noble Lords will recollect the feelings that most people had in the days immediately following that tragic happening. I can remember how fearful we were. Whenever a plane flew overhead people almost instinctively looked up to see what it was. They were anxious about going to the top of tall buildings. There was a general nervousness and unease prevailing throughout, particularly in the City.

All that has gone. We have moved away from those events and even now, perhaps encouraged by the spring sunshine beginning to emerge, people are feeling lighter-hearted and at ease. But they would be wiser to take note of the decisions that have just been taken by the Government committing further troops to Afghanistan, and to ask themselves why this has to be so. As the noble Lord, Lord Desai, said, this is part of a continuing story. What we heard announced in relation to the Commando going to Afghanistan is an instalment. Many further announcements will follow.

However, one thing on which I hope there is unity in this House is that we all owe a great debt of gratitude to the United States of America. It is quite remarkable the way in which the people of America, with their leaders, naturally, responded with such resilience, unity, determination and clarity of purpose. Now that we are focusing on the wider picture of international or global terrorism, it may be more difficult to accept some of the decisions which need to be taken. It was easier to accept a response against Al'Qaeda and the Taliban in one country. But our attention—certainly that of the United States of America—is looking further afield to other countries.

Just across the border from Afghanistan is Pakistan. My noble friend Lord King mentioned the nature of the terrain with which we are all only too familiar. Like others I have been there, and I know how the mountainous region and tribal affinities straddle the frontier. There is no clear dividing line. People move from one side to the other and always have done. Pakistan is now the unwilling host to a large number of former Taliban and Al'Qaeda members.

1 ask the Minister—I do not seek an immediate answer—what support we are giving to Pakistan in their effort to control the activities of their own proTaliban elements? Many people in Pakistan, not least those who are being "educated" in the madrasalis, are in fact being fed ruthless propaganda in which the United States of America is featured as the enemy and we are classified with them.

Many of those countries—Pakistan is no exception—have a high proportion of young people. Two-and-a-half weeks ago I was lucky enough to be in the Gulf area and I visited Iran. They are a most delightful people: the nicest people one could wish to meet. One point I wish to make is that when we condemn states for their perceived or known activities inimical to our interests, we should recognise that we are attacking the rulers and not the people. The people of Iran are wholly delightful and want only one thing—to live a more open, freer life. They want to enjoy some of the things that we take for granted in the West. Many of those things are denied to them by the oppressive, almost tyrannical regime of the mullahs and ayatollahs.

Iran is not alone in having a government that is intent on supporting terrorist activities. It is an active financier of Terrorist groups in Palestine, as is Syria, and from time to time, inadvertently, Saudi Arabia. I know that Saudi Arabia sends considerable funds to Palestine. I hope that it will assist Palestine to try to gain control over the terrorist groups inside Palestine. Iran, Syria and others, pursue a programme of building up substantial capability in missile technology and development. I am referring to Scud-type operations and other weapons of that kind. Much of the technology comes from North Korea, which is a troublesome, rogue state. It is the cause of potential problems in Iran, Syria and, indeed, in Libya, where it supplies the equipment, know-how and technology for the forward development of missile technology. What is the purpose?

These countries were identified by President Bush in his State of the Union Address in January. He has been criticised for some of the words that he used—"the axis of evil", for example. That the rulers of those countries are evil there can be little doubt. They would certainly seem to be evil in intent if they are seeking access to weapons of mass destruction, such as Iraq has undoubtedly been doing.

The mistake was to group those countries together. Each country has its own agenda. They are not like-minded people; they have different objectives. Therefore, they need to be tackled independently and individually. The countries of the Gulf and the Arab countries generally are coming together in a conference in Beirut. It was of great value that Crow n Prince Abdullah put forward his proposition on a possible solution to the Arab-Israel dispute. It may not meet all the requirements but it forms a useful basis on which to develop further discussions and negotiations. It is encouraging coming from that source as the country has the influence and the resources to help bring about a settlement—at least to influence its fellow Arab countries.

Another country that needs to be influenced in the same direction is Israel. Its excessive retribution and response policy to suicide bombing is not helping to foster a solution. This has been going on for a long time and has not solved the problem at all. Nor does it solve the problem by continuing to build settlements on Arab-held land. It would be better if those settlements were withdrawn and a more moderate response shown. Israel should remind itself of the second part of the Balfour declaration of 1917 which, while favouring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, went on to say, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine". I am afraid that a lot has been done to prejudice those rights. I know that Israel is desperate to be assured of security for its own frontiers, and rightly so, but it will not achieve them that way. It will achieve them only by a negotiated settlement. I hope that Israel, too, will offer a positive response to Crown Prince Abdullah's initiative.

We are engaged in a long and sustained campaign against global terrorism. In answer to a question earlier today, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, said that Her Majesty's Government are prioritising measures—whatever that means—to address three types of situation: first, measures to prevent terrorists operating in areas where states lack the resources or skills to confront them; secondly, measures against states that promote and condone terrorism as a tool of foreign policy; and, thirdly, measures against sources of terrorist finance. When he replies, I hope that the Minister can put flesh on those bones and explain what those words mean. How, for example, are we going to act against states which promote and condone terrorism as a tool of foreign policy? That must include Iran, Syria, Libya and Iraq, and probably includes North Korea. What is meant by the Government now "prioritising measures" to act in that respect? If the noble Lord can help, then we will know the nature of the next stage of the fight against terrorism.

I end by supporting very strongly what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, said earlier on; namely, that here we are committing forces with reduced resources. I would hope that we have a Statement soon indicating that the Government are pledging additional resources to back up our military commitment, both with improved equipment and with improved intelligence.

9.9 p.m.

Lord Mitchell

My Lords, six months ago and in the shadow of 11th September, your Lordships were also discussing events in Afghanistan. Then the mood was very different. The fires in New York and Washington were still blazing. The death toll was uncertain. Stock markets had crashed. The world was in turmoil. There was much talk then that life would never be the same again.

President Bush rose to the occasion and found an eloquence and a sense of purpose that few of us thought he possessed. Our own Prime Minister seized the historic significance of the moment and pledged Britain's total support of the United States. Mr Blair said that we would stand shoulder to shoulder with America; and we have done so.

But there has been a darker side to all of this. First, we saw the famed Islamic street celebrating America's come-uppance. Since then, and to this day, opinion polls in Islamic lands have shown that over 60 per cent of Arabs believe that the atrocities of September llth were perpetrated not by Al'Qaeda but by the Mossad, the Israeli secret service.

Here in Europe, and often sotto voce, there were those who said that America had it coming. Even in our own midst there was the sickening gloating from some that the "Great Satan" had been brought to its knees. Who can forget our own shame when the US ambassador was reduced to tears on BBC television when the anti-American rent-a-mob set upon him in the immediate aftermath of the September tragedy?

I recall the defeatism that was at large among much of the media and certain politicians, even within your Lordships' House. I remember what they said: that there was no proof; that America is trigger-happy and obsessed by bin Laden; that wars cannot be won in Afghanistan; and, worst of all, that we were bound to lose.

We heard similar arguments before we took action in Kosovo and Bosnia. Yet who can deny that those lands are happier now that Milosevic has gone? We heard the same before the Gulf War, but who can deny that Kuwait is a better country with its independence restored? We heard the same during the 40 years of the Cold War, but who can deny that the former communist states are beginning to enjoy freedom and prosperity? Before my lifetime the world heard the same in the late 1930s, but who would dare deny that the world became a better place after the defeat of the Third Reich?

I simply fail to understand those people who cannot see a tyrant when he stares them in the face. They believe that all one has to do is to be nice to the bin Ladens, the Milosovics, the Saddams, the Stalins or the Hitlers of this world and that sweet reason will prevail. Appeasement is a one-way street.

In the Gulf War we set ourselves one target—to free Kuwait. We should have set another—to get rid of Saddam Hussein. Today we are paying the price. If tomorrow morning on the "Today" programme the announcer were to say, "Reports are coming in that Iraq has successfully tested a nuclear weapon", would your Lordships be "very surprised", "slightly surprised" or "not at all surprised"? Speaking for myself, I should be not at all surprised. I fully expect it.

Then what? We can all be certain that our friend in Baghdad has not expended so much effort to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction simply for passive defence. If one builds a bicycle, one does not use it to weigh butter.

This is the man who gassed 20,000 of his own people. This is the man who declared war on Iran and Kuwait. This is the man of super gun fame. This is the man who even now pays 10,000 dollars as a special bonus to the families of every successful Palestinian suicide bomber on his or her heinous journey to eternity. This man is pure evil and wishes us more than ill; he wishes us dead. On the basis of his past behaviour and what our intelligence service is probably telling us, we must take pre-emptive action. If we do not, then his scientists will continue to build those weapons, which he will undoubtedly use against us.

There remains one further reason why action against Saddam is to be considered. There is a link between Saddam and bin Laden that many seek to deny. There is little doubt that in April 2001 a meeting took place in Prague between Mohamed Atta, the leading Al'Qaeda hijacker, and Ahmed al-Ani, the Israeli consul in Prague who was Saddam's intelligence case officer there. Atta had flown 7,000 miles from Florida to Prague and back again for a one-day meeting, the third time he had visited Prague that year. Not quite a smoking gun, but evidence enough to suggest more than a casual connection.

