HL Deb 01 July 1998 vol 591 cc799-812

("(1) The executive functions of the Assembly shall be carried out by the Assembly Secretaries and by officials acting on their behalf.

(2) In the discharge of all such functions and otherwise, Assembly Secretaries shall be accountable to the Assembly for their actions and those of officials acting on their behalf.

(3) The Assembly may by resolution of no confidence at any time require any Assembly Secretary or Secretaries to resign.

(4) The standing orders of the Assembly shall provide for any motion of no confidence to take precedence over all other business and shall specify a reasonable minimum period of debate on such a motion.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we welcome the Government's decision to set up a Cabinet structure, but the ultimate decision whether to operate the system fully is left to the assembly. That is because functions are transferred to the assembly, which then establishes committees with responsibilities in various fields under Clause 57(1). At the same time there is established an executive committee comprising among others assembly secretaries who are allocated accountability in the committee fields.

The position is made clear in Clause 56(5) where accountability is defined, basically, as answering to the assembly for the exercise of functions in the various fields. But the line between the executive authority of the assembly's secretary and his committee is not clear cut. It is not easy to wrap one's mind around the distinction between the committee's responsibility and the secretary's accountability.

What happens if the committee takes action of which the secretary disapproves? It is not a problem in the Scotland Bill or here at Westminster where the role of Ministers is clear and distinct from the role of Parliament. Ministers carry both responsibility and accountability here, and of course there are Cabinet committees to help them. However, at the end of the day they are on their own at the Dispatch Box.

The aim of our new clause is to clarify the situation and activate the Cabinet structure. It states unequivocally that, The executive functions of the Assembly shall be carried out by the Assembly Secretaries and by officials acting on their behalf', and that they will be accountable. Finally, I am bound to say that the mix of committee and Cabinet system, and the resulting uncertainty, could very well cause problems in practice and prove damaging to the working of the assembly. I beg to move.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton

My Lords, in this amendment the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, returns to a matter he previously raised in Committee. As I said then, the Government support much of what lies behind this amendment and I regret that the assurances given then did not fully assuage the noble Lord's concerns.

There are a number of points here. Implicit in the noble Lord's amendments is what one might call a "ministerial" model of decision-making with individual assembly secretaries exercising executive power. While we naturally support a Cabinet system for the assembly, we do not support entrenching it permanently on the face of the Bill, which is what this amendment would do. The assembly must be free to review and, if needed, amend its operating structure in the light of experience.

Nor do I think the notion of assembly secretaries exercising executive functions directly squares with the status of the assembly as an indivisible body corporate. In practice, of course, they may well carry out functions within their portfolios, but action will still formally be taken in the name of the assembly itself. I therefore fear that the noble Lord's amendment would only introduce confusion into assembly secretaries', and the assembly's, legal status.

I am happy to repeat the assurances given to the noble Lord in Committee about votes of no confidence. I agree that provision needs to be made for debating such motions: representative bodies large and small are able to do so, and they are a vital part of democratic accountability. However, this is surely more a matter for the assembly's standing orders than for the face of the Bill. In due course, the national assembly advisory group will come forward with advice on handling motions of no confidence, which will then be reflected in guidance to the commission drawing up the assembly's first standing orders. I am happy to give the noble Lord a categoric assurance on that point. As to the standing of the individual committees, all the subject committees, under Clause 57, will have a make-up which broadly reflects the balance of parties in the assembly. So obviously the first secretary and the assembly secretaries will be in a different position from the members of the committee. They will be much more like members of the Cabinet in the traditional Westminster model.

