Greater London Authority Bill

HL Deb 12 October 1999 vol 605 cc297-356

Consideration of amendments on Report resumed on Clause 20.

[Amendments Nos. 50 to 53 not moved.]

Lord Whitty moved Amendment No. 54:

After Clause 22, insert the following new clause—

SALARIES AND EXPENSES

(" .—(1) The Authority shall pay to the Mayor and the Assembly members salaries at such levels—

1. (a) as the Authority from time to time determines; or
2. (b) before the first determination, as the Secretary of State directs.

(2) The Authority may pay to the Mayor and the Assembly members, in respect of expenses incurred in the exercise of their functions, allowances at such levels—

1. (a) as the Authority may from time to time determine; or
2. (b) before the first determination, as the Secretary of State may direct.

(3) A determination or direction under subsection (1) above may provide—

1. (a) for a higher level of salary to be payable to the Mayor than to any Assembly member;
2. (b) for higher levels of salaries to be payable to Assembly members holding the offices specified in subsection (4) below than to other Assembly members; and
3. (c) for different salaries to be payable to Assembly members holding different such offices.

(4) The offices mentioned in subsection (3)(b) above are—

1. (a) Deputy Mayor;
2. (b) Chair of the Assembly.

(5) A determination or direction under subsection (2) above may provide for different allowances for different cases.

(6) A determination under this section may provide for levels of salaries or allowances to change from time to time by reference to a specified formula.

(7) The Authority's functions of making determinations under this section shall be functions of the Authority which are exercisable by the Mayor and the Assembly acting jointly on behalf of the Authority.

(8) The standing orders of the Authority must include provision for the publication of every determination under this section.

(9) The Secretary of State shall publish any direction under this section as soon as is reasonably practicable after it is given.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, there is a range of amendments involved here. They attempt to carry out some quite straightforward things although. in the light of events of the past hour, I am not entirely sure that that will convince people. These amendments provide for the authority to pay the mayor and the assembly members salaries and expenses and for the abatement of those salaries where the members hold other paid public office to which they have been elected or appointed. They provide for the authority to establish a pensions scheme both for the mayor and the assembly and for the authority to publish details each year of salaries and expenses which have been paid and the financial provisions which have been made for pensions. There is also provision for assembly members to be excluded from the right to claim an attendance allowance or other remuneration from the fire authority and the London Development Agency. Provision is already made for that as regards the Metropolitan Police Authority. Of course, assembly members cannot be appointed to TfL. The other minor amendments in this group are consequential.

In this context perhaps I should also mention that my right honourable friend the Deputy Prime Minister has invited the Senior Salaries Review Body to make recommendations to him about the initial levels of salaries which should be paid to the mayor and assembly members and to recommend an uprating mechanism. I beg to move.

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer

My Lords, I would like to check that when the Minister refers to a range of subjects he is also speaking to Amendment No. 55.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, I should have said that in moving Amendment No. 54 I was also speaking to Amendments Nos. 55 to 57, 60, 536, 539, 566 and to Amendment No. 572 as regards pensions.

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer

My Lords, I thank the Minister. That is very clear. I speak in particular to subsection (3) of Amendment No. 55. Why should an authority member, who is also a member of another public body, suffer the penalty of having his or her salary reduced to a specific proportion of what it would otherwise be or to a specified amount? First, that appears not to be very logical. Secondly, it appears to be a very dangerous precedent. If one works for the family firm or is employed in the private sector, one's salary would remain the same as that for an assembly member. However, because one is appointed or elected to another public body, it appears that the purpose of this amendment is to reduce any allowance received.

If the idea is that one would only be able to serve on one public body because the financial penalties involved in serving on more would preclude one from doing so, I believe that the Government should say so. It is the electorate's choice to decide whether it is a good idea for a person to serve on more than one public body. A principle has been established that there is some point in having people to serve on more than one body because they bring experience and cross-fertilisation of ideas from one body to another. To penalise them financially, as this amendment seems to do, does not achieve any useful purpose. I imagine that it would be very counter-productive for someone who did not have any salaried employment for any reason. It might be a parent who chooses to stay at home to look after the children but who has positions on two public bodies. It might be someone who has retired but is still able to bring considerable expertise to more than one public body.

I ask the Minister to say what is the point of reducing a person's salary simply because he or she has been elected to another public body. One should bear in mind that quite often an appointment to some of the public bodies, commissions and so forth, which the Government have introduced, have been dependent on expertise gained, for example, in a local authority. That might equally be the position as regards a London authority member. I would like the Minister to explain exactly the purpose of this amendment. I am minded to disagree with what appears to be its purpose.

Lord Lucas

My Lords, I shall be very grateful to the noble Lord if he can tell me the position under these amendments of what one might call "provisions" made for members such as free transport, free canteens, staff and other facilities which might be provided for members. Do the appropriate costs have to be published as well as the salaries and allowances or are the advantages for the members of the assembly provided in this way free from public inspection, at least in their minutiae?

Lord Whitty

My Lords, as regards the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, if there were a subsidy for catering facilities or transport, that would appear in the mayor's budget and therefore be subject to scrutiny. It would not necessarily cross-refer to the abatement and the other provisions of these amendments. Nevertheless these provisions would be in the public arena.

In reply to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, the position is that these measures generalise the provisions that already exist in relation to the dual function of MPs and MEPs. There are Members of Parliament who are members of both the European Parliament and the Westminster Parliament. They take only one salary. There are similar provisions for persons who are members of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Westminster Parliament. Given that these are paid, full-time jobs in the London assembly, it is re-running the same provisions concerning their positions.

I agree that as regards Amendment No. 55 and subsection (1)(c), the matter is widened somewhat further. But the same considerations apply. We are not against people being appointed or elected to more than one authority or more than one tier of government, but, in principle at least, we are against their having cumulative salaries for so doing. That is already the position as regards MEPs and legislation passed concerning Scotland and Wales.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Whitty moved Amendments Nos. 55 to 57:

After Clause 22, insert the following new clause—

LIMIT ON SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF OTHER PUBLIC BODIES

(" .—(1) The Secretary of State may by order make provision such as is specified in subsection (3) below in relation to any Authority members to whom relevant remuneration is payable—

1. (a) pursuant to a resolution (or combination of resolutions) of either House of Parliament relating to the remuneration of members of that House;
2. (b) under section 1 of the European Parliament (Pay and Pensions) Act 1979 (remuneration of United Kingdom MEPs); or
3. (c) in respect of their membership of any other public body (whether elected or appointed) which is specified in the order.

(2) In this section—

• "Authority member" means—
1. (a) the Mayor; or
2. (b) an Assembly member;
• "relevant remuneration" means
1. (a) a salary; or
2. (b) any allowance of a description specified by order made by the Secretary of State.

(3) The provision referred to in subsection (1) above is provision that the amount of the salary payable to an Authority member under section (Salaries and expenses) above—

1. (a) shall be reduced to a specified proportion of what it otherwise would be or to a specified amount; or
2. (b) shall be reduced by the amount of the relevant remuneration payable to him as mentioned in subsection (1) above, by a specified proportion of that amount or by some other specified amount.

(4) An order under subsection (1) above may make different provision in relation to Authority members—

1. (a) to whom (apart from the order) different amounts of salary would be payable under section (Salaries and expenses) above;
2. (b) to whom different amounts of relevant remuneration are payable as mentioned in subsection (1) above.

(5) Such an order may include provision that it (or a specified part of it) is not to apply to a specified Authority member or description of Authority members—

1. (a) either indefinitely or for a specified period; and
301
2. (b) either unconditionally or subject to the fulfilment of specified conditions.")

After Clause 22, insert the following new clause—

PENSIONS

(" .—(1) The Authority may make such provision for the payment of pensions to or in respect of persons who have ceased to be the Mayor or an Assembly member—

1. (a) as the Authority may from time to time determine; or
2. (b) before the first determination, as the Secretary of State may direct.

(2) The provision which may be made under this section includes, in particular, provision for—

1. (a) the making of payments towards the provision of superannuation benefits;
2. (b) establishing and administering one or more schemes for the provision of such benefits;
3. (c) the making of such payments as are mentioned in paragraph (a) above to any scherne (whether or not established or administered by virile of paragraph (b) above) of which the Mayor or an Assembly member may be or become a member.

(3) Different provision may be made under this section for different cases.

(4) The Authority's function of determining the provision that may be made under subsection (1) above shall be a function of the Authority which is exercisable by the Mayor and the Assembly acting jointly on behalf of the Authority.

(5) The standing orders of the Assembly must include provision for the publication of every determination under this section.

(6) The Secretary of State shall publish any direction under this section as soon as is reasonably practicable after it is given.

(7) A determination or direction under this section shall not affect pensions in payment before the making of the determination or the giving of the direction.")

After Clause 22, insert the following new clause

PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT REMUNERATION PAID

(" . The standing orders of the Authority must contain provision for the publication of information relating to sums paid under section; (Salaries and expenses) and (Pensions) above for each financial year.")

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 23 [Declaration of acceptance of office]:

[Amendment Nos. 58 and 59 not moved.]

Lord Whitty moved Amendment No. 60:

Page 13, line 30, at end insert— ("(6A) No salary, and no payment towards the provision of superannuation benefits, shall be paid under this Act to or in respect of the Mayor or an Assembly member until he has complied with the requirements of subsection (1) above. (6B) Subsection (6A) above does not affect any entitlement of the Mayor or an Assembly member to payments in respect of the period before he complies with the requirements of subsection (1) above once he has complied with those requirements.")

On Question amendment agreed to.

9 p.m.

Baroness Miller of Hendon moved Amendment No. 60A: After Clause 23, insert the following new clause—

REFERENDUM

(" .—(1) At the end of the eleventh year after the first Assembly is elected the Mayor shall arrange for a referendum to be held to take place at any time within the ensuing six months.

(2) The persons entitled to vote in such referendum shall be the persons entitled to vote in any local election in Greater London at that date.

(3) The questions to be asked at such referendum shall be—

1. (a) Are you satisfied with the present structure of the Greater London Authority consisting of a mayor and an elected assembly of 25 members, none of whom represent an actual single borough'? YES/NO
2. (b) Would you prefer the Assembly to consist of 33 members, each one representing a single one of the 32 London Boroughs together with the Common Council of the City of London? YES/NO

(4) The Mayor shall transmit the result of the referendum ':o the Secretary of State and to both Houses of Parliament.

(5) Each Parliament being sovereign and one Parliament being unable to bind a later one, the Secretary of State shall not be bound by the result of the referendum.

(6) The Secretary of State may by Order authorise (but not require) the Mayor to include further questions in the referendum if so requested by the Mayor.").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, when I introduced an identically worded amendment in Committee I described it as a probing amendment, and said that my noble friends and I would be extremely interested to hear what the Government had to say. I must confess that I was not in the least surprised that, as with so many of the constructive amendments which we have introduced in this and in other Bills, the Government arbitrarily rejected it out of hand.

What surprised me was the entirely specious arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, because normally we can rely on him to have carefully studied our points first. He began his speech by saying that he rarely makes cheap political points. However, this was clearly one of those rare occasions. He said, 13 or 14 years ago the previous Government, in the face of massive opposition in London and without any talk of a referendum, completely demolished the structure of local government".—[Official Report, 14/6/99; col. 122.]

As I tried to explain then, a referendum was not required, because the intention to reconstruct London's government was clearly set out in our manifesto for the 1983 election, which we won with a substantial overall majority of 144. As to the massive opposition, that came from the Labour Party, which controlled the GLC as it then was in the person of Ken Livingstone. The expenditure for his campaign, "Say no to no say", was some £20 million of public funds. As we are in the area of not making cheap political points, I shall refrain from saying that the Labour Party does not seem to be falling over itself to be nominating Mr Livingstone as its candidate for mayor.

The noble Lord went on to ask, What will happen under the noble Baroness's referendum if the electors of London answer "no" and "no" to the two questions? Where would that leave us? The assembly would be abolished and nothing would be left in its place".—[Official Report, 14/6/99; col. 122.]

That extraordinary argument is what prompted me to suggest, as I did a few moments ago, that the noble Lord has not prepared himself for that particular debate with his usual care. The answer "no" to either or to both questions would not have the slightest effect without some further primary legislation.

My proposed subsection (5) spelled out the situation with absolute clarity, as it does again here. Perhaps I may read it for the benefit of noble Lords who do not have the text before them. Each Parliament being sovereign and one Parliament being unable to bind a later one, the Secretary of State shall not be bound by the result of the referendum".

In other words, the Government of the day need not take a blind bit of notice of the wishes of Londoners expressed in such a referendum. I reminded the House that, as recently as 3rd June this year, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry said, I think the idea of regulations within the expiry date is an attractive one. There may very well be the case for sunset clauses in new regulation". Is there not an identical case for new legislation? Or are the Government saying that legislation by the Department of the Environment is different from legislation from the DTI? The Government claim that their policy is to listen to the people. But by refusing to accept this amendment, which allows them simply to have second thoughts after the lengthy period of 11 years—in other words, well into a fourth mayoral term—the Government are saying that they will listen to the people, but they will not allow them to say anything. I beg to move.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Hendon, said, the amendment before us today seeks to require the mayor to hold a referendum on the GLA 11 years after its creation and, if one studies the wording of the questions proposed, it may be possible for some people to interpret those questions as having rather a slant towards seeking a particular answer.

The Government do not feel able to accept the amendments. The people of London voted in May last year in favour of the Government's proposals for a Greater London Authority on the basis of clearly laid out proposals contained in the White Paper A Mayor and Assembly for London. It does not seem sensible to place on the face of the Bill a requirement to hold a referendum at an arbitrary date in the future on questions which relate to the current policy position of the party opposite—proposals which were considered and rejected in the context of the Greater London Authority (Referendum) Bill and during the earlier stages of consideration of this legislation. It is entirely possible that that policy may have changed by the time the 11 years come around.

We are not sympathetic to the amendment and ask the party opposite not to pursue it.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, as the noble Baroness is aware, we were not happy with the question having two parts, on both the mayor and the assembly. Nor, I believe, was the other Opposition party happy, but with regard to different aspects. I understand and listened carefully to what the Minister said, but I wonder what would happen if the people of London decided that they did not like the assembly and mayor. There would be no provision for them to do anything about them, whereas they could take part in the referendum which I am suggesting and nothing much would happen. But in view of what the noble Baroness has said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 25 [The general power of the Authority]:

Baroness Miller of Hendon moved Amendment No. 61:

Page 14, line 18, leave out from ("have") to end of line 19 and insert ("the powers conferred by this Act")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving the amendment I shall speak also to Amendment No. 62. I shall not speak to Amendment No. 63 because in due course I shall not be moving it.

When I spoke on this amendment in Committee, my noble friends and I had tabled a further three amendments. Having studied carefully what the Minister said in reply, we have decided to drop four of them, but we still wish to pursue the remaining two. I hope that the Minister has given equal weight to what we had to say and will now accept the amendments we propose, particularly as we accepted all the arguments which he gave in regard to the amendments which we have now dropped.

Amendment No. 61 deletes the sweeping, unlimited, unfettered power given to the authority to do anything which it considers will further any one or more of its principal purposes".

That is power to do absolutely anything without any restraint whatsoever. The provision grants the authority the power to do that without even being required to show that what it is doing will actually further its objects. I can imagine what a field day the lawyers will have over the interpretation of that provision. I have no objection in principle to lawyers having a field day; my husband is a lawyer. But because the Government refuse to define more closely the sweeping powers they are giving to the authority, sooner or later—and probably sooner—the mayor, with the connivance of the assembly, is going to want to do something not specifically referred to in the Act. Someone or some group or other is going to haul them up before the High Court for an order that it is ultra vires. I beg the pardon of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice. Legal Latin is now verboten.

