Greater London Authority Bill

HL Deb 07 July 1999 vol 603 cc914-50

5.34 p.m.

House again in Committee.

Clause 240 [Secretary of State's functions in relation to the strategy]:

[Amendments Nos. 347YA and 347ZA not moved.]

Clause 240 agreed to.

Clause 241 [Audit]:

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton moved Amendment No. 347A: Page 132, line 40, at end insert ("and the Chair of the London Assembly"").

The noble Baroness said: Clause 241 makes provision for the audit of the LDA and provides for the agency to send a copy of its audited accounts to the mayor. Government Amendment No. 347A would require the LDA to send a copy of its audited accounts also to the chair of the assembly. The amendment meets a commitment given by my honourable friend Nick Raynsford in Committee in another place.

Amendment No. 347B, tabled by noble Lords opposite, would also require the LDA to send a copy of its audited accounts to the assembly. I am pleased that we are both thinking along the same lines. I hope that Amendment No. 347A will achieve what noble Lords intend. I beg to move this amendment and invite the noble Baroness not to move her amendment.

Baroness Hamwee

I am happy with the amendment proposed by the Government in the other place. It was argued that our amendment was unnecessary because the accounts would be published and made available to the assembly on request. The step that the Government are taking is a very helpful one. I shall not move Amendment No. 347B.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 347B not moved.]

Clause 241, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 242 agreed to.

Lord Dixon-Smith moved Amendment No. 348: After Clause 242, insert the following new clause—

ANNUAL DEBATEON LONDON DEVELOPMENT AGENCY REPORT AND ACCOUNTS

(" . The London Assembly shall debate annually the report and accounts of the London Development Agency.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment requires the London assembly to debate annually the report and accounts of the London Development Agency. The Bill as drafted does not provide a forum in which the performance of the LDA can either be challenged by elected representatives or, indeed, be discussed. The assembly should fulfil that essential role in order to ensure proper scrutiny and proper accountability.

The assembly provides the best London-wide forum in which to scrutinise the performance of the London Development Agency. The impact of the LDA on the life and economy of London, if it works as the Government expect, will be significant. It is therefore right that the elected representatives of London should be able, indeed required, to examine that performance at least annually. They, in turn, are then accountable to the electors of London for the work of the London Development Agency, as is the mayor in his other capacity in relation to the agency.

The amendment stands in its own right. I should have thought that it ought to be entirely acceptable to the Government. Of course, the Government may say, "The assembly will do this. You don't need to tell its members to do it". The members may do it, but there again, they may not. It is to prevent the latter situation that I propose this amendment. I beg to move.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton

The new clause obliges the assembly to debate the LDA's report and accounts each year. The assembly has a duty, under Clause 49, to keep under review the exercise by the mayor of the statutory functions exercisable by him or her. Given the powers of appointment and direction which the mayor has over the LDA, its activities will fall within the compass of the assembly's duty under Clause 49. Accordingly, the assembly will be able to hold regular debates concerning the LDA, whether on its general performance or on particular matters and will no doubt do so. Adding particular obligations to the assembly's general duties could serve only to cloud its responsibilities. For that reason, I hope the noble Lord will not press his amendment.

Lord Dixon-Smith

I listened with interest to what the noble Baroness said. Keeping under review is keeping under review and it may well be that the assembly will debate the deeds and, rarely we hope, the misdeeds of the London Development Agency from time to time.

However, the amendment specifically relates to the annual report. That report is more significant than just keeping a subject under review. It is for that reason that we proposed the amendment. Nevertheless, I have heard what the noble Baroness said and will study it. I do not believe it will satisfy me, but I will decide what to do in the light of what she said and what I think. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 20 [Further amendments of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998]:

[Amendment No. 348A not moved.]

5.45 p.m.

Lord Dixon-Smith moved Amendment No. 349: Page 274, leave out lines 14 and 15 and insert— (""(4) This section does not apply in relation to London where the London Development Agency shall have regard to the views of and regularly consult with small, medium and large businesses in London and with their representative bodies."").

The noble Lord said: As drafted, the legislation ignores the important relationship which the London Development Agency will need to develop, and succeed in, with the business community. The agency should be required to consult businesses of all sizes and their representatives. It is for that reason that the amendment is advanced.

There seems to be some hesitation in official circles as to the exact number of businesses that exist within London. I suppose that it is because, among other things, there is a shifting population, which may include barrow boys. Some might debate whether they run businesses but I am certain they do. I have heard figures of half-a-million separate businesses in London and have seen figures as high as 700,000. Whatever the figure, it is large. Not only is it a large number, but by far and away the greater proportion of the businesses are small. If we take small and medium-sized businesses, it is likely to be 99 per cent of the total.

Large business has no difficulty in getting its views and interests well understood by official bodies such as the London Development Agency. It is a much greater problem for smaller businesses. They do not have either the administrative back-up, the time, or, all too often one has to admit, the inclination to become involved with officialdom in the way that would be required to get their views across to the London Development Agency. Nevertheless, we believe it is important that they are properly taken into account because they are a significant aspect of the total community of London and of the total economy of London, small businesses though they may be. It is in that sense that we have put the amendment forward. I beg to move.

Baroness Hamwee

This amendment continues the debate we were having before the Statement about the rather complex network of consultations. As I read the provision in the schedule—the two lines which the noble Lord seeks to omit—it proposes that Section 8 of the Regional Development Agencies Act is not to apply to the London Development Agency. The section deals with consultation and subsection (3) deals with the position where there is no regional chamber. It provides for guidance for carrying out appropriate consultation in relation to the exercise of its functions. That is omitted and, for once, it seems to me to be quite a safeguard. People who might not be at the right place in the cobweb would be caught—

Lord Dixon-Smith

If the noble Baroness would allow me to intervene, I accept that the amendment takes out lines, but it also inserts them. Perhaps she is looking at the lines taken out, but not those inserted.

Baroness Hamwee

No, I was using the noble Lord's amendment as a hook to hang the argument on. If I had reached the end of the sentence, the noble Lord would know that I supported him.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton

The Regional Development Agencies Act 1998 empowers the Secretary of State to designate a suitable body in a region to be a regional chamber. He can then require the relevant RDA to have regard to its views on the formulation and review of strategy and to consult it on the exercise of other specified functions. Schedule 20 removes this provision for London. Business representation on the LDA board and requirements for wider consultation on the LDA strategy have an equivalent effect with respect to the functions of the LDA.

Businesses, large and small, will benefit from the targeted approach of the LDA. Given the importance of small businesses to London's economy, I fully expect the LDA to consult them on the strategy and also expect the mayor to insist on it. They must be consulted if their interests are to be affected and that is provided for.

In addition, the scrutiny powers of the assembly provide a key channel for local views to be fed to the LDA and Clause 25 requires the GLA to consult businesses and others on, the exercise of its functions which have an impact on the interests of those businesses. The results of the consultations will no doubt, where relevant, be fed to the LDA board. The Committee has already considered and approved those measures.

The amendment would place small, medium and large businesses, together with their representative bodies, in the role of a regional chamber. This is not necessary to ensure that business views are taken into account by the LDA; it has already been provided for. It would also be undesirable to give businesses in London a role which is given elsewhere to a body representative of all those who have an interest in the agency's work. Therefore, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Dixon-Smith

I am becoming accustomed to being urged by the noble Baroness to withdraw my amendment. She does it with such superb eloquence that it is an irresistible temptation. I am grateful to her for her reply which I will study with care. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Whitty moved Amendment No. 349A: Page 274, line 22, leave out ("In").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move this amendment and, with it, speak to Amendments Nos. 349B and 349C. The amendments correct a lacuna in the grant-making provisions of Parts III and V of the Bill. Part V currently deletes from the Regional Development Agencies Act the power for the Secretary of State to make grants direct to the LDA, in line, with the general policy that all government grants should be made to the mayor.

Part III contains a general power for the Secretary of State to make grants to the GLA for its purposes and those of the functional bodies. But it does not allow sums to be earmarked for particular purposes.

It has always been our intention that the functions of the LDA could be financed by specific grants if Ministers thought that that kind of funding was appropriate. The alternative would be to provide the necessary funding as part of the GLA grant. These amendments achieve that by inserting into the RDA Act the power to make grants to the GLA for the purposes of the London Development Agency. The amendments are framed so that Clause 88 of the GLA Bill will oblige the mayor to hand over these grants to the LDA.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Whitty moved Amendments Nos. 349B and 349C: Page 274, line 22, at end insert ("shall be amended as follows. (2) At the beginning there shall be inserted "(1)". (3) In the subsection (1) so formed,"). Page 274, line 24, at end insert— ("(4) After the subsection (1) so formed there shall be inserted— (2) The Secretary of State may, with the approval of the Treasury, make to the Greater London Authority grants of such amounts, and on such terms, as he thinks fit. (3) Any grant made under subsection (2) shall be made for the purposes of the London Development Agency."").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Baroness Hamwee moved Amendment No. 349D: Page 274, line 25, leave out paragraph 6.

The noble Baroness said: This amendment relates to the borrowing limits of regional development agencies and is intended to ensure that I understand the regime as it relates to the London Development Agency. Paragraph 6(3) of Schedule 20 to the Bill provides that Section 11 of the Regional Development Agencies Act is not to apply in relation to the London Development Agency. In paragraph 6(2) above a lower collective borrowing limit is applied to the agencies on the face of the Regional Development Agencies Act. Am I right in thinking that this provision is included because the regime provided elsewhere by the Bill deals with the borrowing that is required for the purposes of the LDA? Can the Minister say something about the collective borrowing limit, and in particular the amount which it is anticipated will be available for London?

The implication of paragraph 6(2) is that £200 million, less £177.77 million (possibly recurring), is the amount that the Secretary of State has in mind for the work of the LDA, given that provision is made for a lower limit for all the other agencies. The Minister looks puzzled, in which case I was right to raise the question. I beg to move.