Finally, let me turn to the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Noble Lords may know that I am a supporter of Israel but no friend of its present Prime Minister. In my view, he is a man who employs the subtlety of a bulldozer. The tragedy is that Mr Arafat, too, is devoid of any policy that envisages compromise. He is a man whose whole life has been the promotion of terrorism and who even now, in the twilight of his years, refuses to countenance any outcome other than total victory. Two old men, cursed by their personal history, without an initiative between them.

This coming Wednesday is the Jewish festival of Pesach, the Passover. The celebration of the exodus from Egypt of the children of Israel; the 10 plagues; the crossing of the Red Sea; the giving of the Torah by God to the Jewish people and the founding of the biblical state of Israel.

Moses went to Pharaoh and said, "Thus sayeth the Lord, let My people go so that they may worship Me". It was the original cry for freedom of an enslaved people, a cry that has echoed throughout the ages. No Jew should read this story as we do and not draw the parallel with today's Palestinians and their yearning for a state of their own.

On the very same day of Passover, the Arab League will be holding their summit in Beirut. There, the Saudi, Prince Abdullah, is expected to announce a ground-breaking initiative: that all 22 Arab states, acting in concert, will offer Israel total and secure peace as well as full recognition and a normalisation of relations. I say "normalisation" and not just normal relations. In return. Israel will agree to withdraw to the borders that existed on 6th June 1967. This is not a new offer, but coming from the Saudis at this crucial time it is of major significance. The Israelis will be suspicious, the Palestinians will sense a sell-out, but it is the only game in town and it can be made to work.

Every year for 3,000 years the Jews have recited the Passover service around the family table. The final four words of that service are "Next year in Jerusalem". That has always been the dream of the Jewish people. Today, they are in Jerusalem but they have no peace. That is ironic, when the Hebrew for Jerusalem is "Yerushalayim", literally translated as "The City of Peace". After all this suffering perhaps the time has come for Israelis and Palestinians to share that family table and to turn the city of war into the city of peace for ever.

9.17 p.m.

Baroness Park of Monmouth

My Lords, might I say to the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, that I believe he meant to say that the meeting was with the Iraqi attaché in Prague. He said the Israeli. I believe that the noble Lord would wish to have that corrected in Hansard. I thought I would mention it now.

Lord Mitchell

Thank you very much.

Baroness Park of Monmouth

My Lords, other noble Lords have spoken far better than I could do about the strictly military problems of overstretch; of the long lines of communication, especially in view of the emerging difficulties over access for our troops through Pakistan; of whether the troops will have the right equipment when they need it and whether the sad lesson of the Gulf War veterans has been learnt so that the right preventive health measures are applied this time.

There is also the vital issue of enough money for training now and not in the distant future. I expect, too, that most of us, while accepting that we have a long history of effective and friendly co-operation with the Americans, are a little uneasy about some issues of command and control, especially in such a high technology-dominated conflict.

On overstretch, I wish to ask one question which is relevant to but not about Afghanistan. That is the prospect of rival claims on our limited military power where the immediate political dividend rather than our direct defence interest is in question. We are, I believe, being pressed by our European allies to support their proposal to launch the new rapid reaction force on its first military adventure at the very time when we are rightly committing a significant military force as a firm and effective ally of the United States in Afghanistan and in the fight against terrorism, which itself a threat to the United Kingdom.

The EU, however, is pushing for a new military force in Macedonia to succeed the NATO presence later this year. Because we are separating two hostile groups, this would be at the higher end of the Petersburg tasks at a time when the force could not possibly be described as ready in terms of capabilities and would require NATO assets. It is reported that NATO is not prepared to provide these, particularly given the continuing problems with both Turkey and Greece.

Whatever the political dividend (and firm support for NATO would also carry that) I hope that we can be assured that, given the glaring capability gap and our other major commitments, Her Majesty's Government will listen to the military argument against British participation should the proposal be pressed further by the European leaders.

I have a different concern: the environment in which our troops will be fighting in Afghanistan and the implications of asymmetric warfare and of w hat are now called information operations. As several noble Lords have said, our troops will not be fighting a clearly defined enemy, a rival national army. It will not be like the Falklands or the Gulf War. It will be much more like fighting the Communists in Malaysia—a long war of attrition that we won only when General Templer devised a way to protect people in the villages.

The international stability force was specifically asked for and is doing a splendid job, as are the troops undertaking mine clearing at Kabul airport. But Operation Veritas is different. In principle, the Afghans recognise the need for stability and, in principle, their powerful neighbours, Pakistan and Iran, shared the view that, as Mr Brahimi has said: the international community should help the Afghans to find a political solution on their own, because only such a home-grown solution would be credible, legitimate and sustainable". At the Bonn conference, all the warring parties agreed on an emergency Loya Jirgah by June this year to set up a transitional authority to rule the country until a constitutional Loya Jirgah can meet 18 months after that, at the end of 2003 or even in 2004. Meanwhile, however, the whole structure, so far as it exists at all, is fragile. Pathans, once supporters of the Taliban, and their rivals, the Northern Alliance of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, all have then local factions, all still armed, and Al'Qaeda sleepers, as well as those who continue to fight, will be among them.

The participants in the Bonn conference, who were not necessarily plenipotentiaries anyway, declared that they were, conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning". It does take time. We must recognise that our troops will be fighting guerrillas and that the people will sometimes be allied with us and sometimes with them.

A member of the former Indian civil service who served on the north-west frontier once said of the Afghans that they did not in the least want us to "civilise" them and so do not expect that that rejection of foreigners has changed. As General Sir Mike Jackson once told the Defence Select Committee, speaking of operations in Kosovo: You are actually operating amongst people's perceptions, people's attitudes. That is your operational arena, not a piece of ground with a conventional enemy". He was speaking of what might be called a psychological battle space in a peacekeeping operation. The trouble is that our troops will be fighting a tough shooting war with a strong element of potential local treachery to complicate it in just such an operational arena, side by side with a massive humanitarian operation. There will be real practical difficulties of communication with the people. With all their gifts, I do not expect that many marines speak Pashtun.

If anyone can do the job, they can, but the stress will be proportionately greater than in a series of short, sharp engagements in battle. Hence it is extremely important that they, their families and the public know, if possible, for how long that commitment is to last, and what is their required target. The timescale set out hopefully in Bonn can mean only that internal war between the factions, especially in the absence of a central government, could continue at least until 2004. That must mean rotation of troops, given the harsh conditions and the demands of asymmetrical guerrilla warfare. It will also demand more, not less, training and plenty of that vital commodity, good intelligence. We may indeed not be able to set a term. We have a moving target, and a most difficult one, but in that case we must sustain the full support that the troops need for as long as it is needed.

The Northern Alliance has its own agenda; so too, no doubt, do the Russians. We and the Americans went there to eliminate Al'Qaeda, or at least to deprive it of its base, and only incidentally to end a harsh regime. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, said, like the IRA, which was able to continue its guerrilla war from a friendly base in Ireland, those terrorists can either melt into the villages or withdraw covertly to Pakistan, whether Pakistan likes it or not, over a long frontier to regroup and, as one soldier recently said, simply commute to war. Excellent as human intelligence usually is, the conditions make it difficult to obtain in timely fashion so that the troops may be warned of the incursions.

Our troops will be fighting a new kind of war, which could last for years. It is essential that defence should be given the highest budgetary priority. The troops must not be fobbed off with inadequate equipment, and they must be properly rotated. One of the prime causes of the failure to retain good soldiers in recent years is the number of unaccompanied tours that most of the forces now serve, during which troops never see their family. Above all, the troops must know that they are at least as important to the country as good railways and good education.

High morale is one of the best smart weapons that we can offer our troops; exacting a compulsory annual saving of 3 per cent on an already overstretched and inadequate budget, so that even vital training exercises must be cut, is not. We are at war: someone must tell the Chancellor.

9.26 p.m.

The Earl of Sandwich

My Lords, in the past two decades, Afghanistan has seen human suffering and endurance on a scale that none of us can imagine. Its people, although used to deprivation, have reason to expect the help that has been denied them for so long.

The successful US-led military campaign that drove out the Taliban last year has not brought peace but it has given the country a breathing space. Food security, as has been said, has been greatly improved. Many displaced Afghani families have returned home from Pakistan and Iran, and the aid agencies have been able to resume their development and relief programmes. It is difficult to estimate the number of people who are still in need in the conflict zones. About 700,000 are known to be vulnerable, as they are without shelter or regular access to food and live in areas beyond the reach of the UN agencies.

As my noble friend Lord Hannay of Chiswick said, famine has been averted, but some people in remote mountain villages have had no supplies for months and are still waiting. Poverty, especially the lack of food and drinking water, has continued to cause malnutrition and ill health. There are not enough blankets or clothes for the displaced. The Afghan Government's capacity even to meet the basic needs of children and the elderly is weak or virtually nonexistent. That means that the country will need international aid for some time to come.

