Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994

HL Deb 03 March 1994 vol 552 cc1170-82

6 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Transport (Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish)

rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 31st January be approved [7th Report from the Joint Committee].

The noble Lord said: My Lords, many of your Lordships will recall last year the House approving the Channel Tunnel (International Arrangements) Order 1993. That order gave effect to the Sangatte protocol between the United Kingdom and French Governments concerning frontier controls and policing, co-operation in criminal justice and certain other matters, and it modified the Immigration Act 1971 in order to apply it to the Channel Tunnel. The purpose of the order we are considering today is to provide the legal framework for measures to protect the Channel Tunnel, the international train services and related facilities from acts of terrorism.

The Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 sets about that task in two distinct ways. First, it creates a number of new and serious offences against the safety and security of the Channel Tunnel, the trains and associated facilities. Secondly, it provides powers for my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport to direct the concessionaires (Eurotunnel) and other users of the tunnel to take appropriate measures to protect the tunnel system, the trains and associated facilities, people and property against acts of violence. The order will apply a framework of law to the fixed link which closely parallels that now applying to aviation and shipping under the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990. Hereafter, I shall refer to the Aviation and Maritime Security Act not by its full title but by its common acronym, AMSA. That might cut some minutes off the length of my remarks.

The building of the fixed link was authorised in 1986 by the Treat of Canterbury. It was accompanied by an agreement between Eurotunnel and the United Kingdom and French Governments granting Eurotunnel the concession for 55 years. Under Article 5 of the treaty and Clause 23 of the concession both Governments have required Eurotunnel to put in place the measures necessary for the security of the fixed link and to submit proposals showing how they propose to do that. The concession agreement also requires Eurotunnel to secure the observance of those same requirements by other rail users; initially British Rail and its French partner, SNCF.

In the United Kingdom the responsibility for the security of all forms of transport rests with my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport. It is, however, established UK practice to place a duty on the transport operator to put in place the necessary security procedures and facilities. In the civil aviation sector the Secretary of State gives directions under the 1982 Aviation Security Act and the 1990 Aviation and Maritime Security Act to airlines, airport operators and others, requiring them to carry out specified procedures and to install physical security measures and equipment. The same happens at the ports and with ferry and shipping lines under the 1990 Act. This order places Eurotunnel, British Rail and others connected with the security of Channel Tunnel trains on the same legal footing as their aviation and maritime competitors. Each of these transport sectors is from an operational perspective very different and they require security arrangements tailored to suit those operating conditions and the nature of the threat; but the legal framework underlying the arrangements can be, and should be, very similar.

In France, by contrast, most transport security functions are undertaken by state agencies, not the transport operators. At the Channel Tunnel and at railway stations and freight terminals served by international trains most security functions will be undertaken by the frontier and air police and the customs, although French transport operators usually provide the security infrastructure and equipment.

Noble Lords will know that the legal basis in the United Kingdom for building and operating the tunnel system is provided by the Channel Tunnel Act 1987. When Parliament considered the Channel Tunnel Bill it recognised that there would be a need, near to the time of opening, for wide-ranging order-making powers to provide for the regulation of the tunnel system and for applying and enforcing provisions of the law. It was not possible to do that in the Act itself because much of the information required was not available at the time.

The powers for making this order are contained in Section 11 of the Channel Tunnel Act, in particular in subsections (1) (a), (1) (c), (1) (d), (1) (h) and (2). For the purposes of subsection (1) (a), the relevant international arrangements are those contained in the, Special arrangements between the UK and French Governments on security matters relating to the fixed link", Article 3(a) of which requires both Governments to ensure that the security of the fixed link, including the terminal areas, other sites and essential services, is satisfactorily provided and organised and that the responsibilities are properly defined and exercised.

I should like now to focus more closely on the main provisions of the order and say a little about how they will function in practice. The main provisions of the order are contained in Parts II and III, which correspond closely to Parts II and III of AMSA. Part II of the order creates a number of new offences against the safety of the Channel Tunnel and Channel Tunnel trains. These are serious offences, including hijacking, seizing control of the tunnel system, destroying or damaging Channel Tunnel trains or the tunnel system and other acts likely to endanger safety, including issuing threats. All of the offences created in Part II of the order provide that a person found guilty is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life, which in each case is the same as the corresponding penalty under AMSA.

The primary purpose of Part III of the order is to provide for the protection of Channel Tunnel trains and related facilities, the Tunnel system, persons and property from acts of violence. It does so chiefly by giving the Secretary of State powers to direct Eurotunnel, British Rail and others to put in place appropriate physical security measures and to carry out sensible security procedures. All of the articles in Part III, including the related offences for failing to comply with the directions, are based on the corresponding sections of AMSA.

