NATO and the Russian Federation

HL Deb 23 June 1997 vol 580 cc1440-60

3.40 p.m.

Lord Kennet rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what is the status in international law of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed on 27th May.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I begin by welcoming the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, back from her—apparently very recently completed—journey to the Caribbean. I hope that it was a great success.

Since the election we have had a good discussion on the European Union. Now we have to pick up European military affairs again. They do not get any simpler or more sensible.

The Government did excellently last week at Amsterdam, particularly over fish. But the military realities of Europe in the big world remain largely ungrasped in this country. They are not nice to think about, and few people do—least of all in the recent election campaign.

Ministers have not yet had time to get their minds round the confusion within NATO, and indeed within the whole European security landscape. Whitehall therefore, presumably, is carrying on carrying on until it is clearly instructed to do something different. The Defence Review conducted by the Government should help clarify minds in relation to NATO, as well as much else; but it will not be concluded before the end of the year. I was glad to see that NATO is to re-examine its strategic concept. That is good. But there is a great deal more to re-examine than that.

The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation is an oddity in the diplomatic history of Europe: an epoch-making international document in which nobody agrees to anything. It is also an emblem or symptom of a certain self-important and self-ignorant culture of violence and compulsion from which we have to save our grandchildren. And yet, it is also an ugly duckling which might perhaps—just perhaps, given skill and care—turn into a swan of peace and harmony. For that to happen, we shall have to drop goading the Russians and ever-increasing military spending from NATO's agenda.

NATO expansion started badly. I need not remind the House that it is the fruit of internal American politics, not of reflection, and that free and informed opinion in this country was virtually unanimous against it. But here we are: the document is there, and Mr. Yeltsin has signed it. My Question asks what is the position of the foundation Act in law, and I await the answer with interest.

It is certainly not a treaty or agreement: no one agrees with anyone to do, or refrain from, anything at all. The text contains the by now sickeningly familiar language about how NATO has no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons in the countries which may join it. This is the very same language which Mr. Major as Foreign Secretary and Mr. James Baker as US Secretary of State used to Gorbachev about expanding NATO in the first place, and by which they induced the Russians to withdraw from East Germany and Poland. Those commitments did not count, because they had not been written down, you see. The Russians have not forgotten that betrayal. An honest to God treaty would not now have spoken of absence of plans or intentions, but would have simply undertaken not to do the deed in question. That is what Russia asked for, and was refused.

The Russians have withdrawn all their nuclear weapons within their own frontiers. The United States has never for a moment even considered doing that, and we have apparently not suggested it. So it is not unnatural that the Russians should in return have declared that the whole Act collapses if the West's non-binding statements are changed in word or deed, and also if NATO tries to take in any of the ex-Soviet republics. What they will make of the bilateral "Security Charter" the US is now offering the Baltic States, God knows. We do know what they think about the idiotic US-funded exercise, "Sea Breeze", planned for August.

The first part of the Act is largely devoted to setting up the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, and attempting to relate it to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. I tried to table a Question to ask the Government to list all the defence-related organisations in Europe—there are many others—but the Minute Room said it would be unfair to ask for such a long Answer. So I have asked the Library. God help them!

This is a great deal of Euro-spaghetti, the effect of which at the end guarantees that the Russians can raise in NATO any question they like about anything. Yeltsin now claims that Russia will be taking part, as a decision-maker, in any interest of "mutual concern", to use his words. "NATO will not be the only one setting the agenda", he says. And of course, Russia has a veto in both OSCE and the UN Security Council, which alone can now legitimate NATO activity outside its borders.

There is also the matter of transparency, and what that may mean, and to whom. The text establishes as a "principle", mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines". I put down a number of Questions the other day about certain new implementations of defence policies within Europe and the continued arming of our continent; and to my surprise the Government said that all this is "a matter for the individual countries concerned". The United States has just signed a "Status of Forces" agreement with Hungary, which is, the Hungarians make clear, nothing to do with US NATO forces. Does not "mutual transparency" require some interest in, and explanation of, the presence of non-NATO US forces in a country expected to join NATO? And should not transparency begin at home?

Now as to costs. Since I first spoke about NATO expansion in this House last October, the American estimates for the entire cost of taking in the first three countries have become no more sensible. General Shalikashvili, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has vouchsafed that taking in the three first applicant countries might cost altogether between 27 and 35 billion dollars over 10 years, and that the US might pay a sum equivalent to about 3 per cent. of that.

The Congressional Budget Office on the other hand—I quoted from it last year—estimates 125 billion dollars. That is about four times as much, and would put the US contribution at, say, 0.75 per cent.—three-quarters of 1 per cent.—of the total cost of enlargement. Those glaring discrepancies suggest that President Yeltsin's spokesman had a point three weeks ago when he said that the price of expansion is "being intensively kept silent about". Indeed.

So who pays the rest? This country? Portugal? Greece? Our Ministry of Defence just makes hopeful noises: "We expect the costs of enlargement to be manageable". Is that really the Chancellor of the Exchequer's view? It will all presumably have to come from the defence budget, already encumbered with post-dated Tory cheques.

