Terrorism Bill

HL Deb 23 May 2000 vol 613 cc641-64

3.20 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Lord Bassam of Brighton)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Bassam of Brighton.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]

Clause 14 agreed to.

Clause 15 [Fund-raising]:

Lord Cope of Berkeley

moved Amendment No. 39: Page 8, line 26, at end insert (", including a service rendered or to be rendered"). The noble Lord said: I have tabled a query in the form of an amendment. Clause 15 provides for the offence of fund-raising for terrorism or for terrorist groups, which is an extremely serious offence. Subsection (4) provides that it is an offence to provide money to terrorists even in exchange for consideration.

Members of the Committee will be well aware that terrorist organisations all over the world and on both sides of the divide in Northern Ireland provide all kinds of services in apparent exchange for money. Sometimes protection is described as insurance and it is a form of service. In that case, the service may be a lack of beatings. The question is whether such a lack of action is covered by the word "consideration". Is it valid that consideration includes the giving of a service?

There are many other rackets in Northern Ireland. Black taxis, drinking clubs and so forth come to mind. They are valuable sources of money for the terrorist organisations concerned and I believe that such financial considerations there and in other parts of the world are part of the momentum of terrorism.

The amendment is brief and seeks to ensure that all types of consideration, including the lack of action, are covered by the legislation. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his query and I am sure that I can help him. We do not believe that the amendment is necessary. Clause 15 sets out offences of inviting another to provide money or other property, receiving money or other property, and providing money or other property, for the purposes of terrorism. Subsection (4) clarifies that the provision of money or other property includes it being given, lent or otherwise made available, whether or not for consideration.

The expression "whether or not for consideration" is taken from the corresponding provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. It means that if someone is accused of, for example, lending money for the purposes of terrorism, it does not matter whether the supposed terrorist was expected to pay interest on the loan.

Of course, "consideration" could be in the conventional form of interest payable on a loan or it could be in the form of services rendered. If I were to lend the noble Lord, Lord Cope, an umbrella or a coat on condition that he carry my bag, I am sure that would count as a consideration. I do not see any need to set that principle out on the face of the Bill. Of course, the whole point of the provision is that the offences apply whether or not "consideration" is involved.

I trust that with that explanation the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

6.45 p.m.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

The next time I am caught in the rain I shall look out for the Minister in the hope of being able to borrow an umbrella! In the light of his explanation, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 15 agreed to.

On Question, Whether Clause 16 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord Avebury

Perhaps I may comment on Clause 16 and refer to the parallel position in Clause 15. In both clauses an offence is created by the mere intention to do something. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has written to us stating that that constitutes a form of thought crime. One is saying that if a person at any moment intends to do something, he is committing an offence at that moment notwithstanding the fact that the intention is never carried into effect. The offence resembles a class of offences known as inchoate offences, all of which were repealed in the late 1970s. I refer in particular to the offence of sus, where someone was suspected of being about to commit an offence and could be prosecuted and sent to prison. After a substantial public opinion campaign, the Government agreed to withdraw it on the ground that what was in a person's mind could not constitute an offence unless it were carried into effect.

In this Bill, we are reintroducing a form of sus—a form of inchoate offence—which is never carried into effect. The intention may long have disappeared, long before the case gets to court. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is right to have drawn our attention to the provision and I hope that the Minister will consider it before the Report stage. I have not had time to formulate an amendment, but I am giving the Minister notice that if he does not do something about it before the Report stage, we certainly shall.

Earl Russell

Perhaps I may make a brief comment in support of my noble friend. Some of us probably remember the old fashioned telephone boxes with button A and button B. I once heard of a case in a juvenile court where people were prosecuted for loitering with intent to press button B. The magistrates threw it out. Perhaps we should follow their example.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

I remember pressing buttons A and B. I think that the last time was when I was trying to contact a girlfriend—and that must have been a very long time ago!

As regards Clause 16, terrorism and terrorism offences are often about intent. The discovery of intent is very important and is the reason why in extreme and exceptional circumstances we need to have exceptional powers to tackle the problems with which we are grappling.

I understand the anxieties of those who, like us in government, are properly concerned about human rights issues. But terrorism is about serious offences and for that reason the term "intended" appears in Clause 16. The offences in that clause are based on those in Sections 9(1)(c) and 10(1)(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act and we believe—and other governments have believed—that they are essential to our aim of depriving terrorists of their funds, property and means to carry out their trade.

Lord Avebury

As the Minister has mentioned a similar provision in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, can he say how many prosecutions have been successfully brought under that provision?

Lord Bassam of Brighton

I should like to be able to give the noble Lord that information this afternoon but am unable to do so. I believe that it is worth repeating what I said earlier with regard to this particular subsection being relied upon only in extreme situations. Terrorism is an extreme activity and, of course, the power would be used only when appropriate.

I believe that the way in which the legislation has been monitored and reported upon in the past has, by and large, satisfied Members of your Lordships' House. We intend to continue fully to satisfy inspections and to monitor the legislation closely. I understand the noble Lord's concern about intention. However, we rely on the argument that these types of power and provision are essential for the effective operation of the legislation.

I have now been passed a useful paper concerning the offence to which I believe the noble Lord draws our attention; that is, making available money or property for use in connection with terrorism. A total of seven charges have been raised under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1984 and 1989. Four cases were not proceeded with and in three the defendants were found guilty. One of the sentences was suspended and in two cases imprisonment was effected for over one year and up to five years. Therefore, the legislation has played a significant and important part, thankfully in very few and restricted circumstances, in much the same way as I have described to the noble Lord in the past few minutes.

