HL Deb 05 June 1997 vol 580 cc733-56

4.52 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Williams of Mostyn)

My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.

The security of the Nation is a prime responsibility for this Government, as for any government. The threat from international terrorism is a real problem for the whole of the civilized world. It is rightly a high priority for our police and Security Service to counter the activities of international terrorists and their supporters in the United Kingdom. At the same time we must ensure that our procedures for dealing with such people meet accepted standards of fairness.

Where it is possible to do so it is clearly right and proper to take action against such people under the provisions of the criminal law. That is not always possible or practicable. In the case of non-British citizens, an important weapon in our armoury in the fight against international terrorism—and against other activities which threaten our nation—is the ability, under the Immigration Act 1971, to exclude or deport the small number of foreign nationals who pose a significant risk. The powers are used sparingly. They are a vital part of our efforts to protect the United Kingdom from those who threaten us.

In the past the view was that the nature of the decisions in those cases was such that the final decision should rest with the Home Secretary of the day and, unlike other immigration decisions, should not be subject to appeal to the immigration appellate authority. Instead where a person was liable to deportation on national security grounds, he was entitled to have the case against him reviewed by a non-statutory panel which advised the Home Secretary before he took the decision.

Those arrangements, as is now well known, were challenged before the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Chahal, in which judgment was delivered last November. The background to this case is that in 1990, Karamjit Singh Chahal, an Indian national with indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom, was made the subject of a deportation order on the grounds of national security and other reasons of a political nature; namely, the international fight against terrorism. That was because of his alleged involvement in terrorist activities connected with the Sikh separatist movement in his homeland. Mr. Chahal claimed asylum. That was refused. As the ground of the decision to deport him was national security, there was no right of appeal to the immigration appellate authorities against the Home Secretary's decision. Nor was there any right of appeal against refusal of the asylum application in those circumstances. The security case against Mr. Chahal was considered by the advisory panel in accordance with the arrangements I have already mentioned. Having exhausted his domestic remedies, including judicial review, without success Mr. Chahal applied to the European Court of Human Rights.

In its judgment in Mr. Chahal's favour last November the court found that the existing procedures for dealing with cases involving the deportation of foreign nationals on the grounds of national security—and in particular the arrangements for challenging decisions made by the Secretary of State in such cases—were in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. Specifically it found the procedures deficient in respect of Article 5(4) and Article 13 of the convention.

Article 5(4) requires that a detained person is entitled to have the basis of his detention reviewed by a court. The European court found that neither proceedings or habeas corpus nor for judicial review satisfied that requirement because the domestic courts were not in a position to review whether decisions to detain and keep in detention were justified on national security grounds. The advisory panel, while providing an important safeguard against arbitrariness, could not be considered a court for a number of reasons. Those included the fact that individuals were not entitled to legal representation before the panel and that the panel had no power of decision.

Article 13 requires that a person whose rights under the convention are violated should have an effective domestic remedy. The court found that neither judicial review nor the advisory panel satisfied that requirement in respect of national security cases.

Needless to say, this Government fully accept the judgment of the court and have moved quickly to respond to it by introducing this Bill. Until it is passed our ability to deport on national security grounds is severely constrained.

While the Bill is mainly required in order to respond to the Chahal case, it also takes the opportunity to provide a right of appeal to the same commission for European Economic Area nationals and those otherwise exercising rights under the Treaty of Rome in those cases where there is currently no right of appeal. Those are predominantly cases involving national security considerations.

That is prompted by a case currently before the European Court of Justice in which the Advocate General has delivered an opinion strongly supporting the appellants' case that European Community legislation requires an adequate legal remedy in these circumstances not provided by judicial review. The Government accept that it would be desirable to provide such a right of appeal.

In view of its limited purpose the Bill is short. Clause 1 establishes a new body which will be known as the special immigration appeals commission. It also gives effect to Schedule 1 which provides details of the new commission, including its membership. Appointments to the commission, as to the immigration appellate authority, will be made by the Lord Chancellor. The existing panel is appointed by the Home Secretary.

One of the members of the commission must be a person who holds or has held high judicial office. A second must be a person who has experience of dealing with immigration appeals. The Lord Chancellor's intention is that he or she should be a senior member of the immigration appellate authority, either the president of the tribunal, the chief adjudicator or a legally qualified member of the tribunal. The qualifications of the third member are not specified on the face of the Bill. However, the intention is that the third member should be a person who has experience of national security matters and is familiar with the kind of evidence that is likely to be presented to the commission. That should, in our view, provide a proper balance of knowledge and experience for the commission.

Clause 2 sets out the circumstances in which a person may appeal to the new commission. The Immigration Act 1971, and more recently the Immigration (European Economic Area) Order 1994, have previously denied any appeal in the cases described. For the most part the cases where there has been no right of appeal have been those where a decision has been taken on the basis that this would be conducive to the public good on the grounds of national security.

Clause 3 provides that the new commission will have a bail jurisdiction in respect of those cases where a person is detained under the Immigration Act 1971 and the grounds of the detention are that this would be in the interests of national security. Schedule 3 modifies the existing bail provisions for the purposes of cases dealt with by the new commission.

The detailed procedures for the new commission are not set out on the face of the Bill. However, Clause 4 indicates some of the main areas which will be covered in procedure rules made by the Lord Chancellor. These rules will, in view of their importance, be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Our intention is that a draft of the rules should be available to assist the detailed consideration of the Bill in Committee. I hope that the House will find that arrangement satisfactory. The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, and I have had what we both regard as useful and fruitful discussions. He was concerned in particular that there should be adequate opportunity for scrutiny of those rules before we discuss matters in Committee.

I do not propose to talk about Clause 4 at great length, but it may be helpful if I mention one or two aspects. The rules will make clear that an appellant will have the right to be legally represented in proceedings before the commission. Hitherto, there has been no such right.

The rules will also, however, make provision to ensure that proceedings take place before the commission without there being a risk to national security. This necessarily means that there must be provisions which restrict the need for full disclosure of the reasons for decisions to the appellant and which also allow proceedings to take place in the absence of the appellant and his or her legal representative.