Someone will claim that they are doing something beyond their powers, and he will probably be right. Those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it. It is surely not necessary to remind your Lordships of the excursions into matters that were absolutely none of its concern which were indulged in by the former GLC under the leadership of one of the present aspirants for the Labour Party's nomination as mayor. Frolics and diversions were one of the causes for its abolition and are now the reason why the Labour Party is desperately searching for the "ABK" candidate—"Anyone but Ken".

I shall not give a list of the things which were published in a set of booklets called The London Industrial Strategy. I could do so, of course, and I do have the list. However, I have no intention of doing that because there is no point in dwelling on the past. When the Government promoted the creation of the GLA., they promised to ensure that the excesses of its predecessor could not be repeated. Nevertheless, it is giving the blank cheque contained in Clause 25(1).

Theoretically, what could happen under this legislation? Clause 25(5)(a) of the Bill requires the authority in exercising its powers to promote the health of persons in Greater London. What does that mean? Does it mean that it could try to build its own hospitals or make health and safety regulations different from the rest of the country? Or does improving economic development and wealth creation in Greater London mean that it could start to finance workers' co-operatives, like the late-lamented Meridian, or could direct industry hither or thither in London? Does promoting the improvement of the environment of Greater London include making the entire area motor vehicle free and forcing everyone to travel by bicycle? I do not even know what promoting social development in Greater London means. But surely that is a wide enough remit to give the authority power to promote, if it wished to, tea dances in Hyde Park.

It is no use for the Minister to say, "But, of course, none of those things could possibly happen". Once the Bill becomes law, it could, and would, be far too late to stop it. All we ask in this amendment is that the authority's powers should be those specified by the Act and not those which it believes it could try to assume because of the blank cheque that the Government are asking Parliament to write.

The reply of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, to this particular amendment was to accuse the Opposition of "a degree of schizophrenia". Then he went on to claim in a rather curious metaphor that a general power is not an open-ended Trojan horse. An open-ended Trojan horse is a contradiction in terms. If the wooden horse had been open-ended, the Trojans would have been able to see right through it and the whole object would have been defeated. The Opposition and anyone with an elementary knowledge of the English language can see right through the meaning of this clause. It says in totally unambiguous, unequivocal terms that the authority can do anything that it considers will further any one or more of its principal purposes. I emphasise "anything" that it "considers"; not even anything that actually or reasonably might be assumed to further its principal purposes; not even anything that the man on the Clapham omnibus would consider would do so.

The noble Lord pointed out that Clause 1(3) says: The Authority shall have the functions which are transferred to, or conferred or imposed on, the Authority by or under this Act or any other Act". Exactly, my Lords. That is precisely what our amendment says. The amendment prevents the authority from assuming additional powers not specifically granted to it by Parliament under, in the words of Clause 1(3), this Act or any other Act". We do not want the authority to attempt to take advantage of the contradiction between the plain words of Clause 1(3) and the ambiguous and vague words of Clause 25(1).

I draw your Lordships' attention to Section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972, when a similar provision appeared on the statute book for the first time. That section stated that, a local authority shall have power to do anything … which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to. the discharge of any of their functions". That is a vastly different set of criteria and a vastly different test to the airy-fairy test of merely what the GLA considers will further its principal purposes. If the words of the clause, as presently drafted, are not a blank cheque, then why will the Government not say so and tighten up the wording in accordance with the 28 year-old precedent that I have just cited, so that the authority cannot attempt. or even be tempted, to assume powers that it was never intended to have?

I turn now to Amendment No. 62. This simple amendment requires the authority to act in cooperation with the boroughs and with the City of London. What could possibly be wrong with that? The mayor and the authority will have strategies and objectives which will need the co-operation of the boroughs in order to make them work. That is sensible, practical politics. Co-operation between the mayor, the authority and the boroughs is a necessary relationship for the future government of London. On the last occasion when this amendment came before noble Lords, I pointed out—I apologise for repeating myself—that in their wisdom the Government have decided that there should be 14 super-constituencies instead of having one assembly member for each borough. That means that each constituency member of the assembly will be covering pieces of between two and three boroughs.

How will the differing and perhaps conflicting interests of each borough be represented? The Government have answered that by saying that Clause 27 requires the authority to "consult" with others on how to promote their purposes. However, we all know that "consult" is a weasel word. Consultation does not require the authority to take a blind bit of notice of the representations it receives. If the authority decides upon a course of action, in reality it will work only with the co-operation of and in conjunction with the boroughs that are involved.

In a Bill which gives the authority the purposes described by such platitudes as "promoting social development", "promoting improvement of the environment" and "contributing towards the achievement of sustainable development in the United Kingdom", surely there is room for a slight, almost imperceptible nod of the head in the direction of furthering good relations with the London boroughs whose residents will have entrusted the mayor and the assembly with such wide ranging powers?

In his reply on the previous occasion, the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, said that such an amendment would place too great a restriction on the mayor's freedom to act. That is an admission that the mayor is to have supervening powers to override the wishes and views of boroughs or their residents. However, many of the mayor's strategies will work properly only if carried out in connection with—and that means with the co-operation of—the boroughs. The efforts of the mayor alone on biodiversity, municipal waste, air quality and ambient noise, as well as road traffic, will amount to little unless he acts alongside the boroughs.

The Minister said that he accepted the intention behind the amendment. For that reason, I am disappointed that the Government have not offered any concessions or brought back any proposals of their own to meet our genuine worries. I beg to move.

9.15 p.m.

Lord Clement-Jones

My Lords, by a curious grouping decision, I shall speak to Amendment No. 64. I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 105 and 112, which are similar in their purpose and intent.

Crime and crime prevention are issues of the greatest importance to Londoners. I believe that, along with transport, crime will be a key issue in the mayoral elections next year. As a result of the recent Crime and Disorder Act, which I greatly welcomed, I shall repeat what I said at Committee stage; namely, that individual boroughs have a duty to co-operate with the police and probation services in the formulation of local strategies for the reduction of crime and disorder in their areas.

The amendments seek to ensure that the mayor and the GLA play their part in ensuring that the mayor's strategies and the exercise of the GLA's powers—whether in planning urban regeneration, the environment or transport—contribute to the prevention of crime and community safety. Strategies of this kind are judged in respect of health and sustainable development. It seems an extraordinary omission that crime prevention is not included in the list. If anything, the issue is of equal or greater importance to Londoners. Opportunities for crime reduction and prevention exist if support is given at the strategic stage, and there is a clear recognition of the interlinking of crime with many other areas of policy. Clearly, if we are to crack crime, we need also to tackle other social and environmental factors.

There is now a strong recognition that tackling the problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods by embracing all policy areas is the key to significant success in preventing crime. We need to understand the problems and to bring residents into the centre of regeneration. We need to target economic development, to strengthen those communities and to ensure that long-term commitment to sustainable neighbourhood regeneration exists at all levels of government, including regional government.

The GLA powers and the mayor's strategies that are proposed in the amendment would comprise a strong strand of crime prevention provisions, which would assist in solving some of London's seemingly intractable problems.

On these Benches we make no apologies for bringing back the amendment on Report—I do not believe that we received a fully satisfactory answer in Committee—and we shall bring it back at Third Reading, if necessary. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide more enlightenment and agree with the amendment. The logic is quite clear: the new MPA will not provide the necessary cross-departmental scrutiny of either the powers or the strategies in the process. The amendment is vital in order to ensure that all those strategies and powers are properly directed towards reducing crime in London.

Lord Renton

My Lords, Clause 25 is arguably the most important clause in the Bill because it deals with the powers of the proposed Greater London Authority. I support Amendments Nos.61, 62 and 63 which stand in the name of my noble friend Lady Miller of Hendon. I should like to comment briefly on each of them.

Amendment No. 61 is a very neat piece of drafting on her part. It shortens and clarifies the meaning of subsection (1).

Amendment No. 62 states: In furthering its purposes the Authority shall act in cooperation with the London boroughs and the Common Council". I should have thought that that was essential in order to avoid conflict.

Amendment No.63 incorporates the concept of observing any national policy for the time being in force". That is a very good idea, but I should like to make a minor drafting point and to draw the attention of my noble friend Lady Miller to the fact that those words, instead of coming after the word "to" in line 28 should come after the word "further". That would make greater sense and clarify the situation.

Baroness Hamwee

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has spoken very powerfully about community safety. I should like to add that I, and no doubt he, heartily agreed with the Minister's words at the last stage which were used to argue against our amendment, but which entirely supported it, and that is that the mayor's strategies and his or her activities would clearly be directed at crime reduction and community safety. He asked what other logical role there could be for the mayor. Quite so. The new authority has a strategic role, but crime prevention and community safety is one of those holistic subjects that should be the aim of London's strategic government.

Amendment No. 66 is also, a little oddly, grouped with these amendments. It proposes the deletion of Clause 26(8) which provides that the Secretary of State may, by order. impose limits on the expenditure which may be incurred by the authority by virtue of Clause 25(1).

The Minister stated that the new authority must be small and streamlined, as designed, but that reserve powers are needed in case an irresponsible mayor funded a significant expansion of the GLA or essential services were starved of funds as a result of those decisions. He said that they are reserve powers that would be used sparingly. From the drafting of subsection (8), it is not clear to me that they are reserve powers which would be used sparingly.

Why is this subsection necessary, given that all the normal constraints on local government spending will apply to the new authority? This sledgehammer of a clause could undo all the good which we hope that the GLA will do. To take one of the worst reasons, it is perhaps because we have a centralising government in power who do not like the success of the authority. We have been through arguments time and again in this House as to whether it is appropriate for electors to judge whether an administration has more or less hit the right level of spending. I shall not take up time by repeating those arguments. I am sure they are well known to all of your Lordships.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, a number of different and contradictory points have been raised. Contrary to the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Miller and the noble Lord, Lord Renton, the effect of Amendment No. 61 would be to deny the authority the ability it must have to co-operate with other statutory authorities and organisations to ensure that London receives the level and quality of strategic services it deserves and needs.

The noble Baroness seems to think that this would give the authority an open-ended power. I am not sure about the Trojan horse aspect. Clearly, I need to watch my metaphors. However, this is not an open-ended power. As I explained in Committee, the GLA is a statutory corporation and, as such, has only the functions—in other words, the powers and duties—conferred on it by statute.

Clause 1(3) clearly states: The Authority shall nave the functions which are transferred to, or conferred or imposed on, the Authority by or under this Act or any other Act". It cannot, therefore, simply adopt new functions on an ad hoc basis.

Clause 25 confers a general power on the GLA but limits that power to particular purposes which, to differentiate them from other purposes for which the authority may exercise functions—for example, functions for the purposes of the four functional bodies—are defined as its "principal purposes".

The provisions of Clause 26 prevent the mayor from intruding into areas which are the statutory responsibility of other authorities and bodies. It is therefore clear that the GLA cannot incur expenditure in directly providing, for example, housing, education, health or social services. The guidance that the Secretary of State will provide about the use of the general power, under the provisions of Clause 25(7), will make it absolutely clear that the GLA should not use the power to provide services where those are provided by other authorities or public bodies.

If the GLA did seek to do so, the Bill also gives the Secretary of State powers under Clause 26(7) to add to the list of services on which the GLA is prohibited from incurring expenditure.

The Secretary of State also has the reserve power to limit the expenditure of the authority using its general power in pursuit of its general purposes. That is here, in subsection (8), which Amendment No. 66, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to remove. That provides a safeguard against an irresponsible mayor diverting such a large proportion of the authority's resources to discretionary activities so that essential services are starved of funds.

As I have stated in earlier debates on this Bill, we have always made it clear that the GLA will be a relatively small authority, streamlined in terms of staff and costs. It will spend the money on services which Londoners wish to see and not on extravagant, diversionary expenditure of the kind alluded to or on activities other than those which the Bill decides should be the functions of the GLA.

However, it is the case that the GLA should he able to co-operate with those authorities in the London area in co-ordinating or facilitating the provision of services at a strategic level. That is clear from the main clauses of the Bill.

I would argue therefore that Amendment No. 62 is unnecessary in dealing with the question of cooperation with other authorities, because the mayor would both need and want to act in co-operation with the London boroughs and the Common Council of the City in pursuit of the authority's purposes. Their interests are common and the successful achievement of the GLA's purposes relies on co-operation not only with the boroughs but with all London's major players. We have tabled amendments to Clause 31 to enable the mayor to delegate his or her functions to the Common Council of the City where such an arrangement is agreed. Before the mayor can exercise the general power of the authority, he or she must consult the boroughs or the Common Council where their interests are likely to be affected. In preparing or revising any strategy, the mayor must always consult the London boroughs and the Common Council of the City.

There is, therefore, already every opportunity for the boroughs and the Common Council to make their views known to the mayor, and the mayor must act reasonably in the knowledge of those views. On the other hand, we do not believe that the mayor's actions should be prescribed by being made subject to—and to the veto of—the boroughs or the Common Council of the City. That is what Amendment No. 62 would require. They do not want to perceive the mayor as overriding the legitimate concerns of the boroughs, yet we do not want the boroughs to veto the mayor's actions in the exercise of his legitimate functions.

Amendment No. 64, to which the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, spoke, would require the authority, in exercising its general power, to do so in a way which is calculated to prevent crime and to promote community safety. Again, I argue that this amendment is unnecessary, as are the other amendments to which he spoke. It is quite clear that one of the principal purposes of the authority—to promote social development—must include crime prevention, community security and other matters related to the safety and security of citizens. Therefore, crime prevention is not simply the role of the Metropolitan Police Authority, but that factor is subsumed under the general requirement to promote social development. The general power may be exercised only in pursuit of those purposes, and strategies must have regard to those purposes.

I understood the noble Baroness to say that she would not move Amendment No. 63, so I shall not refer to that. In relation to the other amendments, I think that some of them could be damaging as regards constraining the mayor's powers unnecessarily. Others could be damaging, particularly Amendment No. 66, which seeks to delete the power of the Secretary of State to constrain the mayor, in extreme circumstances, from engaging in extravagant and unnecessary expenditure.

Other amendments, such as Amendment No. 64, are unnecessary in that they are covered by the general purposes referred to in the Bill. I hope that noble Lords will not press these amendments. They would undermine the purpose of the authority, and in some cases they are unnecessary.

9.30 p.m.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton

My Lords, I wonder whether I may remind your Lordships that this is Report stage and it is not possible for noble Lords to speak after the Minister.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I would not wish to undermine the purposes of the clause, as the noble Lord the Minister has suggested my amendments might do. I shall read very carefully what he has said. I know he will forgive me if I say that I am amused when he says that something is not necessary—and he says it to me very often. I often reply that such amendments are therefore not necessarily unnecessary.

Perhaps I may comment on Amendment No. 63. I shall not be moving it now because Clause 33 appeared to be a better place to put that particular amendment. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 61.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 62 to 64 not moved.]

Clause 26 [Limits of the general power]:

Lord Dixon-Smith moved Amendment No. 65:

Page 15, line 30, leave out paragraph (b)

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Clause 26 sets out to define the limits of the general power in Clause 25. Therefore, I am somewhat puzzled by the drafting. I propose the amendment so that we can explore exactly what the limits might mean in one specific area. Clause 26 begins: The Authority shall not by virtue of section 25(1) above incur expenditure in doing anything which may be done by a functional body other than the London Development Agency". Subsection (3) says: The Authority shall not by virtue of section 25(1) above incur expenditure in providing—

1. (a) any housing".