If European NATO is not to pay, then are Poland and the other applicants themselves? That notion is laughable. Poland, as my noble friend Lord Eatwell recently reminded us, would, if its economy continued to grow at 5 per cent. per year, reach the present economic level of Greece in 20 years from now. Greece is, of course, the poorest of the present members of the European Union. The Polish armed forces are fairly well forward in bringing their communications and their general inter-operability within NATO up to what membership requires, but their actual arms are another story. Most of their tanks, planes, warships and so on have only another year or two's life left. Polish plans to replace them with modern weapons, to be bought mainly from the US, hope to rely on a system of offset sales which does not yet seem to be very clearly thought out, let alone accepted by the other side. What would Boeing-McDonnell-Douglas-Lockheed, etc. do with several hundred million dollars-worth of Polish exports?

This unthought-out spawning of yet more security organisations comes from the great failure of our generation; the failure to shake off Europe's redundant military structures altogether. Twice this century the US has intervened in Europe, largely at the invitation of this country, to end wars that Europe could not end for itself. Our gratitude remains, and must remain for ever. After the Second World War the tyrant of the Russian Empire, Stalin, advanced and advanced until we had to set up NATO and the American armies had to decide to stay on indefinitely. Stalin, carefully waiting until the day after, then set up the Warsaw Pact.

But in time reason and tolerance prevailed in Russia and the Russian people got rid of communism. We must remember that: we, the West, did not get rid of Soviet communism; the Russians themselves did, led principally by the great peacemaker, Gorbachev. He fell, as peacemakers do, and, because we managed to force the pace at which the Soviet Union and the Russian state itself were dismantled, penury and chaos ensued and have continued.

Who threatened NATO then, and what with? Scrabbling through the waste-paper baskets of the implausible, various think-tanks and lobbies and military industries concluded that it could be argued that various Asian countries with strict Muslim regimes might, if goaded enough, threaten it. Certainly some of those demonised states—not all—used provocative language towards us and certainly some—once, twice, even three times over many years—have committed acts of terrorism in NATO countries. Not big ones: it is notable that neither Oklahoma City nor Tokyo was foreign terrorism, and Lockerbie has yet to come to trial.

How do we protect ourselves against this mini-terrorism? We do so with long-range thermo-nuclear missiles to be launched from land, sea and air, with hundreds of submarines, tanks and bombers and thousands of fighter aircraft and aircraft carriers—in short, with everything we happen to have thought necessary in the Cold War, with everything we have in case we had to fight a third world war in the usual place.

Now we have to face the US revolution in military affairs as well, the better to re-fight the Gulf War, the Seven Days' War, a war against North Korea, a war in outer space or a war against all those rogue hackers who already penetrate the Pentagon's best-kept computers, leaving only a smiley face or, worse, nothing at all.

What we Europeans should have done when the Cold War ran down was to look at Russia's real military capacity and then agree, within the all-embracing security architecture implicit in OSCE, to come down to some equivalent level. Is there any hope that we could still have time to do that before the promised Russian rearmament in response to NATO enlargement has gone too far? If so, we should do it; and, while we are doing it, we should at last find time to analyse the real causes of terrorism, which, except for Israeli terrorism, most obviously begin with fear of the West, and particularly of the US and its unruly CIA.

To say that enlargement is a mistake is not to dismiss the natural ardour with which the applicant governments desire it. Their peoples have all suffered from hostile military occupation by, first, Germany and then Russia for half a century. If you have suffered that, you do not go for half measures in protecting yourself from a recurrence. But Western governments have duties not only to the Polish, Czech and Hungarian peoples, whom we so much admire and like—yes, liking and disliking do come into world affairs—but also to their own peoples, for whom they are immediately responsible; to the Russian people, whom we also admire and like; and to peace in the world.

I spoke of a culture of violence and compulsion. This it is, combined with the vast and growing arms production in many countries—and ours the second exporter in the world—which underlies so much of the tension between the West and Asia, including Eurasian Russia.

We now have to make the best of this ill thought-out initiative and that means turning to good account certain aspects of the text which I have not yet mentioned. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said in an article a week ago: Our long-term commitment to Europe means that it is essential that we … play a leading role in shaping Europe's future". That future cannot but include the Founding Act we are debating today, the new European security architecture in which Russia finds its due place", as last week's presidential conclusions from the Amsterdam Council put it. But this must explicitly be Europe's own future, not what President Clinton calls the new Europe [which] is central to the [United States'] larger security strategy and which last month he told young officers at Westpoint they would be called upon to implement and enforce.

We are not inclined, I believe, any of us Europeans, to act out the new US "full-spectrum dominance" doctrine nor to become part of its larger security strategy. With much of that strategy we quite explicitly do not agree. Even within Europe we do not approve, for instance, of the United States arming and training one of the parties in Bosnia or of pulling out before the job there is done. Outside Europe our disagreements stretch from Cuba to Iran and from China to Israel.

Perhaps above all we have to ask ourselves how long the US Congress will be content to put up with any European independence of view in NATO or with our belief in the United Nations or the rule of international law. Neither Senator Helms nor Senator Lott has much time for Europeans with ideas of their own about Cuba, mines or global warming. Those are heavy questions, but it is our business to ask them. The previous government, for the most part, ignored their existence.

