HL Deb 01 July 1996 vol 573 cc1268-79

6.20 p.m.

Read a third time.

Clause 1 [Extension of special appeals procedures]:

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 1: Page 2, line 2, at end insert ("without giving a reasonable explanation of his failure to do so").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 1 I wish also to speak to Amendment No. 5. I shall do so briefly, but there is a Motion now before the House, or there will be, and if the noble Lord, Lord Jakobovits, wishes to intervene after I have introduced Amendment No. 1, it would be appropriate for him to do so. I am sure that he will find a way of relating his remarks to my amendment.

We debated Amendment No. 1 at an earlier stage, but the Government gave a quite inadequate answer on it and the issues are still far from clear. Clause 1 is concerned with the special appeals procedures, the so-called fast-track procedure. Subsection (3) deals with the issue of whether the appellant produced a valid passport. Subsection (3) applies if the appellant, failed to produce a passport without giving a reasonable explanation for his failure to do so" or; "produced a passport which was not in fact valid and failed to inform the officer of that fact".

In Amendment No. 1, we propose that the proviso: without giving a reasonable explanation of his failure to do so",

should be added to subsection (3)(b). In other words, the same proviso as is contained in paragraph (a) should also be provided in paragraph (b).

Without going over all the ground which was debated at an earlier stage, I wish to make a point which may be helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Jakobovits. It is a matter on which the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has given us specific advice and I hope that the noble Lord will feel that the issue of adherence to the United Nations convention on refugees of 1951 and, from time to time, the views of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is of enormous importance and pervades the whole of the Bill. The UNHCR specifically allows that genuine refugees may have false papers, they may break the law and may lie at the port of entry. That is relevant to the decision which the Committee has just taken about applications at the port of entry. People who are perfectly genuine refugees may find it necessary to produce false papers; they may have a reasonable explanation of their failure to produce a valid passport, but they fail to produce it.

The all-pervasive point, which relates to the decision which the Committee took on Amendment No. 6 which we have just debated, is that using such methods—in other words, lying at the point of entry, having false papers and breaking the law—is often an indication of genuine fears. If you wish to come to this country you do not come and produce a fake passport unless you have fears about being returned to your own country. You do not try to talk your way in if you wish to be an asylum applicant, unless you have the kind of fears which are often shown by prevarication or even lying at the point of entry. So genuine fears should only count if no reasonable explanation can be given.

I do not deny that there are people who come to this country who tell lies in order to get here and seek entry for economic reasons. It is not our concern to deny the Government's intention that there should be a fast-track procedure for such people. However, the clause as drafted provides so many other ways of excluding the possibility of people's claims being given full consideration that it would be reasonable to make this modest change and to provide that there could be a reasonable explanation for having a passport which is not valid and failing to inform the officer of that fact. That is not a way of telling whether a person is a genuine applicant. I fear that the fast-track procedure could, under those circumstances, work to the disadvantage of genuine applicants. I beg to move.

Lord Jakobovits

My Lords, I am intensely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, for giving me a reliable peg on which to hang remarks which, for reasons I shall now explain, I could not make earlier. I have only just returned from a seven-week academic assignment in Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, I could not participate in earlier debates on this important Bill. With the leave of the House, perhaps I may be permitted to speak briefly at this stage. This may be as good a slot as I am likely to find for remarks on a Bill of deep and profound concern to me.

Let me say at once that I must declare my interest. I myself entered this country as a refugee from Nazi oppression about 60 years ago. How lucky I was to arrive before refugees were renamed "asylum seekers" with, I think, overtones or connotations of being mentally unbalanced. I owe my life and the lives of my immediate family to Britain's hospitality and magnanimity in offering us a home and a refuge, not to mention the undreamt of opportunities which have come my way. I am obviously keen to see similar blessings made available to others in need.

Permit me to recall my maiden speech just over eight years ago on the Immigration Bill of 1988. I concluded with a plea: to remember that we are all, each one of us, temporary residents on this planet where we have to learn the art of living together in harmony before our visa expires and we are called to migrate to another world".—[Official Report, 4/3/88: col. 377.] In the present debate one cannot but deplore the deep divisions, passions and antagonisms aroused on both sides of the argument, inside as well as outside this House. It is surely a thousand pities and an irony that a measure designed to encourage and regulate the practice of kindness and charity should sow so much bitterness among ourselves.