I hope that deals with all the points the noble Lord has raised and that, in the light of the assurances I have given, he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Roberts of Conwy

My Lords, I am bound to tell the noble and learned Lord that, despite his assurances, I am still very concerned about the mix, as I call it, of cabinet style and committee style government within the assembly. This will cause confusion and difficulties when decisions and actions need to be taken as to who really takes the initiative and ultimately carries full responsibility. I know it is stated that the committees carry the responsibility and that the assembly secretaries will bear the accountability. Nevertheless, actually to work such a system in practice will be difficult. But, having received the Minister's assurances and with a view to considering them and indeed the entire matter further, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 55 [Sub-committees]:

Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish moved Amendment No. 72:

Page 28, line 15, leave out ("the same party") and insert ("parties which are represented on the executive committee").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, with this amendment are grouped three amendments in my name and also amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Mostyn. This is an interesting subject. We almost stumbled into it, thanks to a probing amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale. I thought there was a serious point but the Minister did not seem to see it. I was not sure whether that was my fault or the Minister's rather clever device when he does not want to engage in a debate but just passes you like the proverbial ship in the night, which I think is what he did in the debates about the European Union and representation there. The noble Lord, having passed like a ship in the night, actually rethought the position and was kind enough to write to me and say that, while he did not think it would ever happen, perhaps I did have a point. He has brought forward amendments which go half-way to meeting my concerns.

The Bill as it stood envisaged one party—the largest party—forming the executive. I think it was drafted on that basis. There is no doubt in my mind about that. It did not envisage coalition government, despite the fact that Ministers talk about it quite a lot, and it did not envisage the two scenarios of coalition government; namely, largest party and another or, alternatively, two of the smaller parties, not including the larger party, forming the government. Amendment No. 72 deals with Clause 55(1), which is about sub-committees. Subsection(3) states: A committee of the Assembly, other than the executive committee, shall not elect as members of a sub-committee Assembly members who all represent the same party". That seems to be very good.

Going back to the point that I made, it seems to me that we should also say, "do not represent all the parties which are represented in the executive committee". I do believe that the Government mean that the minority and the opposition parties should be represented as well as the governing party. I believe that my amendment achieves that.

Amendments Nos. 84 and 85 refer to the chairmen of the scrutiny committees and Amendment No. 88 refers to the chairman of the audit committee. The Bill, as drafted, envisages the largest party equalling the executive and, rightly, as it is drafted, it ensures that the chairmen shall be drawn from the other parties and not from the largest party.

The problem is that in a 60-seat assembly, the largest party might have, say, 22 seats. Two of the other parties have 15 and 12 seats. They combine to make 27 seats and form the government of the assembly, albeit a minority government. The smallest party has 11 seats. One can play about with the figures. I am sure that your Lordships see very quickly my point that the second and third party and, indeed, other combinations, could form the government and the largest party could form part or all of the opposition.

The Bill, as written, would have the largest party not being able to take any of the chairmanships and would frustrate what the Government actually intended; namely, that the executive should not dominate the committees by having the chairmanships. My amendment would stop the coalition partners, if they were the smaller parties, from chairing. In that scenario they would ensure that the largest party would be able to chair. I do not know if the Minister goes that far.

The other scenario of the largest party combining with one of the other smaller parties to form the executive would also create a problem. In those circumstances one would want the chairmanships to be held by the people in the parties outwith the executive.

My amendment says very clearly that, if a party is represented in the executive, then its members shall not be considered as eligible to chair the committees. They may not be chaired by a member who represents, a party which is also represented on the executive committee". The Minister has gone a little way towards me. He said that they should not be chaired by a member who represents the largest party. That still means that the smaller party in the executive could be chairing the committees. I do not believe that that is consistent with what I believe was the original drafting intention.

Having said that, I welcome the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Williams, has moved in some way, but I should like him to move that bit further. He may say to me, "What happens if there is a grand coalition of all the parties?" Dare I say to him that I believe that a suitable amendment could be found to deal with that proposition. It is slightly unlikely, but I fully concede that one ought to deal with it. I am really much more concerned about a situation where two parties are coalition partners and another two parties outside the coalition form the opposition. The intention is that it is on those parties that the chairmanships should fall and not those forming the executive. I beg to move.