The ISAF has been an outstanding example of international co-operation. It has brought stability and security to the capital city and the roads outside, although not to other parts of the country. That was pointed out in detail a month ago by members of the Select Committee on International Development in another place. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, referred to that.

According to some reports, insecurity outside Kabul is not declining but increasing. There are still restrictions on the travel of agency staff. Although the areas surrounding the major Northern Alliance-controlled towns, such as Mazar-i Sharif and Herat, are relatively safe, travel south of Kandahar and east towards Jalalabad is undertaken only at great risk. As in Bosnia, aid agencies must operate in dangerous conditions. They pass through checkpoints controlled by the different warlords; their vehicles are sometimes the target of bandit attacks or shootings. One aid worker told me this week that the neutrality that should guarantee the safety of NGOs is almost impossible to achieve. He said that effectively they had to be friends with no one.

In those conditions, which are in some respects arguably worse in some areas than under the Taliban, neither the peacekeeping troops nor the coalition forces have played—or perhaps can play—any useful part. The continuing battle with the so-called Al'Qaeda remnants has not brought stability to those areas, rather the contrary. My noble friend Lord Hannay of Chiswick mentioned the frailty of the interim authority. The hostilities between rival Pashtun factions inevitably divide the population and create local suspicion of all outside forces, whether they are aid staff or military.

The introduction of additional troops from the UK will of course be welcome, not only to the US, who requested them, but to all Afghans who wish to see Al'Qaeda routed and the roads made safe. However, these troops are not there to help local people. Instead of air strikes with defined objectives, there will be a long-term anti-terrorist campaign in the mountains, as the noble Lord, Lord Howell, and many others have said—with uncertain results. Such a prolongation of the civil war is therefore unlikely to command support from or con tribute to the welfare of the population.

The situation in Kabul is different. ISAF has been very well received by the international community. Some excellent reconstruction work is going on, from police training and the civil service to rehabilitation of roads, buildings and services. The UN agencies, as the noble Baroness described, have made great strides in education and women's participation. Our own DfID has just published figures for mine clearance, showing that over £3 million has gone from us to the United Nations and NGOs like Halo Trust and the Mines Advisory Group in Afghanistan alone.

The public here can hardly appreciate the dangers constantly facing the staff of these organisations, trying to restore something close to normal life. In addition, the de-miners now have to cope with thousands of unexploded bomblets dropped from US aircraft.

In previous campaigns in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor there have been examples of successful involvement of the military in humanitarian work; for example, in the building of emergency shelters for refugees in Macedonia. This might suggest a more active role for peacekeepers in the protection of aid convoys and humanitarian projects in Afghanistan. However, as has been said, there are grave risks in associating aid workers and peacekeeping troops too closely in Afghanistan, especially when those troops are from countries still engaged in armed conflict inside the country.

The NGO Forum in Kabul, which is represented here by the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, issued a statement earlier this month that confusion is being created in the minds of civilians by some armed coalition soldiers who apparently have been taking part in civil operations but dressing and behaving like the staff of aid agencies. Ministers will be aware that local and international NGOs feel that their independence and impartiality will he seriously compromised unless a clear distinction is made. This is an issue about which the NGOs feel very strongly and any reassurance the Minister can give tonight will be welcome.

On the issue of civilian casualties during the war against the Taliban/Al'Qaeda, I have still not received a comprehensive reply from the Government after five months. The noble Lord knows from a conversation we have had that I received two belated Written Answers from the MoD on 12th March which express regret for casualties but still do not acknowledge the reports from reliable sources of the significant numbers of civilian casualties.

For example, a report from UNOCHA, which is the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on 11th March suggested that the numbers killed after 7th October could have been more than 1,000 and as high as 1,500 people. This is a figure which comes close to one-third of the numbers lost on September 11th. While I make absolutely no direct comparison between these figures, which are unrelated, they do nevertheless suggest that the war has not been as tidy an operation as is generally understood in this country. While damage to infrastructure is to some extent compensated by reconstruction, there is no current US plan to reimburse any of the families who are victims—perhaps the Minister will confirm this—families who have suffered losses, or even to acknowledge that such losses have occurred.

If the anti-terrorism campaign involving our troops in one form or another is to be seen not just as a reaction to the events of September 11th but as part of a long-term programme to benefit the people of Afghanistan, it is essential that we demonstrate the actual benefits on the ground. On the one hand, we must provide the unambiguous security which the civilians need to return to normal life, while on the other hand we must not contribute further to the devastation of war through any violent acts against the population. More than that, we have to show that we are on the side of ordinary people in the campaign against terrorism.

There are many issues that concern Afghanis which go beyond the civil war in Afghanistan itself. For example, the ability of the United States to make any real difference to the Middle East peace process is seriously in question, despite the hopes expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, and the noble Lord, Lord Eden, whom I have known for a long time. Our associations with Israel through trade and family ties place us, in Arab eyes, firmly in the US-Israel camp, so that not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also throughout the Middle East, in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, people are watching to learn our true motivation in prolonging and extending the fight against Al'Qaeda and the Taliban, and perhaps even against Iraq.

I personally welcome the arrival of the first of the 1,700 Marines in Bagram in preparation for the next phase of the campaign, so long as the fears of my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig about expenditure can be allayed. Having years ago driven through Afghanistan and having recently re-read King—of the Khyber Rifles, which I am sure noble Lords will know, I am well aware of the considerable problems of logistics and intelligence soldiers will have to face, even with the most up-to-date equipment. Recent news clips of the US special forces peering anxiously into rock crevices did not give viewers much confidence during Operation Anaconda. The Karzai administration will be relieved that a much more highly experienced force is to strengthen the Americans. It is comforting to learn that they are also to have air support.

However, there is another dimension, as the noble Lord, Lord King, pointed out. We have to remember that the coalition against terrorism must go well beyond the destruction of the remnants of Al'Qaeda into a hearts and minds campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That means clear political and diplomatic objectives to ensure the widest possible coalition, as my noble friend Lord Hannay said so well. We must show the countries attending the Arab summit this week, our friends and allies, that we are not simply picking off terrorists but that we are concerned with sustainable development, justice and human rights in all the countries in which terrorism, for one reason or other, continues to thrive.

9.38 p.m.

Lord Rogan

My Lords, I am conscious of the fact that I am not a military man and, indeed, that I have no military experience. As such I am very aware that there are many noble and gallant Lords who are much better equipped to speak in this debate than I. However, I have decided to speak today for those very reasons. The ongoing shrinkage of our Armed Forces has meant that fewer and fewer people in the United Kingdom have regular and direct contact with the military. It is worrying how civil society is beginning to view our Armed Forces. This evening I hope to be able to raise some of the concerns currently being felt by them.

As I said in your Lordships' House last week, I support the Government's decision to order the additional deployment of troops in Afghanistan. Such decisions are never easy, but in this case I believe that the Government have done the right thing. As I also said last week, I was fortunate enough recently to spend time with 45 Commando, Royal Marines, while they were on exercise in Oman. I was very impressed with what I saw. I have no doubt that they will succeed in any task laid before them.

I have always been of the view that once our troops have been sent into battle it is morally incumbent upon us all to back them. Things are difficult enough for those brave men and women without them being made to feel that their own nation is not behind their actions. However, we can only believe ourselves to be offering effective support if we also ask probing questions of the Government—questions which, I am sure, will be running through the minds of some of our troops, and their families, as they prepare to make their journey into theatre.

One question that has cropped up time and time again in relation to this deployment is: how long will it last? Also, has a coherent exit strategy been formulated? Yesterday, we were treated to a procession of Cabinet Ministers appearing on our television screens to provide their views on these and other matters related to the deployment. Their words did little to reassure me.

Speaking on one such programme, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Straw, said of the deployment that, You cannot say for certain how long it's going to last". On another programme, the Defence Secretary, Mr Hoon, said that British troops would remain in Afghanistan, for as long as their military leaders judge that they can do an effective job". I regard this as a somewhat bizarre statement, to say the least. Since when did our soldiers ever do anything other than an "effective job"? Indeed, if one was to take Mr Hoon's words at face value, he could be accused of time-limiting the deployment merely to infinity. I do not think that this situation is sustainable. More clarity is essential.

Mr Hoon said something else yesterday which troubled me. When asked about the future he said: If it is necessary for us to deploy further forces, if the military advice says that it is something that should happen, then obviously we will do that". It is the phrase "military advice" that worries me. Military advice from whom? British military advice or American military advice? I sincerely hope that it is British military advice that is dictating the British commitment.

While I have the utmost respect for all those in command of the allied forces in Afghanistan, I am more than a little uncomfortable with the idea of our Government giving another nation a blank cheque to use British forces in any way, and for as long as it wants.

My anxiety increased yesterday when I read a newspaper report that the MoD had warned the Prime Minister to expect 80 casualties as a result of this deployment, including 20 deaths. This information puts the gravity of the situation very sharply into perspective. We have been warned for some time of the likelihood of our forces taking casualties. However, in these days of precision warfare, an understandable level of complacency has crept into too many minds. But casualties are what we must unfortunately prepare for as precision warfare is not what this deployment is all about. It is, in all probability, about hand-to-hand fighting. Such a scenario makes for unfortunate outcomes and, inevitably, casualties. I hope very much that the Government—and, of course, the general public—are ready for this.