That is fine, but subsection (4) says: Any reference in subsection (3) above to the provision of housing—

1. (a) includes a references to the management of housing: but
2. (b) does not include a reference to the acquisition by the Authority of existing housing accommodation and the making of that accommodation available on a temporary basis for one or more of the principal purposes of the Authority".

I must admit that I would like to hear from the Minister in his reply what the limits of that particular phraseology might be.

If the GLA can acquire housing but cannot manage it, I am not quite sure what it is to do with it. Presumably, the authority would have to make it available for someone else to manage. But who else? As far as I can see, it would probably be one of the other statutory authorities. I do not know who else would be likely to want to manage housing in this way. In that case, it seems to me that it ought almost certainly to fall within the prohibition of Clause 26(3).

I may have misunderstood the purpose of the provision. Of course, it is possible that the authority might wish to purchase existing housing accommodation in order to demolish it for some other development. That would be a perfectly acceptable reason for purchasing housing. However, I am not sure that "demolition" would count as the management of housing, although it is a form of management. If that is the purpose of the provision, I think that the clause could perhaps have been drafted somewhat more felicitously. In any event, it seems to me that the existing drafting leaves an element of uncertainty. I particularly wish to hear the Minister's explanation regarding the exact nature of the restrictions and limitations of this power and why subsection (4) appears to be in some conflict with subsection (3) of the clause. I beg to move.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, I believe that the noble Lord has raised too many anxieties in this respect. Amendment No. 65 would prevent the authority from acquiring and providing housing on a temporary basis—covered by Clause 26(4)(b)—for one or more of its principal purposes or for purposes incidental to such purposes.

The provision in subsection 26(4)(b) will not provide the authority with an opportunity to become a housing authority and, therefore, go into housing management in that general sense. However, it would permit the authority to exercise a rational approach in, for example, its regeneration programme where it might be necessary to engage in the temporary decanting of tenants and rehousing, or the acquisition of property, short-term. which was tenanted. There would be other projects. I am not entirely sure whether, for example, if what is now the Highways Agency—which will become part of the TfL—is covered by this clause or a later clause, but very frequently it acquires houses for road schemes which need to be tenanted for a number of years. That is for a temporary purpose incidental to the main purpose and the Highways Agency therefore has housing on its books. To some extent TfL will inherit some of that. There will no doubt be similar issues in regeneration schemes and a number of other building projects.

The amendment would deny the authority and its functional bodies the flexibility it will need to act in this way and undermine its ability to act in relation to the purposes and functions we have given it. Our proposal is not the thin end of the wedge to it becoming a housing authority.

Lord Dixon-Smith

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. He has clone a great deal to calm my concerns. He has defined the purposes behind the subsection which might otherwise have caused concern. I shall study the reply with some care. In the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 66 not moved.]

Lord Dixon-Smith moved Amendment No. 67:

Page 16, line 8, at end insert ("except where it is the case that the Secretary of State is empowered under any other enactment to impose limits on any expenditure which may be incurred by the Authority,")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, had indicated in tabling Amendment No. 66 her wish to excise Clause 26(8) from the face of the Bill. I have considerable sympathy for that wish to see this particular phraseology outwith the Bill.

I wonder why we spent so long working in the House on the Local Government Act last summer. The Local Government Act begins with defining local authorities and determines that the Greater London Authority is a local authority. If one goes on through the Act, Part II, which deals with the regulation of council tax and precepts, says that Schedule 1 shall have effect. Schedule 1 goes on: If in the Secretary of State's opinion the amount calculated by an authority as its budget requirement for a financial year (the year under consideration) is excessive, he may exercise his power to designate or nominate the authority under Section 52D below".

If one goes further, under Section 52E, which deals with designation for the year under consideration, one sees: He shall notify the authority in writing of… (d) the amount which he proposes should be the maximum for the amount calculated by the authority as its budget requirement for the year".

It seems that we have a wonderful duplication of legislation here. Rather than proposing to excise the phrase—which, it seemed to me, the Government were unlikely to accept—my amendment merely suggests that the power in Clause 26(8) should not be used except where it is the case that the Secretary of State is empowered under any other enactment to impose limits on expenditure; in other words, the Local Government Act should take precedence over this Bill and, therefore, the power would not be used.

It may be that I have missed something somewhere. Some of us in the House did a considerable amount of work—as did the Minister himself—to get the Local Government Act through. When we had done so, we thought we had done some good. When I see such a clause in this Bill, it makes me wonder whether one part of the relevant government department talks to another part of the relevant government department. It is possible that those responsible for drafting one Bill do not talk to those who are responsible for drafting another. In any event, it seems to me that we do not need both provisions. If the Bill is not appropriate, we should seek to amend subsection (8). In the mean time, I await the Minister's reply with considerable interest.

9.45 p.m.

Baroness Hamwee

My Lords, the noble Lord paid me the compliment of agreeing with my Amendment No. 66. I am not surprised; it repeated exactly an amendment that he tabled at the previous stage. I am afraid that I cannot pay him quite the same compliment, as I am not sure what is the proposed effect of his Amendment No. 67. However, I strongly agree with his point that we should be relying on other existing legislation. I am simply not sure about the way in which the proposal is framed.

The noble Lord's amendment enables me to ask the Minister to explain, if he can, in rather more detail than he did in regard to Amendment No. 66 how subsection (8) relates to Clause 25(1). In the previous debate he said that the subsection is to prevent expenditure on peripheral matters. But Clause 25(1) seems to deal with everything. It states that the authority, shall have power to do anything which it considers will further any one or more of its principal purposes". In other words, it covers all the functions of the authority—what the authority does in order to promote its principal purposes. I am unable to see how Clause 28 is limited in the way that the noble Lord has argued. I hope that he will be able to assist me further on that point.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, I am not entirely sure that I follow the noble Baroness's last point. I understand that she is concerned about the inter-relationship between Clause 26(8) and Clause 25(1). But as I understand it, the point of the noble Lord's amendment is that in this whole area there are adequate powers within the Local Government Act 1999, on which he rightly spent some happy hours before the Recess.

The point about the local government legislation, to which the GLA will clearly be subject, is that by and large it provides powers relating to the total budget and precept of the GLA. The provision in Clause 26(8) is not a power to limit the total expenditure of the GLA; it can only limit the amount within that total budget which is spent on activities other than those specific statutory functions under the general powers. That is why in the previous debate we were diverted into references to extravagant activities that were not part of the general purposes of the authority. So while the Local Government Act certainly deals with the total budget, it does not deal with that specific power in those specific circumstances. Therefore, we need that power within the Bill.

Lord Dixon-Smith

My Lords, I hear what the Minister has to say. If he will forgive me, it seems to me that we are in danger of establishing a very nasty precedent which might be used to extend this principle to other areas of local government. The excuse could be made that we have accepted it in this legislation. We are invited to accept that the Secretary of State should have the power to limit the expenditure in a specific area of an authority's budget. I believe there is not an authority in the country that would not fight that to the death. It is a serious matter. Local authorities have perforce had to accept—because they are creatures created by legislation—that the Government should require powers to control their expenditure. The Local Government Act that was made law in the summer was passed with that provision as part of its purpose. It may be reasonable that the Government should control the overall expenditure of the local authority or authorities. Although there is now some academic evidence against it, they argue that the impact of local government expenditure on the nation's coffers is sufficiently significant to justify it.

That may be an acceptable argument, but when we reach the point where the Secretary of State has the power to control a specific part of an individual authority's budget I am obliged to part company with the Minister.

I shall study his reply with care. It is late in the evening, perhaps we have had sufficient excitement for a little while. We may need something later in the evening to wake us all up, therefore I shall not pursue the matter. However, I suggest that there is here an exceedingly dangerous principle. I can imagine that it might well be argued to extend the principle in other directions, and that would be wholly unacceptable. The Minister may say that that will not happen. This House and, I suspect, the other place have had a litany over a number of years and I do not wish to provide the opportunity for the principle to go further. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 27 [Consultation]:

[Amendment No.68 not moved.]

Baroness Hamwee moved Amendment No. 69:

Page 16, line 37, at end insert— ("( ) In determining what consultation (if any) is appropriate under subsection (1) above, the Authority shall have regard to consultation undertaken in the preparation or revision of any applicable strategy.")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, Amendment No. 69 is to explore a little further the relationship between the consultations on functions and strategies. Clause 27(1) gives the power to do anything which the authority considers will further one or more of its principal purposes. That is a wide power, but I do not quarrel with it. Under Clause 27(1), it is exercisable only after consultation with the bodies which the authorities think are appropriate. I hope it will not be thought that I am decrying or denying the importance of consultation, but I remain unclear how this links with consultation on the mayor's draft strategies, as provided by the Bill.

The amendment was spoken to in Committee; it was part of a wide-ranging group. Re-reading the debate, it seemed to me that it became lost in whether there should be a list of consultees under Clause 27(3), or additions to that provision. In considering the Bill, it has seemed to me throughout that the order of events is that the authority needs the power, then the mayor creates a strategy about exercising the power and then comes its exercise. So it would be appropriate to have regard to consultation which has already been carried out on the same subject. I apologise to the House for returning to the point, but I do not believe it was answered at the previous stage. I beg to move.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, I find the amendment slightly confusing. As I understand it, the noble Baroness says that, if the mayor has already consulted on the preparation of the strategy, he needs to take account of that consultation as to whether, with whom and to what degree he needs to consult on the exercise of the powers.

In one sense it would automatically be the case that the mayor would take note of what consultation had taken place on the strategy and would make use of it; but I do not know that we need to legislate for that. The perverse effect of this, it seems to me, is that it could discourage the mayor from consulting about the use of the general power, using the excuse that he had consulted on the preparation of the strategy perhaps a matter of years previously.

I am sure that is not the intention, but the "if any" in the amendment might suggest it. We would wish to consider a continuous, iterative process between the mayor, the authority and the bodies which are the relevant consultees. This would seem to limit that. It may not have been the intention, but it could be the effect in certain circumstances.

I would therefore ask the noble Baroness to consider that and not to pursue the amendment.

Baroness Hamwee

My Lords, the Minister and I probably take the same view. My concern is about whether it is properly expressed.

He is quite right: I certainly did not intend to limit consultation. I intended to direct the mayor's mind, not just to the amount of consultation but to those whom he or she consults, having regard to the comments that have come back as a result of the previous exercise. As he says, it should be an iterative process. The mayor, having regard to comments already made, should be considering very carefully whether the particular points should be explored in more depth.

I do not think that there is anything between us on the substance, and I certainly will not take any more time of the House on it tonight. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton moved Amendment No. 70:

After Clause 27, insert the following new clause—

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

(" .—(1) The Authority shall make appropriate arrangements with a view to securing that—

1. (a) in the exercise of the power conferred on the Authority by section 25 above,
2. (b) in the formulation of the policies and proposals to be included in any of the strategies mentioned in section 33(1) below, and
3. (c) in the implementation of any of those strategies,

there is due regard to the principle that there should be equality of opportunity for all people.

(2) The functions conferred on the Authority under or by virtue of this section shall be functions of the Authority which are exercisable by the Mayor acting on behalf of the Authority.")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, during the Committee stage of the Bill I agreed to take away and consider your Lordships' comments about the need to place on the face of the Bill specific references to the authority's duties in relation to the promotion of equal opportunities. I am now moving an amendment which represents a response to the concerns raised. It also makes explicit what we believe was already implicit in the Clause 25 provisions of the Bill.

The new clause means that the may or must put in place appropriate arrangements to ensure that, in exercising the general power and in preparing and implementing his or her strategies, she or he will have to have due regard to the principle that there should be equality of opportunity for all people. The mayor is already required to consult people or organisations whose interests are affected either by the exercise of the general power or by the strategies she or he has prepared. There will therefore be many opportunities available to people to ensure that the mayor cannot fall short in fulfilling those duties in relation to the implementation of the equal opportunities provisions of the Bill or, for that matter, any other provisions of the Bill. The mayor's statutory meetings with the assembly in the people's question time will provide other public occasions during which the mayor may be held to account and progress assessed.

As we have explained throughout the passage of this Bill, we are concerned that the authority should recognise the diverse nature of the population it will serve and the need for that population to be given an opportunity to have its say and to be involved in the governance of London. We believe that the provisions of the Bill deliver that opportunity and that the provisions of this amendment make our intentions absolutely explicit. I beg to move.

Lord Dholakia

My Lords, perhaps I may first of all welcome the new clause introduced by the noble Baroness the Minister. She has obviously tried to give due weight to arguments advanced by all sides of your Lordships' House during the Committee stage of the Greater London Authority Bill. The proposed amendment, however, falls far short of the arguments that were advanced and which formed the basis of our contribution during that part of the Committee stage.

To explain, the Government's proposal would require the Greater London Authority to make arrangements with a view to securing a number of key areas that the Minister has just mentioned: first, the exercise of the power conferred by Clause 25 of the Bill; secondly, the formulation of policies and proposals under the strategies referred to in Clause 33(1); and, thirdly, the implementation of any of those strategies.

We have a problem here. In short, the arrangements for securing these objectives could be met by the GLA putting some arrangements in place with the intention specified in the amendment, but in reality there would be no real obligation to build equality of opportunity into the functions of the GLA. I go by my previous experience in this particular field. I shall be as helpful as I can to the Minister. I declare that at one time I worked for the Commission for Racial Equality. At present there is similarly vague wording in Section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976, which refers to making appropriate arrangements with a view to securing that various functions of the local authorities are carried out with due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups. Note the similarity between what the Minister proposes and what is already on the statute book.

But the Commission for Racial Equality, which has carried out some major formal investigations under the race relations legislation, has concluded, and will state, that provisions of this nature have enabled some local authorities in this country to pay lip service to racial equality but to do little or nothing whatever. In reality, the discredited Section 71 and the provisions proposed by the Minister do not advance equality of opportunity any further.

We seem to have lost sight of the Macpherson Report. Only last month the Home Office published a thematic review of equality and fairness in the Fire Service—a damning report if ever there was one. Central to this major report is the extent of racism and the need to eliminate such practices. The GLA Bill already provides in Clause 338 that Section 71 of the Race Relations Act shall apply to the GLA, the Metropolitan Police Authority and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris, moved an amendment at Committee stage, which the Government agreed to consider and redraft, to make the promotion of equality of opportunity part of the core function of the GLA. Although the Government have acknowledged that the GLA will be subject to the existing antidiscrimination legislation, there was a strong feeling in your Lordships' House that, given the diversity of London's population, a positive duty to promote equality of opportunity should be included in the Bill. The totality of the Government's amendments adds very little to what will already be the duty of the GLA under Clause 338. Can the Minister explain the difference between Clause 338 and the new clause after Clause 27? In reality, there is none, and Clause 338 depends very much on the provisions of Section 71 of the Race Relations Act.