Lord Kenyon

My Lords, there are two issues represented by this group of amendments. The second issue has been very adequately covered by my noble friend Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish; namely, the membership and chairmanship of the scrutiny committees and the audit committees. But the first issue is Amendment No. 72, which relates to Clause 55. That deals with the actual membership of the sub-committees themselves.

I believe that the intention in the Bill is that the membership of the sub-committees should be broadly representative of the political balance in the whole of the assembly. Clause 54(2)(b) states, as far as practicable, the balance of the parties in the Assembly is reflected in the membership of the committee". I should like to know why that is not repeated in Clause 55(3) so that the political balance remains the same on the sub-committees. It does not seem to me that my noble friend Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish is going quite far enough in that respect.

11.45 p.m.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mackay, raised these points in Committee. I did not think then—I am not sure that I think it now—that his concerns were justified, but I have written to him saying that we shall do our best to meet them. The effect of our amendments would be to prevent the largest party of representation on the executive committee from taking the chairmanships of the scrutiny and audit committees. Smaller parties with representation on the executive committee could still take them. It would he possible to prevent that by provisions in standing orders. If we went down the road suggested in Amendments Nos. 84, 85 and 88, the "grand coalition", to which the noble Lord referred, would lead to no one being able to assume any chairing responsibility of any sort. I believe that our tranche of amendments would meet the noble Lord's reasonable concerns.

Amendment No. 72 would not permit the establishment of any subcommittee in the circumstances of a coalition of all the parties. That is unlikely, but we think that it would be better not to include in the Bill a provision which depends on the unlikely not happening.

We think it proper to adopt the standing order that subcommittees must include at least one member from a party not represented on the executive committee. I am happy to take that question on board.

I am not sure that I have fully grasped the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kenyon, but that is undoubtedly my fault. It may be because we have sat here for quite some time. Perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to consider this point and write to him, which I promise to do as promptly as I may.

Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish

My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend will be content with that response. My noble friend has a point and he has suggested a better way to deal with this matter than I have proposed, so I, too, shall study it. Ironically, earlier today—a lot earlier!—I envisaged certain electoral circumstances which the Minister told me were totally unlikely and he said that we did not therefore need to deal with them. Now I am told that we cannot possibly change the Bill in the way that I suggest because there might possibly be the unlikely event of a grand coalition. The Minister is trying to have it both ways, but at this time of night, I am hoping for only one way; namely, one way home to my bed! For that reason, I am content to beg leave to withdraw my amendment, to welcome the Minister's amendments, as far as they go, and to thank him for accepting that there was a bit of a problem here.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 56 [Executive committee]:

[Amendment No. 73 not moved.]

Clause 57 [Subject committees]:

Lord Elis-Thomas moved Amendment No. 74:

Page 29, line 45, at end insert— ("(9) Each subject committee shall be responsible for monitoring the performance of the non-departmental public bodies within the fields covered by that subject committee. (10) Each subject committee shall be responsible for deciding on any appointments which may be made to the boards of non-departmental public bodies.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should like to home in briefly on the second subsection of this amendment which relates to responsibility for the appointment of members of NDPBs and the responsibility being laid on subject committees. At col. 376 and onwards in Committee (3rd June), we discussed a number of issues in relation to the role of public bodies and the assembly and I received a number of useful assurances.

However, perhaps we did not deal in sufficient detail with the question of whether there would be a role for subject committees in agreeing appointments to NDPBs. That proposal is very much in line with the Nolan and Neill procedures for such bodies in that it opens them out to selection and appointment procedures beyond individual secretaries. In ensuring transparency and accountability, it would be appropriate that the government of the day in the assembly, the executive, should not be the sole source of appointments to NDPBs, but that the subject committees should have a role. I beg to move.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

My Lords, we discussed this matter at some length at Committee stage. My response remains the same. I agree with the sentiments that the noble Lord then expressed and has repeated briefly this evening. One wants a creative relationship between subject committees and the non-departmental public bodies. He mentioned his particular public body; the Welsh Language Board.

