Lords Sitting of 29 October 1999

Preamble
The House met, at eleven of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Oxford.

Business of the House
Lord Carter: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend the Leader of the House, I beg to move the Motion standing in her name on the Order Paper.
The Motion is similar to Motions which were moved last July. The purpose of the Motion is to ensure that if there is a positive outcome arising from Senator Mitchell's review of the implementation of the Good Friday agreement, which is due to end on Sunday, the resulting secondary legislation can be laid before the House and taken without delay. If an instrument is laid on or later than Tuesday next week, there will not be time for the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments to report on it.
The second limb of the Motion I am moving—to suspend Standing Order 72—allows a Motion to approve any secondary legislation laid before the House next week to be taken, notwithstanding that the Joint Committee has not had an opportunity to report on it to the House. This power would be used only in relation to a Northern Ireland order resulting from the Mitchell review. The first part of the Motion allows an order laid next week to be debated on the same day that it is laid. The Motion is purely an enabling Motion and will have no effect if no such order is laid. This Motion has the full consent of the usual channels.
Moved, That, in the event that one or more statutory instruments relating to Northern Ireland are laid before the House before the end of the Session, a Motion or Motions to approve them may, notwithstanding the practice of the House, be moved forthwith; and that Standing Order 72 (Affirmative Instruments) be dispensed with to enable the Motion or Motions to be taken, notwithstanding that no report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments on the instruments has been laid before the House.—(Lord Carter.)
Lord Molyneaux of Killead: My Lords, in view of the numerous reports that some kind of deal has been reached, can the Government Chief Whip assure the House that any document originating from the Northern Ireland Office will be examined very carefully in order that the House is not humiliated as it was on the earlier date in July to which the noble Lord has referred?
Lord Carter: My Lords, the Motion is purely procedural to allow a debate to take place if necessary. We need it to change the Standing Order to enable us to take it on the same day.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Nuclear Waste: Science and Technology Committee Report
11.6 a.m.
Lord Tombs Lord Tombs rose to move, That this House take note of the Report of the Science and Technology Committee on Management of Nuclear Waste (3rd Report, HL Paper 41).
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should first declare some interests, past and present. I am an honorary Member of the British Nuclear Energy Society, and from 1978 to 1990 I held a series of posts in the electricity supply industry in which I had a close involvement in the policy and practice of nuclear power. I am also a director of UK CEED, of which more later.
The bulk of the nuclear waste existing today, and that which is certain to arise in the future, arises from past military and civil programmes. The problem exists and it has to be solved. It cannot be avoided by deciding today to discontinue nuclear power or to stop the reprocessing of spent fuel.
The time-scales which characterise the life and behaviour of nuclear waste are quite unique, requiring the safe isolation of the waste from the environment for hundreds of thousands of years. The difficulties of arriving at technical solutions, and of securing public confidence in those solutions, occupied much of the time of our Committee.
The inquiry, which lasted for 16 months, was occasioned by the rejection of the Nirex application for planning consent for the construction of a rock characterisation facility at Longlands Farm near Sellafield to determine whether the site would be suitable for the construction of a deep disposal facility for intermediate level nuclear waste. The declared government policy for disposal at that time envisaged the construction of deep geological facilities. The refusal of planning permission threw that policy into some confusion.
The chairman of the Select Committee on Science and Technology at that time was the late Lord Phillips of Ellesmere, whose breadth of knowledge and analytical mind are greatly missed by his colleagues. He considered the topic to be of such importance that he decided to chair the sub-committee himself. Unfortunately, his health problems worsened rapidly and he had to relinquish the chair after the first few meetings. He asked me to succeed him as chairman, a task which I undertook with great sorrow and a recognition of the difficulty of following him adequately. He remained interested in the inquiry even when he was too ill to attend meetings, and he made many useful suggestions in the course of our conversations.
The inquiry was complex and interesting. I should like to take this opportunity to thank my committee colleagues for their patient support and help: our Clerk, Dr Don Rolt, for his devoted and skilful approach to the organisation of our work; our special adviser, Ms Marion Hill of W.S. Atkins, whose experience and expertise proved invaluable in exploring and evaluating the many issues which arose in the course of the inquiry; and our special assistant, Tim Bradshaw, whose diligent research clarified many complex issues. I should also like to thank the many organisations and individuals who provided written and oral evidence to the Committee and who gave generously of their time and experience in doing so. Our overseas visits to the United States of America, Canada, Sweden and France added greatly to the perspective of our study. Our thanks are due to the organisations we met in those countries and to the staff of our High Commission and embassies for their help.
Although the immediate cause for the inquiry was the rejection of the Nirex application to build a rock characterisation facility—in effect, a large underground laboratory—with a view to establishing the suitability or otherwise of that site, it rapidly became clear that many other issues vital to a satisfactory solution remained open.
We examined the question of geological disposal in stable rock formations at depths of 300 metres or more; we looked at the Nirex proposals for Longlands Farm at some length; and we sought the views and experience of organisations in other countries. We were greatly impressed by the volume and quality of the research and development work in this field, which has progressed steadily around the world; and we accepted the overwhelming view of experts here and abroad that understanding of the issues made geological disposal a practical and desirable solution.
But we departed from the early Nirex view, which had characterised much of the work being done abroad, that the waste could be sealed in a repository and left in complete confidence. We concluded that provision for monitoring and, if necessary, retrieval could and should be made for a considerable period of time, and that sealing of the repository should take place only when a sufficient level of confidence had resulted from continuing research and experience. We call that "phased disposal" and recommend its adoption. The recommendation seems to be gaining support in other countries.
Organisations opposed to geological disposal, such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, proposed instead indefinite surface or near-surface storage while research work continued on alternative solutions. They were not able to suggest useful lines of research which might meet that goal. We concluded that their opposition to geological disposal was not well-founded and that the proposal for indefinite surface or near-surface storage would place unreasonable demands for supervision and control on future generations and, indeed, on the stability of society itself over the very long time-scales that we had to consider.
Any future provision for the management of nuclear waste will require public acceptance. We examined ways in which that problem is being approached in other countries and suggest ways in which it might be achieved in the United Kingdom. We recommend wide public consultation before the policy is settled by government and endorsed by Parliament, and recommend regular reports to Parliament and subsequent endorsement by that body in order to preserve the necessary level of public support. We also looked at economic incentives to secure the willingness of local communities to accept disposal facilities, and we make some suggestions that might suit the UK.
A number of novel methods of public consultation have emerged around the world in recent years, and a Consensus Conference on Radioactive Waste Management was sponsored by Nirex, the NERC and the OST which was held in London in May this year, following the publication of our report. The report of the conference has been published by the organisers, UK CEED, of which body I am a board member, although I played no part in the conference or its preparation. The conclusions of the lay panel were carefully argued and thorough and offer a useful way forward in the necessary task of involving the public in a carefully considered examination of the complex problems involved.
Beyond the immediate question of geological disposal lie other matters which would greatly affect any future management strategy. There are wastes for which no long-term policy has yet been adopted, and there are a number of materials for which no use can be foreseen but which are not currently classified as waste. As a result, future storage and disposal needs are not well defined and some hazardous materials continue to be stored by essentially temporary methods. Until those matters are addressed, we shall not know the size of the disposal facilities required and we shall not know whether one site will be sufficient.
Further complication arises in the MoD nuclear programme, in which obsolete submarines are kept afloat pending a decision on disposal. That "wait and see" attitude applies also to spent submarine fuel which is in store at Sellafield. That policy carries the risk that the MoD may one day request space in a repository for which no provision has been made. The long-term management of both submarines and fuel should be brought into a national strategy, and we so recommend.
The present fragmentation of waste management policy that I have described is unacceptable, and we recommend the creation of an independent nuclear waste management commission charged with the development and oversight of a coherent and comprehensive strategy. We suggest that that body could well organise the national consultation exercise and would eventually become a statutory body with responsibility for establishing repository requirements and standards and overseeing the work of a "radioactive waste disposal company" charged with the exploration, development and operation of disposal facilities and the necessary enabling research.
Nuclear waste is generally divided into low, intermediate and high levels, representing the activity level of the wastes. The Nirex proposals, in accordance with government policy at the time, proposed the geological disposal of intermediate-level waste. Our proposal is that both intermediate and high-level wastes should be placed in a deep geological facility.
Turning to low-level waste, there is at present only one facility for its disposal; that is at shallow depth and is at Drigg, near Sellafield. The site is owned by BNFL. We understand de it has a limited capacity for some types of low-level waste (for example, contaminated soils and building rubble) and that its capacity will be exhausted by about the middle of the next century. A new site will be needed well before then.
It is important to recognise that nuclear wastes are stored carefully at present, and I should like to take this opportunity to praise the professionalism of the organisations involved, including BNFL, British Energy, Nirex, the Health and Safety Executive, the Environment Agency and RWMAC. But effective management on a short time-scale does not satisfy the need for a safe, robust long-term solution for long-lived wastes, including those that will be produced by dismantling obsolete facilities. Their effective isolation from the environment in a reliable way, one that does not depend on the expertise of the current management of the industry, is an essential requirement for dealing with the present inheritance and an essential prerequisite for any extension of nuclear power.
We did not examine the merits or objections to the extension of civil nuclear power, but we might note here that its important contribution to our present-day economy, and to our international obligations to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide is falling as the early Magnox and AGR stations reach the end of their lives and no provision is made for their replacement. I believe that even to retain the option of further nuclear power for the future will require a clear and effective strategy for dealing with the waste products of the process.
I turn now to the vexed question of plutonium, about which much has been said and written. Some seek to demonise the material, incorrectly claiming it to be the most hazardous substance known to man. Others seek to defend it as a store of energy which may be of great value to society. The fact is that it is a hazardous material with a very long half-life and it is fissionable, making it attractive to terrorists.
Currently, we have a large stock of plutonium for much of which no use can be foreseen. That stock, now about 60 tonnes, is expected to rise to about 100 tonnes by the year 2010, largely as a result of necessary reprocessing. We recommend that the surplus stocks should be declared as waste and disposed of accordingly. We have examined the contribution which fast reactors and the use of mixed-oxide fuel could make to the problem and suggest the retention of a strategic stock. To put this in context, a fast reactor core would probably require about 4 tonnes of plutonium. Therefore, a strategic stock might be of the order of 10 tonnes.
We received representations that reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel should be stopped. We rejected those arguments, partly because of technical considerations which require the reprocessing of Magnox fuel and partly because of a study by RWMAC which demonstrated that, within the limits of the uncertainties involved, reprocessing is environmentally neutral. We discussed with BNFL the possibility of reprocessing for waste management purposes rather than to produce plutonium, and that may merit further examination.
The management of nuclear waste is a subject complicated by technical considerations and by public perceptions and fears. It is a problem shared by other countries but the way in which it impacts upon them, and consequently the solutions available to them, differs substantially given the history of the nuclear industry in those countries. Some began with weapons programmes and had early reprocessing of spent fuel; some continued to reprocess with the idea of recycling plutonium in fast reactors; and some never reprocessed their spent fuel and treated it as waste.
Despite those important differences, there are also many important similarities of risk assessment, safety standards and research requirements which make international collaboration desirable and fruitful. The organisations involved in this work perform a valuable role in collating and disseminating information and in promoting best practice. Great Britain is a valued and active member of these associations.
Occasionally, the idea of extended international collaboration leads to the suggestion of international disposal facilities for nuclear waste. This is an attractively simple idea but one which does not for long survive the realities of the problem. The nature and dimensions of the problem vary between countries depending upon their history. The need to win public support is difficult enough for any country when contemplating its own problems without the questions of transport, of acceptable safeguards and safety and of societal stability. That leads me to conclude that if there is to be an international approach to the provision of waste disposal perhaps it will be in the distant future when the many problems of public acceptability and technical organisation have been satisfactorily solved.
The Government's response was published last Monday, more than seven months after our report appeared. I welcome their careful and thorough examination of the issues and acceptance of the main thrust of our report. I have some comments on parts of the response which, given the length of time that I have spoken, I shall save for my closing remarks. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House take note of the Report of the Science and Technology Committee on Management of Nuclear Waste (3rd Report, HL Paper 41).—(Lord Tombs.)
11.23 a.m.
Lord Winston: My Lords, I echo the comments just made about the late Lord Phillips of Ellesmere whose initiative in setting up this inquiry was so important. As his successor in chairing the Select Committee I miss his guidance, kindness and huge insight into matters scientific. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, for taking over chairmanship of the subcommittee and doing such a splendid job over the course of a year. This was a lengthy and complex deliberation and an unusual amount of inquiry went into producing the excellent report. I believe that that shows the extraordinary strengths of the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology.
Perhaps I offend slightly against the conventions of the House if I say that it is not very often that I have the opportunity to speak before my boss. It is wonderful to see the House so full on a Friday morning. I am sure that one of the reasons is that we all want to hear the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh. It gives us great pleasure that he has devoted time to become active in, and to augment, the scientific work of the Select Committee. We shall listen to his maiden speech with great interest. I hope that that does not further increase his blood pressure. I always find it difficult to speak in this Chamber.
I note that the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, is to speak. Sadly, this may be one of the last occasions on which we shall hear from him, for reasons outside our control. We are grateful to him for the work he has done on the Select Committee.
Whether we like it or not, there is no question that we have to live with nuclear matters. Even if we remove the biggest source of nuclear waste—the power industry and weapons—we shall still require many products of nuclear engineering and items that cause radiation. It is interesting to consider the origins of the public mistrust of nuclear matters which are relevant to the debate. Public mistrust was perhaps initiated by the notion that nuclear weapons were a potent source of human destruction. Very pertinent to that was the measure of secrecy and deception practised in the early development of nuclear weapons. It has been pointed out that not even the Cabinet was fully notified at the time that a British nuclear bomb was being developed.
Further, a number of serious incidents have affected the public perception of the nuclear industry: Windscale in 1957; the meltdown at Three Mile Island; Chernobyl, which scattered radiation over a wide area; and the more recent episode at Tokaimura in Japan. However, if one adds up all of those events, the alarm that they have caused is completely disproportionate to their measurable harm. For example, they probably pale into insignificance compared with risks such as road accidents. In this country the commonest cause of death among those under 47 is not an accident on the railway but a road traffic accident on the MI or something similar.
The problem with nuclear engineering, power and waste is that the risk is seen as being imposed rather than a matter of individual choice. The nuclear industry has not been viewed by the public as being lily
486
white. There have been examples of unsatisfactory record-keeping and, in some cases, monitoring. There have also been undocumented releases into the environment, notably at Dounreay. That was pointed out in 1995 by the Committee on the Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment and the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee.
As to risk, the irony is that the amount of exposure to radiation in domestic circumstances, for example, from radon in Devon and Cornwall, is well above the level that would be acceptable in the industry and, as far as is known, is never reached except on those rare occasions when there is a release. People do not refuse to live in Devon and Cornwall, and there has never been the slightest panic about radon exposure. There has been chronic comment, mostly in the press, but it has never achieved much public perception; nor should it, possibly.
It is worth pointing out that it has been calculated on good evidence that of the 50,000 exposed survivors of the nuclear explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, horrendous though they were, 400 died from cancer between 1950 and 1990. That is less than 10 per cent of the survivors of the two nuclear bombs.
We must address the issue of risk and we must recognise that the nuclear industry is capable of good and harm. When examining other sources of power, such as fossil fuel, it is almost unarguable that they are much more dangerous and have caused more deaths.
The real trick relates to the public's perception of these issues. I do not want to pre-empt what the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, will deal with in his next report for the Select Committee, but it is relevant to point out that there is a real need for public understanding and for the Government to accept public concerns.
Above all, we must be able to forecast issues of scientific importance. Frankly, we have done a bad job in that regard. We did an extraordinarily bad job over BSE. We did not recognise that it would be coming, but we certainly knew that CJD might be a problem. The classic, most recent, example is genetic modification. I do not believe that that story has yet ended. It relates only to foods, but it might extend. I believe that we could have had more foresight and seen the problem coming.
Therefore, procrastination is not a good idea. The noble Lord, Lord Tombs, referred to a wait-and-see policy. However, I am concerned about the Government's response. It is an extraordinarily detailed report which needs urgent action, but the Government have not taken it on board. We in this country have procrastinated over the disposal of nuclear waste for a long time and the report appears to advocate further procrastination. It is worth looking at its final sentence:
"The Government firmly believes that it will be important not to rush this process but to take the time required to make sure each step forward commands the widest possible public support".
It sounds good, but we have not done much about pubic support and we must. That is a debate that the Government might stimulate in the near future.

487
Finally, a recent BMJ leader on radiation and medicine contained a good comment:
"In most human endeavour there is room for improvement.".
In this case, one cannot help feeling that the industry could undertake better monitoring. There is a need for greater communication with epidemiologists and statisticians so that we can understand the risks in relation to the industry. There is a need for more dialogue with psychologists and sociologists about why the public are sometimes unnecessarily alarmed and how we might obviate that. We need to ensure that journalists do not exaggerate. What we must not do is procrastinate and leave it to the pressure groups. In doing so, we risk creating a serious problem in respect of something that is important to our welfare and economy. It is only reasonable to say that the Government could do more. I hope that they will consider implementing some of the Select Committee's suggestions more rapidly than appears to be the case.
11.34 a.m.
Lord Oxburgh: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Winston, for his kind remarks. Although I assure your Lordships that there was no collusion, there could not have been a better introduction to what I have to say. I know that maiden speeches should be uncontroversial and I may be unwise to make my first contribution on nuclear waste. But perhaps I, too, should begin by declaring not so much a personal interest as past involvement. I served for a time as the Secretary of State's nominated representative director on the Nirex board. Within the MoD, I had nuclear responsibilities and several years ago I chaired a government inquiry into the safety of UK nuclear weapons. Most recently, I helped to plan the Consensus Conference on UK nuclear wastes.
The report which the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, introduced today is a most valuable contribution to the debate. As he says, whatever our future policy on nuclear power, we must resolve the problem of the waste. Wastes remain toxic for a long time and somehow they must be made safe. But safety must be quantified. Present regulations state that the risk of a person dying as a result of releases from a repository should be less than one in a million.
In order to meet a requirement of this kind, one has to understand, first, how human health is affected by radiation, and thus what release from a repository can be tolerated; and then how to keep releases below that level by using geology and engineering. As the report shows, matters relating to geology and engineering have been pretty well aired. The physiological response to radiation has, however, received less attention and it is that which wish to address.
The health risk from radiation is calculated according to a time-honoured formula—really a recipe—that incorporates two important assumptions. The first is that the physical effects of radiation accumulate throughout our lives with, by implication, progressively more damaging consequences. This is known as the "dose accumulation assumption". Secondly, it is assumed that for any dose of radiation,
488
the health damage is exactly proportional to the dose; twice the dose gives twice the damage and so on. This is known as "linear dose response".
Taken together, the two assumptions have some interesting implications. They imply, for example, that a succession of exposures at low level can be equivalent to a single exposure at a higher level. This is like saying that drinking two glasses of wine every day for a week is the same as drinking 14 glasses in one go; or, more relevantly, 30 minutes sunbathing every day for a week has the same effect as one exposure of three and a half hours. We know all to painfully that that is not true!
Throughout our lives, we are continuously exposed to radiation from sources that we cannot control, mostly from the earth's radioactivity. People on aeroplanes and mountains may be closer to God, but that means that they are less shielded by the atmosphere and receive an extra dose of radiation from space.
In fact, life-time total exposure can be quite large but generally does not seem to bother people. We know, however, that if someone received the same lifetime dose in a fraction of a second, as perhaps in a nuclear accident, they would at best be very ill indeed. This suggests that the human body's response to radiation is decidedly non-linear and that slow exposure to radiation over the years is very different from a single massive pulse, even though the total amounts of radiation are the same. That is probably the case because body cells have mechanisms that continuously repair damage to their genetic material. Provided that the repair processes can keep pace with the damage, there is little or no long-term harm to healthy people. Faced with a single massive dose, the repair mechanisms do not have a chance.
There is growing recognition that the assumptions in the current formula are probably wrong. It is likely that life has evolved in such a way that most individuals can tolerate a certain level of radiation—the threshold level—without permanent damage.
The idea of safe thresholds for contaminants in the environment is well established. It is not clear why they were not adopted for radiation in 1959 when the present conventions were proposed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. It was probably because it was urgent at that time to agree a simple and precautionary means of estimating the effects of radiation exposure. What was adopted at the time as a quick, administrative solution has achieved a permanence and authority that was almost certainly never intended. That is now recognised by a number of authorities, including the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation which, earlier this year, decided to revisit the basic concepts underlying the current approach.
What has radiation response to do with today's debate? If current assumptions on which all planning is done are invalid—or substantially so—health and safety requirements for waste repositories, above or below ground, can be met with engineering and geological specifications significantly less demanding and less costly than at present.