Well, there we are. We have a provisional resting place in Europe, though the task of bringing back a civilian culture to Russia has not yet begun. Perhaps we should begin with transparencies. Yeltsin has submitted this Act to the Duma and expects it to be accepted. Clinton will not be submitting it to Congress—that is one reason why it has not been made a proper treaty—but the enlargement itself will require ratification in the American Senate, where its future is perhaps uncertain. This House will remember, of course, that the British Parliament is the only one in Europe which does not have the right to ratify treaties reached by its government.

The Founding Act is not a treaty, as I have emphasised, and therefore it does not need ratification. It is thus all the more interesting that it is the same kind of presidential Executive Act as Roosevelt signed up to with Churchill about co-operation on nuclear weapons after World War II, and that Truman later reneged on, thus persuading Clement Attlee and Ernie Bevin that we had better develop our own.

In conclusion, I urge the Government to make time for a full debate on NATO in both Houses.

3.59 p.m.

Baroness Park of Monmouth

My Lords, according to Yevgeniy Primakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, speaking on 26th May of this Founding Act, the document itself states that it will be legally binding. It contains a number of commitments which are so germane to the Defence Review in the context of our future national commitments that, like the previous speaker, I most strongly urge the need for a full debate on the implications of what does amount to a treaty well before we come to debate the Defence Review itself.

Let me give a few examples. Under Section IV, (politico-military matters) NATO, reiterates … that the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks". That refers to all forces, not just to nuclear forces and nuclear infrastructure, which is dealt with elsewhere. Primakov stressed with some satisfaction that the NATO commitment not to deploy on a permanent basis any strike forces or combat forces on the territory of its members concerns both existing and new members.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Baroness will allow me to question her wording. Could she read out that commitment? I did not read it as being a commitment but a statement that there was no present intention to do so.

Baroness Park of Monmouth

I was using Mr. Primakov's own word "commitment". That is how he sees it. I may add that a month after this was agreed, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Ivan Rybkin, was in Kaliningrad pledging to strengthen Russia's Baltic region and its defence capability. The charm of President Yeltsin's bland announcement immediately after signing the Act that, all nuclear warheads targeted against NATO countries have been stood down as of today", was perhaps enhanced by a Russian delegate's statement later that the decision did not mean that they would be dismantled.

The text of the Founding Act abounds in bland statements of principle, such as: the inherent right of all states to choose the means to ensure their own security". Russia clearly does not see that as applicable to the countries seeking entry to NATO. But the truly worrying things are rather cryptically expressed. There is to be: exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and the budgets and infrastructure development programmes; increasing transparency … regarding the size and roles of the conventional forces of member states of NATO and Russia; association of Russia with NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors; conversion of defence industries; possible cooperation on theatre missile defence and on air defence". It is perhaps relevant to remember that Russia's arms exports were worth 3.1 billion dollars last year; that it is the main supplier for India, has greatly increased its trade with China and the Middle East and is still happy to deal with North Korea and Iran; that it has benefited mightily from the lifting of the COCON restriction; and that the conversion programme in Russia was little more than a means of extracting money from the West.

I have never been able to see an alternative to enlargement, because not to have allowed Poland and the others the right to choose what would make them feel safe after the long years of brutal Soviet occupation seemed unthinkable. However, I have to say that the Russians are already on the way to making it, through this apparently high-minded and peace-loving act, a hollow mockery. The Russian white ants will eat away at the whole edifice of NATO, which they are determined to turn into yet another political talking shop like the OSCE and the UN, while acquiring at the same time in the sacred name of transparency the greatest possible knowledge of our military strength, intentions and capacity and using their presence inside NATO to render it no more than an expensive collection of bureaucrats in uniform, busy servicing the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

More and more NATO member governments may gratefully agree that having even conventional forces is unnecessary, provocative or both. Many may well say, "Why not? Russia is no longer a threat". Russia will only not be a threat for so long as it sees in NATO a power to deter. Russia wants the CFE treaty, which it has not yet ratified, amended yet further. Russia has not yet ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention or destroyed its chemical weapons. It says that it will do so by the autumn, given the creation of necessary conditions, which turns out to mean extending the time for liquidating the stockpile of 40,000 tonnes and someone else paying for it, while letting Russia join the convention before it ratifies so that it can take part in decision-making.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, perhaps I may interrupt the noble Baroness once again. She has been very patient. Could she balance that statement about Russia and the Chemical Weapons Convention by reminding the House of the state of American policy as regards that convention?

Baroness Park of Monmouth

My Lords, I prefer to leave that to the noble Lord.

Lord Kennet

Could she take the opportunity of stating it? They have not ratified.

Baroness Park of Monmouth

I recognise that the noble Lord has a different point of view from mine, which he has already made quite extensively clear.

It is the Council of Europe story all over again. Russia was allowed to join and promptly reneged on its human rights commitments.

Russia's agenda is to turn NATO into an emasculated political entity, while using it to exert influence on any and every decision the NATO powers may wish to make, including the future of Milosevic's Yugoslavia, the future of the Baltic states and many other such issues. Its eventual objective is the dissolution of NATO and the advancement of that toothless creature the OSCE.