Of great relevance to the matter we are debating is the state of our Armed Forces in general, particularly with regard to their overall strength and, of course, their financing. I am sure that I am not alone in being alarmed at some of the information that has leaked out to the media in recent weeks about the shortfalls in our Armed Forces. For example, the Army is supposedly currently estimated to be short of more than 6,000 soldiers. I understand that across all three services the deficit is more than 9,000. These statistics are said to be the result of a lack of suitable recruits and of the difficulty of retaining trained personnel, who opt to leave the services earlier than expected. This trend is deeply worrying.

Of similar concern is the apparent lack of funding being made available by the Treasury to the Ministry of Defence. Reports have estimated the current under-funding of the defence budget to be in the region of some £500 million. It is said that, as a result, the Army is being forced to slice its garrison in Kosovo by some 75 per cent. It is also seeking to withdraw its troops from Bosnia. Furthermore, we have heard reports that the MoD has been forced to borrow hundreds of millions of pounds from next year's budget to stave off more trimming. That is hardly the perfect backdrop against which to send our troops into battle in Afghanistan.

In conclusion, following the events of 11 th September, the Government committed the United Kingdom to playing its full part in the so-called war against global terror. I fully support that decision—as did almost all, if not all, of your Lordships. However, while our troops are now being prepared to play an even greater role in that war, the Government continue to seek to find a way to grant an amnesty for terrorists on the run from the security forces in Northern Ireland. What difference is there between these men and the equally evil men associated with Al'Qaeda and the Taliban? I see no difference. I am sure that your Lordships see no difference. I therefore urge the Government to think again on this most serious of matters, lest they wish to risk incurring your Lordships' wrath.

9.48 p.m.

Lord Hardy of Wath

My Lords, at this stage of the debate—and a very interesting one it has been—one is tempted to follow a number of points that have already been raised. I mention in particular the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, to which I listened with great interest. I hope my noble friend will ensure that Her Majesty's Government take note of the suggestions that he made. I was particularly pleased by the reference he made to the need to maintain international interest.

That reminded me of an interview during my trip with the Foreign Secretary to Namibia in the late 1970s. A journalist asked: "Do you think you are wasting your time here?". I said, "No". I was then asked: "Where would you he if you were not here?". I said, "Probably, since it is a Saturday morning, doing my surgery". The next question was: "Do you think your constituents like you being here instead of at the surgery?". I said, "I should hope so. My constituency contains a very important part of the British engineering steel industry. To make steel, we need to add tungsten, vanadium, molybdenum, manganese, and a whole variety of metals because we are a trading nation".

There is another reason why we should be interested. I read in the press yesterday that the United Kingdom received more telephone calls from Mr bin Laden than anyone else. That is not surprising, given the international nature of British life and business. But if we are to be a prosperous state, we have to be internationally minded—and, if we are, we have to accept that the terrorism experience of 1lth September and before then requires the United Kingdom and any other right-thinking state to be fully involved in the effort to counter it; indeed, to make sure that no state is prepared to host it ever again. Some of us have expressed regret over a long time about the capacity of some of our partner states to maintain adequate defence capacity. I hope that they are learning that lesson more clearly today.

Terrorism is a symptom as well as a condition that we find unacceptable. The symptom is serious and has to be rooted out. Any young Muslim who requires motivation about injustice in the world can easily have his attention turned to Israel. I am not anti-Semitic. I recognise that the Israeli state must exist and that it should have adequate international guarantees. However, I find it difficult when land for peace is spurned and when the conditions cause young Palestinian extremists to act in stupid, violent and horrifying ways, commanding a stupid, horrifying response from Mr Sharon. For America and Sharon then to demand that Arafat should control the young Palestinians is asking far too much. I hope that sooner or later the Americans—who perhaps have now begun to regret the support that they gave to terrorism across the Irish Sea—will realise that they have to take a more mature and vigorous approach to resolving the Palestinian-Israeli problem, because if they do not do so, it merely provides fertile sustenance to the cause of terror and more symptoms will raise their heads.

However, our debate is about Afghanistan. I am sure that the quality of our troops to be engaged in the mountains of Afghanistan will be very high. The contribution of the paratroops and other units involved in peacekeeping and society engendering activities in Afghanistan to date has been most commendable. However, they cannot be there for ever. They will have to be replaced. I am sure that the Turkish army, which is a formidable organisation, will provide adequate leadership when it replaces our own. However, we have to try to ensure that the quality of forces that go from other countries is adequate. It has not always been so in former Yugoslavia.

Our troops are of high quality. While I am delighted that there is cross-party and across the board support and high regard for our military forces serving in Afghanistan, I detected the odd note of criticism of the Government's provision and record. I have been interested in defence for a long time. I recall the Falklands War. I was among the Members of Parliament who expressed opposition to the removal of HMS "Endurance", which sent a clear signal to Mr Galtieri. If he had been sensible enough to wait for a few weeks until a few more Royal Navy ships had been decommissioned or sold off, the adventure to the Falklands would have been greatly in peril.

I also recall the Gulf War. I attended a gathering addressed by the American general who commanded the coalition forces in the Gulf. He told us that the one essential contribution that he needed from the United Kingdom was the Tornado bomber, using the JP23 airfield denial weapon. That was regarded as essential, because Iraq had 600-odd combat aircraft. If they had been flown with resolution at the beginning of the Gulf War, a great deal of damage could have been done.

However, the Ministry of Defence then realised that the Tornados had been designed for Germany and not for the Gulf and could not fly without the addition of a capacitator. I have no idea what a capacitator is. I understand that the Ministry of Defence was advised that there would probably be a 15-week delay in delivery and a cost of £15,000 per capacitator. At that time, the Government were eager to privatise. They did not seem keen on the argument that the services should be intelligent customers.

I went to RAF Sealand and met a man called Wilkinson and his five friends. They gave up their free time that weekend and made the capacitators for £108 each. The Tornados were able to fly to the Gulf, and the Iraqi air force got the message and flew off to Iraq.

The government of 1991 may have been sailing closer to the wind than the current Government. When the Government took office, we had to survive several years of attack and derision because of the policy that led to SDR. That policy has been extremely successful, and one hopes that the new chapter also will be relevant and successful. We have heard about inadequacies, but, in 1997, the Government inherited not only a rifle that everyone said was unsatisfactory, but the Bowman military communications system, which would have been a tragedy if it were not a farce. Since 1997, we have seen the Eurofighter going ahead and the lease of the C-17—which is a most impressive aircraft. The noble Baroness, Lady Strange, was with us the other day when we visited that cavernous form of transport. Furthermore, the Tornado, the Jaguar and the Harrier have all been upgraded, and a commitment has been made to JSF. There are new weapons for the air force and new ships for the navy.

There is a military recruitment problem, but it has arisen when unemployment levels are low and recruitment is much more difficult. Indeed, employment levels are higher now than they were when there was a similar problem 15, 10 and even five years ago. The problems in infantry recruitment have to be dealt with. We must also ensure that there are enough pilots. However, it is rather a disgrace that some of those proclaiming themselves to be British and running aeroplanes which sometimes have the flag of our nation on them spend their time poaching pilots because they have not taken the trouble to invest in training themselves. The same goes for those who seek to poach professionals in, for example, the Royal Corps of Signals. It might be crude to say so, but I do not think that anyone who poaches like that should ever be on the Honours List or given tickets for the garden party. I think that a little social disapproval should be used to encourage them to mend their ways, rather than for people to heap odium upon the heads of the Government.

There are problems. As noble Lords have said, our troops will be fighting at 20,000 feet. I hope that they will have a very considerable period to ensure that they are acclimatised. I was glad to have the assurance that there will be proper communications and that our troops will work very closely with the Americans. That is not only good but essential. We do not want any more friendly fire casualties. A few weeks ago, I saw the "Panorama" programme about the Parachute Regiment's conditions in Kabul. They were far from being rich in creature comforts. If those conditions continue, perhaps we should spend a little more to improve conditions for the marines when they come back for a break from their mountain fighting.

I am not criticising the meals that they are receiving. The other day, with one or two other noble Lords, I had a field-meal cooked by Gurkhas which was absolutely delicious. Many hotels and restaurants in London would charge a great deal for that type of food and people would be daft enough to pay it. It was a very enjoyable meal. I hope that the marines and the paras and those who will replace them have at least the variety that was enjoyed by the chief of staff when he called there and a mobile kitchen was flown in. I am not sure that the chief of staff himself requested that; I met him and hold him in high regard. However, we have to ensure that the troops are properly prepared and conditioned, and that their conditions on breaks from fighting are reassuring and provide them with the comforts they need.

We are entitled to go, and I think that we are morally obliged to go. It would be foolish for people to argue that a time limit should be imposed. However, they may do so because, as noble Lords may recall, time limits were demanded and imposed on last year's Macedonian venture. People said that it was ridiculous to send our troops to Macedonia, but they went. They are very good people. We were told, although it was derided, that they would do the job in 30 or 31 days and it was done in 30 or 31 days. A civil war, which was a real risk, was prevented at the cost of one life, a former constituent of mine. One life was a difficult price to pay to ensure that peace was given a chance.