I entirely agree with the noble Lord. It is for the assembly to put in place arrangements that provide proper democratic accountability. After all, there are provisions to allow subject committees to summon the members and staff of public bodies to give evidence and provide documents.

As to the subject committees, that is still under consideration by NAAG. I can assist your Lordships and in particular the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas. I believe that there are likely to be recommendations involving the committees in the procedures about which we have been speaking. I cannot pre-empt that work. NAAG is coming to the end of its work. I believe that what it recommends will be pleasing and satisfactory to the noble Lord. I cannot give him an absolute reassurance. I understand his concerns. Obviously, this is a very important aspect, for the reason that the assembly was set up in the first place. I hope that what I have said is helpful.

Lord Elis-Thomas

My Lords, as always, what the Minister says is helpful but it is particularly so in this instance. I look forward to the NAAG report on this issue and the response to it. On that basis I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 58 [Subordinate legislation scrutiny committee]:

Lord Falconer of Thoroton moved Amendment No. 75:

Page 30, line 2, leave out ("subordinate legislation") and insert ("relevant Welsh subordinate legislation.

(1A) For the purposes of this section "relevant Welsh subordinate legislation" is any subordinate legislation—

  1. (a) which is made or proposed to be made, or
  2. (b) which, or a draft of which, is (or but for paragraph 2(4) of Schedule 7 would be) required to be confirmed or approved,
by the Assembly (whether or not jointly with a Minister of the Crown or government department).").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 75. This group comprises Amendments Nos. 75 to 82 and 93 and 94. Of those, Amendments Nos. 75 to 79 inclusive and Amendments Nos. 81 and 82 are government amendments. I shall speak to those first and in closing deal with any other amendments in this group that may be moved or referred to. This is the first of four sets of amendments that we tabled in response to points made by noble Lords at Committee stage. These amendments effect a restructuring of Clause 58. Earlier I placed in the Library a copy of a letter to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, which shows how the clause would appear if these amendments were adopted.

The assembly will have important powers to make subordinate legislation. The Government's clear view is that it should be able to do this without excessive nannying oversight by Parliament. For this reason, Clause 44 of the Bill generally disapplies parliamentary procedures for assembly subordinate legislation. Clause 58 then requires the assembly to put in place its own scrutiny procedures.

Most assembly subordinate legislation will fall into the category of assembly general subordinate legislation which is defined in subsection (6) of Clause 58 as amended by Amendments Nos. 78 and 79. The subordinate legislation scrutiny committee will have specific responsibilities in respect of assembly general subordinate legislation. These are set out in subsection (4), as amended by Amendment No. 76. These responsibilities amount to a species of internal review as against the external scrutiny provided now in respect of ministerial subordinate legislation by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.

However, the subordinate legislation scrutiny committee may also be given responsibilities in respect of the general category of "relevant Welsh subordinate legislation" which is defined in Amendment No. 75. This category includes assembly general subordinate legislation, but goes wider to take in, for example, orders made jointly with a Minister of the Crown. The assembly could give scrutiny responsibilities to its scrutiny committee in respect of such orders. I think that this meets a concern expressed at Committee stage by the noble Lord, Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish, and my noble friend Lord Prys-Davies. The remaining Amendments Nos. 77, 81 and 82 are drafting amendments to create the right structure for the clause.

I believe that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, has done the House a service in asking us to look again at this clause. We have done so and I hope that the House approves the result of that re-examination. I beg to move.

The Chairman of Committees

My Lords, in view of the references which the noble and learned Lord has made to the various other amendments being dealt with at the same time, I must point out to your Lordships that if Amendment No. 79 is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 80.

Lord Roberts of Conwy

My Lords, I speak generally to the amendments standing in our names. Clause 58(6)(c) excludes from the definition of assembly general subordinate legislation to be considered by the scrutiny committee what is described as subordinate legislation subject to parliamentary procedure. It is questionable whether that is right. Surely the assembly should be aware of such legislation and its implications for Wales.