489
To digress briefly, it may also mean that we are imposing heavy and unwarranted costs on all users of radiation such as hospital imaging units, university laboratories or even nuclear power plants. But worst of all, after the Chernobyl disaster, around 15 million people were moved from their farms and turned into refugees who are still in a desperate plight. Those people were moved because current radiological assumptions suggested that they were in danger. If they are wrong, they led the authorities to turn what started as a very serious nuclear accident into today's massive human catastrophe.
Science and experience have come a long way since 1959. It would be opportune now to review the working assumptions on how our bodies respond to radiation. Others are doing so and it could save substantial public expenditure, not to mention unwarranted personal anxieties and grief.
I very much hope that the Minister will give this matter some consideration and, in so far as a number of departments are involved, perhaps consult the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser.
11.43 a.m.
Lord Jenkin of Roding: My Lords, rarely can the House have heard a speech of such absorbing and fascinating interest and opening up an entirely new line of inquiry, of which the Select Committee might like to have been able to take advantage. I regard it as a great pity that the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, did not serve with us on the Select Committee. I hope that it will not be impertinent of me, as a mere layman, to offer him my warm congratulations on an outstanding maiden speech. It must be rare for a maiden speech to be delivered in this House which one would wish to see published in its entirety in the tabloid newspapers.
The noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, comes to the House with a long and distinguished career behind him. He is a geologist, He was a distinguished academic; for 13 years being Professor of Mineralogy and Petrology at the University of Cambridge. As a public servant he was the Chief Scientific Adviser at the Ministry of Defence for five years. He is now a university leader—the rector of the Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine since 1993. He could not have delivered a speech that demonstrated more clearly the advantages of including medicine in a general university establishment. He has numerous academic distinctions. He has served on many important committees, including the Dearing Committee on Higher Education. I am delighted to be able to tell the House that the noble Lord has been co-opted on to the Select Committee on Science and Technology and has joined the Science and Society inquiry to which the noble Lord, Lord Winston, referred. The noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, has spoken today with authority and humility. I am sure that I am not alone in looking forward to hearing more from him in the future.
The noble Lord, Lord Tombs, referred to the late Lord Phillips of Ellesmere. I should like to be associated with his generous words. Perhaps I may
490
add, as the first member of the committee to have spoken, how much we owe to the noble Lord's expert and extremely patient chairmanship. We were a difficult lot, but we produced in the end a unanimous report which I believe will be one of the major milestones in the history of the difficult matter of nuclear waste.
I believe that I was the only former Minister with responsibilities in this area to serve on the committee. I was Secretary of State for the Environment from 1983 to 1985. So, addressing the Front Bench opposite, I can say that I have some understanding of the problems facing Ministers in dealing with this problem.
I should like to refer to the Government's response—if that is the appropriate word. Our report is dated 10th March 1999. On 16th April, the department wrote to the Committee Office which had asked when we could expect the Government's response. In its letter the department referred to two purdah periods: that between the local government and devolution elections in April and May, and the period following the elections to the European Parliament; that is between 20th May and 10th June. The letter then said:
"Ministers are currently aiming to publish the response between the end of the first purdah and the beginning of the second".
That is to say, we could have expected the response before the 20th May. Then on 24th May, there was the consensus conference to which the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, has already referred. At the conference the Minister made a good and responsive speech, but said this:
"Can I just say that the Government's position is that we will be responding to the House of Lords' Report very shortly about the need for public acceptance at a local level".
That was 24th May. The Minister continued:
"We will then be issuing a Green Paper, by the end of the year I hope, precisely to encourage this citizen involvement".
We have had to wait until this week to receive the response that is before us: six months—three times the normal expected period.
Earlier this week I received a letter from the Minister, Mr Meacher. It begins:
"The Government has today published its response to the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology".
He kindly enclosed a copy. Anyone who has read this response could be forgiven for thinking it is a non-response. It does not say anything of any significance. It is a "peace and motherhood" document. Yes, there must be public acceptability; yes, there must be a long period of consultation; yes, we shall issue a Green Paper early next year. But beyond that, there is virtually nothing. Today's debate has to be a debate on our report. It cannot be a debate about the Government's response.
For that reason, my first question to the Minister is this. The report and the Government's response to it talk about the need for openness and transparency. Indeed, those words occur frequently in our report. Why has it taken so much longer than was indicated by Ministers in the spring to produce such a thin and

491
uninformative document? Perhaps we should start today with a little openness and transparency in the shape of an honest recognition by Ministers that they have faced difficulties in producing even this document, and then an account to the House of what those difficulties were.
As the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, indicated in his speech, the report raises a great many issues and I wish to comment upon only three. The first is public acceptability, to which all speakers so far in the debate have referred. For me the inquiry has been something of an eye-opener. I readily admit that for too long I have accepted unquestioningly that if the science clearly points to a solution, and if the overwhelming body of scientific opinion accepts that that solution is the best one, it only remains to inform the public of that fact in order to be able to proceed.
One of our most fascinating witnesses was Mr Eric Faulds of Shell UK Exploration and Production. He described this process as "DAD": decide, announce, defend. We all know what happened to Shell when they followed that process in relation to Brent Spar. Mr Faulds then described, during an illuminating session of evidence, the lessons Shell learned from that episode. It is not enough to tell the public, however much consultation with stakeholders may have taken place and however much agreement may have been reached about a particular solution and however scientifically correct the solution may have been thought to be. In spite of all that, it will not have public acceptability if the public has had no say.
I realise now that it was that that lay behind what I now recognise as my failure, as the then Secretary of State, to make any progress on this 15 years ago. Yes, we had Nirex; we had RWMAC, the advisory committee; and, yes, we tried to engage in local public consultation. There may be some who will remember the furore over the suggestion that the ICI potash mine in Billingham would be a suitable store. Yes, I made regular Statements in another place. But we made no attempt to engage in a more general public consultation on the options open to us. If I may say so, the result was not just "DAD", but "DADA", with "abandoned" at the end: decide, announce, defend, abandon.
The lesson goes far wider than nuclear waste, which is why the Select Committee decided to set up the inquiry "Science and Society" to which the noble Lord referred. I must not pre-empt any recommendations which may emerge from that. However, I can say that my colleagues and I are much impressed by the evidence that the process of engaging the public on matters scientific must be a two-way process. The public has perceptions and, even more importantly, has values which, if not taken into account, will guarantee failure. That was also pointed out in the 15th report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. We have learnt that this proposition is now widely accepted, and the issue turns on how it is to be done. On that, the Government's response has been total silence. We shall have to wait for the Green Paper.
492
I returned recently with some colleagues from the United States with a great deal of food for thought about openness, regulatory bodies meeting in public, holding public hearings, the use of the Internet and much, much more. I hope that the Government will be able to take such actions into account.
My second point can be expressed much more briefly. However much public consultation is held, in the end decisions are decisions for the Government and they must have the approval of Parliament. That is why in paragraph 6.53 of the report we recommend that:
"The policy should have explicit endorsement by Parliament, as well as a large measure of public acceptance".
We go on to add in the following paragraph 6.54:
"It is essential that the policy is endorsed by Parliament at regular intervals during its implementation".
Parliament is the place where the nation should express its approval. Public acceptance is a necessary precursor to that, but it is Parliament that gives the Government the authority to proceed.
In my final point I shall return once more to the question of how it is to be done. The noble Lord, Lord Tombs, referred to the Consensus Conference held last May. Like the noble Lord, I should declare an interest as a board member of UK CEED. This is only the second such consensus conference to be held in this country. The House will be intrigued to know that the first was held on the subject of plant biotechnology. It was almost entirely ignored by all those concerned—scientists as well as the authorities. The result, as has been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Winston, was that earlier this year GMOs blew up in our face. Here again we must learn the lessons.
There are two lessons here, and they are both reassuring. Given an initial briefing on the facts and arguments, and given the opportunity to formulate the issues, to decide which witnesses to hear and to cross-examine them openly, 15 ordinary members of the public chosen entirely at random can make sophisticated cost-benefit analyses and will reach conclusions that will be widely regarded as full of common sense. That was what happened last May at the Consensus Conference on Nuclear Waste. Trust the public, or, as Churchill said, trust the people.
The second lesson is this. Two or three years ago when we were contemplating this matter, as a UK CEED board member I was deeply anxious that, on the sensitive nuclear issue, the process would be hijacked by the ultras and descend into confusion. However, I need not have worried. The process has in fact precisely the opposite effect. The panel of lay people quickly recognised that bodies like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have their own agendas, and are more concerned with publicity for their own causes than with helping to find a solution to the problem under study. On the final day of that panel's report in public, many witnessed the members shaking their heads sadly as, with his back to them, Charles Secrett, director of Friends of the Earth, delivered his comments on the findings. They realised, as I recognised, that the kind of openness and transparency inherent in the Consensus

493
Conference process is what puts the single issue groups in their proper place. Yes, voices to be heard, but only one of many.
A similar moment of truth came for me during the course of our inquiry. My noble friend Lady Platt of Writtle examined the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, and Dr Helen Wallace of Greenpeace on their attitudes to shareholder consultation. I shall quote the exchange, in the hope that I am not pre-empting my noble friend. Question 4.70 of the oral evidence stated:
"If society were to decide, by whatever process, that disposal is the best option, then would Greenpeace be prepared to contribute to the debate on taking this concept forward, and select the location for a site in the United Kingdom? If so, what features would you like to see in any future site exercise?"
That was the question from my noble friend. The noble Lord, Lord Melchett, answered that as follows:
"The short answer to that, my Lady, is no".
Honestly, one does not really need to say more than that. I hope that Ministers will take account of that. Mr Meacher has a good deal to do to convince the scientific community that he recognises the place of those groups in the scheme of things and that he will not give a wholly disproportionate weight to the single issue fanatics.
I am to be followed in this debate by the noble Lord, Lord Flowers. The committee's report, like the Flowers report of 20 years ago, must be seen as a major milestone on the way to finding a solution. I hope that its recommendations will be closely followed over the years ahead. I only wish that when I was Secretary of State I had had the kind of guidance, particularly in the public acceptability chapter, available to my successors. We tried to find a solution—I went back and revisited the files on the issue—but, like everyone else at the time, we were locked into the "DAD" mindset: decide, announce, defend. That was why we failed. This Government will have no excuse for failing again.
Noon
Lord Flowers: My Lords, I too should declare that I spent many years of my life in, or close to, the nuclear industry although that is no longer the case. I hope that I shall be forgiven if I do not follow the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, although I believe that I agreed with everything he said.
I listened to the distinguished speech of the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, with great interest, as I am sure did the whole House. I am glad that my friend and colleague from Imperial College is now my noble friend.
The noble Lord, Lord Tombs, gave the members of his sub-committee an enjoyable, if at some times exhausting, run for our money. Of particular value were the visits that we paid to other countries which struggle to safeguard nuclear waste. Some of them had gone further than we had in Britain, and that boosted our belief that the matter was not insoluble, as some would have us think.
494
The noble Lord, Lord Tombs, has given an excellent account of our findings and I certainly do not intend to repeat them. I want only, first, to emphasise our firm conclusion that what is required and can be provided is "phased geological disposal". That includes a vital element of long-term monitoring, and postpones the need for irreversible actions until it is generally agreed to be safe to take them.
There is no realistic alternative to phased geological disposal. Some propose that waste can be stored indefinitely on the surface. Certainly it can be kept alongside the power station that produces it during the life of that station—50 years or so, but indefinite surface storage would be irresponsible, given the need for maintenance and periodic hazardous repackaging, and the political instabilities that are likely over many hundreds of years.
Secondly, we proposed a sequence of actions by which there would be full public consultation at every stage of the process over 25 years or more, together with properly appointed bodies to oversee and manage the whole long enterprise. We now await the Government's own consultation process—I must confess with some unease, because it is not a matter that should any longer be delayed and I am not encouraged by the government response to think that it will not be.
Throughout our inquiry I was reminded of a much earlier inquiry referred to briefly by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, which was conducted by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, which at the time I chaired. In 1976 it produced a report entitled Nuclear Power and the Environment. In it we recommended that there should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear power until it had been shown beyond reasonable doubt that the waste could be safeguarded for the indefinite future.
Those were the days when the industry was pushing for an absurdly large nuclear programme, which it is certainly not doing now. In any case, there is no point in making such a recommendation today. Thanks to several decades of civil and military production, the waste now exists in quantity and has to be dealt with. Neither expansion, nor indeed contraction, of production will greatly affect the scale of the problem to which we are now irrevocably committed.
However, global warming is also upon us, and it is generally agreed that we must reduce carbon emissions as a sensible precaution. Renewable resources seem unlikely to substitute effectively for oil and gas, at any rate for many decades. In these circumstances, there will surely be fresh demands for nuclear power in the coming decades.
If that happens, as I believe it will, the situation envisaged in the 1976 report could recur, whereby nuclear production is to be held back pending resolution of the disposal problem. That is why it is so

495
important that we lose no more time getting to grips with it. We have already had the expensive failure of Nirex at Sellafield, which represents a considerable delay. Further delay may well put the future of our electricity production in jeopardy.
There is a further lesson briefly to be drawn from a comparison between the 1976 report and the present one. The Royal Commission could not fail to notice the arrogance and condescension of the leaders of the nuclear industry in those days towards all environmental criticism. Nowadays, the tables are precisely turned. Now it is the leaders of the environmental movement who are arrogant and condescending, not even, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, mentioned, willing to accept an adverse decision of Parliament.
No doubt arrogance is endemic to public life. Lack of it is described as "grey". But arrogance contributes not a jot to the solution of great technological problems. What we need now is concerted hard work in which those who provide the technology and those who care for the environment gradually learn to trust each other to seek agreed solutions.
The programme of consultations, decisions and actions proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, provides the necessary public framework. I hope that the Government, when they have done their own consultation, will agree to implement it.
12.8 p.m.
The Earl of Cranbrook: My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Flowers, for whose wisdom I have the greatest respect. I am glad that, as I depart from this House, he and others, who have reached their position on these red Benches by merit rather than by the anachronistic but biological process of birth, will be here to carry forward the wisdom and integrity of the House.
I pay tribute also to the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, for his vigorous and clear-sighted chairmanship, based, as he said, on his long familiarity with the issues. The noble Lord has politely and sensibly deferred his comments on the Government's reply until his winding up remarks. We do not have that opportunity, and I shall follow my noble friend Lord Jenkin in responding to the Government's position as stated in that response.
I should like to say how strongly I endorse the principal conclusions of our report. We avoided alarmist language but there are clearly very hard reasons for concern about the management of nuclear waste in our country. We make the point that there is a large legacy of existing and predicted waste that must be dealt with. We present the organisational arrangements, which are not satisfactory at the moment. We recognise that past approaches to find a solution have not worked, and we recognise that radioactive waste management is no less profoundly serious an issue now than it was in 1976 when the Royal Commission, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Flowers, first looked at it.
496
I read a few extracts from another report. A committee of your Lordships' House stated that it believed that,
"steady progress towards a solution of the radioactive waste problem should be independent of any decisions on the future of nuclear power … The need to take the first steps now does not mean that unsatisfactory solutions will be imposed in an arbitrary way without due consideration. The date of commencing actual disposal operations is a political and not a technical decision".
The committee believed that,
"the nuclear industry and the regulatory authorities have to learn how to make better and more frequent use of the mass communication media … The history of sudden and rapid shifts in United Kingdom policy can hardly have improved public confidence".
I do not need to go on. That was the report of a committee which I chaired in 1988. What has happened since? The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, says that he hopes our present report will be a landmark. It deserves to be because it is extremely sound and has excellent opinions. But there has been no shortage of sound and excellent opinions in the past and no government of any colour or description have taken sufficient notice of them.
This is a problem shared with, let us say, the world and certainly with our fellow citizens of Europe. There are those among us who have enjoyed the benefits of a secure power supply from nuclear facilities; we enjoy the benefits of radiotherapy when we are sick; and—perhaps this is more contentious—we have enjoyed relative stability and world peace during the fearsome confrontation period when the policy was defined as "mutually-assured destruction".
Let us consider briefly what is happening in the European Community. The European Parliament is engaged in very much the same debate. The report by Mr Giles Chichester, MEP, is available on the European parliamentary web. On the 22nd of this month the Parliament discussed the urgency of the problem of decommissioning nuclear power stations and other nuclear installations in Europe where there are 128 nuclear power stations in service and 39 being decommissioned.
At European Community level there is now serious concern over the decommissioning of the JRC installations that were installed in the first heady days of the EURATOM treaty of 1957 when EURATOM was given the task of contributing to the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries by creating the requisite conditions. It did so by setting up research stations which were scattered through Europe. One of those stations—Ispra—has been closed for a long time. Decommissioning has become a serious issue. The Commission's recent report, Cm. No. 114, recognises that the continuing maintenance of those research centres presents a steady drain on resources and an increasing risk to the environment. The safe disposal of the nuclear materials in those sites is now an urgent problem.
Our Government contribute to the decisions made in Europe through the Environment Council. I should like to ask the noble Lord how seriously our Government take this issue and how seriously they are

497
urging the European Community to reach decisions on those facilities for which the Community as a whole is responsible.
In the Select Committee we had a small discussion on exactly to whom our report was to be addressed. The noble Lord, Lord Tombs, will remember very well what I said, which was that we were approaching devolution. Our report was published at the end of March, just a few days before the devolved Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament were instituted, although they did not, of course, become active until July.
The noble Lord, Lord Tombs, will remember that I wanted to address our report to the entire devolved administrative system which was about to be set up. As is still the case in legal documents in this day and age where "his" refers to "his or hers", we agreed that "Government and Parliament" should refer to the governance and the assemblies or Parliament throughout the devolved institutions that were about to be set up. I am pleased to note that, in the introduction to their reply, the Government clearly state:
"The Government and the devolved administrations propose to publish a detailed and wide-ranging consultation paper early in 2000".
That is admirable. But, necessarily, I ask the noble Lord who will reply what consultations he or his department have undertaken with the devolved administrations. What debate have those devolved administrations engaged in to enable the noble Lord to make that very positive statement? I believe it is an extremely important statement because, unless we involve the devolved administrations, we shall not get anywhere at all. Therefore, although I agree firmly with my noble friend Lord Jenkin that Parliament must be the absolute arbiter, under the devolved arrangements there is not now only one parliament. There are parliaments and assemblies which must be involved.
We are agreed that the process should involve people. I rather abhor the phrase "the public". Some of the Eastern languages which I speak have a way of saying "you" which either means "you and me" or "you and not me". I have a feeling that when we use the word "public", we tend to mean somebody who is not us. I believe that we should talk about people and that we should go further. Instead of saying "the public", we should say "my spouse and I and our children and our grandchildren think this". I believe that that is the way in which the process must devolve. It must involve people.
The noble Lord, Lord Winston, aptly illustrated the public mistrust of science. The noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, gave us a brilliant exposition of science. I understand what risk means, and the noble Lord, Lord Flowers, gave a balanced view of risks. But, as my noble friend Lord Jenkin emphasised, it is not perverse of people to be unpersuaded by the cold facts of science. Through the focus groups and through the people's juries, we know more and more about the way that sensible people can reach sensible decisions.
498
However, even sensible people are not persuaded by facts and figures. I remember that the noble Lord, Lord Howie, who has now left his place, became involved in a debate on exactly what is meant by "probability", which we all remember.
These are unfamiliar terms, and the hazards are so horrible that you cannot expect people to have balanced mathematical approaches to those hazards. Inevitably, the risks are more feared than the equally terrible but much more familiar road accidents, which have taken away a significant number of people, including in my case, close relatives. If we were to look around us, I believe we should all find that we had lost friends and relations through car accidents. None the less, we all drive.
We have agreed—and the report is very firm on this—that the public must have a say. There are processes for involving the public; there are processes for involving people; and, because I shall not be here, there are processes for involving in the future my spouse and my children.
In this report we recognise that one of the major institutional perversities of the present system is the planning system. We refer to this in paragraphs 5.35 and 5.36 where we call for improvements. The Government have responded to that by reference to their own documents. They have referred to the consultation paper, Modernising Planning—Streamlining the processing of major projects through the planning system. They have not referred to the paper by the right honourable Richard Caborn, published in April 1999 and also entitled Modernising Planning. There is also a document called Planning Policy Guidance Note No. 11 on the subject of regional planning.
Those are tinkering documents. Essentially, they are conservative with a small "c". I therefore hope that the Minister will say that the modifications to the planning system are anathema to the Prime Minister. They are not a solution to our present problem. As the report makes clear, we need a widespread process to develop a consensus.
I have already referred to the importance of involving the new devolved assemblies and the Scottish Parliament. The Welsh Assembly has responsibilities for sustainable development. I praise the Government in their approach to sustainable waste management in England. Their publication, A Way with Waste, recognises that waste solutions are an essential part of sustainable development. As the noble Lord, Lord Flowers, said as long ago as 1976, we should not develop any process until there is in hand a scheme for disposing of the waste that will be created. That is a key element in sustainable development.
The UK Round Table on Sustainable Development recommended that the Scottish Parliament should charge its Executive with the same duties that the Welsh Assembly is charged with by statute. The regional development agencies are charged with sustainable development duties. Each of those should be reminded by the Government that sustainable development carries within itself the concept of