Some lives may be lost in Afghanistan, but one hopes not. If lives are lost, Afghanistan may be given a chance. At the same time we have to ensure that there is an understanding that the Afghan problem is part of an international one and that an international effort is required.

10 p.m.

Lord Marlesford

My Lords, I suspect we all agree that the United States holds the key to what happens in the coming months and years. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, pointed out, the United States has virtually a world monopoly on military power. Of itself, that is not enough. The war against terrorism is not like other wars. Yes, it has a military dimension, but that dimension is merely a part of the struggle. It is important that we should understand, as far as possible, how the Americans are thinking.

Since 9/11, I have had three opportunities to visit the United States. In October I went to New York and Minneapolis; in January I went to San Francisco; and in February I went to southern California. I admit that primarily the people to whom I spoke were from the financial world, which is a limited section of the American community, although an articulate and well-informed one.

My first conclusion was that for all its hideous scale, 9/11 was far more traumatic for the United States than terrorism has become for Europe. In a sense, we have almost become desensitised to it. Terrorism to us is like being mugged or burgled. It has been taking place for 30 years or so. To the Americans it was like the members of their families being individually raped. Yet in Europe terrorism continues, which illustrates how difficult it is to solve the problem once and for all. How many would have believed that the Red Brigade, of which we have heard little for some while—perhaps since it reached its peak in 1978 when they killed the Italian Prime Minister, Moro—would re-emerge, as it did only last week, when it killed an unfortunate professor.

The Americans are totally united and determined to fight terrorism without concession. There is also a new readiness in the United States to accept casualties, whereas previously that was not the case. I heard from a number of people that they are convinced that they will be subjected to another major attack this year, probably a biological attack. I heard a great deal about the means of making such an attack: by smallpox, which is described as the Lion King of infectious diseases; by anthrax, a tablespoonful of which, properly distributed, will kill tens of millions of people; by botulism: and by other products.

The tragic irony is that we all thought that smallpox had been eliminated in 1976. It now turns out that in the dying days of the Soviet Union the smallpox virus was being produced by the tens of metric tonnes—probably unknown to the Gorbachev government. There is some evidence that the first information they received about what was happening was from western intelligence sources. In a terrifying way, it was a state within a state.

To emphasise how seriously the Americans take that threat, I can tell those noble Lords who do not know already—I did not know until recently—that the United States Government have ordered 280 million doses of anti-smallpox vaccine to be delivered by the middle of next year; and they hope that it will arrive in time.

A second point which disturbed me deeply was their complete determination to take out Saddam Hussein by any means. I would have no problem with taking him out. It is not a moral problem for me. But how to do that? As we read widely in the press, they are seriously planning a full frontal attack probably involving at least 200,000 troops. That is not "doable". In that form, it would be deeply counterproductive. At the same time, I found it depressing that they did not appear to be willing to drain the reservoirs of hatred from which terrorism has emerged. The most obvious of those reservoirs is the Israeli-Palestinian area. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, and others that a dramatic and radical solution is needed; that Israel must withdraw to its 1967 frontiers. But as part of that equation, there must be a complete international guarantee of the state of Israel and the state of the new Palestine about which the American Administration is beginning to talk. Equally, I have heard Americans saying that to use their undoubted power to impose a solution on Israel would be a betrayal of Israel. That is a frightening and chilling thought.

Perhaps I may speak about Afghanistan. I was proud but not surprised that our military help has been requested to form the tip of the spear to fight the remaining elements of the terrorist organisations in Afghanistan. But I want to focus on the cost of those military operations and how they should be funded. Perhaps I may remind noble Lords that the total cost of the Gulf War was something like £2.5 billion. Of that, some £2 billion was collected from the states which benefited from our action. We are not fighting in Afghanistan for our own advantage. It is no part of some imperial legacy, heritage or memory. We are part of a coalition. I was deeply concerned and disturbed to hear the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, describe some of the down-sizing and reduction of capability which at this moment is taking place among our military forces. Fortunately, those matters have a long lead time and plans can be put on hold, which may become necessary. However, we need to take a new approach to the funding of these kinds of operations and at least emphasise that they are not national but international operations being carried out by the world in order to retain civilisation.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was absolutely right when he said that we should focus particularly on the United Nations as the authority that probably has more support and credibility than any other single organisation in the world. Article 51 of the UN, which is quoted endlessly, provides that nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. We should make the fullest use of the legitimacy given by resolutions of the Security Council. As I have emphasised many times previously, one of the great assets of this country is that it is one of the five veto members of the Security Council. Let us hope that that will continue indefinitely.

Let us remember that there are many examples of the importance of having a reserve capability in order to undertake warfare. An obvious example from my childhood days, which as children we all read about, is Montgomery at Alamein. The new theatre operations were hugely successful, largely because he insisted that first there should be the fullest back-up necessary to sustain the operations.

I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us about the sustainability of what we are being asked and have agreed to do in Afghanistan and perhaps will also tell us a little about how and by whom it is to be paid for.

10.12 p.m.

Baroness Strange

My Lords, I apologise for speaking in the gap. Having been unable to attend the briefing of my noble friend the Minister last week, I had decided not to speak. However, in church yesterday, Palm Sunday, we prayed for 45 Commando, whose headquarters is at Arbroath and of whose mess my husband is an honorary member. I therefore felt that I had to voice a word of support and encouragement. Unfortunately, my plane from Dundee this morning was 20 minutes late and, alas, the speakers' list had already closed. That is why I now speak briefly and with many apologies.

At present, as far as I know, some of 45 Commando are stuck on HMS "Ocean", the helicopter carrier with six 105 millimetre guns, off the coast of Pakistan. There could he difficulties in landing such a force in Pakistan. However, one Tristar of logistics flew into Kabul yesterday. Only a fortnight ago some members of the defence study group talked to the pilots and engineers of 219 Squadron, who run the Tristars from Brize Norton. It therefore felt somewhat personal.

What worries me is the open-ended nature of the commitment. My noble friend the Minister mentioned a period of three months. Yesterday the right honourable Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, said "not very long", and comparisons have been made between Sierra Leone and Vietnam. But how long is "not very long" or a piece of string? The right honourable Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence, is less optimistic. There has been talk of Al'Qaeda and the Taliban regrouping and a pitched battle. There has been talk of possible casualties. Of course, any military commitment is dangerous; so is crossing the road between buses; so even is walking down the pavement at speed—I came a cropper last week.

Here I have to declare an interest. As president of the War Widows Association of Great Britain, I love all my ladies. But I do not want there to be any more. On the front page of one of the papers this morning was a beautiful picture of a golden dog with a pink nose sitting among daffodils. It reminded me strongly of a picture we had of an old basset hound of ours called Comfort. I gave it to Mother McKee, a nun who taught my daughter, because she said it reminded her of Our Lady's dog. I asked, "Did Our Lady have a dog?" She replied, "Probably not, but if she had it would have been like Comfort".

The dog today is a dog of war called Tiger, and he has been brought safely home from an old wine factory in Kabul. Our thoughts and prayers are with our forces in Afghanistan and I am hoping that soon—and by "soon" I mean a very short piece of string indeed—they too will he coming home.

10.16 p.m.

Lord Roper

My Lords, this has been a valuable debate, even if it is ending at a later hour than some of us, and indeed some of those awaiting the next debate, anticipated.

The concept of a "loyal Opposition" becomes very relevant at a moment like this. On the one hand on these Benches we accept the commitment to provide forces to complete the defeat of the Taliban and Al'Qaeda in Afghanistan. We share the Prime Minister's view expressed at the beginning of the campaign that we are not going to walk away from Afghanistan. We also accept the view that 45 Commando Royal Marines are superbly well qualified for that task. They are trained for Arctic and mountain warfare, and those of us who have seen the training of 3 Commando brigade in Norway know how impressive they are.

But as a loyal Opposition, when we are accepting the Government's legitimate decision to put our excellent Armed Forces into harm's way, we have a responsibility to ask questions about the conditions of that deployment, as was said by the noble Lord. Lord Rogan, earlier this evening. I have six questions that I should like to leave with the Minister for his reply.

First, I read with interest the views which the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Boyce, made in his lecture just before Christmas. I should like to quote two sentences, but the whole of those remarks bear reading. He said: Whatever the choices we make, and for whatever reason, we must ensure that those decisions maintain our freedom of strategic choice; but we will have to decide soon whether we make a commitment to a broader campaign (widening the war), or make a longer term commitment to Afghanistan. Recent military success must be capitalised upon, so it is not a question of whether we will trap our hand in the mangle, but of which mangle we trap it in". I take any remarks by the Chief of Defence Staff on this sort of matter extremely seriously. But how do Admiral Boyce's very relevant comments fit into the current decisions and indeed the future decisions of which we heard recently and our longer-term strategy?

My second question is: how are these forces going to get into Afghanistan? Questions were asked at the end of last week about access via Pakistan. Of course there was the arrival of flights directly into Kabul yesterday. But can the Minister tell us about the current position and negotiations which the Government are having with the Pakistani Government? Or at least can he assure us that he will inform the House as soon as he has information on that matter?