In my remarks I want to attempt to narrow the divisions and find some common ground likely to command maximum agreement and consensus. On the one hand, surely as a nation nurtured in the biblical heritage we ought to be united in submitting to the precept in the Book of Leviticus: And if a stranger sojourn with you in your land, you shall not oppress him. The stranger … shall be with you like the home-born among you, and you shall love him as yourself". Other injunctions, too, call on us to extend social benefits to the native-born and the stranger alike.

Once an alien finds himself on these shores, whatever his legal status on arrival, it would be quite wrong and cruel to deny him the elementary claims to food and shelter granted to any native citizen. It would be morally unacceptable to expose him to hunger or homelessness. One hopes that, by decisions made in the course of this debate and the one earlier, that will indeed be effected.

On the other hand, whether such an alien alighting on our shores should be admitted or allowed to stay is a different matter altogether. Clearly there are grave and widespread abuses. Many plead political persecution when, as we heard, what draws them to this country is economic advantage rather than escaping from some threat to their lives or their freedom.

Britain is among the world's most densely populated countries. It is only realistic to accept some limit on fugitives from countries with populations numbering scores of millions or more, if the social health of our society is to be maintained and especially if the innate tolerance of our citizens is to be preserved against excesses and prejudices born of fear or deprivation.

In an unstable and increasingly hungry world, drained by civil wars, famine and over-population in many countries, the pressures of migration could mount dramatically and far beyond the capacity of a single country to absorb. An equitable balance, based on existing economics and populations, ought to be worked out on an inter-European or global basis to determine how any anticipated or actual flow of refugees is to be allocated in a manner that does justice to hosts and refugees alike.

Moreover, in our own minds we should convert the country from appearing to be an asylum into becoming a sanctuary. That will turn us all in the end into beneficiaries, being, as we hope, advantaged rather than impoverished by the newcomers and by their culture, and perhaps even by their economic contributions, as happened notably in the United States of America. To the degree that new arrivals feel welcome and appreciated, they will work harder to become an asset rather than a liability. Successful integration depends on hosts and newcomers alike. And that success is a true measure of our civilisation.

6.30 p.m.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, I am in some difficulty. I have enormous admiration for the noble Lord, Lord Jakobovits. He has made a wide-sweeping speech but, I believe, a Bill do now pass speech. He was invited personally by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, to make that speech. At this stage of the proceedings I am charged to respond to an amendment to the Bill. Therefore I shall respond to the noble Lord's remarks when I come to wind up the debate. He made some important points and it would be right for me to respond to them. However, if the House will forgive me, I shall reply to the amendment on the Marshalled List.

Identical amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, and his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, were debated fully in Committee and on Report. I am therefore very surprised that the noble Lords have again decided to return to this issue at Third Reading. I explained in detail in Committee and on Report why the amendment was unacceptable. Therefore I shall have to be repetitious; the amendment has not changed, nor has my retort to it.

We have consistently made clear that we expect asylum seekers to be completely honest and frank with our immigration authorities on arrival in this country. Dishonesty and concealment damage credibility. Of all people, they damage the credibility of the asylum seeker himself. We accept that there might be circumstances where a genuine refugee would need to use false papers in order to flee a country in which that person had a genuine fear of persecution. Under the Bill, no adverse consequences arise for the asylum seeker merely because that person presents an invalid, forged or stolen passport on arrival here, provided that the applicant declares the forgery to the immigration officer. But what is unacceptable, and casts doubt on credibility, is an attempt to pass off a fake identity or forged passport as genuine. It is the dishonesty inherent in such an attempt which triggers the accelerated appeal procedure. That is why we are unable to accept this amendment.

Those presenting false papers to our immigration officers are, after all, not doing so out of necessity. By definition, they have already fled the country in which they claim to fear persecution and have arrived at their chosen place of safety. Such deception cannot be condoned. They have even been asked about the forged document or the papers that are not in order. In order to answer that question they will have to be dishonest if they choose deception rather than honesty at the point of entry. I regard that as needing some courage, too.

