§ 7.24 p.m.
§ Lord GilbertMy Lords, I beg leave to repeat a Statement made a few moments ago in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence.
"With permission, I would like to make a Statement on decisions which have been made today to ensure that British forces are immediately available in case a NATO force is required to deploy to Kosovo.
"As the House will be aware, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary is currently at the Kosovo proximity talks at Rambouillet in France, which he is jointly chairing with the French Foreign Minister, Monsieur Hubert Vedrine. A news blockade has been imposed on the talks to encourage the parties to focus on the discussions, rather than on telling the world how they are going. It is clear, however, that progress is being made. Contact group foreign ministers will take stock of what remains to be achieved in the negotiations when they meet in Paris on Sunday.
"It is unclear at this stage whether a NATO force will be required to support any peace agreement. Any decision to proceed with such a force will have to be taken by Britain and its allies in NATO, following a satisfactory conclusion to the talks at Rambouillet. No such decision has yet been taken.
"What is clear, however, is that, should a force be required, it will have to be ready to go into Kosovo as quickly as possible after a peace agreement is reached. A military force which is to be effective must be assembled well in advance. This means that we and our allies must have our forces in the region. ready to go into action at short notice.
"It is for this reason that the Government have decided today to send to the region, at the beginning of next week, the vehicles and other heavy equipment of the units which would form the leading elements of any deployment. These will include Challenger tanks. Warrior armoured vehicles and artillery. The units principally involved are the King's Royal Hussars, the Irish Guards, 4 Regiment Royal Artillery, with a tactical headquarters being drawn from 4 Armoured Brigade. Other units will also be providing equipment. Loading of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships 'Sea Centurion' and 'Sea Crusader' will begin on Monday.
"Although these vehicles and heavy equipment will be accompanied by a small number of personnel, the majority of the personnel from the units involved will remain at their bases, at short notice to move and join their vehicles. The decision whether to deploy them will depend on how the situation develops.
385 "To prepare for the arrival of this equipment in the region, about 200 key logistics personnel will be deploying next week to Greece and Macedonia, where we already have an armoured infantry company deployed as part of the NATO Extraction Force.
"The House will draw from these decisions the clear message that the United Kingdom is determined to play its part in supporting a negotiated settlement in Kosovo, but we will only deploy our forces in support of an operation with a clear mission and clear objectives, and alongside our allies.
"Contingency planning is continuing at NATO with Britain playing a full part. Other allies are making preparations similar to our own. From my contacts with my fellow NATO defence ministers, I know that others will be on the ground alongside us should a decision be made to go ahead with the operation.
"The decision that I am announcing this evening represents prudent military contingency steps. In no way does it prejudge any decision to proceed with an operation. Whether a force is to be deployed into Kosovo will depend in large measure on the parties. Neither side can take it for granted that NATO will deploy a ground force. They must make the hard choices necessary to reach an agreement".
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
§ 7.29 p.m.
§ Lord BurnhamMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord for repeating the Statement made by his right honourable friend in another place. There can be no doubt whatever that the Government are wise to take precautions and to prepare themselves for any problems that may arise from the situation in Kosovo and the current discussions in Rambouillet. On 4th February the Secretary of State announced a notice to move for what seemed like a very much larger force than that contained in the Statement. However, it is true that the force to be prepared on Monday which comprises the tactical headquarters of 4 Armoured Brigade will at the very least be a skeleton within which a larger force can be contained. We must make these preparations. I remember that a large force assembled on ships in the Clyde at the time of Suez. It did not do any good in the event but at least we were prepared.
On behalf of these Benches I state categorically that we support the dispatch of troops. This appears to be the first serious test of the SDR and I hope that it turns out well. There is no doubt that at the present moment sea transport is available. If it were necessary at any time to employ any further merchant shipping we would not have the same number of ships that were available to us at the time of the Falklands.
One has the very serious problem of overstretch. I hope that the Army can cope with that because there may be other matters for which troops are required. It is quite easy to say that such and such a unit will go to a place in crisis, in this case Macedonia or wherever it may be, but if it comprises the same people in one unit who have recently returned from Bosnia nominally in 386 another unit that does not relieve their difficulties or the overstretch that we face. I hope that that will not be a problem.