I take off my hat to those who drafted the new clause. It pays lip service to the promotion of equality of opportunity but adds very little to what is already in the Bill, and this simply will not do. What is also needed in the clause is specific reference to race, sex, disability, age, sexual orientation and religion. While the Government talk about equality of opportunity for all people", the major advantage in specifying particular factors that must not be grounds for unequal treatment is that it makes the GLA's duty far more concrete and solid. Critically, this would provide from the outset statutory criteria that must be applied in any monitoring of compliance by the GLA of its duty to promote equality of opportunity. If the government proposals are enacted, the GLA is likely in practice to adopt monitoring on the basis of some, but not necessarily all, of the criteria I have just mentioned. It is preferable for the legislature to specify in primary legislation the specific criteria on which it expects the GLA to monitor its equality performance. Those criteria—race, sex, disability, age, sexual orientation and religion—are the same as those included in Article 13 of the European Union treaty that will ultimately be specified in European anti-discrimination legislation.

Time does not permit me to refer to the ALG briefing. Most of your Lordships will have seen what it had to say. This is a subject that I raised in Committee. Of course, we also need to revisit Clause 338.

I plead with the Minister to reconsider this provision. I shall be pleased to assist her in any way I can. If she does not, I shall certainly move appropriate amendments at Third Reading.

Lord Harris of Haringey

My Lords, when the amendment was considered in Committee, there was all-party support for the principle of placing a responsibility for promoting equal opportunities and tackling discrimination at the heart of the Greater London Authority. I think that is the critical issue. I have listened very carefully to the remarks which have just been made and I understand very clearly the points that are being made. I still think that this is a very welcome step forward because it places clear requirements in respect of equality of opportunity on the face of the Bill. I think that we have to recognise that the nature of the work of the Greater London Authority will be tied in with its specific power conferred under Clause 25 and in terms of the preparation of policies and strategies. That is covered by this amendment.

Having said that, I do think that there should be an expectation on the mayor to report on a regular basis on the way in which this responsibility has been carried forward. Certainly in the legislation on the Welsh Assembly—I refer to the Government of Wales Act—there was a similar requirement on the Welsh Assembly to promote equality. There was also a requirement that the Assembly should publish a report after each financial year containing a statement of the arrangements made which had had effect during that financial year and—this is perhaps most important—an assessment of how effective those arrangements had been in promoting equality of opportunity. Essentially, such a system would require the new authority—if such provisions were applied in those terms to the Greater London Authority—to audit its own progress on this matter.

I listened very carefully to my noble friend the Minister's explanation that, in practice, the mayor will be accountable to the assembly and will be required to report on many matters during the course of the year. I think that is a valid point. I anticipate that assembly members will want to make sure that all such matters are addressed properly in those reports. None the less, it might be helpful to have the requirement to have an over-arching report bringing together all the different strands of policy in terms of equality of opportunity and the work which had been done.

This amendment might have been drafted in a slightly more precise way, but I am none the less extremely pleased to see it in this form. I believe that we have made considerable progress. Something is now to be written on the face of the Bill. I think that is helpful.

I am sure that my noble friend the Minister will want to take away the points which have been made in this discussion. It may well be that in the ensuing discussion and, indeed, in the debates that we shall no doubt have during the run-up to the elections for the new authority and the election of the mayor, there will be considerable emphasis on these issues and we shall find that the new mayor and the new assembly spend a great deal of time focusing on how they are going to deliver what is contained in this proposed new clause in terms of equality of opportunity for the people of London.

Let us be quite clear. Given the nature of London's population it is far more important to get this right in London than it has been in other parts of the country. I do not decry its importance in other parts of the country. However, given the nature of London's population, it will be a critical responsibility for the mayor and assembly.

I welcome the measure. I hope that it is a duty that is embraced enthusiastically by the mayor and all members of the assembly when elected next May to ensure that the new authority has the opportunity to make a real difference in these areas for the benefit of the people of London.

Lord Lucas

My Lords, we are not dealing with specific anti-discrimination legislation. With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, in this Bill we should not go too much into the details under these circumstances. Once one strays beyond race, sex and other easily ascertainable factors, spelling things out in detail can become extremely difficult.

The advantages of the wording in the proposed amendment are that it covers many areas which would be difficult to specify such as age, financial status and other matters which might reasonably be taken into account by the mayor in ensuring that the policies he or she puts forward are of benefit to all Londoners equally, and that all Londoners have the same opportunities as far as reasonably possible. That would not be the case if we limit the provision to individual categories which are well covered by existing legislation. If they are not, the existing legislation should be amended.

I support the suggestion from the Labour Back Benches that there should be a reporting requirement. These issues are best enforced in that way. If they have to be reported on, the mayor and assembly have to pay attention to them. That ensures that the new clause is not a dead letter.

Lord Sheppard of Didgemere

My Lords, I declare, not an interest in the subject, but a passion. Like many noble Lords, I am only here because of actions by many previous generations. To that extent, I feel passionately about the subject. However, putting passion to one side, perhaps I may speak as a businessman.

The clause is mainstream good business for London. Let us take two examples. The cultural diversity of London is a major strength. At times there is great hysteria in the media and elsewhere—some justified, some not—but it is of immense strength if one is dealing with inward investment and business start-up. The huge blend of people from many different groups—they may include Italians and perhaps Scots—makes London a successful business mix. We must build on and encourage that cultural diversity.

If we are to be globally competitive, we cannot have an unskilled underclass. Apart from the fact that we might have a social revolution, we would have extremely bad economics. We cannot afford not to level up in terms of education and skills, and therefore living standards and so on. My only surprise is that the issue arises only at this stage of the Bill. I should have thought it would be the first provision drafted rather than the last.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Harris, that perhaps the provision should be more precise. Equally, I agree with my noble friend Lord Lucas that it is a good thing to have a general clause.

However, I wish to ask the Minister about the wording. The Government have picked up the wording of one of the amendments brought forward previously. I have been unable to find the context in Hansard. The provision states: The Authority shall make appropriate arrangements with a view to securing that … there is due regard to the principle that there should be equality of opportunity for all people. There is no such thing. My great niece is very fond of doing handstands. She has the opportunity whenever she wants, I imagine, to do a handstand in Piccadilly Circus. I do not have that opportunity because I am 74 years of age. I used to be able to do it, but not now. That is a trivial example, but there is no such thing as equality of opportunity for all people.

When we legislate it has to be capable of being tested in the courts. I picture a judge trying to decide whether something that the authority has done provides equal opportunity for all. That phrase is guff. I believe I said so at Committee stage. The noble Lord. Lord Dholakia, explained the remit of the Commission for Racial Equality. He said that it was absolutely precise. I wonder whether the Government have got it right or whether they have just taken notice of whoever moved the amendment and included the phraseology. I suspect that it will not stand up to scrutiny.

10.15 p.m.

Lord Tope

My Lords, when my noble friend Lord Dholakia began his speech he welcomed this amendment. Perhaps I may reiterate that we are pleased that the Government have recognised the concern which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said was expressed from all Benches at a previous stage of the Bill. I believe that the Government have recognised that fact and I say so without qualification.

Quite serious concerns have been expressed tonight by my noble friend Lord Dholakia. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, did not refer to everything. He specifically used the same criteria as those contained in the EU treaty which are race, sex, disability, age, sexual orientation and religion. They are specifics laid down in the treaty, which will become incumbent upon us.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris, rightly drew attention to the requirements upon the Welsh Assembly for an annual report. Others have said that that is a useful requirement. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, said rightly that the assembly members are doing the job that they are supposed to do and that they will pick up that point in any event. That applies to a great deal in this Bill.

I welcome this important step forward by the Government. I suggest that the phrase "could do better" is appropriate. I echo the offer made by my noble friend that we shall be 'very happy to discuss with Ministers and others how best the clause can be improved to meet the objectives that I believe all Members of this House share. I do not believe that there is a difference between us as to what we are trying to achieve. If there is one, it is how best to achieve the objective. I believe that through discussion we shall be able to agree a number of improvements to the clause which will make it clearer, more specific and more generally acceptable.

In response I hope that the Minister will accept the offer in the spirit in which it is meant and that perhaps at Third Reading the Government will produce an amendment that can achieve the objectives to which a number of speakers have alluded tonight.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have been generous about what we have achieved. In reply I shall deal with the points of concern that have been raised. We do not believe that this amendment is a token provision. The Bill provides for a number of ways in which the mayor must report on progress. Clause 38 already requires the mayor to prepare an annual report which must include an assessment of progress in implementing the strategies, a summary of information which relates to the performance of the authority in its statutory functions and information which the assembly, prior to the beginning of the financial year to which the report relates, has asked the mayor to include. It also requires that the report be sent to the assembly and published.

Given that the mayor will be required to include in the strategies targets or bench marks which he or she has set and that all strategies specifically must now have regard to the achievement of equal opportunities, we believe that this new clause is a strong point.

I understand the issues raised by noble Lords. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy, that I fear that I too would be unable to take part in handstands. However, to me, the issue of equality of opportunity relates to the fact that the country, and individuals in the country, are being denied the skills of large numbers of people. Unfortunately, that includes disproportionately large percentages of people from certain sections of the community who have the capacity to achieve an awful lot given those skills. My capacity to achieve handstands departed more years ago than I care to remember, but I look, as do other noble Lords, at the enormous pool of talent. I am aware, as are other noble Lords, that all too often the children who end up with the most difficulties in life are those who have enormous talent which is not recognised because they are not given equality of opportunity to develop that talent.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour

My Lords, I agree with everything that the Minister says about this particular point. But I hope that she will realise that I was not suggesting that there are equal opportunities for all. I was saying that they cannot exist in the terms of the wording of the amendment. I would have thought that the wording was simply not suitable to be tested in court, unless it is already defined somewhere in a way that makes it possible to test it in court. It is simply a vague phrase that should not appear in legislation. Of course I agree with the Minister and, furthermore, I think it excellent to put this clause in—of course I do. But I am questioning the wording of the part which refers to, due regard to the principle that there should be equality of opportunity for all people". If someone could not stand on his head, then there would not be equality of opportunity for all people. It is just nonsense.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton

My Lords, I am sorry. Perhaps, because it is getting late, the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy, and I ought to continue our duologue outside the Chamber.

My point is not that there should be an assumption that all people can achieve equal success in all fields in which other people are able to achieve high levels. That is not equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is absent when a child who has the potential to be a brain surgeon ends up, for a variety of reasons, not even being literate. That, when other children get through, to me is a total failure to achieve equality of opportunity. It would be difficult to take the issue further.

I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sheppard of Didgemere, that if the population of London—indeed, of anywhere in the country, but of London in particular—does not have an opportunity to develop its talents and its cultural diversity, not only will London be the poorer for it, but so will the rest of the country. I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tope, that there is always an opportunity for those with a responsibility to challenge and question and scrutinise and that that has not always happened. I put to him the point that this is a totally new model of governance and that the specific role for scrutiny envisaged within the Bill or the assembly will—I hope and I am sure he hopes—develop a sharper edge and sharper focus.

I appreciate the point made by my noble friend Lord Harris. We believe that the proposals now within the Bill will strengthen and put a hard force before the need to tackle the issue. No one—including Members of this House speaking for the Government at this Dispatch Box—ever claims that they have discovered every single phrase which could possibly strengthen and enhance a particular part of a particular piece of legislation. Of course we stand fully prepared to take into consideration any points raised. It is quite clear from the contributions in your Lordships' House that we have one common goal regarding this item, and that is that we get it right. We must make sure it is as effective as possible and that it delivers the conditions that must apply in this country because of European commitments. I pay tribute to the reference from the noble Lord, Lord Tope. I commend the amendment.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Miller of Hendon moved Amendment No. 71:

Page 17, line 5, leave out subsection (1).

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving this amendment I wish to speak also to Amendment No. 72. I confess that Clause 29(1) has given me more difficulty than any other provision in this Bill or, indeed, so far as I can recall, any other clause with which I have ever had to deal in any other Bill.

As drafted, the clause would enable any of the functions of the Greater London Authority to be exercisable by, in the alternative, the mayor alone or the assembly alone or the mayor and assembly jointly.

When the Bill was first published after being introduced in the other place, my initial reaction was that I did not like the provisions of this subsection because it seemed to me that we could end up with a situation where there was a lack of accountability. Each of the parties—the mayor on the one hand and the assembly on the other—could blame the other for actions they did not specifically agree or decisions in which they had not specifically participated.

It would create a huge potential for conflict if the two had different views on which policy should be pursued. It would create the potential for good old-fashioned demarcation disputes that would put the inter-union conflicts in the shipbuilding industry into the shade if the mayor on the one hand claimed that something was within his jurisdiction and the assembly on the other hand claimed it was theirs, while a disgruntled resident of Greater London might claim that a decision by either one or the other should have been made by the two bodies jointly under subsection 29(1)(c).

My response to this problem was to suggest that there should be only one choice as to who should be responsible for exercising the functions of the authority. My initial choice was that the function should be exercised by the mayor and assembly jointly; in other words, deleting subsections (a) and (b). That was the effect of Amendment No. 98 which I tabled for the Committee to consider. However, when I came to prepare my speaking notes I had a change of mind. I came to the conclusion that, as the office of the mayor was to be the executive of the authority, then logically it should be the mayor who should exercise the functions of the authority. After all, when we consider the governance of the United Kingdom, the functions of Westminster Parliament—the equivalent of the assembly—do not involve it in taking any part in the exercise of its powers by the executive in the form of the government. It grants the executive its powers and supervises the government as best it can. However, I repeat that Parliament itself does not take an active part in the exercise of the functions of the government.

Therefore, having changed my mind about who should exercise the functions of the authority, I withdrew Amendment No. 98 before it was reached and substituted Amendment 98A, which was to delete paragraphs (b) and (c), leaving the functions to be exercised by the mayor. The Government, as is their wont, rejected my amendment and in withdrawing it I said that I was sure that the Minister would not expect me to accept his explanation. I am pleased to tell the noble Lord. Lord Whitty, possibly to his great surprise, that, having since carefully read his remarks, I now find that I certainly do agree with him. He said—and I streamline his remarks—that: The Bill provides for the majority of the authority's functions … to be exercised by the mayor … and it is right that the assembly … should exercise certain functions on behalf of the authority … There are other instances where perhaps the mayor and the assembly could jointly have responsibility".

He then concluded by saying that, in general there needs to be some differentiation in function—[Official Report, 21/6/99; col. 758]

It is that one phrase that contains the nub of the point. On reflection, I entirely agree with the noble Lord.

I am not one to be persuaded by rhetoric but, as an eminently reasonable person, I most certainly can be persuaded by logic. If I may tell the House of my thought processes, following the noble Lord's most logical remarks, I then asked myself the equally logical question, what is the purpose of subsection (1)? In what way does this subsection improve or explain the Bill? My answer has to be: in no way. The individual, separate and joint functions of the mayor and the assembly are clearly set out and defined throughout the Bill. So what does this subsection mean? In my opinion, and with due respect to the draftsman. I believe it is mere verbiage. It does not improve the Bill in any way. As I said a few minutes ago, what it does do is to provide fertile ground for disputes, arguments and uncertainty.

I apologise to your Lordships for raising this point at such a late stage of the Bill, and in particular at such a late hour. I should have questioned it at Second Reading, or I should have introduced a probing amendment in Committee. However, I was so engrossed in adopting a minimalist approach to the amendment that although I realised that there was something drastically wrong with the clause, I did not appreciate that it really was beyond amendment and that the only solution to its basic flaw would be to excise it altogether. I have tried to make up for this by giving the Minister advance notice of my opinion and argument. I look forward with interest to his reply.

I turn now to the minor drafting amendment, Amendment No. 72. It calls for two words, "in particular", to be deleted from subsection (10), which reads: This section is subject, in particular, to Part II of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994".