In its judgment in Chahal, and in other cases involving national security considerations, the European Court of Human Rights has acknowledged that, where national security issues are at stake, consideration will almost inevitably have to be given to confidential material and that safeguards such as the ones included in the Bill may be essential. In such cases, what is needed is a remedy which is as effective as can be, given the threat to national security.

To ensure that the case against the appellant is properly scrutinised in his or her interests, Clause 4 provides certain safeguards. These necessarily fall short of full disclosure of national security information, but they build on Canadian procedures for dealing with similar cases which were commended by the European Court. In particular, the commission will be able to appoint a person—counsel—to help it in its examination of the security evidence, and in particular to look at that evidence as if on behalf of the appellant. The commission will also be expected to give the appellant as full a summary as is possible in the circumstances of any evidence taken in his absence.

The special immigration appeals commission will be replacing the present non-statutory advisory panel—generally known as the "three advisers"—which has considered cases of this type since the early 1970s. With the leave of the House, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who has chaired the panel for a number of years, and the other members of the panel for the work they have done in reviewing these difficult national security cases. The panel has, I know, provided an important safeguard for those individuals liable to deportation on national security grounds.

I reiterate that the consultations have been most welcome. I mentioned the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, but I wish also to mention the contribution made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, in private discussions with me. Perhaps, as this is the first Bill that I have introduced, I may indulge myself and say that it is a pleasure to see my long revered friend Lord Mishcon back here today at fighting weight.

Noble Lords

Hear, hear!

Lord Williams of Mostyn

My Lords, he, too, with his invariable courtesy, has indicated that he wishes to raise one or two matters today.

The Bill is a necessary measure and one which will provide additional safeguards in immigration cases which raise national security considerations. We seek to balance the need to ensure that decisions are properly reviewed and the need to ensure that information is not disclosed contrary to the public interest. Taken together we believe that the measures briefly described will accommodate the legitimate concerns we have about the nature and sources of intelligence information and give the individual appellant a substantial degree of procedural justice. These are difficult issues, but I hope that the House will agree that we have got the balance broadly right. I commend the Bill to your Lordships.

Moved, That the Bill be now read a second time.—(Lord Williams of Mostyn.)

5.5 p.m.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, the Bill before us today, which will establish a special immigration appeals commission, will have our support. Indeed, as a response to the judgment in the Chahal case, we would have sought an earlier legislative opportunity to respond along the lines set out in the Bill. As the noble Lord said, the Bill establishes a commission giving a right of appeal to those liable to be deported on the grounds of national security. At present, they do not have such a right under the Immigration Act 1971. The Bill will ensure full compliance with the judgment last November of the European Court of Human Rights.

As I said previously from the other Dispatch Box, the United Kingdom has a proud record of honouring its international obligations and commitments. But on the issue of national interest and national security, it is our guiding belief that a balance must be struck between the needs of natural justice and the needs of national security. I hope that the Bill will help to achieve that balance. Indeed, it was referred to by the Minister.

Before moving to the specifics of the Bill, I wish to make a point about national security. As I am sure the House will agree, the Chahal case raised several important points in this area. My noble friends on this side of the House have always strongly supported the European Convention on Human Rights and always complied with its judgments when we were in Government. However, the court has made a number of controversial rulings against the United Kingdom which strike at the heart of our ability as a nation to take action to uphold our national security against the pernicious threat from terrorism. But it is essential for the effective operation of the Court of Human Rights that due weight in judgments is given to the margin of appreciation so that states determine their own laws and practices, except where these are clearly contrary to the convention. Nation states must be allowed to uphold the public good of their citizens and to maintain effective national security.

I turn to the specifics of the Bill. We welcome the fact that the special immigration appeals commission will have at least one judge sitting on it, and also a member of the Immigration Appeals Tribunal or a special adjudicator. Several practitioners working in the field of immigration law have said to me that, given the increasing complexity of case work, having a specialist tribunal of this kind can only be a good thing.

However, it is not clear whether the commission will be a court of record and, as currently drafted, there are no provisions in the Bill for the decisions taken by the commission to be binding on the Home Secretary. Perhaps in reply the Minister will confirm whether that is the intention.

We would also press the Government to say clearly whether they have any plans at this stage or in the future to extend the remit of the special commission beyond that which the Bill will give it; namely, to provide a right of appeal only to those individuals who currently do not have one. I know that such clarification would be very helpful to practitioners and adjudicators alike.

Clause 4 of the Bill gives the Lord Chancellor the power to set the rules regulating appeals to the commission. Given the importance that these rules will have on the functioning of the commission, we on this side would press the Government to publish the draft rules, preferably before the Committee stage. However, I was delighted to hear the Minister say that we would see a published draft of the rules under Clause 4 before the Bill completes its passage through Parliament. I understand that we will have them before the Committee stage and I am grateful. It is important that the House is able to give full and effective consideration of the Bill, and the rules which will be set out by the Lord Chancellor will be material to that consideration.

We believe that the Bill is right not to extend legal aid to cases going before the special commission. Voluntary organisations such as the Immigration Advisory Service and the Refugee Legal Centre which currently offer advice and assistance are fully able to deal with such cases. We also do not wish to see vast quantities of taxpayers' money spent controversially on individuals whom the Home Secretary is trying to deport from the UK on the grounds that they pose a threat to national security and the public good.

I also note with amazement the financial effects of the Bill. As I understand it, the annual cost as set out in the Bill is assumed to be no more than £1,500. Even though it is intended to pay a daily rate of attendance for only one member—and I am not sure that that is actually correct; but that is the intention stated on the front of the legislation—is it really the case that no payment whatever, or even expenses, will be given to other members of the commission, especially in the light of Schedule 1, paragraph 3, which refers to "payments to members"? Referring also to the other rather mean sum of money mentioned on the front of the Bill—namely, the £1,000 for the counsel who will be appointed by the commission—can the Minister say how many days work is assumed by that calculation and what daily rate would be paid?

The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Chahal demonstrated Article 3's absolute nature. On the basis of the Government's plan to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into British law (Article 3 of which expressly rules out signatory countries from returning people to countries where there is a serious risk of their being tortured) can the Minister explain, first, how incorporation of the convention would affect our ability to deport on national security grounds; secondly, what effect the Government consider incorporation would have on the provisions of the Bill; and, thirdly, how that would relate to and, indeed, work with the recent British initiative—adopted last December as a UN declaration—denying the protection of the 1951 refugee convention to terrorists?