Unfortunately— or perhaps from your Lordships' point of view, fortunately— I do not have time here today to go through the order article by article—

Lord Graham of Edmonton

Yes, you have.

Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish

I think that I might be tempting the noble Lord's patience if I tried to do that. But I would like to focus on just a few of the articles. Article 11 gives the Secretary of State the power to obtain information, although this is limited to the purposes of Part III of the order. The ability to obtain accurate and up-to-date information is essential to achieving the objectives of the order: in particular it will enable the Secretary of State to judge what other directions, and their terms, may be necessary under other articles.

Article 12 allows the Secretary of State to designate restricted zones. These are an important means of protecting sensitive areas. Normally they are used in conjunction with perimeter security and controls on access. They also provide a secure environment for people, vehicles and goods waiting to board trains. Following discussions with the operators, the intention initially is to designate restricted zones within Eurotunnel's terminal at Folkestone, at Waterloo international terminal and a number of other railway facilities to be used in connection with Channel Tunnel trains.

Articles 14 and 15 are particularly important. They empower the Secretary of State to require searches to be carried out of people and goods before they enter the tunnel system or board a Channel Tunnel train; that includes searches of passengers' property and vehicles, of trains and of the tunnel system itself. Outside the tunnel system it would include searches of premises used in connection with Channel Tunnel trains, such as Waterloo international terminal, and people and property on those premises.

Both articles identify the circumstances and conditions under which searches may be carried out. For this to occur without a warrant it is first necessary for a direction to be in force under the relevant article; and then for the person specified in the direction, or a constable, to have reasonable cause to suspect that firearms or explosives are in, or may be brought into, the tunnel system or the building or train concerned. Regrettably, at the present time there remains good reason to suppose that such articles may indeed be brought in.

It is therefore the Secretary of State's intention to give directions under both articles. The searches may be carried out by the persons specified in the direction or by constables, although normally it will be done by trained personnel employed by the operator, which is the case now at most United Kingdom ferry ports and airports.

Article 16 provides general powers to direct other security measures to be taken. Examples of the type of measures that may be required include the preparation of contingency plans, for example to deal with bomb threats; they may require the implementation of access controls and security pass systems, usually in conjunction with other measures to control access to restricted zones. They may also require the installation of physical security measures or set minimum standards, for example in respect of perimeter fencing or closed circuit TV. Eurotunnel and British Rail are aware of the specific measures that will be required of them under this article and most are already in place. As with AMSA, a number of new offences are created of failing to comply with a direction.

Articles 17 to 28 contain supplemental provisions concerning directions given under the preceding articles. For example, Article 17 allows the Secretary of State to specify the manner in which searches are carried out and the training of those involved. Article 18 places limitations on the scope of directions. It precludes, for example, a direction being given which requires or authorises the carriage of firearms.

Article 20 allows the recipient of a direction given under Article 16 requiring him to carry out works to lodge an objection within 30 days, and it provides a procedure for objectors to present their case to the Secretary of State. Articles 21 and 22 deal with the service and content of enforcement notices to redress any failure to comply with a general requirement of a direction.

In Article 26 provision is made for directions to override other contractual or statutory duties and thereby preclude persons complying with a direction from becoming liable under those other provisions. Its purpose is to ensure that the measures required to counter the threat to the Channel Tunnel, to the trains or associated facilities are not frustrated or delayed by normal restrictions imposed by law. The same approach is taken in AMSA.

The remaining articles of the order underpin the preceding provisions. For example, they provide for Department of Transport officers to carry out inspections. New offences are created of unauthorised presence in a restricted zone; of making false statements concerning the contents of any baggage or goods, or in connection with an application for, or use of, a security pass. Here, as throughout Part III of the order, the maximum penalties available to the courts for each of the offences created correspond to those available under AMSA.

Finally I should like to say a few words in praise of all those who have steered this project from the drawing board to its realisation. Even though the original planned opening date had to be deferred by Eurotunnel, the task of commissioning the tunnel system and the shuttle trains is now approaching the point at which the two Governments, the safety authority and the intergovernmental commission will decide on the grant of an operating certificate. It is by any measure a momentous achievement by those who have brought this extraordinary and exciting project to completion.

It has not been possible today for me to do more than to focus your Lordships' attention on the main provisions of this order, but I hope that I have identified the most important aspects. I commend the order to the House. I beg to move.

Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 31st January be approved [7th Report from the Joint Committee]. — (Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish).

6.12 p.m.

Lord Wigoder

My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships will all be grateful to the noble Lord for the careful and clear way in which he has outlined the history and the substance of this order. I ought at once to declare an interest as the holder of a modest number of shares in Eurotunnel. I hope that it will restore my reputation for impartiality if I add that I have an equally modest number of shares in one of the the cross-Channel ferry operators.