But why "in particular"? This section, and this entire Bill, and indeed every Act of Parliament, is subject to every other part of the law of the land, whether or not mentioned, unless specifically excepted. I can understand that the Government wish to adhere to this Act by an appropriate declaration, but why "in particular"? It is an unnecessary and indeed most odd phrase to use in legislation. Again, it could provide fertile ground for a future nitpicker to suggest that this Act is not "in particular" subject to some equally relevant law.

Just as subsection (1) is not relevant, I believe that the two words "in particular" are mere tautology. I hope the Government will agree to their deletion to prevent any future problems. I beg to move.

10.30 p.m.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, I do not understand, or at least I did not understand until three or four minutes ago, what the noble Baroness was trying to do in moving to delete subsection (1) of Clause 29. The clause provides that all powers under this Act are exercisable by the mayor, the assembly or a combination of the mayor and the assembly as specified under those particular powers. That clarifies the position that there are no powers under this Act that fall outside one of those three areas.

The individual powers are based on the separation of powers which we have described at great length during the course of the Bill. It makes clear that the mayor will play the role of an executive decision maker, and the assembly will provide scrutiny of the mayor's actions. The clause makes it clear that all powers contained in the Bill will be exercisable by either subsections (1)(a), (b) or (c), and not in any other way. Other clauses therefore develop from that point.

If we were to remove the clause, it would open the way for those future nitpickers referred to by the noble Baroness to put forward the possibility that not all actions of the authority are exercisable in this way. They could be exercised in an entirely different way. We therefore need this clause as a safety net, and I resist its removal.

The noble Baroness is correct in stating that in relation to Amendment No.72 any relevant legislation will apply to the provisions of the GLA Bill. Clause 29(1) simply draws attention to Part II of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994, which is particularly significant. Deletion of the words "in particular" would probably have the opposite effect to the one intended by the noble Baroness because it would suggest that it was only subject to Part II of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act and not to other legislation. Whether that provision in itself can alter the basic, fundamental position that all Acts are subject to other relevant legislation unless specifically prescribed, I am not sure, but it would confuse the issue. That Act is singled out because it is particularly significant in these circumstances. It could be argued that the deletion of "in particular" suggests that other Acts that are relevant to carrying out powers under this Act would not apply. It is therefore better to leave those words there, although, as the noble Baroness stated, it does not alter either way the general position that all other legislation, unless specified in this Act, shall apply. I hope that the noble Baroness will not pursue the matter.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I accept what the Minister has said about Amendment No.72, that it is not necessary to delete it; neither is it unnecessary. Nevertheless, I shall accept what he says because it is late.

I have no intention of pressing Amendment No. 71 at this late hour, and I do not think that I shall bring it back at Third Reading, but I should like it to be on the record that I think it is a confusing provision. It certainly confused me. It may very well lead to problems later on, and I think it would have been much simpler to have removed it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 72 not moved.]

Lord Whitty moved Amendment No. 73: After Clause 29, insert the following new clause—

STANDING ORDERS OF THE AUTHORITY

(" .—(1) The Assembly, in consultation with the Mayor, may make standing orders of the Authority.

(2) The procedure of the Assembly, and of any committees or sub-committees of the Assembly, shall be regulated by the standing orders of the Authority.

(3) Standing orders of the Authority may make provision regulating the procedure to be followed—

1. (a) by any member of the Assembly, or
2. (b) by any member of staff of the Authority,

by whom functions of the Authority are exercisable pursuant to arrangements under section 46 below.

(4) Standing orders of the Authority may make provision regulating the procedure to be followed by the Mayor or by the Assembly in discharging any functions of the Mayor or the Assembly. to the extent that the functions—

1. (a) consist of consultation or any other interaction or relationship between the Mayor and the Assembly: or
2. (b) are exercisable by the Mayor in relation to the Assembly or by the Assembly in relation to the Mayor.

(5) Standing orders of the Authority may make provision for any other matter for which provision by standing orders of the Authority is authorised or required by or under any other provision of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) Subsections (2) to (5) above are subject to any other provision of this Act or any other enactment which regulates, or provides for the regulation of, the procedure of the Assembly or any procedure to be followed by the Mayor.

(7) Standing orders of the Authority may make different provision for different circumstances.

(8) The Assembly, after consultation with the Mayor, may at any time vary or revoke any standing orders of the Authority.

(9) Neither section 31 below nor section 46 below shall apply in relation to the functions of the Mayor or the Assembly under this section.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this clause is to provide for the assembly to make standing orders of the authority, following consultation with the mayor, and in so doing to limit the extent to which the assembly can make standing orders in relation to the mayor. Subsection (4) relates in particular to procedures for consultation or any other interaction or relationship between the mayor and the assembly; for example, statutory meetings.

This provision is intended to ensure that the assembly's standing orders do not prescribe the actions of the mayor more generally outside the interface between the mayor and the assembly. It is a useful clarification. I beg to move.

Baroness Hamwee

My Lords, both this new clause and Clause 45 provide that they are subject to other provisions of the Act. On first reading, it seems that neither is paramount. Can the Minister confirm that Clause 29(2), which states that the procedure of the assembly and committees shall be regulated by standing orders of the authority, means that the standing orders take preference over procedure, notwithstanding what is provided later in the clause?

Lord Lucas

My Lords, I am particularly interested in subsection (4) which states that the authority may make provision regulating the procedure to be followed by the mayor. Presumably, this function will be exercised by the assembly.

Let us suppose that the mayor and the assembly were from different parties, which is not unlikely. The mayor could be required to approach the assembly on his knees, or wearing a gold lame jockstrap or whatever else might amuse, or there could be other procedures more subtly intended to humiliate the mayor in the presence of the assembly. That would seem to be an odd arrangement of powers. I am sure that the mayor should have an interest in the procedures to be followed by the assembly concerning its relationship with him.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, as regards the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, the mayor does have such an interest. It is built into subsection (1) of the new clause, which reads: The Assembly, in consultation with the Mayor, may make standing orders of the Authority". I suspect that any such consultation would make it clear that the mayor was not likely to be well disposed towards the kind of situation described by the noble Lord. That point is, therefore, covered.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to other procedures and precedents. The procedure to be adopted will clearly be subject to what is required under the Act. In other words, the standing orders relate to the responsibilities and functions of the various parts of the authority in other parts of the Act. They are therefore procedural and not substantive in that sense.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 4 [Exercise of functions during vacancy or temporary incapacity of Mayor]:

Lord Whitty moved Amendment No. 74:

Page 219, line 5, leave out ("to the Deputy Mayor") and insert—

• ("(a) to the Deputy Mayor, if there is a holder of that office: or
• (b) in any other case. to the Chair of the Assembly.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving this amendment, I shall speak also to the other amendments in this group, all of which relate to the question of a vacancy in the office of the mayor and, in particular, to where it may not be the case that the deputy mayor will, in all circumstances, take on the role of the mayor until that vacancy is filled.

The deputy mayor may be either unable or unwilling to take on those responsibilities. In those circumstances, the chair of the assembly would be invited to take on the duties of the mayor and to act as mayor. We believe, therefore, that there should be a formal office of acting mayor to which either the deputy mayor, in normal circumstances, or, in other circumstances, the chair of the assembly, may be appointed where necessary. Amendment No. 74 creates that office.

Amendment No. 76 provides the procedures for filling the office of acting mayor. Under those provisions, the deputy mayor becomes acting mayor unless he or she is unwilling to accept office. If the deputy mayor does not become acting mayor, the appropriate office notifies the chair of the assembly that he or she will become acting mayor.

The amendment also provides that if the deputy mayor or the chair of the assembly becomes acting mayor, he or she cannot be deputy mayor, chair, or deputy chair of the assembly.

The acting mayor will be subject to the provisions of Schedule 4, Part II(4), which sets out the functions not exercisable by the deputy mayor. Amendment No. 81 provides that the acting mayor may not act as an assembly member other than in relation to the budget.

Amendment No. 92 provides for similar procedures where a vacancy occurs in the office of acting mayor. Amendments Nos. 93 to 9:5 which are virtually at the end of this group, provide for the chair to be treated as mayor when the mayor is temporarily unable to act. The other later amendments in the group are consequential on the principal amendments. I beg to move.

The Deputy Speaker (Lord Elton)

My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord would put on the record the amendments in the group to which he spoke, not all of which he has mentioned.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 74, I spoke also to Amendments Nos. 75 to 95. Then there are Amendments Nos. 172, 177, 179 and 182.

10.45 p.m.

Lord Lucas

My Lords, as I have told the noble Lord, I intend to speak to Amendments Nos. 93, 94 and 95 separately. On consideration, I shall add No. 92 to those, in order to keep the subjects separate. On Amendments Nos. 74 to 91, I have no point of major importance to make, but I should like to ask the noble Lord about one subtlety of drafting.

Amendment No. 83 inserts the words "unless and", followed by "until". Amendment No. 90 makes it "unless or until". Can the noble Lord explain to me the difference between those two phrases and why they should be different in those two positions? Perhaps he can also explain the necessity for reinforcing the word "until" with "unless" in the first place.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, if I may, I should like to speak to Amendment No. 76 and ask the noble Lord for his help. I find it difficult to reconcile the proposed paragraph 2B(1) in the amendment with paragraph 5(1). There it says that the deputy mayor may not exercise the functions of the acting mayor until he has delivered a declaration of acceptance. Yet by paragraph 2B(1) the deputy mayor is the acting mayor immediately, though the status is lost if he does not deliver a declaration of acceptance within seven days. I refer to paragraph 2B(1)(b) and 2B(6). But as soon as the deputy mayor becomes the acting mayor he ceases to become the deputy mayor under paragraph 2B(2). Therefore how can paragraph 5(1) in the Bill actually apply? I have to say that I find that a complete and utter muddle. I should be most grateful if the noble Lord could help me on that. To me, paragraph 2B(1)(b) is barely comprehensible. It says that if the deputy mayor does not give a notice under paragraph (a) above "and". I think that is quite unnecessary and ought to go, because as soon as a notice is given under (a) the whole thing is triggered. I find that inelegant drafting and I cannot understand it.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, there are complicated interrelationships between the various clauses. On the noble Baroness's last point, you need to provide for the situation where there is a formal declaration that the person does not wish to be acting mayor and also for the situation where the person does not deliver a declaration under paragraph 5(1). One is a passive and the other an active denial, so to speak, of taking on the office.

Regarding the earlier cross-references between what is on the face of the Bill and paragraph 5(1), I am not immediately in a position to give a clear answer. I hope that the noble Baroness will allow me to write to her. If necessary, we can return to the matter at Third Reading.

The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, gave me notice that he wishes to raise questions on Amendment No. 93, and so on. Perhaps he can remind me which of the amendments he wishes to discuss in this first group.

Lord Lucas

My Lords, I shall get difficult when we reach Amendment No. 92. However, there are also Amendments Nos. 83 and 90—the use of "unless and" in the former and "unless or" in the latter; and, indeed, the reason why the word "until" in Amendment No. 83 needs reinforcing. I wish to know what additional circumstances are covered by the words "unless and". I am quite happy for the noble Lord to write to me on the matter, but I would like to know the answer.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, the noble Lord will probably get a more accurate response in that case. If the noble Lord will bear with me, I shall write to him.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Whitty moved Amendments Nos. 75 to 91:

Page 219, line 8, at end insert—

("Provision for acting Mayor during vacancy

2A. During any vacancy in the office of Mayor there shall be an acting Mayor of London (in this Act referred to as the "acting Mayor").")

Page 219, line 8, at end insert—

("Filling the office of acting Mayor

2B.—(1) If a person holds the office of Deputy Mayor on the date on which a vacancy in the office of Mayor occurs, that person shall be the acting Mayor unless, within the permitted period—

1. (a) he gives notice to the proper officer of the Authority that he does not wish to be the acting Mayor; or
2. (b) he does not give a notice under paragraph (a) above and does not deliver a declaration under paragraph 5(1) below.

(2) If a person becomes the acting Mayor by virtue of being the Deputy Mayor—

1. (a) he shall cease to be the Deputy Mayor: and
2. (b) he shall not be the Deputy Mayor, the Chair of the Assembly or the Deputy Chair of the Assembly at any time while he is the acting Mayor.

(3) If, by virtue of sub-paragraph (1) above, the person who is the Deputy Mayor does not become the acting Mayor, the proper officer of the Authority shall give notice of that fact to the Chair of the Assembly as soon as practicable after—

1. (a) receipt of any notice under sub-paragraph (1)(a) above; or
2. (b) if no such notice is given, the last day of the permitted period.

(4) Where notice is given to the Chair of the Assembly—

1. (a) under paragraph 2(1)(b) above, or
2. (b) under sub-paragraph (3) above,

the person who is the Chair of the Assembly shall be the acting Mayor.

(5) If a person becomes acting Mayor by virtue of being the Chair of the Assembly—

1. (a) he shall cease to be the Chair of the Assembly; and
2. (b) he shall not be the Deputy Mayor, the Chair of the Assembly or the Deputy Chair of the Assembly at any time while he is the acting Mayor.

(6) In this paragraph "the permitted period" means the period of seven days following the day on which notice under paragraph 2(1)(a) above is given to the Deputy Mayor.")

Page 219, leave out lines 9 and 10 and insert —

("Acting Mayor to be treated as Mayor during vacancy

3.—(1) If and so long as there is an acting Mayor—")

Page 219, line 12, leave out ("Deputy") and insert ("acting")

Page 219, line 14, leave out ("Deputy") and insert ("acting")

Page 219, line 16, leave out ("Deputy") and insert ("acting")

Page 219, line 31, at end insert—

("Acting Mayor not to act as Assembly member except in relation

to budget

4A.—(1) While a person is the acting Mayor, he shall not act as an Assembly member except in relation to the functions of the Assembly under Schedule 5 or 6 to this Act.

(2) Any period during which sub-paragraph (1) above has effect in relation to a person shall be left out of account in applying section 6 of this Act in relation to that person.")

Page 219, line 33, leave out ("The Deputy Mayor shall not") and insert ("A person shall not, by virtue of being Deputy Mayor,

1. (a) become the acting Mayor, or
2. (b)")

Page 219, line 34, after ("above") insert ("unless and")

Page 219, line 35, after ("Authority") insert ("within the permitted period")

Page 219, line 36, at end insert— ("( ) In sub-paragraph (1) above, "permitted period" has the same meaning as in paragraph 2B above.")

Page 219, line 40, leave out ("Deputy") and insert ("acting")

Page 219, line 43, leave out ("Deputy") and insert ("acting")

Page 219, line 47, leave out ("Deputy") and insert ("acting")

Page 220, line 1. leave out sub-paragraphs (3) and (4)

Page 220, line 6, at end insert—

("Declaration of acceptance by Chair of Assembly

6A. A person who becomes acting Mayor by virtue of being the Chair of the Assembly shall not act in the office of acting Mayor unless or until he has satisfied in respect of his office as an Assembly member the requirements of section 23(1) above.")

Page 220, line 7, leave out paragraph 7

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Whitty moved Amendment No. 92:

Page 220, line 15, al end insert—

('Occurrence of vacancy in office of acting Mayor

8A. —(1) If, at any time during a vacancy in the office of Mayor, a casual vacancy occurs in the office of acting Mayor, the head of the Authority's paid service shall give notice of the vacancy —

1. (a) to the Chair of the Assembly, and
2. (b) to the Deputy Mayor, if there is a holder of that office,

and this Part of this Schedule (other than paragraph 2 above) shall have effect as if a vacancy in the office of Mayor had arisen on the date on which the vacancy in the office of acting Mayor occurs.