Is there not a danger of wholesale muddle here, hindering the United Kingdom's ability to take effective action to uphold the national interest? I urge the Government to clarify the issue and to look carefully at the detailed implications of what appears to be a conflict which could impact on this country's ability to protect the national security interest. As I said at the outset, we do support the Bill but would find it most helpful to have clarification of some of the points that I have raised.

5.12 p.m.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to be able to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Mostyn, on his appointment. He is a well-respected and well-liked colleague at the Bar and will be greatly missed in the courts. Indeed, he has made a personal sacrifice in accepting the appointment and I wish him a happy and fulfilled period in public office in a great department of state in which I once very much enjoyed serving in a more minor capacity. I should, I suppose, mention that my wife is a special adjudicator, though I doubt whether that is a matter on which I need to declare a personal interest however interested I am in her work.

A quarter of a century ago, Professor Bob Hepple observed in a learned article in the Modern Law Review on "Aliens and Administrative Justice: the Dutschke Case" that, as Mr. Dutschke sailed away from Britain in the "Winston Churchill", more than a few liberal consciences must have been aroused at this reminder of the demise of the rule of law which once protected Kropotkin and others such as Kossuth, Mazzini, Bakunin. Lenin, Marx, Engels and Sun Yat Sen, all of whom engaged in lawful political activities in this country". The present Bill is a necessary measure and is welcome to the extent that it seeks to introduce a better system of administrative justice in the area than was evident in the Dutschke case and to the extent that it gives effect to European human rights law. A purist would argue that the system is defective in the Bill in not ensuring the full panoply of natural justice in this difficult area, but I agree with the Government and with the noble Baroness that it is compatible with the rule of law to adopt a special procedure enabling the proposed appeals commission fairly to determine appeals in these exceptional cases without prejudicing the interests of justice or of national security and to do so by means of a special procedure. Lest I forget, perhaps I may just say that I do not agree with the noble Baroness if she was implying that Chahal involved the European court in excessive intervention in our system or, indeed, that there is any threat posed by that case to the security of this nation.

However, having welcomed the Bill in general from these Benches, I have to say that it is an incomplete measure and is defective both in design and execution in ways that I shall try to explain simply. As the noble Baroness indicated, the Bill was conceived by the previous Administration and, if I may say so respectfully, it bears all those hallmarks. It involves only incomplete compliance with the requirements of European human rights law. It is unfortunate that the first Home Office measure of this brave new reforming Government should have been introduced with such haste and with no time for proper consultation with people who are much more expert than I am. Nevertheless, I hope and believe that the Government will be responsive to constructive criticism and to amendments to improve the Bill in Committee.

I am most grateful to the Minister for having discussed the Bill with me in advance of today's debate. I have given him notice of my main concerns and I hope that he will be able to meet at least some of them in his reply and later in the Bill's proceedings. As the Minister said, the Bill is intended to give effect to the judgment of the European court in Chahal. The main defect in the design of the Bill is that it fails to give effect to the judgment in one important respect and will, therefore, have to be followed by further amending legislation of the corpus of immigration law. I shall return to that aspect a little later.

There are three central questions which need to be considered at this stage. First, will the Bill, and any other measures that the Government introduce, sufficiently ensure that the prohibition against torture or inhuman treatment guaranteed by international human rights codes (by which the UK is bound) is adequately safeguarded? I have in mind Article 3 of the European convention. Indeed, that question has already been asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch.

Secondly, will the commission's jurisdiction capture all the situations which need to be covered by means of this new right of appeal? Thirdly, are the powers and duties of the commission sufficient to ensure a fair procedure? As the Minister indicated, one central finding of the European court in Chahal was that there was no effective remedy under English law, whether by way of judicial review or otherwise, in cases where individuals seeking to come to this country face deportation or extradition to another country in which they are likely to face the real risk of torture or inhuman treatment in breach of Article 3.

The European court pointed out that in such cases it was irrelevant whether the individual concerned was considered to be a national security risk because the overriding requirement was to ensure protection against Article 3 torture risks. This means that there must be effective judicial review, whether by the ordinary courts, by adjudicators or by some special review body such as the commission, to ensure that Article 3 is really complied with.

More recently in the French case of H.L.R., decided on 29th April, the court reiterated that where the expulsion of an alien to a foreign country gives rise to a real risk of being subjected to ill treatment contrary to Article 3, there is an obligation not to deport the alien. It has reaffirmed that Article 3 prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman treatment—I emphasise the following words—irrespective of the victim's conduct.

At present the special immigration adjudicators are not empowered to take account of Article 3 risks except in hearing appeals under Section 8 of the 1993 Act in relation to the Geneva Refugee Convention. When they are doing that they have to decide whether there is a well founded fear that an asylum seeker will, if returned, he persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. To that extent they can have regard to Article 3 risks, but not otherwise. Suppose, for example, that an ordinary asylum seeker, not a suspected terrorist, faces a real risk of ill treatment in breach of Article 3 on some other ground not covered by the Geneva Convention. The special adjudicator has no power to take Article 3 into account. That is the first example of a gap between this Bill and the requirements of the convention which needs to be filled.

Similarly, when the Crown Court exercises its power to recommend that an offender be deported, the Crown Court is not entitled to have regard to the political system in the country to which the offender may be deported. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, made it clear in Nazari that the courts in this country are not concerned with the political systems operating in other countries. Lord Justice Lawton said it was exclusively for the Home Secretary to decide in each case whether an offender's return to his country of origin would have consequences which would make his compulsory return unduly harsh.

In other words, the present law does not empower the criminal courts, in exercising their power to recommend deportations, to have regard to the risk that the deportee will face torture, or inhuman treatment in the country to which he will be deported. They cannot take into account Article 3 and the Bill does not seek to fill that gap.

I turn now to the third kind of court, the judicial review court. That, too, is precluded from treating the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment in Article 3 as absolute in nature, when reviewing decisions by the Home Secretary or, for that matter, decisions of the criminal courts or the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. That was partly the vice that constituted a breach of the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 read with Article 3 in Chahal. Once again the present Bill is incomplete. It does not seek to fill the gap, except in cases where a right of appeal has hitherto been excluded because the Home Secretary has certified that a person's exclusion etc. was conducive to the public good.