Some may say that it is wrong to raise such misgivings, that it is a bold and trustful move to bring Russia inside NATO and to go so much further than half-way. But NATO is not primarily a political body. The European Union is that; the OSCE is that; the UN is that; the Council of Europe is that. Let us make our political gestures there. NATO is a defensive military organisation whose purpose is to keep the peace through deterrence. It cannot keep the peace without power to deter. We should not allow the Russians to prevent that and to manipulate us, as they so well know how to do, into making us feel vaguely guilty that we have an effective, peaceful, non-aggressive engine of peace, whose purpose has never been anything but defensive. We should not negotiate away our strength and we should think most carefully before we throw away our power.

When I speak about Russia, I am not speaking about the many thoroughly nice Russians whom we all know but about a nomenklatura whose methods have changed very little and whose objectives are clear. Of course it is right and useful to work with the Russians on peacekeeping, but that should not be allowed to turn into effective Russian penetration and emasculation of NATO as a vital defence asset. The Russians will respect us if we robustly protect our own interests. Our interests, incidentally, are the interests of the Russian people too, because we all need to keep the peace.

Let me say one last word. I recognise the difficulties of bringing in the Baltic states but I do not think that we should accept the Russian view that they are Soviet Republics. They were incorporated by force and are now free. The power to deter is needed not only to prevent a fighting war; it is needed to ensure that threats are empty. Those threats are still being made today.

4.7 p.m.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire

My Lords, this is an important debate in a thin House on a document which ought to have received a good deal more attention in the western press. Reading both this document and the Treaty of Amsterdam in the past two days, I have to admit that I was not clear which was the more obscure of the two. One has to get into the codes of the language in order to understand rather more clearly what is indicated. This is a founding charter, a declaration and not a treaty. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said, they do not want to have to take it through the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Therefore, it is not entirely clear what it offers.

It represents a further stage in what has been a drift of policy towards what the document describes in its fourth paragraph as "a historic transformation of NATO"—a historic transformation of NATO which is likely to continue as this charter goes into effect and which will take NATO towards something which Henry Kissinger, in a rather strong article in the Washington Post the other weekend, said will no longer be an alliance but will become in effect a collective security organisation. I think that that is rather a good thing; he thinks that it is rather a bad thing; the noble Baroness, Lady Park, obviously also thinks it is rather a bad thing. Since I am informed that the nomenklatura inside Russia has considerably broken up in the past four or five years and been replaced by a number of other private organisations, mafias and the like, I am not sure that I share the same view of a monolithic Russia that she still retains. It does not mean that I do not believe that there are many dangerous things within Russia. Some of those things are dangerous when one walks along the street in Moscow. But it is a different Russia from what we had before and we need a different response.

We have a transformation under way in the structure of European security and European order as such. I bitterly regret that the last British Government did not explain it to their people. This charter marks a further stage. In a few days' time the next NATO Council in Madrid will announce an enlargement of NATO to three, four or five countries which is also a further stage in the transformation of the whole architecture, as some people call it, of European security.

I welcome that change. I wish the last Government had explained it rather more to the British public. I hope that the new Government will understand that it needs a great deal of explanation to the British people. I also bitterly regret the unilateralism with which the United States has been leading us along the way. There have been battles within Washington between the Polish lobby and the "Russia firsters", which have pushed for enlargement to Poland at the same time as offering something to the Russians. It was the desire was to satisfy the Polish lobby on NATO enlargement, but at the same time to give something in return to the Russians, which started the US Administration on this process.

Time and again we have seen leading members of the American administration making unilateral gestures to the Russians of which they have not informed their NATO members. I remember the NATO council in Bergen a year ago in which Bill Perry told the Baltic states on behalf of NATO members that they were not going to join NATO for the time being. I remember vividly the occasion in Brussels when Madeleine Albright announced with the SACEUR standing next to her that there was to be a NATO Russia brigade about which the American General SACEUR had not been informed. That is not a good way to run an alliance. I recall our friends in this House, who take a sceptical view of the European Union, insisting that NATO worked better because it worked on consensus. That is an odd kind of consensus.

We have been pulled along by American politics and by an American view of how Europe should be restructured, which I am not sure we entirely share. The last British Government were loyal to the United States and went out of their way to defend what they saw as the developments within American policy. Malcolm Rifkind famously made his last major speech before the election in Washington telling the Americans that they had to accept NATO enlargement. He did not make such a speech over here. I hope that this Government will not be so subservient to American interests and will take more clearly a further statement in paragraph 4, which interestingly comes out in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation and says, NATO is in the process of developing the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance". I have asked a number of people in London and elsewhere exactly what European security and defence is. The French tell me that they are in favour of it but cannot define it; British officials say that we are against it but cannot define it. It is interesting to know that, nevertheless, it appears in the founding charter.

A transformation of NATO is taking place, opening up half membership for Russia. The charter talks in paragraph 1.6 of, common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour". If it comes into effect with all the gestures we have so far made, those shared values must include Russia; they are not shared values of the west against the east as we were all brought up to believe. In paragraph 2.14 the charter says that there are shared objectives to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible". It expands on that to talk of joint operations, including peacekeeping operations. Can the Minister say whether that envisages peacekeeping operations within the CIS? So far peacekeeping operations within the CIS have been left to the Russians. If NATO troops are to participate in peacekeeping operations in, for example, Georgia and Tadjikistan, that too raises large questions about our future defence obligations. There is to be a permanent joint council which is to meet regularly; there is to be a permanent Russian mission in SHAPE which I am told will be physically closer to the Secretary-General's office than the permanent missions of the majority of current NATO members. And there is to be a possible NATO mission in Moscow.