I ask the Government to be more specific than they have been so far as to what other countries are doing. We understand that France and Germany are to provide sizeable forces. I have tried to interpret the comments of Mrs. Madeleine Albright. To my mind she speaks in riddles. My reading of the situation is that the United States will provide only a small number of ground troops. But when the force gets there what is it to do? If a peace agreement is agreed in Rambouillet we accept that the United Kingdom should be part of a large multinational force, but we need to plan well ahead. I accept that we must get the troops and all of their equipment onto the ships but before they get anywhere near action we must know the long-term plan. We would be rather less happy if that force were to be involved in conflict. There is a danger—let us pray that it does not happen, and I do not believe that it will—of another Vietnam which started on a very small scale. I remember the headline on the cover of the first edition of the colour magazine of the Daily Telegraph which read "Vietnam—the forgotten war". Let us hope that we are not entering, with whatever good intentions, something that leads to that. Having gone through Bosnia, that is probably all right.
Finally, can the Government clarify the rules of engagement of any force that may go to Kosovo? I suggest to the noble Lord that they must be the same as in Bosnia. If I understand correctly, UNPROFOR could interfere only if NATO personnel were under attack or were in any danger. They could not do so if atrocities were being committed by one part of the local population against another. Under Op Palatine in which our forces are currently engaged I believe that they can interfere in such cases. I hope that what any force is allowed to do will be made clear. Can the noble Lord confirm that the extraction unit is not part of the force to be deployed under the notice to move Statement? I do not believe that it is because it is a separate body. But however much we believe that the step that has been taken is the only course that the Government can follow, we hope that this evening the noble Lord will be able to provide some answers to one or two questions that remain unanswered.
§ 7.36 p.m.
§ Lord Wallace of SaltaireMy Lords, I shall be brief. Clearly, this will not be the last Statement on Kosovo in the next few weeks. We support this action as clearly prudent military contingency planning. It is inappropriate to say that one welcomes the necessary commitment of troops. I recall that when the intervention in Bosnia occurred it took a remarkably long time to get the heavy equipment there. Therefore, it is sensible to make the necessary moves in advance even if we are not yet sure how much we may need to deploy. However, it seems to me likely that we shall have to deploy something.
387 We on these Benches also recognise that at this very delicate stage in the negotiations in Rambouillet the Government cannot say much about the exact deployment of the forces or even the rules of the deployment. I reiterate from these Benches what we said on the previous occasion a Statement was made. We recognise that this may well be a substantial and potentially long-term commitment. We see this as being a necessary commitment in Britain's national interests. On that very sober basis we give it our full support.
We recognise that deployment depends on there being a peace to enforce in which both sides in the conflict will have to come to an agreement. We also recognise that what is currently being discussed is only an advance guard of what has been referred to as an enlarged brigade of as many as 8,000 troops. We have already remarked that this means the problems of overstretch are likely to involve a substantial number of reserves being called up to maintain the commitment. Therefore, the future of the Territorial Army and how actively that is re-recruited seems an extremely important element. I support the noble Lord, Lord Burnham, in his request. What can the Minister tell us about parallel moves by other governments who are likely to take part in the force, not only the French and the Germans but also, if possible, the United States?
§ 7.39 p.m.
§ Lord GilbertMy Lords, first, I express my unfeigned gratitude to both noble Lords who have just spoken for their acceptance of the necessity for the decisions taken today by Her Majesty's Government. They have both asked about the position of other governments. I do not believe that I can go further than to say that we confidently anticipate that all our major allies will be alongside us should it be necessary, I emphasise as strongly as I can, for us to take further steps and deploy troops and other assets inside Kosovo. I do not think that I can say more than that. We are in constant discussions not only with our French, German and American friends, countries which have been mentioned by both noble Lords, but also with other friends. in particular the Italians who are closest to this area of controversy.
The noble Lord, Lord Burnham, invites me to speculate on the size of any land contribution the United States may make. I think that it would be rash for me to do so, in particular since these matters are still under discussion with the American authorities and no doubt within the American Government.
The noble Lord said he would be less happy, as we all would be, if the United Kingdom force were to be involved in a conflict. I wish to assure noble Lords that it is absolutely no part of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government that we fight our way into Kosovo. Our present intention is only to deploy into Kosovo to help to enforce a peace agreement reached by the parties now negotiating in Rambouillet.
The noble Lord, Lord Burnham, asked about the extraction force. I may he able to help him. The advance party would be designated as part of the extraction force at this time because no status of forces agreement has 388 yet been negotiated between NATO and Macedonia for an implementation force. But it would be necessary for NATO to negotiate as soon as possible host nation support agreements with Greece and Macedonia. I hope that that covers the noble Lord's point.
