Police Bill [H.L.]

HL Deb 26 November 1996 vol 576 cc123-94

3.14 p.m.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Blatch)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Baroness Blotch.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.] Clauses 1 and 46 agreed to.

Schedule 1 [Appointment of Members of the Service Authorities]:

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 1: Page 50, line 9, leave out ("Three") and insert ("Two").

The noble Lord said: Before starting on the substantive business and in order to allow noble Lords to leave quietly, perhaps I may apologise to the Committee for my incorrect grouping of the amendments. When I was sorting out the chairmanship from the membership of the core authority I should have separated Amendments Nos. 2, 3 and 6 from the rest rather than Amendment No. 6 alone. On this occasion, therefore, I am moving Amendment No. 1 and speaking also to Amendments Nos. 4 and 5.

The Committee will perhaps be surprised that, in the consideration of this Bill, we have allowed Clauses 1 and 46 to go through without amendments. That is most unusual in the consideration of a complicated Bill, but there are good reasons for it. I believe that those good reasons were made clear at Second Reading when the Opposition gave their support to the establishment of the statutory National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad. These are not matters of political controversy between us and Clauses 1 and 46, which set up those bodies on a statutory basis, have received our entire approval.

Where we differ from the Government is in the constitution in particular of the core authority which is to direct the operations of these two organisations. When I speak to these amendments I am reminded of the amendments that we made to the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill only a few years ago. I am disappointed that the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, and the noble Lord, Lord Carr of Hadley, who were in their seats only a minute ago, are not in their places now. They played such a valiant part in persuading the Government that their original proposals were wrong. The issue that is before us is very similar; that is, whether the Secretary of State should have an effective majority in the core steering authority for these two organisations.

As is made clear in the schedule, what is proposed by the Government is that the so-called independent members, who are in fact members appointed by the Secretary of State, should form half of the core membership of the two bodies and that the chairman who is to be appointed by the Secretary of State should have a second and casting vote. In effect, therefore, that is giving the Secretary of State a majority of the effective voting membership of the core authority. It was exactly those proposals which the House, with support from all sides, resisted so strongly when we considered the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill.

What we are proposing in Amendments Nos. 1, 4 and 5 is that, instead of three so-called independent members appointed by the Secretary of State, there should be only two; that the civil servant member to be appointed by the Secretary of State should be removed from the core membership and that the two resulting vacancies in the core membership of 10 should be filled by local authority members of police authorities.

It is not as though there were any shortage of effective controls for the Secretary of State in respect of either of these two organisations. For the sake of simplicity I shall concentrate on the National Criminal Intelligence Service, although similar provisions apply for the National Crime Squad. When we look at the clauses in Part I of the Bill which deal with the National Criminal Intelligence Service we find that Clause 25 provides that the Secretary of State has the responsibility for ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of NCIS. In Clause 26 it is the Secretary of State who sets objectives for NCIS. In Clause 27 it is the Secretary of State who sets performance targets for NCIS. In Clause 29 it is the Secretary of State who has power to remove the director general if necessary. In Clause 30 it is the Secretary of State who has power to order inspections of the NCIS and to give directions to the service in the case of an adverse inspection report.

In Clause 31 it is the Secretary of State who has power to require from the authority reports on any subject he chooses. In Clause 32 he has power to require reports from the director general on any subject that he chooses. In Clause 34 it is the Secretary of State who has power to order inquiries into the operations of NCIS. In Clause 35 he has the right to impose standardised equipment on NCIS. In Clause 36 the Secretary of State has the right to impose the requirement that standardised common services should be used by NCIS. Clause 37 gives him power by regulation to lay down disciplinary procedures. In Clause 38 he has the right by regulation to lay down complaints procedures. There can be no doubt that the Secretary of State has the National Criminal Intelligence Service tied hand and foot to his own wishes and to the wishes of central government.

If that were all, perhaps the argument that he should then appoint an effective voting majority of the members of the core authority would have some validity. But there is one element that I have not yet described: the funding of the NCIS. The Minister gave a long and helpful but still very difficult explanation of the funding system in her admirable speech at Second Reading. Since 1992 when NCIS was founded under executive arrangements—that is, without statutory authority—the service has been funded by central government. It is now proposed that NCIS should be funded by top-slicing from the funds of police authorities. As we shall discuss when considering subsequent amendments, there is no particular provision to ensure that the activities of NCIS are not to the financial detriment of other police services. Therefore, the funding of the NCIS, which is so comprehensively directed in detail by the Secretary of State, falls on local authorities, local police authorities and ultimately, after grant, on council taxpayers. In those circumstances, it is wrong that the Secretary of State should have such a majority in the core authority. Surely, it is right that local authority members should have the majority of the places in the authority that directs the ways in which their money, not central government's, is spent. I beg to move Amendment No. 1.

Baroness O'Cathain

I was a little concerned when the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, described certain members of the NCIS as so-called independent members. First, one would hope that those appointed to this body would be independent. Secondly, the inclusion of a civil servant in the NCIS is most valuable. Noble Lords opposite have said on many occasions, not least in the debates on the privatisation of Recruitment and Assessment Services, that civil servants are different. They have a special ethos; they are objective; they are rigorous in analysis, and they have integrity. All of that would be exceedingly important in the new authority. Thirdly, if one reduces the number of independent members, not so-called independent members, from three plus a civil servant to two—from four to two—it will be difficult for those independent members to be strong enough to counterbalance the overwhelming influence on the other side, as it were. It is important for independent members of any body to have solidarity. That is based on my experience as a non-executive director of several companies. When the balance of the board is tipped too far in the direction of executive directors, independent non-executive directors find it exceedingly difficult to maintain the balance. Perhaps one should think about this two or three times before deciding to support the amendment.

Lord Dixon-Smith

I listened to the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, with great interest. He referred to so many clauses and other aspects of the Bill that for a moment I had the vain hope that the Committee would not hear about them any further. However, I assume that such an optimistic wish will not be part of this afternoon's discussion.

I should like to make two points. First, NCIS and the National Crime Squad will be above all national services. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suppose that national representation is at least as appropriate as local representation. I do not want to go into the detail of the financial arrangements now. Local members sitting at this level are in one sense answerable to no one. In this instance independent members who are appointed by the Secretary of State—my instinct is not to like such appointees—are likely to be independent because the Secretary of State is himself answerable to Parliament. The other place will quite rightly call him to account if he appoints anyone who is seen to be "not independent".

Lord Harris of Greenwich

I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, expresses a very optimistic view. Let us go back to the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act. On that occasion we talked about independent members and there was a great to-do in this House. Eventually, the Government realised that they were about to be defeated and sued for peace. A number of us—the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, myself and others—went into a committee room to discuss what would be a satisfactory formula.

The idea that the other House would pursue the Minister vigorously if he appointed the wrong independent members was very soon disproved. Under the very complicated formula which was eventually announced by the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, we were told that there was a new system to appoint these so-called independent members to police authorities, as a result of which a number of names came before the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary then sent his own abbreviated list of so-called independent members to the police authority. That authority then chose a number from that list. Following a Question for Written Answer tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hilton of Eggardon, it became clear that every one of those names had been checked with the Home Office Whip in the House of Commons. So much for independent members! They were all checked to ensure that they had the right political views, or at least not unacceptable political views. I believe that that is what "independent members" means so long as Mr. Michael Howard is Home Secretary. I hope that the situation will change if there is a change of government.

The noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, drew a comparison between the independent members of the new authorities and executive directors or non-executive directors of companies. With great respect to the noble Baroness, I cannot understand the analogy. Local authority members put forward by the local authorities are in no sense executive directors; they are merely elected representatives of the people. That seems to me to be a simple and desirable way of making such a decision. They are accountable to their own police authorities, if I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith. They represent someone, whereas the so-called independent members will represent only Mr. Howard if he is still Home Secretary at the time the Bill reaches the statute book.

Baroness O'Cathain

Before the noble Lord sits down, perhaps I may make the point that I was not saying that it was a direct analogy, but that it reminded me of the situation. The people who will be appointed by the local authority will have the same relationship with one another as an executive on a board would have. The point I was making was that we need to have a balance, because if we have too few of either—say there were only three or four local authority members while the rest were independent, and I refuse to call them "so-called independents", because they are independent—there would be a difficulty. The balance according to the Bill is about right. I drew on my own experience just to show that it can become difficult. Just one or two can result in a situation where one loses that sense of balance.

3.30 p.m.

Lord Campbell of Alloway

I shall leave aside for a moment the question of independents about which the Committee has heard serious argument. On this I agree with the question of balance put forward by my noble friend Lady O'Cathain. The short points which I wish to make concern the logic of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, to which I attended with the utmost care. First, he took the point, and took it well—he took all his points well, if I may say so—that the Secretary of State has effective power. He referred to most, if not all, of the relevant clauses in the Bill. Then he conceded, as I understood it, that because of that it should have and would have a majority of voting power but for the question of funding.

Then one comes to the question of funding. The noble Lord took the point that because there was a distinction between what was funding by central government and is now funding by the police authority, there was some effective and realistic distinction. With respect to the noble Lord, I cannot see why there should be. This is a totally different structure of Bill from the Bill to which the noble Lord referred during which my noble friend Lord Carr of Hadley made a notable contribution which I think I supported. On the presentation of this argument by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, I cannot see the substance of the justification for this amendment.

Baroness Blatch

While I accept fully the noble Lord's apology over the amendments, I must say that it makes it rather difficult. It was not until mid-day that I knew that we were going to discuss Amendments Nos. 1 to 5 with Amendment No. 6 separately. Two hours later I was told that Amendment No. 2 would come out and join Amendment No. 6. Only when the noble Lord was on his feet did I know that Amendment No. 3 was being decoupled. I say that as a preface, because there may be some overlap between me responding to this set of amendments and the next set which, as I understand it now, is to be Amendments Nos. 2, 3, and 6.

There is no doubt that the membership of the two new service authorities to maintain important new national services was bound to be the subject of close scrutiny by the Committee. It would be astonishing if that were not so. The Government's approach has been to try to strike a careful balance. We need to preserve our tripartite and essentially local system of policing, and yet ensure that national and multi-agency interests are adequately reflected in these new arrangements. That is not an easy balance to strike and I entirely accept that there is room for more than one view on precisely how it should be achieved.

Turning to the detail of these amendments, they propose that the number of independent members should be reduced from three to two. First, perhaps I may remind the Committee that there are three members on one service authority of 19 and three members on another service authority of 17. The introduction of independent members into local police authorities has proved to be an enormous success. They have introduced new ideas and brought new skills and experience to the work of police authorities. I have no doubt that the role of independent members in the new service authorities will prove to be equally valuable, as my noble friend Lady O'Cathain said. Reducing their number from three to two will be a vital opportunity lost. It will not be possible to achieve the wider spread of experience and skills which would be possible with three independent members, and it will be that much harder for the independent members, as my noble friend said, to make an impact on the business of the service authorities. We do not believe that it is unreasonable on bodies with a membership of 19 in the case of the National Criminal Intelligence Service and 17 in the case of the National Crime Squad for each to have three independent members. Indeed, we believe that three is really a minimum requirement if there is to be a meaningful independent element to the arrangements.

Nor is it clear what other practical advantage is to be gained by reducing the number of independent members in this way. The amendments propose that the vacancy created by reducing the number of independent members should be filled by a local authority representative. But representatives of police authorities, including those for the metropolitan police district, Scotland and Northern Ireland, will comprise half the 16 voting members on the service authority for the National Criminal Intelligence Service. When it comes to voting on the levy, they will comprise two-thirds of the nine members eligible to vote. We believe that this strikes the right balance for an authority, which needs to reflect UK and multi-agency interests. It is by no means obvious, when seeking to reconcile all these various interests and keep the overall size of the authority to manageable proportions, why the number of local authority representatives from England and Wales, who already form the largest single block, should have even more representatives.

When one looks at the service authority for the National Crime Squad, the effect of the amendments is even more difficult to defend. Representatives of police authorities already have an overwhelming majority of the voting membership both generally and in relation to decisions on the levy. There really is no justification for extending this majority still further.

I accept that these issues are complex. But it is wrong to focus on the constitution of the "core" membership as if it were somehow a separate body, or that "core" members had some extra powers or functions. They do not. The purpose of the core membership is simply to bring a common sense of purpose and direction to services which will need to work very closely together.

We believe that such core membership is preferable to having a single service authority for both services, or having two totally separate authorities. We need to look at the overall membership of the two authorities. On that basis, we believe that the balance of independent and local police authority members is right and that these amendments would not achieve a better balance.

I turn now to the question of the role of Crown servants on the service authorities. These amendments would exclude Crown servants from the core membership of the service authorities. The result would be that it would not be possible for all three home departments to be represented on the service authority for the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the Secretary of State would not be represented at all on the service authority for the National Crime Squad. I know that it has been argued that the Secretary of State is represented in other ways, but that is to misunderstand the role of those other members. The independent members, although appointed by the Secretary of State, will most definitely not represent him. They will be utterly independent, able to deal with all issues exactly as they, as individuals, see them. Their purpose is to bring their skills and their experience to the work of the service authorities, not to represent the views of the Secretary of State.

I say in passing to the noble Lord who is enjoying a little scoff on the sidelines on the Front Bench of the Liberal Party that he does a great disservice to the many people appointed to authorities up and down this land who perform magnificently and independently, even though, from time to time, their appointee is the Secretary of State or a Secretary of State.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

We are playing around with this word "independent". Similar guarantees were given by the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, on the last occasion we discussed the matter. Can I ask a simple question? If the Government are striving for genuinely independent people, why, on the last occasion, was every name checked by the Government Whips' Office in the House of Commons.

Baroness Blatch

The noble Lord cites one particular instance which has been properly answered in another place. There are thousands of people who are appointed by Ministers from all parties. That was done under the party opposite just as it is under this party. I say to the noble Lord, as he sits there enjoying his moment of ridicule, that he does a disservice to many people who, I believe, give valiantly and generously of their time, their expertise and their judgment as independent members of many bodies throughout the land.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

The noble Baroness has been good enough to say that the question was answered in another place. I am, frankly, not aware of the answer in another place. On the basis of the noble Baroness's statement that these people on this occasion, as on the last, are to be genuinely independent, receiving no form of direction, advice, or anything from the Home Secretary, why, as far as the independent members of the Police Authority were concerned, was every name checked by the Government Whips' Office in the House of Commons? The noble Baroness says that the question was answered in another place. I do not know the answer. Can she tell us?

Baroness Blatch

I shall bring this altercation to an end by simply saying to the noble Lord, and I hope the House will accept it, that we now have Nolan's procedures in place. These are points that will be made entirely consistent with Nolan procedures. If the noble Lord wishes to take issue with that, the noble Lord may do so. I certainly wish to put on record my admiration of the people who give of their expertise, their time and their judgment in public service up and down the land as a result of being appointed by members of various departments of government.

Similarly, the person appointed to represent the Secretary of State in his capacity as police authority for the Metropolitan Police district will not be able to represent the Secretary of State's interests more widely. That person will be expected to speak in the interests of the Metropolitan Police district and that may well not be consistent with, or take account of, wider considerations. In short, the only way in which the wider responsibilities of the Secretary of State can be properly represented on both service authorities is by the presence of a Crown servant. May I, at once, associate myself with the comments made by my noble friend Lady O'Cathain when she described the civil servants and their role in such committees. That is why the Bill proposes that one Crown servant—one Crown servant—should serve on both authorities, with two additional places on the service authority for the National Criminal Intelligence Service to represent the interests of the Secretaries of State for Scotland and for Northern Ireland. We believe that such representation is reasonable, although we recognise that the role of Crown servants should be to contribute to the deliberations of the service authorities and should not extend to the power to vote.

These are important issues which rightly deserve close scrutiny. I have sought to explain why we believe that the proposals in the Bill fairly reflect the interests of all the parties who will need to he involved in maintaining and supporting the new services if they are to be effective. There is always room for argument about whether arrangements of this kind strike the right balance. We believe that we have done so and, for the reasons I have explained, we are not persuaded that the amendments represent an improvement.

References have been made to the local police authorities. That point makes itself. They were local police authorities. There was a genuine debate in this House and the Government eventually reconciled differences between the views of this House and the Secretary of State. This is a national body with plenty of local representation on it, but it is right that there should be some people representing the wider national view as well.

There are many disadvantages, and in those circumstances I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment. If not, I hope that noble Lords will support me in the Division Lobbies.

3.45 p.m.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

The Minister was not, of course, in the Home Office team at the time of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill. If the noble Baroness had been she would have recognised some of her arguments as being those which the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, put forward on behalf of the Government and the Home Office at that time and about which the House expressed such scepticism that the Government were persuaded they were not going to get their proposals through and had to make very welcome concessions.

Incidentally, if I may add to what the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, my understanding is that the solution we came up with, which we persuaded the Government to adopt, is working rather well. The appointment of the third independent member and of the chairman is actually working, so perhaps our efforts were not entirely in vain.

However, there is an element of unreality in the arguments, in particular of the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, and also of the Minister, about the use of the word "independent" and objections to the use of the phrase, "so-called independent". These people are appointed by the Secretary of State. We know perfectly well what that means in practice, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, pointed out. We know perfectly well that the names in the end go through the Government Whips' Office in the House of Commons just as we know that when local appointments are being made a list is posted up behind the bar in the local Conservative Club. There is no doubt about these things. We do not have to pretend. We do not have to have mock innocence about it. When the Secretary of State makes an appointment he makes an appointment with his own objectives in mind. Those objectives are political as well as administrative.

Baroness O'Cathain

I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I find this difficult because I have worked on three separate government organisations or government sponsored organisations. One was the Design Council; another was the Engineering Council; and another was a marketing thing for the Ministry of Agriculture. I have to say that on each occasion I was very independent. In fact, at one stage I was told I was a bit of a loose cannon, which I rather enjoyed. But although I got my letter from the Secretary of State for each of those three appointments I never thought that my non-pay and rations, so to speak, or my job with them, or my position with each of the three, depended on my kowtowing to the Secretary of State. Far from it. I felt independent, and I operated independently.

I am sure there are people sitting on the other side of the House who have accepted government positions from this Government who are acting in precisely the same way on health authorities and so on.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

The noble Baroness has chosen to personalise it, which I certainly did not wish to do. I recall that she came to this House on a Conservative working list and then found that she could not sit on the Conservative Benches because she was a local government employee earning more than £19,000 a year, and I hope a lot more. Therefore, she sat on the Cross Benches. I do not suppose that she gave up her membership of the Conservative Party at that time, and I do not suppose she changed her opinions. I am sure she was as independent then as she is now. I have no doubts about her independence at any time.

Baroness O'Cathain

I must ask to be heard again. I was not a member of the Conservative Party when I joined this House. I was not.

Baroness Blatch

I was about to say that noble Lords opposite started this one, so I make no apology for intervening. I want simply to defend my noble friend. I believe she has acted properly on all occasions. I can even say as a Front Bencher that I have been on the Front Bench when my noble friend has taken issue with the Government. Therefore, she is a very independent lady indeed.