Lord Avebury

I am most grateful to the Minister for giving those figures. I believe that they help the Committee in its consideration of these particular provisions. What he has just told the Committee is that people have been convicted under the Prevention of Terrorism Act not for the intention of transferring money to terrorists but for actually transferring money to terrorists. I have no quarrel with that. If one gives money to terrorist organisations, one must be liable to prosecution. However, this Bill states that it is a crime to intend to give the money when one has not passed cash over. I believe that that is thought crime. I ask the Minister again whether he can tell me of a single case where a person has been convicted of the intention of, as opposed to actually, handing money over.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

I well understand the point that the noble Lord makes. However, if we simply wait until an act has been carried out and then seek to prevent it, we shall be in a rather ludicrous situation. Therefore, intention is important, as is a reasonable cause for suspicion, also referred to in Clause 16(2)(b). We believe that those matters are and have been essential in preventing the very acts of terrorism. In order to prevent things, one must understand people's intention. We consider that to be extremely important. Therefore, the clause has, and will continue to have, a value.

With regard to the legislation and the way in which it has worked, the cases that I have described in which a person has been caught making money available are, thankfully, narrow and limited in number. However, we believe that it is essential that the powers are in place so that we can prevent terrorism. After all, it is much better to prevent terrorism than to try to chase after terrorists after they have committed some awful act.

Clause 16 agreed to.

Clause 17 agreed to.

Clause 18 [Money laundering]:

Lord Cope of Berkeley

moved Amendment No. 39A: Page 8, line 40, after ("control") insert ("by himself or "). The noble Lord said: Clause 18 deals with money laundering and makes it an offence for someone—for example, a banker—to help terrorists to retain or control money. However, it was suggested to me that the wording of the clause does not make it an offence for the terrorist who launders the money, only for the banker or other person who handles it. Of course, I realise that the terrorist treasurer may well be guilty and presumably will be guilty under Clauses 16 or 17. However, it struck me as odd that only the banker would be charged, for example, in respect of an agreement to smuggle money out of the jurisdiction for a terrorist purpose. Is that a correct reading and is that what is intended? I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

We well appreciate the spirit in which the amendment is moved. It appears to emphasise that a person should not enter into an arrangement to facilitate the retention or control "by himself" of terrorist property. I agree that that should not be permitted. However, as we see it, we do not believe that the amendment is required because that matter is already covered by the offence as it stands.

Clause 18 deals with arrangements by which the retention or control of terrorist property by one person is facilitated by another. The clause provides that a person commits an offence if he enters into or becomes concerned in such an arrangement. It does not specify on which side of the arrangement the person has to be in order to commit the offence. Therefore, it is fairly flexible.

Therefore, both the person who facilitates retention or control and the person whose retention or control is facilitated commit the same offence. That is because both have entered into, or have become involved in, the arrangement. I trust that with that explanation the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

Clearly the Minister wishes the same things as I do, which does not surprise me for a moment. However, I am still not entirely satisfied that the wording is adequate. I shall not pursue the matter today, but my point is that the clause states that: A person commits an offence if he enters into … an arrangement which facilitates the retention … of another person".

Lord Bassam of Brighton

If the noble Lord looks closely at the clause, he will see that it states, enters into or becomes concerned in". Therefore, if one is involved in the arrangement, one is caught up in the committing of the offence. I believe that that is the important point. I shall be happy to try to clarify the matter between Committee and Report stages, if the noble Lord wishes. However, I believe that the intention of the clause is quite clear and that it covers both situations.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

I believe that it is the use of the words "another person" which caused the interest in this issue. However, I do not wish to pursue the matter at the moment. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 18 agreed to.

Clause 19 [Disclosure of information: duty]:

Lord Glentoran

moved Amendment No. 39B: Page 9, line 8, at end insert (", or is likely to commit an offence,"). The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 39B extends Clause 19(1)(a) to include, or is likely to commit an offence". It seems sensible to me that if one suspects that a person has committed an offence, one should report it. However, if one also suspects, or even knows, that a person is about to commit an offence by knowing that he or she is going to a certain place to do a certain thing, that also should be included in that part of the clause. Therefore, I beg to move that that should be considered.

Lord Bach

The Government do not accept the need for the amendment and I shall try to explain why in a few words. I believe that there are three other amendments in this group and perhaps the noble Lord will want to speak to them in due course. Therefore, perhaps I may deal, first, with the amendment that he has moved.

Clause 19 requires the reporting of belief or suspicion that someone has committed one of the terrorist property offences set out in Clauses 15 to 18. As the noble Lord said, Amendment No. 39B would require the reporting of suspicion that someone is likely to commit such an offence. That would broaden quite considerably the scope of the requirement—too far, in our view. The equivalent provisions in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988 already produce a steady flow of information on suspicious transactions, some of which produce useful leads. The amendment is presumably intended to produce more. But we do not believe it is necessary to extend the scope of the offence in this way.

In many cases a suspicion that someone will commit a funding offence will lead inevitably to a suspicion that he has committed one. For example, if I suspect that someone is going to "provide money or other property" for the purposes of terrorism—that is, Clause 15(3)—I presumably already suspect that he possesses money or other property for the purposes of terrorism. So I am not sure, in effect, how much difference the amendment would make in practice.

To the extent that there is any difference, however, there is of course nothing stopping someone who wants to report suspicion of a potential funding offence, as opposed to suspicion of an actual offence. The "permission to disclose" provision in Clause 20 adequately covers this.

But a statutory requirement to disclose is a serious measure and we would not seek to extend it lightly. We think it right that the requirement should apply to more substantive suspicions that someone has committed an offence rather than that he is likely to commit such an offence.

I do not know whether the noble Lord wishes to speak to his other amendments at this stage so I can answer him in due course.