Like the rest of Clause 1, sub-paragraph (3) will not prejudice the consideration of the asylum claim on its merits. If the claim is valid, asylum or exceptional leave will be granted regardless of document deception used on arrival. And the Bill will not penalise the genuine asylum seeker who has to travel on false papers, provided he is honest and declares the false papers on arrival.

I reject the argument that sub-paragraph (3)(b) as currently drafted is contrary to the terms of Article 31 of the 1951 United Nations convention, as hinted by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh. Article 31 states that refugees shall not be penalised on account of their illegal entry provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry and presence.

First, the issue of a certificate only comes into play after the claim has been considered fully and on merit and has been found to be invalid. By definition, therefore, the Secretary of State has concluded that the applicant is not a refugee under the terms of the convention.

But, secondly, applying a certificate to a refused asylum claim, thereby triggering an accelerated appeal procedure, cannot be construed as imposing a penalty in terms of Article 31. As I have just said, repeating what I have said on many occasions, all claims will still be considered on merit in the usual way. All applicants will still have an appeal to an independent adjudicator if the claim is refused. This is a perfectly adequate procedure in such cases and cannot be termed a penalty. Moreover, those who enter or attempt to gain entry using false papers would have had ample opportunity to present themselves to the UK authorities to apply for asylum when examined by an immigration officer on arrival. It is the dishonesty inherent in deceiving the immigration officer that triggers the certificate if the claim is refused.

I confirm that the noble Lord coupled Amendment No. 5 with this amendment. That was my understanding. As I understand it, Amendment No. 5 appears to proceed from the misapprehension that any asylum seeker who uses deception in order to secure his passage to the United Kingdom will automatically and consequently fall within the terms of the offence which would be created by Clause 4. That is simply not the case.

As I have said during consideration of the Bill, we recognise that asylum seekers may have to practise deception in order to leave their own country and travel to this country. I say again that what we do not accept is that having arrived in the United Kingdom, the deception, such as reliance on false travel documents, is maintained in an effort to secure entry in a capacity other than as a refugee. An asylum seeker who has employed deception in order to reach the United Kingdom but then presents himself at the control and seeks asylum will have absolutely nothing to fear from the offence in Clause 4.

However, the effect of the amendment would not only be felt on entry. It would also completely remove a criminal sanction when an asylum seeker practises deception in order to secure leave to remain. It is difficult to imagine any circumstances where an asylum seeker would need to employ deception in order to secure leave to remain as a refugee or on an exceptional basis unless he actually had no claim to such status and his asylum claim was a work of fiction or deception. I am unclear why the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, and colleagues who support him in the amendment wish to see such people free from the threat of criminal conviction and punishment, but I have to accept that that is what the noble Lord does mean. For all of those reasons, I hope that the amendment will not be accepted.

6.45 p.m.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

My Lords, the Minister quoted, entirely properly, from Article 31 of the 1951 convention. However, I should remind her—I am not entirely clear whether the point was made at an earlier stage—that the UNHCR in April this year produced guidelines on detention which explain the provisions of Article 31 in more detail. It is not that I am concerned with detention. I am concerned with the interpretation which is to be placed on Article 31. The document says: Given the special situation of a refugee, in particular the frequent fear of authorities, language problems, lack of information and general insecurity, and the fact that these and other circumstances may vary enormously from one refugee to another, there is no time limit which can be mechanically applied associated with the term `without delay' … Along with the term 'good cause'… it must take into account all of the circumstances under which the asylum seeker fled (e.g. having no time for immigration formalities). That places a slightly different complexion on the issue from that the Minister put on it. However, this is not a matter which I wish to pursue to a Division.

Before I seek leave to withdraw the amendment, perhaps I may say that I quite understand the difficulty which the Minister had in responding to the more general comments of the noble Lord, Lord Jakobovits. I am sure he also understands the position. Of course, the problem is that the normal time to intervene is on the Motion that the Bill do now pass. That will not actually happen until tomorrow. I am sure that honour is satisfied by having allowed the noble Lord to make his very valuable remarks at this time without blaming the Minister for not responding to them. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Williams of Crosby moved Amendment No.2: Page 2, line 24, leave out ("in the country or territory to which he is to be sent") and insert ("prior to his arrival in the United Kingdom.").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I make no apology for detaining the House briefly on this amendment. The purpose of the amendment is that someone who has shown evidence of torture should not be returned to a country other than the one from which he comes if there is a likelihood that he will be tortured or returned to a country which will torture him if he is sent back to that country.