I doubt whether the restrictive language of the Long Title of the Bill will enable it to be amended to deal with these gaps. But I hope the Minister will be able to assure the House that the Government intend at an early stage to introduce another amending Bill to deal with them, incorporating the Article 3 requirements specifically into the immigration statutes. That seems, with respect, to be a better method than relying upon the general incorporation of the convention.

As regards the requirements of the other system of European law, the Community law system, the Minister has referred to the pending case of ex parte Mann Singh Shingara and Abbas Radiom which makes quite clear that there must be merits review, including proportionality, to satisfy the requirements of Community law. There can only be effective protection to the extent to which the legal remedy allows full review of the administrative act in question. I should be grateful if the Minister could indicate in his reply whether the Government intend the present Bill to give effect to Community law as interpreted in that way in the present case. In my view it is essential that the notion of a proper review in terms of Clause 4(6) of the Bill means a full merits review.

As regards the question whether the Bill captures all the situations where a right of appeal is called for, it seems—I am not an expert and I get a headache when I try to check the chapter and verse of this—that the following cases which should be covered are at present excluded from the Bill. I have given the Minister notice of this, but I should not he surprised if more time were needed to check each of these examples. I shall briefly say what they are. It seems that refusals to revoke deportation orders in non-asylum cases; curtailment of leave cases; refusals of leave to enter and refusals of entry clearance in cases involving other than EEA nationals, are all outside the scope of the Bill at the moment but should be within it.

There also seem to he significant gaps in the bail provisions. These arise because of the differences of terminology in different provisions. For instance, the bail provisions cover only cases of national security. They do not provide for those whose exclusion is on weaker grounds and who therefore have a greater likelihood of being granted bail. The bail provisions leave out exclusion on grounds of the public good and in the interests of relations between the UK and another country, or for reasons of a political nature. There also seems to be a need to be included in the Bill a reference to Section 19 of the 1971 Immigration Act such as is contained in the 1993 asylum and immigration Act. That is because without that reference it is unclear what powers the appeals commission will have and the grounds on which it may allow or dismiss appeals.

I turn to procedural fairness. As the Bill does not seek to extend the jurisdiction of the judicial review court to examine the merits of cases involving the exclusion of individuals on non-conducive to public good grounds, it is all the more important to ensure that the procedural safeguards contemplated by the Bill for statutory appeals will comply with the requirements of European law.

Under the law as it stands, English courts cannot review the evidence on which the Home Secretary decides that someone like Mr. Chahal and his deportation would be conducive to the public good for reasons of national security. It is vital that the special appeals commission should be able to ensure in deciding an appeal both that the decision is proportionate and that the deportation or extradition of someone like Chahal will not expose him to Article 3 risks. I should be grateful if the Minister could indicate in his reply whether that is envisaged.

As the Minister has indicated, the Bill is to some extent modelled on Canadian immigration law, as suggested not I think by the court but by Justice, Liberty, the Aire Center and the JCWI in their amicus brief to the European Court. If we are to match the Canadian immigration law provisions it is important to ensure not only the right to legal representation in Clause 2 but also the right to a summary of the grounds on which a notice to deport is based, a right to give evidence and to cross-examine witnesses, the circumstances in which the commission may decide to hear evidence in the absence of the appellant, and his or her legal representative, and in such a case a right to have the case against the appellant tested by a court-appointed counsel.

We need to ensure the right to receive a summary of the evidence heard in the appellant's absence and the right to comment upon it; a power in the commission to compel the production of evidence and information and to call for witnesses, and the power to decide which information should be disclosed to the appellant. My next point was referred to by the noble Baroness; namely, the right to make a binding decision. Further, I refer to the need for the commission to publish its decision with reasons. We greatly welcome the affirmative procedure that is contemplated and the fact that the draft rules will be available before the Committee stage so that we can see whether they meet these requirements.

A small technical error has been drawn to my attention in Schedule 1 to the Bill. Paragraph 5(b)(i) provides that, The Commission shall be deemed to be duly constituted if it consists of three members", including, a member of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal qualified as mentioned in paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 to the Immigration Act 1971". It should surely say instead, designated under section 8(5) of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 and section 3(3) of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996". That is a purely technical point which no doubt can be considered further when the Bill is in Committee.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, I am puzzled by the Government's estimate of the financial implications. Indeed, I have two Questions for Written Answer. I very much hope that they may be answered today rather than in writing. First, what is the Government's estimate of the number of days each year that the proposed commission will sit to determine appeals? Secondly, what is the Government's estimate of the daily fee for counsel to be appointed by the commission?

I know that lawyers are an unpopular profession. I know that the general view is that barristers and solicitors are vastly overpaid. But I note that it is estimated that it will cost only £1,000 per year for counsel appointed by the commission in some or all of the cases heard each year. I would hope that the Government will consider using the Treasury panel, which will be security cleared, as counsel to act independently of the excluded appellant. I know that if one undertakes Treasury work, white tape work, it is almost a breach of Article 4 of the convention—a case of enforced labour or involuntary servitude without pay. I suggest that £1,000 to cover all the costs of counsel for a year's work must be a misprint. I look forward to hearing from the Minister that the figure should be £10,000 or even higher.

5.32 p.m.

Lord Mishcon

My Lords, when I ventured to put down my name to speak today it was because I wanted to thank the Minister for the Bill and for the speed with which it has been brought before your Lordships, and to say what I believe every Member of this House would want to say: what a delight it is to see my noble friend occupying this very important position in the Home Office where one can be sure that the light of humanity will certainly shine through the windows of that great department. When I decided to say that, I had no idea that the Minister would say some kind things about me. I wish him to know that they are much appreciated.

The noble Lord, Lord Lester, said that the noble Lord the Minister will be missed by the Bar. Perhaps I may merely say that he will be missed equally by the superior branch of the profession to which I have the privilege to belong.

That brings me to the half witty intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and the very serious comment made by the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, referring to the estimate in the financial memorandum of counsels' fees for one year of £1,000. I merely ask the Minister outside this Chamber, and in complete confidence, to tell me to which chambers I should apply where such reasonable charges will be made. I wish to take advantage of that professionally and I want to say that frankly to the House.