Lord Glentoran

I wish now to speak to Amendments Nos. 41A, 41B and 41C. It seems that it was a reasonable defence if the person concerned believed that his employer would ensure that a disclosure was made in this situation. I do not think that needs very much explanation. If he has told his employer what he believes and he assumes that his employer is going to tell the necessary authorities, that seems to us fair and reasonable.

Amendments Nos. 41B and 41C seek to take out "thing" and insert "money or other property". "Thing." is a very undescriptive word. Really what is being spoken of in this Bill is money or property, and I ask the noble Lord to consider that.

Lord Bach

I shall deal first with Amendment No. 41A. Clause 19(4) makes provision for persons in employment by allowing them to make the disclosure to their employer rather than directly to the police. Amendment No. 41A proposes that someone seeking to rely on this option should also have to prove that he reasonably believed his employer would pass the suspicion on to the police.

There is no need for such provision on the face of the Bill because the defence set out in subsection (4) only applies where the employer has established a procedure for the making of disclosures. So in order to rely on the defence, the employee would have to prove that he had followed the established procedure. The procedure could only reasonably be regarded as an "established" procedure if it indeed had the effect that employees reasonably believed it would ensure eventual disclosure to the police. So we think that that point is covered in the Bill as currently drafted.

I deal with the two remaining amendments in the following way. Clause 19(7) is an extra-territorial gloss on subsection (1) and ensures that disclosure is to be made even if the suspected offence involves a "thing" and takes place overseas. I am advised that, as a matter of statutory drafting, it would not produce the right result to refer instead, as the noble Lord proposes, to "money or other property". That is principally because the extra-territorial question arises only in relation to "things". With money, for example, it is possible to take possession without any physical thing changing hands.

With those explanations, I hope that the noble Lord will consider withdrawing the amendment.

Lord Glentoran

I thank the Minister for that explanation. Certainly with regard to the last two amendments, I accept the advice on statutory drafting in relation to matters overseas. I hope that we are secure in relation to the employer/employee relationship but for the moment I accept the noble Lord's advice and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Goodhart

moved Amendment No. 40: Page 9, line 13, at beginning insert ("Subject to subsection (3A),"). The noble Lord said: This is, I believe, an amendment of some importance because it concerns the freedom of the press. Let us assume that a journalist wants to interview someone who is alleged to be a major donor to a proscribed terrorist organisation. That organisation could be one that operates in the United Kingdom; it could be one whose operations are entirely outside the United Kingdom but which has been proscribed.

The journalist wishes to establish whether those allegations are true or not. During the course of the interview, again let us assume that the alleged donor makes statements which make the journalist believe that the allegations are true. He may make them on the record or off the record but the alleged donor admits that he is indeed a donor. Under Clause 19 as it stands that journalist will commit an offence if he does not tell a police constable about the interview as soon as reasonably possible. I should have thought that in that context "as soon as reasonably possible" must mean no later than the point at which the journalist gets back to the office or gets home, has access to a telephone and can pick up that telephone up and contact the police.

The effect of Clause 19 on a journalist in those circumstances is obvious. No journalist will interview someone on the basis that he will report anything that he has learned at the interview to the police. No one will speak to a journalist if he knows that anything said to a journalist must be reported by law immediately to the police. The effect is to restrict freedom of speech.

The Government may well take the view that it would be better if an interview of that kind did not take place. But that, of course, is not the test. It is not whether the Government think it better or not. The true question is whether the obligation to report the interview to the police is something which is necessary in a democratic society. I believe that in the great majority of cases the answer to that question will be no.

I accept that there could possibly be cases where the danger from a terrorist organisation is so acute that the ordinary rules do not apply. That, indeed, is why we included in Amendment No. 141 subsections (3B) and (3C). Subsection (3C) is modelled on the power to derogate from convention rights under the Human Rights Act, which itself is modelled on the provisions as to derogation in the European Convention on Human Rights. That would make it possible in extreme circumstances to suspend the exemption for journalists.

In general, however, it is very difficult to see what damage is likely to be caused if journalists are exempted from Clause 19. Indeed, investigative journalism may even be helpful to the Government. This is an entirely different category from the case where banks may suspect money laundering on behalf of terrorists where, clearly, it is in the public interest that the banks should be required to disclose their suspicions to the Government. In practice, Clause 19 will not lead to journalists providing any useful information whatever to the police. It will simply reduce the flow of information to the journalists.

Clause 19 imposes an unjustifiable restriction on the freedom of the press, which is an essential element in freedom of speech and is recognised by the Human Rights Act as a matter of particular importance.

I recognise that Clause 19 is based on an existing section in the Prevention of Terrorism Act that does not include a special defence for journalists. In replacing the Prevention of Terrorism Act there is no presumption that Clause 19 should be identical to the corresponding section in the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Therefore, I suggest that it is proper and desirable that Clause 19 should be amended in this way. I beg to move.

Lord Avebury

I support my noble friend and I draw attention to the fact that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, in his inquiry into legislation against terrorism concluded that an offence prescribing failure to disclose information about acts of terrorism should not be enacted in permanent legislation. I would be inclined to go even further than my noble friend and say that the whole of Clause 19 is objectionable, bringing back into our law something that used to be called "misprision of felony". Noble Lords may remember that several years ago that was cleared out of obsolete statutes, many of which dated from the Napoleonic wars.

Again, the Human Rights Commission of Northern Ireland has objected to Clause 19 and suggested, in relation to Northern Ireland, that an extremely wide offence exists in the prevailing ordinary criminal law, prescribing the kind of behaviour that this clause seeks to address. That is to be found in Section 5 of the Criminal Law Act 1967.