On a point of detail, the noble Lord believed that sea transport was available at present. By my silence I should not wish to mislead him. We shall have to look outside our present assets to find adequate maritime transport. However, we hope to be able to charter some vessels in the near future. The heavy assets will go by sea from Emden. However, in the long run more will go by sea from Marchwood.
§ Lord BurnhamMy Lords, I think the noble Lord for giving way. I understand the necessity to charter transport. Will it be British flagged ships?
§ Lord GilbertMy Lords, we hope that it would be. However, if British flagged ships were not available at short notice, I hope that we may make arrangements with our allies for other ships to meet our needs. I cannot give the noble Lord a commitment on that point.
The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, said that it was the advance guard of possibly as many as 8,000 troops. He is exactly right. We are looking at the possibility, which we hope will not come about, of having to send as many as 8,000 troops.
The noble Lord asked me what the force was going to do. I think that I have answered that question. It will be there to enforce a peace agreement. He wanted to know the long term plan? These things are wrapped in the future. It is pointless for me to speculate. But if we go in, we shall not expect to come out until it is clear that peace has been established, that the parties engaged there accept it, and that it is being enforced in good faith. That is all I can say usefully at this stage.
§ 7.42 p.m.
The Earl of CarlisleMy Lords, I thank the Minister for the Statement, which I fully support. First, will the noble Lord assure the House that if the force is deployed the force commander will be given a clear military aim? Secondly, can he tell us more about the chain of command? To whom will the brigade commander report? Thirdly, he has not mentioned any reconnaissance units within the force. Will the force be supported by reconnaissance helicopters?
§ Lord GilbertMy Lords, helicopters will be available. It is best that I do not speculate at this stage on whether they will be deployed. The chain of command will flow to the Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.
§ Baroness LudfordMy Lords, like my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire, I fully support the Statement. It is evident that we have learned our lesson from Bosnia. While aware that it is prudent military planning and does not pre-judge a decision on deploying a force, nonetheless were such a decision to be taken—I believe 389 that it would be honourable and courageous—it would need to be explained to the British public. As my noble friend said, to welcome such deployment sends wrong signals, but it would indicate that it was necessary for our security and that of Europe. It is not a foreign venture in a far-away place of which we know little. If we took the decision to deploy such a force, have the Government any plans for conveying to the British public that such a decision is relevant to our security so that there is no misunderstanding of the matter?
§ Lord GilbertMy Lords, I am obliged to the noble Baroness for her contribution. First, I should emphasise that any future decision will not be taken by Her Majesty's Government alone. It will be taken in conjunction with governments of our allies in NATO. I wish to make that absolutely clear. Secondly, I think today's Statement is evidence that we want to take the British people into our confidence as early as possible, making clear that the Government are prepared to live up to their international responsibilities, as well as sending the same message to the people of Bosnia and Serbia.
§ Lord MonkswellMy Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. We are pleased that the Government are not acting on their own but are working in conjunction with allies. We are all pleased that what might be described as the heavy element—I refer to tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers—will be deployed from British military forces. But we are also cognisant of the fact that in modern military affairs helicopters play a major part. Can my noble friend assure the House that helicopters will be available? If they are not available through the British contingent, will they be available from our allied contingents in the possible theatre of activity in Kosovo?
§ Lord GilbertMy Lords, I am obliged to my noble friend for his support for what we are doing and for his recognition of the need for us to make preparations to move our heavy equipment as soon as possible. I hope that I have made clear that helicopters are to be available. Whether or not they will be deployed is a matter for the future.
Earl AttleeMy Lords, from experience with Bosnia, I would expect the staff to be planning for a three-year deployment. What will be the effect of that on overstretch in the Army? My noble friend Lord Burnham referred to the rules of engagement. Can the Minister confirm that the rules of engagement will be broadly the same as for Op Palatine?
§ Lord GilbertMy Lords, the noble Earl, as usual, is right. This deployment will add to overstretch in the Army, in particular if we end up deploying of the order of 8,000 men. Some will be RAF personnel. However, it will add greatly to overstretch within the Army.
If the noble Lord will forgive me, I prefer not to say more about the rules of engagement at this stage.
§ Lord HoyleMy Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until 8.25 p.m.
§ Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
§ [The Sitting was suspended from 7.48 to 8.25 p.m.]