499
sustainable management of waste. As I have emphasised, every one of us benefits from the nuclear facilities we have, be it through power, medicine or, probably, defence. This task must involve not only the Government but the entire gamut of regional and devolved administrative, consultative and policy-making institutions set up by them.
We are beginning to understand the exercise of the new devolved system in the United Kingdom. It is important that that whole system should be brought to bear on this problem.
12.21 p.m.
Baroness Platt of Writtle: My Lords, first, I join other noble Lords in welcoming to this House the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh. After hearing his fascinating speech and knowing of his reputation in the past, we are grateful that he is to join our committee in the future.
As has been said, our report was published in March. The government response was finally published four days ago, on 25th October. I hoped that it would at least agree with our emphasis on the urgency of the present situation. I am glad that they will publish a consultation document in early 2000. However, nearly all the other recommendations of our report seem to be put off and we are left with little government encouragement after all our careful work.
As mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Winston, there is a whiff of procrastination about decision-making in the future, which we believe is wrong. The time taken to arrive at decisions must depend, as we and the Government say, on public consultation. Nevertheless, the programme will need government drive with all patties behind it if safety is to be safeguarded for future generations.
It is nearly two years since Lord Phillips of Ellesmere, who chaired the main Select Committee on Science and Technology, suggested with his customary courage that we should study this difficult subject. He chaired our sub-committee expertly and openly until his illness overcame him and, to our great sadness, he died. The noble Lord, Lord Tombs, stepped into the breach magnificently, as always. He chaired the committee equally expertly until the publication of our report. We were fortunate in the experience and expertise of both of our chairmen, our expert adviser, Ms Marion Hill, and our clerk, Don Rolt.
As we all knew from the start, the problem of the management of nuclear waste is unique in its difficulty, bearing in mind its hazardous nature and the fact that the hazard may continue for hundreds of thousands of years. Some people may wish to bury their heads in the sand and put off decisions for as long as possible, emphasising the long-term nature of the hazard. We took the opposite view: that waste exists as a result of past civil and military nuclear programmes. It will not go away. Whatever decisions are made in future about nuclear power and the reprocessing of spent fuel, it will continue to exist and must be dealt with. We owe that responsibility to future generations so that they too can continue to deal with it safely and responsibly.
500
Our consultations with witnesses were all open to the public. Many witnesses with considerable expertise provided evidence, both written and in person, which again is published. We believe deeply in the importance of openness and transparency in dealing with this difficult subject in order to build up public trust in the future. We therefore operated in that manner during our inquiry.
Members of the committee travelled abroad to gather international opinion on the options available for disposal as it is an international question; for instance, disposal on the bed of the deep ocean might have been a feasible solution but is now prohibited by international agreements.
It is clear that while learning from each other's experience and sharing expertise, individual nations will have to make their own responsible decisions for disposal of their own nuclear waste. As research continues internationally, results need to be available to all nations so that they can benefit in their future decision-making. However, we were impressed by the majority view from the scientific and technological communities world-wide in favour of deep geological disposal.
Our conclusion, therefore, is also in favour of phased deep geological disposal in a repository where the waste can be monitored and, if necessary, retrieved; the repository being kept open while research data is accumulated and closed only when there is sufficient competence to do so. That is a key decision of our committee.
We hope that a long time-scale of open consultation and public government decision-making, which we expect to stretch over a period of about 24 years, will build up public trust and acceptance of the resultant programme set out on pages 51 and 52 of our report, including a timetable of many years. We believe that our suggested programme of parliamentary and government decision-making, interspersed stage by stage with open and transparent consultation, is the best way to build up that trust. We set out our suggested programme, including the publication of both Green and White Papers, for consideration, both publicly and by Parliament, as an important stage in the process leading to a Bill establishing future policy.
I am glad to say that the Government's response accepts the need for that kind of consultation before controversial decisions are made. However, these nettles will need to be grasped firmly in future. That will include establishment of a nuclear waste management commission, outside government, which, to begin with, can operate in a non-statutory way in gathering public opinion. A Bill would later give it powers of oversight. It must operate openly, making annual reports, have expert scientific and technical staff, and be properly funded over a long period so that it can carry out necessary research and maintain records of research already carried out. In that context, I was glad to see that the Government, in their response, specifically value the strong research base and expertise of Nirex in the mean time.

501
The commission will also need to ensure adequate long-term funding for repository development, operation and closure by the Government. The Environment Agency needs to be given statutory powers over the storage of nuclear waste, not only on civilian sites but also, over a period, on military sites to ensure similar safety standards. I am glad the Government give encouragement to that.
Eventually, there will be a need to design, construct, operate and close repositories. For that, we recommend the setting up of a radioactive waste disposal company, industry and MoD-based, which will also have to operate in an open way. At that point, Nirex and RWMAC should be disbanded.
With the Bill through Parliament, the commission and company in place reporting annually to Parliament and the public, the most difficult part of the operation will need to start. I refer to selecting a site or sites for the repository. We are all deeply aware of the NIMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome. I was involved as a councillor in Essex's fiercely fought battle against the third London airport at Stansted. However, one of the things one learns in public life is that one cannot win them all, and the site for the third London airport, sadly, is in Essex.
Similarly, the actual site or sites will have to be found for this repository or repositories. The search must be open, transparent and involve the public, especially the local population who must be compensated practically for the blight that may be caused. We have not been good at that in the past as a nation. We must consider the anxieties of individuals and the local authority in planning practical support, both financially and in terms of local infrastructure, in good time and make sure that the scale of support is well known locally.
There is no doubt of the public's anxiety about the consequences of the disposal of nuclear waste, both in its extreme form by single issue groups, to which my noble friend Lord Jenkin referred, but also through its technical complexity and lack of understanding of the effects of radiation by the general public. There will be a need for patient and clear explanation by the scientists, as illustrated by the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, this morning, and the technologies involved. Public education will take time. The media need also to present balanced, factual information and to seek confrontation and sensational stories less avidly if a good decision is eventually to be reached.
The present storage is not designed to last for ever, and within 50 years the waste will need to be repackaged and transferred if proper decisions have not been laid long before that. That would mean leaving a crisis legacy to our grandchildren, which is neither right nor proper, nor is it responsible. The nettle needs to be grasped now to set our timetable lines of action in motion so that a stable and controllable situation is left for future generations. The Government need to start that action without delay.
12.32 p.m.
The Earl of Shannon: My Lords, we should all be grateful to my noble friend Lord Tombs and his sub-committee for this well-prepared report on a subject which has, for far too long, been one of weeping, wailing, hand-wringing and wondering where to go, especially by green pressure groups.
It was in October 1997 when I tried, by means of a debate in your Lordships' House, to draw your Lordships' attention to the problems of disposal of high level nuclear waste. At the time I was unaware that the Select Committee on Science and Technology had only just decided to form a sub-committee to inquire into that subject. Unfortunately for me, that deprived me of what should have been the star speakers in my debate, as they were all now members of the sub-committee. However, the debate proceeded, albeit slightly lamely, and I drew your Lordships' attention to the neglected use of synthetic titanium ceramic rock instead of borosilicate glass for the safe encapsulation of high level and possibly other nuclear waste. I was privileged later to give evidence to the subcommittee. In the meantime, I was invited to join the company, Synroc International Limited, which was trying to encourage the use of such synthetic rock, and so I must now declare that interest.
I do not wish to go over my evidence again or what I said in the debate of 1997, save to emphasise that borosilicate glass, admirable in its day, came into use for the purpose of packaging high level nuclear waste, although comparatively less research had been done into it, unlike ceramic which had been researched to death for 15 years, all of which has been highly satisfactory. Yet it was never used commercially and the original patents have expired. The organisation originally possessed of the proprietary rights for commercialisation proudly announces that it has had a continuing programme of research but omits to say how it failed commercially. All that is now past and new technology from elsewhere is available.
As your Lordships may know, I have been extolling the use of titanium ceramic as being today's technology over glass; but I now find that I may be in error. There is yet another technology—described in paragraph 3.10 of this excellent report we are now debating—which in my opinion is set fair to become tomorrow's, if not today's, technology. I refer to transmutation, already well researched and a fully viable technology, especially for surplus plutonium. The only bar to its use so far seems to be the totally uneconomic and large size of accelerators, apart from physical or chemical partitioning, to provide the necessary energy to the protons used in the bombardment of the waste.
So there is an accepted technology, unable to be used owing to the uneconomic size of parts of the equipment. However, recent developments show that with backward wave linear accelerators of Los Alamos connection, protons can be given the necessary energy and, through a subcritical nuclear reactor to process nuclear waste by splitting long-lived actinides into short-lived isotopes, at the same time produce useful

503
energy. Being a subcritical reactor, there is no question of any possible damage to the environment, any more than would result from an accident at a big contemporary, non-nuclear power station.
Even this BWLAP technology produces a requirement for an unfortunately large accelerator. But there is better news yet with the latest technology incorporating a three-dimensional accelerator. The size of the accelerator comes down to a manageable, and even almost portable, unit of a 10-metre cube, giving the possibility of its additional use in medical and other industrial or security projects.
In this excellent report we have the recommendation that we should have a nuclear waste management commission. I heartily support that and can only hope that they will see and use the advantages of the newer and later technologies which provide for the better immediate packaging of high level waste with ceramics, rather than the ageing leaking glass and, best of all, render the waste far less radioactive as well. This will, of course, facilitate the use of phased, safe, deep deposit in areas at present undesirable on hydrological or other grounds.
Please let us not allow the new technology to become, as has happened for so many years with the ceramics, just a professor's "toy" and the subject of continuing endless research without practical application. Perhaps we may hope that the Government will produce their fully comprehensive policy as quickly as possible, for both parliamentary and public acceptance, so that the proposed commission can get to work and help to solve this pressing problem.
12.40 p.m.
Baroness Hogg: My Lords, as a member of the sub-committee, I have interests to declare in the chairmanship of an economic consultancy working in the energy field and as a former director of the Energy Group.
In contributing to this important debate—what a pleasure to hear the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, and what a sadness to think that we shall hear no more from the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, or even from his mobile phone—I should like to join other members of the Select Committee in thanking the Government for their response but in a tone somewhat tinged by disappointment. They are in danger of entering a closed loop on this issue. It is essential that a policy for the disposal of nuclear waste should command general support. But policy does not create itself. The general attitude to the problem can be expressed as hoping that if this particular sleeping dog is left to lie, someone may have a better idea of how to manage it when it wakes up.
Of course, it is true that immediate solutions are not needed, but that attitude can lead to sheer irresponsibility with respect to the issues involved in the use of nuclear power. The ongoing management of nuclear waste from our use of energy is enough of a burden to pass on to future generations. It would be quite unconscionable to pass on all the burden of thinking about it as well.
504
I commend the Government on undertaking to begin consultation in the new year. However, I have to say that their reluctance to commit to a timetable for the whole process of policy formulation fills me with gloom. With merely the intention to "see how consultation goes", it seems to me rather too clear that successive Ministers will find it easy to dump the problem in the too difficult box labelled, "Leave for my successor".
The Government have rejected the committee's advice to appoint a commission to undertake this consultation exercise. To be fair, I think that the arguments for doing so are indeed finely balanced. On the one hand, if a commission comes up with a policy that Ministers do not like, the process of policy formulation becomes more rather than less difficult. On the other hand, a commission might attract greater public trust than politicians or their Civil Service departments, so that its proposed solution would be more likely to command support or at least acquiescence.
I would assert that with greater confidence if there were not evidence of greater mistrust in scientists than in the past, making it rather harder to believe that a committee of experts could walk where Whitehall fears to go. But to my mind, the clinching argument in favour of a commission undertaking this work is its visibility. Government is perpetually consulting on almost anything that you care to mention, for indefinable periods of time and a range of reasons, including a simple desire to prevaricate. A visible commission would be under much greater pressure to complete its work and report.
The Government are right to say that such a commission could not sensibly consult and advise on whether it should itself have charge of the process of disposal. But if Ministers understood that to be the recommendation of the committee, there must have been a failure of communication. Once policy had been decided by Ministers and legislated on by Westminster, a new statutory commission, essentially different from the original advisory commission, would of course have to be appointed. The Government are hedging their bets by saying that decisions on management should await the outcome of consultation. That is reasonable enough. But in declining to express a view even on the advisability of appointing a statutory commission, answerable to Parliament, to oversee management, I think that they are being just a little constipated.
There is one other issue of acceptability that I should like to stress. The mechanisms of consultation and consensus-building are important in the development of a viable national policy. But they are, as our report emphasises, quite distinct from the problems involved in securing local agreement to a disposal site. National consensus on such issues, however carefully constructed, will always be fragile. I do not believe that it can or should be mobilised to force acceptance of a disposal site on any local community. I personally believe strongly that we must proceed, as the Swedes are doing, only on the basis of consent.

505
That has some very important implications. Most obviously, there will be no hope of achieving agreement unless a particular local community sees some benefit. That, of course, strengthens arguments for proximity between production and disposal. But let us make no mistake about it—achieving acceptance will depend not merely on government sensitivity but also on government generosity. The usual Treasury attitude, which is to concede as little as possible to begin with in the hope of ending up without spending too much, would be highly counter-productive. On this most sensitive of issues, I believe that—as in Sweden—the views of the local community must be respected. Once lost, the local argument cannot be rewon. Therefore, Whitehall must learn from past mistakes in this respect, and think well ahead.
Our report ranged widely not only over the science of disposal, but also over the perception of risk and the issues of accountability and acceptability. We did not, of course, all agree on all issues. I should, therefore, like to pay heart-felt tribute to our chairmen: Lord Phillips, who is so much missed, and the noble Lord, Lord Tombs. The noble Lord, Lord Tombs, showed immense skill in achieving consensus and bringing this inquiry to a substantial conclusion. His achievement has been to lay out a way forward for government in this difficult area. I hope that his efforts will not be wasted.
12.46 p.m.
Lord Cavendish of Furness: My Lords, it is difficult to exaggerate the debt of gratitude owed to the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, and his colleagues on the Select Committee for this remarkable document entitled, Management of Nuclear Waste. I join other noble Lords enthusiastically in welcoming the report, which is more than just an excellent review of the present position. It is also more than just a series of recommendations, good as they may be. It seems to me that it presents the Government with a wonderful opportunity because it provides a new foundation upon which to build a clear policy for the future management of nuclear waste. Moreover, it unambiguously services notice that this is a national issue of first importance and that it should no longer be delayed.
As some noble Lords may know, I was involved in the issue of nuclear waste when I had the honour to serve for six years as a director of UK Nirex Limited, appointed by the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. For a time, I was a colleague of the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, whose maiden speech it was such an extraordinary pleasure to hear. As it happens, in June of this year I was hugely gratified, and slightly surprised, to be re-appointed by the present Secretary of State. Unfortunately, I do not think that I measured up to his exacting standards because I survived in that position for only a day—or was it a day and a half?
I cannot let this occasion pass without saying how greatly I was struck, as a director of Nirex, by the tremendous professionalism and commitment I found among Nirex staff at all levels. There was also a vast base of knowledge and experience in that relatively
506
small organisation. It has been and remains an anxiety of mine that the considerable values that have accumulated through science programmes and other work could be lost, perhaps by accident.
New organisations are envisaged in this Select Committee report. If the existing structure of Nirex were dismantled, I earnestly hope that the Government would take a lead in protecting—or cause to be protected—the assets that successor organisations could take advantage of. I pay tribute also to the chairmen under whom I worked at Nirex. I believe that Nirex was fortunate in the leadership of both chairmen with whom I worked: first, Sir Richard Morris and then the present chairman, Mr. David Bonsor. They did, and continue to do, a wonderful job, often operating in extremely difficult circumstances.
Nirex has never been short of critics and the company itself acknowledges that many lessons were to be learned from the events leading up to the refusal of planning permission for the rock characterisation facility in Cumbria. Science, as my noble friend Lord Jenkin says, is not enough. First and foremost is the approach to gaining public acceptance for any policy on how best to deal with radioactive waste. The report is, I am sure, absolutely correct, as other noble Lords have said, in recognising that full consultation in an atmosphere of openness and transparency will be essential if any government policy is to succeed.
I and, I am told, former Nirex colleagues welcome the Government's intention to consult on all aspects of policy and policy development so that the whole landscape can be minutely explored and thought through before attempting to move forward. I understand that Nirex has just implemented its own transparency policy which is designed to give interested parties access to the scientific and technical information needed to take decisions. This is an important step forward and a practical demonstration of how lessons have been learnt by Nirex.
Mistakes were made in the past but the central fact remains that radioactive waste exists—as my noble friend Lady Platt said—and more is being produced as we speak. It is simply unacceptable for anyone to try to ignore the problem and hope that something turns up eventually to "magic" this beastly material away. Britain has to develop a long-term policy designed to protect current and future generations from the hazards posed by this material.
Further work and further consultation are essential features of any future strategy. I join the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, and other noble Lords in commending the conference organised by UK CEED—in which noble Lords were so much involved—last May. It seemed to me an excellent example of how to involve a broad spectrum of people in discussions with policy makers. It showed that when people learn about issues of site selection, risk analysis and how one can engineer practical solutions to problems, they in turn pose highly intelligent questions which need good and proper answers from the experts. This, I venture to