A feeling is emerging from the remarks of noble Lords opposite that I do not wish to be taken seriously; namely, that if somebody who happens to be a Conservative is appointed to a body, that person is incapable of being independent. To personalise the matter, there is a noble Lord on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench who, as I understand it. was an appointee of this Government. I suspect that Liberal Democrat and Labour appointees, many of them on health authorities, are doing a good job. Because—

Lord Harris of Greenwich

May I ask to whom the noble Baroness refers? Will she be good enough to give a name?

Baroness Blatch

My understanding is that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, was appointed to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

Lord Thomas of Gresford

The Minister is absolutely right. I resigned because of Mr. Michael Howard's change to the criminal injuries compensation scheme, a matter to which I referred when I made my maiden speech.

Baroness Blatch

The noble Lord makes my point for me. That confirms the noble Lord's independence. I am simply saying that being of Liberal Democrat, Labour or Conservative persuasion in terms of the vote does not inhibit people from being independent and taking issues as they see them, on their merit, and making their own judgment. That is important.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

The Minister does not need to defend her noble friend Lady O'Cathain; she was not being attacked. Had she listened to my remarks she would have heard me praising the noble Baroness's independence at all times.

Personal issues apart, there is a profound difficulty. To accuse those of us who attack the expanding use of quangos in this country and attack the use of quangos to replace bodies elected by local people of doing a disservice to the individuals who serve on those quangos is not to elevate public debate on the issue. There is no way in which we can express a general opinion regarding the use of nomination, as opposed to the election of members of the many local authorities, if we are to be ruled out of order and told that we are doing a disservice to the individuals concerned. We oppose quangos because we are opposed to a system of nomination as opposed to election; and we are opposed to the effect of that on subsidiarity and democracy in this country. We do not do so out of personal antagonism towards any of the individuals appointed to the quangos.

Lord Dixon-Smith

Perhaps the noble Lord might agree that in this particular instance we are not dealing with the replacement of some local democratic body by a quango. If any body is involved at all in this matter it is the Home Office, which at present has control of NCIS. There is of course at the present time no National Crime Squad.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

Exactly, the noble Lord makes my point. What we see here is the creation of a new quango. We are seeing the creation of a new core membership which does not exist now and in which the Secretary of State will have an effective voting majority, as the Minister recognised. That is not a criticism of any of the individuals who are likely to be appointed to that body.

Lord Dixon-Smith

The noble Lord might concede that that is perhaps preferable to control by the Home Secretary himself, which seems to be the alternative.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

It is control by the Home Secretary himself. The nominations are made by the Home Secretary. The alternative that we propose is that it should not be the Home Secretary, but that a majority should be appointed by local authorities, the police and chief officers of police. The Minister and her friends have made our case very effectively for us. They made clear that their objection to this degree of democratic control—over something that will be paid for not by central government but by local authorities—is political. They appear to have made the case for these amendments more effectively than I was able to do. I wish to take the opinion of the Committee on Amendment No. 1.

3.55 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 96; Not-Contents, 172.

Division No. 1
CONTENTS
Addington, L.	Blease, L.
Allen of Abbeydale, L.	Bonie, L.
Barnett, L.	Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Carter, L.
Berkeley, L.	Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.
Blackstone, B.	Clinton-Davis, L.

Dahrendorf, L	McIntosh of Haringey, L.
David, B.	McNally, L.
Dean of Beswick, L. [Teller.]	Mallalieu, B.
Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, B.	Mar and Kellie, E.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.	Mason of Bamsley, L.
Donoughue, L.	Merlyn-Rees, L.
Dortnand of Easington, L.	Milner of Leeds, L.
Dubs, L.	Molloy, L.
Elis-Thomas, L.	Monkswell, L.
Exmouth, V.	Morris of Castle Morris, L.
Falkland, V.	Nicol, B.
Farrington of Ribbleton, B.	Party, L.
Fisher of Rednal, B.	Paul, L.
Fitt, L.	Peston, L.
Gallacher, L.	Plant of Highfield, L.
Geraint, L.	Prys-Davies, L.
Gladwin of Clee, L.	Ramsay of Cartvale, B.
Gould of Pottemewton, B.	Rea, L.
Graham of Edmonton, L. [Teller.]	Richard, L.
Grenfell, L.	Ritchie of Dundee, L.
Grey, E.	Robson of Kiddington, B.
Harris of Greenwich, L	Rodgers of Quarry Bank, L.
Haskel, L.	Sainsbury, L.
Hayman, B.	Scanlon, L.
Hayter, L.	Serota, B.
Henderson of Brampton, L.	Sewel, L.
Hilton of Eggardon, B.	Shannon, E.
Hollis of Heigham, B.	Shaughnessy, L.
Hooson, L.	Shepherd, L.
Howie of Troon, L.	Simon, V.
Hughes, L.	Stallard, L.
Hutchinson of Lullington, L.	Stoddart of Swindon, L.
Hylton, L.	Strabolgi, L.
Jeger, B.	Tenby, V.
Jenkins of Hillhead, L.	Thomas of Gresford, L.
Jenkins of Putney, L.	Tordoff, L
Judd, L.	Turner of Camden, B.
Kilbracken, L.	White, B.
Kilpatrick of Kinctaig, L.	Whitty, L.
Kirkhill, L.	Wigoder, L.
Lytton, E.	Williams of Elvel, L.
McConnell, L.	Winston, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Charteris of Amisfield, L.
Addison, V.	Chesham, L. [Teller.]
Ailesbury, M.	Courtown, E.
Ailsa, M.	Cox, B.
Aldington, L.	Craig of Radley, L.
Allenby of Megiddo, V.	Cranbome, V. [Lord Privy Seal.]
Anelay of St. Johns, B.	Crathome, L.
Annan, L.	Cockney, L.
Ashboume, L.	Cullen of Ashboume, L.
Astor of Hever, L.	Cumberlege, B.
Barber of Tewkesbury, L.	Dacre of Glanton, L.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Davidson, V.
Bemers, B.	Dean of Harptree, L.
Blaker, L.	Denham. L.
Blatch, B.	Denton of Wakefield, B.
Bledisloe, V.	Devonport, V.
Blyth, L.	Dixon-Smith, L.
Brabazon of Tara, L.	Downshire, M.
Braine of Wheatley, L.	Elibank, L.
Brookes, L.	Ellenborough, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.	Elles, B.
Burnham, L.	Elliott of Morpeth, L.
Butterworth, L.	Elton, L.
Byford, B.	Eme, E.
Cadman, L.	Fairfax of Cameron, L.
Caithness, E.	Feldman, L.
Campbell of Alloway, L.	Ferrers, E.
Campbell of Cray, L.	Fraser of Cannyllie, L.
Camegy of Lour, B.	Gainford, L.
Chadlington, L.	Geddes, L.
Chalker of Wallasey, B.	Gisborough, L.

Gormanston, V.	Napier and Ettrick, L.
Goschen, V.	Nelson, E.
Griffiths of Fforestfach, L.	Northesk, E.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.	O'Cathain, B.
Halsbury, E.	Onslow, E.
Harding of Petherton, L.	Oppenheim-Bames, B.
Hardinge of Penshurst, L.	Orkney, E.
Harris of Peckham, L.	Palmer, L.
Hastings, L.	Palumbo, L.
Hemphill, L.	Park of Monmouth, B.
Henley, L.	Pender, L.
Hogg, B.	Perry of Southwark, B.
Holdemess, L.	Peyton of Yeovil, L.
HolmPatrick, L.	Pilkington of Oxenford, L.
Hothfield, L.	Pym, L.
Howe, E.	Quinton, L.
Hylton-Foster, B.	Rankeillour, L.
Ilchester, E.	Rathcavan, L.
Inchcape, E.	Reay, L.
Inglewood, L.	Rees, L.
Jellicoe, E.	Renfrew of Kaimsthorn, L.
Jenkin of Roding, L.	Rennell, L.
Johnston of Rockport, L.	Renton, L.
Kinloss, Ly.	Richardson, L.
Knights, L.	Rotherwick, L
Lauderdale, E.	Saatchi, L.
Layton, L.	St. Davids, V.
Lindsay, E.	Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly.
Liverpool, E.	Sanderson of Bowden, L.
Lloyd-George of Dwyfor, E.	Sandford, L.
Long, V.	Seccombe, B.
Lucas, L.	Sharpies, B.
Lucas of Chilworth, L.	Shaw of Northstead, L.
Lyell, L.	Shrewsbury, E.
McAlpine of West Green, L.	Skelmersdale, L.
McColl of Dulwich, L.	Soulsby of Swaffham Prior, L.
Mackay of Ardbrecknish, L.	Stewartby, L.
Mackay of Clashfem, L. (Lord Chancellor.)	Stodart of Leaston, L.
Mackay of Drumadoon, L.	Strange, B.
Macleod of Borve, B.	Strathcarron, L.
Malmesbury, E.	Strathclyde, L. [Teller.]
Marlesford, L.	Sudeley, L.
Masham of Ilton, B.	Swansea, L.
Merrivale, L.	Swinfen, L.
Mersey, V.	Terrington, L.
Middleton, L.	Teviot, L.
Miller of Hendon, B.	Thomas of Gwydir, L.
Mills, V.	Trumpington, B.
Milverton, L.	Ullswater, V.
Monk Bretton, L.	Vivian, L.
Montgomery of Alamein, V.	Wade of Chorlton, L.
Mountevans, L.	Walton of Detchant, L.
Moyne, L.	Westbury, L.
Munster, E.	Whitelaw, V.
	Wilcox, B.
	Young, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

4.05 p.m.

The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Cox)

The next amendment is Amendment No. 2, in the name of the Lord McIntosh of Haringey. I should point out that if Amendment No. 2 is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 3 because of pre-emption.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 2: Page 50, leave out lines 18 to 20.

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 2 I should like also to speak to Amendment No. 6. I have left out Amendment No. 3 not merely because of pre-emption, of which the Deputy Chairman has reminded us, but also because Amendment No. 3 is a fall back to Amendment No. 2.

Both of these amendments refer to an issue which took a great deal of debate at the time of the passage of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill, in which this House distinguished itself by winning the principle of the right of a body to elect its own chairman against the imposition of a chairman by a Secretary of State. That was done for local police authorities, but the argument is as strong for the National Criminal Intelligence Service and for the National Crime Squad.

The fundamental argument in all of this is that the chairman of a body of this kind has to command the confidence of the members of the authority of which he is the chair. That is the purpose of these amendments. Amendment No. 2 proposes that the section which states that the Secretary of State shall appoint the chair shall be removed and be replaced by a new provision which states that the chairman of both the NCS authority and the NCIS authority shall be appointed by the core members appointed under this schedule from among their number.

It will be noted that this is a modest amendment. It does not include the additional members—who are largely local authority members—of the two separate authorities. It includes only those members who are the core members of the two authorities. It does not follow, the Committee having expressed its view in the Division on the last amendment, that the chairman will be elected from among 10 people, five of whom—and let us not get back to the word "independent"—are appointed by the Secretary of State, however independent they may turn out to be in practice.

The discussions that we had at the time of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill were generally thought—not only by Members of this House but also by the outside world—to be an issue of considerable constitutional importance. The Government wanted the right to appoint the chairmen of all police authorities. I accused the Secretary of State at that time of wanting the ability to sit his chairmen around his table in his Home Office and to tell them what to do, which would have resulted, via the back door, in a national police force.

The Government disclaim the desire to create a national police force through the provisions of the Bill, and I believe them. I agree with the Government that the Bill does not create a national police force comparable to the FBI. I accept what the Government say: that there is no equivalent here of federal crimes and that the only activity of these two organisations is to be in support of the operations of individual police forces. There is nothing comparable in the way in which they operate to the operations of the national police forces of the United States, France, and many other countries in the developed world. But, at the same time, the recognition which is implicit in that understanding of the importance of the tripartite system in the control of our police needs to be preserved and enhanced as we consider the Bill's provisions.

What we have had for many years in the control of our police force has been a tripartite system between local authorities and police authorities, which has sometimes been more complicated because of the existence of magistrates on police authorities, and the Home Secretary. That has been the tried and tested method of control of police forces. Remarkably few scandals and intolerable disagreements have resulted from what appear on the face of it in "management theory"—if I may appeal to the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, in the matter—to be a recipe for self destruct. It does not actually happen that way.

Whatever management theory may be, all of these people—and they are all non-executive directors, by the way—have managed to work together and to control police forces. They have managed to pursue coherent and yet flexible and responsive policing in all parts of this country. Surely we can do the same today for the NCIS and for the National Crime Squad. Surely we can do so by upholding the tripartite system and saying that those core members, wherever they come from and whether they are appointed by the Secretary of State, by chief officers of police or by local authorities, can be trusted to get together and to agree on the best person to act as their chairman; and then to elect that person to act as chairman. That does not need the heavy hand of the Home Secretary; it is a continuation of a well-established and well-proven system of the control of policing in this country. I commend the amendment to the Committee. I beg to move.

Lord Renton

With great respect to the noble Lord, I think, on reflection, that he should not have made the speech that he has. The noble Lord introduced the concept of local democracy, referring, quite rightly, to the way in which police authorities have been chosen mainly by local authorities since the Police Act 1964. Here, on the other hand, we have two national bodies which are largely of an advisory character. In order to ensure better democratic control over them, we have to engage the responsibility of the Home Secretary. That is what the schedule and the clauses which introduce it aim to achieve.

The Home Secretary's responsibility is surely much more closely and more strongly engaged if he is to appoint the chairman. I believe it will cause a little confusion if we start borrowing the concept of local democracy and try to apply it to these two national bodies. It just does not follow.

Lord Knights

At one time the concept of a national criminal intelligence service would probably have been regarded with extreme suspicion—suspicion based on the perceived activities of organisations of that kind in other parts of the world. I suggest that it is a measure of the trust and confidence with which the police service of this country is held that, so far as I am aware, anyway, no hint of criticism has ever been raised at the system which was set up some four and a half years ago as, I understood, a common police service by mutual agreement of chief constables, local police authorities and the Home Office. I repeat, no hint of criticism has ever been levelled at it during that period. Indeed, the Home Affairs Committee of another place last year welcomed the start that NCIS had made towards improving the response to serious, organised and international crime. Those words come from paragraph 95 of that committee's Third Report in Session 1994–95. Indeed, Members of the Committee have already agreed this afternoon that such a system should be set up as a corporate body.

However, if that trust and confidence is to be maintained, I believe that it is essential that there should be no breath of political influence about its activities and that the NCIS service authority should be clearly seen as a true partnership of the three tripartite bodies which are responsible for the totality of policing in this country at present. I do not believe that that will be possible if the chairman is to be appointed by the Home Secretary and from one of his three appointees to that authority.

Given the power which is vested in the authority to call upon the director general to resign in the interests of efficiency and/or effectiveness contained in Clause 7, I believe that it is imperative to ensure that there can be no suggestion of undue influence being brought to bear on the authority by way of the Home Secretary's appointment of the chairman. There may well never be any such influence, but the possibility of alleging it should be removed. I shall support the amendment.

Baroness Blatch

When speaking on the previous amendment, I made clear that our approach to the membership and to the chairmanship of the service authorities has been to strike a balance between our tripartite system of policing and the need to reflect national and multi-agency interests in these new arrangements. I entirely accept that the question of the chairmanship is of particular importance in that context. The amendments do not challenge the proposal that there should be a single chairman for both authorities. I welcome that measure of agreement. Such an arrangement will be of crucial importance in building the shared strategic vision and close working relationship which will help to achieve the best from both services. But the amendments will have two other results which I am unable to welcome so warmly.

First, and I believe most importantly, they will mean that the chairman will not necessarily be one of the independent members. It could be one of the police authority representatives or it could—although perhaps less likely—be one of the police service representatives. I would not wish in any way to undervalue the particular skills and experience that such members will bring to the service authorities, but I do not believe that it would be right for either of them to be the joint chairman of both service authorities. That is particularly true in the case of the National Criminal Intelligence Service. I have already mentioned its United Kingdom and multi-agency remit. A chairman drawn from representatives of police authorities alone or police forces in England and Wales could not, in my view, properly reflect that wider remit. An independent member is best placed to do so and to provide the impartial leadership which these new authorities will clearly need.

Secondly, the amendments would mean that the core membership rather than the Secretary of State would appoint the joint chairman. This place has in recent years taken a close and influential interest in the arrangements for the appointment of police authority chairmen. But service authorities for national and multi-agency services raise rather different issues. I have already explained why the Government believe that those differences constitute strong arguments for the joint chairman being an independent member. We also believe that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Northern Ireland, is best placed to take account of those national and multi-agency interests by appointing the chairman from among the independent members. If the appointment was not to be made by the Secretary of State, it would be necessary to give further careful thought to the question of whether the appointment should instead be made by the other core members or the wider membership of both authorities. We believe that this would create unnecessary complications and that the best approach, and a reasonable one given the nature of the bodies involved, is for the appointment of chairman to be made by the Secretary of State.

Reference has been made to the powers that the Secretary of State would take. First, the Bill has been before the Delegated Power Scrutiny Committee. We shall be responding positively to the recommendations of the scrutiny committee. However, it did not query the numbers of powers in the Bill for the Secretary of State. Secondly, all the powers are similar to those for the police authorities. The service authorities will also have many of the powers; for example, to set objectives.

The noble Lord, Lord Knights, clearly is concerned. First, he gave examples of the kind of malevolent activity of a chairman which could go undetected if undue influence were brought to bear either on the director general or on members of the board. I should like to think that there are safeguards set out in the Bill. I refer to the rather exposed way in which the service authorities will work and the accountability through Parliament by the Secretary of State for appointments that he makes. Clearly if appointments go wrong those are public issues and at least one can hold a Secretary of State accountable for them. Therefore, I do not believe that some of the noble Lord's concerns will be borne out in practice. Nevertheless, I take them seriously.

For the reasons that I gave, we are not persuaded that these amendments would make better provision for the appointment of a joint chairman. They would leave open the possibility that the service authority could be chaired by one of the police representatives. I do not think that that would be appropriate. Alternatively, one of the police authority representatives might be appointed but he would be representative of police authorities in England and Wales only. We do not believe that this is the best approach given the United Kingdom and multi-agency remit of the National Criminal Intelligence Service. In the circumstances, although I recognise again that there is more than one view on this sensitive matter, I hope that having heard what I and my noble friend Lord Renton said the noble Lord will not press the amendment to a vote.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

Let me remove one, I think, marginal issue. The Minister prayed in aid the fact that the Delegated Powers Scrutiny Committee made no comment about the authority or chairmanship of the authority.