In Committee an amendment was agreed to deal with people who showed evidence of having been tortured. The Government responded, at least to some extent, to that decision. In the amended Bill subsection (5) of Clause 1 states: This sub-paragraph applies to a claim if the evidence adduced in its support establishes a reasonable likelihood that the appellant has been tortured"—

That was what the House wanted— in the country or territory to which he is to be sent.

What that means, I understand, is that the protection would only cover someone who was about to be returned to the country in which he had been tortured. It would not cover someone who was about to be returned to a country other than one in which he had been tortured, which might nevertheless torture him, or might send him on to a country in which he might be tortured.

In case noble Lords feel that I am making a purely abstract argument, I shall give two examples. All noble Lords will have read of the desperate plight that the state of Myanmar finds itself in. It is what used to be called the country of Burma. Very terrible things are happening to those who, with an extraordinary degree of courage, are supporting the almost certain victor of the last election in Burma, Miss Aung San Suu Kyi. She is defying the whole of the military government by persisting in arguing claims for democracy to return in Burma. Burma is a country which does not have any inhibitions about torturing dissidents and opponents of one of the most terrible governments in the world.

There have been cases in which people returned to other East Asian countries, specifically Thailand, have then been sent back to the country from which they came. Thailand is a country to which it is quite probable that people would be returned. It is apparently a safe sort of country. There is a great danger that Thailand, which has practised so-called reforms—meaning the return of people to the country of origin, directly in the face of the United Nations convention relating to refugees—might do it again.

The second example, to which the noble Lord, Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish, referred, relates to the case of Belgium. The noble Lord said, justly enough, that most of us would regard Belgium as a safe country, certainly one that does not torture its citizens or those who flee to it. The trouble is that there is already clear evidence that in certain cases Belgium has returned Zairean refugees to another of the most dreadfully governed countries in the world, namely, Zaire. Indeed, some refugees have been sent straight from the airport in Brussels on to Zaire without so much as their cases being considered even for a matter of moments.

It is against that background that this modest amendment is directed, so that the Government cannot return someone, and I repeat the phrase, if the evidence adduced … establishes a reasonable likelihood that the appellant has been tortured".

We are not questioning that. We want to make sure that the person cannot be returned to a country which might continue to torture him.

It is a modest amendment. However, because I move an amendment about torture, I want to raise two questions with the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch. I raised these questions previously but the noble Lord, Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish, did not respond to them, no doubt for reasons of lack of time. They are so important to the intentions of this House that I raise them again on this amendment about torture.

At the Committee stage of the Bill the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, said: We are trying to arrive at a situation whereby a genuine claim of torture is properly considered and, if genuine, is well-founded at the first stage of consideration".—[0fficial Report, 23/4/96; col. 1057.]

Later she went on to say: I referred to the very great importance and weight which are attached to any evidence of torture, especially when supported by a medical certificate".—[Official Report, 23/4/96; col. 1058.]

A few moments ago this Chamber decided that it would extend the right of asylum seekers from asylum given at port of entry only to three days, although that decision was taken against the advice of the Government. I ask the House to consider two situations. The first is where somebody who has been tortured applies for asylum at the port of entry. He is likely to have at most half an hour, perhaps an hour, with the immigration authorities. By the nature of things, he cannot advance medical evidence, unless it is highly improbable that he has medical evidence of torture from his own country. How then does he obtain the medical evidence? By leave of this Chamber, he may now be given three days to get that medical evidence.

The noble Baroness shakes her head. I repeat that I asked that question before and no answer was given to me. Therefore I am entitled to raise the matter again. What steps does he take to get medical evidence in this country if he is on the fast track? I am still not clear how far victims of torture will be removed from the fast track. I repeat the question. Can we hear from the noble Baroness how somebody establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that he is a victim of torture in a matter of an hour or so before an immigration officer at the port of entry? Or, if he applies under the new amendment within three days, how can he establish that likelihood, unless he is able to get a medical examination in this country, which, as most of us know, is very difficult to do within three days? Indeed, in some cases it is close to impossible. That is my first question. How does he establish what brings him within the amendment agreed by this Chamber?