The Bill is a good measure. It has been the anxiety of the Law Society and those associations which look after the situation of immigrants and those who may be expelled from our shores that there is no right of appeal. The commission is now being set up and there is no doubt that that is a proper thing to do. Doubt was expressed by those who have been watching for the legislation to come before Parliament as to whether Section 19 of the Immigration Act will confirm the duty of the Secretary of State to accept the decision of the commission. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, referred to that point. That may have been left out inadvertently. It may be that it is deliberate. If it is deliberate, I think that the House will wish to comment on that at a future stage of the Bill.

It is also right that consideration should be given, and I believe a word of praise uttered, on the right of the commission to grant bail. That has not been mentioned. So often we have heard cases where detention has operated most harshly upon those who are looked at by the Home Office with some amount of suspicion, those who wish to enter our shores and for some reason or other are not permitted to do so by the immigration officials. This right of bail granted under the Bill is a matter of great importance and of great advantage.

The lot of a Minister is a hard one. I say immediately that it is not one of which I have personal experience. Nevertheless I have watched. If a Bill is introduced with some amount of speed after a government come into office because, for example, it is necessary, as in this case, to obey the Convention on Human Rights as set out by the Court of Human Rights, people of even the repute and kindliness of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, immediately say that there has not been enough time for consultation. If the matter is delayed then people say to the Minister, "You should have done all this before". From these Benches, I wish to congratulate the Minister on having dealt with this important matter as speedily as he has done; and I am sure that the House will grant the Bill a Second Reading.

5.38 p.m.

Lord Hylton

My Lords, I apologise for putting my name down late. I realise that the Bill is tightly drawn and limited in scope, and arises at least in part out of certain individual cases. Nevertheless, I trust that I may be granted a little latitude to make two points concerning asylum seekers and the use of detention.

First, I thank the right honourable gentleman the Home Secretary for his clear statement of the present Government's policy in a letter dated 12th March addressed to Charter 87, a movement as regards which I was one of the original signatories. The letter was positive, in particular about treating asylum seekers with respect and not leaving them destitute. However, there remains some uncertainty about policy on detaining a minority of asylum seekers, although I welcome Her Majesty's Government's intention not to use prisons for this purpose.

Will the Government reappraise the use of detention except for those who face deportation under existing immigration law? Will the Minister say now that asylum seekers will not be put into detention on mere suspicion, bearing in mind that they have sometimes escaped persecution and death only by using forged or irregular documents?

During debate on the previous asylum Bill I moved amendments dealing with the use of non-governmental organisations and of bail in some circumstances as alternatives to detention in borderline asylum applications. Will the Government please consider these points in the course of their reappraisal?

5.41 p.m.

Lord Thomas of Gresford

My Lords, I join in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Mostyn, on his elevation to the Government Front Bench. He has been a long-time colleague and adversary. His appointment gave particular pleasure to the Wales and Chester circuit, of which he was once leader and of which we are both members. I hope that he and I will continue, as we have in the past, to obey the precept which is set in the stained-glass window of Chester Crown Court: strive mightily but eat and drink as friends.

In the Chahal case, the European Court of Human Rights considered the provisions of Article 5.4 of the convention: Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful". Exception was taken earlier today to the decision of the European Court which the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, regarded as possibly an unwarranted interference in the national security of this country. May I remind the noble Baroness and those who feel that way that the principle was drafted by English lawyers who sought to express what they believed to be the common law principles that lie behind English common law—habeas corpus—and to set out the concepts of natural justice as we know them.

The position under the 1971 Act was unsatisfactory. Mr. Chahal had not been brought to justice speedily; he had been detained for six years because successive Home Secretaries had maintained that he could not safely he released for reasons of security. The Court held that there was no effective judicial control over the executive in cases of this sort. The European Court held that the domestic courts of this country did not have access to the national security evidence against him. Indeed, in earlier proceedings in the Divisional Court Lord Justice Staughton, who considered the matter on judicial review, said in his judgment: All [the allegations against him] are denied by Mr. Chahal. We cannot determine whether the Secretary of State was right, after considering the report of the advisory panel, to reach these conclusions. Nor can we review the evidence. We have to accept that the evidence justified [the decision]". Hence he concluded that it was, impossible to say that this decision of the Secretary of State that the deportation of Mr. Chahal would he conducive to the public good for reasons of national security was irrational, perverse or based on any misdirection". The position under the 1971 Act was that the court was not given the information by which to consider whether the decision of the executive was a correct one. Hence it is not surprising that the European Court of Human Rights concluded that Mr. Chahal did not have sufficient procedural safeguards to meet the standards set out in Article 5.4.

It is in the light of that judgment that the Bill has to be considered. Does it provide a measure of procedural justice? The meat of the matter is not in the Bill itself; it is to be contained in the rules to be made by the Lord Chancellor. Let us consider the Bill's structure. Clause 1 sets up the commission. I agree with noble Lords regarding the cost set out in the explanatory memorandum. I personally took it to be a misprint and that at least two noughts had been missed out on both the sums mentioned. Clause 2 sets out the jurisdiction. Clause 3 gives a waive to the possibilities of bail; although Mr. Chahal's experience, even after his application to the European Court had been declared admissible, does not give rise to any confidence that bail will be granted in this type of case. I noted the welcome given by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, to the bail provisions. I shall be interested to see how often they are actually applied.

Everything else is supplementary. The opportunity is lost to set out in the primary legislation the approach of the commission to an appeal brought before it. I follow my noble friend Lord Lester in asking what are the grounds on which the commission may allow or dismiss the appeals that it considers. From the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Williams, today, I assume that it is not simply to advise the Home Secretary as the advisory panel chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Berwick, used to do. The problem with that panel was that the evidence it received was never disclosed. There was no legal representation, and no information was given to an appellant as to the advice the panel provided to the Home Secretary, and in any event the Home Secretary was not obliged to follow the advice of the panel. It was highly unsatisfactory. It would be helpful if the Bill set out how the commission is to decide the appeals that it has before it.

I assume also that the commission is not to review the decision of the Home Secretary to determine whether it is irrational, perverse or procedurally flawed, as in a judicial review.