Baroness Blatch

I should correct that. It is not what I said. I said that it did not query the numbers of powers taken in the Bill by the Secretary of State.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

The Delegated Powers Scrutiny Committee has to be concerned with the powers delegated by Parliament. It cannot consider the powers taken by the Secretary of State in that way since those are powers which have been created and not taken from Parliament. If the Minister will look again at the scrutiny committee's report, in particular in reference to Clause 89, she will see that although it expresses concern at the fact that intrusive surveillance is to be authorised by chief officers of police, it feels debarred from making any formal comment on it because it does not involve any use of delegated powers. I do not believe that the powers referred to by the Minister are delegated powers from Parliament. They are not within the remit, therefore, of the Delegated Powers Scrutiny Committee, and could never have been considered by it. The silence of that committee should not be seen as assent to the Government's proposals.

The noble Lord, Lord Renton, attacked my speech rather comprehensively. He said that on reflection I would wish that I had not made it. I shall disappoint him. I do not agree with him that these are simply advisory committees. If the noble Lord reads the Bill carefully, as he usually does, he will see that those committees have extensive powers, although, as I made clear, there are also extensive reserve powers for the Secretary of State. I do not follow his argument that the Home Secretary's responsibility is more closely engaged if he has the power to appoint the chairman from among the core membership. The Secretary of State is closely engaged; it is spelt out in great detail in the Bill, as I made clear. That engagement will not be increased by his ability to impose a member on those 10 people who are the joint core members of the authority.

The Minister raised worries about whether the chairman might be a local authority member or even a police service member. I do not care whether the chairman is a member appointed by the Secretary of State, a police member or a local authority member. I simply care that the chairman should be the best person for the job and should have the confidence of the core membership of the authorities. That is the recipe for effective management and effective steering authorities. What is not a recipe for effective management is that the Secretary of State should have the power to impose a chairman on this body and, quite possibly, someone who would not have commanded the confidence of most members of the body.

The reality of the situation is that the Secretary of State and the Government are politicising the appointment of the chairman of the two bodies. I regret that very much. I do not do so on the grounds that I want someone of a different political party to be the chairman. I do so because I believe that the chairman should be independently chosen, should be seen to be independently chosen, and should have the confidence of the body of which he is to take the chair. I believe that the matter is of such importance that I should take the opinion of the Committee on it.

4.26 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 2) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 93; Not-Contents, 158.

Division No. 2
CONTENTS
Addington, L.	Kilbracken, L.
Barnett, L.	Kilpatrick of Kincraig, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Kirkhill, L.
Berkeley, L.	Knights, L.
Blackstone, B.	McIntosh of Haringey, L.
Blease, L.	McNair, L.
Borrie, L.	McNally, L.
Brooks of Tremorfa, L.	Mallalieu, B.
Bruce of Donington, L.	Mar and Kellie, E.
Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.	Mason of Barnsley, L.
Carter, L.	Merlyn-Rees, L.
Clinton-Davis, L.	Milner of Leeds, L.
Cocks of Hartcliffe, L.	Molloy, L.
Dahrendorf, L	Monkswell, L.
David, B.	Morris of Castle Morris, L. [Teller.]
Dean of Beswick. L.	Napier and Ettrick, L.
Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, B.	Nelson, E.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.	Nicol, B.
Dormand of Easington, L.	Palmer, L.
Dubs, L.	Paul, L.
Elis-Thomas, L.	Peston, L.
Falkland, V.	Prys-Davies, L.
Farrington of Ribbleton, B.	Ramsay, B.
Fisher of Rednal, B.	Redesdale, L.
Fitt, L.	Richard, L.
Gallacher, L.	Ritchie of Dundee, L.
Geraint, L.	Robson of Kiddington, B.
Gladwin of Clee, L.	Rodgers of Quarry Bank, L.
Gould of Potternewton, B.	Sainsbury, L.
Graham of Edmonton, L.	Serota, B.
Grenfell, L.	Sewel, L.
Grey, E.	Shepherd, L.
Harris of Greenwich, L.	Simon, V.
Haskel, L. [Teller.]	Stallard, L.
Hayman, B.	Stoddart of Swindon, L.
Henderson of Brompton, L.	Strabolgi, L.
Hilton of Eggardon, B.	Strafford, E.
Hollis of Heigham, B.	Tenby, V.
Hughes, L.	Thomas of Gresford, L.
Hutchinson of Lullington, L.	Tope, L.
Hylton, L.	Turner of Camden, B.
Inchyra, L.	Weatherill, L.
Jeger, B.	White, B.
Jenkins of Hillhead, L.	Whitty, L.
Jenkins of Putney, L.	Williams of Elvel, L.
Judd, L.	Winston, L.
Kennet, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Jenkin of Roding, L.
Addison, V.	Johnston of Rockport, L.
Ailesbury, M.	Keyes, L.
Ailsa, M.	Kimball, L.
Aldington, L.	Kingsland, L.
Allenby of Megiddo, V.	Kinnoull, E.
Anelay of St. Johns, B.	Leigh, L.
Astor of Hever, L.	Lindsay, E.
Barber of Tewkesbury, L.	Liverpool, E.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Long, V.
Blaker, L.	Lucas, L.
Blatch, B.	Lucas of Chilworth, L.
Bledisloe, V.	Lyell, L.
Blyth, L.	McAlpine of West Green, L.
Bowness, L.	McColl of Dulwich, L.
Brabazon of Tara, L.	Mackay of Ardbrecknish, L.
Braine of Wheatley, L.	Mackay of Clashfern, L. [Lord Chancellor.]
Brookes, L.	Mackay of Drumadoon, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.	Malmesbury, E.
Burnham, L.	Marlesford, L.
Butterworth, L.	Merrivale, L.
Byford, B.	Mersey, V.
Cadman, L.	Middleton, L.
Caithness, E.	Miller of Hendon, B.
Campbell of Alloway, L.	Mills, V.
Campbell of Croy, L.	Milverton, L.
Carnegy of Lour, B.	Monk Bretton, L.
Carnock, L.	Montgomery of Alamein, V.
Chadlington, L.	Mottistone, L.
Chalker of Wallasey, B.	Mountevans, L.
Charteris of Amisfield, L.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Chesham, L. [Teller.]	Munster, E.
Courtown, E. [Teller.]	Norfolk, D.
Cox, B.	Northesk, E.
Cranborne, V. [Lord Privy Seal.]	O'Cathain, B.
Crathorne, L.	Oppenheim-Barnes, B.
Cuckney, L.	Orkney, E.
Cumberlege, B.	Palumbo, L.
Dacre of Glanton, L.	Park of Monmouth, B.
Davidson, V.	Pender, L.
Dean of Harptree, L.	Perry of Southwark, B.
Denham, L.	Peyton of Yeovil, L.
Denton of Wakefield, B.	Pilkington of Oxenford, L.
Devonport, V.	Pym, L.
Dixon-Smith, L.	Quinton, L.
Downshire, M.	Rankeillour, L.
Ellenborough, L.	Rathcavan, L.
Elks, B.	Reay, L.
Elliott of Morpeth, L.	Rees, L.
Elton, L.	Renfrew of Kaimsthom, L.
Erne, E.	Rennell, L.
Fairfax of Cameron, L.	Renton, L.
Feldman, L.	Rotherwick, L.
Ferrets, E.	Saatchi, L.
Fraser of Carmyllie, L.	St. Davids, V.
Geddes, L.	Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly.
Gisborough, L.	Sanderson of Bowden, L.
Goschen, V.	Sandford, L.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.	Seccombe, B.
Halsbury, E.	Sharples, B.
Harding of Petherton, L.	Shaw of Northstead, L.
Hardwicke, E.	Shrewsbury, E.
Harmar-Nicholls, L.	Skelmersdale, L.
Hams of Peckham. L.	Soulsby of Swaftham Prior, L.
Hemphill, L.	Stewartby, L.
Henley, L.	Stodart of Leaston, L.
Hogg, B.	Strange, B.
Holderness, L.	Strathcarron, L.
HolmPatrick, L.	Strathclyde. L.
Home, E.	Swinfen, L.
Hothfield, L.	Tebbit, L.
Howe, E.	Teviot, L.
Hylton-Foster, B.	Thomas of Gwydir, L.
Inchcape, E.	Trumpington, B.
Inglewood, L.

Ullswater, V.	Wilcox, B.
Vivian, L.	Willoughby de Broke, L.
Wade of Chorlton, L.	Wise, L.
Whitelaw, V.	Wynford, L.
	Young, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

4.36 p.m.

[Amendments Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 not moved.]

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Schedule 2 [Other provisions about Members of the Service Authorities]:

On Question, Whether Schedule 2 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I have indicated notice of my intention to oppose the Question only in order to speak on a relatively minor issue and to try to elicit the Government's thinking. I have been approached by the head of one of the regional crime squads who recognises that the regional crime squads will no longer exist. He is concerned about whether they are going to have any say in the appointment of police authority members of the National Crime Squad in particular. I am simply asking whether the Government have given any thought to the issue, which is not covered in the Bill as it is.

It seems to us that there are two possible ways of appointing the individual members, the local authority members of the steering authorities. One would be for it to be done by the local authority associations; the other would be, at any rate in the first instance, for the six members to come from the six regional crime squads. They know each other and may be in a position to make an effective nomination. I take no view on the issue. I recognise in retrospect that I should have given the Minister some warning of the concern which has been expressed to me in case it has not been expressed to her from any other source. However, if she were able to say something about it or, failing that, if she were able to write to me about it, that would be most helpful.

Baroness Blatch

I was about to say that it was an extraordinary proposition to take Schedule 2 out of the Bill, but I shall not have to do that now. On the point raised by the noble Lord, I am sorry that he did not write to me about it because I think we could have dealt with the matter by correspondence, and I shall certainly do that. My understanding is that local authority members of police authorities will be elected from those bodies representing local police authorities and that local authority police authority members will not be appointed by regional crime squads, whatever they are and whoever they are as a collective. However, I shall certainly think about the question the noble Lord has raised today and will come back to him in correspondence.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I am most grateful. I could not have asked for more without having given notice. I am sure the noble Baroness will get correspondence from those who are more closely involved with the issue. She may prefer to wait, before responding to me, until she has seen what other people have to say. This is not in any sense a party political matter and I shall not be pressing my opposition.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 2 [General functions of the NCIS Service Authority and NCIS.]:

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon moved Amendment No. 7: Page 2, line 17, leave out ("criminal intelligence") and insert ("intelligence necessary for the prevention and detection of serious crime").

The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 7, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 8 and 9. This series of amendments addresses the specific functions of NCIS and the definition of the matters in relation to crime that they deal with. The intention of these amendments is to define more narrowly the areas of crime dealt with by NCIS and limit them to serious crime rather than the broad, vague definition of "criminal intelligence".

There are three very specific reasons why I feel it is important to define more narrowly the functions of NCIS. First, there is a wide variety of interpretations in the Bill as currently drafted and therefore the functions of NCIS could be subject to individual interpretations and distortions. Because of the powers that NCIS officers will have and the position of NCIS at the top of the hierarchy of law enforcement agencies, it is important that it should have a very precisely defined function.

Secondly, if the function were specifically defined so as to deal with serious crime, it would assist NCIS in its relationship with European police forces under the Convention on the European Information System, which is specifically related to serious crime. Its functions would thus be brought into line with, for instance, Article 2(1) of the Europol Convention and other European conventions referring to extremely serious offences. The present rather loose and vague definition of the functions of NCIS would be brought much more into line with what is required by our European partners.

Thirdly, the explicit mention of "serious crime" in relation to NCIS would put it on parallel grounds with the National Crime Squad, the aims of which are to prevent and detect serious crime. Since these two parallel organisations will be set up under the same administrative structure, it seems appropriate that they should deal with exactly the same range of offences. I beg to move.

Lord Renton

This is primarily a drafting matter. I believe the noble Baroness has made a point that deserves further consideration. The word "intelligence" has a number of different meanings in our language, depending on the context. It may mean "very clever" or it may just mean "information". On page 2, in lines 17 and 18, we find the words "information" and "intelligence" appearing in the same sentence. It reads: to gather, store and analyse information in order to provide criminal intelligence". If "criminal intelligence" is itself a statutory term of art which by cross-reference one could find a meaning of, this would be a correct way to use the expression; but I believe it could very well read, on the lines suggested by the noble Baroness: information necessary for the prevention and detection of serious crime". instead of: information to provide criminal intelligence". I believe the matter is worth looking at again purely from a drafting point of view.

Baroness Seccombe

It would be helpful if we could define "serious crime" more specifically. One of the problems is that those involved in serious and organised crime are often surrounded by people who are caught up in petty crime, too. If this is a gathering-of-information service, the term "serious crime" may be too narrow a definition.

4.45 p.m.

Baroness Blatch

There is no doubt that the main function of NCIS both now and in the future is to provide intelligence about serious crime. That is what police forces and other law enforcement agencies want, and NCIS exists to provide them with the criminal intelligence support which they need. But the fight against crime must be conducted flexibly and with all the weapons at our disposal. These amendments would restrict that flexibility. We do not think that such a restriction is helpful or desirable. Anything which thwarts the success of tracking down serious crime must be resisted and flexibility will be needed. I shall explain that in a moment.

Although, as my noble friend Lady Seccombe has said, the amendments do not provide a definition of serious crime, I have to assume, in the absence of a definition, that it is intended to apply the definition used in Clause 89(5) of the Bill. The effect of applying this definition to the work of NCIS would be to remove any possibility of its undertaking wider criminal intelligence activities. It would severely limit the support which NCIS could give to local police forces. For example, a group of police forces might be investigating a series of organised crimes which fall outside the definition but where some national co-ordination or analysis of criminal intelligence would be helpful. Intelligence support from NCIS might help to solve these crimes but these amendments would prevent that assistance being given. That cannot possibly be in the public interest.

There is another disadvantage. Under Clause 2(2)(c) of the Bill as presently drafted, NCIS will be able to support police forces and other law enforcement agencies in carrying out their own criminal intelligence activities. The intention is that NCIS will be able to promote common standards for intelligence activities by local forces against any level of crime—that is important—in addition to its specific role in tackling serious crime. This will help to make intelligence activities more effective. These amendments would restrict the role of NCIS and so obstruct this objective.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hilton, referred to the National Crime Squad. Of course, the National Crime Squad will deal with serious crime; but the Bill as presently drafted enables NCIS to deal with serious crime and—this is the important point—other intelligence which requires national analysis and co-ordination. The amendment will reduce that flexibility. We believe that that is important work for NCIS and we would not wish to inhibit it in any way.

Lord Renton

I should be grateful if my noble friend could help me on this because it is important. It seems to me that the words "information" and "intelligence" are used synonymously here and therefore we do not need to use both. One or other of the words would do—preferably "information".

Baroness O'Cathain

Perhaps I can help on this point. Information can surely be made up of many bits of information which, as a composite, give global intelligence on a matter. For example, it can be the building blocks of a specific problem which will give information about how many people were in a place, what they were doing, and all the rest of it. It will give the overall composite picture; namely, the intelligence. That is how I see the difference. I do see a difference between the two terms and I should be grateful if my noble friend the Minister would tell us whether that is the way it is intended.

Baroness Blatch

That was a helpful intervention from my noble friend, because that is the case. There will be a great deal of information which may be nothing more than strict database which, when put together with other pieces of information, will provide intelligence which may be handed over to a police force to help them in their criminal inquiries or provide parts of a jigsaw which, when put together, will provide intelligence on which to take serious crime into the courts and which will then become part of the evidence. But my noble friend raises a point about the meaning of words. I shall certainly look at it between now and the next stage of the Bill.

Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank

I put my name to this amendment because I thought it was totally consistent with the spirit in which the Minister moved the Second Reading of the Bill. On Second Reading she spoke very particularly about the new organisations dealing with organised crime. Let me remind her of what she said: This Bill represents a further major step forward in the fight against organised crime. It will give the police, working together with other enforcement agencies, the national structures which they need to tackle serious and organised crime"—[Official Report, 11/11/96; col. 789.] A little later she referred to the police having to deal with "organised and violent criminals". Again, she said, But we need to strengthen our capacity to tackle organised crime". I do not dissent from anything she said then. But it is fair to say that the more we look at this Bill we see that it is a complex, major and important Bill which extends police powers and embodies them in statute in a way that has not been done before. It is therefore very important to look very closely at what the Minister said then and what she is saying now. I understand, notwithstanding what she said at Second Reading, that she envisages that the two new agencies will look into all kinds of crime and will not be limited mainly to organised and serious crime, as previously described by her at Second Reading.

Lord Knights

One of my worries over the creation of NCIS and the National Crime Squad is the extent to which local police forces will lose the support that they currently receive from the regional crime squads, which includes intelligence as much as it does investigation. I support the Minister when she says that we must not take away the flexibility that the present drafting gives to the National Criminal Intelligence Service. If it is to be able to say to a local police force, "What you are seeking that we should look into is not serious crime and therefore nothing to do with us", then the local police force has nothing—unless it is to serve its own full-scale criminal intelligence system as well.

This will be the only criminal intelligence system in the country. There will be no regional intelligence systems. Indeed, I understand that they have already gone. It will mean that each police force will have to rely on its own activities, if serious crime is the only thing that the national organisation is prepared to deal with. I believe that it should remain flexible, as the Minister said.

Baroness Blatch

I am grateful for that intervention. The noble Lord speaks with a great deal of experience. But the important point that was then made was about the lacuna which would be left if the operations of the NCIS were restricted in the way that this amendment suggests and we lose the crime squads as well. That kind of collating of information and providing intelligence to local forces to do the local job and pursue crime in their areas, which may or may not include serious crime but crime across boundaries, whether they are force boundaries or regional boundaries, seems to me to be very important.

In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Rodgers, it does not preclude anything that I said at Second Reading. It is an additional function. Flexibility and the additional function of being able to support the work of local police forces would be inhibited if we were to restrict it as the consequence of this amendment.

Lord Thomas of Gresford

I notice that in Clause 102—enhanced criminal record certificates—there is a reference to applications for the issue of certificates for gaming machines, for licences and for societies' lotteries. Are we to assume that that information, as broadly stated as it is in the proposed wording, is to be gathered by a National Criminal Intelligence Service for such purposes as that? Is that a proper use of resources? Or is not it proper so to limit the functions of the NCIS to the kind of serious matters to which my noble friend referred?

Baroness Blatch

It is almost impossible to see any crime in a particular category. It is possible that crime involving lotteries may be either very serious—a network of crime—or very localised, in which case it would be a matter for local police forces. It may be that something is going on in various parts of the country which to a local police force may be an isolated incident, but intelligence gathered nationally will provide evidence that there is a network of people operating in that particular activity. So I do not believe that it is right to restrict both the flexibility and the important primary purpose of those bodies, which is to pursue serious crime.

The last constraint, which will be extremely effective, on those bodies will be when they produce their annual reports which spell out what they have been doing in the course of the year. They will not waste their time chasing trivial criminality. They will want to use their time and expertise in helping the police forces when it is appropriate to do so but also in pursuit of serious crime. But with flexibility and their ability to work in support of local police authorities, I believe that the balance is right in the Bill. I believe that this amendment would restrict that flexibility.