My second question relates to how asylum seekers can establish likelihood, if they remain on the fast track. I am not yet clear whether the amendment takes all possible people who claim to be victims of torture out of the fast track. I am sure that the Government will say, with some justice, that they cannot simply accept an a priori statement of torture as grounds for establishing likelihood. So my second question is: what establishes the likelihood of the claim? How do they go about establishing that likelihood and what would the Government regard as adequately fulfilling the conditions that they themselves have now laid down as a way of meeting the mood of this Chamber?

It is on the basis of the answers to those questions, which I believe are absolutely crucial in terms of the intention of the House, that I shall decide whether to press the amendment to a Division. I beg to move.

Earl Russell

My Lords, my noble friend is quite right. On the first day of Committee on the Bill, the Minister entirely conceded the major premise on which my noble friend's amendment rests. The Minister said that it was quite impractical, before returning a person to another country, to gain an undertaking that that country would consider his claim. That was a very significant admission. It means that, when we return a person to another country which is not the country from which he came, we cannot be certain that that country will not again "billiard ball" return him, until he ends up back in the country from which he came. So for that reason, if for no other, my noble friend is quite right. It is whether he has been tortured in the country from which he comes and not whether he has been tortured in the country to which he is to go which is material.

I shall not detain the noble Baroness now with all the case law. She has heard it from me before. Although we disagreed profoundly at the beginning of the Bill on the significance of the judgment in ex parte Bostam by Mr. Justice Hidden, the noble Baroness on her own interpretation of that case concedes that such "billiard ball" returning to a third country may be possible. It has happened. That is all that the supporters of my noble friend's amendment need to prove. As I see it, one case would be enough. I have with me a great many more cases but I shall not detain the House with them.

We next need to consider my noble friend's point about how a claim to torture can be established. I have two points on the torture amendment, which I very much welcomed. One concerns the exemption from the fast track; the other comes under paragraph (7) in Clause 1, that the invocation of the torture amendment disapplies the prohibition of appeals to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. Those are both crucial matters.

We are agreed that the mere assertion that one has been tortured is not enough by itself to establish a foundation to a claim. But obtaining the most eminent medical experts from Oxford takes time. They tend to have other engagements and other commitments, not all of which can instantly be set aside. So establishing adequate evidence to lay the foundation for a claim of torture must take some time. It is our recurrent fear that that time will not be available under the fast tracking procedure and therefore that victims of torture who are fast-tracked will be returned before they have been able to establish the evidence.

The appeal point is also vital. The Minister heard what my noble friend had to say about the case of Mr. Igbinidu. I cannot understand why the Home Office has not accepted that case. It tends to show that initial decisions on the question of torture may give rise to a need for appeal. I feel that there is here a question of natural justice. If the Minister were to accept my noble friend's amendment, she would protect the Government from a good many court cases in which I do not believe she would wish to become involved. I am delighted to support the amendment and hope that it is accepted.

Lord Hylton

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, raised at least two important points on this amendment. I am very happy to support her. However, to my mind the matter goes somewhat wider.

When the Bill left this Chamber after Committee, page 1, line 20 read: (2)(b) a person who is claiming to fear persecution in a country which has a recently documented record of torture". That wording was agreed in this Chamber by a substantial majority of votes. I have no doubt that it could be argued that it was a form of words which went rather too wide. But to my mind constitutional convention would indicate that the Government should have accepted it and not attempted, as they have done, to eliminate it by their own amendment, which was carried at Report stage.

In my view, the very least that would be acceptable is that the country in which the person claims to have a fear of persecution, which may involve him being tortured if he is returned there, should be a country named in a report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or possibly named in a report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture. I do not know whether that point can be considered at this late stage; in my opinion it is extremely important.

7.p.m.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, we have debated the safeguards for victims of torture at length during Committee and Report. Sub-paragraph (5) exempts applicants from having their appeal accelerated if it is reasonably likely that they have been tortured in the country to which they are to be sent.