Lord Whitty

The noble Baroness may have been right to ask the question, but I am not sure that I follow her arithmetic sufficiently to provide an answer. We do not wish to see this clause modified. We decided to remove the LDA from the controls related to the other agencies in the RDA Act because of the special circumstances of the LDA, which effectively operates within a local government structure. If the noble Baroness asks whether the reason for it is that we are providing the borrowing structure for the GLA as a whole, the answer in general terms is yes. The borrowing controls relate to the GLA and the functional bodies within the local government financial regime, not the system of borrowing controls designed for non-departmental public bodies.

I shall read the remarks of the noble Baroness related to the arithmetic and see whether I can provide clarification. I did not recognise her final figure. Perhaps she will allow me to reply to that part of her observations in writing and, on that basis, withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Hamwee

To avoid any confusion, I referred to paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 20, which in the Regional Development Agencies Act substitutes a collective borrowing limit of £177.77 million in place of £200 million for all the development agencies. I asked whether £200 million, minus £177.77 million, was the amount that we could be assured the Secretary of State has in mind for the LDA, perhaps not as the borrowing limit given its particular structure, but for the work of that agency. I hope that that makes the point clear. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Hamwee moved Amendment No. 349E: Page 275, leave out lines 19 to 21 and insert— (""(4) Subsection (1) has effect in relation to the London Development Agency as if the reference to the Secretary of State was a reference to the Mayor of London and the London Assembly. (4A) Subsection (2) has effect in relation to the London Development Agency as if the reference to the Secretary of State was a reference to the Mayor of London.").

The noble Baroness said: Amendment No. 349E in my name and that of my noble friends is grouped with Amendment No. 350 in the name of the Conservative Front Bench. Amendment No. 349E is a simple amendment which requires that the LDA sends a copy of its annual report to the assembly. I hope we shall be told that not only is it inconceivable that it would not be provided, but that somewhere the point is covered in the legislation. I beg to move.

Lord Dixon-Smith

My Amendment No. 350 is coupled with Amendment No. 349E. The specific aim of our amendment is to achieve openness so that everybody can understand the way in which the London Development Agency works. The amendment provides that, The report shall include the criteria used by the London Development Agency for granting financial support to other institutions". The LDA will have considerable financial power and influence, and it is important that the public at large understand and have confidence in the management systems which the agency uses, particularly when it handles sums of public money and makes them available to institutions or individuals. The amendment requires that the criteria used are open. I believe that if that was stated on the face of the Bill, it would represent a considerable improvement.

Lord Whitty

The first of these amendments is unnecessary and the second is inappropriate. Amendment No. 349E is unnecessary because it is already provided for in the new subsection (6) which has been added to Section 17 of the RDA Act by virtue of paragraph 11 of Schedule 20 to the Bill. Obviously, the noble Baroness should have known that, but there we are.

As to Amendment No. 350, it would oblige the LDA and the mayor to include in the LDA's annual report notice of the criteria to be used for the grant of financial support. There are two issues here: clarity for the benefit of potential recipients and propriety. The LDA will, in the main, be dispensing money for the achievement of functions delegated by Ministers. There will normally be criteria in the public domain for each of these, at least in broad terms. The single regeneration budget is a good example. Here we have national criteria that are widely known. At present, the Government Office for London, subsequently the authority, publishes its more specific guidelines which tailor the national guidelines to the specific circumstances of London. No doubt the LDA will wish to do likewise.

The LDA will have a chief finance officer and monitoring officer following local authority practice in this instance. Its accounts will be audited annually, which is a check on the use of defensible criteria for dispensing funds. But the amendment will not help either objective. The annual report is not the appropriate vehicle either for detailed bidding advice as to criteria against which bids can be set or audit information. In any case, bidding guidance needs to be issued when bids are being sought and should not wait for the annual report. Therefore, in the terms it was put I do not believe that this amendment is appropriate, and I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw it.

Lord Dixon-Smith

I welcome the noble Lord the Minister back on to his perch. I assure him that he has been adequately substituted for in his absence. I shall not say that he has not been missed; it is nice to see him back again.

I heard what the noble Lord had to say, and I shall study it with care.

Baroness Hamwee

I am glad to be assured that my amendment is unnecessary. I realise that the Official Report will not record that when the Minister told me that I should of course have realised that paragraph 11 applied, he did so as a humorous comment. I say that now to protect my good name. I thank the noble Lord for pointing that out, and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 350 to 350B not moved.]

6 p.m.

Lord Dixon-Smith moved Amendment No. 351: Page 276, line 1, leave out paragraph 14.

The noble Lord said: the amendment raises an interesting point: What is the economic region that comprises "London" and should it be for ever as it is described in the Bill? It seems to me that if paragraph 14 stands, the opportunity to change the boundaries of the region will no longer exist. If I am wrong in my interpretation, no doubt the Minister will tell me. I well remember that under a previous Labour government the south-east region was judged to include Hampshire and everything eastwards through Kent, northwards towards Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire, and coming round to include Hertfordshire and Essex. In many senses there, is a reason for saying that that is a more valid economic development region—if one wants to consider economic development in the context of a city and its environs—than having the boundaries of the London Development Agency cast in stone as the boundaries of the Greater London Authority.

The question of economic influence is always important. I accept that what the Government are doing now is in a sense but a first building block in a process that they hope will create some rationality out of a putative regional structure. However, this country's economy does not work like that. Any regional structure that is arrived at is unlikely to have genuine validity in the economic context. It may make sense from other points of view, but it is not likely to make sense from the economic point of view.

We do not think that it is right that the boundaries of the London economic region, which is what the London Development Agency should be dealing with, should be set in stone. There may well be a time when opinion is different; and if that is so, there may well be a valid case for amendment. However, as the Bill is drafted, such amendment is not possible. We do not think that that is sensible, and that is the reason for the amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Whitty

As the noble Lord says, the amendment raises an interesting issue. Nevertheless, on balance the argument is against the noble Lord. It is true that the RDA Act allows the Secretary of State to alter the boundaries of Me RDA areas in the rest of England, but it would not make much sense in relation to London, where the LDA is responsible to the mayor. Indeed, if the amendment were accepted, it is at least notionally possible that the mayor of London would extend his power, at least in the economic area, over the whole of Essex. I am not sure that that would be desired by the noble Lord's former constituents in the county of Essex.

Although it is true that some flexibility is necessary, that can best be achieved by co-operation between the RDAs, as we spelt out in some detail during the passage of the RDA Act. Clearly, the mayor and the LDA will have responsibility for acting, for example, on the Thames gateway with the east and south-eastern RDAs, and it is very important that they do so. If one were to extend the power of a body controlled by the mayor to territories outside his own territory, I believe there would be serious political repercussions. I hope, therefore, that on balance the noble Lord will see the wisdom of not pressing his amendment, and I ask him to seek leave to withdraw it.

Lord Dixon-Smith

I am grateful to the noble Lord the Minister for his reply. I accept that I was somewhat extreme in the way in which I expressed the case for the amendment. None the less, I am reassured by what the noble Lord said about the need for co-operation between regional development agencies across their boundaries, particularly in the south-east of England. That is essential.

I shall study what the noble Lord said. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 351A to 353 not moved.]

The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Allenby of Megiddo)

Before calling Amendment No. 353A, I have to inform the Committee that if the amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 354:

Lord Clement-Jones moved Amendment No. 353A: Page 277, line 20, leave out sub-paragraph (6) and insert— ("(6) In paragraph 4 (staff) after sub-paragraph (2) there shall be inserted— (2A) Appointments to the position of Chief Executive of the London Development Agency shall be made as follows—

1. (a) the first appointment shall be made by the Mayor of London after consultation with the chair (or chair designate) of the agency and with the approval of the London Assembly decided by simple majority vote,
2. (b) subsequent appointments shall be made by the Agency with the consent of the Mayor of London and the approval of the London Assembly decided by simple majority vote."").

The noble Lord said: I think we all agree that the role of the chief executive will be extremely important, particularly in the early years of the London Development Agency. If some of the responses that the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington of Ribbleton, gave about the types of powers to be delegated to the LDA and the mayor are fulfilled, clearly the LDA will have considerable powers and significant resources at its disposal. In that case, the chief executive will have a very responsible job for the regeneration strategy for the whole of the Greater London area.

We believe that it is therefore very important to have the right mechanisms for the appointment of that chief executive. Those mechanisms should include the assembly; it should not simply be the mayor who has an involvement in the appointment of the chief executive. The assembly should be explicitly included to ensure that the chief executive has the full confidence of the authority as a whole.

As does paragraph 19 of the schedule, the amendment would amend Schedule 2 of the Regional Development Agencies Act, which deals with the question of staffing. We believe that by including the assembly in this we are being wholly consistent. We realise that the Government have in a sense adopted their own consistency in the other direction, but in many respects this is even more important than the way in which board members are appointed. The chief executive will be the agency's day-to-day head. He or she will be responsible to the board as well as being responsible for a very large undertaking.

We very much hope that in this case the Government will consider making an exception to one of their tenets which runs through the Bill, which appears to be that it is for the mayor to decide, not for the assembly and the mayor to decide. We believe that there would be considerable merit in this proposal. I beg to move.

Lord Whitty

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has indicated that the amendment relates to previous discussions of the division of powers, and, although it is correct that the assembly will have a role in relation to its staff and the authority's staff, the LDA is the executive arm of the mayor in the economic and regeneration field. We believe that it should be the mayor who makes the appointments and takes the decisions in relation to the LDA, as we have discussed more generally. It is the role of the assembly to hold the mayor to account for his exercise of his executive functions.

The principle that functional bodies are the arm of the mayor is one that we have consistently pursued. I know that the Liberal Democrats, by and large, disagree, but for logic's sake I must ask the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Clement-Jones

I thank the Minister for that not unexpected reply. I certainly could not accuse him of inconsistency. We obviously have a difference of view about the role of the assembly in such circumstances and I suspect that it will be irreconcilable during the passage of the Bill. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 354 not moved.]