The Minister said that the commission is to have the power of decision. It is to carry out the balancing exercise between, for example, the threat of torture or threat to life or freedom of the appellant by return to his own country against the risk to the national security of this country. The commission will reach its own conclusion on the merits of the matter by a decision which will overrule the Home Secretary. I agree with my noble friend Lord Lester that it would be helpful, if this balancing decision is to be set out as the approach that the commission must take to appeals brought before it, that some of the factors should be enumerated. For instance, Article 3 risks should be specifically referred to in some part of the primary legislation. There is a need for clarity as to what the commission should do.

My other main objection is the nature of the commission itself. It may have a Canadian flavour; however, I do not think that it thereby answers all the problems. I know of no judicial process in this country, whether a court or a tribunal, dealing with the liberty of the individual which does not tell him the substance of the allegations that he faces. Yet Clause 4(3)(a) of the Bill makes just such a provision. He is not necessarily to be informed of all the allegations that are laid against him. I understand from the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that under Canadian legislation such a summary of allegations is required under the Canadian code. Again, the appellant need not be given full particulars of the reasons for the decision that is the subject of the appeal. It is a straightforward breach of the rules of natural justice, created not by primary legislation, with the possibility of full debate whereby this House and another place can consider the merits and importance of the national security question against breaches of natural justice; it is to be created by subordinate legislation which, though it may be by way of affirmative resolution, does not have the same force and scrutiny as primary legislation would have.

Subsection (3)(b) is just as bad as (3)(a). Proceedings may be held in the absence of the appellant and any legal representative appointed by him. The commission may appoint its own person to act on behalf of the appellant instead of his chosen legal representative. On what basis? Is the person appointed by the commission to take and follow the appellant's instructions and to have confidentiality and the benefit of legal professional privilege? Those problems all need to be addressed.

As for subsection (3)(d), which provides that the appellant "may" be given a summary of any evidence taken in his absence, that does not, in my view, accord the substantial measure of procedural justice to which the European court referred. As my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill pointed out, there is nothing in the Bill which makes it mandatory for reasons to be given and a copy of the reasons for the commission's decision to be handed to the appellant.

In addition to that, the Bill clearly envisages changes to the ordinary laws of evidence by providing for rules specifically dealing with the mode and burden of proof and the admissibility of the evidence on appeals. The safeguards which exist in our ordinary courts in relation to the use of intercepted telephone calls and mail are simply abandoned in the schedule. The Government must justify these violations of the principles of natural justice before the Bill can receive my warm commendation.

In domestic criminal cases in this country we have developed a whole code of practice in relation to matters of security and intelligence. Public interest immunity covers the sources of information, the techniques of the security services and all the other matters that need to be covered in the interests of national security. Subject to those matters, applications are made daily in the courts in the most serious cases, including cases of terrorism, which proceed with the nature of the allegations fully disclosed to defendants. Defendants remain in the court, which sits in their presence and that of their legal representatives. In cases of special security, witnesses may be concealed or the court may even sit in camera.

We already have a well developed system to deal with problems of national security and I wonder why we have to go to Canada for a code of this sort to deal with this matter. It is for the Government to justify why proceedings of this nature require such overwhelming secrecy of the Canadian flavour, such secrecy that not even the appellant himself can know the full extent of the allegations against him or be present at the hearing.

I do not consider that the Bill in its present form entirely fulfils the desire of the Court of Human Rights to ensure that the national authorities are effectively controlled by the domestic courts. Those are the operative words: the Executive should be effectively controlled by the domestic courts. Unless the gaps referred to by my noble friend Lord Lester and the matters to which I have referred are addressed, there will be a serious danger that the machinery will be challenged again in the European Court and in all probability fresh legislation would ensue. For my part, I regard this Bill as "business as usual" from the Home Office and I assure noble Lords that as far as I am concerned it is "business as usual" on these Benches.

5.55 p.m.

Baroness Anelay of St. Johns

My Lords, I add my congratulations to those already expressed to the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Mostyn, upon his appointment. I hope that he will not think it presumptuous of me to do so, having it seems only been here about five minutes myself.

We have a proud tradition in this country of honouring our international obligations and have always been a haven for those fleeing persecution and torture in their own countries. On this side of the House we believe, as my noble friend Lady Blatch said earlier, that the needs of natural justice must be balanced with the needs of maintaining effective national security. It is important that those who incite or conspire to commit terrorist acts should have no base in Britain. That is why the previous Conservative Government pushed hard at the United Nations to deny terrorists the protection of the 1951 refugee convention.

The Government have our support on this Bill. However, we seek clarification from them on a number of points on various aspects of it. I was pleased to hear the Minister's announcement today with regard to the rules, which is one of the points about which I was going to ask him. I am delighted to hear that the draft rules will be published in time for Committee.

Will the Government say today whether they have any plans at a later stage to give the special commission any greater role than the Bill currently proposes?

Secondly, do the Government intend that the decisions of the commission should be binding on the Home Secretary? That is not clear from the Bill.

Thirdly, what consideration have the Government given to the possible implications of incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into British law on the deportation of individuals on national-interest grounds and on the provisions of the Bill?

Finally, like other noble Lords today, I should like to mention one or two points about the money, about which one or two amusing remarks have been made. I should like to know how the Government have calculated the financial effects of the Bill. I am not trying to be difficult or flippant on this matter; it is simply that before coming to this House I sat on appeal tribunals for 14 years and am very aware of the problems of managing their workload in such a way that all parties are treated fairly at all times and that there is a degree of cost-effectiveness about their operation. I know that it is a difficult balancing act.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, I notice the provision in the Bill about the bail power to be given to the commission. Schedule 3, paragraph 3(2), prescribes that: A person arrested under this paragraph shall be brought before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission within twenty-four hours". It is laudable, as the noble Lord pointed out, that those under arrest should have rapid access to making a bail application. When I sit as a magistrate, I am always very keen to make sure that I am available as quickly as possible to hear bail applications. However, such a power adds both to the work of the commission and to the unpredictability of its sitting dates.

It is against that background of its workload that I found the costings for the commissioners a little puzzling. The annual sum of £1,500 projected to cover the cost of the daily rate to be paid to one member of the commission has been mentioned. I assumed before coming here today that the other two members would be volunteers to whom only expenses would be paid, but I noticed that in his opening the Minister referred to the fact that not only will one of these members come from the appeals tribunal but he or she will be a senior member of that service—one, I would venture to say, who is not accustomed to turning up day by day without any payment and certainly not without expenses.