507
suggest, is the way to generate trust and reduce fear. The technicians and the decision makers need to learn from such exercises and design processes that take account of the concerns of people at large. Only then will there be any measure of public acceptance for any future policy.
There is one aspect to this debate that needs consideration. The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, who will reply for the Government, makes no secret of his membership of Friends of the Earth and therefore probably knows better than I what is the current thinking of Friends of the Earth and other "green" NGOs towards building a repository. I hope that he may take the opportunity of telling us that. In the past it seemed always to me that they adopted a tactical and ideological line which held that the very concept of a repository was to be opposed because it enhanced the nuclear industry's chance of securing new build once this generation of nuclear power stations is decommissioned. This of course generated contrived criticism and gratuitous hostility towards Nirex. What the "greens" most feared, put simply, was a solution being found to the intractable problem of nuclear waste.
The question of whether Britain maintains the option to build new nuclear generating capacity will be central to future debates. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, touched on that point. I do not think that that is a matter for today's debate but I hope that it will be decided sooner rather than later because it is such a closely related matter. But today we can all concentrate on the issue in hand which is that radioactive waste exists, more is going to be produced, especially with decommissioning, and the country needs to have a long-term policy on the safest place for these materials. It seems to me self-evident that below ground is better than on the surface.
The issue of the science is another area of much discussion. I welcome the Government's intention to review all the science of deep disposal to see exactly where more work needs to be done and where there are areas of consensus. Obviously, there needs to be a sound scientific underpinning to the whole endeavour.
The issue of radioactive waste is one where there are few if any votes to be won. This is an area where the population relies on the Government to do what is right rather than what is electorally expedient. Like radioactive materials, governments also have half lives. All administrations decay with time; their will and their authority decline. But this Government are relatively young and on this issue Ministers can surely dispense with political advice and do what Ministers should do, which is decide. With a huge majority in another place the Government have the chance to develop and implement a policy on radioactive waste management that will serve the country well for generations to come. It will be an enduring achievement of Ministers if they accept this challenge.
12.55 p.m.
Lord Chorley: My Lords, I begin by congratulating my noble friend Lord Oxburgh on a marvellous and important maiden speech. He is a great addition to this House.
I put my name down to speak in this debate on this excellent report for two reasons, although I can claim no expertise at all on the subject. First, like my noble friend Lord Flowers, I believe that it is likely that the global warming problem of fossil fuels may give rise to strong pressures to return to nuclear power generation. We should remember that if the economies of China and India take off in a sustained and serious fashion in the years ahead, the current level of CO2 emissions will seem rather modest if they have to rely on fossil fuels. Therefore, industry and government need to find acceptable ways—both technically, and, just as importantly, politically—to deal with nuclear wastes.
The second reason I want to speak in this debate is that the nuclear waste problem is part of a much wider problem which is, in large measure, a political problem. I refer of course to the public perception of risk and the widening gap between actual risk and perceived risk on which many have spoken with great effect, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Winston. There is, indeed, a breathtaking muddle-headedness, particularly in the media, leading to deep suspicion of science, scientists, engineers and technical experts. I shall return to that point.
I found the technical side of the report thorough and convincing and I can readily go along with the basic but important conclusion of "phased geological disposal". I find irresponsible, to put it no higher, the much touted "indefinite surface storage" proposals which are based on the hope that something better might turn up and which are advanced by some of the so-called "environmental organisations". Indeed, I sometimes wonder whether they want to find any solution. In that connection, I noted with the greatest interest the quote from the report from the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, and the question of and answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Platt.
To me, the most important part of the report is chapter 5 on the problems of public acceptability and chapter 6 on policy development and organisational issues. I believe that it is wise to separate the decision on which method or process of disposal should be adopted—which is clearly a national issue—from decisions on which site or sites should be used, which are locational issues. It is wise to separate widely these issues in time—by years—and it is wise that there should be extensive public discussion and that Parliament should be involved at each stage. To recognise that the whole process will take at least 25 years is both prudent and proper. We should be under no illusions, however, that the locational stage—which the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg mentioned—of where to site such facilities will be fraught with difficulty. There is, indeed, a big educational process to be gone through if public acceptability is to be achieved.

509
It seems to me that this part of the report has been carefully thought through and I look forward to the Minister's response. I have to say that I was not aware that the Government had produced a response. When I inquired at the Printed Paper Office at the end of last week, there had not been a response.
It is in connection with that response that I revert to the issue of public attitudes to risk and the perception of risk in general. I suggest that the wider problem is now becoming a very serious cause for concern which needs to be tackled by government. This report is helpful in this regard, but equally, if government—and for that matter society—also start to tackle the problem on a wider front, it will serve to help in progressing the nuclear waste disposal problem.
The problem I am alluding to arises in its most strident form when we have a disaster such as the recent rail crash at Ladbroke Grove, or equally, for example, at Clapham Junction. It arises in a rather more complex way over BSE and new variant CJD. There are, of course, many other examples, to which there have already been references today. The characteristic of all of them is the demand for, and indeed the implicit notion of, completely safe systems. The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, was close to answering questions on this only two days ago.
This problem also gives rise to the well identified paradox that people are happy to take enormous risks in their private lives but react violently against statistically minute risks in the public domain. It gives rise, as I have said, to the unfortunate issue of the credibility and trustworthiness of professional experts. It also gives rise to serious distortions and anomalies in investment decisions. It hampers, delays and distorts policy-making. I suspect that the economic and social costs of those distortions is colossal. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Winston, has given a number of examples. However, I realise that the House is expecting an important announcement in a moment and so I shall not add to the examples that he gave.
In the hot-house world of health and safety regulation, rationality goes out of the window, and so we are left with a situation in which reality—let us call it "measured risk"—is swamped by perceived risk. In other words, the political reality is what is perceived, not what is real. All this is of course well known. It was the subject of an important Royal Society report in 1992. In recent years, the social scientists, through ESRC funding, have done a lot of work in this area. What is not clear to me is whether we are getting any closer to ameliorating the problem.
It seems to me that a huge educational effort led by, but not confined to, government over a period of years is now necessary. I should like to think that this report has shown us part of the way forward. That is valuable, but I rather suspect that a much wider effort will be required.

Hereditary Peers' Elections
1.3 p.m.
The Clerk of the Parliaments: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will now announce the results of the election of 15 hereditary Peers ready to serve as Deputy Speakers or other office holders, in accordance with the provisions of the House of Lords Bill and Standing Order 9.
Six hundred and thirty-one Peers completed valid ballot papers. A paper setting out the complete results will be available in the Printed Paper Office and the Library when I sit down. That paper gives the names of the successful candidates and the unsuccessful candidates, with the number of votes cast for each.
At the election held on 27th and 28th October the following candidates have been elected:

Candidate

Votes

C. Mar

570

L. Strabolgi

558

L. Elton

558

L. Lyell

547

L. Skelmersdale

544

L. Aberdare

530

L. Brougham and Vaux

525

V. Falkland

519

L. Colwyn

488

V. Oxfuird

482

L. Reay

471

L. Geddes

461

V. Simon

453

L. Methuen

421

L. Ampthill

418

The tie between Lord Strabolgi and Lord Elton was resolved by taking into account voters' preferences, which puts Lord Strabolgi ahead of Lord Elton on that basis.

Nuclear Waste: Science and Technology Committee Report
1.5 p.m.
Debate resumed.
The Earl of Liverpool: My Lords, as so often happens in this House, it is an elegant quirk of fate that it falls to me, as a hereditary Peer who will probably not be with you for very much longer, to thank the Clerk for that announcement and to congratulate all noble Lords who won in the election. If it is not too presumptuous of me to do so, I should like also to commiserate with all those who did not get through. There are more elections coming up and there is still hope for them, I think. Having made those brief remarks, I continue with the debate on the Science and Technology Committee's report.
I speak with some trepidation because I am a rank amateur among so many professionals in your Lordships' House. However, I wish to declare my reason for standing up today. I did speak some five years ago in the debate on the low level waste repository at Billingham, to which my noble friend

511
Lord Jenkin of Roding, referred. So maybe this is my swan song but at least there is continuity: I have spoken before on this subject in your Lordships' House.
I join other speakers in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, and all members of his Select Committee, for an excellent report. I thought it very thorough and very detailed. It is a veritable mine of information about the state and size of the problem which faces us, going into great detail. More particularly, as my noble friend Lord Cavendish stated, it is important to future generations. It faces us, but more importantly it faces future generations. It is a sobering prospect to read in paragraph 2.13 that safety assessments of high level waste disposal indicate that potential risks to humans may be significant for hundreds of thousands of years.
This is an international problem. Reading through the report I was interested to see a table which lists in descending order the countries, showing the percentage of electricity generated there by nuclear power stations. Top of the list was Lithuania, with just over 81 per cent of its electricity supply generated by nuclear power. France came second with 78.2 per cent. The United Kingdom was quite a long way down the list, at only 27.5 per cent. I know that we are having a little local difficulty with our neighbours across the Channel at the moment but we share a common problem with the disposal of nuclear waste. Certainly, with their placing on the list, it is a significant problem for them too. I hope that we shall be able to discuss this problem with our neighbours and seek to resolve it in the near future.
It is difficult for me, as an amateur, to understand in volume terms the size of the problem. The report states that the total stock of all radioactive waste as at April 1994 was 40 million terabecquerels. I hope I have got the pronunciation right. Not knowing what terabecquerels were, I turned to the glossary of the report, as suggested. It told me that a terabecquerel was 1012 becquerels. I was still somewhat confused, but I understand from inquiries I have made in the Library that this is a unit to measure the relative speed of nuclear fusion or fission—I am not sure exactly which. However, it still does not enable me to visualise the volume or the weight of this waste. I could not find that anywhere in the report. It would have been of great interest to me to have been able to visualise the actual dimensions in terms of size and scale of the problem. I do not know whether the Minister will be able to enlighten me when he responds.
As my noble friend Lord Cavendish said, this is a big problem. It is getting bigger; and it has to be addressed. I was pleased to see in the report that disposal of radioactive waste in deep oceans has now been excluded effectively as a practical viable option. That had always concerned me. As has been said, the most favoured option is the emplacement of vitrified or synroc high level waste in deep geological formations on land. This would require the creation of deep mined tunnels and caverns. When I read that, my thoughts turned to the possibility of adapting one or two of our disused coal mines. That might make sense; and it
512
would provide employment opportunities in some areas of high unemployment. There may be insurmountable geological problems in doing so. As my noble friend Lady Platt of Writtle said, there is always the NIMBY problem. I do not know whether that suggestion is a "runner", but I hope that at least it may be considered.
The executive summary states that the present policy for waste management in this country is fragmented. It goes on to say that the problems require changes in the organisational structure of waste management. Other noble Lords have referred to that. It proposes the setting up of a nuclear waste management commission and a separate radioactive waste disposal company. When established, those would subsume the role of Nirex and the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee. This seemed like a very sensible suggestion; I know that other noble Lords felt so too. Even if the Government respond with all possible speed to implement the Select Committee's report—it has been said by some noble Lords that they have dragged their feet thus far—the report states that it will take about 21 years even to start construction of some sort of deep mine facility. So time is our enemy; we have to move quickly.
I understand that the Government will be issuing their Green Paper early next year. I hope that the impetus as recommended by the Select Committee will be maintained thereafter.
1.12 p.m.
Lord Craig of Radley: My Lords, I shall leave it to the bench of experts behind me to enlighten the noble Earl on becquerels. Perhaps I may say at the outset what a privilege it was to be a member of the Select Committee which studied this complex and at times emotionally charged topic, under the firm, courteous, expert and enjoyable leadership of the noble Lord, Lord Tombs.
I am pleased that we have had sight of the Government's response as a backdrop to the debate. But what a cautious response it is. The complexities of devolved responsibilities are no doubt an additional factor in the time it has taken to get to even this very cautious preliminary stage. But I was pleased to note the intention to bring as far as possible the Ministry of Defence's nuclear wastes under the civilian regulatory regime. Some of the MoD's holdings will present very difficult problems and their disposal will need very careful handling to sustain public confidence.
When they appeared before our Select Committee in December 1997, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Prescott, and the Minister of State for the Environment, Mr Meacher, said that they would be very interested in the content of our report, on which we were then just embarking. The new Government recognised, following the collapse of the Nirex proposals, that they had inherited no viable waste management strategy. They would have to start to develop a new one.

513
Now two years on, we seem to be very little nearer to embarking on a comprehensive and coherent approach. Our 18-month inquiry has pointed a way ahead. I believe that there is great merit in what has been proposed by our committee, even if the Government are not yet ready to adopt our suggestions. But before they embark on their approach, I think that it would be helpful if the Government were to establish very clearly who will have the lead in mapping and progressing the way ahead. What has struck me very forcefully is the spread of responsibility within government for the policy and management of nuclear wastes: DETR, DTI, MoD, the Scottish Office and a number of agencies all have important responsibilities.
If there is to be a joined-up approach to this topic, I hope that there will be agreement as to who will have the lead responsibility. My experience on Select Committees has demonstrated to me more than once that there is a world of difference in dealing with government departments when it is clear that one of them is both in the lead and takes responsibility for co-ordinating a collective, cross-department government response.
I think that the same principle is required when dealing with the wider public and with specialist interest groups on a topic as complex as the management of nuclear wastes. I hope that the Government will be minded to tackle this topic in that way; to make it clear who has the lead responsibility, and not be tempted to rely solely on the multi-departmental committee methods and sometimes unco-ordinated and conflicting statements which may be made on the many issues which arise.
Devolved responsibilities, in particular for the environment, will not make it any easier for central Government to co-ordinate such a response. But would it be acceptable for one part of the United Kingdom to adopt an alternative strategy for nuclear waste management from another? This issue is not in the same league as the question of whether eating beef on the bone is safe or unsafe to human health.
In our report we have devoted a complete chapter to the topic of plutonium, reprocessing and MOX. As we have said, whether spent fuel is reprocessed is a key factor in determining what types and volumes of waste have to be managed. That in turn may well have a bearing on the long-term management strategy that can be adopted. It was clear from our witnesses that there are major conflicting differences of view about reprocessing. I shall not attempt to summarise them now. But what is clear is that a major effort will be required to get a broad measure of agreement on this one aspect alone. If we are to proceed eventually to a form of underground storage, and ultimately underground disposal, it will be difficult if not impossible to make progress on the management issues for the existing quantities of waste without agreement on our longer-term reprocessing strategy.
514
In their response to our Recommendation No. 1, the Government say that the,
"quantity and nature of the wastes will be important in considering the relative merits of the various management options".
I agree, and so they must have reached a view about the plutonium stocks early in the consultation process. It may be tempting for the Government to argue that this is a commercial matter for the industry to determine. Up to a point I should like to agree with that, but the politics which surround all things nuclear will surely make such a purist approach a non-starter.
In his interesting response to the UK National Consensus Conference held last May, Mr Meacher said that site selection was, "an acutely political issue". I am sure that there is widespread agreement about that. It calls out for a central Government lead.
On all our visits to the other nuclear-generating countries, it was quickly evident that public acceptance of, or at least acquiescence in, the manner of disposal and the handling of nuclear waste had become a major issue. Indeed, there has been some criticism of our report in that it did not dwell sufficiently on the social, as opposed to the technical and scientific, problems. When on behalf of the committee I attended a Cumbrian County Council economy forum, which spent a day discussing our report and a number of other contributions on the subject, one of the points to emerge was that our report was seen as fundamentally science-driven. Some felt that it failed to carry an adequate weight of social and regional economic argument. I do not think that that is altogether fair. We are, after all, a science and technology committee.
Moreover, in a number of paragraphs we have drawn the reader's attention to the experience of other nations with their publics. Sweden—with perhaps the most sophisticated and sympathetic of publics on this issue—was still finding difficulties in getting a firm agreement to the siting of a long-term depository. Societal issues were seen as the challenge. Those required, first, an acceptance of the safety criteria and the concept of reasonable assurance.
Canada, which appointed the Seaborn review panel, found after almost 10 years' work that it would not be possible to proceed with site selection and examination until what it termed the "social issues" had been further addressed. In the United States, both site selection for use as a deep depository and the transportation of nuclear wastes across the continent were key issues of concern.
In France, with its major reliance on nuclear generation—and consequently a greater level of public acceptance of nuclear issues—there is a strong element of financial inducement to local communities to accept a depository site, or the search for one.
In dealing with the complex issues involved in waste disposal, it is our view that it is no longer possible to rely on the "decide, announce, defend" principle to take account of these social pressures. However achieved, the demand is loud and clear for greater transparency and greater openness at every stage.

515
However, I rather fear that those high-sounding phrases conceal a plethora of different and ambiguous meanings to different groups of people. There are some interesting parallels (which the Government will, I hope, consider) between this issue and the recent way in which genetic modification of crops and the BSE and related beef problems have had to be handled to gain, or attempt to gain, public, if not French, acceptance.
Our past approach to nuclear waste management has been shown to be flawed. That legacy will hang around the necks of those who are charged with mapping out and implementing a new way ahead. But the key question for government—it cannot be left to the industry to decide—is whether we go for phased underground disposal. We have proposed in outline, step by step, a way of tackling this all-important question.
I am concerned that the Government's preliminary cautious response will be seen by some as a lack of determination, a lack of resolve—even a lack of will—to take a lead on what will remain one of the most politically demanding long-term issues to be faced. I do not think that it is acceptable to allow the present major uncertainties to run on without resolution. It is time to start in earnest; time, once started, to keep up the momentum to secure an agreed waste management strategy for the long term.
1.24 p.m.
Lord Kirkwood: My Lords, I wish to start by welcoming from these Benches the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, and to congratulate him on his excellent and informative maiden speech. I am sure that we have in our midst a new star to present scientific information to your Lordships.
As the noble Lord, Lord Winston, indicated, this is the last time I shall address the House. I do so with mixed feelings: sadness that I shall no longer have the privilege of sitting in this Chamber and contributing in a small way to the work of your Lordships' House; but the satisfaction of recognising that the hereditary right to attend this House was, in my view, indefensible. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Winston, for his kind remarks. I find it slightly puzzling that suddenly I have been propelled to the Front Bench at the point where I am about to receive an ejection. I suspect that the sudden motion will cause me to be a little unwell.
I hope that the good manners, good sense and judgment that I have experienced in the House will continue throughout the interim period and be passed on to the rim reformed House, whenever it may come into existence.
Perhaps I may now turn to the subject matter of the debate. I was not a member of the sub-committee under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, which prepared the report. There was clearly a long and detailed investigation into the problem of nuclear waste management, involving a great number of witnesses. The sub-committee is to be congratulated on coming up with a good, readable report, with valuable conclusions and recommendations.
516
One of the points made early in the report, and which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, is that the problem of waste disposal is with us now, even if no further nuclear power stations are built. Like the noble Lord, Lord Flowers, I believe that in the long run we will have to turn to more nuclear power—it will be our only choice—either to reduce atmospheric pollution and global warming, or when fossil fuels are spent.
Furthermore, the high and intermediate level of radioactive waste now existing in surface storage will need to be treated within the next 50 years or we shall run into further problems. These statements seem to be the "givens" from which the debate must proceed.
The Government, in their response to the report, embrace the need for open and transparent consultation with the public in developing a national plan for the management of waste disposal which covers all levels of waste, in order to achieve some consensus, public acceptance and to avoid the mistakes made in the Nirex planning application. This is an excellent start and there seems to be no reason for delaying the start of this exercise, which the Government in their response have scheduled for early 2000, unless there is a blip.
The Government appear to be less than enthusiastic about the recommendation to set up a nuclear waste management commission which would be outside day-to-day government and which would have authority and permanence. They would prefer it to be established, if at all, after widespread consultation. It is difficult to envisage how there could be any co-ordinated management or policy—which the Government agree is necessary—without a single independent body of the type suggested in the report. How will the Government proceed if the creation of such a body is prevented? Will they simply accept that management must continue to be fragmented? One proper role for the consultation exercise is surely to comment on the powers that various bodies should have in relation to one another to provide open and efficient management.
One of the functions suggested for the proposed commission was the co-ordination of all UK research on the long-term management of nuclear waste. At present, it is carried out by Nirex for intermediate-level waste and by the DETR for high-level waste. The benefit of that approach should be the greater transfer of ideas and knowledge across the spectrum of radioactivity level and the avoidance of duplicated work due to lack of communication. That would also allow more long-term research of a generic nature, rather than the narrow problem-solving that is specific to a particular section of the industry, which I believe to be a danger.
I follow the noble Earl, Lord Shannon, in suggesting a new technology—although nothing quite so radical as the one that he suggested. I refer to an account of work carried out by a colleague in the Earth Sciences Department at the University of Sheffield, Dr Fergus Gibb, who is a geologist. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, may see some virtue in this proposal.