During Report, I argued against an amendment to cover countries from which applicants had come. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, now returns to this point. Her amendment, to which the noble Lord, Lord Soper—who is not in his place—also put his name, proposes to extend the scope of sub-paragraph (5) even wider, so that it would apply regardless of the country in which the applicant had been tortured.

The case for sub-paragraph (5) is that where torture has occurred there is likely to exist a sufficiently strong prima facie case that the appeal ought not to be accelerated. But that argument cannot be advanced if the torture has occurred in a different country. The fact that the applicant has been tortured elsewhere has no bearing on whether he is at risk in his own country.

I return to the example I gave at Report. If we are returning an Indian national to India, the fact that he may have been tortured in a third country—say Iraqis irrelevant to whether he is at risk in India. In other words, if after examination an asylum claim is refused and meets one of the criteria in Clause 1—for example, because it is manifestly unfounded—the accelerated appeal procedure should normally be available. The fact that the applicant may have been tortured in a country other than the one to which he is to be sent ought not to prevent us from applying it.

The noble Baroness raised the case of an applicant who has been tortured in his own country but whom we are sending elsewhere. Might not the country to which we are sending him return him to his own country where he was indeed tortured? The answer to that is that we are discussing Clause 1 and Clause 1 is concerned only with removing people to their country of origin. Removals to third countries are governed by Clause 2. The Secretary of State has to certify that the third country will not itself remove the applicant elsewhere otherwise than in accordance with the 1951 convention. The great majority of such removals would be to other European Union countries or to other designated safe third countries with highly developed legal and asylum systems. Where the third country has not been designated and is not a member state of the European Union, the applicant will have a non-accelerated in-country appeal.

The noble Baroness said that I had not responded to her questions. Indeed I have, but I shall do so again because it is important that I should. Applicants do not have to prove on entry that they have been tortured. On entry they are making their claim for asylum. That is important. If they make their claim for asylum on entry, that claim must be considered. If, however, as part of that claim, part of their case is that they have been or are in fear of being tortured, it is important that they establish that at the first hearing. It is not until after that first hearing that the certification process applies.

If somebody needs to find medical evidence to support his claim, then time for that evidence to be found is given. That has nothing whatever to do with the three-day amendment that we passed earlier. The three days relate to making the claim for asylum, not to providing substantive evidence that the person has been tortured. The same explanation applies to establishing a likelihood. The point at which an applicant needs to establish the likelihood of having been tortured will be at the adjudication point. Where the adjudicator has given time for the applicant to amass his evidence, he will consider it and then make one of three judgments. First, he may dismiss the case because it is manifestly unfounded; secondly, he may take the view that the evidence is so overwhelming and what has been said in support of the claim is such that he believes that torture has taken place—in which case Clause 1 would be disapplied; or, thirdly, he may believe that a likelihood has been established, in which case again Clause 1 would not apply.

The problem the noble Baroness introduces in regard to time to provide the evidence is taken into account. However, as a caveat to that, judgments will have to be made about somebody who takes an unreasonable amount of time and clearly is not showing signs of producing or securing evidence. All reasonable accommodation is made at the adjudication point.

I believe that there is confusion between applying for asylum at the point of entry and having to prove or establish a likelihood that an applicant has been tortured.

Baroness Williams of Crosby

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her further explanation. I read carefully through all stages of the Bill and now the noble Baroness has made the situation clear beyond peradventure. I am grateful to her for that.

We mentioned the case of Mr. Igbinidu, about which we were particularly concerned. Perhaps I may take another example from my noble friend Lord Avebury. He has an instance of an asylum seeker who came from Iraq. He was returned to France as a safe country and was then sent from France back to Iraq, where we understand he has again been tortured. It is that kind of case that led me to ask these questions in such precise terms. I hope the noble Baroness will forgive me for pressing her for more clarity. I am sure she will understand that these are precisely the kinds of case about which the House is concerned.

In the light of the Minister's response I shall not press the matter to a Division. I thank her once again for her answer and will send her details of the specific case that I mentioned. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The Earl of Courtown

My Lords, I beg to move that consideration after Third Reading be now adjourned. In moving this Motion, I suggest that proceedings on the Bill begin again at five minutes past eight.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.