Thirdly, what is to happen when the troops do get in? I accept the constraints of the Minister who opened this debate about the House not seeking detailed operational information. But can we be given any information about the range of actions in which our forces are likely to take part? The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, referred to that in his remarks. How far should we judge from the recent example of the United States' Operation Anaconda? It was not, judging from some of the reports that I have read, a totally unqualified success. There seemed to have been problems with Humint—referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Park—and the assessment of the local political situation.

Those are both areas in which, historically, the United Kingdom has had a comparative advantage, as long as we ensure that our forces have the requisite intelligence support, to which reference has been made. The real problems of asymmetric warfare, to which the noble Baroness referred, are particularly acute in this situation. We want some assurance that they are being taken into account by the Government.

Fourthly, there is the question of the command arrangements, to which a number of noble Lords have referred. We benefit from the fact that we have had a substantial presence in the US central command in Tampa and we are involved in the discussions and thinking about the operation as a whole in Afghanistan. On the ground we are working to an American command structure, based in Bagram under Major General Hagenbeck, as are the Canadians and other substantial suppliers. We will not automatically have the safeguards that would exist under a NATO system. We remember the useful way—of course it was an exceptional situation—in which the so-called red card was used by General Mike Jackson when he was uncertain about the decisions of DSACEUR, General Wes Clark, in Kosovo. Is there a need for some sort of parallel arrangement in Afghanistan? Will Brigadier Lane have a card comparable to the one that General Jackson had'? I do not necessarily expect a public reply from the Minister on this point, but trust that he will note our concern.

More serious, however, and a number of noble Lords have referred to this, are relations with the United States and the other external forces and the relationship with the various local Afghan allies. The noble Lord, Lord King, referred to this issue in his remarks. We have seen the problems that the United States have had with such local allies. It is important to understand how it fits into the command structure to operate in the area where 45 Commando will be. Will 45 Commando have direct relations with such local warlords, or will there only be direct links between the warlords and the American headquarters in Bagram? It is an important and serious matter to which we need answers.

Fifthly, I raise an issue that was raised in another place last week. What will happen if 45 Commando takes prisoners? The Secretary of State in the Commons said that they would be handed over to the United States, but one or two issues need to be clarified. What would be the implications if our forces were to capture UK citizens who happen, quite wrongly, to have been fighting in Afghanistan? Problems could also arise from the differences between ourselves and the United States in the interpretation of both the Geneva conventions and the applicability of the United Nations International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. I realise that these are complex issues to which the Minister may not be able to reply tonight, but we need answers to what could become a complex situation.

Sixthly, I come to an issue that was raised by my noble friend Lady Williams and others on ISAF and the British contribution to that force. To use Admirable Boyce's admirable phrase, are we getting our hands out of that part of the mangle?

What is the latest state of the negotiations with Turkey? The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, made some reference to that issue. When are we likely to get an answer? Should we consider the proposal made by my noble friend Lady Williams that perhaps it would be more important if ISAF were to be taken into some form of NATO structure under a NATO headquarters, which could provide some continuity?

My right honourable friend Menzies Campbell in another place and the noble Lord, Lord King, raised the question of the risk of UK forces undertaking the same time both security assistance tasks in Kabul and neighbourhood and war-fighting tasks in the remaining parts of Afghanistan. There is a real risk of some parts of the Kabul population finding it difficult to appreciate these different functions, or being provoked to do so, even if that was not their original intention.

The United States has deliberately avoided taking part in ISAF. One of the reasons which has been given is to avoid the confusion of these different roles. Will there be some changes in the operational instructions to the British forces in ISAF? Will they be taking appropriate defensive measures if they are going to he in a more risky environment because of our deployment elsewhere in Afghanistan?

What is the overall strategy for the training of the Afghan defence forces? The Minister, in introducing the debate, talked about the useful contribution that we were already making in Kabul. But we have also heard that the United States is using its forces to train parts of the Afghan army. Surely, if we are to have a proper reform of the security sector as a whole we need to have an overall strategy. We need to see how these things are rooted together. Do we yet have clear information on that?

In conclusion, as the Secretary of State for Defence in his speech last week said, this is the largest British deployment of ground forces since the Gulf War. This is therefore an important stage in the development of the process. We share the support for our forces which has been expressed in all parts of this House. We wish them well in the very difficult tasks that lie before them. But we also support increases in the defence budget, both for the coming year and in the Comprehensive Spending Review which we look forward to hearing from the Government later in the year. On that the arguments of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, were most powerful. We hope that they will be listened to seriously by the Government, especially, as the noble Baroness, Lady Park, said, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

10.28 p.m.

Lord Vivian

My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for making time available for this debate. I thank the Minister for bringing this debate to our attention today and for covering so many different aspects.

As I have said before, and wish to repeat again, we on these Benches strongly support the action being taken by the Government and continue to declare that we should stand shoulder to shoulder with our American allies. We strongly support the deployment of 45 Commando in Operation Jacana. We support the exemplary contribution that our troops have made in ISAF, even though we have some concerns about that force.

There are three main points of focus that run through this debate. My noble friend Lord Howell has dealt with the theme of the fight against global terrorism. I shall mention that in connection only with one of our military capabilities. The two other themes are the war-fighting role of 45 Commando and the peacekeeping role of the ISAF.

The tragic events in the United States of America on llth September—some six months ago—are beginning to fade in the general public's mind. The public should be reminded of the fact that the United Kingdom is at risk of attack from international terrorists. There may be sleepers within the country waiting to carry out devastating attacks possibly using weapons of mass destruction. The nation must not wait for this to happen with predictable catastrophic results. We must ensure that the enemy is destroyed now before he has the chance to strike us.

Towards the end of last year the Chief of the Defence Staff stated that we would be in for a long haul. Although the operations have been successful so far, there is still the destruction of Al'Qaeda to be completed. Let it not be misunderstood that it is right that we are in Afghanistan, and there have been considerable successes that we should all be proud of. As has already been said, we are right to continue to try to find and capture bin Laden and Mullah Omar. It was right that we broke up the Al'Qaeda and Taliban integrated structure and destroyed their training camps in Afghanistan. It was right that we stopped Afghanistan from harbouring and giving succour to international terrorism; and it is right that we are now committed to the destruction of the Al'Qaeda and the Taliban groups dispersed in remote mountain areas of various provinces of Afghanistan. Not to have done so would have been a sign of weakness. Now is not the time to be weak, but to show our determination and strength in resolving this problem. If Al'Qaeda is not destroyed it might well encourage other extremists and terrorist groups to engage in further acts of international terrorism.

The common factor in these two themes is the need for sufficient resources. Her Majesty's Government have willed the ends and, as I have said, we wholeheartedly support them in this. However, we cannot have a situation where the Treasury uses its powers to withhold the resources required to carry out efficiently measures which are the policy of the Government as a whole. There is a real need for a substantial increase in the defence budget and a greater requirement for intelligence resources. It is our responsibility to ensure that our troops have the best and sufficient equipment regardless of cost. In connection with funding and costs, I agree with my noble friend Lord Marlesford. I hope that the Minister will take note of what he said. Furthermore, I hope that the Minister will take note of the excellent contribution from my noble friend Lady Park.

We must also ensure that press reporting is accurate and not misleading. I shall enlarge on this subject at the end of these comments. It is also imperative that all our Armed Forces are made aware that we here at home are lock, stock and barrel behind them in all that they doing in Afghanistan and that we shall be watching their endeavours and supporting them throughout the campaign.

I now wish to turn to 45 Commando. The tactical role of 45 Commando will probably be to search, cordon and destroy the enemy. Establishing the cordon will be essential in view of the proximity of the Pakistan border if the enemy are not to slip over it, especially as it is so ill-defined or really not defined at all.

This commando is trained in mountain warfare and to operate in Arctic conditions. It is right that these troops, who are trained for this role, are committed to mountain warfare in Afghanistan. But they will need altitude acclimatisation. This war-fighting role indicates well the fact that we should not become mesmerised by peacekeeping roles and home defence issues only. Three Commando Brigade will come directly under the command of Centcom and under the immediate command of the US 10th Mountain Division. The United Kingdom is, as we have heard, providing some 1,700 troops with 45 Commando for Operation Jacana of which some 800 will be in the front line. Could the Minister say how many troops from the United States of America, Canada, and other countries are fighting in the front line?

I have no concerns about the two chains of command as they are completely separate with areas of operation in completely different places. I do not think that this chain of command will be a top heavy organisation as it will be much easier for 45 Commando to implement their tasks working to their own brigade and brigade commander. It is well understood that the allies have complete air supremacy. But we are also aware that the United States has sufficient tactical air support to give 45 Commando when their forward air controllers call for it. In addition, the Royal Air Force is supplying three Chinook helicopters. But why can it not have its own strike aircraft? From my experience, it really makes a difference to know that one has one's own direct, dedicated air support. The Royal Air Force is providing invaluable assistance in Afghanistan and virtually daily since January has carried out operational support sorties.