(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, the cases in which, and the date on which, a casual vacancy occurs in the office of acting Mayor are the cases in which, and the date on which, a casual vacancy—

1. (a) occurs in the acting Mayor's office as an Assembly member; or
2. (b) would have occurred in the office of Mayor, had the acting Mayor been the Mayor.

(3) Any notice under sub-paragraph (1) above shall be given as soon as practicable after the date on which, by virtue of su-bparagraph (2) above, the vacancy is, in accordance with section 9 or 15 of this Act, to be regarded as occurring.")

Lord Lucas

My Lords, I should very much like some clarification of paragraph (2) of the amendment, which sets out the date on which the casual vacancy occurs in the office of acting mayor and offers two alternatives—the date on which the casual vacancy occurs in the acting mayor's office as an assembly member, or would have occurred in the office of the mayor had the acting mayor been the mayor. I should be very grateful to have the Minister's confirmation that there is no possibility of conflict between those alternatives and that there is no possibility of that duality generating two different dates because of concatenation of events which resulted in both a vacancy in the position of the assembly member and a vacancy in the position of mayor. I shall be fascinated to know the function of paragraph (2)(a); in other words, what vacancies might occur in the acting mayor's position as an assembly member which would not, at the same time, trigger a vacancy in the office of mayor if he had been mayor?

Lord Whitty

My Lords, in relation to the noble Lord's first point, I should point out that it is not at all clear that there is a position where the two dates would lead one to a different answer. As regards his second point, if the previous deputy mayor has not become acting mayor there is a difference between paragraphs (a) and (b). That is why we require the distinction. That leads me to my first conclusion; namely, that there would not be a different date. However, it may be necessary to look at all the contingencies covered by the clause. If that is the case, I had better, once again, agree to write to the noble Lord.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Whitty moved Amendment No. 93:

Page 220, line 17, at end insert—

("Notice of Mayor's temporary inability to act

8B.—(1) If the head of the Authority's paid service becomes aware that the Mayor is temporarily unable to act, he shall as soon as reasonably practicable give notice of that fact—

1. (a) to the Chair of the Assembly; and
2. (b) to the Deputy Mayor, if there is a holder of that office.

(2) For the purposes of the following provisions of this Part of this Schedule, any period when the Mayor is temporarily unable to act shall be taken to begin with the giving of the notice required by sub-paragraph (1) above.")

Lord Lucas

My Lords, here we come to a subject of much high drama and great fiction—the Mutiny on the Bounty no less, passages in "Hornblower" and other great sea-going stories; in other words, when does the captain become sufficiently doolally that he should be replaced by his senior officers? As I remember it, in those cases the arbiter was the ship's doctor. It was a very tricky position for him because a court martial awaited automatically at the other end to discover whether he had been right. If he had got it wrong, that was the end of him.

"If somebody else becomes aware that the mayor is unable to act"—that is a very undefined position. How would it have been defined, for instance, in the case of President Reagan or Boris Yeltsin; or in the case of any other leader people might say was getting to the point when his ability to act was questionable? There have certainly been stages where Boris Yeltsin has been unable to act and he has handed over power, temporarily, to other people while he has been in hospital undergoing operations.

It seems very odd that the power should not be exercised in consultation with the mayor and that the burden of making such a lonely and difficult decision should be placed on someone without the support of some democratic procedure to ensure that the decision is taken properly. I would appreciate the Minister's comments on how this particular formula has been arrived at and whether it has any precedent in any elected office of any other authority in this country.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, the intention is to avoid he situation where it is part of the political process that someone reaches that conclusion. I suspect that in many political circumstances there have been occasions when your colleagues might decide that you are incapable of acting.

Noble Lords

Never!

Lord Whitty

My Lords, I was not referring to anyone who is in the Chamber at the moment. One can think of geographically less distant situations than those referred to by the noble Lord where at least a query about an ability to continue to act might have been raised by one's colleagues. It is therefore important that it should not be the assembly—or, if you like, the politicians—who make that judgment; it should be taken by the senior professional within the authority. It is a judgment he would take in consultation with the mayor, if the mayor is capable of making a rational judgment—it is a chicken and egg situation—and, if necessary, with medical authorities if it concerns a medical condition. The amendment seeks to clarify who takes the decision in such a situation and to remove the decision from the political arena.

I am getting into deep water here. To leave a decision as to the mayor's health or sanity to an assembly or political vote could be very dangerous. Therefore it will be the senior professional in the authority who makes that judgment.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Whitty moved Amendment No. 94:

Page 220, line 31, leave out from ("under") to end of line 32 and insert ("Schedule 5 or 6 to this Act;")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 94.

Lord Lucas

My Lords, I would be very grateful if the Minister could explain what this amendment achieves and why it is necessary.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, Amendment No. 94 clarifies and further specifies that the deputy mayor, acting in place of the mayor in case of a temporary vacancy, is not allowed to act in relation to the budget. That is the main point of the amendment: it prevents the deputy mayor from determining the authority's budget in accordance with Schedules 5 and 6. It mirrors the provision which restricts the acting mayor from doing the same under Part II of Schedule 4 to the Bill. That is why the reference is to Schedules 5 and 6.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

11 p.m.

Lord Whitty moved Amendment No. 95:

Page 221, line 10, leave out paragraph 13 and insert— ("13.—(1) This paragraph applies in relation to any period (or, as the case may be, the remainder of any period) when the Mayor is temporarily unable to act, if

1. (a) at the beginning of that period there is no Deputy Mayor; or
2. (b) the person who, at the beginning of that period, is the Deputy Mayor gives notice to the proper officer of the Authority, within the permitted time, that he does not wish to exercise the functions of the Mayor pursuant to paragraph 9 above; or
3. (c) a casual vacancy occurs in the office of Deputy Mayor during that period;

and in paragraph (b) above "the permitted time" means the period of seven days following the day on which notice under paragraph 8B(1)(b) above is given to the Deputy Mayor. (2) Where this paragraph applies—

1. (a) paragraphs 9 and 10 above shall have effect with the substitution for references to the Deputy Mayor of references to the Chair of the Assembly; and
2. (b) paragraph 12 above shall be disregarded, but without prejudice to any action taken under paragraph (a) or (b), or required to be taken under paragraph (b), of that paragraph.

(3) If and so long as functions are exercisable by virtue of paragraph 9 above by the Chair of the Assembly, he shall not exercise any of the other functions of Chair of the Assembly.

(4) If and so long as the Chair of the Assembly is precluded by sub-paragraph (3) above from exercising any of his functions, those functions shall be exercisable instead by the Deputy Chair of the Assembly.

(5) If and so long as any functions of the Chair of the Assembly are, by virtue of sub-paragraph (4) above, exercisable by the Deputy Chair of the Assembly, the Deputy Chair of the Assembly shall not exercise any of his other functions.

(6) If and so long as the Deputy Chair of the Assembly is precluded by sub-paragraph (5) above from exercising any of his functions, those functions shall be exercisable instead by a person ("the acting Deputy Chair") elected for the purpose at a meeting of the Assembly from among the Assembly members.

(7) A person must not at the same time hold office as acting Deputy Chair and as Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Chair of the Assembly or Deputy Chair of the Assembly.

(8) If the acting Deputy Chair becomes Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Chair of the Assembly or Deputy Chair of the Assembly, a vacancy shall occur in the office of acting Deputy Chair.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move.

Lord Lucas

My Lords, I have a couple of questions. First, could the noble Lord elucidate the meaning of sub-paragraph (2)(b)? I am afraid that, after a fair amount of study, it still eludes me and I should be grateful for the noble Lord's help. Secondly, I am interested in the contrast between the provision in subparagraph (3) and the provision in Amendment No. 81, where budget provisions are excepted. I should be grateful if the noble Lord could tell me why the provisions in this case are different.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, on the first question, the whole point of the amendment is to set out arrangements when the mayor's office is vacant and, perhaps for entirely different reasons, the deputy mayor's office is vacant—that is, the deputy mayor has resigned or, for other reasons, there is no deputy mayor in place. If there is no deputy mayor in place when the mayor becomes temporarily incapacitated or unable to act, the provision in sub-paragraph (2)(a) applies.

I was not entirely clear in regard to the noble Lord's reference to the previous amendment and the cross-reference to the budget provisions in this proposal. Perhaps I may write to him on that aspect.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 31 [Delegation]:

Lord Whitty moved Amendment No. 96:

Page 18, line 15, at end insert— ("( ) the Common Council;")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 97 to 102.

In these amendments we seek to meet concerns expressed at earlier stages of the Bill about the need for the clarification of the mayor's powers to delegate his or her functions.

Amendment No. 96 is straightforward. It simply adds the Common Council of the City of London to the bodies to which the mayor may delegate functions. I regret to say that its omission was an oversight.

In the light of concerns expressed in Committee, Amendment No. 97 makes explicit on the face of the Bill what we had previously thought was implicit; namely, that the mayor, when delegating functions to a local authority or the Common Council, may do so only with the written consent of that authority. It also makes clear that any authority which makes such an agreement may withdraw from it when it chooses to do so.

Amendment No. 98 provides that the mayor may apply conditions to any delegation he or she makes to an authority, and that those conditions would also apply to any committees, sub-committees or people to whom the authority in turn sub-delegates those functions.

Amendment No. 99 adds the Common Council and any local authority to the list of bodies which can exercise functions on behalf of the authority, whether or not they would already have the power to do so were it not for the provision in this subsection.

Amendment No. 100 extends to Transport for London and the LDA the delegation provisions of Section 101 of the Local Government Act 1972. These permit delegation to committees and sub-committees.

Amendment No. 101 deletes the current provisions on joint committees—which adopt the provisions of the Local Government Act. They are replaced by the specific provisions for joint committees between the GLA and one or more local authorities which are set out in Amendment No. 102. This will allow them to form joint committees where their functions are either the same or, where they are different, they have related or connected interests. Again, that reflects some of the concerns expressed earlier in terms of the working between the GLA. and the boroughs and other authorities.

The purpose of this group of amendments is practical. They are intended to assist the authority in the conduct of its business and its relationships with other authorities. I beg to move.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I have a simple question to ask the Minister on Amendment No. 102. In subsection (7), what do the words "Subject to that" mean? Should those words be amended to make more sense?

Lord Whitty

My Lords, I shall clarify the matter if that is not the case, but, as I read the provision, it is subject to subsection (6). However, the noble Baroness may have a point. It relates to persons disqualified under subsection (6). Subject to that, the mayors may appoint virtually whomever they like, under subsection (7) Perhaps it could be clearer.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Whitty moved Amendments Nos. 97 to 102:

Page 18, line 16, at end insert— ("(2A) In the case of the Common Council or a local authority, an authorisation under this section—

1. (a) may only be granted or varied with its written consent; and
2. (b) shall cease to have effect if notice of the withdrawal of that consent is given to the Mayor.")

Page 18, line 16, at end insert— ("(2B) Where, by virtue of an authorisation under subsection (1) above, a duty is exercisable by any of the bodies or persons specified in subsection (2) above, that body or person shall discharge the duty in accordance with the authorisation and any conditions imposed by the Mayor under subsection (1) above. (2C) Subsection (2B) above is without prejudice to the exercise by the body or person concerned of any power to arrange for the discharge of functions by—

1. (a) a committee or sub-committee, or a member. officer or employee, of the body or person, or
2. (b) a joint committee on which the body or person is represented,

except to the extent that the terms of the authorisation or any conditions imposed by the Mayor under subsection (1) above otherwise provide.") Page 18, line 24, at end insert—

• ("(c) the Common Council,
• (d) any local authority,")

Page 18, line 31, leave out from ("authorisation") to ("as") in line 32 and insert ("under subsection (1) above given by the Mayor—

1. (a) to a local authority,
2. (b) to Transport for London, or
3. (c) to the London Development Agency,")

Page 18, line 34, leave out subsection (6)

After Clause 31, insert the following new clause—

EXERCISE OF FUNCTIONS BY JOINT COMMITTEES

(" .—(1) Where any functions exercisable on behalf of the Authority by the Mayor are, by virtue of an authorisation under section 31(1) above, also exercisable by one or more local authorities, the Mayor and those authorities may enter into arrangements under section 101(5) of the Local Government Act 1972 for the joint discharge of the functions by a joint committee.

(2) Where—

1. (a) a statutory function of the Authority is exercisable, or has been exercised, by the Mayor acting on behalf of the Authority, and
2. (b) the exercise, or any particular exercise, of that function will or may affect, or be affected by, the exercise, or any particular exercise, of statutory functions of local authorities (whether or not the functions are the same in the case of each such authority),

the Mayor and those authorities may enter into arrangements under section 101(5) of the Local Government Act 1972 for the joint exercise of any of the statutory functions mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) above by a joint committee, as if those functions were exercisable by the Mayor acting on behalf of the Authority and by each local authority.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) above, the exercise of a function shall be taken to affect, or be affected by. the exercise of another function if the functions are exercisable for the same, or for similar or connected, purposes or in relation to the same, or similar or connected, subject matter.

(4) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) above, sections 101(5) and 102 to 106 of the Local Government Act 1972 shall have effect as if the Authority acting by the Mayor were a local authority.

(5) Any arrangements made by virtue of subsection (1) or (2) above for the discharge of any functions by a joint committee (or by a sub-committee of a joint committee) shall not prevent the Mayor or any local authority, or the joint committee by whom the arrangements are made, from exercising the functions.

(6) A person who is disqualified under section 20 above from being elected or being the Mayor or an Assembly member. otherwise than by reason only of being a member of staff of the Authority, shall be disqualified from being a member of a joint committee established by virtue of subsection (1) or (2) above or of any sub-committee of such a committee.

(7) Subject to that, the Mayor or any other individual may be appointed as a representative of the Authority on any joint committee established by virtue of subsection (1) above and any such representative may be appointed as a member of any subcommittee of such a joint committee.

(8) Any reference in this section to a local authority includes a reference to the Common Council.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 97 to 102 en bloc. They are subject to my comments on Amendment No. 96.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 33 [General duties of the Mayor in relation to his strategies]:

Lord Luke moved Amendment No. 103:

Page 19, line 25, at end insert— ("( ) the River Thames Strategy prepared and published under section (River Thames Strategy) below,")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving this amendment I wish to speak also to Amendment No. 544, which is consequential.

The river Thames, for some extraordinary reason, usually gets left out or at best a cursory mention in discussions about London. This is all the more strange in that the Thames is why London is where it is, and what it is, and it is the fount of London's prosperity and fame. Tourism is now of great economic importance to London and yet only a fraction of tourists visiting London do so with the prime object of taking a trip on the Thames. Both the London Tourist Board and the British Tourist Authority are rightly most concerned about this and are constantly looking at ways of encouraging tourists to go on the Thames.

As the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, said in his Amendment No. 451 at Committee stage, the advent of the mayor is a golden opportunity to combine and co-ordinate the affairs of the Port of London Authority, the riparian authorities and other interested bodies, to the benefit of all those participating and, I add, the cause of tourism on the Thames.

What is the present state of affairs? I am grateful to the London Tourist Board for up-to-date information. There is, of course, the Greenwich Dome, the catalyst for much new activity on the Thames. There is the new ocean terminal which I hope will come to Deptford Creek. There are other significant new riverside developments at Woolwich and Greenwich. All those should lead to more Thameside attractions for tourists. River services are being significantly boosted for the millennium. Thames 2000 is the umbrella name for them and the cross-river partnership is the coordinating factor.