Those are major developments in the movement from an alliance to a collective security organisation. I find it interesting that in the NATO-Russia agreement there is reference to a need to further adjust NATO's strategic concept; to further changes in the treaty on conventional forces in Europe; and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Park, mentioned, to the questions in relation to nuclear weapons.

The links between this Act and other developments also seem to me to be important. I asked the Library if it was possible to obtain a copy of the agreement between NATO and the Ukraine. I am told that that had been agreed but had not been signed and is not yet available. I hope that the Minister will tell us what comparability there is between NATO's agreement with the Ukraine and that with Russia. The Ukraine is an important country to us. It matters to us that it remains independent as a part of a new European balance.

How do we see the Baltic states developing? How far have we now accepted that the Baltic states will not join NATO? Or is part of the purpose of this agreement with Russia to open the door to the Baltic states becoming at least associated with NATO to the same extent as Russia and perhaps in time to be full members?

What about south-eastern Europe? At Madrid the Americans will tell us who is to be allowed to join NATO in the next one-and-a-half years. Indeed, the Americans have now decided that they can only get three countries through Congress without arousing too much opposition, so Romania and Slovenia will not be allowed to join. What proposals do we wish to make for those other countries of south-eastern Europe which represent the most insecure parts of Europe today, to improve their security if NATO enlargement or founding acts of this sort are not going to take care of them in the near future?

Finally, what do we see as the role of OSCE in this developing process? There are many references to OSCE within the text but it seems to me that we are moving towards NATO replacing the OSCE for many purposes, with Russia as a half-member and with the Ukraine as an associate. NATO is going to become the major collective security organisation for Europe with an integrated military organisation at its core and therefore rather stronger than the OSCE but, as Kissinger argued, fundamentally different from the alliance we knew.

This debate is taking place largely within Washington. I regret that. European allies have largely been spectators to this American-Russian dialogue. The Americans are now actively moving towards obtaining ratification through Congress. Two weeks ago in Washington I met a state department official who is working full time on relations with Congress to try to ensure that the Senate will ratify. I am glad to know that they treat their legislature in such an active and positive way. I hope that our Government will now tell us—not necessarily at the end of the debate but over the next few months—how they see the process of the gradual transformation of our European order affecting the context in which British defence policy, British foreign policy, British involvement in closer European co-operation and in continuing transatlantic relations will affect the roots of British foreign policy.

4.20 p.m.

Lord Moynihan

My Lords, there is consensus between the two Front Benches in this House and in another place that no issue has a higher priority in Britain's foreign policy than the future of NATO. It is not news to your Lordships that it is a real but most regrettable fact that peace in post-Cold War Europe cannot be taken for granted. The history of Europe has left behind many animosities and tensions, particularly in the East. Bosnia stands as a stark and devastating testament to that fact.

It is not an overstatement to say that NATO is the most successful defence alliance the world has ever seen. Its unique military capabilities and its politically stabilising framework have given its members unprecedented peace since its foundation in 1949. As we approach the 50th anniversary of its foundation, it is appropriate that we should be able to begin the lead-up to those celebrations with another milestone in the form of the Founding Act.

The signing of the Founding Act last month in Paris was an historic occasion. In this Act the heads of government of the 16 NATO member countries and of Russia have paved the way for a new relationship between NATO and Russia. This is a partnership built on consensus and co-operation, on consultation and co-ordination rather than on an adversarial approach and enmity.

This pact of permanent partnership and strategic co-operation has concluded the process that began in Lancaster House seven years ago when NATO first stretched out the hand of friendship to its former Warsaw Pact adversary in the dying days of the Cold War. It creates the real possibility, unthinkable a decade ago, that the security pact may one day span the nations of the northern hemisphere from Vladivostok to Vancouver without a break.

The Founding Act, whereby NATO and Russia no longer consider themselves adversaries, is the fruit of seven years of hard bargaining, of mutual concession and compromise. It is a milestone on the road to underpinning security and stability in the whole of Europe. The Act acknowledges the future enlargement of NATO, thereby greatly minimising press speculation that such expansion will—I quote—"Bait the Russian bear". In return, it assuages the preconception in Russia that NATO is a threat to the Russian people. Neither NATO nor Russia has a right of veto over the actions of the other, nor does it restrict independent decision-making and action.

The newly created NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council will provide the principal mechanism for routine consultation and co-ordination on security issues of concern to either side and will oversee deep and systematic military and practical co-operation, including, where possible, joint planning, training, exercises and operations.

The noble Lord, in raising this debate, which is greatly welcomed, has concentrated rightly on the status of the Founding Act in international law. It is politically binding but, as the noble Lord rightly pointed out, it is not a legally binding treaty and needs no ratification as such, as the Russians had originally requested. However, the important status of the Founding Act should not be underestimated. The 17 co-signatories have all agreed to be bound by its terms. It is therefore to all intents and purposes a binding document.

The summit in Madrid next month is the next milestone on the road to NATO's fourth expansion, when the alliance's 16 existing members will meet to decide which of the 12 applicant countries will be invited to begin accession negotiations. I thought that the contribution by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, was extremely pertinent in this context.