517
It was described at a recent meeting of the British Association which took place earlier this year. It is an example of a solution to the problem of waste disposal which could deal with both high and intermediate-level waste, and possibly plutonium waste. The idea is to lower the still highly active waste in a container down a very deep borehole—to a depth of four to five kilometres. That is much deeper than the 500 metres envisaged at Sellafield. At that depth the highly active waste heats up the surrounding rock to around 850 degrees Celsius. That is hot enough partially to melt the rock within a period of a few days. That process is followed by slow cooling—which is important to provide the right kind of structure—and crystallisation of the rock over a period of years. The container and its waste becomes entombed in a "sarcophagus of solid crystalline granite". It is important to note that at these depths any fluids in the rock do not interact chemically or physically with the groundwater, which is in the top 700 metres of the earth's crust. In principle, that approach could deal with high-level and low-level radioactive waste, as well as with plutonium, should that be declared a waste material. The concept has been demonstrated to work in the laboratory, simulating the pressures that are to be found at a depth of five kilometres. It also happens that at those depths there are large areas of the earth's land surface that have suitable granitic structures so that the siting of the boreholes is not so restrictive. I am well aware that that is not the phased approach recommended by the committee. However, one should keep an open mind in the light of further research.
Much more work remains to be done on such matters as container materials and on fluid circulation at those depths. Nevertheless, the concept of dispersal in very deep boreholes seems an ideal solution for dealing with spent nuclear fuel. As Dr Gibb says,
"Putting it back into the earth's crust—even deeper than where it came from—is probably the next best thing to never having dug it up in the first place".
We need to fund more ideas of that kind to deal with a problem that could have tragic consequences if it is left unsolved.
1.35 p.m.
Lord Dixon-Smith: My Lords, it is a double pleasure for me to wind up this debate on behalf of my colleagues on these Benches. My first reaction is one of huge pleasure to be debating the subject again with so many noble Lords who are my former colleagues, from the days when I had the great privilege of serving on the Select Committee on Science and Technology. I have long felt that my time on that committee was the most useful that I have spent in this House.
It is a particular pleasure to add my welcome to the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh. He introduced a perspective on the subject that I had not previously heard. Indeed, he was the only speaker to touch on the physiological aspects of the body's reaction to radiation. That is an important consideration. His remarks added to the contents of the report and I regard them as a great bonus.
518
I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, may not be in this House for much longer. We on these Benches regret the passing of a number of colleagues at this time. There are many faces that we shall all miss.
The Minister's has also become a familiar face over the past few weeks and in the weeks leading up to the Recess. It is in a sense a pleasure to see him in his place waiting to reply to the debate. I look forward to his remarks.
The failure of the planning application for the rock characterisation facility at Sellafield brings us full circle. I found myself with a feeling of déjá vu as I read the report. I imagine that the feeling was common to many who had to deal with the report. Certainly the state of knowledge has developed since the initial actions undertaken by Nirex which led to that planning application. We know a great deal more today about the scale of the problem. But the problem was there in the 1970s and early 1980s when I was a consultee. Possibilities in my county were suggested. I also had to deal with the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster as they affected local government quite dramatically in certain areas of this country. So I am not wholly unfamiliar with the risks of the nuclear industry.
My first comment relates to an important point touched on by the committee regarding the implications of the refusal for the planning process. I do not intend to go into the report's contents in detail. The House will delighted to hear that I intend merely to touch on two or three subjects. They are largely non-scientific, but are none the less important for that.
There has long been concern about the planning problems for applications involving major national infrastructure. Serious questions have been raised as to whether the conventional planning process is adequate to deal with such applications. The suggestion in the report that the parliamentary process should be involved in these matters to a much greater extent seems to me to be worth while and one that I hope that the Government will consider seriously. I do not say that because the planning process is inappropriate. However, when one is dealing with matters that perforce involve national policy there must be some way to involve the parliamentary process. Further, for the sake of everybody, public inquiries into applications of this nature need to be rather better focused than is the case under existing practice.
My second point concerns risk. The noble Lord, Lord Flowers, and other noble Lords have touched on this matter. All risk is relative. When one deals with these particular matters one does not consider the risk of one solution versus a second or third solution; one is also concerned with the risk of any of those solutions versus the risk of doing nothing. If I have a marginal criticism of the report—I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, will forgive me—it is that it could have said more about the risks involved in doing nothing. I am a life Peer and so am allowed to refer to some worthwhile matters handed down by my father. My father had an aphorism which is all too true in the present situation: there are always reasons why things should not be done. However, we are in a situation where things need to be done.

519
My third point concerns the need to build public knowledge and acceptability of the risks and the solutions. It does not matter how good is the science, the decision-making process or the politics if the public are not knowledge able about the subject. If the public understand the issues involved, when the point of decision arrives there is at any rate an inclination towards acceptance. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, said that not only must we trust the public, but that we can trust them. I found that intervention particularly pleasing. Unless we build public trust in matters of this kind, acknowledging all the difficulty involved, a solution to the problem is not possible. The need to carry the public all the way through the process is well spelt out in the report.
If I have one other worry about the report, it is that when I finished reading it I thought that perhaps it gave the Government the opportunity for prevarication. I read the report before I received the Government's response. Far be it from me to be cynical, but I believe that the response was generated more by the timing of this debate than any willingness to get on with the issue, which is regrettable. I hope that when the Minister comes to respond to the debate he will give an assurance that it is not the intention of the Government to prevaricate on this immensely important issue.
Two vital steps must be taken: first, the commencement of the process to build public acceptability. It is important that the Government do that. In so doing, I hope that they will clarify the risks involved, all the possible solutions and, most importantly, the risk inherent in doing nothing. Secondly, I hope that when the Minister replies he will give an assurance that the Green Paper referred to in the Government's response will arrive rather more promptly than did the Government's response to the report.
If this report is correct—we can reach conclusions only on the basis of the current state of knowledge and technology—we are looking for structures with a lifetime as long as 200 times that of the great pyramids. That is not only an interesting perspective but also an illustration of the significance of the problem. I welcome the report.
1.46 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Lord Whitty): My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, and his committee for producing this report and all noble Lords who have participated in this extraordinarily well informed and, in my case, informative debate. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, for his maiden speech in this House. I assure him that the points he makes have been received with considerable interest and will need to be considered in our whole approach to safety management. I also welcome the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Flowers, who I am glad to see back in his place. For a long time he has provided a major
520
insight into this issue. His report in the 1970s was an early milestone in these considerations, none of which has yet been fully resolved.
I should like to place on record the Government's apology for the fact that it was not possible to produce the response before the Summer Recess. As many noble Lords have said, it was our intention originally to produce it earlier. However, it is an exceptionally difficult subject that merits consideration. Having apologised for the timescale of the response, I do not apologise for the content. It may be thin, as my noble friend Lord Winston said, but it is substantive. The response is not prevarication or procrastination. As the committee's own report indicated, it is a recognition of the need both to proceed cautiously and, above all, to consult and take experience and public support with us. I do not regard the response as procrastination but as a sensible recognition of the enormous problems involved, not least the problem of public acceptability.
It is plain from the evidence before the committee, the report itself and the Government's own assessment that there is an enormous amount of anxiety out there. It is also plain that whatever view is taken on the future role of nuclear power, nationally or globally, we already have a problem in addition to any that may result from future decisions. We must put the problem into perspective. I have some sympathy for the noble Earl, Lord Liverpool, in trying to grasp the size of the problem. I can tell him that at the last annual count the total amount of high level and intermediate level waste was 71,000 cubic metres. That is probably a concept he understands better than a becquerel—and a becquerel measures radiological impact, not volume. It is therefore not a huge volume, and only 2.3 per cent is the high-level waste. Nevertheless, the problem is of long-term, immense importance, as many noble Lords have said.
As the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, my noble friend Lord Winston and many others pointed out, an important aspect is public anxiety not only in the UK but elsewhere. Perhaps I misunderstood the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, in his suggestion that political reality was not a reality. In this case, it is a reality with which we must deal in taking decisions on these matters. The anxieties are not originated by the green organisations. Perhaps on occasions, there are distortions, but there are deep anxieties among ordinary people.
That spills over into wider debates about the perception of risk, and government and other leaders of opinion attempt to assess various risks. Many noble Lords have tempted me into that area, including the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith. I am glad to be debating another subject rather than the GLA Bill! Such wider debates are for another day. I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, has an inquiry on the public's perception. It will be intriguing and important for your Lordships to consider.
There are deeply held views on the issue. On the one hand, there are those who are convinced that intermediate and high-level waste should be disposed

521
of in an engineered repository deep underground. They are committed to that. On the other hand, there are those who are not persuaded that we know enough about what will happen to radionuclides disposed of in this way over the long period that they would remain hazardous. In their view, while this uncertainty remains the waste should continue to be stored on the surface in properly constructed stores.
There are not many options. As the noble Earl, Lord Liverpool, indicated, sea disposal is not an option and rightly so. The previous administration considered that radioactive waste should be disposed underground and Nirex was charged with finding a suitable site. But efforts to obtain approval for a rock characterisation facility near Sellafield were proceeded with too hastily. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, referred to the fact that insufficient attention had been paid to the need to achieve consensus either on the principle of deep disposal or on the choice of location. It is not surprising therefore that so much opposition was mounted to the proposals.
There is local and national public opinion, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, pointed out. Some of that public opinion manifests itself through the planning process, to which the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, and the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, referred, and we are taking steps to improve it. But there are planning considerations even after a clear option has been reached.
I was pleased to see the Select Committee recommend so clearly that we need to take time to build a consensus for whatever option is chosen in the long term. In the Government's response, we have wholeheartedly accepted that recommendation. We are currently preparing the consultation paper which will invite views on the approach that should be adopted in the long-term management of radioactive waste. We aim to publish that in the spring of next year. That is our timetable.
We also agree with the Select Committee that the policy on radioactive waste management needs to be fully comprehensive. Nirex's plans for a deep repository during the previous administration covered only intermediate-level waste. Decisions on long-term management need to cover high-level waste as well. The Government have just published the results of a study carried out by the company, Quantisci, which was a government research strategy for high-level waste. The Government also need to consider the Sheffield work, to which the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, referred, on deep borehole solutions.
As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, mentioned, we also need to take account of military wastes. The Government are in favour of bringing military wastes under the civilian regulatory regime, provided that security and operational effectiveness can be guaranteed. The forthcoming consultation paper will therefore also seek views on the extension of the civilian regime to MoD sites.
Despite the Select Committee's emphasis on the need for full consultations, it opted heavily for its preference for phased geological disposal. It also
522
recommended that wastes disposed of deep underground should be monitorable and retrievable. The Government views the committee's report and recommendation in this respect as the first steps in the consensus-building process. Therefore, it would be wrong for the Government to come to a decision on their preferred option. Nevertheless, it would be right to say that if eventually deep disposal were considered to be the right choice, we would regard monitorability and retrievability as important components of that decision.
The Government have therefore acknowledged that deep disposal may indeed be the only solution. However, I cannot stress too strongly that consultations must first take place. In particular, if disposal is to be the preferred solution, timing will also be a crucial issue.
The Select Committee concluded that a deep repository would be needed in about 2050. If deep disposal is to be the chosen option, the Government agree that this would be about the right target date. As the noble Baroness, Lady Platt, indicated, it is necessary to grasp the nettle somewhat before that. If a decision were to be taken to construct a deep repository, it would take 30 to 40 years from the time of that decision to the disposal of the first waste. Therefore, although 2050 is a long way off, it will not be long before decisions need to be taken on whether we wish to pursue that course. The Select Committee is right, therefore, to emphasise that progress needs to be made. But we have time to consider these difficult issues and therefore there is time for consultation and for bringing the people with you.
As several noble Lords indicated, the most difficult issue of all—assuming that a repository is considered the right solution—is that of site selection. For those outside this House, I need to be clear about the issue and say categorically today that no work is currently taking place on any potential sites. If the time comes when investigations need to start again, that would need to be on the basis of full consultation over the criteria to be adopted for the sites and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, indicated, for local openness and early consultation.
The noble Baroness, the noble Earl, Lord Shannon, and the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, supported the Select Committee's recommendation of establishing a nuclear waste management commission to oversee the implementation of policy. The Government do not consider that the setting up of a new body at this stage would be beneficial during the early stage of consensus building. It could even be counter-productive. In the forthcoming consultation, the Government will be seeking views on the possibility of such an institution or of other institutions to implement and oversee the policy.
In that context, there is also the recommendation that Nirex's role should be taken over by the proposed new commission and disposal company. The noble Lords, Lord Kirkwood and Lord Cavendish, referred to the role of Nirex. The Government consider that Nirex should continue the generic research it is

523
currently undertaking and continue to advise the nuclear industry on the packaging of radioactive waste. The Government are also consulting on other aspects of the planning process, as I have indicated.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, and others raised the issue of the multiplicity of government institutions involved. It is not quite as complex as he indicated. The committee's main recommendation was that the Environment Agency should be given statutory power over the storage of waste at nuclear licensed sites. Currently, the HSE is responsible for the safe regulation of these wastes, but its memorandum of understanding with the Environment Agency ensures that the agency's point of view is taken on board. On the wider issue of the number of government departments and institutions involved, I can confirm that my department, the DETR, is in the lead on radioactive waste management, but it is necessary to consult other interested departments as well as the devolved organisations.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, also referred to future decisions on importation and reprocessing. The Government are still considering the scope of the consultation on radioactive waste management. They have not yet made a final decision on the review. The reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from both foreign and UK reactors is carried out in full compliance with all domestic and international regulations. There is only very rarely approval to import licensing. There are a number of decisions to be taken in that respect, as there are in relation to MOX which was also referred to by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig. As your Lordships may know, a consultation exercise was carried out over the summer into the economic case for the MOX plant. The responses to hat are being analysed and announcements will be made about those applications as soon as that process is complete.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, the noble Earl, Lord Liverpool, and the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, referred to the international dimension, both in terms of other countries facing similar problems and the need for co-ordination. The UK has a good record for participating in such discussions but at the start of deciding what our option is, it is probably inappropriate at this stage to take a new initiative in international disposals. Nevertheless, we would wish to join in the overall international activity on this front.
With regard to the particular point in relation to European facilities raised by the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, on the disposal of obsolete joint research centre nuclear facilities, it is the case that member countries are being consulted on the decommissioning of these facilities. The Government's concern has been to ensure that the Commission draws up a robust, properly-researched and costed plan for dealing with this.
Going back to the institutional element, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, and others, raised the question of devolution. The Government's response, outlined
524
today, has already been agreed with the devolved administrations which have a role in this matter. It refers to the fact that part of the Select Committee's report covers some issues which are reserved and others which are devolved. The response also confirms that terms of response have been agreed with those administrations. Clearly, when decisions need to be taken on a long-term management of radioactive waste, there will also need to be consultations with devolved administrations.
The noble Earl, Lord Shannon, raised the issue of synthetic titanium rocks, ceramic rock and the work of Synroc Limited. As I understand it, the noble Earl is aware that Synroc has yet to demonstrate the viability of disposal of large volumes of radioactive waste. Nevertheless, the department and the nuclear authorities welcome being kept in touch with these new technologies and also the technology, mentioned by the noble Earl, of transmutation through accelerators for plutonium. We are keeping in touch with developments on all those fronts.
This is a very complex and difficult area. The views expressed during today's debate reflect great experience from various dimensions of the nuclear industry. I myself, although possessing no degree of experience of the industry, share some of the concerns of the noble Earl, Lord Liverpool, about how this is made clear to the public we are about to consult.
I have at various stages in my life had dealings with the nuclear industry. In the 1960s I worked at AEI, Harwell when there was great enthusiasm for nuclear power as the salvation of many of our ills. Indeed, in one sense, at that time nuclear power was seen as the green option for the future. But there were even then doubts about its economics and safety. Along with my noble friend Lord Burlison, I represented the trade union membership which was very much based in Sellafield, with its big interest in the nuclear power industry and economic and employment prospects in the county of Cumbria. There were also safety problems to be addressed. This balance between safety considerations and the undoubted benefit which nuclear power could bring is always there.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Cavendish, I do pay a subscription to Friends of the Earth. It does not mean I necessarily agree with all their policies. I pay a subscription to the Labour Party as well.
Noble Lords: Oh!
Lord Whitty: From time to time one disagrees. I personally believe that whatever the share of nuclear power in Britain's energy generation, the world probably needs nuclear power and it is therefore important to get these questions right. Since the end of July, I have taken dual responsibility in this area. I am responsible for the Health and Safety Executive within my department, but I am also responsible, with my colleague Michael Meacher, for the climate change dimension. I believe that nuclear power has a serious role to play and that decisions on nuclear power will be important in getting those

525
very difficult equations right. The safety issue, the contribution to the planet's future energy needs, are all involved here.
In the light of that, it is probably sensible for us to be a little cautious and perhaps a little considered in our response to what is an immensely valuable piece of work by the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, and everyone involved in the committee. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, that at the appropriate point there will be proper parliamentary consideration of these issues. I have no doubt that as background to that, whenever it comes, this report will play a major part. I would like once again to thank the committee and all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate.
The Earl of Cranbrook: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, since I did give written notice of this question I would be most grateful if he could be more explicit about the nature of the consultation between the Government and the devolved administrations. Can he say whether or not the statement, which I quoted briefly from the introduction to the paper, would be regarded by the devolved administrations as firmly placing their name on that reply? It is very important at this stage of devolution that we should establish what the nature of these processes are, how they can be facilitated, and how there can be unified approach to these problems.
Lord Whitty: My Lords, I thought I had made it clear that, so far as devolution is concerned, the devolved assemblies have been fully consulted over this report and are therefore party to it. Clearly, future regulatory requirements and the relationship of any new organisations in this field, were we to pursue the committee's option, would need to be discussed and implemented via, in some respects, the devolved administrations. And, of course, already in Scotland the Scottish Executive and Parliament have the oversight of the Scottish Environment Protection Agency which is one of the major institutions already in this area. There is agreement with the devolved administrations and any forward movement would have to be taken with their agreement.
2.7 p.m.
Lord Tombs: My Lords, we have had a long but comprehensive and useful debate on a subject of great importance to present and future generations. I should like to express my thanks to all the speakers who took part and to those noble Lords who did not take part but listened with great patience.
The noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, made a distinguished and authoritative maiden speech to which many other noble Lords referred with justified admiration. As a long inhabitant of this field, I would observe that very cautious assumptions were made at the beginning of the nuclear process which have survived despite a growing amount of evidence that they are cautious. So I think that the suggestion for a review is extremely timely.
526
I should like to pick out one or two individual contributions. The noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, drew attention to the fate of past reports, which seem to have a great facility for attracting dust. I hope that this does not prove to be one of them, though I am perhaps less convinced than I sound. The noble Earl mentioned, too, that he had wanted to import the devolutionary problem or mechanism into the report. At that time I took the view that that would probably produce a problem of similar complexity to the one we set out to examine. It may be that the time-scale of the response, to which I shall return later, supports that view.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, made a very penetrating remark that policy does not invent itself. There is a need for leadership in policy. That is a fine balance, of which we were conscious throughout the committee's deliberations—the balance between consulting in an open way and appearing to pre-empt a decision. It is a problem which has obviously troubled the Government and they have come down perhaps rather more in one direction than I would have considered desirable. But I shall say more about that in a moment.
The noble Earl, Lord Liverpool, described himself, I think unfairly, as an amateur. Even if he were, the position of amateurs is very important in this debate. It cannot be left to experts alone because the public generally tend to want to be involved in some way which is not wholly professional. Had he gone on to look beyond terabecquerel to becquerel, he would have found it defined there as one nuclear disintegration per second; and that is a very small amount—hence the use of powers to reach anything of importance. However, in relation to the noble Earl's comments, there is an inverse relationship between the radioactive inventory and the volume of the product involved. One cannot generalise from a radioactive inventory to the size of a repository. Disused coalmines are not likely to be very useful to us. A requirement for a deep geological repository is a stable body of rock. That is almost ruled out by moving chunks of the rock in the course of exploration. Most of our coalmines are in any case very heavily faulted.
Perhaps I may take up the rather distressing criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood. He felt that we had not spelled out the risk of doing nothing. I thought that we had. I quote two points from the executive summary alone. Point II states:
"The problem exists and has to be solved".
Point IV states:
"The long time-scales involved might be thought to be a reason for postponing decisions. The contrary is the case, since existing storage arrangements have a limited life and will require replacement, and eventually the repackaging and transfer of stored waste. Reliance on supervision for very long periods increases the probability of human error".
Both of those observations are spelled out at length in Chapters 2 and 3 of the report.
Perhaps I may turn to the Minister's response and to the published response of the Government. I said in my opening remarks that I welcomed it. That was more from a sense of relief after the series of false