City Cruises are providing four new boats to run services from central London to the Greenwich peninsula. They will go from one of the new piers just by the London Eye, via Blackfriars to the dome. A new shuttle service is already running from central London as far as Canary Wharf and will continue after the Experience is over. A shuttle service will run from Old Greenwich to the dome. Several new and refurbished piers are coming into operation as part of Thames 2000. There is also the new pedestrian bridge at Bankside and the new pedestrian bridges attached to Hungerford Bridge.

All the projects are most welcome and worth while, but we are worried by the advent of the new authority made responsible for licensing the use of piers and river operators. This is London River Services, a subsidiary of London Transport. They seem to be embarking on a policy of providing services for transport as distinct from being angled towards tourism. They could even insist, I am told, that boat operators adopt uniform fares. This is not good for competition and is causing consternation among operators. I submit that the new mayor will be splendidly placed to help resolve this and other, similar kinds of problems.

Tourism, though at present modest in its scope, is vital to the well-being of the river and therefore of London itself. All possible means should be used to encourage it. The mayor will see the Thames from his new office, if he uses it. If not, he should go up the Eye and count the vessels using the Thames on an average day.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment No. 104 as a paving amendment and also to Amendment Nos. 554 and 555.

We had the opportunity of visiting this issue when we were debating the matter at Committee stage. I therefore do not need to rehearse all the arguments at any length. I do believe, however, that it is very important for the Bill to be able to set out the nature of a strategy for utilising the River Thames much more effectively than has been the case in the past.

The amendment deals with a wide variety of policies to give effect to the strategy; it deals with transport and spatial development, biodiversity, municipal waste, air quality, ambient noise and cultural activities. I certainly do not propose to go into those matters at this time of the night. It is very important, however, that this great jewel in the crown of London, with its historic past, should have a major role in future so that it can be used for this wide spectrum of policies. These need to be mobilised in a coherent way, since all the areas and activities identified are in a sense interdependent. They clearly require a public transport service, and the amendments address transport, freight and also water.

Why should we separate the approach from that referred to elsewhere in the Bill in defining the duties of a mayor? The Government have argued previously that the new clause, or something like it, is not necessary. It will he for the mayor, they say, to deal with issues relating to waste, transport, biodiversity and public access, all as part and parcel of his strategies to promote the use of the river.

I have felt. and this is a matter of judgment of course, that the Bill does not comprehensively and conclusively deal with all these matters in satisfactory detail. The River Thames Association has indicated that it concurs with that view.

It is perfectly true that there are discretionary powers relating to the "desirability" of promoting the river, especially in its transport role: but what about enhancing the civic and cultural matters which are associated with the river? These are intrinsically involved with using the river as a resource for public amenity, enhancing its civic and cultural attributes.

What it comes to is requiring the mayor, through a statutory duty, to follow a strategy to promote social development. Is such a separate strategy desirable? I would argue very strongly that it is. Co-ordination goes to the heart of all that has been set out in this amendment, and I am not wholly reassured by the arguments produced by my noble friend at the Committee stage.

Bearing in mind the significance of this river and everything that it stands for and does not only to London but the whole country, it is important that there should be a framework within which the mayor will work for the benefit of London and the country as a whole. That is an integral part of our national policies to which the Thames is so vital.

The amendment also provides that there should be the fullest consultation. That is set out in subsections (5) and (6) of Amendment No. 554. That is also an important ingredient of the mayor's duties. Although I do not intend to expand on that matter, I should like to know whether in the past few weeks my noble friend has been able to reflect on the validity of the argument, bearing in mind the significance of the matter, that a particular framework should be provided within which the mayor can work so that he is able, together with the authority, to exercise proper discretion.

11.15 p.m.

Earl Bathurst

My Lords, I ask both noble Lords who have tabled the amendment and the next one—perhaps the Minister is able to confirm it—whether the River Thames strategy also involves safety. One thinks about safety particularly at this moment. One also casts one's mind back to the tragedy of the "Marchioness" disaster some time ago. I cannot see any reference to safety in the Bill, but perhaps it is there. If so, can the Minister confirm that the River Thames strategy is concerned with safety? It may be that both noble Lords who have tabled these amendments can also confirm the position.

Lord Whitty

Nily Lords, the Government understand and sympathise with the sentiment behind the amendment. As all noble Lords have said, the River Thames is an important component of London's identity. It has a number of diverse roles that need to be handled sensitively and in a strategic manner. However, as I indicated in Committee, we have given further thought to this matter. We still believe that the Bill already gives the mayor the powers that he or she needs to reflect the strategic importance of London's river through the spatial development strategy and other strategies. We do not consider that to require a free-standing, separate strategy for the Thames is the best way to achieve the objective that the noble Lord has set out.

The Government currently set the strategic framework for planning policy in London through regional planning guidance. A dedicated annex sets out strategic policies for the River Thames. It may well be that the mayor will want to incorporate the Government's current policies on the Thames, which are widely supported, wholesale into the spatial development strategy. But we believe that that should be a decision for the mayor, and that it is not one that we should place on the face of the Bill. To retain strategic policy for the Thames within the ambit of the SDS confers very positive advantages; in particular, it will ensure that it has added teeth.

The boroughs' unitary development plans will also have to be in general conformity with the spatial development strategy and the mayor will be responsible for monitoring; that. The effect or putting policies for the Thames into a separate strategy as the noble Lord proposes is to take them out of those arrangements and may result in the Thames having less protection than it has at present. Noble Lords will be aware that Clause 33 already provides that the mayor must consider in all the strategies the desirability of promoting and encouraging the use of the River Thames.

I hope that I have at least reassured noble Lords that we recognise the importance of the Thames to London and that we have provided the mayor with powers in the Bill to preserve and enhance its role. Having highlighted the concerns about having a separate, freestanding Thames strategy, hope that the noble Lord will recognise that those concerns are central both to the SDS and other strategies.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, I do not know whether my noble friend is about to sit down.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, I am not, but I shall sit down.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, we are all in eager anticipation of sitting down. That is totally untrue: we want to go on for ever.

Perhaps I may put a question to my noble friend. If the strategy adopted by the mayor and authority was in conflict with the wider aims of the Government in relation to the river and everything that it offers, including its access to the sea, would the Government have no status in that argument? Would it be solely a matter for the mayor of London to devise, as prescribed in the Bill? Surely there are transport issues here which could be of great national import. How would that be given effect to by the Bill as presently constructed?

Lord Whitty

My Lords, the strategies of a mayor all have to be in broad conformity with national policy and the Secretary of State would have some reserve powers were the mayor attempting—a slightly unlikely situation—to close the Port of London to international shipping. I am not quite sure of the conflict my noble friend envisaged but there is provision within the Bill for conformity between all strategies, including in particular the development strategy, and broad national strategies, and that would apply to transport as well.

The Thames features in many of those strategies, in particular, in the spatial development strategy, and would best be linked with all the broader policy objectives, both London-wide and nationally, rather than being dealt with on its own.

Safety on the river, covered by both the intervention by the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, and also Amendment No. 108, is a matter we must take very seriously. Noble Lords will know that an inquiry now being carried out by Lord Justice Clarke into safety on the Thames will review the current position, particularly in the context of potential additional use of the Thames during the millennium year celebrations and indeed will consider early issues arising from the tragedy of the "Marchioness". I cannot at this stage prejudge the conclusions that the inquiry may reach but we are committed to ensuring that safety procedures on the river are adequate for responding to emergencies, including collisions. With that in mind, I would like to take away Amendment No. 108, particularly with regard to adding the word "safe" to Clause 33(5)(d). I am not so persuaded by the rest of Amendment No. 108 but I believe that the safety issue does require further consideration and, with the leave of the House, I shall consider it further and the possibility of bringing forward a proposal at Third Reading. Subject to that, I hope that the noble Lord will not pursue his amendment.

Lord Luke

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I confess that I am a little disappointed by his response. Nonetheless, I still feel that at some stage a proper river strategy should be incorporated in the directives to the mayor. Perhaps we can come back to the issue at Third Reading. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 104 and 105 not moved.]

Baroness Miller of Hendon moved Amendment No. 106.

Page 20, line 3, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

• ("(a) the need to ensure that the strategy is consistent with the international obligations of the United Kingdom,
• (aa) national policy")

The noble Baroness said: I believe that this is one of the most important amendments to be considered on the Bill. I did try to have it degrouped but there was a bit of a muddle in the office. The only reason I wanted it degrouped was to point out the importance that I attach to it. It goes right to the heart of the relationship between local government, particularly London's local government, and national government. It will also be a precedent for other city authorities with elected mayors and others forms of regional government which may eventually be set up.

As drafted, the Bill requires the mayor to do two things in preparing or revising any of his strategies. First, he must ensure that the strategies are consistent with national policies. Secondly, he must ensure that the strategies are consistent with those international obligations that the Secretary of State may notify to the mayor. I should like to look at each of those two concepts in turn. First, he must ensure that the strategies are consistent with national policy; that is, with the policy of the government of the day. The Bill does not say that the mayor should simply have regard to those policies when formulating his strategies. It does not say that he should simply consider them. Either of those forms of words would mean that the mayor should look at national policy but would not be bound to follow it. The words in the Bill positively impose an obligation on the mayor to follow government policy.

That is a major constitutional innovation that the Government are slipping in through the back door of an extremely long Bill. It is right and proper that a local authority should have regard to national—that is, government—policy. However, having regard to government policy is not the same as being required to follow it if the local council disagrees with it. That is a total negation of the concept of local government. The council, or in this case the mayor, should be able to decide that the policy should not be applied in their particular circumstances; or that the policies are wrong. The law does not oblige a local authority to obey the Secretary of State's policies. It requires the local authority to obey primary or secondary legislation. Parliament has not previously required local councils to follow national policies except in rare and special cases: for example, the interpretation of the contaminated land regime. The Secretary of State will have policies on local government responsibilities and the way that they carry them out. It is right and proper that he should do so. However, he cannot demand obedience unless Parliament has given him a direct power or the responsibility for determining appeals by the public against local council decisions.

Subsection (5)(a) is a dangerous and damaging innovation. It creates as a matter of law the necessity of local government acting consistently with government policy. If the Bill remains as drafted, the mayor would be hard pressed in law to justify a failure to follow government policy. Indeed, in Committee the Minister referred to judicial reviews.

The second part of the amendment reverses the rampant centralization—the very over-centralisation that the Government claim as a justification for their policies of devolution, regionalisation and the creation of the Greater London Authority. The mayor would be required to take national policy into consideration but he will not be required to follow it or even be consistent with it. This part of the amendment ensures that the mayor's role is not merely to produce strategies as the proxy of the Government: to be the Government's rubber stamp.

The other part of the amendment requires the mayor to ensure that his strategies are consistent with the international obligations of the United Kingdom. As drafted, the Bill has the rather curious obligation for the mayor to follow, such international obligations as the Secretary of State may notify to the Mayor". That means that the Secretary of State could pick and choose which international obligations he would require the mayor to follow. What about any other international obligations about which the Secretary of State did not formally notify the mayor? Is the mayor free to ignore them? Of course not. Perhaps I do the Government an injustice over this extraordinary passage. Perhaps the Government intended that the mayor should be reminded of international obligations to which he is subject. We do not need an Act of Parliament to tell the Secretary of State to do that; and certainly not one in the form at present proposed. Like all public bodies, the mayor's actions, not merely his strategies, should be consistent with the country's international obligations.

The amendment maintains that obligation while removing the implied limitation of the present wording to only those obligations notified by the Secretary of State. Compliance with international obligations should not be dependent on a letter from the department to the mayor.

When this same amendment was debated in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, gave us the benefit of the Government's thoughts on the subject, which I promised to study. I am sorry to say that in this case, uncharacteristically, he does not appear to have answered the points that I and other noble Lords who supported me then made, which is why have brought the matter back before your Lordships. In dealing with the aspect of international obligations, he said, The GLA is not a nation state which makes its own international obligations"."—[Official Report, 23/6/99; col. 926.]

We entirely agree with that. That is why we want the mayor to have regard to all this country's international obligations, not just such of them as the Secretary of State may designate. The noble Lord told my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith at col. 930 that, The duty to ensure that international obligations are carried out falls on the state. The state must therefore notify those authorities that are required to act in conformity". We entirely agree. We also agree with what he told me two paragraphs further on in col. 930, when he said, Clearly, there are many international obligations which are totally irrelevant to the GLA". He disclaimed any intention to cherry-pick but that is precisely what the clause does, as drafted, whether that was the Government's intention or not. If we are both agreed that, first, the Secretary of State should notify the mayor of any international obligations affecting London—which we presume he would normally do as a normal executive act without being told to do so by statute—and, secondly, that he is only seeking to exclude irrelevant obligations, then our amendment produces precisely the effect on which we both agree, but without the ambiguity that simply bothers us.

I am surprised that, having heard of the disquiet that the wording of the clause has produced, particularly including the word "such", and having acknowledged that there was a genuine problem, the Government have not introduced their own amendment to tidy up what is clearly a loose piece of drafting.

As regards the mayor being obliged as a matter of law to conform to national policy in framing his strategies, the Minister's reply has confirmed our worst fears. That is precisely the Government's intention. When the Minister replied to the earlier Amendment No. 111, moved by his noble friend Lord Graham of Edmonton, he said at col. 925: The mayor must, in preparing any strategy, ensure that it is consistent with national policies". Noble Lords should note the word "must". It is not just a question of "have regard to" as the clause under debate proposes: he "must ensure" their consistency with national policies.

Having taken considerable time in discussing the issue of international obligations, the Minister only briefly touched on that part of the amendment dealing with national policy, where he said at col. 929: This is not a centralising matter. It is designed to ensure that London plays its part in the delivery of our national policies and our international obligations". Ensuring that London plays its part in delivering our national policies, as the Minister put it, is centralising. If it is not, then what is it? That one remark confirms what we fear. The clause, as drafted, makes the mayor a Government poodle whose purpose is to act as a figurehead while obeying the orders of the Secretary of State, but taking the blame in London if anything goes wrong. The clause, as drafted, removes the mayor's promised powers and ability to decide his own policies. It merely leaves him applying the Government's policies as the proxy of the Secretary of State. This amendment restores the balance. It allows the mayor to decide what is best. It allows the people of London to have the sort of mayor they voted for in the general election and in the referendum. It allows the people of London to get in each term what they were voting for in the successful candidate for mayor. Both parts of the amendment re-establish the mayor as an independent political figure with independent executive powers, elected by the popular vote of the people of London to reflect their aspirations and concerns. That is what the Government promised in their manifesto. I beg to move.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, it may be because of the time of night, but I found the argument of the noble Baroness perplexing, because surely it is the duty of the Government and the Secretary of State to point out to the authority, as stated in Clause 33(5)(a), what are the relevant international obligations. Otherwise it will impose on the mayor the impossible task of having to identify what is relevant and what is not. Therefore I believe it is a helpful provision and not a hindrance as regards this subject matter. It is quite clear that international obligations are paramount. Having said that, as a matter of convenience it is right that those issues should be pointed out by the Secretary of State to the mayor.

I am a little bewildered by paragraph 5(d). That is why I suggested that it might be wise to leave it out, at least for the purpose of this debate. Does it not, as it stands, contain a question mark about whether in fact the mayor might even suggest that the river is closed down with respect to passenger transport services and the transportation of freight? That is unlikely to take place, but it is an ambiguity and one which should be dealt with in the legislation, although not in the way in which it is represented in paragraph 5(d). I will be interested to hear what my noble friend has to say on those points.