Schedule 20, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 243 [Establishment, membership and duty to maintain police force]:

6.15 p.m.

Lord Cope of Berkeley moved Amendment No. 354ZA: Page 133, line 11, leave out from beginning to end of line 3 on page 134.

The noble Lord said: The amendment moves us on to Clause 243 and Part VI of the Bill, which deals with the Metropolitan Police. I admit that this is a probing amendment, which has been crudely drafted. It is by no means the sort of finely honed legal text that I prefer to put before the Committee, but I hope that it has the value of permitting us to discuss—at least briefly—the fundamental step that is being taken in the replacement of the Home Secretary as the police authority for the Metropolitan Police area by a joint authority on more conventional lines with elected representatives, magistrates and independent members.

The change is one of the most important in the whole history of the Metropolitan Police. That is evidenced in the Bill by the repeal of the statutory basis for the Metropolitan Police—Section I of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829. That is of course the famous Act of Sir Robert Peel, Home Secretary, which set up the world's second modern constabulary, or police force as we know it. The first was the Irish Constabulary, which was also set up by Sir Robert Peel in 1822. As the noble Lord, Lord Molyneaux, is in his place, I remind the Committee that that force was the predecessor of the Irish Constabulary, later the Royal Irish Constabulary, and of the Royal Ulster Constabulary—a force that has been and remains vital to democracy.

Before 1829, the duties that we think of as police duties were carried out, in London and elsewhere, by watchmen and constables, who worked directly under city and town councils and the local justices of the peace. In a general conceptual way, the Bill will reverse the 1829 Act by putting elected representatives and magistrates back in charge of the policing of London, as they have been elsewhere throughout. Modernisation is not always what it seems: sometimes it harks back to earlier times.

Since 1829, the Met has been different. In part, that is simply a reflection of the size of London, but it also reflects the force's national responsibilities. The Metropolitan Police have taken a lead in many sensitive and important areas. That consideration is still, as the Bill stands, reflected in the provision that the Home Secretary can appoint a member of the new Metropolitan Police Authority and can also appoint, directly and indirectly, some of the members of the selection panel who will appoint others. The Liberal Democrats have tabled an amendment on the question of the Home Secretary's representation and we will reach that later.

In general, the Home Secretary will withdraw from his role as the Metropolitan Police Authority. I support that move, but it is a significant change that needs some explanation from the Minister of the reasons for it. The move has had the support of others over the years, including the Commissioner and his predecessor. It will bring the Metropolitan Police Authority nearer to, although it will not make it identical to, other police authorities.

The reasons for the change are not so much argued as asserted. It is said that greater democracy must be a good thing, although the Bill's provisions are a long way from total democracy for the Metropolitan Police Authority. The fact that the Home Secretary, who is answerable to Parliament, has been the police authority all this time is in itself democratic. The frequent debates on the Metropolitan Police, especially in the other place, emphasise the democratic control that has been exercised.

Therefore, the Bill will not mean a step to democracy from no democracy at all. It is a much more subtle move than that—from one partial form of democracy to another partial form of democracy. However, it is difficult to avoid the idea, more usually implied than expressed, that in recent decades it has somehow become less acceptable to have a single politician acting as the Metropolitan Police Authority. I do not mean that as any criticism of the present Home Secretary or his predecessors. Politicians as a group, and I speak as one, have become less trusted to act in a quasi-judicial role one day and a political one the next. The prestige of politicians as a group has diminished. We are nearly as lowly rated as journalists. We are right down the bottom with lawyers and persons of that class.

Of course, a majority of the new police authority will also be politicians and some of the rest will be chosen by politicians. Any blame going—and there is bound to be some at times—will be more widely spread. It will also prove true to say that the chairman, never mind the members, of the Metropolitan Police Authority will be largely unknown to the public, certainly in comparison with any Home Secretary. That may be another clue as to why the change is being made. It will help to lower the visibility and hence sometimes the political temperature of the authority, and I believe that to be desirable.

I hope that the change will also lower the perception of political interference in policing matters. I emphasise the word "perception", because I am riot trying to make the case that either the present Home Secretary or his predecessors improperly interfered politically. In any case, even if they had, successive commissioners would have resisted them.

We are in difficult waters. Ministers and elected councillors are expected to use their powers on behalf of the public, because that is our system of democratic control.

All in all, I think it is desirable to transfer responsibility from the Home Secretary to the police authority somewhat on the lines suggested in the Bill, although we shall have some modifications to suggest shortly. However, I think that the Committee should ask the Minister to explain the Government's reasons for bringing about this historic change. I beg to move.

Lord Tope

I am grateful to the noble Lord, whose name so resembles mine that I occasionally receive his post, for explaining why he has moved separately from the other grouped amendments an amendment which he described rightly, if I may say so, as a rather crude amendment. In fact, if the amendment were passed it would leave us with a Metropolitan Police district and some form of unspecified Metropolitan Police Authority. We shall debate those details later on and so I shall leave any comments I have on those details until the proper time when we deal with those amendments.

The noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, said that it was for the Minister to give the Government's reasons for why there is to be this historic change and why we are to revert to the situation that applied more than 170 years ago. I suspect that London has changed a little in 170 years. I happy to let the Minister do that. However, I want to place on record the strong support of the Liberal Democrats for the setting up of a Metropolitan Police Authority and for the authority no longer to be the Home Secretary. We shall come to the details in a few moments.

Why should it not be the Home Secretary? Why do this? It should be done not only because we have supported it for years and the Labour Party—now the Government—have supported it for years, but the most important reason of all in many ways is that for many years and publicly the Metropolitan Police, and particularly its commissioner, have been advocating such a change. With such powerful forces in support of it, it must be a good Idea.

Why is it a good idea? First, the Home Secretary has a huge range of duties and powers. The amount of attention that that one Minister, however able, can give to the affairs of the largest police force in the country must be very limited. Whatever good advice he or she may receive, it is still very limited. The degree of accountability, therefore, for the Metropolitan Police service is perhaps limited to the annual debate in the other place, annual or twice yearly meetings with the representatives of the London boroughs and, more recently, the meetings of the Metropolitan Police Committee. All of us are agreed that that is inadequate. For that reason alone, it is important that we are to have a body of people—a police authority—that is able to give more time, detailed knowledge and attention to the strategic work of the Metropolitan Police.

However, I think it goes beyond that in that it also brings about certainly the possibility—and I very much hope the reality—of a greater degree of community accountability within London for the Metropolitan Police, its strategic priorities and so on. That in itself must be desirable. How the members of the authority will work and how they will relate to London's communities is perhaps a debate for later today.

The other aspect of the matter that is less often mentioned is the whole financial regime of the Metropolitan Police with which I have occasionally had some dealings in my role as a London borough council leader. The Met has made strenuous efforts in recent years to try to bring its financial regime a little more up to date than it was. However, had it been similar to a London borough council in financial accounting and accountability terms, these moves would have happened a long time ago. The Met has a huge budget. Were it to be receiving rather greater public scrutiny than is now the case, I am sure that greater and less damaging savings would have been found than has had to be the case in order to meet the other restrictions that have been placed upon it.

We on these Benches very much welcome the historic change that is taking place. I acknowledge that it is a historic change. It is long overdue. It is time that the metropolis, like everywhere else in the country, had its own police authority which is not the Home Secretary but is more directly related to and accountable to Londoners.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

This amendment would remove the police authority's status as a body corporate; it would remove any enabling provision for it to have any members; and it would remove any provision for it to have any name. But apart from that, the short reasons are these: first, it is inappropriate for a single political Minister, however distinguished, to be in charge of such a large authority; secondly, it will improve accountability; thirdly, it will improve openness; and, fourthly—I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Tope—it will enable local involvement in a way which is exactly parallel, for instance, with the thinking behind the Crime and Disorder Act and is long overdue. Furthermore, it is Liberal Democrat policy; it is also Conservative policy; and—the clincher—it is government policy.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

I am grateful for that legal advice on the drafting of the amendment. It is much appreciated. The debate has enabled us to hear at least some of the reasons that lie behind this historic change. In view of the legal consequences of the amendment, I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 243 agreed to.

Schedule 21 [The Metropolitan Police Authority: Schedule 2A to the Police Act 1996]:

Lord Cope of Berkeley moved Amendment No. 354A: Page 277, line 31, leave out ("twelve") and insert ("six").

The noble Lord said: I sometimes find the numbering system for the amendments slightly confusing, but that is a question for another day.

We are now dealing with the composition of the new authority. The first suggestion—it was made in A Mayor and Assembly for London—is that the Metropolitan Police Authority should reflect the model of other non-metropolitan police authorities throughout the country. That is what we were expecting, not necessarily in every detail but in principle. In normal circumstances, each non-metropolitan police authority has 17 members. Nine are appointed by the county council or, in areas of the country such as where I live where there are unitary authorities, the district council; five independent members are appointed by the authority from a shortlist drawn up by the Secretary of State; and there are three magistrates.

This amendment addresses the question of the council representatives. In the case of other authorities, they are the councils principally responsible for the major services to the citizen. However, the Bill proposes 23 members for the Metropolitan Police Authority: 12 members of the new assembly, to be appointed by the mayor; seven are to be independent members in the same way as the other authorities; and four magistrates. Therefore, the proportions are roughly the same but the amendment concerns the 12. Our contention is that those 12 should not be wholly drawn from the new assembly but that six of them should come from the assembly and six from the London boroughs.

The important point is the representation of the boroughs. We shall come later to the question of whether the members picked from the assembly should be chosen by the mayor or whether they should be appointed or elected by the assembly. In some of the amendments proposed by myself and by the Liberal Democrats there is a distinction over whether to use the word "appointed" or "elected". I do not think that it makes any difference. The only way an assembly can appoint anyone is by a vote. It is a verbal difference without a distinction. The real distinction is whether the mayor or the assembly picks the assembly members. On this amendment, the issue is whether the boroughs should be represented as well as the assembly. At present the boroughs are not to be represented; all representatives are to come from the assembly.