In this Bill we seem to be modelling United Kingdom legislation on a measure that has been in force, on a temporary basis, in relation to Northern Ireland alone where the position may be totally different. There is no particular reason why a measure that was appropriate in the conditions prevailing in Northern Ireland should now be extended to the whole of the United Kingdom.

Can the Minister give the Committee any figures for prosecutions and convictions under the corresponding provision in the Northern Ireland Act to which my noble friend has referred? I refer to Section 18A of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Have any prosecutions been brought against journalists under that section and, if so, what was the result? As my noble friend has said, these provisions appear to fall foul of the Human Rights Act and there is case law in relation to this matter. Cases have been taken before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg where this provision appears to be in contravention.

I believe it would be unwise for us to endanger journalists in the way suggested. If we do so, we shall fall foul of Clause 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is difficult to imagine how Ministers have certified that this legislation conforms with the Human Rights Act when we have the case of Goodwin in front of us. The noble Lord may want to refer to that in his reply.

I am sure that the objections are not limited solely to journalism because many other people may inadvertently have matters disclosed to them in the course of their professional lives and have the same obligation of confidentiality as a journalist owes to the person he interviews. I believe that my noble friend is right to focus on the matter of journalism because this clause can do the greatest harm to that profession. I hope that the Minister will consider this matter seriously before Report stage.

Lord Marlesford

I too want to support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. I do not do so because of any great principles such as the European Convention on Human Rights or any other legislation. I support the amendment on the simple basis that the clause seems to show an astonishing lack of understanding of how journalism works in practice by a government who include, in their inner sanctum, so many distinguished journalists who do understand such matters.

It is inconceivable that a journalist should ever be put under the restriction of carrying out an interview of any sort on the basis that he may hear or learn something that he would be required to report to the authorities afterwards. It would not work. Journalists would not feel bound by it. One would not be able to administer such a restriction. It is a thoroughly foolish and pernicious proposal. I say that as someone who will yield to no one in the desire to support the overall intentions of the Bill.

Lord Desai

I support the amendment. I have been disturbed by the case taking place against some journalists, in whose support I have signed a petition. I am worried not only that if confidentiality is broken, people will not talk to journalists; but, as an academic, I am also concerned that a lot of information used by my colleagues in international relations or politics comes from good journalistic reporting. Such reporting is a valuable source, not just for academics, but also for governments. If journalists do not find out things, we shall all be in ignorance. This matter impinges on the freedom of the press and on academic freedom. Some so-called "journalists" may be colleagues of mine; for example, I have a distinguished colleague, Professor Fred Halliday, who knows many Arab terrorists. He knows lots of terrorist groups and has spoken to them. Is he supposed to divulge all his information? In doing so, he would lose his career.

Another concern is that while surfing the Internet I may come across a terrorist website. Am I obliged to do something about that immediately or can I click past that and go somewhere else? Will I have committed an offence? The definition of what offence may be committed is so broad that I believe that we should carefully consider whether it should be prescribed more carefully.

Lord Monson

I have a more technical point to make. I refer to the last line of Amendment No. 41, which contains the rather melodramatic words, threatening the life of the United Kingdom". I believe that is open to all sorts of interpretations. Is there any precedent for using that exact form of words? I do not believe that it is the most desirable form that could be devised to achieve the purposes of the Liberal Democrats.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

This has been a useful short debate. I understand and appreciate that journalists, among all the professions that may be affected by the clause, feel particular concern about this matter. I well understand some of the misgivings that have been expressed in Committee, not least because of the several and various representations that the Government have received from the Society of Editors, the Newspaper Society and members of the broadcast media who have made direct representations to my honourable Friend Charles Clarke.

The Government would be the first to concede the vital importance of ensuring a free press and that the press must be able to go about their lawful business in an entirely proper and unfettered manner and without undue constraints. We fully accept the integrity and the professionalism both of the journalistic profession as a whole and of individual journalists, particularly those who may be interested [...] the area of public policy.

However, I would argue that w[...]h that integrity and professionalism must go a degree of responsibility to the wider society. As my honourable friend Mr Clarke said when this matter was debate[...]n another place, a journalist may, during the course of his business, become aware that, say, Canary W[...]f is to be blown up. I am sure that Members of the Committee agree that it would be unacceptable for him not to tell anyone in order to protect his sources. That journalist would have had knowledge and information, something of value to the wider society, clearly indicating that people were to be placed at risk. To withhold that information on the grounds that he was protecting his sources would be neither right nor proper.

4 p.m.

Lord Marlesford

Does the Minister really believe that that is a realistic example? As a journalist—I do not have an interest to declare now but I was a journalist for 16 years—protecting one's sources and revealing a real threat to human life are totally different things. I cannot think of any journalist, if he or she were to hear of something like that, who would not immediately take whatever action was necessary prevent it happening. That is not the same as revealing a source. It is an extreme example which does not support the case.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

It may well be an example in extremis, but it is something which could take place. We must acknowledge that point. The battle against terrorism is extremely important.

Lord Goodhart

I thank the Minister for giving way. Is it not the fact that the offence under Clause 19 has nothing to do with disclosure of information about the potential bombing of Canary Wharf? The offence under Clause 19 is limited to disclosure of information relating to the commission of an offence under Clauses 15 to 18, which deal with fundraising and property.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

I accept the point the noble Lord makes. But knowing about and having knowledge of the means of support for terrorist activity is an important element of this debate. Having knowledge of the obtaining of funds for committing acts of terrorism and supporting terrorism has a bearing on this whole debate.