Schedule 1, paragraph 5(a), provides that at least one member of the commission must be a person who, holds or has held high judicial office (within the meaning of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876)". I understand that we are talking about somebody of High Court judge level or above. Yesterday I contacted the Lord Chancellor's Department to ask the daily rate for a retired High Court judge who could do this work. I am told that currently it is £492 and that from 1st December 1997 it will be £509. That would seem to indicate that the Government anticipate that the commission would sit on about three days a year and I wondered whether that fitted in with the Minister's expectation.

If the Minister is considering using High Court judges who are currently appointed, I would remind him that there are already too few High Court judges to tackle the existing caseload. I hear, "Hear, hear!" from my right. At least I assume that that has to be the case, so much use is made of Section 9 judges—circuit judges and deputy High Court judges, such as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who sits on my right—who sit as High Court judges, to cover the work which the latter simply do not have time to do. Indeed, some retired High Court judges are also brought back on a per diem basis. I wonder whether the Minister has taken that into account when determining whether the current High Court judges will have time to do commission work.

Attention has also been drawn to the sum of £1,000 a year to be paid to counsel. I mention that matter with some trepidation because, like others, I do not subscribe to the public perception that lawyers are overpaid. Indeed, how could I? I am married to one. I also did some work on this point and discovered that at the moment a junior barrister, fresh into his (or her) first case, flushed with the excitement of going to the Bar, could command about £150 a day, whereas the most experienced barrister would receive perhaps £1,000 a day. So even on the average of £400-ish, one comes back to an estimate of two or three days' work a year.

It is said that it is not anticipated that the Bill would have an effect on public service manpower. However, I am very much aware that, due to the sensitive nature of the work of this commission, there would be an implication for security and for transporting the person accused, particularly if that person was not on bail, but even if on bail for making that courtroom secure. One would also have to take all that into account wherever the commission were to be held.

In addition, one would expect that some of the people who would appear before the commission by its very nature would come from outwith this country and perhaps would not necessarily be fluent in our language. There may be documents to be presented to the commission by the people who are prosecuting and acting against the defendant. Those documents would have to be subject to translation costs. Certainly, I know from my experience as a magistrate that those costs are not at all small. I await clarification of all those points from the Minister.

We support the Bill as it ensures full compliance with our commitments under the European Convention on Human Rights, though, as I said, subject to the rules to be established by the Lord Chancellor regulating the commission. We are hopeful that it strikes the right balance between the principles of natural justice and our national security needs.

6.2 p.m.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

My Lords, life is full of bitter sweetness. Until 1st May this year the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, occupied the Woolsack and until 5th May this year I was in gainful employment as a practising member of the Bar. It was not until the noble and learned Lord vacated the Woolsack and I left my former employment that either of us had the infinite pleasure of hearing unanimity in your Lordships' House that lawyers were paid far too little.

Perhaps I may deal with that point because it seems—I imagine to the noble Lords, Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Lord Thomas of Gresford—to be a topic of enormously gratifying interest. Virtually every noble Lord referred to it. The numbers likely to be involved are very small indeed. The panel which advised the Home Secretary in the past has in the past six years dealt with only six cases which were not Gulf War related. So I hope to have set a modest perspective. The legal members of the commission will probably be paid only expenses because one or two will still hold judicial office and therefore already be paid at public expense. High Court judges work very hard but I have never met one who claimed that he (or she) would not be able to spend a short period of time on possibly one or two cases a year. The sum of £1,000 may be an under-estimate. We do not expect many cases. At risk of intruding into private grief, I must say that the going rate for junior Treasury counsel at the moment is £200 to £300 a day. Perhaps some noble Lords will leap up immediately to say that that is grotesque under-remuneration, but, alas, that is a fact of life.

I leave remuneration on one side and go to more important matters.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, I am deeply grateful to the Minister for giving way. He has not dealt with security, translation and interpreters or ancillary assistance that would need to be provided on hearing days of the commission.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

That is so and there may be some costs of that kind. I refer to the section of the Bill on the financial effects in the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum. One is dealing here with the costs of the commission itself and the costs of counsel and, as the noble Baroness noted, they do not include the costs of interpretation.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, for her overall support of these matters. I know she will join with me in the conclusion that one has to bear national security very carefully in mind. It is a balance of interests and of rights. Any government would be unacceptably irresponsible not to bear in mind the fact that there are small numbers of people who come to our country with terrorist and murderous intent. We have a duty not only to the civil order of this country and to our own citizens but also to foreign nationals who may be the object of violent terrorist activity.

We have tried to strike a decent, reputable balance between competing interests. I entirely agree with the observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that it will be a balance. There will be some disadvantages to someone who is accused of terrorism, but those are inevitable disadvantages when one has to perform a balancing exercise.

If your Lordships will allow me, I shall not deal with each individual contribution distinctly. It may be more fruitful if I attend to topic rather than author.

First, there is the very important question raised by the noble Baroness and echoed by subsequent contributions from your Lordships of whether the decision of the commission is to be binding on the Home Secretary. I do not dissent from the proposition that that is an essential and legitimate question, to which I give the answer, which I hope is acceptable to the House, that it is intended that the decision should bind the Home Secretary. I respectfully suggest that that is a very significant advance in human rights terms. It is not expressed in the Bill and we shall give consideration to bringing forward a clarifying amendment to put that beyond doubt. However, I hope that I have made it as plain as possible. I do not believe that that is simply a cosmetic concession. It has been thought about with care, bearing in mind our obligations under the convention and also the judgment in Chahal.

With regard to related matters, the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, asked whether this would be—I believe I have his phrase correctly—a full merits review. The intention of the Government is that the commission should have the same jurisdiction as the existing appeal bodies, which means a full appeal on the merits.

Questions were raised about jurisdiction. We shall certainly look at the questions that have been put—they were, if I may say so, quite careful questions—as to whether the commission's jurisdiction is as full as it should be. Consideration will certainly be given to that.