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon

I take the point made by the Minister about flexibility but I do not think that this amendment would in any way restrict the flexibility of the NCIS, which will be a scarce resource. Although I take very much to heart the view of the noble Lord, Lord Knights, that it is important to provide support to local police forces, it is a matter of what one sees as serious crime. For instance, I should certainly include burglaries as serious crime and I imagine that that would be the kind of area in which local forces might wish to combine to catch a persistent group of burglars or whatever.

On the other hand, I should want to exclude offences of shoplifting or motoring offences, for instance, which also count as crimes. It might be that some chief constables would want the NCIS to analyse data on such crimes. I should have thought that it was a good thing to protect a scarce resource, which the NCIS will be, from pressure from local forces and that some local concerns should be dealt with by something which is a sophisticated analytical machine.

It was on those grounds that I tabled these amendments. I do not in fact take the point that they would restrict enormously the flexibility of the NCIS in responding to urgent local needs or serious organised criminal activity. I regret that the Minister is herself inflexible on this point, but in the circumstances I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 8 and 9 not moved.]

Clause 2 agreed to.

5 p.m.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 10:

After Clause 2, insert the following new clause—

THE COMMISSIONER OF NCIS

1. (".—(1) The Prime Minister shall appoint a Commissioner who shall keep under review the performance of functions under section 2(2), and who shall in particular review the following—
   1. (a) the quality, accuracy and content of criminal intelligence information gathered or stored by NCIS;
   2. (b) the disclosure of such information by members or employees of NCIS; and
   3. (c) the need for the retention of such information by NCIS.
2. (2) The person appointed under subsection (I) shall be a person who holds or has held high judicial office within the meaning of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876.
3. (3) The Commissioner shall hold office in accordance with the terms of his appointment.
4. (4) The Secretary of State shall pay to the Commissioner such allowances as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
5. (5) The Secretary of State may, after consultation with the Commissioner, provide the Commissioner with such staff as the Secretary of State thinks necessary for the discharge of his functions.").

The noble Lord said: The wording of this amendment will be readily recognised because it comes directly from the proposals for the commission on intrusive surveillance which are included in Clauses 93, 94 and 95 of the Bill. The reason for taking the precedent of a commissioner (to be appointed by the Prime Minister) who is of high judicial office within the meaning of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 and all the rest of the provisions in the amendment is because of our concern about the five words in the amendment to which I draw the Committee's attention. The commissioner is intended to be concerned with: the quality, accuracy and content of criminal intelligence information … the disclosure of such information by members or employees of NCIS; and … the need for the retention of such information by NCIS".

All the duties and responsibilities of the NCIS are very widely drawn indeed. They are: to gather, store and analyse information in order to provide criminal intelligence [and] to provide criminal intelligence"—

information—we will not go back on the question of the wording— to police forces … law enforcement agencies".

and government departments. We recognise that is necessary. We recognise that the powers have to be widely drawn if the National Criminal Intelligence Service is to have the flexibility necessary in order to combat the growing threat of serious and organised crime. It is to have powers to gather information about suspects as well as powers to pursue specific lines of investigation leading directly to arrest and conviction. But there must be concerns about the way in which those powers are used. Without in any way taking from the breadth of the powers, the amendment proposes that there should be a commissioner who should have the responsibility of providing an independent review of the issues to which I have referred.

In 1990 the House of Commons home affairs committee carried out an inquiry into the national criminal records system. It heard evidence that criminal records provided to the courts and other agencies were all too often incomplete, inaccurate, out of date or contained material which was not strictly relevant. When we talk of "intelligence information", there must be an even greater risk of inaccuracies and errors because there is no clear definition—as there is in the rules of evidence—about what is and what is not acceptable evidence.

The Data Protection Act 1984 does not cover the point. It exempts the police from complying with the first data protection principle—that is, the principle which requires data users to obtain and process information fairly and lawfully—because the registrar does not have the power to enforce compliance where to do so would be likely to prejudice the prevention or detection of crime.

We are concerned in subsection (1)(a) with the quality and content of criminal information. There are no controls in the Bill on the quality or content of information. It could include, under a malign administration—I do not accuse this administration of being malign in this respect—information about somebody's perceived subversive political activities, their sexual orientation, allegations which have not been tested in court or even information which follows acquittal in court. The Bill just provides for NCIS to process any information which it believes might be useful in preventing or detecting crime. There are no regulations to prevent wholly unreliable speculation or rumour about people who could be innocent or information which, if properly assessed, simply should not be on police files at all.

It is important to ensure that controls are in place; that the intelligence held by NCIS is accurate, complete and up to date; and, as we say in subsection 1(c), that it should be retained for no longer than is absolutely necessary. In all other parts of the criminal justice system there are elaborate rules covering disclosure and retention of information. There are rules in this Bill—for example, Clause 102—in relation to the nature of disclosure for enhanced criminal record certificates. There are conditions under which information can be disclosed from police files which are properly defined, and there is some degree of protection, though I shall return to this point later, as regards the proper application of those powers.

The Home Office circular of 1993 on the protection of children and the disclosure of the criminal background of those with access to children, talked of the conditions under which other relevant factual information could be retained and disclosed. There is no such protection in regard to the intelligence information collected by the National Criminal Intelligence Service. We believe that there should be, as proposed in the amendment, an independent view; that is, the view of a commissioner who must be of high judicial office and appointed by the Prime Minister. He can take a view on the quality, accuracy and content of criminal intelligence information, the rules for disclosure and the rules for the retention of such information.

Introducing such a commissioner will not in any way handicap the proper conduct of the work of the National Criminal Intelligence Service. It will simply counteract the possibility of inaccuracy by the National Criminal Intelligence Service or abuse of its powers. I am much more concerned with failure of accuracy than with intentional abuse of powers. In every other part of our criminal justice system and elsewhere in the Bill there is provision for an independent view to be taken. We consider it to be no less than reasonable to provide the same independent review as would be provided by a commissioner under this amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Renton

I am puzzled. I do not see why we need a commissioner as well as the director general referred to in Clause 6, to which I did not hear the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, refer. If we look at Clause 6 we find in subsection (1), NCIS shall have a Director General appointed by the NCIS Service Authority on such terms and conditions as the Authority considers appropriate". In subsection (2) it says that, The Director General shall be chosen by a panel of members of the Authority from a list of persons eligible for appointment which has been prepared by that panel and approved by the Secretary of State". The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, now wants to drag the Prime Minister into this and say that the Prime Minister shall appoint a commissioner. I am sure that we cannot have both solutions and I should have thought that the one in the Bill was the right one.

Perhaps I may be greatly daring and refer back to the discussion on drafting that we had on a previous amendment. In his new clause the noble Lord used the expression, the quality, accuracy and content of criminal intelligence information". There we have tautology if ever we had it. The noble Lord said "any information"; he wants information. I should have thought therefore that if the new clause is to be introduced it should read, "the content of criminal information gathered or stored by NCIS".

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I cannot believe that the Minister will want to follow the noble Lord, Lord Renton, down either of those culs-de-sac and perhaps it is appropriate for me to respond straight away.

Clearly an independent commissioner appointed by the Prime Minister is nothing to do with the appointment by the Home Secretary or by the steering authority of a director general. The director general is in managerial, administrative charge of the organisation. The proposed commissioner is an independent check on the quality and accuracy of the information collected and would be responsible also for laying down rules in regard to disclosure and retention.

In relation to the use of the phrase "criminal intelligence information", if the noble Lord, Lord Renton, reads with his usual assiduity he will discover that we have taken that phrase from other parts of the Bill, in the same way as we have taken all of the references to the appointment and responsibilities of the commissioner from Clauses 93 to 95 of the Bill.

Lord Hylton

Before the Minister replies on this amendment, can he say what are the Government's plans to ensure that information gained by NCIS remains there and is only used for bona fide police purposes? I ask that question because it seems to me that much of the information will be highly sensitive and possibly damaging to people's reputations.

We have all heard of "cheque book journalism". There may be pressures from the media to obtain information when they should not be obtaining it; equally, there could be pressures from commercial organisations which want to find out what information is held. I hope therefore that we can hear what the safeguards are to be so that the information is not improperly disclosed.

Baroness Seccombe

I see the appointment of a commissioner as an extra layer of bureaucracy. When we have important and sensitive information, the fewer people involved the better. There is machinery to ensure that the NCIS is working properly. We must never forget that the thrust of the Bill is to fight sophisticated organised crime. Very often no crime has been committed. Therefore, it is to try to stop crimes being committed that we need a body such as the NCIS.

Lord Thomas of Gresford

I support the amendment. I come back to the point I made earlier concerning the enhanced criminal record certificates. A chief officer of a police force may provide any information which in the chief officer's opinion might be relevant for the purposes described in the statement. Any information in the possession of the chief constable may find its way onto an enhanced criminal record certificate which can be used for employment purposes. With respect, this is not an additional layer of bureaucracy. This is an important safeguard. The amendment seeks to introduce an independent person—independent of the Home Secretary and independent even of the NCIS itself—to deal with. the quality, accuracy and content of criminal intelligence information". My experience is that the accuracy of information that is kept in files may not be guaranteed. I recall a colleague of mine who discovered that in a file concerning him kept not very far away from your Lordships' House he was described as a married man with four children, which did not disturb him, and a Liberal, which did. He had clearly been confused with me. That may have affected his employment prospects and his career. It was just by accident that he discovered this inaccuracy. With the appointment of a commissioner who can act independently, the accuracy of such criminal intelligence information as my life could be checked.

5.15 p.m.

Baroness Blotch

I shall reject the advice of the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, and go down the road of one of the points raised by my noble friend Lord Renton. My noble friend Lord Renton said that the effect of the amendment would be to drag the Prime Minister and yet another layer of bureaucracy into the system. I shall come back to safeguards. I have been drawn by a number of Members of the Committee on to the issue of safeguards and I shall refer to them.

I believe that the arrangements proposed in the amendment would be impractical to operate and would impose a further layer of bureaucracy which could hinder the NCIS's vital contribution to the fight against organised crime. Any new arrangements would be in addition to procedures that already exist in the NCIS. Those include induction procedures for new staff covering duty to use and handle information responsibly and an internal inspection process which reports to the director-general. It is an obligation on the director general—this point was made by my noble friend—to operate in accordance with the provisions of the Act. He will have no alternative. Not only that; the director general will be responsible to the service authority, so there is that layer too. I shall come back to even greater safeguards in a moment.

In considering the amendment, it is important to understand the role of the NCIS. It is not itself an investigating body. The role of investigating will remain with the police, Customs and Excise and other law enforcement agencies. Together they will provide much of the information and intelligence collated and developed by the NCIS. They must be responsible in the first place for the quality, for the accuracy and for the content of the information that they pass to the NCIS. That is where the importance of accuracy of content is concerned. In turn, the NCIS must do all it can to verify the information. It already carefully grades information to take account of its source and its likely accuracy. For example, information provided by a police officer about an event witnessed by the officer would be graded A 1. On the other hand, hearsay information supported by a less reliable source would receive a lower grading. I see no practical way in which the proposed commissioner could check the quality, accuracy and content of the information gathered and stored by the NCIS without going back to the source of the information or the subject of the intelligence report. In addition to the logistical difficulties, there is the risk that in some cases sensitive police investigations against some of the world's worst criminals operating in this country would be jeopardised.

The NCIS is a policing body and provisions in the Bill place it firmly within the controls that apply to the police. That is one safeguard. The Bill extends the role of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary to cover the NCIS and envisages a formal complaints procedure for staff in the NCIS based on the current police complaints regime. That regime is open, it contains an independent element in the shape of the Police Complaints Authority and it works well. Any member of the public who has concerns about the way the NCIS has or may have dealt with him will be able to use the complaints procedure to address his concerns. Equally, any member of the NCIS who disclosed information when he should not would be dealt with as appropriate through the discipline procedures or the courts. The complaints and disciplinary regime in the NCIS will be established by regulations made by the Secretary of State under Clauses 37 and 38 of the Bill. Those regulations will be laid before Parliament, which is a partial answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton.

As to legal proceedings, the NCIS is subject to the Data Protection Act, although I take the caveat mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh. Some of the Data Protection Act will bite. But where the exemption applies when the NCIS is in pursuit of a serious crime I hope Members of the Committee opposite will support us—that the exemption is important. If there is an exemption which allows it to pursue crime and to carry out its role we should be on the side of the NCIS. Nevertheless, there is the Data Protection Act. An officer gaining unauthorised access to computer material could be prosecuted under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Its staff could also find themselves liable for prosecution under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act if they improperly disclose information from which the recipient could impute that someone had had a spent conviction. There is also the possibility that a member of the NCIS using information improperly could be the subject of an action for breach of confidence. A commissioner would not strengthen or improve any of these arrangements.

The need to retain information must be informed by the other information available—for example, about the associates of a person and their activities—and judgments about the relevance of that information at the time or the likely relevance of the information in the future. These are operational decisions which quite rightly rest, as my noble friend said, with the director-general of the NCIS. They are matters which the director-general takes very seriously. The NCIS has a strict weeding policy to ensure that unnecessary information is not stored needlessly. This weeding policy also serves the practical purpose of ensuring that the NCIS is not swamped by information which is being held needlessly. These are not matters for a commissioner.

In opposing the amendment, I am mindful that the Bill makes provision for a commissioner to oversee the authorisation of intrusive surveillance operations and that Security Service activity of this kind is subject to oversight by a commissioner. Comparisons with these other commissioners is not valid. The sole purpose of a surveillance commissioner is to ensure that the proper procedures for authorisation are followed. Similarly, the Security Service Commissioner exists to investigate that warrants permitting the Security Service to enter on or interfere with property have been properly authorised.

The amendment would provide an extra layer of bureaucracy. We certainly believe that it would be impractical. The idea of a commissioner with oversight, delving around within the NCIS for the accuracy of the content when the accuracy of the content is way down with the Customs officer, the police officer or the person gathering information and carrying out the investigation is wholly impractical.

The bodies are subject to the National Audit Office, the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act and the Computer Misuse Act. As I have said, they have induction programmes for internal purposes. There are internal inspections and Her Majesty's Inspectorate would externally inspect. There is a formal complaints procedure and the bodies will be governed by the improper disclosure of information regulations. That could result in internal disciplinary measures being taken or legal remedy in the courts.

There are so many safeguards built into the Bill and if one more layer were to be added it would not add to the security of the way in which these bodies carry out their work. We have to strike the right balance. These are very sensitive matters for which oversight by a commissioner provides the best way to ensure that powers may be used properly, but that is not necessary in the case of the NCIS given its role and the other means of ensuring its accountability. In fulfilling the role intended by this amendment, the commissioner would also be duplicating the existing effective and open oversight arrangements that apply to the police and which the Bill would extend to the NCIS. In my view the proposals in this amendment would hinder rather than help the fight against crime.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I have made it an assumption all my life that if I am misunderstood in what I say or do it is my fault, but that assumption is being sorely tested today. The misunderstanding of this amendment, including that of the Minister, is so profound that I cannot really believe that it is entirely my fault that I am being misunderstood. Of course it is not an extra layer of bureaucracy. We are simply pointing out the fact that in every other part of the criminal justice system there are proper rules to ensure that evidence, information or intelligence, as the case may be, is properly collected and recorded and that it is accurate and of high quality. There are rules to ensure that information of this kind is only disclosed to those to whom it may be properly disclosed and retained only for the purposes and for the period of time for which it may be properly retained.

It is only in respect of the National Criminal Intelligence Service which, as the Minister said, is not an investigative body, but an intelligence-gathering body, that we have no such rules and no such independent review.

The Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Renton, talked about the role of the director general. It is of course in the interests of the director general, as it is of the Home Secretary, that the National Criminal Intelligence Service should concentrate on information which is of high quality and accurate and its content should be relevant to the purpose. I did not use the word "relevant". The Minister is quite right to say that the relevance of information to an investigation is an operational matter and not a matter for review by a commissioner.

But the analogy of the commissioner as used for the security service and as proposed for intrusive surveillance, is a very good one and appropriate in this case. It is no good the Minister telling us that the Police Complaints Authority has responsibilities in this area. The problem with the role of the National Criminal Intelligence Service is that it is collecting intelligence which may never come out in evidence. It may never be known to a potential complainant and therefore it may never be available for somebody to take to the Police Complaints Authority. It is behind-the-scenes information.

We are not calling for the general distribution of behind-the-scenes or secret information. We are saying that at the highest level a senior judge appointed by the Prime Minister should have the responsibility for independent review of these highly sensitive activities. It may be that the amendment is defective in the sense that it says that he should, keep under review … the quality, accuracy and content of criminal intelligence … disclosure [and] retention". Perhaps it would be better for the amendment to say, "that he should keep under review the arrangements for ensuring that there is high quality, accuracy and content; that there are proper rules for disclosure and retention and that those rules are adhered to". On that basis I shall certainly not be pressing this amendment because I believe that I can draft it more appropriately at a later stage.

It may be some time since the Minister has been involved with further education. I can assure her that the thrust of the Further Education Funding Council in England and Wales is heavily towards what it calls "quality assurance". By that it does not just mean that inspectors go in and look at the quality of the teaching; it means that there is an independent quality committee of each governing body which takes on itself the responsibility of ensuring that there are proper rules to protect the quality of educational provision and the proper fulfilment of promises made to students and ensuring that they are kept. That is what a commissioner would do and that is why he would not be an additional layer of bureaucracy, but a real help for the operations and responsiveness of the National Criminal Intelligence Service. In view of the possibility that we might come up with better drafting—

Baroness Blatch

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Before he withdraws the amendment perhaps I may make two points. The noble Lord might care to look up Clause 28. That clause provides for a code of practice which will govern the functions. It seems to me that that is an appropriate place to set out the ways in which those functions should be carried out to which the director general and the NCIS will be held. The noble Lord may like to reflect on that when he considers redrafting the amendment.

Perhaps I may also say to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, that Clause 104 provides a safeguard for inaccurate information held on certificates, which I know has been a particular concern of his. It reads, Where an applicant for a certificate under any of the Sections 100 to 103 believes that the information contained in the certificate is inaccurate he may make an application in writing and a new certificate can be issued. That is an important safeguard and a particular concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

Perhaps I may respond to that part of the intervention which was addressed to me. I was aware of the code of practice. But the point about a commissioner is for ensuring not only that there is the equivalent of a code of practice, but that there is also an independent view as to whether the code of practice is being adhered to. That is the addition which a commissioner provides as the Government recognise in other comparable circumstances. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 3 and 4 agreed to.

Clause 5 [Annual reports]:

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 11: Page 4, line 22, at end insert ("(4) The Secretary of State shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a copy of the report.").

The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment I wish to speak also to Amendment No. 42, which is the comparable amendment for the National Crime Squad. These are very simple amendments indeed and follow a well-trodden route in your Lordships' consideration of legislation.

What we are seeking to do by adding the provision that, The Secretary of State shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a copy of the report

is to enable Parliament properly to exercise its important function as the ultimate democratic body to which the NCIS can be held responsible. The Bill makes clear that the Secretary of State will receive a copy of the report, but it does not make clear what will happen to it. There are provisions for publication, in such manner as appears…appropriate

to the service authority. As regards the director general's report, there is provision for publication in such a manner as appears appropriate to him.