527
dawns, to which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, referred. The report accepts the general thrust but proposes an earlier stage of consultation on the methodology—a further consultation. That seems to be not so much taking the first step on a long journey, which is important, but talking to others about how one might be able to take the first step on a long road. I found that somewhat disappointing. In some ways it reflects much of the tone of the report. I shall come back to that point.
It is not easy to understand why it took more than seven months to prepare the report given what amounts to its very general content. I hope that this leisurely pace will not characterise future actions on this important topic. I am very much afraid that it may, particularly in view of the oblique comments made in the report to the consultation of other assemblies. Perhaps we will have a very long discussion about how it might proceed rather when it can start.
Of major importance and something which may offer some amelioration of that essential or inherent delay was the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, and the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood. I had it on my list as an important mechanistic route. We recommended that the national waste management commission could be set up at an early stage to organise the method of consultation and the basis of consultation long before it became statutory and inherited the duties described in the report. That would offer a way of taking the issue away from governments who are essentially transient in their nature and, it would seem, complicated and somewhat—I was about to say "dilatory" but perhaps that is not the right word—casual in approaching a matter of great urgency.
Perhaps I may make one or two comments on particular responses to recommendations. I was disappointed that in response to recommendation 11, the Government are reluctant to contemplate a leading role for UK organisations even, as we suggested—and this is an important caveat—when public consultation is complete and if the chosen policy is geological disposal. That is quite a constrained recommendation. I found the rejection of that to be regrettably timid.
The response to recommendation 12 on the issue of plutonium as waste seems rather confused, perhaps reflecting divergent departmental interests. It appears to miss the point that a decision on this matter would influence the physical size of the problem that must be addressed and hints at a solution. The response expresses a welcome intention to keep the committee informed of future developments and a willingness to welcome further scrutiny and comments as matters develop. Noble Lords will know that at the end of an inquiry the committee is wound up and its staff dispersed so that the aim, though gratifying, may be difficult to realise in practice. Nevertheless, I shall be happy to give any help that I can, and I am sure other members of the committee will say the same on an individual basis. Furthermore, I can promise the Minister that, irrespective of any invitation, we shall take every opportunity to harry the Government through Questions
528
I have greatly enjoyed both the chairmanship of the committee and the debate that has followed. We have exposed the issues and I look forward to more positive action from the Government, first, in involving the public to a greater extent and, secondly, in offering their lead on the matter. I commend the Motion to the House.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Licensing and Registered Clubs (Northern Ireland) Order 1999
2.15 p.m.
Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 19th October be approved [28th Report from the Joint Committee].
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the purpose of the Licensing and Registered Clubs (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 is to allow licensed premises other than off-licences and registered clubs to stay open for the sale or supply of alcohol throughout the night of the millennium New Year's Eve. This is a one-off relaxation of the permitted hours of drinking and is similar to that allowed for England and Wales. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 19th October be approved [28th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.)
Baroness Seccombe: My Lords, I have only one question. Will the provisions outlined here be similar to those on the mainland? The noble Baroness has assured us that that is the case. We support the order and we hope that those who benefit from the advantages of the order, which is of very short duration, will act responsibly.
Lord Redesdale: My Lords, we also support the order from these Benches. I believe that the problem will not be the number of off-licences and pubs that stay open all night, but the large number that will probably plan to close early.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Courses for Drink-Drive Offenders (Experimental Period) (Termination of Restrictions) Order 1999
2.17 p.m.
Lord Whitty Lord Whitty rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 12th July be approved [26th Report from the Joint Committee].
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this order has already been approved in another place. It seeks to introduce on a permanent basis throughout Great Britain a scheme to provide an incentive for drink-drive offenders to attend courses the purpose of which

529
is to persuade them not to reoffend. If they complete the course satisfactorily, the period of disqualification from driving will be reduced by up to one-quarter.
The scheme has been running in certain designated court areas on an experimental basis since 1993. The experiment was first proposed as long ago as 1988 in the review of road traffic law chaired by Dr Peter North. Since 1993 a number of different organisations have been running courses on a self-financing basis, including issuing of fees to be paid by offenders. A typical course is organised into sessions lasting for between two and four hours per week for a period of eight to 10 weeks.
Monitoring of the courses by the Transport Research Laboratory has involved tracking three groups of drink-drive offenders convicted between 1993 and July 1996. Those groups comprise: first, those who attended an experimental rehabilitation course; secondly, those who did not although they were convicted in designated courts; and, thirdly, those convicted at 18 control courts where rehabilitation courses were not available. Researchers looked at the proportion of offenders who were reconvicted within a three-year period as the main measure of the effectiveness of the courses. The results suggested that those who attend a rehabilitation course are three times—I repeat, three times—less likely to reoffend than those who do not.
We therefore propose a permanent rehabilitation scheme operating throughout Great Britain as that may play an important role in our long-term campaign to reduce drink-drive casualties and the rate of drink-drive offending. I hope that the order will be supported. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 12th July be approved [26th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Lord Whitty.)
Viscount Simon: My Lords, as my noble friend has said, these courses to rehabilitate drink-drive offenders have been very successful, resulting in a lower level of reoffending. Perhaps I may take this opportunity to congratulate everyone involved in running the courses.
I ask only one question of my noble friend: is the monitoring of those who take these courses to continue? I hope so. I am pleased to support the formalisation of this experimental order.
Viscount Falkland: My Lords, from these Benches I should like to say—as indeed I did when I spoke to the original draft order—that the provision of these options for those convicted of drink-driving is very welcome. However, we on these Benches, and myself in particular, as a deputy chairman of the All-Party Group on Alcohol Misuse, are concerned about the information that is coming out on the assessment of those convicted, in terms of their drinking history. I refer to male drinkers between the ages of 16 and 24, who in relation to the social costs of drinking in
530
this country are always viewed as a particularly active group of likely offenders, and to those whom one might term "addicts".
We should like to know whether there is any information so far relating to the effect of the scheme on those two groups. I take it that what the Minister said, and the welcome statistic that he gave on the reduction in offending, probably relates to the former group that I mentioned rather than to those identified as having a long-term drink problem, but I may be wrong. Perhaps in his closing remarks the Minister will be able to throw some light on that matter.
I conclude by saying that this is a welcome development which I fully support. I hope that in the future we shall gather more information and statistics on which we may base future action to help those with such problems.
Baroness Seccombe: My Lords, it is always a pleasure when experiments such as this prove successful. As a magistrate, it seems to me a sound and sensible provision to give courts the discretion to order someone convicted of drink-driving to attend a rehabilitation course. We on these Benches support this scheme, and we hope that it will go from strength to strength.
Lord Whitty: My Lords, I greatly appreciate the support from all around the House for these measures and for the rolling-out of the scheme nationally. In response to the question of my noble friend Lord Simon, I assure him that when the permanent scheme is established we shall be conducting further research to evaluate best practice among the courses and to consider how the providers of those courses can continue to maintain high standards. We shall consider also how we may publicise the courses more widely and obtain more information on the nature of drink-driving offences.
The noble Viscount, Lord Falkland, raised a good point about how we may categorise the different types of offender. It is not clear from the current statistics whether they can be divided precisely into the two types that he mentioned in terms of those who reoffend. That is something at which we shall be looking across the range of drivers. Of course, even addicts can change their behaviour in relation to their driving.
It may be of some consolation to the noble Viscount to know that the courses which we run are currently provided by a range of different bodies, including voluntary organisations in the alcohol rehabilitation field. Therefore, identified addicts' problems can be referred to other advisory services and hospitals by professionals. That is one of the many measures that we have taken in dealing with drink-drive problems which have brought the problem home in a small way so far but which will, we hope, do so in a greater way hereafter, to change the behaviour of drivers so that one-time offenders no longer offend.

531
We have had a substantial record in reducing the number of drink-drive fatalities and accidents over the past 10 years. This will be one more measure to improve that record. I thank your Lordships for your support. I commend the order to the House.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Financial Services Act 1986 (Restriction of Exemption) Order 1999
2.25 p.m.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey Lord McIntosh of Haringey rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 27th July be approved [27th Report from the Joint Committee].
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this order is to improve protection for charities which invest in common investment funds. Common investment funds are unit trusts in which only charities may invest. They provide a means of investing which is simple and tax efficient. For smaller charities in particular, they enable funds to be invested more widely, while minimising risk.
At present, the trustees of common investment funds are exempt from the Financial Services Act 1986 and are therefore not regulated in the same way as other unit trusts. As charities, common investment funds are regulated by the Charity Commission. In 1996 the Treasury and the Charity Commission jointly consulted on the future regulation and structure of common investment funds. The Government are grateful to all who responded. Respondents generally supported the policy aims to strengthen regulation and increase investor protection.
Following consultation, it was concluded that it was necessary to strike a balance between the need for greater regulation and the desire to keep the costs of management and compliance as low as possible. That could be done by removing the exemption for the trustees of common investment funds.
In future any trustees who carry out investment business which is regulated under the Financial Services Act will need to be authorised by IMRO (the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation) and must comply with their rules and codes of conduct. The change will enable the common investment funds to be regulated as part of the financial services industry. That benefits charities by providing additional reassurance that those responsible for the funds comply with rules and regulations established for investment business. Charities which invest in common investment funds will also become eligible for compensation for the first time under the investors' compensation scheme.
Since the proposed change was announced last year, common investment funds have been considering what changes they should make to enable them to comply with the proposed changes in legislation. Many of them propose to restructure. At the request of the financial services industry, the order contains a transitional period to enable common investment funds which are restructuring to
532
do so at their half-year evaluation date. That makes the process simpler and cheaper. An economical transition will benefit the charities which invest in common investment funds. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 27th July be approved [27th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Lord McIntosh of Haringey.)
Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, this order is complicated and technical but it is of great importance within the charity sector. I should declare an interest as a solicitor whose firm acts for a number of the charities which will be affected by this order, and in particular the Charities Aid Foundation.
Over the years, some of the charities concerned have established common investment funds for the reasons clearly set out by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh. Some of them now take the view that the removal of exemption from the trustees of the existing common investment funds will place the funds concerned in a problematic position. Some have decided that the better course is not to restructure so as to comply with the Financial Services Act under the aegis of IMRO but rather to set up OEICs (open-ended investment companies). For various reasons which it is not appropriate to explain here, some charities are of the opinion that the OEICs offer better scope and prospects for their investors.
As the noble Lord pointed out, the common investment fund is a particularly advantageous beast for small charities with relatively small funds. Such charities would otherwise not receive wholesale rates and would not have the advantage of best management. Secondly—this is really the point of my intervention—the fund is of particular advantage to those charities which have only a narrow constitutional right of investment; that is, a right of investment confined to the provisions of the Trustee Investments Act 1961 as amended.
As many of your Lordships will know, the statutory limitation requires that at least a quarter of the portfolio of the charities within the 1961 Act has to be invested in what are called "narrow range investments", which are generally thought to be disadvantageous in the modern investment world.
The problem is that OEICs do not have the particular advantage currently enjoyed by the common investment fund which, in effect, allows charities with whatever investment powers to invest in them without restriction. That will not be true of OEICs. Therefore, those common investment funds which wish to transmogrify into OEICs rather than restructure so as to comply with the new regime, might well find themselves caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.
The Government have, quite rightly, listened to representations and provided a six-month transitional period. However, the likelihood is that that will not be long enough to see the existing trustee investment legislation changed so as to allow small charities with limited investment powers to transfer their funds from the existing common investment funds into OEICs.

533
There is in existence a Trustee Bill drafted by the Law Commission and largely promoted by the Association of Charitable Foundations. That Bill overcomes this technical problem, which, in effect, if passed will eliminate the 25 per cent narrow range band of investments.

I apologise for winding so gradually up to the question. I did so because otherwise it would make absolutely no sense to the uninitiated. I am not sure that it makes much sense now. Can the Minister give any guidance and assistance to those within the charity sector who are now having to make up their minds as to what to do? Plainly, those that want to transfer to OEICs would much prefer to be able to do so in one fell swoop. They would prefer to move from the common investment funds they now are into the OEICs they wish to become.
The worst of all worlds would be a situation where the new Trustee Bill is not brought before Parliament in time for it to pass into law within the six-month transitional period. It would thus leave those concerned having to obtain the new certification under the new regime. That is an extremely expensive and laborious business. It is expensive not only to the charities and hence to those who invest in them, but also to IMRO. There are a number of novelties in this group of investment funds which may want to become registered under the new regime.
Can the Minister give an assurance that the Government will consider bringing before Parliament, very soon, the Law Commission's Trustee Bill? That, in turn, would enable the trustee investment regime to be altered early enough to avoid the interregnum which would otherwise have to exist and which would cause cost, expense and inconvenience to all concerned.
Finally, perhaps I may make an observation on a separate, drafting point. Paragraph 1(2)(c) defines the pooling scheme fund. It states at the end that it is only a pooling scheme fund under this order where the property concerned is transferred into that fund by or on behalf of a charity whose trustees are the trustees appointed to manage the fund.
My question is simple. Is that wording intended to restrict the charity trustees referred to from appointing professional investment managers, as is the current practice? I am sure it is not. It would be wholly counter-productive to prevent the charity trustees of such pooling schemes from being able to appoint investment managers. However, given some of the past uncertainties, it would help if the Minister were able to say that my interpretation—namely, that they can appoint investment managers—is correct.
Baroness Seccombe: My Lords, we on these Benches believe that this order is not controversial and has been widely circulated. We are therefore content to support it.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, declared an interest, and I suppose that I should have declared an indirect, non-financial interest as my wife is a trustee of the Charities Aid Foundation and, until three years ago, was trustee of the two common investment funds which it operates. She is no longer, since it restricted the trusteeship of those funds.
The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, from his great knowledge of this area, raises a number of interesting points. I am sorry to have to say at the outset that there is no slot for the Law Commission's Trustee Bill at the moment. But the Lord Chancellor is keen on pushing forward Law Commission Bills, as the noble Lord will recognise, and I hope that we shall be able to get it on to the statute book, after due parliamentary consideration, as soon as possible.
The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, raised specific questions about the transitional arrangements and those common investment funds which choose to go in the direction of being open-ended investment companies rather than adopting the restructuring, as will most of the funds. Nothing in the order affects the ability of organisations to establish open-ended investment companies. The order follows extensive discussion with those who have been involved. The policy was announced in September 1998 and those who wanted to do so should have made a start on it before now. Including the 13-month period between September 1998 and now, and the transitional period provided in the order, all those involved will have had between 14 and 20 months to prepare for it. If there are any specific difficulties which the noble Lord would like to draw to our attention, I am sure that we shall take account of them.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, I thank the Minister for giving way. It is a bit tough to say that they should have been preparing their OEICs during the consultation period. There was great uncertainty as to what would emerge from the consultation and only since the way the cookie is crumbling has become clear have OEICs become the preferred alternative.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I understand that point. But since the order, as it emerges, is very much in line with what those who were consulted wanted, they could have anticipated to some extent that they would get what they wanted; we are not entirely unreasonable people. However, as I say, if there are specific difficulties, I am sure that the noble Lord will draw them to our attention.
The noble Lord made a second point about the trustees of pooling funds. I am happy to confirm that nothing in the draft order affects the ability of trustees of pooling funds to appoint investment managers. I hope therefore that the House will see fit to approve the order.
Baroness Seccombe: My Lords, as other noble Lords who have spoken declared an interest, perhaps I should do so also. I am chairman of the trustees

535
of Nuffield Hospital Pension Fund. I do not know whether or not that is relevant, but I felt I ought to make that declaration.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, unless they use a common investment fund, it is not a relevant declaration. However, I a m grateful to the noble Baroness.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 (Amendment) Order 1999
2.39 p.m.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey Lord McIntosh of Haringey rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 19th October be approved [28th Report from the Joint Committee].
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this order is to amend the schedule to the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977. That schedule prescribes the number of members of the Insurance Brokers Registration Council and how they are to be chosen. When the Act was passed, it was anticipated that the original provisions might he changed, and there are powers to amend those provisions.
Why is it necessary to amend the schedule? The House will be aware that the Government are currently making progress through Standing Committee in the other place with the Financial Services and Markets Bill. The thrust of that Bill is to create a single statutory regulator for the financial services sector. Last year, before the Bill was introduced and having consulted interested parties, the Government decided that, as regards the distribution of general insurance as opposed to long-term life insurance, statutory regulation might not be appropriate. It is a matter of balancing the costs and rigidities of statutory regulation against the requirements of consumers for adequate protection. The Government's view, and that of many who replied to the consultation, is that the case for statutory regulation was not proved.
However, there is genuine concern about the need for high standards of business conduct and propriety among those businesses which distribute general insurance. The former Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Helen Liddell, announced in July 1998 that the Treasury would look to the insurance industry and general insurance intermediaries to work together and devise an effective non-statutory means of promoting high standards of conduct. Progress in forming a general insurance standards council has been very encouraging so far. It is hoped that all those businesses which have gained Financially from the distribution of general insurance will respond positively to the challenge of self-discipline.
We intend to repeal the existing statutory regulation in the field of general insurance distribution; that is, we propose to take powers in the Financial Services and Markets Bill to repeal the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977, which sets up a council, charges it with carrying out certain functions and provides that those persons who wish to trade as insurance brokers (whether sole traders, partnerships or bodies corporate) must register or be enrolled by the council. Registered brokers must abide by rules set out by the council, which include a code of conduct, provisions regarding professional indemnity insurance and requirements as to financial adequacy, accounts and statements.
It is an offence to trade as an insurance broker without being registered. The costs incurred by the council are met from fees and there is no public funding. However, until the Act is repealed, the council remains answerable for the discharge of its statutory functions. Given the expectation of its being wound up, it is reasonable that the approach of the council should now be one of active care and maintenance. The changes proposed are intended to help the council conduct affairs in that fashion.
As I said, the schedule to the Act prescribes the size of the council, the number of its members and how they are to be chosen. The proposals in the order, which the House is now considering, will reduce the size of the council from 17 members to 10—six members of the current council who have been elected and four nominated by the Treasury—who will then serve until the council is wound up. However, as a contingency measure, the proposals also allow the Treasury, at the request of the council, to fill a casual vacancy should the council decide, in the light of its current situation, that to hold an election to fill such a vacancy would be wasteful of resources.
The Treasury will then make a further order, which will be subject to annulment—in other words. to the negative procedure—to replace the existing requirements as to elected members of the council with simpler requirements. It seems unlikely that the new election scheme will be activated, but the Treasury wishes to provide for that to happen just in case winding-up takes longer than expected. The original intention was that a majority of members of the council should be elected from the broker community. These proposals are designed to ensure that that intention is respected.
Finally, I should like to assure the House that, in accordance with the existing schedule—much of which will remain in place—the council has been consulted on this draft and on the other order to which I referred. I am pleased to tell the House that council and Treasury officials have worked closely together in developing these proposals. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 19th October be approved [28th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Lord McIntosh of Haringey.)
Lord Newby: My Lords, we on these Benches support the Motion. However, I have just one question