Again, there is consensus on the Front Benches of your Lordships' House and in another place as to the benefits of NATO enlargement to Britain, to Europe and to the world. Enlarging our institutions is the key to future European and global success. NATO is the best assurance for prosperity, security and confidence in the nations of central Europe, just as it was for the nations of western Europe from its foundation 50 years ago. It is right that NATO's guarantees of a real and credible common defence should be extended to the new democracies of central and eastern Europe who have thrown off the yoke of communism. Already great efforts are being made in the aspirant countries to establish democracy, the rule of law and individual liberty, as well as to resolve border disputes and organise defence planning in a democratic way.

I would like to take this opportunity to wish the Government success in the discussions at the Madrid summit next month, and I am sure they will take a measured and considered approach to the important decisions facing the UK and our NATO allies. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, put his finger on the issue. It is no secret that there will be dissent and disagreement between the American-led model of limited enlargement and the French-led model—which he rightly supported and for which I have a great deal of sympathy—of a wider "southern enlargement" which would include Romania and Slovenia and would focus expansion on the Mediterranean as well as eastern Europe. Diplomacy and determination will be required to broker a decision acceptable to all and agreed by all, with no lingering resentment of a diktat on any side.

I hope that this decision will take into account the fact that NATO cannot be a one-way street. New countries must be able to play a full role in all NATO operations. They will have to increase defence expenditure where necessary; they must bring their armed forces up to the level of NATO armed forces and ensure interoperability.

I hope it will take into account the effect of enlargement on the internal structure of NATO. Too many new members would prove counterproductive, placing a strain on NATO, weakening its important military and political cohesion and reducing the credibility of its pledge of continued openness, increasing Russian concerns and diluting its effectiveness in guaranteeing the defence of new members.

I hope it will be clear that NATO expansion will be an evolving and fluid process which will enhance the security of all. There is no reason why this fourth enlargement should be the last. The door must remain open for those willing and able to further NATO's goals. Nor should any country feel left out in the cold. On this note, the designs for the architecture of European security have been drafted.

I hope the Government will make sure that the security alliances which have been referred to and which overlap NATO—OCSE, WEU and the Council of Baltic Sea States—are built on and developed so that the plans for the architecture of European security become reality and the old iron dividing line between west and east is blurred and eventually erased. An enlarged NATO should be one of the foundation cornerstones in a network of security alliances that criss-cross and bind Europe in peace and stability. I believe that this is an opportunity for the Government to demonstrate leadership, and I very much hope that they will rise to the occasion.

The Founding Act opens the door for discussion between NATO and Russia, but there will still be significant diplomatic hurdles ahead. The Founding Act provides the basis for the continued expansion of the alliance by declaring that there can be no new dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any states and by stressing the inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security. This keeps the NATO door open for the accession of the Baltic States and even the Ukraine. Russia has already issued a warning that the failure of NATO to rule out the Baltics and the former Soviet republics could undermine and damage NATO's relations with Russia.

I take this opportunity to wish the Prime Minister success in his proposed trip to Moscow in the autumn, when I am sure that some of these issues will be on the agenda.

Perhaps I may pick up on one point that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, raised. There is an additional and important dimension to our debate today which should focus on Russia's relationship with the republics of the former Soviet Union. This weekend, in my capacity as Managing Director of the Independent Power Corporation, I met Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin in Kazakhstan. In addition to the bold and radical economic reforms being implemented in the interests of all the people in the country by the Prime Minister and the President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, it is also a country which exemplifies the attempt to establish practical working relations with both Russia and NATO in defence policy.

The key relevance to this debate is the series of important tensions which remain to be resolved within the former Soviet Union countries. For example, Kazakhstan used to serve as the main nuclear testing ground for the Soviet Union. The poisonous testimony of those years serves as an environmental legacy to the Kazak people today. The Republic of Kazakhstan made a very bold step by unilaterally surrendering its nuclear arsenal.

Now, with joint military manoeuvres, NATO addresses more than a traditional Russian stand-off. NATO is rightly but potentially precariously being woven into a patchwork quilt, a complicated web of foreign policy and defence initiatives to which it must respond sensitively and positively.

In the case of Kazakhstan NATO has responded well. The fact that NATO needs to do more to help Kazakhstan is incontrovertible, particularly in providing assistance to the Kazak army, epitomised, for example, by the challenge posed by the Kaliban movement in Afghanistan at a time when Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, with the assistance of the outstanding British ambassador, Barbara Hay, Kyrgistan and Turkmenistan face the rising tide of Islam. What this represents is an example of one of a series of internal tensions between Russia and the Baltics, where Russia is still perceived as a threat, Russia and the Ukraine, over the Black Sea division, and Russia and Chechnya, where the word "oil" predominates and the Caspian Sea policy, Azerbaijan and issues regarding the pipeline are important.

We needed in the past a strong NATO because Russia was strong. We need an even stronger alliance now because the fledgling Russian democracy is weak. We have no reason to mistrust President Yeltsin and his team. Moreover, we have every reason to believe their good political intentions. But at the same time we can legitimately ask: how much control does the president and his team exercise over their military; and how much control, after we saw the example of Admiral Khmelnev selling submarines and weapons for personal gain, do the Russian generals themselves have over an ageing and increasingly volatile nuclear arsenal? Whatever the legal status of the Founding Act, we ought to establish proper and foolproof systems of verification and control. The Russian people, above all, need our help in that matter.