I do not know exactly what "such manner" means. It could mean restricted, summarised or selective publication. It could mean publication to a relatively small number of people. Surely, the proper protection is that a report which has been received by the Secretary of State, the police authorities and all other interested parties listed in Clause 5(3) should also be laid before Parliament. I beg to move.

5.30 p.m.

Baroness Blatch

The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, said that it was not known what would happen to it. Clause 5 spells out in considerable detail what happens. I believe that the noble Lord refers to the nature of the report as opposed to what happens to it. Copies of the report go to the Secretary of State, each police authority for an area in Great Britain, each police board within the meaning of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 and the Police Authority for Northern Ireland. Copies also go to the chief officer of police of each police force in England and Wales, the chief constable of each police force in Scotland, the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the National Crime Squad Service Authority, the Director General of the National Crime Squad and the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. That can be reversed. The National Crime Squad is also required to send copies of its reports to the same list of persons. They send copies of reports to each other.

Clauses 5 and 50 as drafted mirror the arrangements for the publication of annual reports by police authorities, except that they also require service authorities to send copies of their annual reports to police authorities, chief officers of police, each other and the director general of each other's services. Police authorities are required to send their annual reports only to the Home Secretary. There is no requirement for the Home Secretary to lay those authorities' reports before Parliament. The amendments would require the Home Secretary to lay the annual reports of both service authorities before Parliament. That would imply that he was accountable to Parliament for the service authorities in a way different from his position in respect of police authorities. As we have been debating in another context, that is simply not the case. The Secretary of State has a legitimate interest in the work of both authorities, but he is not accountable for their reports. This would be inconsistent with the Government's intention that the regime governing service authorities should, so far as is consistent with their national status, be the same as the regime governing police authorities.

That said, I should make it absolutely clear that the reports will be published and that copies will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses of Parliament. We believe that this is the right approach and is consistent with the independent status of the service authorities and the regime governing police authorities generally. I have given an assurance that they will be widely available, and I hope the noble Lord accepts that the particular route that he chooses is inappropriate.

Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank

I listened carefully to what the Minister said. She drew a precise parallel with the police authorities. I do not believe that that parallel is sustained by the very nature of the two organisations that we are discussing. In order to reflect further on what she has said, I should like to ask the Minister a question. The Minister said that these two bodies were not accountable to the Home Secretary. Did she mean that it would be improper for this place and another place to debate these reports? These reports are to be placed in the Library and will receive wide distribution. Does she imply that it would be wrong for Parliament to debate them? If it is right that Parliament should debate them, surely in saying that these documents have the same status as the reports of police authorities she draws a parallel which is not precise.

Baroness Blatch

To my knowledge, I do not believe that there is any restriction on what is debated in this place. If anyone wants to initiate a debate it is for the usual channels to decide how it can be fitted into the programme. The proposition in the amendment is that there should be a formal laying of these reports before Parliament. The important principle is that they should be publicly available documents, and I have given an assurance that that will be the case.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I believe that we are pretty close. If I accept the assurances of the Minister, as I do, that they will be publicly available, they can hardly avoid being publicly available if they are to be sent to all of the people set out in the clause, and that they will be published in full without excisions (the Minister nods her assent) there is not much difference between laying them before Parliament and placing them in the Library. As the Minister has rightly said, what is debated is up to Parliament. It is not for the Home Secretary to choose what is debated. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5 agreed to.

Clause 6 [Appointment of Director General]:

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon moved Amendment No. 12: Page 5. line 5, leave out subsection (5).

The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 12 I should like to speak also to Amendment No. 44. These are intended as probing amendments which pick up a question that I raised at the end of my winding up speech on Second Reading. I seek clarification of an assurance by the Minister that it is not the intention to appoint non-professional, non-career police officers as directors general of either the NCIS or the National Crime Squad. The subsection that is sought to be deleted is that which allows for the director general to take an oath as a constable. That implies that the director general of the NCIS may not be a serving police officer but may be a former member of MI5, or the director general of the National Crime Squad may be a retired Army officer. That would take us back to the bad old days of chief constables being drawn from the ranks of the military, or even the Navy on occasion. I formally seek an assurance from the Minister that it is not intended to appoint as Director General of either NCIS or the National Crime Squad someone who is not a professional, career police officer within the civilian Police Service. I beg to move.

Baroness Blatch

I understand that the purpose of the amendments is to ensure that only a serving chief constable can be appointed director general of the National Criminal Intelligence Service or the National Crime Squad. If that is the only point at issue here I believe that the amendments are unnecessary.

I am a little disturbed by what I have heard. Certainly, I will remedy the position if necessary. I wrote to the noble Lord on 19th November. I intended that that should be for the benefit of all Members of the House. I placed copies of my letter in the Library. I said: Lady Hilton also asked whether Clauses 6(5) and 51(5) would enable someone other than a police officer to become the Director General of NCIS or the new National Crime Squad. Let me assure you that the legislation as drafted does not permit this and it is not the Government's intention to appoint someone other than a police officer to either role. Clauses 6(3) and 51(3) restrict eligibility for appointment as the Director General of either service to a person who must be:

1. (i) a chief officer of police in a police force in England and Wales. That is the chief constable of a police force outside London; the Commissioner, an Assistant Commissioner or a Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police; or the Commissioner of the City of London Police;
2. (ii) a chief constable of a Scottish police force or the chief constable of the RUC;
3. (iii) eligible for promotion to one of these posts or ranks".

The Bill makes clear that a person will be eligible for appointment as director general only if he holds the rank of chief constable in a police force in Great Britain or in the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

Even with those amendments, the provisions of Clauses 6(5) and 51(5) are still necessary. In order to take up an appointment as director general, a chief officer will have left his previous force. Therefore, the particular clause which will be removed if the amendment is accepted is important, because he or she will not have the powers of a constable unless the Bill specifically provides them. To take another example, a chief officer from a Scottish police force or the Royal Ulster Constabulary would not have the powers and privileges of a constable in England and Wales unless the Bill made specific provision for that to happen. Both directors general would require such powers in order to perform their full duties and manage the services for which they were responsible. If the noble Baroness does not have the letter I will ensure that immediately after this session she is provided with a copy.

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon

I am grateful to the Minister for that assurance. When I joined the Metropolitan Police—if I may reminisce for just a second—we took an oath which meant that we were constables within our police force only and within five miles of any royal palace, which included Scottish royal palaces. I believe that the Police Act 1964 changed that so that we became constables throughout England and Wales. I wonder what is the situation for a director general appointed from a force in England and Wales in relation to Scotland. Presumably, as serving officers in England and Wales, such a person can carry out his duties throughout England and Wales. Will he take an oath in order that he can perform his duties in Scotland and Northern Ireland so that the situation is now reciprocal? I am asking this merely as a matter of complication. Perhaps they would all have to take an oath to operate in both areas.

Lord Knights

I am not sure whether I should intervene, but on my reading of the Bill if a chief officer of a police force within England or Wales seeks to become the director general, he will have to retire or resign from his force. He is therefore no longer a constable. He will take up the appointment without being a constable. Unless he is appointed a constable, he cannot be given the rank of chief constable, which is also provided for in the Bill.

Baroness Blatch

The noble Lord is spot on. We have subsection (5) to vest in that person the rank necessary to do the job.

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon

I am still slightly puzzled, because if one moves from one force to another one does not have to retake an oath as a constable. That is surely the situation if one is moving from a force in England and Wales to become director general which, as I understand it, is effectively to become a chief constable. I am still slightly puzzled about the matter of the oath, but I am grateful to the Minister for her assurance which I wanted to flesh out by putting down the amendments. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 13: Page 5, line 12, at end insert— ("( ) The Director General shall hold the rank of chief constable.").

The noble Baroness said: I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 14 to 18; 20 to 23; 45 to 49; 51, 53, 55 to 58; 144 and 145.

This large group of amendments seeks to achieve a very simple purpose. They ensure that senior police officers who are permanently appointed to the National Criminal Intelligence Service or National Crime Squad will retain a specific police rank. In this way they put beyond any doubt the original intention of the Bill that the directors general will hold the rank of chief constable and that only assistant chief constables, or those eligible to be appointed to that rank, will be permanently appointed to other senior police posts in the two services.

The vast majority of the police officers serving in the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad will be officers engaged on a period of temporary service away from their force. They retain all the powers and privileges of a constable as if they remained a member of their force and they have a right of return to their home force.

This arrangement will generally not be possible for senior police officers. It is impracticable for a chief constable to have a right of return to his previous force—the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Knights. His former post will have been filled. The same is generally true for other senior police officers where there are a limited number of assistant chief constable posts—perhaps only one—and it would be impracticable for officers to have a right of return. That is why the Bill makes provision for them to be permanently appointed to either service.

But because they break their ties with their previous force, it is essential to make clear in the Bill that they continue to hold a specific police rank. The directors general of each service and their senior colleagues are responsible for the overall direction and control of all the staff, including the police officers on temporary service. It must be clear for the good management of both services that the permanent senior police officers have a specific rank. It will also be important for some operational purposes, such as authorisations under PACE, that the rank of senior police officers is beyond doubt.

Amendments Nos. 13 and 45 provide that the director general of each service shall hold the rank of chief constable. Amendments Nos. 14, 15, 47 and 48 provide that the only other permanent police appointments will be senior officers of assistant chief constable, or equivalent rank, or eligible for appointment to that rank. Officers appointed in such circumstances will hold the rank of assistant chief constable.

I should mention that one effect of the draftsman's approach to these amendments is that officers on temporary service who were covered by Clause 9(2)(a) in the Bill are now covered by Clause 9(2)(b). Permanent police members who were covered by Clause 9(2)(b) are now dealt with in Clause 9(2)(a). The same applies in Clause 54. Amendments Nos. 17, 20, 22, 46, 51, 55, 57, 144 and 145 are all necessary to reflect this change in the order of Clauses 9 and 54. The other amendments are consequential upon these changes. For example, subsection (10) of both Clause 9 and Clause 54 which clarifies the position of senior officers in the Metropolitan and City of London forces, is no longer necessary as a result of these amendments.

These amendments will ensure that senior police officers within both services will have the rank and authority which they need to perform their duties.

I commend them to the Committee. I beg to move.

5.45 p.m.

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon

I thank the Minister for that explanation. I welcome the fact that the problem of their return to their forces of officers appointed to central duties has been recognised at last, because for many years there have been problems with officers seconded to the Home Office who have had no home base to which to return. I therefore welcome this series of amendments.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 6, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 7 and 8 agreed to.

Clause 9 [Other members of NOS]:

Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 14 to 18: Page 6, line 8, at beginning insert ("he is appointed to the rank of assistant chief constable in NCIS and he met the requirements of subsection (2A) immediately prior to his being appointed, or

(b)") Page 6, line I I, leave out from ("applies") to the end of line 14 and insert—

• ("(2A) A person meets the requirements of this subsection if—
  1. (a) he holds the rank of assistant chief constable or a higher rank in a police force in Great Britain or in the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
  2. (b) he holds the rank of commander or a higher rank in the metropolitan police force or in the City of London police force, or

• (c) he is, in accordance with regulations under section 50 of the Police Act 1996, section 26 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 or section 25 of the Police Act (Northern Ireland) 1970. a constable eligible for appointment to the rank of assistant chief constable or commander in any of the police forces, or in the Constabulary, mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).").

Page 6, line 15, leave out ("to (7)") and insert (", (6) and (7)"). Page 6, line 16, leave out ("(2)(b)") and insert ("(2)(a)"). Page 6, line 18, leave out from "("(c)") to ("shall") in line 19.

On Question, amendments agreed to

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon moved Amendment No. 19: Page 6, line 24, at end insert— ("( Before determining any terms and conditions of an appointment under subsection (1)(b) which do not relate to any matters mentioned in subsection (I) of section 61 of this Act, the NCIS Service Authority shall consult persons whom the NCIS Service Authority considers to represent the interests of police members or prospective police members of the NCIS.").

The noble Baroness said: The amendment's intention is to provide for consultation with the various police representative organisations, such as the federation, on the particular conditions of service of NCIS officers on matters such as hours, leave and their personal equipment, clothing and so on. The intention is that they should be subject to the PNB before they are determined. As currently drafted, the Bill makes no provision for consultation with the police staff associations on their various terms and conditions, such as length of probation, job descriptions, appraisal, grievance procedures, and so on. Since police officers cannot of course take industrial action, it is all the more essential that there should be a statutory obligation to consult before conditions are drawn up. I beg to move.

Baroness Blatch

The Government recognise the importance of consulting the police staff associations about the terms and conditions on which police officers are employed by NCIS and the National Crime Squad. For that reason paragraphs 73 to 75 of Schedule 9 extend the remits of the Police Negotiating Board and the police advisory boards to NCIS. The Government believe that this provides adequately for consultation with the police staff associations. It also means that police officers in NCIS are in the same position as their colleagues in police forces when it comes to collective consideration of their terms and conditions.

This amendment would extend consultation beyond the areas already covered by the remit of the Police Negotiating Board. Section 61 of the Police Act 1996 defines this as the consideration of hours of duty; leave; pay and allowances; pensions; and the issue and return of police clothing, personal equipment and accoutrements. This remit is adequate for the police service and is, in the Government's view, adequate for NCIS. We see no reason to make a special case of NCIS.

There is no need to put NCIS in a different position from the police service by placing a duty on the service authority to consult the staff associations on other terms and conditions such as probation, job descriptions and grievance procedures. The Bill already provides for police members of NCIS to be members of staff associations. This would be pointless if we did not intend the police staff associations to be fully involved in representing their members' interests. And, in practice, NCIS will have no option but to consult the police staff associations. They are the collective voice of potential police members of NCIS, all of whom will need to be satisfied that the terms and conditions on which they are to be employed are satisfactory. I would remind the Committee that NCIS will rely on seconded police staff who will be volunteers. If the terms and conditions that NCIS wishes to impose are unsatisfactory, then these officers will not volunteer.

In addition to questioning the need for this amendment, I am concerned that, as drafted, it would have the undesirable and inappropriate effect of requiring the NCIS service authority to consult the relevant police staff association about the terms and conditions of each individual, not just the generality of the terms and conditions applying in NCIS. Individuals' salary or job description are properly matters for their employer to determine not for the police staff associations to decide or negotiate.

The Bill already makes appropriate provision for consultation, which we regard as important, with the police staff associations. As a result this amendment is unnecessary. I hope the noble Baroness will agree not to pursue it.

The Bill already provides for police members of the NCIS to be members of staff associations. This would be pointless if it did not intend the police staff associations to be fully involved in representing their members' interests and, in practice, NCIS will have no option but to consult the police staff associations. The police staff associations are the collective voice of potential police members of the NCIS, all of whom will need to be satisfied that the terms and conditions on which they are to be employed are satisfactory.

I would remind the Committee that the NCIS will rely on seconded police staff who will be volunteers. If the terms and conditions that the NCIS wishes to impose are unsatisfactory, then these officers certainly will not volunteer.

In addition to questioning the need for this amendment, I am concerned that as drafted it would have the undesirable and, I believe, inappropriate effect of requiring the NCIS service authority to consult the relevant police staff association about the terms and conditions of each individual, and not just the generality of the terms and conditions applying in the NCIS. Individuals' salaries or job descriptions are properly matters for the employer to determine and not for the police staff associations to decide or negotiate.

The Bill already makes appropriate provision for consultation, which we regard as very important, with the police staff associations. As a result, I believe that the amendment is unnecessary and I hope that the noble Baroness will not press it.

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon

I am grateful to the Minister for that exposition. It certainly was not intended that it would apply to the conditions of individual officers. I take that on board, although there might have been some scope for some additional provision for consultation. In the circumstances, I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 20 to 23: Page 6, line 25, leave out from beginning to ("at") in line 26 and insert— ("(6) A police member to whom subsection (2)(b) applies shall cease to he a member of NCIS"). Page 6, line 33, leave out from ("NCIS") to end. Page 6, line 35, leave out ("within subsection (2)(b)") and insert ("to whom subsection (2)(a) applies"). Page 6, line 43, leave out subsection (10).

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 10 agreed to.

Clause 11 [Reports by Director General to the Authority]:

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 24: Page 7, line 7, leave out ("general").

The noble Lord said: This amendment, together with the relevant amendment in Part II, which is Amendment No. 59, is intended to probe the meaning of the word "general" in the sentence, The Director General of NCIS shall … submit to the NCIS Service Authority a general report on the activities of NCIS".

The word "general" is not used in Clause 5 when the service authority, after the end of each financial year, issues a report on the carrying out of its functions during that year. My puzzlement, I suppose, is a puzzlement about the English language. Is the word "general" supposed to be widening the scope of the report so that it covers everything, or is it restricting the scope of the report so that it cannot cover particular matters? It is unclear to me. I dare not tempt the noble Lord, Lord Renton, but perhaps he knows in which of these senses "general" has been used in the past in legislation. I simply do not understand it.

Lord Renton

As the noble Lord mentions it, I have always regarded it as leaving out unnecessary detail.

Baroness Blatch

That may come in very handy for me to use in a moment. Clauses 11 and 56 were drafted to ensure that the directors general of NCIS and the National Crime Squad were subject to the same duty to report annually on the activities of the services they manage as chief constables after a report on the policing of areas covered by their forces.

Section 22 of the Police Act 1996 requires chief constables to prepare a general report. The Government's intention is that the two directors general should have to prepare the same kind of report as chief constables and that is why Clauses 11 and 56 also refer to a general report. The approach is consistent with the Government's wish to ensure that the regime governing NCIS and the National Crime Squad is the same regime as that governing police forces wherever this is possible, given the national nature of NCIS and the National Crime Squad.

The intention of the word "general" also helps to clarify the meaning of the provision. A report should be general in the sense that it covers the full range of activities of the force or service in question. It could also be general in the sense that it does not deal with individual cases or matters that are operationally sensitive. I now invoke the phrase that my noble friend has just used and that is "unnecessary detail" because that can come in other forms. Particular reports can be commissioned on specific aspects of a body's work.

It seems to me that the intention of the legislation is clearer if the word "general" is retained. I see no reason to require the directors general of NCIS and the National Crime Squad to report in a different way from their chief constable counterparts. In the interests of clarity and consistency, therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will not wish to press the amendment.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

It may be that that reply is caviar to the general in the sense that some of it may be wasted on me. I accept the point that it is clearly desirable to be consistent with the consolidated Police Act of 1996, but it still does not make very good sense. If the Minister wants to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Renton, wants to say, that it excludes unnecessary material, then I think the noble Baroness should say so. If it is intended that it should exclude, for example, information about ongoing investigations or matters whose inclusion would damage the operations of the organisation, then I think that should be made clear. The advantage of being more precise would be that it would then be possible to say that unless these reports referred to ongoing investigations, or unless they referred to matters which should in the interests of security be withheld, they should be comprehensive reports. That conclusion would also apply, I imagine, to the Police Act of 1996, but I am not prepared to fight about that at this time. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 25: Page 7, line 8, at end insert ("during that year").