The Minister referred to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the importance of local links with the police and local consultation. Section 5 of that Act imposes a duty on London borough councils, as well as others elsewhere in the country, together with the commissioner, to formulate strategies for the reduction of crime and disorder in their areas. The underlying philosophy of the Crime and Disorder Act is to develop and enhance partnerships between, in this case, the Metropolitan Police and other agencies involved in the criminal justice system, but, above all, with local government. In London, those agencies are, and I believe will remain, the boroughs. The boroughs will still have most of the powers to do the things which the citizens want from local government. They will still have the responsibility under the Crime and Disorder Act for formulating strategies and liaising with the police; but they will not be represented on the authority.

That does not seem to be a sensible arrangement through which to implement the Crime and Disorder Act. With a large number of boroughs, it is difficult not to get into a situation where one makes the new police authority too large and unwieldy. With 23 members, it is a little larger than similar bodies in the rest of the country. I do not think that it would matter if the size were increased a little. The proportion should remain the same, but it would not matter if the number of members were larger. That would permit a few more representatives from the assembly than the six we propose, and a few more from the boroughs. I am not hung up on specific numbers. The important principle is that the boroughs should be represented.

The arrangements we have suggested for electing those borough representatives mirror those in the schedule to the Police Act 1996 for local councils or, in some cases where necessary, joint committees of local councils to appoint members to other police authorities. We envisage that similar joint committees would operate within London so as to arrive at the representatives of the boroughs. However, we are concerned about the principle that boroughs should be represented on the authority. I beg to move.

6.30 p.m.

Lord Tope

Perhaps I may preface my remarks by saying for the benefit of anyone in the Chamber who may not be aware of the fact that I am, and have been for the past 13 years, a London borough council leader and may therefore be thought to have some natural sympathy for this group of amendments. I do not. I understand that the amendments arise from the Conservative approach, which is that the assembly should comprise entirely London borough council representatives. That is a view we have debated previously. It is one that I do not share. For that reason, I cannot share this view.

The Greater London Authority and the Metropolitan Police Authority are supposed to be strategic in their roles. Therefore, it is right and appropriate that the democratic representatives should come from the strategic authority and the assembly rather than the London boroughs. I fear that were six, or some such small number, to come from the London boroughs, inevitably that would detract from the strategic role and transfer some of the emphasis to a more local role. That is the wrong emphasis.

The noble Lord, Lord Cope, makes an important point in relation to the crime and disorder strategies. It is important that those are fed clearly through to the deliberations of the Metropolitan Police Authority. But the implementation and development: of each London borough's strategies are primarily matters for that borough, and the partnerships and consultation within that borough. Where and how that should feed into the police authority is another matter. It will be for the authority to develop effective consultation arrangements with the boroughs collectively—dare I say perhaps through the Association of London Government?—to consider matters of wider concern and interest on the implementation of the crime and disorder strategies.

These proposals will not stop that happening. It is for those involved to ensure that it takes place. To have only six London borough representatives on the authority may be useful for the six London boroughs or the City of London (if there happens to be a representative). But, speaking for the London borough of Sutton, although we have good relationships with the next-door borough of Croydon, having a councillor from Croydon on the Metropolitan Police Authority would be of little greater use to us than having our constituency Member on the authority. It is of limited value. As a London borough council leader, I have some sympathy with the amendment, but essentially it is misguided. Subject to the amendments we shall propose later, the authority is about the right structure. It is for the authority to ensure that it establishes good and effective liaison arrangements with the boroughs, in particular in relation to their crime and disorder strategies.

Lord Harris of Haringey

I share with the noble Lord, Lord Tope, a feeling that there is a superficial attraction to the amendment. However, I agree that it does not bear much examination.

Members of the London assembly are being elected for strategic purposes. The role of the authority will be focused on strategic issues in relation to policing London. It will not be concerned on a day-to-day basis with operational matters or with issues around the crime and disorder strategy which will be developed at a local level. Indeed, it would be wrong if that were the case. Therefore, the argument that borough representation is required is fallacious.

It is also fallacious in practical terms, for the reasons to which the noble Lord alluded. To have six representatives of the boroughs purportedly representing 32 London boroughs makes difficulties for each representative who will be a locally elected borough councillor but will have to represent the interests of, presumably, five or six borough councils. In practice, that will not work. It will do nothing as regards the accountability structures of the police authority. If one wants good accountability and good links with the boroughs, no doubt an amendment can be tabled suggesting 32 representatives. I do not believe that that would then be a practical police authority. It would not necessarily serve the purposes set out in the amendment. Those purposes will be achieved by much closer collaboration between the police authority, the London boroughs and the local crime and disorder partnerships.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

The consequences have already been accurately set out by my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey and the noble Lord, Lord Tope. I do not retraverse that ground. Essentially, we have sought to draw a clear line between strategic issues for which the GLA should be responsible and other issues which are rightly kept by the boroughs.

As the noble Lord, Lord Tope, said, the policing of London clearly requires a strategic overview. Therefore, the elected membership should be drawn from the assembly and not from individual boroughs. However, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, has raised an important point and I am happy to reiterate, as firmly as I can, that the needs of local communities in London will not be overlooked. Consultation with the community is a requirement of the Police Act 1996 and of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

I am sure that the MPA will work closely with the boroughs, just as the Metropolitan Police Committee does now. It will take account of the views of the boroughs when drawing up its annual policing plan. I stress that the MPA and the boroughs will be involved in the new statutory partnerships under the Crime and Disorder Act. Therefore, although I recognise the concerns that have driven these amendments, I believe that they are best addressed through the mechanisms that I have described.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

I am slightly disappointed, but only mildly, to discover that the two senior representatives of local government—particularly of local London boroughs—present in the Chamber this evening have not leapt to their feet to support the amendment. Nevertheless, I am not entirely put off by that.

The Crime and Disorder Act provides for the involvement of London boroughs, among others, and the Police Act provides for the involvement of what are called "relevant councils". So there is a case to be made for such involvement. The local strategies of which we talk will need to add up to the total, overall strategy—the same word is used in both cases—of the Metropolitan Police Authority and the Metropolitan Police force. It would be no good if that did not happen.

I realise that the London Borough of Sutton or any other individual borough would not have its Own councillors on the authority, even if the figure of six that I have suggested were enlarged somewhat—I certainly do not think that it should be enlarged to 32 or anything like that because it would make the authority much less workable. It is proposed that 12 representatives of the assembly should serve on the police authority, so it is likely that some boroughs will not be represented on that body. The noble Lord, Lord Tope, may find that, if the amendment were carried, the position would be the same.

Lord Tope

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I make it clear that I do not wish my borough, or any other, to be represented specifically on the Metropolitan Police Authority. My point is that the MPA should be a strategic authority that deals with strategic issues. Of necessity, the assembly members who serve on that body will live somewhere. However, I would not wish them to be viewed as borough representatives in any sense. Some of them may be constituency members of the assembly—I hope that is the correct term—and others may be London members from the top-up list. The important point is that they should be strategic representatives, not borough representatives.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

I accept that. I understood entirely the thrust of the noble Lord's earlier intervention. At the same time, the point of having elected representatives—whether they are from the assembly or from the boroughs—is that they should represent, to a degree, the people who elected them; otherwise there is no democracy at all.

Judging from what the Minister has said, I am not likely to make much progress with the amendment this evening. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

6.45 p.m.

Lord Tope moved Amendment No. 354ZB: Page 277, line 32, leave out ("appointed") and insert ("elected").

The noble Lord said: I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 354ZD, 354ZF, 354YJ and 354ZJ. I agree with the point that the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, made when considering the previous group of amendments: I think that probably all Members find the numbering and lettering system quite difficult to follow at times.

The numbering may be difficult, but the purpose of this amendment is very simple and clear. It relates to the 12 members who are to come from the assembly to serve on the police authority. Our batch of amendments proposes that the assembly members should be chosen by the assembly, not appointed by the mayor.

We have returned time and again to this issue during the debate because our view differs from that of the Government. Our view, which has been stated many times, is that the mayor should have less power and the assembly should have more power. The Government do not agree. This amendment is not strictly part of that argument—although perhaps it has its genesis there. We agree with the Government's proposal that 12 members of the assembly should serve on the Metropolitan Police Authority. Our point of difference with the Government is: who chooses those assembly members?

It seems to us to be right—and a fairly fundamental democratic principle—that those assembly members must be seen to represent the assembly. They will certainly be held to account by the assembly for what they do and say. Therefore, they should be chosen by the assembly and not appointed by the mayor who may at least be tempted to choose people to serve on the police authority whom she or he feels might be most comfortable for the mayor. If the assembly is to be represented on the authority, we believe that the assembly should choose its representatives. The purpose of these amendments is to give the assembly the power to elect its 12 representatives—because perforce that is what they will be—to that body and to do so in accordance with the existing political balance on the assembly.

That is a fairly clear point and I hope that it will not get lost in our previous arguments about the distinction between the executive role of the mayor and the scrutiny role of the assembly—which I understand very well. We are talking about a simple democratic principle: assembly members who represent the assembly should be chosen by the assembly and not appointed by the mayor, without taking account of the assembly's wishes.

I would like to think—although I am not too hopeful—that the Government will recognise this fairly important point. I am quite sure that, if the assembly is able to choose its 12 members, those members will enjoy the assembly's greater confidence than if they are chosen simply by the mayor and appointed to the Metropolitan Police Authority. I beg to move.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

I shall speak primarily to Amendments Nos. 354F, 354H and 354J, the effect of which is broadly the same as that of the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Tope. The noble Lord's amendments use the word "elected" rather than "appointed", but that is not an effective difference.