537
for the Minister. It relates to Article 2(1)(b) of the order. It states that the Treasury is appointing four persons to the council, one of whom,
"shall be a barrister, advocate or solicitor".
There is then a wonderful piece of "Sir Humphrey" language, which says that one of the persons might or might not be an accountant and one of the others might or might not represent the interests of policyholders of insurance companies. Therefore, as there is certainty that one of these nominated people "shall" be a lawyer, should there not be equal certainty as regards having on the council an accountant and someone who can represent policyholders?
Baroness Seccombe: My Lords, I thank the Minister for outlining the purpose of this statutory instrument. We on these Benches have no particular problems with the order. As a generality there is consensus that the statutory status of the IBRC—albeit that it will effectively operate in limbo—should be ended, but that before its abolition the council should continue to be subject to efficient administration. However, I have a question for the noble Lord. Is not the problem of statutorily required appointments to the IBRC a problem of the Government's own making?
Having sought—albeit subject to the decision of another place and the usual channels—to subject the Financial Services and Markets Bill to the procedure of carry over, such anomalies as that thrown up by this order were bound to occur. That being so, will the Government in any future use of the carry over procedure do their utmost to ensure that these kinds of problems either do not arise or are ironed out before the event?
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, is not a lawyer and therefore I can make the following comment without fear of causing offence. We understand that it is always possible to find lawyers to serve on these bodies but it is not always possible to find accountants. That is the reason why the provision for accountants and for policy holder representatives is slightly more flexible. I doubt whether it will make any difference in practice.
Without accepting the noble Baroness's strictures about past policies, I give her the assurance she wants about consultation.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Jobseeker's Allowance Amendment (New Deal) Regulations 1999
2.46 p.m.
The Minister of State, Department for Education and Employment (Baroness Blackstone)The Minister of State, Department for Education and Employment (Baroness Blackstone) rose to move, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 14th July be approved [26th Report from the Joint Committee].
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving the first Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper, I wish to speak also to the second Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Jobseeker's Allowance Amendment (New Deal) Regulations will help to open up the current New Deal education and training opportunities to a broader range of long-term unemployed jobseekers. Currently, the JSA regulations provide that people aged 25 and over who have been in receipt of JSA for a two-year qualifying period may be treated as available for and actively seeking employment while they undertake an education and training opportunity. We propose to provide for periods in receipt of National Insurance contribution credits only, as an unemployed person, or autocredits for those aged 60 to 64, to count towards the two-year qualifying period. These amendments will ensure more consistent treatment across long-term unemployed jobseekers and will enable more people to benefit from the support which is on offer to help them get into work.
The Jobseeker's Allowance (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations serve three purposes. First, they correct a defect in the current regulations and ensure that people in receipt of incapacity benefit who are found capable of work by the All Work Test, are able to move smoothly onto JSA. The decision disentitling a person to incapacity benefit is effective from the day on which it is made, but the notification may take several days to reach the claimant. The claims and payments regulations currently allow the Secretary of State to backdate a JSA claim to the day after the final day of incapacity benefit. However, the JSA claim for that period is still likely to fail because the claimant was not available or actively seeking employment, since he did not know he should have been. The amendment regulations provide that the claimant may be treated as satisfying the labour market conditions in JSA for the period covered by the administrative backdating.
Secondly, the regulations correct another defect and, in doing so, make sure, as originally intended, that prisoners who are released from detention and then claim JSA are given a short period to readjust to normal life. The regulations provide that ex-prisoners shall be treated as actively seeking employment during the period of up to six days at the start of their claim, before the beginning of their first full benefit week.
Thirdly, these regulations make a technical amendment which is necessary as a result of the mergers since 1994 of certain training and enterprise councils with chambers of commerce to form chambers of commerce, training and enterprise. These regulations allow us to put right defects in the current rules. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 14th July be approved [26th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Baroness Blackstone).
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Jobseeker's Allowance (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 1999
Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, I beg to move formally the second Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 21st October be approved [28th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Baroness Blackstone.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Social Security (New Deal Pilot) Regulations 1999
2.52 p.m.
Baroness Blackstone Baroness Blackstone rose to move, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 21st October be approved [28th Report from the Joint Committee].
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move the third Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. I propose to seek your Lordships' approval for a further set of New Deal regulations. These will allow the pilots we introduced last November to continue. As many noble Lords will know, under the Jobseekers Act, we have the power to introduce pilots by affirmative regulations, but those regulations may last for only a maximum of 12 months. The regulations we are debating today will renew those introduced last November and will come into force on 29th November 1999 and continue for a further 12 months.
I would like to explain briefly what we are trying to achieve with these pilots, their content and the progress we are making. The New Deal pilots for people aged 25 and over are an important part of our welfare-to-work strategy. We introduced the pilots in November 1998. They build on the existing national programme for people over 25, and are aimed at people who have been unemployed for 12 to 18 months. They provide a more intensive period of support designed to help people into employment and to improve their employability. We are testing new ways of helping unemployed people aged over 25 into work, in order to inform the future development of our support for this group.
When we introduced the pilots last year we made clear that we intended them to run for two years, with the last entrants in May 2000. Our policy intention is unchanged. These regulations simply renew those which were introduced last year to support the pilots and the amending measures which were introduced in April 1999 to allow pilot participants to begin setting themselves up in business while claiming jobseeker's allowance. A number of minor technical changes have been made to reflect the new arrangements for decision-making and appeals and for the introduction of the working family tax credit and the disabled person's tax credit. We have also added a transitional provision to ensure that participants fall within an uninterrupted regulatory framework.
Noble Lords may find it helpful if I expand further on the nature and scope of the current pilots.
There are 28 pilots across Great Britain and one covering the whole of Northern Ireland, which between them will help 90,000 people. They are aimed principally at people who have been unemployed for 18 months or more, but in some of the pilots we are testing the impact of offering that help earlier to those at, or beyond, the 12-month point of unemployment. In four areas we are also testing the effectiveness of allowing people at a particular disadvantage in the labour market earlier access to the pilots. The pilots are delivered by a variety of public and private sector organisations.
The design of the pilots is intended to allow for the widest possible scope for tailoring help to individual need and local circumstances. Pilot participants initially enter a gateway period of advisory support and other help to find work. Those who do not find work in this gateway period are then required to take part in intensive jobsearch alongside other activity; for example, work experience or job-focused training, for up to 13 weeks. During that time they will receive a grant of up to £200 paid over and above their JSA and other benefits. Those who do not find work by the end of this period are then offered further help in the follow-through period.
The renewing regulations I am proposing today support the pilots in a number of ways. They prescribe the categories of people who will be required to participate in the New Deal pilots, and the impact on their benefit of not participating. They ensure that the payments they may receive as part of a pilot, including self-employed earnings, will not affect their benefit.
It is still too early to be making any assessment of the impact the pilots are having. The Government have put in place an evaluation strategy which will measure the impact of the pilots on those participating in them compared with people outside the pilots. That comparison will enable us to judge the added value of the pilots but the main outputs from the evaluation will not be available until next year.
Our initial statistics indicate that up to the end of August over 54,000 people have entered the pilots and that at least 7,500 have already found work, while the majority is still benefiting from the intensive support that is available.
The number moving into work each month continues to grow. Those initial figures are encouraging but, as I said, the true test will be the proper evaluation. I believe that these pilots are crucial in helping us to determine the shape of future support for adult unemployed people. The regulations give us the power to continue with the pilots so that we have sufficient experience upon which to draw. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 21st October be approved [28th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Baroness Blackstone.)
Earl Russell Earl Russell rose to move, as an amendment to the above Motion, at end to insert ("subject to an undertaking from Her Majesty's Government that the pilot study shall include a study of the outcomes for

541
those disentitled to benefit under Regulation 6, such study to include information on the means of support on which such people rely, on the proportion of those who six months later, are (a) employed, (b) unemployed, (c) in hospital and (d) in prison, and how these outcomes compare with those not so disentitled.").
The noble Earl said: My Lords, it is always tempting to assume that business which comes before the House on a Friday is ipso facto unimportant. I must admit that I have occasionally given way to that temptation, but one must prove that one can occasionally resist temptation. That is why I have tabled an amendment to this Motion. I hope that it is in order for me to address, first, general questions about the regulations and then turn to the specific amendment.
The regulations which we are now renewing were last before us on 13th November 1998. In fact it seems that they will be a regular distraction for the ping-pong season. I asked then a number of questions to which I have not yet received answers. I hope that it is possible for the Minister now to provide answers to some of those questions.
First, why is there the introduction of sanctions for the over-25 group? There was no hint whatever in the Labour Party manifesto that any such thing was going to happen. As recently as 9th July 1998, a reply to my honourable friend Mr Keetch from the Secretary of State said that there was no such plan. The design document for the over-25s said that people will not be sanctioned for refusing the offer of a course. I asked a year ago what led to the decision to change that policy and introduce the sanctions. I should rather like an answer.
In DfEE News of 4th November 1998 it was stated that these programmes for the over-25s would offer the same high quality standards as for the under25s—despite the fact that an employment option for the under-25s was funded at the rate of £2,000 per person, but for the over-25s only at the rate of £1,300 per person. I conceded last year that it is perfectly possible by the most remarkable exercise in efficiency to match the quality of those two things at the different prices. I wanted to know how that was done. I still want to know. I want to know it rather more than I did previously in the light of a Written Answer given to my honourable friend Mrs Ballard the day before yesterday. It demonstrated an underspend of no less than 90 per cent on this programme; and that £103 million had been returned to the windfall tax reserve. That would seem to be carrying prudence to the point of recklessness.
No doubt we shall be told, as Tom Lehrer would have put it, that it turned out there was a reason. I should very much like to know what that reason may be. It calls for some explanation. I asked a year ago whether any training was available beyond 13 weeks. That question is again one to which I should still like an answer. I also wanted to know why the Government brought in sanctions before appeal in spite of all that the noble Baroness and her noble friends said about that before the election.
I now turn to what has happened since the election. I have figures provided by the unemployment unit—I regret to say that I have none from the Government—of the outcomes of those who have left the New Deal for over-25s so far. Some 8 per cent of them have gone to unsubsidised jobs—not a particularly distinguished figure; 6 per cent have gone to other benefits; 2 per cent to other known destinations; and 6 per cent unknown. I hope there is at least some curiosity within the department about what has happened to those who are unknown. To anticipate my amendment for a moment, I should like to know whether there is a correlation between those whose outcome is unknown and those who have received sanctions. That could be rather interesting information.
I also want to know what progress has been made with monitoring discrimination—which is in some cases an obstacle to re-entry into the labour market—whether on the grounds of race, gender, age or any other relevant criteria.
The purpose of my amendment is to ask the Government to monitor the outcomes of those who are sanctioned, who are disentitled to benefit in whole or in part, and to find out after six months what has happened to these people; whether they are unemployed, employed, in prison, in hospital or other outcome; and, if so, what. It also seeks to find out what means of subsistence are available to them during the period of disentitlement: whether they are being supported by family or friends; or, if not, how; whether there is a correlation between those who are able to turn to the support of a family group and those who are not; and, if there is such a correlation, whether we are penalising those who have suffered a family breakdown for a second time.
I want to know how many people who have been disentitled have subsequently had their disentitlement reversed on appeal. When I find that one of the commonest grounds for disentitlement is for refusing a Gateway interview, that makes me believe that we should have known the outcomes of those disentitlements before we considered the gateway clause to the Welfare Reform Bill, which left this House temporarily last week. It would have been very interesting to know what the effects were when we were discussing this matter. Clearly this information was discoverable.
There are two possible views of what the effect of disentitlement to benefit may be. The first, one might describe in shorthand as the short, sharp shock view; it brings people to their senses, makes them pull their socks up, and so on. One might argue that that way the effect is salutary. The other, negative, view is that it might tend to lead people into crime, into illness and into disappearing into the underclass. There is a great deal of hypothesis available in this area; it would be nice to have a little bit of fact as well. Obviously both those hypotheses are capable of being true in part. It would be nice to know which parts were the larger.
With the pilot scheme in front of us, we have an opportunity to use it, with a manageable sample of people, to collect that information and to use it to

543
inform future policy. One wants to know whether the ways in which people live while sanctioned affect the negative or positive outcome; whether those who have friends to rely on do better than those who have to scrounge. For example, one needs to know whether care leavers are more unfortunate after being disentitled than other people. One needs to know whether there is any correlation between disentitlement and the crime statistics. Noble Lords who were in the Chamber at Question Time yesterday will have noted that the Home Office Minister who was asked that question was entirely unable to provide an answer. We need a certain amount of joined-up government.
Also, anyone who reads the Acheson Report must be aware of the link between low income and ill health. One would like to monitor the extent of that link in regard to those who are disentitled to benefit. If the link exists with a benefit income because it is low, one might imagine that it might exist a fortiori with no benefit, which is even lower.
The Government set targets as regards suicides. Regrettably, there has been an increase in suicides among males, especially young males. Again, one would like to know whether that coincides with disentitlement to benefit. It might perfectly well not, but it would be nice to find out. It is in the hope that the Government may have a certain amount of laudable curiosity that I beg to move.
Moved, as an amendment to the above Motion, at end to insert ("subject to an undertaking from Her Majesty's Government that the pilot study shall include a study of the outcomes for those disentitled to benefit under Regulation 6, such study to include information on the means of support on which such people rely, on the proportion of those who six months later are (a) employed, (b) unemployed, (c) in hospital and (d) in prison, and how these outcomes compare with those not so disentitled.").—(Earl Russell.)
3 p.m.
Baroness Seccombe: My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her explanation of the statutory instrument. What are the cost implications of the regulations and what consultation has taken place with interested parties; for example, with the Benefits Agency, the Employment Service and the New Deal partnerships'?
Much has been claimed for the New Deal, in our opinion much of it exaggerated. I and my colleagues in another place have serious reservations about the effectiveness of the New Deal scheme. As the noble Baroness will understand, we shall be vigilant in following up those reservations.
I was most interested to listen to the noble Earl's introduction of his amendment. We share his concern about the underspend. The reply referred to by the noble Earl suggested that it is the timing of the submission of invoices by the contractors—namely, for the year 1998–99—that caused some of the underspend. In that case, does the noble Baroness agree that the underspend should be very different now?
544
Also, it is stated that the numbers of people entering the New Deal programmes were lower than had been projected on the basis of the Government's unemployment assumption at that time. I am sure that the noble Baroness will agree that we on these Benches predicted that. Is the noble Baroness able to tell the House how many participants in the New Deal have disappeared from the system without trace`' I look forward to her reply. In the meantime, as is the custom of this House, I shall not vote against the regulations.
Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl and the noble Baroness for their response to the regulations. As I have said, their purpose is to enable us to continue to test new and innovative ways of helping unemployed people aged 25 and over back into work, as both the noble Earl and the noble Baroness recognise.
I shall try to deal with the questions that have been put. The noble Earl asked about sanctions. The pilots are designed to offer individually tailored help to people to improve their employability and to help them back into work. It is therefore right to expect people who are unemployed to take advantage of the help that is provided. We want them to have a right to that help; but with that goes the responsibility for taking advantage of it. It cannot be right that people can claim JSA while not taking any steps to improve their employability and their prospects of finding work. People who refuse that offer of work and have no good cause for failing to take part in the pilots will lose their entitlement to JSA for two weeks in the first instance and for four weeks for any subsequent offence. However, they may be eligible for hardship payments. The noble Earl is aware that people in vulnerable groups, including those who have children and those who have health problems, have immediate access to hardship payments.
This is a national programme. The pilots contain rights but also responsibilities. Those in the New Deal who are over 25 are JSA claimants and therefore remain subject to conditions which contain sanctions if they unreasonably cause or perpetuate their unemployment. This is a long-standing feature of benefits for the unemployed. Sanctions are a deterrent to refusal to take up what we believe to be important and helpful support to unemployed people.
Earl Russell: My Lords, if we do not monitor the effect of sanctions how do we know that they are an effective deterrent?
Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, the noble Earl anticipates my later comments. Perhaps I may turn to monitoring in a moment.
The noble Earl asked why the unit cost of the New Deal for those over 25 was lower than for young people. The options in the New Deal for Young People last at least six months, but the intensive activity periods in the pilots that we are discussing today last for three months. For that reason the costs are lower.

545
Evaluation will tell us whether the model that we are testing in these pilots is effective. That is the simple, straightforward explanation for the difference in cost.
The noble Earl also asked about underspend. Falls in unemployment have led directly to lower expenditure. To date, there has been a lower take-up of the subsidy. That also means lower expenditure. Measures such as the pilots will help us to make a greater number of people more employable and attractive to employers, and therefore they may not want to make use of the subsidies.
The noble Earl's next point was that the pilots did not provide enough education and training. It is important to remember that this is a different pilot client group from that comprising 18 to 24 year-olds. Many of the people in this group will already have skills and a lot of experience of work, but the pilots make provision for training to be delivered to meet individual needs. Training support can be available throughout the pilots. In addition, clients have the opportunity to study for up to one year while remaining on JSA. I hope that that provides the noble Earl with some reassurance.
The noble Earl asked whether these pilots had been successful so far. It is too early to judge their success. To make a sound assessment we need to monitor what happens to people who have benefited from all the help on offer. It is also recommended evaluation practice to allow new programmes to bed in for a while before one attempts to draw conclusions about their impact. As the pilots did not begin until the end of November of last year, the first results of the evaluation will not be published until the end of this year and the beginning of next. I shall ensure that the noble Earl and the noble Baroness have a copy of the outcome of any evaluation as soon as it is available.
The noble Earl asked whether the evaluation would be able to monitor discrimination on such matters as age, gender, race and disability with regard to entry into the labour market. Certainly, that is something I am happy to take back to ensure that it is considered. The noble Earl raises an important point.
The noble Earl also asked about the number of people who have been sanctioned. Just as in the New Deal for young people, the vast majority of people in the pilot schemes responded well to the opportunities on offer. However, regrettably, a small minority did not. Our early statistics suggest that 1 per cent of those who started the pilot schemes in Great Britain have been sanctioned. That amounts to fewer than 400 people.
I turn to the noble Earl's amendment. I accept that he is making an important point and it is vital that we measure the impact of the New Deal on individuals. The published objectives of the New Deal make it clear that a reduction in social exclusion is one of the Government's aims. Therefore, as regards some of the groups to which he explicitly drew our attention, we must take care to ensure that they are not permanently socially excluded.
546
The evaluation strategy which we already have in place for the New Deal, including the pilot schemes, will enable us to explore what happens to those who have been subject to benefit sanctions, through both surveys and one-to-one interviews. I hope that that provides the noble Earl with some reassurance. The evaluation will be able to examine all the comparisons he suggests. If the noble Earl would find it useful, I should be happy to write to him giving further precise details of our evaluation plans.
I hope that my reply has reassured the noble Earl and that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment. I do not believe that it would serve a useful purpose because we are doing exactly what he intends. That laudable curiosity to which he refers is well embedded in the Department for Education and Employment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Seccombe, asked whether we have consulted the various parties to the development of the pilot schemes. I can confirm that that is the case. It would be difficult for us to undertake the work had not the agencies to which she referred been fully engaged in the discussions that took place when we set them up.
The noble Baroness and the noble Earl asked about the cost of the pilot schemes. The budget is £136.5 million for the whole period from November 1998 to the anticipated conclusion next year.
I hope that I have covered all the questions that have been asked. If I have failed in any way, I shall write to the noble Earl and the noble Baroness. I hope that the noble Earl will feel able to withdraw his amendment and that we can agree these regulations.
Earl Russell: My Lords, I thank the Minister for a full and generous reply. I am extremely interested in what she says about the evaluation. It seems to go a long way towards meeting what I am asking. She appreciates that the key issue that concerns me is the means of subsistence available to those concerned. Having praised laudable curiosity, I must practise what I preach. I should be most grateful to see the further documents on evaluation, which the Minister so generously offered to send me. In the light of those remarks, I shall of course beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Blood Donation
3.20 p.m.
Lord Teviot Lord Teviot rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether the level of blood stocks and public participation in blood donation are adequate.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I welcome those speakers who have stayed behind in the middle of Friday afternoon. My idea of introducing this small debate came from the initiative of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, who arranged for a mobile blood unit to come to your Lordships' House earlier this year. I think