I have to deal with Article 3, which is another important question. There is no danger that new procedures will result in a person being returned to a place in which he or she will be at real risk of being subjected to torture or cruel or degrading treatment. Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights prohibits us from returning a person to a place where there are substantial grounds for believing that such real risk would subsist. The absolute nature of Article 3, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, indicated, was determined by Chahal. I hope that that will be recognised and accepted as a distinct step forward or at least a distinct amplification of our responsibilities.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Before he leaves Article 3, perhaps I may again make the point that Article 3 needs to be a binding standard within the scope of this Bill. There will still be the gap to which I referred when one is dealing not with suspected terrorists and others of that kind but with the routine asylum seeker, where, unless the special adjudicators and the criminal judges are given the power to give effect to Article 3, we shall be in the paradoxical situation in which wrongdoers such as suspected terrorists are given Article 3 protection under this Bill, but an innocent asylum seeker or a criminal offender facing deportation under sentence of the court is not given the same protection. Perhaps the Minister can indicate whether that gap also can be filled, if not in this Bill, then subsequently.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that intervention. As he rightly observed in his earlier remarks, those questions are outwith the scope of this specific Bill. That in itself does not prevent the noble Lord from putting his question. My answer—which I hope he will find a prudent and acceptable one—is that the Government's policy is to incorporate the Convention. Detailed work is being done on the nature of that incorporation and it is appropriate to await further discussions with interested parties, not least the noble Lord, as to exactly how that incorporation will affect our domestic, criminal and civil jurisdictions. It is not a point that is being overlooked.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, I understand that the Minister is about to leave that point. The specific question that I posed related not only to the Article 3 point; it related to the juxtaposition of Article 3 and the declaration adopted earlier this year at the United Nations, the effect of which conflicts with Article 3. My specific question was whether thought had been given as to how they sit together on this issue.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

My Lords, I am grateful again for that distinct question from the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, as to whether or not there is a conflict. I repeat my answer that Article 3 is an absolute obligation. In respect of her specific question in relation to the declaration on terrorism, terrorists will benefit from the provision of Article 3 because it is an absolute obligation which has been specified by the European Court, as was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill

My Lords, is the Minister aware that not only is that answer correct under the Convention, but also, in relation to the convention against torture by which we are bound, exactly the same applies? However hard it may be to apply in practice, even if one has a terrorist with a ticking time bomb situation, international human rights adopt an absolutist view, which is that one cannot torture a terrorist and one cannot extradite a terrorist to a country where he will face torture. Nothing being done in the United Nations conflicts with that. Is the Minister aware that that is the general understanding of international human rights law across the world?

Lord Williams of Mostyn

My Lords, I am aware of that general understanding and offer this as an observation. It is easy to accord decent, civil rights treatment to decent, reasonable people; that is not the present problem. The problem is affording decent treatment to those who behave extremely badly, and I believe that to be one distinguishing mark of a civilised as well as a civil society.

The question of bail was specifically raised. We envisage that it may well be possible for bail applications to be heard by a single member to avoid the delays to which the noble Baroness referred. That is extremely important and I was heartened to hear someone of the authority of my noble friend Lord Mishcon saying that it is important. If delays occur and bail is denied, whatever the ultimate outcome, the complainant, appellant or applicant—however described—may well have suffered injustice.

I turn to one or two further questions which were specific to the noble Lord, Lord Hylton. Detention of an asylum seeker is only used as a last resort. Temporary admission is granted wherever possible. Only around 1.5 per cent.—the noble Baroness smiles because that may well be the sort of answer that she gave to me by way of reproof when we were in separate and distinct reincarnations—of asylum seekers are detained. The majority of those—75 to 80 per cent.—will have had their applications refused. Almost every asylum seeker has the right to apply to an independent adjudicator for bail. We do not incarcerate persons on mere suspicion alone. I hope that is a specific answer to the noble Lord's question. There are various ways, as is well known, of challenging detention by various applications for habeas corpus, applications for bail or judicial review.

We are conscious of the fact that lengthy periods of detention are undesirable and in many cases plain wrong. One of the aspects at which the Government are looking is the length of detention, the use of bail, the use of chief immigration officer's bail, the alternatives to detention consistent with other interests, when detention should be used, whether prisons ought to be used for detention and what is the place of bail hostels. The noble Lord had that particularly in mind because he was good enough to write to me in regard to the use of bail in these circumstances. The Government have those matters under review.

I detected, I hope, a general welcome to the steps that have been taken in the expression of the Government's policy in this Bill. I readily accept that there are challenging questions to be asked and they will essentially devolve on the nature of the rules to be produced by the Lord Chancellor. I reiterate the commitment that we wish the draft rules to be available so that they may be considered at Committee stage. They are important.

I do not entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford—whom I should earlier have thanked for his generous welcome. He focused in particular on Clause 4(3)(a), which says that rules may provide that proceedings may take place, without the appellant being given full particulars of the reasons". There is no sensible way of running a system like this without that disabling power being given to the commission. At the risk of being tedious—I hope I am not—I repeat that some of these people are extremely dangerous not only to their countries of origin, but also to the people of this country and fellow nationals of their country of origin in this country. No responsible government, in any circumstance, will give to an alleged terrorist such particulars as will enable him to murder or maim anyone who is resident in this country or elsewhere. One must have a sensible and prudent balance.

These proceedings are not perfectly analogous with ordinary criminal proceedings in this country. They cannot be. That is why we intend to make provision, first, for legal representation—that is the appellant's right; secondly, for the appointment of security vetted counsel to the commission who will be able to act as though for the appellant. They will not disclose that material to the appellant; such a system cannot work. It is not a perfect system but, alas, the world which we inhabit is not perfect either.

I hope that I have dealt with matters as fully as seems reasonable this evening. I recognise, and for my part welcome, a detailed scrutiny of the rules. My belief, fortified by five years sitting opposite, is that the more scrutiny this House gives to the detail, the better the legislation is in the end. I hope I have dealt with at least the most important aspects, forgiving myself for starting with the remuneration of lawyers. Further details will be forthcoming and I welcome that further consideration.

This is the first Bill which I have had the honour to introduce and perhaps I may say how grateful I am for the welcome given to me by those present. As the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, knows, it means a great deal to have a fruitful working relationship, which I hope we have always had in the past and know will continue in the future. I commend the Bill to the House.

On Question, Bill read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

House adjourned at twenty minutes past six o'clock.