I believe it is sensible that assembly members who sit on the authority—whether it is six or 12—should be elected by the assembly rather than appointed by the mayor. I cannot say that I followed with proper attention all of the previous debates about the mayor and the assembly—although I have done my best to read the relevant parts of Hansard. As far as the police authority is concerned, I believe that it is important that assembly members who serve on it should represent the assembly not only in the sense that the party balance is reflected—that is provided for in the Bill, and we wish to continue it as far as possible—but in the sense that they feel that they are answerable to the assembly.

The basic purpose of the assembly is to be a democratic check on the mayor. If he is to be given such patronage, that check is weakened. If he is able to say to a member of the assembly who is put on to the police authority that he is not doing what he wants and that he will remove him from the assembly, the mayor will directly control and heavily influence the authority.

We must remember that the 12 members are a majority. The independent members will be appointed by the 12, so whatever they and the magistrates say, they can be overruled. That will influence the way in which the authority works. It is therefore important that the assembly members have the protection of being elected by their fellows rather than being the beneficiaries of the mayor's patronage.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

If it is convenient to the Committee, I shall speak to all the amendments in the group.

The effect of Amendment No. 354F, the Conservative amendment, is to have the assembly members of the MPA appointed by the assembly rather than the mayor. The Liberal Democrat Amendment No. 354ZF is similar, except for the difference in terminology. The other amendments are consequential.

It comes down to a difference of approach, as identified by the noble Lord, Lord Tope. We return to the old argument about the extension of the powers of the assembly at the expense of the mayor. I am not sure how helpful it would be if I wearied the Committee with a rerun of arguments which have been well ventilated, albeit in the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Cope, and myself.

We believed that the amendments downplay the purpose of the mayor's strong strategic role. We regard the power of appointment as critical to the mayor's ability to take a high level and strategic interest in the authority's efforts to tackle crime and maintain an efficient and effective policing service in London. We do not want to see any diminution of the mayor's power in that respect.

Fundamentally, the difference of approach is as simple as that, but it is important not to overlook the fact that the mayor' s power of appointment is subject to the requirement that he or she shall ensure so far as practicable that the appointments reflect the balance of parties on the assembly. We believe that those two aspects taken together arrive at the right, properly balanced conclusion.

Lord Tope

Perhaps I may begin with a point of agreement as regards election or appointment. I entirely accept that the assembly would be appointing the 12 members. It might well be that the 12 appointees would be chosen by elections within the assembly. In that way, we can agree on both election and appointment.

I turn to the more important and substantial matter. I was disappointed with the Minister's reply not because I expected him to agree with me, but because he had not understood and perhaps I had not made my point clearly. The argument is not about the powers of the strategic role of the mayor. If the Government were proposing that the mayor could appoint any 12 members from anywhere, some of whom might happen to be assembly members, I might well be having the argument that we have had throughout; that the assembly and not the mayor should appoint those 12 people.

We are not discussing that. We are specifically discussing 12 members of the assembly, as the Bill provides. Therefore, we are discussing whether the assembly can chose its own members who are bound to be seen as its representatives. Indeed, I assume that they are to be there as representatives of the assembly and through it of the London communities. We are discussing whether the assembly has the right to chose its 12 representatives or whether the assembly has imposed upon it whoever the mayor chooses—the mayor's 12 most favoured members of the assembly—subject to the political balance.

That is a different point from the one we repeated about the role of the mayor and the assembly. I am talking specifically about who appoints the 12 people from the assembly. We say that it ought to be the assembly, from which they come and to which they will inevitably be held accountable, rather than the mayor, who will impose them. Many of those 12 unfortunate people who may well have been chosen by the assembly, given that we are talking about almost half the membership, will be held to account by their fellow assembly members who will have had no choice in their appointment. That seems rather unfair to those 12 people, to say the least.

I hope that the Minister will recognise that that is a different point from the one to which he has replied. I am happy to pause in order to give him an opportunity to reply to it. I see that he does not wish to do so. I suspect that I may have won my argument and that we may well return to the matter later when he 'will have had chance to think of a counter argument or have been persuaded by ours. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 354B to 354F not moved.]

Lord Cope of Berkeley moved Amendment No. 354G: Page 278, leave out lines 1 to 3.

The noble Lord said: We now turn to the deputy mayor. The Bill provides that the deputy mayor should automatically be a member of the MPA. The deputy mayor is to be appointed by the mayor under Clause 41. It also provides that the deputy mayor can be dismissed by the mayor at any time. If after a year or two, or a week or two, the mayor decides that he does not like the deputy mayor, he or she can be dismissed from the post.

However, the Bill also provides that the deputy mayor, by reason of his office, is automatically appointed to the MPA. Interestingly enough, there is no provision for the dismissal of the deputy may or from that authority. I am not sure whether the deputy mayor, having been dismissed from his post, automatically ceases to be a member of the MPA. If not, presumably the mayor will have to juggle about with the other 11 places.

That is all in the detail of the Bill. We ask whether the deputy mayor should automatically be a member of the MPA. There may well be someone who is regarded as well qualified and the ideal person to be deputy mayor, but who does not want, or is not considered suitable, to be on the MPA. In any event, the mayor may want to delegate to his deputy a great deal of authority in other areas of activity and not want him to be distracted by MPA business.

It does not seem to me that there should be anything automatic about it. There is more of a case for the deputy mayor to be appointed automatically to the authority if the other 11 were to be elected. If the mayor is to appoint all 12, he can appoint the deputy to the police authority if he feels like it. That would give the mayor greater flexibility. If the others were to be elected, something might be said for making sure that there was a senior figure on the assembly chosen by the mayor. If the Minister does not agree to the previous amendments, there is a strong case for this amendment. I beg to move.

7 p.m.

Lord Tope

I too shall listen with considerable interest to the Minister's response to the very good points that have been made. I am not quite clear why the Government believe that in giving the mayor the power to appoint 12 assembly persons they must insist that one of them has to be the deputy mayor. I do not entirely understand why that is so. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley. Should the Minister be so moved by my persuasive arguments that the assembly member should be appointed by that body, it might well be a reasonable compromise that the deputy mayor shall be a member and the other 11 shall be chosen by the assembly. That would appear to be a reasonable way forward. But given that the mayor is appointing all 12, why is it required, whether he likes it or not, that one of them has to be the deputy mayor?

Lord Williams of Mostyn

Amendment No. 354G would remove the requirement that the deputy mayor be one of the assembly members on the MPA. The answer to the question raised by both noble Lords who have contributed to the debate is that the deputy mayor is intended to be a figure of considerable importance. He is a key player in the assembly and an important participant in the mayor's cabinet. We believe that if the deputy was not on the MPA, that would significantly weaken the relationship between the mayor and the MPA and would diminish the mayor's influence. We do not want that to happen. That is the simple answer to the question which was very courteously put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Tope.

Baroness Thomas of Walliswood

I thought the Minister was going to reply in that way, but his argument can be turned upside down. If the mayor already has "his man" or "his person" on the police authority, why does he need to have 11 other people whom he has also appointed? He has his representative in place already and that would be enough.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

I agree with that. The Minister said that the deputy mayor is to be a key player in the assembly and I understand that. He may be a key member in different ways. It may be that his skills and experience show that he is the appropriate person to put on the police authority. But he may be a key member in other respects. There may be another key member in the assembly who is more appropriate to be the mayor's principal link with the police authority, the strategy and the planning. It does not seem to me that a case has been made out for having the deputy mayor automatically elected.

I understand that the mayor will want to have a good relationship with the police authority. If the mayor is able to appoint 12 people, he will have a good relationship with the authority. If not, it will be the mayor's fault if he does not have a good relationship. I do not believe that it would be weakened if for some of the time the deputy mayor was put on the police authority. Does the Minister want to intervene?

Lord Bach

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Can he really envisage circumstances in which someone as significant as the deputy mayor, a member of the assembly, would not be properly on the police authority? Inevitably, that person would be the link, if nothing else, between the assembly and the police body. Can the noble Lord envisage circumstances in which such an important person would not be on the body? If he can, perhaps he can tell the Committee what those circumstances might be.

Lord Tope

I shall give the noble Lord a little more time to think of those circumstances. It may very well be that, given that nearly half the members of the assembly will be on the police authority, one of them will be the deputy mayor. I do not understand why it must be the deputy mayor. As the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, has already said, there may be other very important responsibilities which the deputy mayor undertakes as regards the various other functional bodies. Why does it have to be the police authority'? Why cannot it be another important member of the assembly who fulfils the role? That is the point that we are trying to make. It is not that the deputy mayor is not important or that appointment to the police authority is not important; but why does it have to be prescribed that one of the 12 has to be the deputy mayor? If he is much better informed, suited and experienced in another important aspect of the GLA's work, why should not the deputy mayor play an equally important role in the area for which he or she is better qualified? That is the point that we are trying to make. I hope that by now the noble Lord, Lord Cope, has thought of many possibilities that may arise.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

The noble Lord, Lord Tope, has expressed the matter more eloquently than I; I seem to have failed to put over my point. The situation where the deputy mayor may not be on the police authority may arise in two different ways. First, the mayor may consider that it would be more appropriate for the deputy mayor to spend most of his time working on some of the other responsibilities. In that case, it may be better for the deputy mayor not to be on the police authority so that he can devote his time to the other responsibilities that the mayor wishes him to have.

Secondly, it may well be that another member of the assembly should be the principal man or woman on the police authority because of his or her past experience, training or qualities. Therefore, it may be unnecessary to appoint the deputy mayor because someone else can fill the role of being the important principal link between the mayor and the police authority. I do not know whether the Minister wants to contribute further to the debate. I gather not. In that case, no doubt the debate will continue on another occasion. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment Nos. 354H to 354ZL not moved.]