In conclusion, I should like an assurance from the Minster that the strategic defence review will preserve our sense of responsibility to our allies in NATO, which includes our outstanding contribution to NATO's high command Rapid Reaction Corps, which is led by a British officer. I should like, in the context of the defence of NATO and this debate, to ask four questions. There are military cost implications for the future of the NATO alliance. I should like to know how these will be taken into account and what the involvement of the Treasury will be in this foreign policy led defence review. If NATO is indeed to remain the bedrock of our security, and fundamental questions on the future shape of the alliance and the contribution of its members will remain unanswered in the immediate future, what timescale do the Government envisage before they are able to reach definitive conclusions about the UK defence needs, and how will those defence needs be evaluated to take into account NATO enlargement and the matters before the House today?

Britain plays a unique and leading role in the world. It is the only country to be a member of NATO, the European Union, the WEU, the Commonwealth, what is now the G8 most powerful industrial nations and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. I hope the whole House agrees that the United Kingdom carries out its responsibilities throughout the world with honour and respect: providing troops, planes and ships for the Gulf War, the delivery of aid and the supervising of the ceasefire in Bosnia, help to war-torn Rwanda, support for the United Nations around the world, as well as fighting international crime and terrorism. We are very proud of the role we played in staunchly defending freedom in the 1980s in the face of the Soviet threat, which helped to bring about the collapse of Communism and the emergence of democracy in central and Eastern Europe. We have now come full circle. Fifty years after the rejection of the Marshall Plan by Stalin, which led to the isolation of the Soviet Union and the division of Europe, the Founding Act marks the making of a more constructive, secure future for all of Europe. I urge the Government to take no action to hinder Britain's continued lead in shaping this future.

4.34 p.m.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Kennet for initiating this debate today as I welcome the interest shown by other noble Lords in the NATO/Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security, and in NATO generally. The alliance is of vital importance to our defence and the security and stability of Europe, as the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, pointed out.

The signature of the Founding Act on 27th May, by NATO heads of state and government, the NATO Secretary-General, and President Yeltsin is an historic breakthrough in relations between Russia and the West. One of the main provisions of the Founding Act is the establishment of a Permanent Joint Council which will consult regularly on a wide range of security issues and will provide a mechanism for building greater trust and co-operation between Russia and NATO.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked about the status in international law of the Founding Act. As the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, said, it is not a treaty. If it had been a legally binding document the constitutions of many NATO member states would have required them to go through a process of ratification, and that would have delayed matters considerably. During the course of the negotiations between NATO and Russia the two sides agreed that it should take the form of a solemn commitment, made at the highest level. In this respect, the Founding Act is similar to the Helsinki Final Act. The fact that the Founding Act is not legally binding does not, of course, mean that it was entered into lightly. It was signed at the level of heads of state and government. I assure noble Lords that the British Government will scrupulously honour the political commitments it contains and expect that all other NATO member states and Russia will do likewise.

The signature of the Founding Act underlines that the Cold War is now firmly consigned to history. Its second paragraph reminds us that the two sides are no longer adversaries. NATO's own transformation in the 1990s underlines this fact. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, pointed out, it is no longer an organisation designed to deter or defend against a massive attack from the East. Its priorities are now much more diverse. It has expanded its political functions and taken on new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management. In Bosnia, NATO has been working side by side with Russia to restore peace.

We welcome signs that Russian public opinion is increasingly taking a more realistic view of NATO and overcoming misconceptions of the alliance created under the former Soviet Union. That is not to say that there are not still anxieties in Russia about NATO, but these are based on a profound misunderstanding of the character and intentions of the alliance, which are strictly defensive.

The best way to achieve a thoroughgoing and lasting change in perception is to develop the relationship between NATO and Russia and find a way of involving Russia in discussion of European security issues that corresponds to her legitimate security interests. The signature of the Founding Act responds to these needs by offering a real partnership with NATO, with a framework for increasing levels of practical co-operation, and by giving Russia a chance to make her voice clearly heard on matters of security concern to her. Co-operation in the new Permanent Joint Council will be based on the principles of transparency and reciprocity.

The Founding Act contains no provisions that restrict the rights or responsibilities of new members of NATO. The candidates for NATO membership have recognised this, and have welcomed the Founding Act. It contains a section on military issues which underlines clearly that NATO, whether now or after taking in new members, will pose no military threat to Russia. It contains, for example, references to earlier unilateral statements by NATO that the alliance has no intention, plan or reason to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members and that it will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the ability of forces to work with each other rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. It also sets out an approach agreed by Russia and NATO to the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe to the new circumstances of Europe. The Founding Act also contains provisions for more co-operation between military establishments.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked about this element of transparency. The text of the Founding Act is available for debate, as indeed we are debating today. As for the conduct of NATO/Russia discussions, there will be no deals at the expense of third parties. The proceedings of NATO/Russia bodies will be as open as possible.

A number of noble Lords raised the perhaps related issue of NATO enlargement. The fact is that the Founding Act contains no provisions on NATO enlargement, which is a matter only for NATO and candidate countries and not for any third country. There is no understanding, secret or otherwise, between NATO and Russia about the question of NATO's future enlargement. The negotiations between NATO and Russia were about NATO-Russian relations, not about enlargement.