With regard to Amendment No. 93, the first part of Clause 65 requiring an appraisal of the costs and benefits of complying with assembly subordinate legislation is excellent, especially as it is to be carried out before a draft is laid before the assembly. Subsection (2), which we propose to delete, promptly states that the appraisal need not be carried out if it is inappropriate in the circumstances or not reasonably practical. There are further sound provisions in subsection (3) requiring publication and consultation if the costs are significant. They too would be negatived.

Looking at the clause as a whole, what is the point of procedural requirements for subordinate legislation if they can be dispensed with so easily? This is a very bad clause. It undoes all the good achieved earlier and leaves open the possibility of some very arbitrary subordinate legislation produced by the executive without the approval of the assembly and very little scrutiny indeed.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, made three points. First, he dealt with his Amendment No. 80. That amendment would delete the stipulation that orders which are subject to parliamentary procedure are not assembly general subordinate legislation. That cannot be right. As I said, Clauses 44 and 58 together assist us to distinguish between assembly orders, which are not subject to parliamentary procedure and which are called assembly general subordinate legislation, and other orders such as joint orders with Ministers of the Crown which will continue to be. Amendment No. 80 does not fit into that structure and I would ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Amendments Nos. 93 and 94 raise important points about procedure. Clause 65, as presently drafted, imposes upon the assembly an obligation to undertake regulatory appraisals of its draft orders. However, Clause 65(2) allows the assembly to dispense with that if it would be inappropriate or it was not reasonably practicable to undertake them. Inappropriateness relates to the subject matter of the order. We are seeking to write into the Bill the existing administrative practice of holding regulatory appraisals in respect of many types of order but not all. For example, orders whose sole impact is on the public sector or which increase a statutory fee by a predetermined formula are not subject to regulatory appraisal now and it may well be that the assembly will not have appraisals of such orders in the future. There must be a let-out in the Bill to deal with that.

The not reasonably practicable test in both Clause 65(2) and Clause 67 which permits disapplication of procedural requirements relating to the making of assembly orders is primarily concerned with cases of urgency. For example, food safety orders may need to be passed very rapidly. It would obviously not be sensible to require the assembly to have to observe the full rigour of procedures appropriate when time is less pressing.

Your Lordships will see that Clause 67 allows for a revocation power so that any assembly member may, within 40 working days, seek to have withdrawn any order made under the urgency procedure. That is an important check on the use of the procedure. With that explanation as to why there are those let-outs to the regulatory appraisal and the reasonably practicable test, I hope that the noble Lord will see that they are sensible and will be minded not to pursue his amendments.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

12 midnight

Lord Falconer of Thoroton moved Amendments Nos. 76 to 79:

Page 30, line 7, leave out from ("any") to ("laid") in line 8 and insert ("proposed Assembly general subordinate legislation when the draft statutory instrument containing it has been").

Page 30, line 18, leave out subsection (5).

Page 30, line 22, leave out ("subordinate legislation") and insert ("relevant Welsh subordinate legislation within subsection (1A)(a)").

Page 30, line 24, leave out from beginning to ("any") in line 26 and insert— ("( ) not made or proposed to be made by an instrument in the case of which, or of a draft of which,").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

The Chairman of Committees

My Lords, this is probably unnecessary, but so that no noble Lord is taken by surprise I must point out that if Amendment No. 83 is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 84.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton moved Amendments Nos. 81 to 83:

Page 30, line 28, at end insert— ("( ) The Assembly may not give to the subordinate legislation scrutiny committee responsibilities not relating to the scrutiny of relevant Welsh subordinate legislation.").

Page 30, line 29, leave out subsection (7).

Page 30, line 43, leave out from ("but") to end of line 44 and insert ("it may not be chaired by a member who represents the largest party with an executive role.").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 84 and 85 not moved.]