547
it is probably—certainly in my time—the first time we have ever discussed the National Blood Service. It is not before time.
I confess to having no medical knowledge but have been a blood donor for many years. I simply cannot understand why only 6 per cent of the adult population donate blood. It has been 7 per cent, which is the figure in most European countries. I would go further and say I consider it an indictment of society that people do not give blood as much as they should.
Before I become "holier than thou" and try to avoid blowing a gasket, I shall explain how I started to be a blood donor. I am sure there are other ways of becoming a donor but for me it was in 1954 when I was doing my national service in the ranks in the Army. The Medical Officer was a man of some years of distinction. Most of his life had been in the Indian Medical Service. I recall that he was a Medical Officer in Jodphur and that in the last war he commanded a hospital in Basra—robustly. His fury would always rise when a soldier's documentation was incorrect, which it often was. For instance, if a doctor forgot to record inoculations in the soldier's paybook the unfortunate soldier had to have them all over again. Hence, when the blood unit was set up there was no question of anyone not giving blood. One wretched corporal refused and he was subjected to a number of undignified tests. Sadly it took me after that time another 20 years before I donated again, basically, I must confess, through apathy. But then one finally got round to it and for the past 25 years I have given blood. At this stage perhaps it is worth while to give a little background to the history of blood donation.
The first successful blood transfusion took place in 1665 by Dr Richard Lower, who used animals as subjects. But human blood transfusions continued to cause unexplained deaths until 1900, when Dr Karl Landsteiner of Vienna discovered that there were four different blood groups. Again an interesting fact of early British history is reflected in the distribution of blood groups. Within the UK as invading Anglo Saxons came in—mostly Group A—they pushed the native Bronze Age Celts—mostly Group O—to the west and north.
I could cover a great deal more of this subject but I think it would be a good idea if I took up the cudgels again to destroy some of the myths that allow people to make what are sometimes absurd excuses. As I have already said, the attitude of most people is appalling. From time to time I have asked people whether they give blood. Some look askance as if one has made an improper suggestion. People usually say they would like to but never got round to it, or they produce one of the following myths. Sufferers from hay fever can donate provided they are well on the day. Many people believe they can never give blood after contracting hepatitis or jaundice, whereas except for certain types they can give blood after a period. So that is another myth gone.
Asthma sufferers requiring inhaler treatment can give blood so long as they have no symptoms on the day. Glandular fever patients can do so when they
548
recover, as well as ladies receiving hormone replacement therapy. The same applies for those receiving electrolysis. There are two other groups; namely, people who have travelled to a malaria area, who can donate six months after they return to the United Kingdom, if they are well, and, finally, those who indulge in body piercing, including ear-piercing, who need only wait one year before they can donate again.
The National Blood Service should he congratulated on improving its service. An appointments system has been introduced following complaints from people who thought they had been waiting for an inordinate length of time. I believe that those complaints were somewhat exaggerated. If you feel antisocial and you do not want to chat with your fellow donors, I suggest that you bring a good book. The age limits have also changed. You can start as young as 17 and continue until you are 70 provided you started donating before you reached the age of 60 years.
Noble Lords may think that my next point is a little trite, but quite a number of people go to give blood when they have not had anything to eat. You really must have something to eat, preferably something with iron in it or, I am told, red wine. Perhaps the noble Lord who is to answer the debate will dispel that theory. On a few occasions I have not been allowed to donate because my haemoglobin count has not been high enough. On one occasion I arrived to give blood, having had the said glass of red wine, but my count was not high enough. When I related this to a tough lady attendant, she said, "Next time you must have two glasses".
I shall now come onto a very sad point. The service is costly to run but it spends £1.5 million a year on advertising to get people there, which it really must do. Surely such a large sum of money could be better used as a grant or spent on research. The demand for blood is now static. In 1946 the need was only 200,000 donations a year. The figure is now more than 2 million.
I have probably said enough. I shall leave it to others to make their points. I fully appreciate the co-operation that I have received from the service and from the noble Lord, Lord Burlison, who is to reply. Before I sit down I shall give out the telephone number for people to become donors. It is 0345 711711. The telephone is answered fairly quickly and the people are extremely helpful. I should also mention—I know that the Minister will refer to this—that a great many more donations are needed at the turn of the millennium.
3.27 p.m.
Lord Addington: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, for raising this important subject. I start my speech with one slight apology. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones is unable to be here so I am his stand-in, as it were.
I also have to make one confession. I have never given blood. I tried once when I was at university but managed to turn up five minutes after the booth closed. More recently, when a special centre was set up

549
in the Palace of Westminster to enable us to give blood, I managed to forget all about it. I remember looking in my diary and saying, "I meant to do that yesterday". I am quite sure that I am one of those people who is well intentioned until it comes to changing the details of their day. Unfortunately, we all tend to do that on certain issues. Blood donation just happens to be one of the issues for me.
The noble Lord said that £1.5 million is spent on advertising. I must disagree with him. That would seem to be a very small price to pay to get enough people to give blood. I feel quite guilty about it. I give an undertaking that by Christmas I will have at least started the process. We should all give more blood or at least start to give blood. I shall resist the temptation to come out with jokes and comments like, "One unit, that's nearly an armful", and other quotes from that famous sketch by Tony Hancock.
The National Blood Service has a rather chequered recent past. As a result of events in the Liverpool area, we have lost a chairman. Sir Colin Walker has been replaced by Mr Mike Fogden. That was as a result of a report by Professor Cash on the events in Liverpool. The report showed that the management in Liverpool had broken down and was no longer doing its job. There was inadequate leadership and people were being overloaded within the system. All credit must be given to the then Secretary of State for acting promptly once he received that report.
A major point I should like to put to the noble Lord who is to reply to this debate on behalf of the Government is this: how much progress have the Government made in their implementation of the recommendations in Professor Cash's report? We have learnt one thing from this matter: when it comes to dealing with the primary problems of the nation's healthcare, a regular blood supply is one of the building blocks that enables many functions to be carried out. Demand is rising because new discoveries have been made and more uses for blood are being found, not just for the raw material but for its components once they have been broken down. The number of cancer patients who require blood products is quite staggering. The more I read in preparation for the debate, the more surprised I became at the large number of uses for blood.
The National Blood Authority has been caught up, shall we say, in some of the major health scares of our time. Over the past decade and a half, it has had to deal with the problem of scanning for HIV infection. Unfortunately, some people became infected with that virus because the systems for detecting it in blood donations were not in place. There have also been problems with the various forms of hepatitis. Now there is the spectre of new variant CJD, which casts a dull light—if that is the correct expression—across the whole process. What progress has been made in the identification and eradication of this new danger from our blood supplies?
The subject of blood can be spoken to fairly shortly in broad terms, or requires infinite detail that would take far longer than the generous 15 minutes available
550
to noble Lords today. However, I should like to say that a national blood collection and distribution service is evidently of vital help to the National Health Service. If there are problems in its management, the Government must identify them and give full backing to all the means to rectify them. The Government must not skimp on costs. Furthermore, in regard to safety, funding should not be an inhibiting factor when it comes to statistical analysis.
On the matter of advertising, I feel that we need to do more. I am living proof that we should do more. I am one of those well-intentioned people for whom the £1.5 million worth of advertising was not enough to get me into the booth.
3.33 p.m.
Earl Howe: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Teviot has stolen a march on the rest of us with his Question today and I congratulate him. This issue is very important and achieved prominence among many noble Lords when, as my noble friend reminded us, earlier this year the so-called "Bloodmobile" parked itself in Black Rod's Garden, so generating some welcome national publicity as well as some high quality blood.
I doubt whether I am alone in regarding the work of the National Blood Service as one of this country's minor miracles. The statistics are extraordinary. Every day the service needs some 10,000 units of blood to meet demand from 350 hospitals in England and Wales. That demand has risen steadily over recent years, almost entirely as a result of advances in medical treatment. In 1946 only 200,000 donations were needed to serve the requirements of the entire country. Nowadays, some 2.4 million donations are collected every year from 1.9 million donors. As my noble friend said, that is equivalent to about 6 per cent of the population giving blood one, two, or occasionally three, times a year.
It is a characteristic of blood that some of its valuable components have only a limited shelf life. Red cells, for example, which are used in routine surgery, last only 35 days, and platelets, which are needed by patients undergoing cancer therapy, only five days. That means that there is a constant need to collect new blood. It is the reason why the National Blood Service refers to blood stocks in "days' worth".
When I was a Minister in MAFF, I had a fascinating introduction to the system of stock control and replenishment practised by the major supermarket multiples. At the heart of that system lies what is known as the "just in time" philosophy. It is a philosophy that also governs the supply of blood, but with a difference. For the supermarket, failure to maintain stocks at below the optimum level will result in empty shelves and lost profit. For the National Blood Service the consequences are far more serious.
I happen to have in front of me the figures for red cell stock levels as at 26th October at 9.00 a.m. My noble friend may be impressed to hear that. On the other hand, he may feel that I am just showing off. The figures show stocks of O positive at 17,933 units—well

551
above the critical threshold of 3,200 units—and stocks of O negative at 8,695 units, again well above the relevant threshold of 1,100. Total stocks stood at 53,985 units, or roughly five and a half days' worth, which must be regarded as satisfactory.
What is perhaps more illuminating than the figures for a particular day is the picture over a period of months. The National Blood Service has published figures which show that on 49 out of 251 working days during 1996–97—in other words, roughly 20 per cent of that year—total blood stocks in England fell below the critical threshold of 15,000 units. However, if we look at the first six months of the following year, the picture shows a dramatic improvement: the critical threshold of 15,000 units was never once breached. It would be interesting to hear from the Minister whether that general improvement has been sustained to the present, not least in the light of the additional strains imposed by the Government's waiting list initiative.
My noble friend's Question rightly draws attention not only to the demand for blood but also to the other side of the equation: the need for adequate supplies. I should be grateful if the Minister could tell us whether the N HS Executive is satisfied that the rate of increase in the demand for blood is not outstripping the rate at which new donors are recruited. Can he confirm also my understanding that over the past four years hospitals have increased their demand for blood by around 12 per cent? Is that upward trend expected to continue or to level out?
I believe in giving credit to the Government where it is due. One such bouquet must surely be appropriate when we look back at the advertising campaign for blood donations which took place between January and March this year. It led to blood stocks rising from under 15,000 units, a dangerously low level, to more than 40,000. Earlier this month the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, relaunched that campaign in preparation for Christmas and the millennium holiday. I should be interested to hear from the Minister the extent to which the National Blood Service has come to be reliant on campaigns such as this to maintain adequate stocks. I ask him two specific questions: what will be the cost of the latest campaign in relation to the anticipated quantity of blood supplies that. will result from it? Furthermore, how has the ratio changed in recent years between the cost of obtaining blood and the supplies of blood actually donated?
The cost of obtaining adequate supplies of blood is also influenced by the need to maintain public confidence. In 1998 the decision was taken to cease the fractionation of blood plasma from donors in England and Wales in the light of scientific advice on the theoretical risk of transmitting new variant CJD. All such plasma is now imported. In addition, since mid-1998, all donated blood has been subjected, as a precautionary measure, to a process known as leucodepletion, again to minimise any risk of new variant CJD being passed from donor to patient.
552
The maintenance of public confidence is vital and I do not in the least criticise the Government for taking those precautionary measures. However, will the Minister say what is the cost of those measures and how long they are likely to remain in place?
The voluntary and altruistic basis of blood donation is both precious and essential to our system of collection. What attitude surveys have been carried out, particularly among the young, to establish what may be the likely trend of the donor pool over the next few years? What are the obstacles to attracting new donors? Have the Government given any thought to promoting blood donation other than by advertising; for example, by story lines in popular television soap operas?
I am aware that at NHS trust level much can be done to conserve blood stocks by following good practice in transfusions and by minimising wastage. Will the Minister say whether all hospitals have disseminated up-to-date protocols for blood transfusions to the relevant staff and whether and to what extent autologous blood transfusions are becoming a practical possibility, particularly the practice known as perioperative cell salvage? How many partnerships has the National Blood Service established with district general hospitals to augment the number of collection centres?
As the noble Lord, Lord Addington, reminded us, it is public knowledge that the National Blood Service. at an organisational level, has had its share of difficulties over the past two years. I pay tribute to the chief executive, Martin Goreham, who has identified and tackled head on a number of organisational shortcomings and who, with his management team, has formulated and implemented the necessary internal changes. I hope that the Minister shares my view that the NBS is better structured and focused than it has been in the past and that there is cause to hope that staff morale, which was patchy, is improving.
It is the efforts of the staff of the NBS and the continuing generosity of the British public in donating blood which underpin the work of our hospitals and which mean quite literally the difference between life and death for thousands of our fellow citizens. The occasion of this debate, for which I pay tribute to my noble friend, enables us to express our appreciation to blood donors and the NBS on whom we depend so greatly.
3.42 p.m.
Lord Burlison: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, for asking this Question. It is extremely important to keep blood donation at the forefront of people's minds. I know that this House has a good record in relation to giving blood and in helping generally to publicise the need to do so. As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, reminded us, noble Lords rolled up their sleeves in April of this year in order to give blood.
The noble Lord, Lord Teviot, is a long-standing donor, going back to his days in the Army, to which he referred. We are grateful to him for his interest and for

553
keeping this essential cause and service in the public eye. I am not too sure whether his comments about two glasses of wine meant that he was restricting himself to that in the future. But whatever he meant, I applaud his actions.
At present the stocks of blood held centrally are at a high level—about 50,000 units in England. At present, there is only a small variation, up and down. That means that the National Health Service's need for blood can be fully met. As has been mentioned, 50,000 units is about five days' supply. The intention is to approach the millennium with between six and seven days' supply—about 60,000 to 70,000 units—so that we can be sure that we can cope.
Donations tend to drop during the festive season and are expected to drop a little more than usual this year because of the extended festivities. The contingency plans are in hand to cope with that. They are also in place to cope with future demand. Some forms of cancer, such as leukaemia or intensive treatment of breast cancer, require many units of blood.
In answer to the first part of the noble Lord's question, there are adequate stocks of blood, and they will become even more adequate. There have been times not so long ago when supplies have had to be managed very carefully indeed. As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, mentioned, it was not unusual for the central stock to be around 15,000 units, which is just less than 2 days supply. The units of blood would be collected from the donors, taken to the blood centre where they were tested and processed, and taken as quickly as possible to hospitals all round the country for the patients who depend on them. The blood services can, and have, managed with 15,000 units of stock. That is a tribute to them and to the hospitals that gave their co-operation. But 50,000 units is a more reasonable amount. Red blood cells have a 35-day shelf life. The blood services ensure that when the hospitals receive the red cells, there are at least 10 days shelf life left.
The noble Earl also asked whether public participation in blood donation is adequate. That question needs some thought because it might suggest an expectation of the public, or a duty on their part, and this has involved some thorny issues. As regards the adequacy of public participation, ours was the first voluntary blood service in the world. The first volunteers gave blood at King's College Hospital in 1921. And in 1946, when the blood service in roughly its present form started, 200,000 donations a year were needed. Now it is somewhere near 2 million.
Comparing January this year with January 1998, 25 per cent more donors gave blood and the number who registered as donors almost doubled. So I think that public participation in blood donation is adequate, and those who donate blood make a much valued gift.
However, there is a cautionary note. A relatively small proportion of the public donate blood. As the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, stated, that figure is about
554
6 per cent of the public. There is a continual need for supplies of donated blood. That means that while I can say that there are adequate stocks of blood at present, I do not want people to be so comforted by that message that they stop donating. The blood service needs regular, reliable donors and a regular supply of new donors to replace those who can no longer donate, for whatever reason.
I am therefore faced with a dilemma. I must be honest and tell the noble Lord that our blood stocks are adequate and that our donors are more than adequate. However, it is very important for the blood service that I add that for the blood stocks to continue to be adequate we are ever reliant on the donors continuing to be generous.
Altruism and blood donation was the subject of research commissioned in 1998 by the Central Office of Information on behalf of the Department of Health and the National Blood Service. It found that the moral imperative was very strong. People feel they ought to give blood, whether or not they do. If they do not give blood, they find reasons to explain it rather than saying that it is not important or that it is not relevant to them.
There was evidence in this survey and in others that altruistic attitudes and behaviour were declining, especially among young people, but I am pleased to say that giving blood seemed to have escaped that trend. The survey proposed that there were two major factors affecting altruistic behaviour: namely; is the potential beneficiary deserving? How much effort is involved in giving help?
People did not question the fact that people needing blood deserved help. They also thought that relatively little effort was required to give blood. It should be easy, with convenient blood donor sessions and little effort needed to find out about them.
Potential donors claimed that if they were made conscious of the constant need for blood, this would spur them into donating. That prompted careful thought about the best way to attract donors in these times. Television came to mind.
In the course of the past year, the National Blood Service (working with the Department of Health and the Central Office of Information) launched major initiatives to help potential donors to donate and to build up the number of regular donors. To back up the publicity, in December 1998, a national call centre was set up to take all the calls about blood donation; give information on donor sessions; make appointments or rearrange them, and refer callers to the blood service's doctors if they had a medical query. It answered over 700,000 calls and registered 90,000 donors.
Between Christmas and New Year, Members from another place turned out in their constituencies and gave blood. A picture of Joanna Lumley appeared on the front page of the Guardian. She was with a small boy whose life had been saved through a blood transfusion. On 5th January 1999, just after New Year, the television advert for blood donation came on air for the first time and ran from January until the end of March. While the TV advert was running, blood

555
stocks rose nearly threefold. There was a 25 per cent increase in new donors giving blood and an increase of almost 100 per cent in new donors enrolled.
As part of a plan to have two complementary TV adverts, a second one has just been made and appeared on TV for the first time yesterday. It shows a busy street and focuses on a young man who, the voiceover says, is "about to save a life". The film cuts to a brief shot of an operating theatre and a successful operation. The voiceover concludes, "Yesterday, he gave blood". The overall message is, "Do something amazing today. Save a Life. Give Blood".
I have spoken so far of the level of central blood stocks held at blood centres and in the blood service's blood banks. Those stocks are delivered to individual hospitals which hold manageable amounts. The blood service has been working with hospitals in the national blood stocks project to ensure that there is an improvement in the physical management of the stocks and that there is a continual improvement in the relationship between blood centres and hospitals based on mutual trust and co-operation. Donated blood is a very valuable resource and it is important that it is carefully managed and used.
NHS trusts and clinicians are also being asked to improve transfusion practice so that it is first class. That includes initiatives such as ensuring that all trusts in which blood is transfused have hospital transfusion committees in place to oversee all aspects of transfusion.
I turn to some of the points raised. The noble Lord, Lord Addington, raised the question of blood services and leucodepletion—the process referred to in reference to CJD. The blood services in the UK have carried through a number of changes as a precautionary measure against the theoretical risk of CJD. The blood centres filter the blood for transfusion so that white cells are removed—a process called "leucodepletion"—because it is thought by the expert group that if a variant CJD infectious agent were to be present in blood, it would most likely be in the white cells. It has been an enormously complex process for the blood service to install all the filters of appropriate quality, and I am pleased to say that from Monday next, 1st November, all blood collected will be leucodepleted.
556
With regard to the comparison between expenditure and supply, the supply is excellent. I am happy to write to the noble Lord on that with more comprehensive details, but we are pleased with the progress which has been made at the moment.
I turn now to the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, regarding surveys taken on younger donors. Such surveys are regularly carried out in this area. Young people feel able to give if they believe that the cause is a deserving one. However, once again, it is really a matter of getting the message over. It is not too hard, but young people need to be pressed a little so that they see this as being a priority.
Mention was also made of the Liverpool issue. Without going into it in any great detail, I should like to tell noble Lords that we are very pleased with the direction in which Liverpool is going. A good deal of cash has been put into that area, and I believe we will find that the blood centre there proves to be an excellent resource with an excellent future. There are a number of points which I have not covered because I am mindful of the time. However, with the agreement of noble Lords, I shall be pleased to write to them on the issues not mentioned in my response.
One of the main features of the Question tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, and of his comments, was the cost of television advertising. I believe that the total cost of both advertisements that were created was about £1.5 million. That may seem to be a lot of money, but when one weighs it up in relation to the blood resources and the generation of new donors, it is clear that this is cash which has been well worth spending.
We should be proud, not complacent, about the current level of blood stocks. We should be proud of the donors we have, because they are personally far more than adequate. However, we shall always need more of them and must continue to make every effort to increase their numbers. As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said, the blood donation service is now better structured, better staffed and, indeed, more efficient. Indeed, it really has a healthy future in front of it.
House adjourned at three minutes before four o'clock.