It is a matter of striking the right balance. In drafting the legislation we have shifted the balance somewhat from the position under the existing legislation by repealing the old Section 18 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. I remind the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, that that legislation was put in place in 1984 and again in 1989. The Bill removes the statutory requirement to disclose information which could lead to the prevention or detection of specific acts of terrorism. We agreed with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, that this was of limited usefulness and served mainly to criminalise the families of terrorists.

But we believe it is important to retain the old Section 18A of the PTA. That is the provision now replicated in Clause 19 of the Bill. We regard that as an essential position of permanent counter-terrorist legislation. It is more limited than the old Section 18 in that it applies only to belief or suspicion that another person is committing a terrorist property offence under Clauses 15 to 18. It also applies only where a person bases his belief or suspicion on information which comes to his attention in the course of a trade, profession, business or employment. So it is not just about journalists.

This provision is especially relevant—this must be underlined—to the financial services industry as it generates a flow of information from banks and building societies. But that does not mean that it should only apply to that industry, or that any other industry should be exempt. Of course the Government recognise that the journalistic profession takes its responsibilities extremely seriously; we do. But the Committee will understand that to provide a specific exemption for journalists, even one which could be switched off as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, argued his was at certain times, would leave a potential loophole in what we consider to be an essential provision. It would also carry the risk of making it much easier to launder terrorist finance through press and media companies, a result which I am sure the Committee would not intend.

If I may be a little more reassuring to those journalists who feel that the clause may restrain their legitimate activities, I must emphasise that the Government see the "reasonable excuse" defence in subsection (3) as an important safeguard in this area. I cannot, of course, give a cast-iron assurance that protecting sources will always be a reasonable excuse; it would be wrong for me to do so. That would be for the courts to determine in any individual case. But protecting sources is clearly an important principle for journalists, particularly those working in this difficult area. However, money and other resources are the lifeblood of terrorist organisations. The offences in Part III are extremely important in deterring and disrupting the planning and execution of any act of terrorism, the more so where concerted terrorist campaigns are concerned.

I know Members of the Committee will agree that every effort needs to be made to co-operate with the police in enforcing these offences. Nevertheless, the "reasonable excuse" approach is the best way to arrive at the right balance. By allowing each case to be considered individually, on its merits, we avoid the risks which would go with a blanket exemption while recognising that there could be cases in which a journalist—or anyone else—might have a reasonable excuse for keeping a belief or suspicion to himself.

In the debate in another place Mr David Lidington referred to the view that, it would not be in the people's interest for police time to be wasted by journalists reporting all the many rumours that they pick up when going about their normal occupation"— an argument with which many of us would find it hard to disagree. But it is surely for the police alone to assess the information which is reported to them and, above all, it is against the public interest for terrorists and their supporters to generate with impunity the funds and other resources which enable them to carry out their deadly crimes.

The Government believe that the importance of tackling terrorist finance is an overriding factor in this area. We do not support a specific exemption for journalists. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, asked about the number of prosecutions. I can advise him that there have been no prosecutions under the current provisions. In a sense, that underlines their important deterrent effect and the point I made earlier about the value of the clause bringing forward important information which will enable the prevention of terrorism. After all, that is what this legislation seeks to do.

We understand and have considerable sympathy with the problems Members of the Committee have highlighted in this short debate. We do not wish unreasonably to fetter the journalistic profession or, for that matter, other professions in the lawful exercise of their duties and responsibilities and their professionalism. But we have the balance right. We have narrowed the legislation as it was previously set out in the PTA. We have taken careful note of the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, in this matter and feel that the balance is about as right as we can get it. Given the seriousness and sensitivity of this issue, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Goodhart

I am grateful for the support that I received in this matter, not only from my noble friend Lord Avebury and the noble Lord, Lord Desai, but also and perhaps more importantly from the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford. On issues relating to the Terrorism Bill, support for these Benches from speakers on the Conservative Benches is relatively rare and therefore more valuable, but much more so in view of the long professional experience of the noble Lord as a journalist.

It seems to me, from the response made by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, that the Government—as the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, said—do not understand the way in which journalism works, nor the importance of the freedom of the press. Saying that journalists may be able to rely on the defence of "reasonable excuse" is nothing like an adequate answer here. The real problem is that, if journalists are threatened with being taken to court, they will simply not seek the information which may render them liable to prosecution, even if at the end of the day they may find themselves able to raise the defence of "reasonable excuse".

What is needed is an amendment making clear that journalists who act in good faith are not in danger of prosecution. This is an important matter. I have to say that I do not find the Government's answer satisfactory. Therefore, it is a matter to which we shall very probably wish to return at future stages of the Bill. Having said that, it is not my intention to press the issue to a vote today. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 41 not moved.]

[Amendments Nos. 41A to 41C not moved.]

Clause 19 agreed to.

Clauses 20 to 23 agreed to.

Schedule 4 [Forfeiture Orders]:

[Amendment No. 42 not moved.]

Lord Bach

moved Amendment No. 43: Page 73, line 9, after ("also") insert (", on such an application."). The noble Lord said: in moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 44 to 52. These are really minor technical amendments. Amendment No. 43 makes it clear that the Court of Session has power to make a restraint order under paragraph 18 where the Lord Advocate applies for a restraint order in the circumstances set out in sub-paragraph (2). Amendments Nos. 44 to 50 are all minor drafting amendments. As Members of the Committee will no doubt have seen, the changes reflect the drafting approach taken in Part I of Schedule 4 for England and Wales.