Noble Lords have also asked why NATO should be enlarged. NATO membership brings considerable benefits to members, not only militarily in collective defence guarantees but also political benefits. It would not be right to deny those benefits to countries that wished to join and share the values and principles on which NATO was founded and whose accession to NATO would add to our common security. As the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has pointed out, the process of enlargement has already brought substantial benefits to European security as candidates for membership have sought to prepare themselves by pursuing important reforms, such as the introduction of proper democratic control over their militaries and a peaceful approach to the resolution of long-standing issues. A more secure and stable central and eastern Europe where two world wars have started this century should be in the interests not only of the West but also of Russia.

Several noble Lords raised the question of the costs of enlargement. Pending NATO's decisions on who should be invited to join, it is not possible to make precise estimates of the cost of enlargement, including the cost to the United Kingdom, but NATO's preliminary work on cost suggests that it will be manageable. Costs will be shared equitably between existing and new members. A US Government report to Congress in February 1997 estimated that the direct cost of enlargement to existing and new members over a 13-year period would be no more than 9 to 12 billion US dollars. This is far less than some of the earlier estimates that failed to take into account the change in the military threat since the end of the cold war and the modernisation measures that allies would need to take irrespective of enlargement.

Noble Lords will be aware that 12 countries have asked to join: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Albania and Macedonia. The UK has not yet decided who should join. As noble Lords have observed, the US has already declared for three: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The US voice in NATO is obviously influential, but the final decision will be taken collectively by the allies at the Madrid Summit on the 8th or 9th July.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, asked about those countries that had not been invited to join. NATO is determined that the admission of new members must not mean less security for those not invited at this stage or the creation of a new dividing line in Europe. At the Madrid Summit NATO will repeat its pledge that the door remains open to the possibility of further enlargement, as the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, indicated.

The noble Baroness, Lady Park, asked about arms control. Perhaps I may reiterate that no Russian missiles have been targeted at the UK and no UK missiles have been targeted at Russia since 30th May 1994. The US also has a de-targeting agreement with Russia. The UK does not target Russia or any other country with nuclear missiles. By the end of 1998 the UK will have only one system, that is, Trident. Therefore, it would not be possible to detach the warheads, of which so many have spoken, and maintain a credible deterrent. The noble Baroness also raised a number of questions about possible co-operation in the theatre of missile defence. I can confirm that the TMD is one of the areas for possible co-operation between NATO and Russia.

The noble Baroness also asked about Russian attitudes to NATO. The Founding Act gives neither side a veto over the actions of the other. Both sides maintain their right to act independently. The new NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council will not be superior or, for that matter, subordinate to the alliance's supreme body, the North Atlantic Council. It is a separate structure. To the extent that Russia uses the new forum constructively, NATO will wish to take greater account of her voice and the opportunities for joint initiatives and decisions by the Permanent Joint Council will naturally increase. An increasingly democratic and outward-looking Russia will deserve greater influence and full recognition of her legitimate security interests.

The noble Baroness also referred to the Baltic states. We recognise the aspirations of those states to join both NATO and the EU. Decisions on NATO membership will be announced at Madrid. But we are particularly aware of the security concerns of the Baltic states. We are willing to participate in international initiatives to enhance their security. We shall continue our programme of bilateral defence assistance to the Baltic states including their joint peace-keeping battalion BalTBat.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, raised the question of NATO and the Ukraine. The relationship between NATO and the Ukraine is very important. The Ukraine's sovereignty and security are important to the security of Europe. The Ukraine has a special role to play in building the new European security architecture. Her de-nuclearisation is a commendable contribution to security in Europe. We welcome the initialling of the NATO/Ukraine Charter on the 29th May at Sintra. We expect it to be signed at a meeting between NATO heads of state and government and President Kuchma in Madrid on the 8th or 9th July. This forms a sound foundation for further future developments of the distinctive relationship between NATO and the Ukraine which recognises the latter's particular role in European security.

NATO wants the Permanent Joint Council to work as does President Yeltsin. Her Majesty's Government believe that this is a unique opportunity to promote constructive dialogue in the area of European security. Russia's voice will be heard more clearly. Inevitably, NATO will take notice of Russian views and sensibilities. It is right that in future NATO should take into account the concerns of a democratic Russia and engage her in building European security. The United Kingdom is committed to the success of this process. I am happy to be able to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, that the Government believe that the signing of the Founding Act is one of the most significant steps on the road to European peace and security since the end of the Second World War. It should be recognised as such by Parliament and the public. I assure the noble Lord that we shall, in the context of the strategic defence review, make the consequences of the Act more widely appreciated. But the signing of the document is only the beginning. We must now capitalise on the opportunity that it creates by building co-operation and consultation in the new Permanent Joint Council to new levels. This will require determination and creativity on the part of both NATO and Russia. We shall work within the alliance and with our Russian partners to fulfil the promise of a lasting transformation in relations between Russia and the West.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire

My Lords, before the noble Baroness sits down, perhaps I may press her on the question of joint peace-keeping operations within the former CIS. This seems to me to be a very important point that hangs within the founding charter in which the interests of this country are engaged.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, as I understand it, there is no reason why, if we agree with Russia, we should not be part of such a peace-keeping force.

House adjourned at twelve minutes before five o'clock.