The noble Baroness said: In speaking to Amendment No. 25, I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 28, 40, 41, 43, 50, 60, 64, 86, 138 to 141. In speaking to this list of technical amendments in Clause 11, I also speak to, as I have said, the other raft of amendments. With the exception of Amendments Nos. 40, 50 and 141, they are required to ensure clarity and consistency of drafting throughout the Bill, which I hope will please my noble friend Lord Renton. Amendments Nos. 40 and 50 are necessary to correct references to other clauses in the Bill. Amendment No. 141 extends Section 65(a) of the Local Government Finance Act 1988, inserted by Clause 3 of the Local Government Ratings Bill at present before Parliament, to the NCIS and National Crime Squad service authorities. Reference to Section 65(a) is necessary to ensure that NCIS and the National Crime Squad service authorities are liable for non-domestic rates. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 11, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 12 agreed to.

Clause 13 [Officers and employees]:

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon moved Amendment No. 26: Page 7, line 34, at end insert— ("( ) Where the Authority seeks to appoint persons under this section or section 14 below, it shall so far as practicable appoint persons who are at the time of their appointment employees of police authorities where such persons fulfil the requirements for the post.").

The noble Baroness said: This is urging, one hopes, good management practice on these new organisations rather than perhaps something that is appropriate to go on the face of the Bill. There are many people currently employed by regional crime squads and the forerunner of NCIS, as it currently exists, who are employees of local police authorities or employees of the Metropolitan Police civil staff. It is hoped that some expression of good intentions might arise as a result of that, in that those who have great expertise in the field of crime analysis, crime intelligence and converting crime information into crime intelligence could be appointed to the new authorities by some more expeditious route than might be arrived at by advertising all the posts and doing a general trawl in the first place, as is normal Civil Service practice. The amendment is therefore intended to assist by protecting the experience, knowledge and expertise of a particular group of people who will be most profoundly affected by the changes that will be brought about by these clauses of the Bill. I beg to move.

6 p.m.

Lord Renton

Although there is nothing in the Bill to prevent the appointment of such people, I believe it would be dangerous to insert this amendment. There might be civil servants in the Police Division of the Home Office who could be very useful doing this work. Indeed, there might be people who have had police experience in the Commonwealth or elsewhere abroad who might be able to make a special contribution. If we narrow the measure in this way, we may be restricting the talent that will be required.

Baroness Blatch

The proposed amendments to Clause 13 and Clause 57 seek to restrict the service authorities for the two services to recruiting officers, employees and clerks from among the employees of police authorities where practicable and where they meet the requirements of the post. I should also point out that the proposed amendment to Clause 57 is defective because the National Crime Squad will appoint its clerk under Clause 58, not Clause 14. However, I do not use that as an argument against the amendment.

The Government believe that it would be totally unacceptable, as my noble friend said, to impose such an artificial restriction on the service authorities in deciding whom to employ. The service authorities will be subject to a number of local government enactments which already apply to the police authorities. Section 7 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 requires authorities to appoint their staff on merit. That section will be applied to NCIS and to the National Crime Squad Service authorities through the application of Section 21 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989.

There may indeed be occasions when candidates from police authorities will demonstrate that they are the best person for the job and will bring valuable experience to the post. I expect that to happen more often than not. However, equally, a candidate with no police authority experience may be able to demonstrate skills and experience that the service authority considers make that person the most suitable candidate for the job. The service authorities must be able to select the best candidates. That is consistent with the statutory requirement to appoint on merit. There can be no possible justification for attempting to restrict the pool of potential recruits in the way proposed. That is not to say that we are not sympathetic to the point that the noble Baroness makes; namely, that there is a pool of expertise, which I believe will certainly be drawn upon by the service authorities.

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon

I am grateful to the Minister for that final assurance, which was all that we sought to achieve through the suggested amendments. I believe that they were not appropriate to appear on the face of the Bill in any case. We were attempting to cover the immediate short-term bridging between the current set-up and the future set-up and provide some crumb of comfort to those who will be greatly disrupted by the new measures. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 13 agreed to.

Clauses 14 to 16 agreed to.

Clause 17 [Power to issue levies]:

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 27: Page 8, line 20, at end insert— ("( ) The Secretary of State shall, in respect of each financial year in which an order under subsection (2) above applies, satisfy himself that the resources available to each police authority are adequate wholly to meet the amount of the levy without adversely affecting the level at which other police services are provided by that police authority.").

The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 63, which is the comparable amendment in Part II of the Bill. I have not checked to see whether it cross-references correctly to the other clauses.

This is a matter of very great importance, although I shall try not to detain the Committee any longer than I have to. The current budget of NCIS, set up since 1992 on executive arrangements—the polite way of saying, "without statutory authority"—is approximately £25 million a year. So it is a great deal of money. That comes from a Home Office Vote different from that which supports the activities of local police authorities, an arrangement which has been in place since the new police authorities were set up following the 1995 Act.

It is now proposed that, from April 1988, NCIS will be funded through a levy on police authorities. The Committee will recall that this was one of the reasons why we were dissatisfied, and still are, with the balance of membership of the service authority for the National Criminal Intelligence Service.

There is no assurance that the resources that are necessary for the National Criminal Intelligence Service or the National Crime Squad, in the former case provided from a separate Home Office Vote, will not be in competition for funding with other police responsibilities. The current jargon phrase used is "top slicing". We understand that the expenditure required for NCIS and the national crime squad will be top sliced from the funding provided by the Home Office to local police authorities.

It is very difficult to decide how the problem should be addressed. There can be no doubt that it has to be addressed. We have to be sure somehow that there is no threat to other policing activities as a result of this change in the funding of these two national bodies. Some people would argue that they should continue to be financed by central government. A rational case can be made for that. It would be a more straightforward funding route than the one proposed in the Bill and which the Minister explained in her opening remarks at Second Reading. However, these amendments do not go that far. We may be wrong and we may have to return to the matter, but all we are saying is that the Secretary of State has to satisfy himself—not even satisfy Parliament; that is how modest we are—that the resources available to each police authority are adequate wholly to meet the amount of the levy without adversely affecting the level at which other police services are provided by that police authority.

Under Schedule 3 the Secretary of State's approval is required before the total amount of the levies is agreed. So the Home Secretary has the ultimate power to control the size of the levy. It is not the local authorities which have that power. But, for example, if the Secretary of State decides that, for whatever reason, good or bad, there should be growth in real terms in the expenditure of NCIS or the National Crime Squad, then, unless other provision is made, it is the council tax payers who will have to meet that cost, not the Secretary of State—although it is the Secretary of State who will have to make the decision. Therefore we must resolve the issue of funding if we are to have a proper division of responsibility between the Secretary of State and the local police authorities.

There could be considerable differences. There are considerable problems which need to be resolved. What will be the approximate size of the respective budgets of NCIS and the National Crime Squad? Will they be 10 per cent. of the present police budget? Will they be 5 per cent. of it; or 1 per cent? It is very difficult to work that out on present information. What will be the basis of the levy? Will it be on a population basis, a council tax basis or on some calculation of the level of crime? Will the transitional grant cover all the additional costs set out in the financial memorandum? It is set out as being £1.65 million. How will those estimates be arrived at, and what will be the effect on local police authority finances?

This is partly a probing amendment to get the answers to the questions that I have posed, and partly far more than a probing amendment: it is a demand to government that they should properly resolve the issue of resources for these important and welcome new bodies. At the moment the transfer of financial responsibility from the Home Office to local police authorities is not adequately explained in the legislation. The safeguards which are necessary to protect other police activities have not been provided in the Bill. I beg to move.

Lord Dixon-Smith

I have some sympathy with the questions that the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, asks. That said, I am not sure that I have a great deal of sympathy with the solution that he expounds.

I have always assumed—and I hope my noble friend the Minister will assure me of this—that the current funding for NCIS will be transferred initially to the normal Home Office police grant. To that extent the existing funding will not affect the present situation with regard to funding for current police authorities. The regional crime squads are already funded through the central police grant, so to that extent what is happening here is that the funding is being clawed back from the police authorities and going to what will be a national crime squad instead of to a regional crime squad. So the actual changes in service funding levels probably will be very small at the operational police authority level.

If this is the way it is to be done, it is effectively top slicing. Even if the police authority is required to send its levy back it is effectively top sliced off it. Given that that is happening, to expect that that money can be taken back without any impact on the services provided by a particular police authority at all times is an unreasonable expectation.

I have some experience in dealing with police authorities from time to time, and there are, as the saying goes, police authorities and police authorities. They all try extremely hard—and I defer to none in my admiration for them—but some are better than others. It may well be that from time to time an individual authority could find itself marginally embarrassed by its levy in one particular year. It should be noted that the levy is subject to a great deal of consultation with the police authorities before it is finally agreed, but an individual authority could well find itself marginally embarrassed. We are not talking about a vast sum of money in relation to the totality of the budget, but it may find itself marginally embarrassed at some point as a result of the particular way it chooses to allocate its resources. We should not deny the police authorities that right.

I agree that the whole question of funding needs further definition and tightening, but I do not accept that this amendment is at all appropriate as a way of taking the matter forward.

6.15 p.m.

Baroness Blatch

I am grateful to my noble friend who again speaks with enormous experience, not only at local government level but as having been chairman of one of the local authority associations.

I can see that the intended purpose of Amendments Nos. 27 and 63 to Clauses 17 and 61 is to protect police authorities from excessive increases in the costs of NCIS and providing the services of the current regional crime squads.

I recognise that police authorities in England and Wales are justifiably concerned that they may face levies for these services which reduce their ability to fund necessary local policing. But the Government are not persuaded that these amendments are necessary for the purpose and indeed they could have undesirable effects.

The Bill already safeguards the interests of police authorities and makes provision for an informed decision about the split between funding for local policing and these two national services. First, paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 gives the police authority members of the two service authorities the dominant voice in determining the levies. Secondly, paragraph 2 requires the Secretary of State to consult representatives of the police authorities before deciding whether to approve the proposed levies. In practice, the provision in paragraph 2 will be implemented by creating a tripartite body to advise the Home Secretary on what level of levy is appropriate.

In view of this I believe that the proposed amendments are unnecessary. Not only are they unnecessary but they are impractical and they have undesirable consequences. The amendments to Clauses 17 and 61 would require the Home Secretary to reach a judgment on whether or not a single police authority could fund the policing services it intends to provide out of the resources it had left after the levies for NCIS and the National Crime Squad had been deducted—a point made very well by my noble friend, Lord Dixon-Smith. This means detailed central examination of the policing plans for the 43 police authorities in England and Wales. Not only is this impractical—the result would be immensely bureaucratic—it also usurps the role of police authorities and would result in direct intervention in local policing by the Home Secretary. This attacks the very foundations of the local policing structure in this country. It is potentially a move in the direction of a national police force.

The amendment to Clause 61 would have a further undesirable effect. It would tie the level of funding of the National Crime Squad for all time to the current level of funding. It would also mean that the costs of the National Crime Squad would have to be distributed to police authorities as they are now. Under this amendment the police authorities in an area served by an existing regional crime squad would be charged the same proportion of the National Crime Squad's costs as they currently pay for their regional crime squad. This cannot be right. For instance, what happens if crime patterns change over time or the tasks the police service ask the National Crime Squad to undertake within the remit we give them develop or alter? Under this amendment to Clause 61 the service authority would be unable to respond.

It is clearly right that the process of deciding on the levies for NCIS and the National Crime Squad should take account of local policing needs—that is absolutely fundamental. The Bill already provides for the interests of local chief officers of police and their police authorities to be taken into account. That is consistent with our tripartite system of policing. These amendments would create more bureaucracy and affect the role of police authorities in a way which we do not believe would be helpful or feasible.

The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, asked a number of questions, first about the size of NCIS and the National Crime Squad, the size of the budget, and would it be the same as is currently spent on those services. The NCIS and the National Crime Squad budgets will be based on the current levels of expenditure on these services. That also answers the question that my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith posed.

The provisions in the Bill are not for top slicing, as the noble Lord, knows, and I would like to write to him on the other points of detail that he raised in speaking to this amendment.

There are arguments both for and against top slicing. I will not rehearse them. We have set our face against top slicing. We believe that the levying principle avoids the direct principal control that flows from top slicing. It means that the recipients of the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad services pay directly for the services they use. We believe that is a good discipline. The levy is more transparent than top slicing and will appear on council tax bills.

Lord Knights

To clarify things in my own mind, will the Minister say if I am right in thinking that the costs of the regional crime squads at the moment are met by the police forces of the regions which they serve, and that those expenses will no longer be payable because the regional crime squads will have gone? Presumably that is roughly the same amount of money as they will be called upon to pay for the central squad?

As to NCIS, I was under the impression—perhaps wrongly—that that was funded as a common police service. That means that each force is already paying a common police service contribution and, therefore, that money will equate roughly with what they will pay under the new arrangements?

Baroness Blatch

The best way for me to answer the noble Lord, Lord Knights, is to say that the money that is in the system, both for NCIS and the regional crime squads, will remain and be available through a levying process which will be heavily influenced by consultations and negotiations between the local authority members of the two service authorities. That money will not disappear; it will remain available. As I said, in the early stages—and as my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith observed—the levels of payment to those bodies will be based very much on the costs that apply at present. The situation may develop differently over time.

Lord Knights

I thank the Minister for that response; but, unfortunately, I must persist in the matter. Am I right in thinking that police authorities already make a contribution to NCIS and that they do not get it for free?

Baroness Blatch

Yes.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

Can the Minister clarify her answer of "Yes"? Does it mean that they get it for free? All the £25 million comes out of the Home Office Vote, does it not?

Baroness Blatch

I am told that it does not come off the Home Office Vote. I shall write to the noble Lord on the matter. The important fundamental point here is that the money that local police authorities will be expected to pay for both NCIS and the National Crime Squad will be made available to them from the moneys that are in the system at the moment for NCIS and the NCS.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I shall turn to another subject so that the Minister will be able to avoid writing to us and may, therefore, be able to give an answer now. Of course the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, is right to say that the regional crime squads are at present funded by police authorities and that will continue. However, I hope that the cost of the NCS will be greater than the combined cost of the regional crime squads. After all, the whole intention of the exercise is that the NCS will be able to fight crime more effectively and do more than the regional crime squads have been able to do. To me, that means that the new system may well cost more money. If it provides better crime busting, I do not believe that we will begrudge the money involved.

There is a combination of money at present paid by local authorities for the regional crime squads and money which is at least largely paid by the Home Office for the NCIS. We shall no doubt receive more precision in that respect in just a moment. If the Minister thinks, as she clearly does, that my amendments are technically defective, clearly I cannot pursue them to a Division. However, I was fascinated and enormously impressed by what the noble Baroness said regarding the need to leave the decisions about expenditure to the local police authorities and for the Government not to get involved. Indeed, that seems to apply not just to expenditure but also to "needs".

The Minister may have been out of local government for some time, but my understanding is that every local authority has its standard spending assessment determined by government who presume to decide what is the proper amount for each local authority to spend not only on its police services but on all its services; and that government grant to local authorities is based on that SSA. Therefore, all the criticisms that the Minister is making of the intervention of central government in local government expenditure as it affects the police should also apply to the use of the SSA and universal capping which is the practice in the rest of local government. I shall treasure the Minister's words. I shall probably have them picked out in needlepoint and make sure that they are used effectively when we come to the next local government spending round. The analogy will be of great help.

If the amendments are defective, we may well be driven back to saying, as some people would wish us to say, that the costs of the National Crime Squad and NCIS should be paid for by central government and not by local police authorities. I hope that is not the case because I do not wish it to be so. However, we shall have to find a way to protect the rest of police expenditure if we are to travel the route proposed in the Bill; namely, a levy. I understand the point that the Minister is making regarding the difference between a levy and top-slicing. I am sure that the Minister is right to say that the transparency of the levy has certain advantages, but there are still profound difficulties about the proposals and we shall have to return to the matter at a later stage.

Baroness Blatch

Before the noble Lord picks up his needle and thread and starts sewing my words into a piece of material for perpetuity, perhaps I may convey to him that, as I read the amendment, it seems that the Secretary of State would be expected to measure the impact of the levy on each individual authority. I believe that my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith made that very point. Each local authority will have decided how it will spend the sum of money allocated to it from the grant for police authorities. Some will have different priorities from others. The impact of paying the levy may be different for different authorities. Once they have received their sum of money, it is not for the Secretary of State to second guess how they will deploy it operationally. That is the point I was trying to make.

The sum of money that is made available for NCIS comes in fact from the Police Vote money. That is taken into account in the share of money which is given to each local police authority. I do not know about the actual mechanics of whether the police authority takes the money and gives it back to the Government, or the other way round. However, it is part of that Vote and properly reflected in the allocation to each police authority.

Lord Dixon-Smith

I shall not detain Members of the Committee any longer because I understand that the noble Lord has already indicated that he will withdraw the amendment for further consideration. The noble Lord has revealed to me the fact that he has been out of local government rather longer than I have. However, I will say this for him: there is a difference between what actually happens and what is supposed to happen.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

We shall, indeed, enjoy discussing the next local authority expenditure round. The amendments may not be adequate to the purpose, but the problem will not go away. I do not believe that it has been resolved by the Minister's response, and it certainly was not resolved by the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 28: Page 8, line 36, leave out ("by") and insert ("in pursuance of").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 17, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clauses 18 to 27 agreed to.

Clause 28 [Codes of practice]:

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 29: Page 12, line 27, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert—

• ("(2) Where the Secretary of State proposes to issue a code of practice under subsection (I), he shall prepare and publish a draft of that code, shall consider any representations made to him about the draft and may modify the draft accordingly.
• (3) The Secretary of State shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a draft of the code of practice prepared under this section.
• (4) When the Secretary of State has laid the draft of the code before Parliament, he may bring the code into operation by order made by statutory instrument.
• (5) No order under subsection (4) shall have effect until approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
• (6) An order bringing the code into operation may contain such transitional provisions or savings as appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary or expedient in connection with the bringing into force of that code.
• (7) The Secretary of State may from time to time revise the whole or any part of a code to which this section applies and issue that revised code; and the foregoing provisions of this section shall apply (with appropriate modifications) to such a revised code as they apply to the first issue of the code.").

The noble Lord said: In moving the above amendment, I shall, with the leave of the Committee, speak also to Amendments Nos. 30 and 31. All three amendments are designed to ensure that the general public as well as Parliament are consulted in the preparation of a code of practice. I pause for a moment because I gather from the Minister's face that I have done something wrong? Is that correct?

Baroness Blatch

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but I should like to clarify one point. I understood this grouping to include Amendments Nos. 29, 30, 31 and 65 to 67.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I beg the Minister's pardon; of course this grouping also applies to Part II of the Bill, and Amendments Nos. 65 to 67 are the comparable amendments relating to the National Crime Squad.