Amendment No. 51 ensures that all the appropriate sub-paragraphs of paragraph 27 can be applied to the enforcement in Scotland of external forfeiture and restraint orders. Amendment No. 52 ensures that the Bill correctly replicates the position in the PTA. Part IV of Schedule 4 allows for cases where a person subject to a forfeiture order is declared bankrupt. Under sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 47 the forfeiture order is set aside, but under paragraph 48 the Secretary of State is taken to be a creditor and has to be paid after the debts of all other creditors have been paid in full, with interest, under the relevant provision. Paragraph 48(3) defines "relevant provision", and the amendment to paragraph 48(3)(a)—Amendment No. 52—corrects the unintended omission of the application of this definition in relation to the winding-up of a company to Scotland. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bach moved Amendments Nos. 44 to 52:

Page 73, line 32, leave out ("Where") and insert ("When").

Page 74, line 35, leave out ("his").

Page 74, line 36, leave out ("his").

Page 74, line 37, leave out ("he is") and insert ("the person convicted is subsequently").

Page 74, line 38, leave out ("his").

Page 74, line 40, leave out ("has") and insert ("had").

Page 74, line 44, leave out ("is some") and insert ("was a").

Page 77, line 49, leave out ("(7)") and insert ("(8)").

Page 86, line 31, after ("Wales") insert ("or Scotland").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 24 agreed to.

Clause 25 [Seizure and detention]:

4.15 p.m.

Lord Glentoran

moved Amendment No. 52A: Page 12, line 26, leave out ("to which this section applies"). The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 52B, which seeks to remove subsection (3). The latter is a very convoluted provision regarding the potential movements of money, which seems to be completely unnecessary. We do not see why the movements of money that can result in arrest should be confined to movements to and from Northern Ireland, those in preparation to be moved to Northern Ireland, those in preparation to arrive here from Northern Ireland, or whatever.

If money is ill-gotten and "terrorist money", if I can use that phrase, and it happens to be on the move from A to B anywhere within this kingdom, it is reasonable for it to be apprehended and the necessary proceedings followed. That is the basis of our argument. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

I recognise the attractiveness of permitting cash to be seized anywhere, not just at borders. However, the seizure of cash is a significant interference with human rights. The Government need to ensure that they get the right balance—an expression I often use, but one which I believe describes the situation well. This has to be the case in the issue of civil forfeiture, such as provided for in Clauses 24 to 31. It is called "civil forfeiture" because forfeiture allows civil as opposed to criminal proceedings to take place. There is no need for someone to be convicted of a criminal offence. We are, therefore, proceeding in this area with some care and caution.

The cash-at-borders powers in Clauses 24 to 31 are modelled closely on those used in the Drug Trafficking Act 1994—legislation with which, no doubt, the noble Lord will be familiar. The main difference is in which borders are included. In the Drug Trafficking Act the powers apply only where cash is being imported into and exported out of the United Kingdom. In this Bill, the powers can also apply where cash is being transferred, say, from Northern Ireland to Great Britain or vice versa. We are not prepared in this Bill to go as far as permitting the seizure of terrorist cash other than at borders. That is because we are dealing with that issue, as I am sure the noble Lord is aware, in another context.

The third report of the Home Office working group on confiscation, published in November 1998, proposed a wide range of improvements to current law and practice. The working group recommended an in-depth study into the feasibility of a national confiscation agency to oversee civil forfeiture and, perhaps, take on other confiscation functions. The report also discussed a range of options, including extending civil forfeiture to all crime and all property and establishing a national agency to conduct all civil forfeiture of non-cash property, with operational oversight of cash forfeitures and criminal confiscations.

In collaboration with Her Majesty's Treasury and the Performance and Innovation Unit of the Cabinet Office, we have been working on a comprehensive package of measures in this area. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister will be publishing the report of the PIU study shortly. It will, I am sure, give much more detail on those proposals. Therefore, while we are using the opportunity of the Terrorism Bill to introduce civil forfeiture of terrorist cash at borders, modelled on the existing powers in the Drug Trafficking Act, to go any further at this stage would mean duplicating or perhaps cutting across the broader work that is of considerable importance in the wider sense of dealing with criminality. Options for civil forfeiture of terrorist cash other than at borders and of terrorist property other than cash are being considered as part of that much broader exercise.

With that reassurance, I trust that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment. We think that both amendments highlight a useful issue; indeed, it is something of which we are very aware and upon which we shall be publishing more details shortly. I hope that the Committee will be satisfied with my response.

Lord Molyneaux of Killead

In his response, the Minister used the words "at this stage". But in view of what has been said, the discussion we had in the debate on the political parties Bill, when we touched on a parallel problem of money shipment into Northern Ireland, and the Prime Minister's forthcoming statement, I hope that he has not entirely closed his mind to tightening up the draft legislation as it stands.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

The Minister's reply was extraordinary. It seemed to boil down to the idea that the Government intend to do what is suggested in our amendment but will do so on a much wider basis. That is what I gathered from reports in the press this morning. In other words, the Government will adopt a much wider approach but they are not prepared to act now. That seems odd when we have the Bill before us and the time is available.

Moreover, if I may say so, the Minister did not seem to put forward any argument as to why money should be seized when being moved from, say, Liverpool to Belfast, but not when being moved from London to Liverpool or, for that matter, from Belfast to Londonderry. It seems to me most odd that it is only when the money is being moved, or is being prepared to be moved, between Northern Ireland and Great Britain that it should be subject to seizure, and not when it is being moved within Great Britain or within Northern Ireland.

However, the Government clearly intend to return to this matter. We shall need to discuss it at a later stage in the Bill to discover the reasons why the measure is proposed in the first place and, secondly, to ascertain what the Government propose in agreeing with us as they appear to do.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

As I said earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, we find the measure attractive. It is clear from press coverage—perhaps of remarks attributed to my right honourable friend Dr Mowlam—that we regard this as an important area. At this stage we are content with the provisions that we have put in place. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Molyneaux, that as this is part of a wider and more complex picture we hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments at this stage. We recognise their importance and significance, but because of the complexity of the matter we wish to ensure that the provisions we introduce are workable and appropriate in all circumstances. We are grateful to the noble Lord for prompting this important debate.