Lord Cope of Berkeley moved Amendment No. 354L: Page 278, line 16, at end insert— ("3A. The members of the Metropolitan Police Authority shall exercise their powers to appoint members under paragraph 3(3)(a) so as to ensure that, so far as is practicable, where members for whose appointments they are responsible are members of political parties their numbers reflect the balance of parties for the time being prevailing among members of the London Assembly.").

The noble Lord said: I signalled earlier that I understood that the Liberal Democrats were going to suggest that the Secretary of State should not have the power to appoint, but evidently they have changed their minds. They are extremely wise to do so otherwise should have been obliged to support the Government, not that I mind doing so occasionally.

Amendments Nos. 354L and 354M both seek to ensure that as far as possible the party balance is still maintained. There will also be seven members who will be voted on to the authority by the main members of the authority and four from among the magistrates. I do not seek to suggest—and the amendment is careful in this respect—that everyone who finds a place on the authority in that way should belong to a political party or should have to identify or express their preferences in terms of the parties that they support. However, where those individuals who serve on the authority belong to a political party, an effort should be made among them to ensure that the party balance is maintained.

I hope that many, if not all, of the independent members may be what in your Lordships' House are called Cross-Benchers, independent members belonging to no party at all. Ir.: so far as some of them may not be Cross-Benchers, I believe that the party balance should be reflected. These two amendments provide for that in respect of the two categories of members other than the members drawn from the assembly.

It would be wrong to exclude from appointment those who belong to parties. Similarly it would be wrong to exclude from appointment those who choose not to belong to any political party. If political party members are appointed to the authority, that should not upset the party balance. I beg to move.

Baroness Thomas of Walliswood

Before the Minister replies, I am bound to say that I find these two amendments quite disturbing. I have a small acquaintance with the police authority in the county where I was a county councillor. To return to our old argument, when that police authority was set up it was universally agreed that one of the county councillors representing us should be the former chairman of the police authority, who was immensely knowledgeable. When the county council took the decision to appoint him as a member, his party affiliation was totally unimportant. Subsequently, he chaired that police authority with great distinction.

Turning to the independent members and the members chosen by the magistrates, I am quite astounded to hear the noble Lord say that their political affiliation should have any consideration. The Secretary of State will nominate a panel from which, if I understand the Bill aright, the other members will appoint the independent members. The Secretary of State, in creating that panel, will conduct a great deal of careful research. Quite a complicated form has to be filled in for that purpose. The Secretary of State, or someone on his behalf, will have satisfied himself that the person appointed, whether or not he or she has a political affiliation, is capable of acting with independence on the police authority.

I know a lot of magistrates and sometimes I can guess what their political affiliations may be. One or two of them occasionally confess into my ear what that affiliation is, but I have never heard them behave as though they belonged to a political party on, for example, the probation committee, of which I am a member. I am sure that the tradition of magistracy—I hope that it is as strong in London as elsewhere—would not favour a party political approach on behalf of magistrates. I would rather leave such matters to good sense and the general assumption that there are some people on bodies who can behave in a non-party political manner so that they make sure that we have the right people serving on the Metropolitan Police Authority.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

No magistrate has ever confessed to me the shame of being a Liberal Democrat!

Baroness Thomas of Walliswood

I do not know why the Minister suggests that it is only those in sympathy with my particular orientation whose affiliation I have occasionally been able to adduce!

Lord Williams of Mostyn

The points made by the noble Baroness are overwhelming. The function of the independent members and the magistrate members, as she says, is precisely to be independent, bringing qualities and skills which are not dependent upon and are not generated by membership of a political party. It will be difficult enough to obtain the correct balance of skills, age, ethnic background and gender without introducing politics into the equation.

Outside London, independent member appointments are not dependent upon political allegiance or political parties. If one went the way that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Cope, indicates, the result may be a membership, as indicated by the noble Baroness, consisting mainly of politically minded people. We do not want that for a body of this sensitivity.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

I have expressed my view on this subject, but it has not found favour. I seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 354M not moved.]

Schedule 21 agreed to.

Clauses 244 to 247 agreed to.

Clause 248 [Appointment of Commissioner]:

7.15 p.m.

Lord Tope moved Amendment No. 354MVA: Page 135, leave out lines 3 to 19 and insert— ("(2) Any appointment of a Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis shall be made by the Metropolitan Police Authority. (3) A person appointed as Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis shall hold office until such time as the Assembly shall decide otherwise by two thirds majority on receiving a request from the Metropolitan Police Authority. (4) Any appointment of a Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis shall be subject to regulations under section 50.").

The noble Lord said: I rise to move Amendment No. 354MVA standing in my name and those of my noble friends. I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 354MWA and 354MXA.

These amendments concern the appointments of a commissioner and a deputy commissioner. They propose that those appointments should be made by the Metropolitan Police Authority rather than, as proposed in the Bill, by the Queen acting on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. It also provides for the removal by a two-thirds majority of a commissioner so appointed. Amendment No. 354MWA prescribes that if we do not succeed in that, the London assembly should also have the opportunity, indeed the right, to make representations to the Secretary of State on the appointment of the commissioner.

These amendments are in line with the recommendations of the Macpherson report on the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, which recommended that all chief officer appointments in the Metropolitan Police service should be made by the authority. The Government have accepted those recommendations, except in relation to the commissioner and deputy commissioner. I believe it is the view of the Government—as we shall hear shortly—that, because of the particular nature of the Metropolitan Police service, its national and international functions, and status—if that is the right word—of the commissioner and deputy commissioner being higher than that of the Chief Constable, the Secretary of State should continue to play a more active role.

We feel that is the wrong way round. We are appointing a Metropolitan Police Authority responsible for the Metropolitan Police service, and the Macpherson report was right to recommend that the commissioner and deputy commissioner should be appointed by the authority. I am sure that in making such an appointment they would wish to pay due regard to the views of the Secretary of State. If we are to have an authority, it seems right and proper to us—we agree with Macpherson—that that authority should have the responsibility of appointing the two senior posts that will report to them.

The Government, in their response to the Macpherson report, have simply commented that those appointments will remain royal appointments. They have not said why. My question is not intended, in any sense, to be anti-royalist or anti-monarchist. I do not understand, and I hope that the Minister will explain, why the appointment has to be a royal appointment, even if the Home Secretary is to retain, in effect, the power to appoint, or certainly the power to nominate the appointment. Perhaps there is a simple explanation that has escaped me. I shall be pleased to hear the Minister's reply.

However, I return to our principal point; namely, that now we are to have a fully-fledged Metropolitan Police Authority it should have the power, after consulting appropriately, to appoint—and, for that matter, dismiss—the two senior officers of the Metropolitan Police Service. I beg to move.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

I do not find myself in agreement with this set of amendments. Notwithstanding the Macpherson Report, I think that the Bill is to be preferred in this respect. The noble Lord seemed to be making a distinction between whether Her Majesty the Queen would be involved or whether it would be the Secretary of State. The question of whether or not the Queen would be involved seems to me to be the smaller of the two considerations. I do not believe that it is disrespectful to refer to that as a bit of the ornamental part of the constitution, as Bagehot suggested, rather than the practical part. Nevertheless, it is appropriate that Her Majesty the Queen should be involved.

The real question is whether the Secretary of State or the assembly should, essentially, make the appointment. After all, the Bill provides that the Secretary of State shall "have regard to" the recommendations made to him by the authority and any representations made to him by the mayor of London. Those recommendations and representations may point to the same person being appointed as commissioner or, for that matter, they may point to different people being appointed. If the majority of the authority is appointed by the mayor, it may be unlikely that the mayor's judgment would be different from the majority of the people whom he appointed; but it is still entirely possible. In those circumstances, it seems to me that the Secretary of State has a most important role to play. But even in circumstances where the recommendations of the authority and the representations of the mayor point in the same direction, it still seems to me to be a good thing that the Secretary of State should actually be the one to recommend the appointment.

For a while I was security Minister in Northern Ireland. Therefore, when in Great Britain I benefited from the protection of the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police. I came to know quite a bit about the way in which they are able to operate in different parts of the country in that rather particular regard. It gave me a certain feeling for the national role which the Metropolitan Police have in addition to their more conventional role of policing the metropolis. But, of course, it is more than just the Special Branch protection people; indeed, this applies across a wide range of responsibilities. That is the reason for the Secretary of State's involvement.

The noble Lord on the Liberal Democrat Benches did not move earlier the proposal that the Secretary of State should lose the power, suggested under the Bill, to appoint a member of the authority. In not moving that amendment, the noble Lord recognised the national role of the Metropolitan Police. This is another recognition of it. I am not sure whether the difference between the two methods of appointment is actually quite as great as it might seem in prospect. If a person is recommended by the authority and supported by the mayor, it seems to me unlikely that the Secretary of State will appoint anyone else at that stage. So the distinction may not be quite as great a chasm as it may seem. However, in so far as there is a difference—indeed, there is—I support the Bill as it stands.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

The present arrangements in the Bill are to be found in Clause 248. Amendments Nos. 354MVA and 354MXA give completely new arrangements. The appointment of the commissioner—this is quite important—becomes the sole gift of the Metropolitan Police Authority, as does the appointment of the deputy. I cannot accept these amendments. They give no role to the Secretary of State in the appointment of either the commissioner or the deputy; indeed, no role at all. That is very strange because the Police Act 1996 requires the Secretary of State to approve the appointment of chief constables and assistant chief constables outside London. The Macpherson recommendations said that the MPA's role in appointing chief officers of the Metropolitan Police should be brought into line with the role of other police authorities in appointing their chief officers. So this amendment is not consistent with that recommendation.

The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, were well made. This is a police force absorbing over a fifth of all resources devoted to policing in England and Wales. It has national and international functions in respect of counter-terrorism and Royal security. These are functions for which the Home Secretary will continue to have a particular responsibility. That means that his relationship with the commissioner and deputy is a special one.