The codes of practice which are promised in this part of the Bill are welcome and we look forward to an opportunity to debate them in due course. However, it is important that the process of consultation should be clearly laid down in the Bill as is the case for other codes of practice for different purposes. We have been increasingly concerned with this issue in legislation over the past few years. Indeed, one of the most important innovations in legislation in recent years has been the increasing use of codes of practice and the problem of how far they can be flexible and, at the same time, how far Parliament can maintain its responsibility for dealing with the detail of legislative provisions.

Amendment No. 29 and the comparable amendment for Part II of the Bill propose that there should be a draft laid before both Houses of Parliament and that the affirmative resolution procedure should be adhered to. Amendment No. 30 proposes that other people outside Parliament should have regard to the code. In other words, there should be proper provision for observance of the code of practice. We suggest a number of enactments which will need to be covered by the code. Amendment No. 31 and the comparable amendment in Part II provide for the use of the code of practice where relevant in evidence in criminal proceedings.

What we are doing is not new; it is an extension of the authority underlying codes of practice, ensuring that they are properly drafted and properly observed and that they have the same effect in criminal proceedings as the conditions set out in detail in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. There should be no obstacles to the introduction of consultation proceedings for the drafting. There should be no argument that it is unnecessary. NCIS is holding extremely sensitive criminal intelligence. It is an important, indeed vital part in the fight against serious and organised crime. Under those circumstances the control of the detailed operation of NCIS should not be left to the Secretary of State. Provisions subject to consultation and to conditions on observance should apply to the code of practice. It is vital that the code of practice has the authority necessary to ensure that everyone in NCIS and those who deal with NCIS in any way are assured that the code of practice is in place, has been properly drafted, and is being observed. I beg to move.

6.30 p.m.

Lord Renton

I hope that my noble friend will resist the amendments. I greatly understand the noble Lord's desire to ensure that codes of practice are properly drafted, approved and observed. But, quite frankly, if one considers it very closely indeed, Amendment No. 29, which is intended to replace subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 28, adds practically nothing. It contains a tremendous amount of verbiage but has no further effect that I can understand. The noble Lord said that there must be consultation. Consultation is not mentioned in Amendment No. 29. I am open to correction, but I understand that the provisions of Clause 28 are now common form; there are a number of precedents. The essence of the matter is that a copy of the code shall be laid before Parliament, as set out in subsection (3) and in the noble Lord's amendment. The noble Lord's suggestion that there needs to be a draft code of practice and that that constitutes something fresh is somewhat mistaken. In a sense, every code that requires the consent of Parliament is a draft. If Parliament does not approve it, it is not approved.

Subsection (4) of Amendment No. 29 provides that, When the Secretary of State has laid the draft of the code before Parliament, he may bring the code into operation by order".

Therefore his suggestion of a draft adds nothing to what is already in the Bill.

Amendment No. 30 puzzles me. It begins with the word "persons". It does not state which persons. But we all know that the code of practice will affect people concerned with police affairs who would be bound by the code of practice. But it states that, Persons, other than persons required to have regard to any code of practice issued … by virtue of regulations under any of the enactments",

—and they are specified; they are police statutes— shall by virtue of this subsection have regard to any such code in the performance of their functions".

A code is a code and obliges people anyway. It seems to me that the amendment adds nothing in effect.

Amendment No. 31 states that, In all criminal and civil proceedings a code issued under this section shall be admissible in evidence".

Codes of practice have never had to be regarded as evidence on which there can be cross-examination. A code of practice is almost part of the law. Some of us wish that we had never invented this phrase. It is just like a statutory instrument. But let us make an exception in our minds and say that it is different from other statutory instruments. The point is that it has only to be presented to a court as having had the authority of Parliament. It should not be regarded as evidence.

For those various reasons, I hope that my noble friend will resist the amendments. They add great length and confusion to the Bill.

Lord Thomas of Gresford

I strongly support Amendments Nos. 29 to 31, and 65 to 67, and in particular Amendments Nos. 31 and 67.

If there is a code, it is not enough to rely upon the assurance given by the noble Lord, Lord Renton, that the people concerned will be bound by the codes of practice. What happens when the people concerned do not bind themselves by the codes of practice but breach them? If evidence is produced in a criminal or civil court as a result of the breach of the codes, what is to be the result? Surely there has to be some sanction. The sanction under the codes introduced under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act which are concerned with the interrogation of suspects is provided in Section 78 of the Act, whereby the judge can rule evidence to be inadmissible on the grounds of unfairness.

Lord Renton

If the noble Lord will allow me to intervene, perhaps I may say with deep respect that he is confused. As regards the codes of practice and evidence of breaches of the codes of practice, we do not need to have it written in the Bill, as does Amendment No. 31, that a code issued shall be admissible. It is admissible whether or not it is produced in evidence. It is the breaches, as the noble Lord rightly states, which are the subject of evidence; but that is a different matter. Amendment No. 31 does not refer to the breaches.

Lord Thomas of Gresford

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his help and assistance. I do not contest that a code is admissible, or that a court can have regard to the contents of a code. However, I place the greatest emphasis on the words, if any provision of such a code appears to the court or tribunal conducting the proceedings to be relevant to any question arising in the proceedings it shall be taken into account in determining that question". Surely the question to which this amendment refers is the question of the admissibility of evidence that has been obtained in breach of these codes. Of course the code in relation to Clause 28 may perhaps be less relevant, since it deals with the NCIS, than the code in relation to the National Crime Squad, because the National Crime Squad is concerned and its principal function is stated to be: the prevention and detection of crime relevant to more than one police area in England and Wales". One can readily envisage, certainly so far as Clause 67 is concerned, that there could well be breaches of the code that is promulgated and that those are matters which could be of very considerable concern to a court. An hour or so ago the Minister spoke against the concept of having a commissioner to oversee the implementation, the fairness and accuracy of the work of the NCIS. He or she having gone, the phrase that comes to my mind to be adapted is "Quis custodiet codices ipsos?" Somebody has got to ensure that these codes are maintained and obeyed.

Baroness Blatch

Amendments Nos. 29, 30 and 31 to Clause 28 and Amendments Nos. 65, 66 and 67 to Clause 72 all relate to the provisions in the Bill which enable the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice about the way in which the service authorities discharge their function. Clause 28 relates to the NCIS service authority while Clause 72 deals with the National Crime Squad, as the noble Lord has already pointed out. I emphasise that it is the service authorities to whom any such codes of practice would apply, not the services themselves. That is a crucial point to bear in mind when considering these amendments.

The amendments seek to achieve three main purposes. First, they require any codes of practice to be subject to formal consultation requirements and the affirmative resolution procedure before they can come into effect. Secondly, they seek to require that persons performing functions under Clauses 89 and 91 of the Bill, which deal with the authorisation of intrusive surveillance, should have regard to these codes of practice. Finally, they provide that the provisions of these codes of practice are admissible in evidence in civil and criminal proceedings. Clauses 28 and 72 of the Bill are identical to Section 39 of the Police Act 1996, which enables the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice about the way in which police authorities discharge their functions. The purpose of the power is to allow the Secretary of State to issue binding guidance to service authorities about administrative procedures and about the way they discharge their duties. The only code of practice—

Lord Thomas of Gresford

Would the noble Baroness agree that there is a marked distinction between ensuring that administrative matters are carried out by police authorities under codes of practice and a situation that is envisaged in this Bill, where we are dealing with the collection of evidence one way or the other, whether through the NCIS or the crime squad provisions?

Baroness Blatch

I am just coming to the distinction, because the distinction is a very important one and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, will see the point. The only code of practice issued to police authorities was published in 1994 and covered financial management by police authorities. Where a code was issued to a service authority, it would be subject to precisely the same consultation and precisely the same parliamentary procedures as a code issued to police authorities.

As I say, Clauses 28 and 72 of the Bill are identical to Section 39 of the Police Act. The distinction is between that and the moving on to the codes of practice which will cover the intrusive surveillance part of the Bill. I will come to that in a moment. All of that is perfectly reasonable, given that the codes will be concerned with matters of detail about the discharge of functions which have been subject to thorough parliamentary scrutiny. We can see no possible justification for dealing with codes of practice relating to the service authorities any differently from those of police authorities. The Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation of this House is also satisfied that there is an appropriate degree of parliamentary control over these powers. Although we have no present plans to issue codes of practice under these provisions of the Bill, we cannot in these circumstances accept that these amendments are necessary.

Turning to the second element of the amendments, this seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the codes of practice envisaged. Any codes will be concerned with how the service authorities discharge their functions. The service authorities and police authorities generally have no role whatsoever in the authorisation of intrusive surveillance—this is the distinction I make—to which Clauses 89 and 91 relate. That will be a matter, under the Bill as presently drafted, for chief constables and will be one for which a specific code of practice will be issued. It would be totally inappropriate and indeed unnecessary for chief constables performing those functions to have regard not only to their own specific code of practice but, as these amendments require, to codes of practice issued under these very different provisions in the Bill.

Finally, as I have already mentioned, the codes of practice will be concerned with matters of detail about how the service authorities discharge their functions. As such, they will not be relevant as evidence in criminal or civil proceedings, which was the point made by my noble friend Lord Renton. There is no provision for codes of practice relating to police authorities to be admissible in evidence in this way, and there is no need for such a provision in relation to service authorities. However, there is a provision in relation to intrusive surveillance and the way in which that code of practice will work. That code of practice and the way in which it is adhered to by people involved in intrusive surveillance activities will, I understand, be admissible in evidence.

We believe that the Bill makes perfectly adequate provision based on the arrangements for police authorities for these codes of practice to be prepared and to be laid before Parliament. These amendments are unnecessary and in some respects inappropriate, and therefore we cannot support them.

6.45 p.m.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I did not actually expect the Government to support the amendments and I do not think it was only the pleading of the noble Lord, Lord Renton, that persuaded them not to. I have to say to the noble Lord that, unusually for him, his observations were almost entirely misconceived. Codes of practice are treated in this way in particular in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and codes of practice, which form such a large part of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, and therefore of our criminal procedures, are subject to exactly these constraints on consultation, on parliamentary approval, on observance and on use in evidence.

I suspect that I am wrong, not so much in the wording of these amendments but in where they have been placed. I accept that the Minister is right in that to some extent the wording I have used is more appropriate to police activities than to the activities of the service authorities. I also think that my amendments are wrong in their references to Clauses 89 and 91. I think they should be dealt with separately when we come to Part III of the Bill. Indeed, as the noble Baroness will know, we have a number of amendments down about the code of practice which she has so kindly supplied to us in draft.

These are clearly not amendments which I can pursue, but the point which I tried to make at the beginning and which was powerfully backed up by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is still true. In other words, if you have codes of practice—and they are referred to in Clause 28—then they have got to be properly enforced. The provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 28 and the comparable provisions of Part II of the Bill simply do not provide adequate enforcement procedures; nor do they provide for adequate consultation. To that extent, the analogy of the codes of practice in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act is very relevant, and this is a matter which I shall have to come back to at a later stage.

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 30 and 31 not moved.]

Clause 28 agreed to.

Clauses 29 to 35 agreed to.

Clause 36 [Common services]:

[Amendments Nos. 32 to 35 not moved.]

Clause 36 agreed to.

Clause 37 [Discipline regulations]:

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon moved Amendment No. 36: Page 15, line 38, leave out ("members") and insert ("employees").

The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 36 I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 52, 54, 68 and 143. These amendments relate to the procedures for the disciplining of officers attached to the central organisations.

I have considerable experience in working in mixed squads of police officers and civilian staff and understand that it might seem attractive to have a common procedure for disciplining all members of NCIS and the National Crime Squad. However, I think that such a common procedure will cause greater confusion not only to police officers themselves, who find that they are not subject to the normal discipline code they have been used to when members of their own forces, but also, and perhaps more importantly, it will cause confusion to members of the public if they find that the officers attached to the central organisations are not subject to similar discipline codes as apply within their own forces. This is particularly the case in relation to the National Crime Squad whose officers will presumably be engaged on joint operational exercises with officers from local forces in various parts of the country.

This point will relate to further amendments with regard to complaints about the police. If the public find that some of the officers concerned are subject to one set of disciplinary regulations because they belong to the ordinary police forces throughout the country while other police officers, because they are attached to either NCIS or the National Crime Squad, are subject to a different discipline code, it could be extremely disruptive to public confidence in the behaviour of these officers.

I ask the Minister to consider whether it is appropriate that these organisations should have a separate form of discipline to that which the police service throughout the rest of the country enjoys. I beg to move.

Baroness Blatch

Seconded police officers will form the majority of the police officers working in both services. The Police Federation wants those officers to remain subject to the discipline regulations which apply to all forces and do not want there to be any possibility of a separate set of regulations being applied.

I understand those concerns. The existing discipline arrangements for officers on temporary service under Section 97 of the Police Act 1996 have worked well. It is likely that in many respects they will continue to operate as they do now. It is our intention that the discipline arrangements for police officers in the two services should be entirely consistent with those for police officers generally. In practice, they will have to be. Officers coming to work in both services will be volunteers and it would not be possible to attract them if they felt that they were being disadvantaged in any way.

It is also the Government's intention that the discipline arrangements will apply as far as is reasonable to all staff, including the civilians. At NCIS, for example, there may be police, Customs and Immigration officers all working on the same operation. The Government believe that staff working in the services should be subject to a consistent complaints and discipline regime as far as possible. It would be difficult to justify treating the various groups of staff in different ways. It could lead to confusion for members of the public as well. It is vital that, if members of the public wish to complain, there are clear and consistent procedures for doing so. Alternatively, a person making a complaint might have to make several complaints simultaneously: one through a police procedure, one through a procedure governing Customs officers and another through a system for civilian staff. This would be confusing for the complainant and could be unjust for staff working side by side in the same organisation.

To turn now to the amendments to Clauses 37 and 80, there will be some police members permanently appointed to the services to whom general discipline regulations cannot apply. They are defined in the Bill as members, not employees, and so these amendments would mean that there could not be discipline regulations which applied to them. It is also important that the position of the director general and his senior officers in relation to disciplinary matters is clear. This may mean that they should in some matters have the same disciplinary powers as their senior colleagues in police forces and that those powers should be consistent in relation to all members of their services. This would require regulations to be made which were appropriate to the needs of the two services and which could be applied to all staff.

I am happy to repeat the assurance which I gave at Second Reading that there will be full consultation with the police staff associations and others before any regulations are made on these matters. But regulations may be needed and the Bill as presently drafted correctly refers to such regulations applying to the conduct of members, not just employees, of the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad. For that reason, we are unable to accept these amendments to Clauses 37 and 80.

The amendments to Clause 54 go even further than those to Clauses 37 and 80. They seek to provide that police members of the National Crime Squad will continue to be subject to all the terms and conditions of service set out in police regulations rather than terms and conditions determined by the service authority for the National Crime Squad.

At present, police officers in the regional crime squads are seconded from their forces and so remain subject to police regulations. Under the provisions of the Bill such officers will, as is already the case for the National Criminal Intelligence Service, be seconded on a period of temporary service, to which Section 97 of the Police Act 1996 applies. Police regulations do not apply to such officers, but virtually identical terms and conditions are applied administratively. This has worked well because, as will be the case with the National Crime Squad, officers working in such central services are volunteers and would not join unless the terms and conditions very largely reflected those in forces.

As with the current arrangements for central service, we do not believe that police regulations should apply directly to the National Criminal Intelligence Service or the National Crime Squad. They are national bodies and may wish to develop terms and conditions which better meet their specific needs. That is why the Bill provides for the terms and conditions to be determined by the service authorities. But we recognise the concerns of staff that there should be consultation with their representative bodies before such wider terms and conditions are determined. Paragraphs 73 and 74 of Schedule 9 to the Bill specifically provide for consultation with the Police Negotiating Board before the terms and conditions for police members are decided. We believe that this will provide adequate and appropriate machinery for consultation on these important matters.

We do not believe that it is right to leave police members of the National Crime Squad directly subject to police regulations. These matters should be dealt with in the same way as for police members of the National Criminal Intelligence Service and in line with the arrangements which already work perfectly well for officers on central service. There will in future be specific provision for consultation with the Police Negotiating Board, which we believe adequately protects the interests of police officers working in both services. Unless the terms and conditions are as good as those in forces, the National Crime Squad will simply not attract the volunteers which it will need. In those circumstances, we believe that the Bill adopts the right approach and therefore we cannot accept these amendments.

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon

I am grateful for that response from the Minister, which I shall study in due course. It is nothing to do with the amendment, but I am surprised that she thinks people will not volunteer for these exciting new squads unless the conditions are right. People often volunteer to do jobs because they think they will be interesting and it is possible that they will be willing to put up with conditions that could be thought inappropriate. Nevertheless, I accept the tone of what the Minister said. I will study her answer carefully.

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 37 agreed to.

7 p.m.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 37: After Clause 37, insert the following new clause—

APPEALS: PART 1 (".—(i) A police member of NCIS to whom section 9(2)(a) applies and who is dismissed or required to resign by a decision taken under or by virtue of regulations made under section 37 may appeal to an appeals tribunal against the decision except where he has a right of appeal to some other person; and in that case he may appeal to an appeals tribunal from any decision of that other person as a result of which he is dismissed or required to resign. (2) The Secretary of State shall, by order, make provision in relation to appeals tribunals and appeals under subsection (1) corresponding (with or without modification) to that which is or may be made in relation to police appeals tribunals and appeals under section 85(1) of the Police Act 1996 by, or by virtue of, section 85(2) to (4) of and Schedule 6 to that Act. (3) A statutory instrument containing an order under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.").

The noble Baroness said: In moving this amendment I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 69 and 142. Amendments Nos. 37, 69 and 142 to Clauses 37 and 80 and Schedule 9 respectively are necessary to ensure that senior police officers who are appointed as permanent police members of the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad will have access to the same appeals tribunal machinery as their senior colleagues in police forces.

Section 85 and Schedule 6 to the Police Act 1996 make provision for senior police officers to have a right of appeal to a police appeals tribunal before they are dismissed or required to resign from police service. That machinery will not be available to senior police officers permanently appointed to the two services unless this Bill makes specific provision for it to do so. These amendments make such provision and so give senior permanent police members of the two services the same protection as their senior colleagues in police forces. This is not something which could be done by means of the regulation-making powers which the Bill already provides. The provisions for senior officers in police forces are on the face of the Police Act 1996 and so should be on the face of this Bill.

Amendment No. 38 provides, in relation to the National Criminal Intelligence Service, for the Secretary of State to make regulations governing the conduct of appeals tribunals which will correspond to those made under the equivalent provisions of the Police Act 1996. This is necessary because the National Criminal Intelligence Service is a United Kingdom body and so the regulations cannot be applied directly as they are in Amendment No. 69 for the National Crime Squad. But there will be no difference in practice between the arrangements for the two services. As with the appeals tribunals under the Police Act 1996, Amendment No. 142 to Schedule 9 ensures that the arrangements established by this Bill are covered by the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 and will be subject to the oversight of the Council of Tribunals.