Lord Falconer of Thoroton moved Amendment No. 86:

Page 31, line 10, leave out from ("Act") to end of line 12 and insert ("a party is the largest party with an executive role if—

  1. (a) an Assembly member representing the party is a member of the executive committee, and
  2. (b) it is represented by more Assembly members than any other party represented by an Assembly member who is a member of that committee.").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 60 [Audit committees]:

The Chairman of Committees

My Lords, to avoid anyone being taken by surprise, I must point out that if Amendment No. 87 is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 88.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton moved Amendment No. 87:

Page 31, line 24, leave out from ("but") to end of line 25 and insert ("it may not be chaired by a member who represents the largest party with an executive role.").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 88 not moved.]

Clause 61 [Regional committees]:

Lord Roberts of Conwy moved Amendment No. 89:

Page 31, line 28, leave out from ("establish") to end of line 36 and insert ("regional committees to hold the Assembly First Secretary and Assembly Secretaries accountable for the exercise of their functions in each region.

( ) Each regional committee shall be responsible for an electoral region in effect at the last ordinary election.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the establishment of regional committees is important, as the Government realise, for the future of the assembly. Such committees can help assure people in different parts of Wales that the assembly is aware of their interests and is taking them into account. The people of Wales need reassurance at this time.

Clause 61 as drafted specifies only a committee for North Wales, which is not further defined geographically, and a committee for each of the other regions of Wales, also undefined as to areas and numbers.

These committees are committees of assembly members, not councillors or any other body that has had occasion to sub-divide Wales. The assembly members are elected by constitutency and electoral region, of which there are five. They are disparate in terms of physical geography but not in terms of population. I refer to the electoral regions. They could form the basis for assembly committees. They could also be adapted in the light of experience and be subject to boundary changes. But even as they are, they are a reasonable starting point. I fear that if all that is left to the assembly to sort out many will justifiably fear that the regional committee proposal was a last-minute bid to gain regional support within Wales during the referendum campaign.

The second key point is that if these committees are to be meaningful, they must be more than advisory. That is why our amendment proposes that the assembly first secretary and his fellow secretaries are held accountable to those committees for the performance of their functions within the areas served by the committees in the same way as they are held accountable to other committees of the assembly. All this amounts to a reasonable proposition in line with other proposals in the Bill for subject committees. The regional committees will be responsible for the overall performance of the assembly in their respective areas. The knowledge that these committees are to be established will serve to reassure many people in Wales. I beg to move.

Lord Elis-Thomas

My Lords, during our Committee stage I expressed my concern about the priority being given to regional committees by a number of your Lordships. Having reflected upon my statements since then, I find that I am entirely in agreement with myself, despite what the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, might make of that when he reads Hansard.

This amendment is particularly unworkable. The noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, appears to be second guessing the assembly function at different regional levels. The amendment makes secretaries doubly accountable both for the national delivery of their programmes and for the regional delivery in as yet unspecified regions. Times have moved on. The announcement in the other place and in this House only at the beginning of this week about the new regions for Objective 1 status of the European Union for statistical purposes indicates that as regards regions of Wales we must be flexible. I have always been opposed to the notion of creating a place called North Wales because I do not know where that is. Is it the coastal strip, or is it mid or west? Where is it? The whole question of regional committees, although that was part of the debate in the referendum, has moved on. To try to re-establish an internal regionalism in a country of 3 million people with a double notion of accountability on the secretaries and the executive of the assembly is to place an unnecessary burden upon them.

The assembly will deliver new forms of national unity through diversity using the structure of existing local authorities. To create a doubly accountable regional committee over and above the current tiers of the new unitary authorities and over and above the activities of the NDPBs within Wales, including the WDA and its regional structure, is to create an incredibly structured and disorganised form of accountability within the country. I ask that the whole issue of internal regionalism and its divisive potential should not be flagged up so strongly by politicians who are seeking to curry votes, as I suggested in Committee, out of regional disparities and differentiation. The big issue we have to face has been displayed yet again by Regional Trends No. 33 published last week. It shows the overall income per head in Wales and the overall performance of the Welsh economy in relation to the rest of the UK and Europe. We should be mobilising ourselves in order to tackle those issues and not spend so much time on internal divisions and structures to balance between them.