Lord Glentoran

I thank the noble Lord for that explanation. Like my noble friend Lord Cope, I am not entirely convinced by the arguments that have been put forward but I understand that there is quite a lot of work going on behind the scenes. We look forward to hearing more, perhaps at Report stage of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 52B not moved.]

Clause 25 agreed to.

Clause 26 agreed to.

Clause 27 [Detained cash]:

Lord Bach

moved Amendment No. 53: Page 13, line 38, leave out ("of the following persons") and insert ("person"). The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 53 I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 54 and 55. These are three minor government amendments. Amendments Nos. 53 and 54 were suggested by parliamentary counsel and are purely drafting amendments. They achieve precisely the same effect as the original wording but make it more concise. Amendment No. 55 provides an opportunity for third parties to be heard in civil forfeiture proceedings similar to the opportunities provided in connection with criminal forfeiture proceedings in Clauses 23(7) and 58(6). This is an additional safeguard which I hope will be welcomed by the Committee. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bach

moved Amendment No. 54: Page 13, leave out lines 41 to 44.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 27, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 28 [Forfeiture]:

Lord Bach

moved Amendment No. 55: Page 14, line 23, at end insert— ("( ) Before making an order under this section, a magistrates' court or the sheriff must give an opportunity to be heard to any person—

1. (a) who is not a party to the proceedings, and
2. (b) who claims to be the owner of or otherwise interested in any of the cash which can be forfeited under this section.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment has already been spoken to. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 28, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 29 to 32 agreed to.

Clause 33 [cordoned areas]:

Lord Goodhart

moved Amendment No. 56: Page 16, line 9, leave out ("expedient") and insert ("reasonably necessary"). The noble Lord said: Before I deal with the substance of the amendment I should say that I asked for Amendments Nos. 57 and 58 to be removed from the group we are discussing. I was too late to secure a change to the groupings list but I hope that I shall be excused if I deal with Amendments Nos. 57 and 58 separately.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

They have been decoupled. Therefore they will form the subject of a separate debate. I hope that that helps the noble Lord.

Lord Goodhart

I am grateful for those comments. I obtained my groupings list from outside the Chamber. It was not marked with the word "draft" and therefore I assumed that it was the final version.

Lord Bach

It was the final one, but not the final, final one. Apparently there is a revised version outside.

Lord Goodhart

The first group of amendments I wish to address comprises Amendments Nos. 56, 117 and 123. These amendments seek to tighten up the requirements before certain action can be taken, in each case by requiring the action in question to be "reasonably necessary" rather than, as provided by the Bill, "expedient". Amendment No. 56 applies to Clause 33(2) of the Bill which allows a police officer to designate an area as a cordoned area if he or she considers it expedient for purposes of terrorist investigation.

Amendment No. 117 applies to Clause 44(3) which allows police officers to authorise the stop and search of vehicles if, expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism". Amendment No. 123 applies to Clause 48(2) which concerns the imposition of parking restrictions.

These are all, of course, actions which impose inconvenience on the public. No one in their senses would object to suffering some degree of inconvenience if there was a real possibility that as a result an act of terrorism would be prevented or if there was a chance of catching a terrorist. However, the action must be proportionate to the objective. I would have expected the test in the Bill to be that the action must be reasonably necessary, not absolutely necessary or essential.

The Government may say that "expedient" means the same thing as "reasonably necessary". Therefore this is in effect a probing amendment. Do the Government say that "expedient" means the same as "reasonably necessary"? If not, what is the difference between the two expressions? Can the Government give examples of differences? I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

I am not an expert in Fowler's Modern English Usage but I shall try to enter into the spirit of a debate about words.

Amendment No. 56 would alter the way in which the cordon designation regime under the Bill, which replicates that currently available under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, would work. It would replace the existing test that a cordon designation must be "expedient" for the purposes of a terrorist investigation with a "reasonably necessary" test. As the noble Lord said, Amendments Nos. 117 and 123 would similarly replace "expedient" with "reasonably necessary" in Clause 44, which covers stop and search, and Clause 48, which covers parking.

As we explained when a similar amendment was tabled at Committee stage in another place, we do not think that this quite meets the case. The police would not impose or maintain a cordon if they did not believe that to be the appropriate course of action in all the circumstances—and the involvement of a senior police officer in the process provides an adequate check on any tendency for over-use. However, that is not the same as requiring a reasonable belief that the cordon is necessary—which is what I take the amendment to mean. I am not sure that something which can be described as being "reasonably necessary" achieves exactly that. However, I shall not over-egg that argument.

An example might be where a bomb warning was imprecise, or the police believed it was inaccurate—deliberately or otherwise. In such a case the necessity for a cordon might be debatable, but it makes good sense to have one. Similarly, in the case of stop and search or parking restriction powers, there could be cases where a cordon might not he considered "reasonably necessary" but could be to the general advantage. That is the important test. For instance, this might be the case if the alternatives, in the light of a terrorist threat to an event, were to authorise the use of the stop and search power or parking restrictions around the venue or to see the event cancelled altogether.

That is not to say that the "expediency" requirement gives carte blanche for the police to set up cordons without good cause. The term has been criticised as being too broad or, perhaps, overly subjective. In debating it at the Commons Committee stage, Simon Hughes quoted a dictionary definition which suggested that the term carried a sense of being "morally dubious". But that is not the primary meaning or understanding of the term.