We believe that these are different appointments because of the reasons outlined by rhe noble Lord, Lord Cope, and which I mentioned a moment ago. That is why the Bill provides for the Home Secretary to make a recommendation to Her Majesty. We believe that the different status justifies that different basis of appointment.

I turn now to the question of removal. Clause 251 already provides arrangements for the removal of the commissioner and the deputy commissioner. The proposals set out in Amendment No. 354MVA suggest a different removal procedure. It says that the commissioner is to hold office until the assembly decides otherwise by a, two thirds majority on receiving a request from the Metropolitan Police Authority". Amendment No. 354MXA suggests a similar provision in respect of the deputy commissioner but with two differences: it refers to the authority, not just to the assembly; and only a "simple majority" is required to remove the deputy commissioner from office. We cannot see any reason why the assembly should have such a role in removing the commissioner or his deputy. The influence that the assembly has in this matter, as in the appointment process, should be through the presence of 12 members on the MPA. As I indicated, they will have a significant role in appointment and removal. I believe these amendments to be misconceived and possible causes of danger.

Lord Tope

I should like to begin by saying that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, that whether or not these appointments are Royal is a secondary issue; indeed, I accept that fact. However, I still have not received an answer to my question as to why these should be Royal appointments rather than, as the Minister would argue, appointments of the Secretary of State. I shall no doubt wait in vain for an answer to that, albeit secondary, issue.

I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cope, that it is to be hoped that no chasm will open here. Perhaps, through some miraculous process, the authority and the Secretary of State will come to a like view, after consultation, that there is one person uniquely qualified to be the commissioner. In that case, everyone will be happy, not least, I imagine, the person so appointed. But it is not stretching credulity too far to envisage a circumstance where the mayor and the police authority may reach a different view from that of the Home Secretary of the day as to who is the appropriate person. Then a rather serious chasm would open and we would have two authoritative bodies with a different view—on the one hand, we would have the police authority with, presumably, the support of the mayor and, on the other hand, the Home Secretary. That would put the person appointed, and perhaps the person not appointed, into a very difficult position.

While I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Cope, will always be right and there will not be a chasm, I do not think it is fanciful to envisage that such circumstances could arise. The Bill is all about envisaging circumstances which most of us hope will never arise, but, nevertheless, we are providing for them just in case they do. This is another such situation. It is quite an important issue.

I accept the gentle censure of the Minister as regards the imperfect drafting here. Perhaps I may explain that the reference to "the Assembly" in Amendment No. 354MVA is probably a misunderstanding on our part. I do not doubt that that was what was written in the amendment when it was originally tabled, but it should certainly have referred to the authority. I entirely accept and agree with that view. Indeed, the Minister was night to point out the differences, which were unintentional.

A similarly unintentional but more serious error concerns the Minister's point about the provision not being in line with practice in the rest of the country. We certainly intend that the Home Secretary should have a role in this matter. I shall certainly withdraw the amendments and shall endeavour—

7.30 p.m.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

Before the noble Lord does so, perhaps I may point something out. If in Amendment No. 354MVA the word "assembly" is supposed to be "authority", that seems to make the provision if not meaningless at least diminished in meaning. Amendment No. 354MVA—with the substitution of the word "authority" for "assembly"—would state that the person, shall hold office until such time as the authority shall decide otherwise by two thirds majority on the request of the authority. It will have to consult itself and then confirm its decision with a two-thirds majority. That seems to me to be peculiar wording.

Lord Tope

The noble Lord is absolutely right; the wording is extremely peculiar. It is wording to which we shall have to pay greater attention if and when we bring this measure back at Report stage. The principle that we are trying to put forward here is clear. I accept the shortcomings in the drafting but the principle is clear. We believe that the commissioner and deputy commissioner should be appointed and removed by the authority, not by the Home Secretary. I accept the imperfections in the drafting for which I take responsibility and apologise. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 354MWA not moved.]

Clause 248 agreed to.

Clause 249 agreed to.

Clause 250 [Appointment of Deputy Commissioner]:

[Amendment No. 354MXA not moved.]

Clause 250 agreed to.

Clauses 251 to 253 agreed to.

Lord Williams of Mostyn moved Amendment No. 354MYA: Insert the following new Clause—

CONTINUATION IN POST OF CURRENT COMMISSIONERS AND COMMANDERS

(" .—(1) Any appointment of a person as the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis under section 1 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 which is in force immediately before the coming into force of section 248 above shall have effect as from the coming into force of that section as the appointment of that person as the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis under and in accordance with section 9B of the Police Act 1996.

(2) If, immediately before the coming into force of section 250 above, there is in force in respect of a person who is one of the Assistant Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis an authorisation under section 8 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1856 (authorisation of one of the Assistant Commissioners to act as Commissioner in case of vacancy, illness or absence) that person shall be taken, as from the coming into force of section 250 above, to have been appointed as the Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis under and in accordance with section 9D of the Police Act 1996.

(3) Any appointment of a person (other than a person in relation to whom subsection (2) above has effect) as an Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis under section 2 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1856 which is in force immediately before the coming into force of section 252 above shall have effect as from the coming into force of that section as the appointment of that person as an Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis under and in accordance with section 9F of the Police Act 1996.

(4) Any appointment of a person as a Commander in the metropolitan police force which is in force immediately before the coming into force of section 253 above shall have effect as from the coming into force of that section as the appointment of that person as a Commander under and in accordance with section 9G of the Police Act 1996.").

The noble Lord said: This group of amendments contains Government Amendments Nos. 354MYA and 354MZA and Opposition Amendments Nos. 354MA and 354MB. Government Amendment No. 354MYA inserts a new clause which makes transitional provision in respect of those individuals in one of the four senior ranks of the Metropolitan Police—commissioner, deputy commissioner, assistant commissioner or commander—on the date when the new provisions applying to the appointment of those ranks come into force. This will be 3rd July 2000. The clause provides that these individuals will be deemed to have been appointed under the new arrangements inserted into the Police Act 1996 by the Bill.

This amendment will confirm that those individuals will remain in post and ensure a smooth transition to the new arrangements. It will also have the effect that those concerned are subject to other provisions made in the Bill in respect of those ranks.

These various provisions will be applied to senior Met officers appointed on or after 3rd July 2000, and we think it is right that individuals who are in post on that date should similarly be subject to them. This will not mean any worsening of conditions for these individuals. But it will mean there is no delay in conferring the full range of powers and duties on the Metropolitan Police Authority. Special transitional provisions are not needed for officers below the rank of commander—the Bill does not give the MPA a role in their appointments, which will continue to be made by the commissioner in accordance with regulations made under Section 50 of the 1996 Act.

The other government amendment—Amendment No. 354MZA—clarifies the wording in new Section 9H of the 1996 Act. This section sets out the ranks that may be held in the Metropolitan Police. These are the four senior ranks to which I have just referred—namely, commissioner, deputy commissioner, assistant commissioner and commander—together with the ranks of superintendent, chief inspector, inspector, sergeant and constable. The current wording might be regarded as being ambiguous and that is why we want to put the matter beyond doubt.

I now come to Opposition Amendments Nos. 354MA and 354MB. These amendments are also concerned with Clause 254. At present, the clause provides that, in addition to the four senior ranks, the ranks that may be held, shall be such as may be prescribed by regulations". It goes on to provide that these ranks shall include those of superintendent, chief inspector, inspector, sergeant and constable. This wording means that the Met (like other forces) must have these ranks. It would be possible to add to them using the regulations, but it would not be possible to delete any of them. This is consistent with the position outside London. The amendments would change this wording to say that the ranks, shall be superintendent, chief inspector, inspector, sergeant and constable or such as may be prescribed by regulations". The effect of this change is that it would be possible for the regulations to provide not only for additional ranks to those listed, but to dispense with one or more of the listed ranks. This would be inconsistent with the position outside London. We believe that the same set of ranks from superintendent level down ought to obtain generally. Therefore for the reasons I have indicated briefly, I cannot support those two amendments. I beg to move.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

As the Minister has pointed out, the two amendments standing in my name in this group are Amendments Nos. 354MA and 354MB. The Minister has just described their effect. The first point that attracted my attention was the transitional one with regard to what the ranks would be in the first place. As I read the Bill, a new regulation would have to be introduced in order to create these ranks. I seek to provide that they should continue, at least until there is a further regulation. But I believe that the Minister has covered the point about the transitional provisions and therefore my amendments are no longer required in that regard.

However, I sought to provide not only that the traditional ranks could be created but also that other ranks might be removed. In recent years the rank of chief superintendent has been removed. In all kinds of organisations there is a tendency to shorten chains of command and the number of ranks that exist. At some point in the future there may be further movement in that direction. I do not propose that that should happen, but if it should occur I seek to remove the need for primary legislation to be introduced to secure that end. However, in view of the fact that these ranks have relatively recently been reduced in number and there is no immediate expectation of any further reduction, I think perhaps it is unnecessary for me to move these two amendments when we reach them.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

I have already moved Amendment No. 354MYA which is the first amendment in the group that we are discussing.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 254 [Other members of the metropolitan police force]:

Lord Williams of Mostyn moved Amendment No. 354MZA: Page 137, leave out lines 32 to 43 and insert—

(""Other members of the metropolitan police force.

9H.—(1) The ranks that may be held in the metropolitan police force shall be such as may be prescribed by regulations under section 50.

(2) The ranks so prescribed in the case of the metropolitan police force shall include, in addition to the ranks of—

1. (a) Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,
2. (b) Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,
3. (c) Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, and
4. (d) Commander, those of superintendent, chief inspector, inspector, sergeant and constable.").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 354MA and 354MB not moved.]

Clause 254, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 255 agreed to.

Lord Williams of Mostyn moved Amendment No. 354MZC: Insert the following new Clause—

SECONDMENTS TO MEET DEMANDS CAUSED BY THE BOUNDARY CHANGE

(" .—(1) The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis may, on the application of the chief officer of police of a police force maintained under section 2 of the Police Act 1996 for the police area of Essex, Hertfordshire or Surrey, provide for that force constables from the metropolitan police force.