Baroness Hamwee

My Lords, we shall not be speaking to the amendments on community safety and crime prevention which are tabled in this group. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones spoke to the subject matter earlier. However, I shall speak to Amendment No. 116, which relates to Clause 34(6). It proposes a small amendment in connection with revision of any of the mayor's strategies. We propose that the assembly—this is one of the few places where we are going to make the point—has a role in determining whether a revision to a strategy will or will not materially affect it and therefore whether there should be further consideration on it.

At the last stage of the Bill, the Minister indicated on a similar amendment that the provision was to allow the mayor to make minor and drafting changes to a strategy. Of course we have no objection to provision being made for that possibility. However, the provision in this subsection is rather wider. The clause is about far more than minor or drafting amendments. Amendment No. 116 seeks to provide some sort of brake on the mayor, because, if the mayor is acting slightly ambitiously by suggesting merely a small revision that does not require further consultation, the assembly with its scrutiny role will be well placed to determine whether or not that is actually the case. It will thereby act as a guardian for the interests of Londoners who would, if the mayor did not take such a restrictive view, be able to contribute to a consultation. We have proposed that the decision under this subsection as to whether a proposed revision will or will not materially alter the strategy is not one for the mayor alone, but should also involve the assembly.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, this is a slightly mixed bag of amendments. Through Amendment No. 106 the noble Baroness has again sought to address the issue of strategies being consistent with international obligations and national policy. The noble Baroness has referred to my previous explanation that the Bill makes it clear that the mayor's strategies must be prepared within the context of national policy decisions and those national policy decisions will include some international obligations, some international treaties and some international cooperation. The GLA is a city-wide governance of supreme importance within the United Kingdom, but it is not a nation state or even a city state.

It is therefore important that the mayor's strategies are consistent with international obligations, but those international obligations are the responsibility of the state and not of lower tiers of government. Therefore, it is important for the state to decide which of those obligations will be carried out and met by the mayor. That is why the Bill provides for the GLA to meet those obligations where the central state has notified the obligations to the GLA and where guidance has been given about the contributionwhich it is to make in relation to those obligations.

It is not unique for national bodies to be subject to government policies. In this as in other areas, the Government set targets which authorities are expected to meet and use as a basis for their own strategies. That applies in relation to international targets as well as to other targets.

I turn to the other main point made in this discussion, which I believe relates to Amendment No. 116 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. That amendment would require assembly agreement to be given before the mayor could waive the consultation requirements set out in Clause 34 in relation to revising strategies. Again, I believe that that is a reflection of a quite deep-seated difference between us in relation to the mayor and the assembly. We believe that that must remain a matter for the discretion of the mayor. The mayor would obviously have to be able to demonstrate that he had good reason for deciding not to consult on a particular strategy and he would have to be able to justify the view that the revision did not materially affect the strategy. Those reasons could be challenged and tested by the assembly in its normal procedures and in its regular statutory meetings with the mayor and others. However, we believe that the discretion should be a matter for the mayor.

Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness would not pursue this amendment. I hope also that the noble Baroness will not pursue Amendment No. 116 in due course.

11.45 p.m.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I agree with the Minister that the hour is late. However, I did not totally understand his answer. We have no objection to the fact that the mayor of London must have policies which are consistent with this country's international obligations. That is very much the point which we are making. The Bill refers to obligations such as those that are notified by the Secretary of State. It may be that, for one reason or another, even by some sort of omission, the Secretary of State did not notify the mayor of a particular international obligation, which, if the mayor did not take note of it, would cause quite a lot of problems. We certainly do not consider London to be a nation state.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, with respect, if the Government were to breach their obligations in that way, there is a legal remedy to deal with that. Surely that is sufficient.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, we are not going to argue about the wording at this time of night. All that I am saying is that we have no objection whatever to the mayor's policies having to be consistent with international obligations or with other obligations about which the Secretary of State tells him; but we shall not argue about that now.

With regard to the national policy, the Minister was busy talking about national targets and so on. My amendment does not refer to targets but to policies. The fact remains that this would be a complete break away from the current position as regards local councils throughout the country. The mayor of London is either a special person and a model for something else, or he is not. It seems extraordinary that that strong position which is now being created will be less powerful than is any local leader of a council who could do something different from national policies.

The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, shakes his head but I can tell the House that I have been lobbied by numerous councillors across the country who are concerned that this is a new move. What the Bill should properly provide is that the mayor should have regard to national policies when he is making his policies. That is what would happen in local government. However, my amendment seeks to provide that his strategy is consistent with national policy.

At the beginning said that I wanted to degroup the amendment because I consider it to be very important. I shall certainly not pursue the matter today. I shall read very carefully what the Minister has said. It is rather late and I believe I may have misheard him. I thought he was talking about targets and I am talking about policies. I urge the Minister to read very carefully what I have said and to take note of what other local councillors are saying because this is a new move which could be extremely dangerous. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 107 and 108 not moved.]

Baroness Miller of Hendon moved Amendment No. 109:

Page 20, line 11, at end insert ("; and ( ) the views of such organisations representative of business as the Mayor considers it appropriate to consult having regard to the impact of his strategy on business")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I should like to speak to Amendments Nos. 109, 110 and 115. The three amendments have a common theme. They require the mayor, at the barest minimum, to consult with business on the impact of his strategies on commerce and industry and to consider the compliance costs of his strategies. Consultation with business interests will not mean that commerce will have a veto over the mayor's strategies or compel him to modify them in any way. However, it does mean that the mayor will not simply be able to blunder in and produce strategies that may have long-term or unforeseen effects simply because he has not sought advice from appropriate sources.

There are some of us who recall the former Greater London Council's disastrous experiment in banning lorries in Central London. Attractive as no doubt that was to the green lobby, it produced a bureaucratic nightmare and heaped untold costs on everyone, especially businesses trying to receive stocks or dispatch goods. Before that there was a no less disastrous direction of industry perpetrated by both political parties. "Make industry move out of London", they said. That is why there is a shortage of unskilled and clerical jobs for the youth of our capital city.?

I shall not indulge in any further recrimination. However, the point I wish to make is that we must ensure that we do not, by accident or through ignorance, make the same mistakes. Further, we have to be sure that London will not be used as the guinea pig for a social engineering experiment. I shall also not comment on the business experience of any of the declared or would-be candidates for the office of mayor. This debate has neither the time nor is it the place for electioneering. However, let me instead point out the irrefutable truth that since there are no qualifying examinations for political office, and no apprenticeship requirements—more is the pity, some of us might say—it is not impossible that the person elected as mayor may never have been in commercial employment. He or she may never have had the problem of covering the employees' payroll on a Friday afternoon. They may not know the meaning of the three most dreaded words in business: negative cash flow.

A lifetime politician, a political adviser, or even a journalist, teacher or lawyer may not necessarily be a business orientated mayor. That is what the amendment aims to address It requires the mayor to seek advice, even if in the end he chooses to ignore it. Let him take the political risk, when it all goes wrong, of having someone say to him, "Well, I told you so".

The issue raised in Amendment No. 110 relates to compliance costs. It is surprising that this is not part of the proposed requirements. In the case of new legislation passed by Parliament, this is a factor to be considered, so why does it not have to be by the mayor? Restraints on noise are superficially desirable, but in an area where there is a great number of restaurants and bars, what would be the effect on local jobs? The mayor should at least be able or be made to consider the matter.

When imposing requirements for recycling more waste, as distinct from handing it over to the dustman, what will be the effect on small businesses? The mayor should at least give that a passing thought before deciding on his strategy.

We can all think of numerous examples where one desirable objective can also result in an undesirable effect. It is only a question of weighing up the pros and cons. That is all that the amendment requires him to do.

It is convenient to include Amendment No. 115 in the same group, even though it relates to Clause 34. Clause 34(1) requires the mayor, when preparing or revising any strategy, to consult the assembly, functional bodies, the London borough councils, the Common Council and any other body or person he considers appropriate. The amendment simply adds "business" to the list of those specifically named, rather than leaving it to the mayor to decide whether to include businesses in the catch-all of "any other body or person".

As has become the invariable practice of the Government, the Minister dismissed the identical amendments by saying that they were not necessary. He prayed in aid Clause 34(2) and Clause 27(3), claiming that they covered these issues. With respect, they do not. Clause 34(2) refers back to Clause 27(3) for a definition of those to be included in the phrase "any other body or person". Clause 27(3) includes, bodies which represent the interests of persons carrying on business in Greater London". Consulting the usual trade and employers' associations goes a long way to achieving what is required, but the vast body of commercial firms, the small businesses, do not belong to those organisations. Why should unattached businesses not have the right to make their views known?

My own experience of these "bodies" is that they do very little consulting with their members; instead, they rely on the decisions of their policy sub-committees. Without naming names, my husband and I resigned our separate memberships of one such body, not because it announced its policy on a particular topic, but because it had not sought members' views before it did so.

It should be clear to the public and to businesses in particular, especially those which are not members of trade associations, that they have a right to be consulted. That right should be clear on the face of the relevant clause. It should not be discoverable only by someone having to hop backwards and forwards through the various subsections of this extremely lengthy Bill.

It is a common theme of the amendments that both the assembly and the mayor should have regard to the views of the wealth creators in our capital city. After all, the three principal purposes of the authority have at their head, promoting of economic development and wealth creation in Greater London". If that is the first function of the authority, why should the Government be so coy about boldly including business in the list of those to be consulted, rather than burying it in a pile of verbiage or hiding it in a completely different quarter?

Before the general election, the Labour Party claimed that it had reformed and that it was now extremely friendly to business. By accepting the amendments, that would enable them not only to put that fine sentiment into practice, but also to be seen to be doing so. I beg to move.

Lord Sheppard of Didgemere

My Lords, it would be a great tragedy if we took a step backwards in the Bill. Over the past five or six years, a close voluntary working relationship with business, local government and central government, normally through the Minister for London, has been built up. It would be very sad if we were to go backwards rather than forwards in that respect. I know that noble Lords opposite are conscious of that situation.

We happen to have a great success on our hands: London is a fabulous business success. We must not do anything to damage that. We need to grow more wealth so that we can reduce inequality. We spoke about equality of opportunity earlier.

I see no reason for not supporting the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, because although the Government have done an amazingly good job—it may not he amazing to them—of convincing business that the GLA is a good and sensible thing for London, it did not necessarily start that way. The amendments would cement that relationship and demonstrate that there will he consultation. We know that there must be. Business will certainly consult with the mayor of London, whether or not he wants to be consulted. It is probably a good idea, therefore, if he or she consulted with business.

I should probably declare an interest to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, in that I am not only a "large businessman" but I also happen to be a "very small businessman" in many start-up businesses, and so on. I am aware, therefore, of some of the problems she describes.

We must find a way to keep businesses of all sizes and types locked in, supporting the whole of this mission. I cannot see any reason why we should not cement that by inserting some of these clauses.

Baroness Hamwee

My Lords, in Committee we proposed an amendment which was not dissimilar to the first of those tabled by the noble Baroness. We, too, regard the relationship between the new authority and London's business sector as very important. The noble Lord, Lord Sheppard, quite rightly referred to the way in which the relationship between local government and business in London has developed over the past few years. He has played no small part in that. He has provided a terrific lead. I was fortunate enough to be involved as a board member of London First when it was originally formed. It was an illuminating experience to see business and local government, under his assistance and with his lead, gradually begin to understand one another rather better than before.

We received considerable assurances from the Government in Committee. However, I should like to put on record our concern that there should be no doubt about the importance of involving business in the same way as other sectors, and being particularly sensitive to the needs of business.

In response to the noble Baroness, I reject the notion that strategic government in London, implementing policies which reflect environmental concerns, will necessarily, therefore, be against business. I do not believe that the two are mutually exclusive. She referred to the London lorry ban. For the record, perhaps I should briefly make the point that that was not an anti-business strategy but was to reduce the traffic going through London and not to places within London. There are exempted routes and a licensing scheme. These matters are often difficult to balance. However, we should not allow ourselves to believe that business and environmental interests are somehow in two pigeon-holes and cannot be put together.

Earl Bathurst

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for acknowledging my interjection regarding safety. However, my noble friend has withdrawn her Amendment No. 108. As far as I can see, that is the only mention of safety in any of the amendments and, indeed, in the Bill. Amendment No. 108 contains the little word "safe" which might appear to be there accidentally. If the noble Baroness withdraws her amendment or if the Minister will not accept it, could he give assurances that safety is written in fiery letters in the strategy for which the mayor will be responsible. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that or perhaps he might consider, with his colleagues, introducing an amendment at a later stage which brings in safety as a policy within the strategy.

Lord Whitty

My Lords, as regards the latter point, I am sorry if that was not clear to the noble Lord. I believe I specifically told him that the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, withdrew his amendment on the basis that I would consider—partly in relation to the "Marchioness" inquiry but also in the light of this amendment—whether to bring forward at Third Reading an amendment relating to safety in this context. It would be without commitment: at this point I needed to consult somewhat more widely. I did agree to take it away, and it was on that basis that it was withdrawn.

Turning to the main point of these amendments, I find it slightly difficult because, although I agree with quite a lot of what the noble Baroness said, together with virtually all of what the noble Lord, Lord Sheppard, said, I do not know why it is necessary to put the amendment in here. The noble Baroness dismissed my earlier assurances, but the Bill does say that the mayor must consult bodies which represent the interests of persons carrying on business in Greater London.

The noble Baroness seemed to suggest that her formulation, which also refers to organisations representing business, was somehow closer to the grass roots of business. I do not myself see that, and since that formulation relates to the general duties of the mayor I do not know why we need to repeat it in a different form at later stages. I do not want to have a dispute with noble Lords opposite on this, because clearly it has been central to the formulation of the whole strategy for London that we take on board discussions with representatives of business and put into the Act and its procedures a requirement to involve business in all the key decisions which the mayor will produce under this Bill.

I find it unnecessary to specify this in a slightly different way from what was specified earlier, because that in itself could lead to confusion at various stages of this Bill. I would hope that noble Lords opposite, and the business community of London, would accept that general position as being indicative of the Government's intention to ensure that the mayor works closely with business of all kinds in London. That is certainly our intention, and it would be a very foolish mayor indeed who attempted to ignore that. Indeed the Bill would not permit that. I simply do not think that we need to write it into every clause and I would ask noble Lords opposite to consider that what is already in the Bill would meet their points.

Regarding Amendment No. 115, which refers to compliance cost assessment, that is a term of an which is related to legislation and the authority is not a legislative authority. Nevertheless, the noble Baroness is clearly concerned not with compliance cost assessment in a technical sense, but with the costs which would fall on business or distort the economics of London. It is clear that the cost implications of the mayor's strategy and other related matters such as unemployment will be part of the consultation that has been described, and so I think the noble Baroness's point would be met. I do not think we ought to fall out over this. I hope that, on consideration, noble Lords will see that we have made our intentions clear. If not, no doubt they will return to these matters at a later stage.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I can certainly assure the noble Lord that in none of our amendments do we intend to fall out with the Minister: it is the very last thing that we would dream of doing. As the noble Lord has explained the position so well and as he has asked me to consider it carefully, I shall undoubtedly do so. Perhaps in return he might also consider some of the things that we have asked him to consider during the course of our debates, particularly those where there might be confusion. Having said that, it is with pleasure that I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 110, 111 and 112 not moved.]

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton

My Lords, I beg to move that further consideration on Report be now adjourned.

Moved, That further consideration on Report be now adjourned.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House adjourned at five minutes past midnight.