Lord Stanley of Alderley

My Lords, I put my name to the amendment because in Committee I expressed concern that the regional committees would be "waffle shops" and have no influence. The noble Lord, Lord Williams, replied that if that were the case there would be no point in having them. Quite so; I could not agree more with the noble Lord.

However, I am not sure whether that reply agreed with my point that they were toothless wonders or whether the noble Lord did not mean me to take it in that way. I gained the impression from the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas, that he was following a similar line of thought because, as he repeated tonight, the committees were in existence only for political reasons in order to encourage North Wales to vote for an assembly.

At least the noble Lord, Lord Williams, now has the chance to clear up this muddle, for, if he really believes that the regional committees will be able to influence the assembly and not be second, third or even fourth-class citizens, he must accept the amendment moved by my noble friend. It will at least give them a tooth, albeit a poor one.

Lord Thomas of Gresford

My Lords, I do not accept that the sole purpose of these provisions—to give North Wales its own regional committee and for there to be other regional committees—was simply to sell the concept of devolution.

One of the problems that we face in Wales, as we do in the United Kingdom, is the pull of the south east. In Wales, it is the pull of Cardiff, where the decision has been taken to site the assembly. As a North Walian, I have a very clear view of where North Wales is. I know North Wales from west to east. It is a very clearly defined area in my mind. I know also that the people of North Wales are not familiar with the south east of Wales and even less so with the west of Wales. Consequently, they tend to feel isolated from centres of gravity such as south east Wales.

I believe that a regional committee such as is envisaged for North Wales is extremely important. It will reassure the people of North Wales. I am pleased to see the provision in the Bill. I support it. As for other regions in Wales, it is for the assembly to determine what is appropriate; what sort of advice is required in respect of those regions; and to form its standing orders accordingly.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

My Lords, it seems to me that there are three issues here deriving from the amendments and comments made: boundaries, powers and membership.

If Amendment No. 89 were accepted, there would be five committees: one for North Wales, one for mid and west Wales, and then western, central and eastern parts of South Wales. The noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, himself said that, if his amendment were accepted, we should have the absurd situation of a single committee representing Llanelli and Llanrrhos. One would have other oddities; for example, most of us would say that Aberdare and Treorchy have much more in common with Merthyr, which is not in the same electoral region, than Cardiff, which is. The noble Lord's amendment would prevent that arrangement and similar arrangements being reflected in the assembly's committee structure. It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, is right to say that that is for the assembly to determine. That deals with boundaries.

As regards powers, those regional committees are not intended to hold the assembly to account. They are advisory and they will work, one assumes and hopes, with other public bodies in the area—for example, North Wales—to have what may well be genuinely not a separatist but a collective North Wales view which it can put forward to the assembly as a regional committee. That seems to be perfectly reasonable to me.

As regards membership, the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, suggests that his Amendment No. 90 would make the selection of members easier. That may be so. But the committee is not to be constituted to make selection easier but to perform a specific role which is advisory in the most effective way. The noble Lord, Lord Stanley, says the committees will be toothless waffle shops. No, it depends on the members who are elected, their commitment to their advisory function and their commitment to making the assembly work, not on the basis of confrontation—we have had enough of that over the past 25 or 30 years in Wales—but in a spirit of co-operation.

The boundaries suggested in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, will not work and should properly be within the province of the assembly's decision.

Lord Roberts of Conwy

My Lords, I am disappointed by that reply. Of course, I recognise that the amendments I have tabled have their shortcomings. But I should like to have a more positive attitude on the part of the Government.

We have been told quite clearly that the key features, beyond those contained in the clause, are to be sorted out by the assembly. I simply note the fact that this another highly problematical area which we are foisting on the assembly, even before it starts. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 90 not moved.]

12.15 a.m.

Lord Elis-Thomas moved Amendment No. 91:

After Clause 61, insert the following new clause—