(2) An application under subsection (1) above may only be made for the purpose of, or otherwise in connection with, meeting the demands placed, or reasonably expected to be placed, on the resources of the police force in question in consequence of the change effected as a result of section 255 above in the police area for which that force is maintained.

(3) While a constable is provided under this section for a police force, he shall be under the direction and control of the chief officer of police of that force, notwithstanding section 9A(1) of the Police Act 1996 (metropolitan police force to be under the direction and control of the Commissioner) or any other enactment relating to the direction or control of the metropolitan police force.

(4) The police authority maintaining a police force for which constables are provided under this section shall pay to the police authority maintaining the metropolitan police force such contribution as may be agreed upon between those authorities or, in the absence of any such agreement, as may be provided by any agreement subsisting at the time between all police authorities generally, or, in the absence of such general agreement, as may be determined by the Secretary of State.

(5) This section is without prejudice to any other power of a chief officer of police to provide constables or other assistance to another police force.

(6) Expressions used in this section and in the Police Act 1996 have the same meaning in this section as they have in that Act.").

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 354MZC, I wish to speak also to Amendment No. 354MD.

The new clause proposed in our amendment gives power to the commissioner to provide police officers to the county police forces of Essex, Hertfordshire and Surrey. These three forces will have the area they police enlarged on 1st April 2000. Changes to the boundaries are provided for in Clause 255 of the Bill.

To police their enlarged areas, Essex, Hertfordshire and Surrey will need additional officers. We need a seamless transfer of responsibilities between the Met and the county forces on 1st April 2000 so that there is no loss of service to the public.

The four forces concerned have, since last summer, been holding discussions between themselves and with Home Office officials about issues which derive from the boundary changes. A key part of these discussions has been how to decide the best way to provide increased police officer numbers. In the longer term the majority will be obtained by direct recruitment. Some officers will transfer on a voluntary basis from their current forces. However, not all the newly recruited officers will be in place and fully trained by next April. The new clause provides a way of bridging the gap. It enables Met officers to be loaned for a period of time, which we would expect to be between six months and two years. They will retain the pay and allowances of a Metropolitan Police officer but will be under the direction and control of the chief constable of the force to which they have been seconded. At the conclusion of the secondment, the officers would return to the Met.

The wording of the new clause is based closely upon an existing provision; namely, Section 24 of the Police Act 1996, which provides for aid from one police force to another.

Opposition Amendment No. 354MD seeks to insert a new clause which would require the Chief Inspector of Constabulary to certify that the Metropolitan Police had a sufficient number of police officers before the commissioner was able to second police officers to another force. It is not a necessary amendment. There is no requirement that the commissioner should second officers to Essex, Hertfordshire or Surrey; our new clause simply gives him the power to do so. He plainly would not do so if he was left with insufficient officers to police his own district to the required standard. As I have said, we believe it will be possible for sufficient police officers to be seconded without jeopardising the standard of service.

In addition to being unnecessary, we believe the amendment to be inappropriate. It is a matter for the commissioner to decide how many officers he needs to police the MPD within his available resources, just as it is a matter for other chief officers to determine the number of police officers required in their forces. Bearing in mind the explanation I have given, I invite the noble Lord, in due course, not to move his amendment.

Lord Cope of Berkeley

I have no objection in principle to the new clause in Amendment No. 354MZC; secondments may be necessary. Although I would not want necessarily to press on the Committee the details of how the proposed new clause in my Amendment No. 354MD would work, it seeks to draw attention to the fact the Metropolitan Police are already under considerable strain, both financially and in terms of numbers. The latest information I have is that since March 1997 the size of the Metropolitan Police has fallen by a further 680; that the police settlement for 1999–2000 has been criticised by the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Police Federation; and that it has been suggested that that settlement could result in 1,000 more posts being cut in the Metropolitan police area. That is a part of the background to officers being seconded from the Metropolitan Police to the Essex, Surrey and Hertfordshire police forces.

However, in another sense, it is clearly necessary that, at least in the early stages, some police officers should be seconded. The Minister said that the secondments were expected to last for between six months and two years. We doubt that it will necessarily be the case that over such a period the three county forces affected will be able to recruit enough officers of their own to ensure that no more secondments are required.

I understand that the original intention was to ask for volunteers to transfer from the affected divisions of the Metropolitan Police into the Essex, Surrey or Hertfordshire forces respectively but that it might be necessary to second volunteers from further afield or, indeed, to compulsorily transfer some officers. It would be helpful if the Minister could indicate whether compulsory transfers are expected at this stage.

As the Minister said, officers who are transferred will continue to receive the additional weighting of the Metropolitan Police. That in itself will put a strain on the budgets of the Essex, Surrey and Hertfordshire police and give the chief constables concerned an incentive to try and recruit as much as possible locally.

The monetary considerations which will follow from such transfers are, to me at least, extremely obscure. Is the Minister in a position to say, as regards the number of individuals concerned, how many will be compulsorily transferred and what the financial effects will be? It would be not only interesting for us to know but important. We need to understand the implications before deciding whether or not to endorse the decisions taken by the Bill. The consequences are not small—they are very large—and will have implications for the police budgets of the counties and of the Metropolitan Police.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

The noble Lord has asked particular questions to which I should respond. We expect that there will be sufficient numbers of officers who will be happy to volunteer for secondment, for obvious reasons. The noble Lord is quite right. There is a power in the new clause to second officers on a compulsory basis. However, I stress that we expect a sufficient number of volunteers.

The noble Lord raised a question about funding. The enlarged size of the county forces and any traditional costs, including the higher pay and allowances of seconded Met officers compared with officers in the county forces, will be considered by the Government as part of the police force settlement for 2000–2001.

Baroness Thomas of Walliswood

We welcome both the establishment of a satisfactory boundary for the Met area and the very subtle method that has been chosen to reassure Met officers that they will continue to have the same pay and conditions of employment as when they were working in what was previously a Met area. We urge all Members of the Committee not to disturb this satisfactory arrangement with which, so far as I am aware, all parties are in agreement.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

I commend the amendment.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Cope of Berkeley moved Amendment No. 354MC: After Clause 255, insert the following new clause—

TRANSFER OF ASSETS FROM METROPOLITAN POLICE AUTHORITY

(" .—(1) In the absence of agreement between the Police Authorities for Essex, Hertfordshire and Surrey and the Metropolitan Police Authority about the transfer of land, buildings, capital and other assets from the Metropolitan Police to the other authorities, the Secretary of State shall make an order to determine what transfers shall take place.

(2) No order under this section shall be made unless a statutory instrument containing 3 draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment brings the Committee on to the question of the transfer of other assets from the Metropolitan Police to the police forces of the three counties of Surrey, Essex and Hertfordshire. Clearly, assets such as land, buildings, police stations and so on will need to be transferred during the change from one authority to another. Other assets such as cars, radios and all the other equipment which the police use these days so effectively on our behalf will also need to be transferred.

Strenuous efforts are being made at the moment by the four police forces involved to reach an agreement as to what should be transferred and what should be the financial arrangements for covering the transfers. It seems to me and to others that there may not be ultimate agreement about the very elaborate transfers that will be needed. If that were to happen, the Secretary of State should, as it were, referee the matter. He will of course be a party to the negotiations in the sense that some of them will take place while he still has responsibility for the Metropolitan Police Authority. In addition to that, no doubt arguments about money will revolve to a considerable degree around what grants will be available in the future for the four police authorities involved.

As the Secretary of State is, in any case, involved in the matter, it would seem better to make it clear that, if agreement is not reached—and we all hope that it will be—the Secretary of State should be the one to decide. However, given that the Secretary of State has an interest, both from a financial point of view and also as the existing policy authority for London, it also seems right that he should report the result of his labours in that respect to each House of Parliament and obtain their agreement.

On that basis, if agreement was not reached, at least there would be some public discussion as to whether this complicated transfer of assets was being done in a way that was fair. The representatives of all four areas would have an opportunity to express their opinions. The fact that matters would come out in public might assist the process of agreement in the first place. Even it did not, a mechanism for doing so would be provided. I beg to move.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

We do not believe that this amendment is required. The Bill already gives the Secretary of State power to make an order or to require the forces concerned to make a scheme to transfer property rights and liabilities involved in any of the transfers of responsibility under the Bill, including the police boundary change. We have not decided whether transfers following boundary changes will be carried out by scheme or order. However, the clause proposed would simply give effect to what is already agreed government policy.

There have been fruitful discussions between officials in the Home Office and representatives of the four forces. They have been urged to agree between themselves the detail of the transfers. If there is a failure to agree, the Home Office will decide. The four forces are content with that approach. They are working together constructively to ensure that the transfer runs smoothly. All parties hope it will be possible to avoid the use of the Home Office as the arbiter in areas of disagreement, but we already have that power.

Subsection (2) would require the approval of both Houses for any order. We do not believe that it is necessary to have that kind of parliamentary procedure for what are essentially matters of detail in a transfer between police forces. Any other transfer orders effected under Clause 319 of the Bill would be subject to negative resolution only. That seems the appropriate procedure for such matters. I remind the Committee that the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee did not raise any objections to that procedure. I cannot see why the police force area boundary change should be singled out in this way.

There is a point of detail—there always is. The MPA comes into existence only on 3rd July. The boundary change takes place on 1st April. Therefore, this amendment could not work anyway. That is not really the point of my remarks. I merely felt obliged to mention it as the last refuge of the useless Minister!

Lord Cope of Berkeley

I am always delighted to receive free legal advice, even on the drafting of a deficient amendment. I am also glad that government policy and activity are following the line suggested in my new clause, and that I therefore need not press it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton

I beg to move that the House do now resume. In moving this Motion, I suggest that the Committee stage begin again not before 8.55 p.m.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.