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary advises that the term means, Advantageous … fit, proper; suitable to the circumstances". That last expression provides the basis for the kind of criteria on which we expect the police to make judgments when considering whether or not to set up a cordon.

I hope that that explanation helps the noble Lord. In that spirit, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

4.30 p.m.

Lord Glentoran

Perhaps I may make a short comment, having lived in an atmosphere and environment of cordons, searches and so on for 30 years. In my experience, "expedient" is a word which is understood by those in the services; it is used fairly frequently in different ways. It denotes a positive attitude; a positive way forward. Those of us who have lived in such an environment know that we do not want our security forces pussyfooting around and hesitating about whether or not to cordon off an area. If there is a likelihood that an area should be cordoned-off and you live around there, you would want it cordoned quickly.

Lord Goodhart

I listened with interest to what the Minister said. His examples all seemed to be cases where the test of "reasonable necessity" would have been satisfied. Certainly if the police think that a bomb warning is inaccurate as to the location of the bomb, any area where they suspect a bomb might be would be cordoned-off not only as a matter of reasonable necessity but as a matter of virtually absolute necessity. I have no difficulty with that.

However, I am left with a slight sense of uncertainty. I question whether the test of what even a relatively senior policeman thinks is "expedient" is necessarily the right one. As to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, I take them very much on board. He has great experience of those conditions. But, again, the kinds of circumstances he spoke about would satisfy the test of reasonable necessity.

Having said that, we shall take the amendment away, think about it again and consider whether this matter is of sufficient importance to bring back at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 33 agreed to.

Clause 34 agreed to.

Clause 35 [Duration]:

Lord Goodhart

moved Amendment No. 57: Page 16, line 42, leave out ("14") and insert ("4"). The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 57 and 58 concern the power to cordon off an area and to exclude people from it.

There is no question but that this is an absolutely essential power in terrorist circumstances. Obviously the police need to keep people away from anywhere where they think a bomb may be liable to go off; they need to keep people away from land or buildings which are being searched for weapons or for evidence; and they need to keep people away from an area which is dangerous because of the damage caused to buildings by an explosion.

But, of course, the power can cause extreme inconvenience. People can be forced out of their homes; businesses in a cordoned-off area may have to close; and road closures obviously disrupt the activities of a locality. In most cases, closure would be necessary only for a matter of hours; where there has been an explosion, it could be a matter of perhaps two or three days in order to search for evidence and to remove debris. I wonder whether it is really necessary to provide that a police superintendent, on his or her own authority, can impose a cordon for as long as 14 days, and then extend it for a further 14 days.

The amendment seeks to impose a limitation of four days. I suggest that that would be sufficient in the great majority of cases. There may be a few cases where a longer period is needed but, given the serious effect of a cordon, I suggest that an extension beyond four days should require a court order. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

In our view, these amendments would significantly alter the way in which the cordon designation regime under the Bill would work. As the noble Lord explained, they would allow a cordon designation under police authorisation to last for only four days as compared with the current 14 days, extendable to 28 days, under the Bill. The amendments would also introduce a judicial involvement into the process.

This is, essentially, an operational matter. Having listened to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, of how one needs to be "expedient" in these circumstances—hence the use of that term in the earlier debate—we feel that this is a matter of expedience and of good operational sense. For that reason it would probably be entirely inappropriate to involve the courts.

I fully accept that a cordon imposes some limitation on the right of people to pass by and to have access to areas that they might otherwise freely use. But, after all, these powers are usually used in operational circumstances—for example, where an explosion has taken place; where evidence needs to be gathered; where the complexity of an investigation may grow; and in extreme circumstances of great tragedy, where many people have been affected, injured or perhaps even killed. It may well be necessary in such circumstances for the cordoned-off area to remain in that state for a particularly long period of time.

I think that the measures we have put in place, which allow 14 days and then a further period, will cover most circumstances. But, where the forensic examination of explosives at a bomb scene is involved, it may well be that the area will need to be cordoned off for much longer. We have a proportionate approach which bears in mind the interference and the rights of passage involved. I can assure the Committee that the police are extremely sensitive at all times to the requirements of businesses and individuals in the wake of a terrorist incident. It is no small miracle that business returns as rapidly as it does in those kinds of extreme circumstances.

Ultimately, of course, the use of the power in any particular set of circumstances could be tested by judicial review. After 2nd October this year it will be open to those concerned properly to exercise convention rights.

I hope that, in the light of those comments—focusing as they do on the essential operational importance of retaining the powers—the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendments.

Lord Monson

Before the Minister sits down, can he tell the Committee how many times in the past 30 years in the United Kingdom a cordon has been in place for longer than 96 hours, which is four days? It surely cannot have been very often.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

I suspect that the noble Lord is right, that it has not been very often. I do not have the data in regard to the effect of cordons, the length of time they have been in place and the number of instances, but I undertake to make inquiries in that regard. I am sure that the noble Lord will accept that there may well be circumstances—perhaps as with Canary Wharf or the Manchester bombing and so on—where, in extremis, it will be essential to have an area cordoned off for quite a long period of time,

Lord Goodhart

We will consider carefully what the Minister said. I do not hold out much hope for judicial review as a remedy. Given that the maximum period of time that cordoning can last is 28 days, it would he a very hopeful litigant who thought he might get a decision from a court within that time. We will consider that. I should certainly find it helpful if before Report stage the Minister could let me know how many cases there have been where cordons have been maintained for a period of longer than four days.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

I gave an indication to the noble Lord, Lord Monson, that I would make investigations about that and of course any information I produce as a result of my investigations I shall share with your Lordships and place a copy in the Library.

Lord Goodhart: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 58 not moved.]

Clause 35 agreed to.

Clauses 36 and 37 agreed to.

Lord Burlison

I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.