On exit strategy, I agree that we should not withdraw from Operation Jacana until the enemy has been defeated and the task completed, but, as many of your Lordships have said, how will we know when we have won? If that takes longer than six months, who else is mountain trained to replace 45 Commando? I believe that 40 and 42 Commando are, or will be, involved in other operations. We cannot put troops who are not trained for mountain warfare into the mountains at about 13,000 feet, which is where they may well have to operate.

Your Lordships may also be aware that a mountain and Arctic training exercise was cancelled about two years ago due to lack of funds. That brings into question whether the two commandos are up to their appropriate training standards in those roles. Perhaps the Minister would reassure the House on that matter. The fact that 45 Commando has no armour was raised. The area in question is not one in which tanks or even light tanks should be used. Mountainous terrain is an area that armour should avoid at all costs.

Will the Minister reassure the House about the chain of command for 3 Commando Brigade? Will he also tell us why the Royal Air Force is not providing support for tactical air strikes? Who will take over from 45 Commando if the operation should last longer than six months? What have been the reasons for the delay in departure of the advance party of 45 Commando, and have the problems with Pakistan now been resolved? Will the Minister also confirm that 45 Commando, the field hospital, and all the other supporting units are up to strength at war establishment and have not been deployed at peace establishment?

I turn to future developments in ISAF. I remind your Lordships that that has so far been a most successful operation. Our troops have excelled in their difficult tasks, even under provocation. A handover to Turkey as the lead nation for ISAF would be most welcome. As our armed forces are over-committedas—as they clearly are—my concern is whether we can really afford to have troops locked up in a peacekeeping role in Afghanistan. Primary warfighting training is being missed out due to peacekeeping. That does not bode well for the future. I am aware that a German multibrigade has taken over from 16 Air Assault Brigade, but will that allow the complete brigade headquarters to withdraw? What other supporting British troops will be left to support the Royal Anglian?

Mr Brahimi has requested that the United Nations mandate be extended for another six months in June—not that there is any surprise in that. However, if that is the case, has another battalion been warned to take over from the Royal Anglian after June, so that it can start its training for the Kabul peacekeeping role now, or is the plan to withdraw from the peacekeeping role after the Royal Anglian completes its operational tour of duty? I agree with my noble friend Lord King that it is unwise to be committed to peacekeeping and war fighting in the same theatre, as the peacekeepers may suffer.

I wonder whether the tasks for ISAF are to be broadened. Is the force to take on tasks outside Kabul? Can the Minister say what any additional tasks would consist of, bearing in mind that we have only one line of communication into the theatre? Our Armed Forces are structured for only two lines of communication; the other one is in the Balkans. It should be noted and understood that taking on a new operation against global terrorism in any other part of the world would necessitate our withdrawal from either the Balkans or Afghanistan.

I am aware that I have asked the Minister several questions. I hope that he will be able to answer them when he winds up the debate, but I am also aware that I am the last speaker on the list and that there is little time for him to obtain the answers, unless they are already in his brief. If that is the case, I should be most grateful if he would write to me, as he has lone on many previous occasions, in his usual courteous manner. I am also grateful to him for the briefing that he arranged for some of us today.

Now that we have troops committed to war fighting in Afghanistan, there is a need for the Government to come back to the House and, through Parliament, to the public with adequate and accurate statements and answers to the many questions that will arise. I am still waiting for a reply to a Written Question dated 29th January. The statements and reports should be regular, direct and accurate, not filtered or distorted by the Pentagon or Centcom. They must not be exaggerated or misleading. I am not suggesting that advance plans or any sensitive information be made public, but Parliament owes that to the nation. If the nation is to be kept onside, the reports that I have suggested are essential. We owe that to our troops and to their families, and Parliament will then put matters into their proper perspective.

Finally, I pay tribute to the brave and courageous men and women who serve their country loyally and with the utmost dedication to duty. In particular, today, I pay tribute to those in the Afghanistan theatre. There are 6,000 personnel deployed there. To date, they have been highly successful in all that they have done and have shown their customary professionalism and their usual efficiency. Those of us on these Benches wish everyone in ISA F, the Royal Anglian, 3 Commando brigade and 45 Commando every success and a safe return.

10.43 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Bach)

My Lords, it was last December when we last debated the role of our Armed Forces in Afghanistan. As has been said, much has happened since, as noble Lords will know from the Statement that was made to the House last Monday. That time gap and the great depth of knowledge and experience in the House make it no surprise that this debate has ranged as widely as any other that we have had. I thank noble Lords in all parts of the House for their contributions. I shall try to respond to as many of the points raised by noble Lords as I can and to expand on some of the matters raised when we debated the Statement last week.

I welcome noble Lords' expressions of support for the men and women in our Armed Forces. Last week, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Inge, who, alas, cannot be here tonight, said how important it was for the Armed Forces to feel that the nation was behind them when they were deployed. The noble Lord, Lord Rogan, said that with some force today. I agree with him entirely. However, it is not always enough just to express support in words. The men and women of our Armed Forces matter, and we must give them our full support. That is particularly true when we are sending them, as we are, into battle.

Before I say anything about the decision that was taken a week ago, I must say that I was surprised by the comparison made with the Falklands. The decision last Monday was a serious and sombre decision but it does not compare to decisions taken about the Falklands War. I believe that such comparisons are not helpful. Indeed, they are somewhat surprising coming from where they did in the House this evening.

This is a sombre and serious prospect and we should keep in mind the great dangers that 45 Commando Group may face. The Secretary of State warned last week in the other place that our troops might suffer casualties. That is true. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Rogan, will accept from me that the figures that were bandied around in the press this morning, which he quoted, have no substance at all as coming from the Ministry of Defence. They are meaningless figures and they do not help the argument at all.

Nothing has changed from last week. When we ask this of our forces, the support of Parliament such as noble Lords have shown today, and indeed of the whole country, is all the more important. What matters is the knowledge that we are doing the right thing, and we believe that we are. It seems as though the House also believes that we are.

In another place the Secretary of State made a powerful case for our deployments in Afghanistan. It hangs on the three points that my noble friend Lady Symons mentioned in her opening remarks this afternoon. I want to remind the House briefly of what she said about point two, which was that the action that the international community has taken has been remarkably successful. Afghanistan is indeed a different country, and the decision to deploy considerable military force against the terrorists and their supporters has, we believe, been vindicated.

It is quite clear that Osama bin Laden and his Al'Qaeda network have been dealt an extremely heavy blow, and only remnants of the Taliban, whose support was so crucial to Al'Qaeda, are left. We have defeated a ruling party; no longer do they control the government.

In my view it would be a mistake, therefore, not to acknowledge the success that has already met the coalition response. I believe it an unfair criticism that somehow victory over the Taliban and Al'Qaeda was claimed. It was said by Government Ministers many months ago that this was a long haul; that this would take years, not months. For selective quotations to be given seems to me to be beneath the level of discussion that we normally enjoy in this House. We all knew that this would be a long haul. Nothing has changed. No one ever claimed anything different.

I know that the existence side by side of the two roles—the ISAF and the Operation Jacana forces—has been questioned in another place. Indeed it was touched on here last week. The chains of command—and this relates to one of the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Roper—are distinct, reflecting the separate roles of the forces involved. ISAF does not command our combat forces and will not command 45 Commando Group when it deploys. They are wholly separate. Instead, 45 Commando Group will be under the command of the American-led coalition headquarters at Bagram. Headquarters 3 Commando Brigade will be embedded within that headquarters.

It may be asked why we need to deploy a brigade headquarters if 45 Commando Group is under coalition command. We think that the answer is simple. We need the additional command capability it offers, for it is not simply a matter of the commando group. There are the additional combat support and services support elements, namely 7 Battery, 29 Commando Regiment; 59 Independent Command Squadron, Royal Engineers, and elements of the Commando Logistics Regiment; plus the three Chinook helicopters and crew of 27 Squadron RAF.

The brigade's commander, Brigadier Lane, will act as Commander British Forces for all our personnel serving in Afghanistan, other than the ISAF. Those in ISAF will remain under Major General McColl's command. I do not think that that command structure can be accused of being either top heavy or confused.

I want to stress that the two roles are not contradictory. Other members of the ISAF agree. Denmark, France, Germany and Norway all provided ground forces for Operation Anaconda. French strike aircraft also flew close air support missions. The two roles complement each other, for both are consistent with our objectives as we set them out last October. Both aim to remove the threat offered by international terrorists operating from Afghanistan. Both aim to contribute to restoring Afghanistan as a peaceful and stable country. How could that be achieved if we allowed these terrorists and their supporters to regroup? They would always try to overthrow everything the Afghan people and their friends in the wider world have achieved to rebuild that country. If we allow them to regroup, why have we bothered to take any military action at all? What would have been the point?

The ISAF, of course, is a very obvious demonstration of the international community's commitment to Afghanistan. Various noble Lords have pointed that out during our debate, including the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and the noble Earl. Lord Sandwich. Noble Lords know that we are committed to act as lead nation until 30th April. We are negotiating the transfer of that role to Turkey now. I can tell the House that those talks are going well. Beyond that, I do not think that it would be appropriate to speak here and now about the ins and outs of what are, after all, important negotiations between governments. I venture to say to some of those who have tempted me down that path that if they were standing where I am now—indeed, they were doing so not that many years ago—they would say precisely the same.