Finally, I wish to emphasise that specific provision of this kind does not need to be made for the vast majority of police officers working in the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad. They will be on temporary service under Section 97 of the Police Act 1996. If there were any prospect of officers seconded in this way being dismissed, required to resign or reduced in rank, they would be returned to their home force. They would then automatically have access to the usual police appeals machinery. Their position is fully protected without the need for specific provision to be made in the Bill. I hope that the Committee will accept these amendments. I beg to move.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

Perhaps I may ask the noble Baroness a question on this matter, which she may prefer to deal with by correspondence. What are the arrangements now for someone who is the equivalent of a chief officer—that is, after all, the rank of the officer who will be commanding the National Criminal Intelligence Service—in the unlikely event of any disciplinary proceedings being initiated? I should be grateful if she would let me know what the procedures are now in relation to officers of that rank.

Baroness Blatch

I can give the noble Lord an assurance that I shall contact him on that matter.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 38 [Application of police complaints regime to NCIS]:

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon moved Amendment No. 38: Page 16, line 7, leave out from ("shall") to ("make") in line 8 and insert ("to the extent that they relate to police members, so far as is practicable").

The noble Baroness said: This amendment covers very much the same ground as before in relation to discipline codes. The Bill appears, on the face of it, to make provision for a totally different police complaints procedure to be set up. We seek assurance that in relation to Amendments Nos. 38 and 70 it is not intended to have a totally different regime for complaints about officers in these squads.

Let me again make the point in relation to the National Crime Squad that officers who are engaged in practical operations on the street with officers from local forces should not expect to find that there is a different system of complaints in relation to them. Even more important perhaps is that members of the public should have a single avenue for complaining about the actions of officers who are acting jointly in operational situations and should not be required to make complaints through two separate channels or two separate authorities.

I therefore seek a similar assurance as on the discipline code that the police complaints procedure set-up particularly for the National Crime Squad will be the same as that for local police forces, so that neither the police nor members of the public will be confused or have difficulty in dealing with the procedures. I beg to move.

Baroness Blatch

I hope that I am able to reassure the noble Baroness. As with the discipline arrangements we have just debated, the Government understand the concerns which have prompted these amendments. We do not intend to make any regulations which would disadvantage police officers in any way. Indeed, we expect the complaints procedures to be modelled very closely on existing police procedures. That is clear from the Bill. But we also believe that it is important that we should, as far as possible, ensure that all staff working in the two services should be subject to consistent complaints systems. That will be particularly important in the case of the National Criminal Intelligence Service, where members will be drawn from the police, Customs, immigration and security services and where there will be many civilian staff as well. And, as I said in debate on Clauses 37 and 80, a member of the public may, as the noble Baroness said, find himself in the confusing position of lodging complaints under very different systems if his complaint involved more than one person from different parent organisations. We want to do what we can to smooth that process for complainants.

The provisions of the Bill will enable the Secretary of State to make regulations for such procedures so far as he thinks desirable. As the noble Baroness knows, this is a complex matter on which a great deal of further work will be needed before any regulations can be made. Again, I assure the Committee that there will be full consultation with the staff associations and others before final decisions are made. Careful consideration will need to be given to the circumstances of all staff. But we do not think that it is right to try on the face of the Bill to put police members in some special or different position. There will be other staff who are equally vulnerable to malicious complaints and whose position also needs to be considered.

I take the point made by the noble Baroness. We need to be as fair to the complainant as we are to protecting the rights of those who work in the authorities.

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon

I am grateful to the Minister for that assurance. I hope that when the complaints procedure emerges it will be very much on all fours with the complaints procedure in relation to other police officers from the home forces. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 38 agreed to.

Clauses 39 and 40 agreed to.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 39: After Clause 40, insert the following new clause—

LIAISON BY DATA PROTECTION REGISTRAR WITH EUROPOL (". The Secretary of State shall by regulations provide the designated national supervisory authority responsible for personal data protection with the necessary powers to supervise and monitor the functions of NCIS in acting as the national unit liaising with the European Police Office (known as Europol) in relation to personal data as provided by the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (the Europol Convention).").

The noble Lord said: This amendment is not critical of any provisions in the Bill as drafted. It seeks to deal with a problem which arises out of the role of the data protection registrar in relation to the files of the NCIS.

Under Article 23 of the Europol Convention, every member state of the European Union has to designate a national supervisory body with the task of independently monitoring the functions of the national liaison unit in relation to the gathering and distribution of personal data. At the moment, the likely body, when the convention is ratified, will be the data protection registrar.

The data protection registrar has already anticipated that possibility. In her recent response about the implementation of the data protection directive of the European Union, she points out that she does not have sufficient powers under the Data Protection Act 1984 to carry out that role. What she would need in order to carry out the role would be audit powers to enable her to pursue compliance, particularly in relation to those holding sensitive data. That includes for the purpose of this Bill the National Criminal Intelligence Service.

I understand that at present there are administrative or executive actions—in other words, non-statutory actions—being developed, so that the Europol Convention can replace without legislation the powers which are missing and which she lacks in this area. Her powers at the moment are rather passive. She receives and investigates complaints and she has the responsibility of promoting observance of the data protection principles which her office has produced and of disseminating information to the general public. The audit powers which would be required by ratification of the Europol Convention would require her to have those additional powers to which I referred. It would seem desirable, at a time when we are considering the constitution and the responsibilities of NCIS, to provide, as in other European member states, for those powers to be on a statutory basis. I beg to move.

Baroness Blatch

I hope I can be helpful to the noble Lord on this point.

There is no need to provide the data protection registrar, as the intended national supervisory body under the Europol Convention, with additional statutory powers to perform that role. The Europol Convention provides that the national supervisory body shall have access at the national unit (in the UK, the National Criminal Intelligence Service) for the purposes of monitoring data sent to, and received from, Europol. We believe that that role can be fully performed through NCIS providing access voluntarily to the registrar, which it is willing to do. A written agreement is currently being pursued between the registrar's office and NCIS to set out precisely how that access would be exercised in practice. Full consideration should be given to how that approach fares in practice before considering alternatives.

There is nothing inherent in the proposed change of status of NCIS that would alter either the willingness of NCIS to grant access voluntarily or the registrar's ability to monitor this data. But the matter is in hand between the registrar and NCIS.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I understood that and that is what I indicated in moving the amendment. I understand that what I call "administrative arrangements" and the Minister referred to as a "voluntary" agreement are in hand. But what happens if they go wrong?

It seems to me that the opportunity arises, when we are considering the statutory basis of NCIS, to put the matter on a proper footing. I do not doubt the good will of both NCIS and the data protection registrar in seeking to provide the access which will be necessary. The Minister recognises that access will be necessary but for some reason is insisting on relying on voluntary arrangements rather than the firmer basis that would be provided by the new clause.

I understand what the Minister says, but I am puzzled by her resistance to this modest change. I shall need to think about the matter and perhaps talk to her about it before the next stage. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 41 [Liability for wrongful acts of constables etc.]:

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 40: Page 18, line 23, leave out ("(4)(b)") and insert ("(4)(a)").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 41, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 42 agreed to.

Clause 43 [Orders governing NCIS Service Authority]:

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 41: Page 18, line 45, leave out ("by") and insert ("in pursuance of").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 43, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clauses 44 to 49 agreed to.

Clause 50 [Annual reports]:

[Amendment No. 42 not moved.]

Clause 50 agreed to.

Clause 51 [Appointment of Director General]:

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 43 Page 22, line 22, after ("in") insert ("paragraph 14 of").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 44 not moved.]

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 45: Page 22, line 30, at end insert— ("( ) The Director General shall hold the rank of chief constable.").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 51, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 52 agreed to.

7.15 p.m.

Clause 53 [Deputy Director General]:

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 46: Page 23, line 6, leave out (" 54(2)(b)") and insert (" 54(2)(a)").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 53, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 54 [Other members of the National Crime Squad]:

Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 47, 48, and 49: Page 23, line 27, at beginning insert ("he is appointed to the rank of assistant chief constable in the National Crime Squad and he met the requirements of subsection (2A) immediately prior to his being appointed, or (b)") Page 23, line 29, leave out from ("applies") to end of line 32 and insert—

• ("(2A) A person meets the requirements of this subsection if
  1. (a) he holds the rank of assistant chief constable or a higher rank in a police force in Great Britain or in the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
  2. (b) he holds the rank of commander or a higher rank in the metropolitan police force or in the City of London police force, or
  3. (c) he is, in accordance with regulations under section 50 of the Police Act 1996, section 26 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 or section 25 of the Police Act (Northern Ireland) 1970, a constable eligible for appointment to the rank of assistant chief constable or commander in any of the police forces, or in the Constabulary, mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).").

Page 23, line 33, leave out ("to (7)") and insert (6) and (7)").

The noble Baroness said: I have already spoken to these amendments. With the leave of the Committee I shall move them en bloc. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 50: Page 23, line 33, leave out ("person") and insert ("a police member").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 51: Page 23, line 34, leave out ("(2)(b)") and insert ("(2)(a)").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 52 not moved.]

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 53: Page 23, line 36, leave out from ("(c)") to ("shall") in line 37.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 54 not moved.]

Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 55 to 58: Page 23, line 43, leave out from beginning to ("at") in line 45 and insert ("(6) A police member to whom subsection (2)(b) applies shall cease to be a member of the National Crime Squad"). Page 24, line 5, leave out from ("Squad") to end of line 6. Page 24, line 8, leave out ("within subsection (2)(b)") and insert ("to whom subsection (2)(a) applies"). Page 24, line 16, leave out subsection (10).

The noble Baroness said: These amendments have already been spoken to. With the leave of the Committee I shall move them en bloc. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 54, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 55 agreed to.

Clause 56 [Reports by Director General to the Authority]:

[Amendment No. 59 not moved.]

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 60: Page 24, line 28. at end insert ("during that year").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 56, as amended, agreed to.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 61: After Clause 56, insert the following new clause—

ACCOUNTABILITY OF NCS SERVICE AUTHORITY

1. (".—(1) Where a police authority in England or Wales notifies the NCS Service Authority of a request that it investigate a matter of concern to which this section applies, the Director General of the NCS shall investigate and report to the NCS Service Authority as soon as reasonably practicable.
2. (2) A matter of concern to which this section applies is an exceptional matter of concern arising from an incident or series of incidents which have occurred within the police authority's area and relating to the conduct, efficiency or effectiveness of the NCS.
3. (3) The NCS Service Authority shall, after considering a report made by the Director General of the NCS under this section, notify the police authority concerned as soon as practicable and shall make available to that authority a statement as to its conclusions and any action which it proposes to take.").

The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 61 takes the form of a new clause to be inserted after Clause 56. It would provide a mechanism for a police authority to raise issues of serious concern with the director general through the service authority for the National Crime Squad.

This is an analogy with the provision under Section 22 of the consolidated Police Act 1996. That Act provides, and earlier legislation provided before it, that a chief constable must, when required to do so by the police authority, submit a report to the authority on such matters as may be specified in the requirements which are related to the policing of the area.

There are comparable powers to require reports in this legislation and we have passed through them without debate and without difficulty. In fact, so many reports are flying between the service authorities, the Secretary of State and the criminal intelligence service and the National Crime Squad that a few more forests will need to be created to provide the paper for them. The analogy for the provision under Section 22 of the 1996 Act does not exist in the present Bill. We are suggesting that it should.

The power under Section 22 is not used very often but it is a useful safeguard. It allows a police authority to ask for a report when there is some disquiet about the operation of the force. There is a get-out provision which allows the chief constable to refer the requirement to the Secretary of State if he believes that the disclosure of the information is not in the public interest or is not needed for the discharge of the police authority's function. In those circumstances, the Secretary of State can put aside the requirement which the police authority has made. There are analogies in this Bill to that get-out provision.

I am not suggesting that there will be problems, but with a new national crime squad investigating crime in many areas, there is bound to be the possibility of conflict of some kind between a local police force and the National Crime Squad. They are intended to work hand in glove. I accept that the intention of the legislation is in that direction and I accept that a great deal of effort has been put in to ensuring that there is no conflict between the National Crime Squad and the local police force. However, if anything goes wrong with the liaison, not through any lack of good will but through simple human error, it is possible that a serious crime could be committed in the area of a local force, there could be loss of life and it could be that the local police force and the local police authority are called to account by the people living in the area. In this amendment we provide that there should be the possibility of a police authority raising the issue with the director general of the National Crime Squad through the service authority. It would give some assurance to the local police authority that matters were being properly investigated and that a full explanation of the circumstances would be given.

Clause 76 of the Bill allows the Secretary of State to require reports of this kind. The Secretary of State, being accountable to Parliament, is able to answer questions in Parliament about the operation of the national crime squad and has to be sure that he can get the information. What we are proposing here is a similar power for a local authority which is also responsible to people in a local area. We do not want this to be widely used. If it were to be widely used it would be the result of a more general failure in liaison between the National Crime Squad and the local police force. I hope that would not happen; and if it did happen, it probably would be a matter of national concern. A comparable power to that provided in Clause 76 is appropriate. This seems to be the appropriate place to insert it. I beg to move.

Baroness Blatch

The Government recognise that police authorities in England and Wales will have a legitimate interest in the way the National Crime Squad performs the role set out for it in the Bill. That is why the Bill provides for nine police authority members, plus a representative of the police authority for the Metropolitan Police, to sit as members of the National Crime Squad service authority. It is also why the Bill provides no fewer than five separate requirements for police authorities in England and Wales to be consulted about important matters relating to the service authority and the National Crime Squad itself.

Clause 46 requires the Secretary of State to consult persons whom he considers to represent the interests of police authorities before making an order to vary the size of the National Crime Squad service authority. Clause 48 requires the service authority to consult with representatives of police authorities before determining its objectives for the National Crime Squad. Clause 70 places the same duty on the Secretary of State before he sets objectives for the National Crime Squad. Clause 83 places a general duty on the service authority to make arrangements to obtain the views of police authorities. There is a similar duty on the director general of the National Crime Squad to consult chief officers of police. There is a duty in paragraph 2 of Schedule 5 for the Secretary of State to consult police authorities before deciding whether or not to approve the levies proposed by the NCS service authority. This is in addition to the provisions at paragraph 1 of that schedule which ensure that police authority members sitting on the service authority are in the majority when any decision is taken about the levies to be charged to police authorities in England and Wales.

As well as these specific requirements for the Secretary of State or the service authority itself to consult police authorities in England and Wales about matters relating to the service authority, the Bill also requires the service authority to provide all police authorities in England and Wales with a copy of its service plan and annual report. Clause 71 allows the Secretary of State to set performance targets for the National Crime Squad. These measures will assist individual police authorities in judging the extent to which the National Crime Squad is efficient and effective.

There are other measures in the Bill which ensure that the performance of the National Crime Squad is closely scrutinised. Principal among these is the role for Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Secretary of State's power to require the service authority to take remedial action in the light of an adverse report.

I hope the Committee will agree with me when I say that together these measures ensure that police authorities in England and Wales are fully consulted about matters relating to the National Crime Squad and its service authority in a manner which is consistent with the existing tripartite structure of policing in this country.

But it is not for this reason alone that I must oppose the amendment. The amendment cuts across the primary role of the National Crime Squad service authority. It is its duty to ensure that the National Crime Squad is an efficient and effective service. I doubt that any police authority in England and Wales would be prepared to accept being second guessed in the way this amendment would lead to the National Crime Squad service authority being second guessed. It is also at odds with one of the basic tenets of policing in this country: the operational independence of chief constables. Under this clause, police authorities would be able to question operational decisions taken by chief constables.

The Bill already contains adequate and extensive measures to ensure police authority involvement with the National Crime Squad. In view of this and given the way the measures in this clause would interfere with the operational independence of the director general of the national crime squad and cut across the primary duty of the squad's service authority I hope that the Committee will agree that the proposed new clause should not be included in the Bill.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

As I predicted, the Minister has given an impressive list of reports which fly backwards and forwards and consultations which take place, although the Committee will have observed that most of them involve the Secretary of State requiring reports. It is mostly top-down consultation rather than bottom-up consultation.

The purpose of the amendment was rather different. We sought to require the people who are accountable to local people on the ground in individual police authority areas to do something comparable to that which the Secretary of State in other circumstances quite properly is authorised to do. I emphasise again that it is not intended that the power should be used frequently. Subsection (2) of the new clause provides: A matter of concern to which this section applies is an exceptional matter of concern". The word "exceptional", as the Minister will recognise, has legal significance, as we shall no doubt hear again when we come to the Crime (Sentences) Bill. I also emphasise that it is not a report being made by the director general to an individual police authority. What we are asking for is a report being made by the director general to the service authority.

The service authority shall consider that report and make such conclusions as it thinks proper and notify the police authority about those conclusions. That is what is provided for in subsection (3). So there is no question here of what the Minister calls "second guessing". We are not saying that the police authority has the right to go to the director general and say, "Provide me with a report about this". It is only the service authority which has that power in many other respects to require reports from the director general. All that happens here is that there is an additional trigger for a report which reflects the proper concerns of a police authority.

I understand the Minister's concerns, although I do not accept that what is proposed runs counter to good policing principles. I shall think again about how these provisions fit in with the many other complex provisions which are in this part of the Bill. In the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 57 [Officers and employees]:

[Amendment No. 62 not moved.]

Clause 57 agreed to.

Clauses 58 to 60 agreed to.

Clause 61 [Power to issue levies]:

[Amendment No. 63 not moved.]

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 64: Page 26, line 6, leave out ("by") and insert ("in pursuance of').

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 61, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clauses 62 to 71 agreed to.

Clause 72 [Codes of practice]:

[Amendments Nos. 65 to 67 not moved.]

Clause 72 agreed to.

Clauses 73 to 79 agreed to.

Clause 80 [Discipline regulations]:

[Amendment No. 68 not moved.]

Clause 80 agreed to.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 69: After Clause 80, insert the following new clause—

APPEALS: PART II

1. (".—(1) A police member of the National Crime Squad to whom section 54(2)(a) applies and who is dismissed or required to resign by a decision taken under or by virtue of regulations made under section 80 may appeal to an appeals tribunal against the decision except where he has a right of appeal to some other person; and in that case he may appeal to an appeals tribunal from any decision of that other person as a result of which he is dismissed or required to resign.
2. (2) Section 85(2) to (5) of, and Schedule 6 to, the Police Act 1996 (police appeals tribunals) shall apply, subject to such modifications as the Secretary of State may by order prescribe, in relation to an appeals tribunal and an appeal under subsection (1) above as they apply in relation to a police appeals tribunal and an appeal under section 85(1) of that Act.
3. (3) A statutory instrument containing an order under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 81 [Application of police complaints regime to National Crime Squad]:

[Amendment No. 70 not moved.]

Clause 81 agreed to.

Clauses 82 to 86 agreed to.

Schedule 6 agreed to.

Clauses 87 and 88 agreed to.

The Earl of Courtown

I beg to move that the House do now resume. In moving this Motion, I suggest that the Committee stage begins again not before 8.35 p.m.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.