However. I shall say this. Both we and the Turks are committed to getting this right. We both want to make the ISAF as successful for the second phase as it has been in the first. Make no mistake, it has been a success. Turkey wants to know what kind of help and assistance she will receive from her partners, exactly as we did when we were working to set up the force. We have always said that we shall go on contributing forces to the ISAF after 30th April. We never said that we would withdraw all our forces, only that we expect to be able to reduce their numbers, and, indeed, we still do. And with good reason. Today we have around 1,700 troops deployed either with the ISAF or in support of it. Compare that with the 1,800 troops we originally assigned, along with an additional 300—2,100 in all—to repair and operate Kabul international airport. Of course the reduction does not mean that our commitment is any the less; we needed some capabilities to get the force that we do not need now that the force has become established.

The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, asked one or two questions in regard to the ISAF. As far as cooperation with the Northern Alliance is concerned, which responds to a particular question put by the noble Baroness in which she named an individual, the advice I have received is that co-operation with the Afghan police and with the interim authority generally is very close indeed. This was boosted by Hamid Karzai's visit to this country at the end of January, as well as visits by our Foreign and Defence Secretaries to Afghanistan. We are working closely with the interim authority on the first stages of security sector reform. I am delighted to be able to tell the House, and the noble Lord, Lord Roper, in particular, because he asked about this, that early in April the G8 is to hold a conference on the future of security sector reform. I hope that that deals with the point made by the noble Lord.

If we agree that the ISAF is a success in all its forms, and I hope that the House does so, there are many who wish to extend it, even to expand it outside of Kabul and give it new responsibilities. The House will be realistic about this and understand that there is a good possibility that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 will be renewed to extend the deployment of the ISAF in its current area of responsibility, but I must stress that the security situation outside Kabul is very different from that in the city, as recent events have shown. The ISAF is not configured either for war fighting or peace enforcement. Ultimately, security is the responsibility—it must be—of the Afghans themselves. We shall look to see how we can help them, particularly through the security sector reform that I have mentioned.

A point was raised as to whether bringing 45 Commando into Afghanistan will make it more dangerous for British ISAF troops. We do not believe that it will, but time will tell. British troops have been on the ground in a fighting role for a very long time now—for as long as there have been troops in Afghanistan—and this is a considerable addition to that number. But they have been there and those people in Kabul will know that they have been there, just as they will know that 45 Commando is there. I remind the House that there are tough rules of engagement as far as the ISAF in Kabul is concerned.

My noble friend outlined earlier our campaign objectives. To achieve them requires that we take offensive military action as well as work towards Afghanistan's reconstruction, and we have been involved in that right from the start. Our decision to deploy 45 Commando is simply a part of our wider commitment to defeating international terrorism.

Undeniably, this is a significant part of that commitment. Deploying 1,700 troops and their equipment is no small undertaking. It is another call upon our Armed Forces and our Armed Forces are stretched. We would deny that they are overstretched; we are not even sure what that expression means. We have had this discussion in the House before—no doubt we will have it again—but I must tell your Lordships that more than 400 of the personnel involved were already in theatre and others were held at high readiness in this country against such a need.

Certainly all our Armed Forces are extremely busy, the Royal Marines included. Naturally, we keep all our commitments under review. We know that we have a duty to balance our operational needs with our other tasks, and not least with the needs of our service personnel. Our deployments in Afghanistan are necessary. We believe—as does the House—that this is something we must do. As to overstretch in this particular case, we are confident that this limited deployment can be managed alongside our existing commitments. I have explained how a number of personnel have been kept at high readiness and others in theatre. We believe that this is a realistic, manageable and sustainable development.

I should say to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, that I have been tempted by some of his remarks to make one or two points. I understand the depth of feeling that goes into what he says, but to describe what we are doing as a political gesture does not catch the reason for our actions. Of course we responded quickly. That was not a political gesture but a genuine, practical response to give the help and support requested by our closest friend and stoutest ally. It was not gesture politics. We are talking about real people, real troops, real capability and we are offering real help. The phrase "a political gesture" does not reflect what we are doing.

The noble and gallant Lord asked about pursuit over borders and I shall do my best to answer him. Our actions have been, and will continue to be, part of the coalition, of which Pakistan is a valued member. We do not believe that there is in the end any hiding place for those engaged in activities of global terrorism. Of course we know the difficulties along that particular border.

The noble and gallant Lord set out a number of matters that had occurred over the past weeks and months at the Ministry of Defence as some kind of proof that the Ministry of Defence was not able to meet its needs. On the other hand, perhaps I may mention one or two things that he did not point out—that is, the list of new projects and capabilities that we are in the middle of procuring for the Armed Forces of this country. I start with two new carriers; I continue with six Type 45 Destroyers; I go on to mention alternative landing strip logistics; two landing platform docks; Skynet 5; Bowman, which at last we are putting right, after many years; personal role radio, which is already in existence; Nimrod; the Eurofighter; Merlin helicopters, including the EH101, which is a success at home and abroad; Trojan and Titan; and, not least, ground-based air defence. So if we are to have one side of the argument, and there is a case to be made, it is only fair that we should have the other.

Lord Craig of Radley

My Lords, I quite understand the Minister's wish to put another perspective on the matter. We could get into a long and detailed argument. He mentioned the Nimrod, for example; but there will not be so many Nimrods as originally planned. And so it goes on. Of course, there must be good stories to tell in this area. It would be impossible to believe that there were no good stories. My point was that there are a number of unsatisfactory stories at a time when the Armed Forces are very heavily committed. I was trying to get across the need for more support, and more Treasury support, for the Armed Forces.

Lord Bach

My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord made his point extremely effectively. But, as he pointed out, there is another view. That is why it is important to place on record exactly what we are doing.

There has been some ill-informed speculation about our involvement in the Balkans. The noble Lord, Lord Rogan, referred to it in passing. The developing security situation in the Balkans has resulted in NATO conducting a joint operational area review. The review is considering the structure, number and role of NATO forces in the region. We remain committed to the security of the Balkans region and actively support NATO's review, which will be discussed by NATO Foreign Ministers in May.

In the light of the review, the United Kingdom is considering with NATO allies how it will continue to contribute to regional security. No decisions have been made by either NATO or the UK. Implementation of any changes will be in the context of allowance decisions and the security situation at the time. I want to emphasise that talk of reductions is speculative, and suggestions that reductions will be forced on the United Kingdom for cost reasons are false.

There have been reports in the media that the deployment of 45 Commando Group has run into the sand and that we have been unable to send out our forces. I urge your Lordships not to read too much into these stories. The lead elements of our deployment flew out last week, just as we said they would. Arrangements for the deployment of the whole force are in hand. I cannot say more; we have real concerns about operational security—which is hardly a surprise—if the fine detail of individual unit moves or the comings and goings of our ships and aircraft become widely known. It is, after all, the deployment of a war fighting force into a war zone.

The composition of the deployment is well known. As noble Lords would expect, the shape of our force is driven by its job. Quite simply, 45 Commando Group will participate in operations to defeat bands of Taliban fighters and Al'Qaeda terrorists who have fled into the mountains of Afghanistan. I said earlier that, left alone, they would threaten Afghanistan. They could also threaten us. The training camps would, of course, be rebuilt and new terrorist attacks would be planned. We have to defeat these groups. Doing so will not be easy, and it will take time. We shall keep our forces there until the job is done.

As has been said, as specialists in mountain warfare, the Royal Marines, like their American counterparts in the 10th Mountain Division are ideal for the task. They can deploy quickly, whether from HMS "Ocean" or from their bases in this country. They are trained and equipped to manoeuvre and fight in difficult terrain. They can bring to bear the fire-power of their 105 millimetre light guns, and they have expert forward air controllers, practised in operating with American strike aircraft. That will be of particular importance as the Royal Marines will be operating as coalition forces, and so will be able to call upon air support by coalition aircraft.

As my right honourable friend the Secretary of State made clear, the reason for deploying 45 Commando Group is not that American or other coalition forces have failed. They have not failed. What they have achieved, most recently in Operation Anaconda, is remarkable. There they fought and won a dangerous and difficult battle high in the mountains against an enemy that was well armed and heavily dug in. They did not do so without loss. American and Afghan soldiers died fighting the terrorists. My right honourable friend also rightly said that it was contemptible to think that the Americans will not risk casualties. They have had, have now and will continue to have soldiers fighting on the ground.

I have spoken for longer than I should. This has been an excellent debate, as all debates on this subject have been in the House. There are unanswered questions, which I shall answer in the normal way, by letter. I hope that I have covered some of the main points that have been raised.

I conclude by saying that our Armed Forces face a great challenge in Afghanistan, whatever their role. They need to know that they have the support of their country and their Parliament. They need that support in good times and bad. I repeat that words of support, while very welcome, are not enough. Support is proved by an acceptance that we are all in this as one and also by a self-imposed restraint so that we do not compromise our Armed Forces in any way. They are, after all, risking their lives for us and they deserve nothing less than our full support.

On Question, Motion agreed to.