My noble friends and I regard the tunnel not simply as being a quite extraordinary and imaginative engineering achievement and certainly not simply as being an additional means of transport across the Channel. We regard it as even more important: as providing this country with a fixed link to the Continent of Europe, to which we believe this country will be irrevocably committed in the future.

Of course the security of this enterprise is a matter of vital importance. It is and has been talked about frequently. Indeed, the very fact that the matter has been talked about may prove something of a temptation to the occasional maniac of one kind or another who seeks to test that security. I suppose that it would be idle to point out that this is not the first time that trains have run in tunnels of some considerable length, whether those tunnels be under mountains or under London. The fact remains that certainly in the early stages, before everybody begins to take travelling through the tunnel totally for granted, as I believe will happen very soon, it is particularly important that special care should be taken over safety and security issues.

For that reason a vast amount of attention has obviously been given to those issues. The British and French Governments have been concerned with the subject; Eurotunnel, BR and SNCF have been involved; there has been an intergovernmental commission with a safety authority and there is a safety directorate inside Eurotunnel. All of them have been studying these matters. I have no reason to query the ability and competence of any of those people. I have no doubt that they are fully aware of the risks involved and the steps that should be taken to meet them; hence, this order.

It is true that I have been provided, as I suspect other noble Lords have also, with briefing material which outlines various other risks. It is idle to pretend that those matters have not been considered by those who are responsible for ensuring the safety of passengers through the tunnel. I must confess that I am not impressed by some of those— I do not for one minute suggest that they are those who have been supplying us with material— who have been tempted to scaremonger in that regard. Whether or not that is their intention, I know not. I say at once that I exempt entirely from that observation the cross-Channel ferry companies. As one would have expected, they have shown complete restraint. Indeed, it must be obvious to them and to the Eurotunnel operators that any form of advertising war that breaks out which might endeavour to claim to offer more safety and less danger than any competitors would be a campaign doomed to backfire and, I believe, totally unproductive.

But the subject is one that is capable of enabling people who wish to do so to obtain cheap publicity. We have seen over the past months examples of that. in the press. Taking up a purely fanciful example, I suppose that if I wanted to get my name in the papers (which I do not), I could make up some story for your Lordships about the grave risk that an AIDS victim might go berserk, run through the tunnel carrying a syringe of contaminated blood and plunge it into the sides of motorists or passengers waiting in compartments beside their cars as they travel through the tunnel. One could say that. It is long odds that if I put that about seriously, there would be some story in one of the newspapers tomorrow about the grave AIDS risk to travellers in the Channel Tunnel.

For very much the same reason I do not feel that it would be helpful to pry across the Floor of your Lordships' House into the details of how security will be operated. There are matters about which I should like to know, such as where searches or checks will be made and how they will be carried out. But I do not believe that it would be in the public interest for that sort of information to be requested publicly and, if so, certainly I do not believe that it should be answered publicly. It would only be a temptation for people to see whether they could evade the checks which were thereby disclosed. Therefore I am certainly content with the subject matter of this order.

The only other matter to which I want to refer is a rather different one; namely, the parliamentary procedure that is involved in the making of the order. It is made by virtue of Section 11 of the Channel Tunnel Act 1987. As the Minister made clear, it largely follows the various sections of AMSA of 1990. It is clear that Part II of the order creates a whole series of totally new criminal offences which are very largely punishable, and quite properly so, with life imprisonment.

But I find it an unattractive procedure that an Act of Parliament should give to a Minister, through a statutory instrument, the power to create totally new criminal offences. I do not believe that Ministers should possess that power, whether the order is subject to the affirmative or negative procedure. In practical terms there is perhaps not a great deal of difference. As your Lordships know, by convention— though it is not always complied with— this House has no power to vote against an order and certainly does not have the power to amend one. If it had the power to amend an order I should be tempted to refer to Article 7 which, in subsection (3), makes it an offence, for any person intentionally to communicate any information which he knows to be false in a material particular, [which) endangers the safe operation of any Channel Tunnel train". Quite right too ! Subsection (4) goes on to say that, It is a defence for a person … to prove … that he communicated the information in good faith in performance of those duties". I must confess that my mind boggles at the scenario of anybody who has communicated information intention-ally, knowing it to be false and endangering safety, attempting to put up a defence that he was doing it in good faith in performance of his duty. But that is merely an incidental illustration of the fact that it is impossible to debate to any practical purpose the details of the order.

The answer which the Minister is fully entitled to make is that my point has no relevance today. It may have had a point six years ago when the principal Act — or Bill as it then was— was being debated in your Lordships' House, and that is certainly correct. Nevertheless, it is worth making the point that six years ago there was no Delegated Powers Scrutiny Committee in your Lordships' House. Had there been such a committee, grave doubts would have been expressed as to whether it is right in any circumstances to give such extensive powers to a Minister by statutory instrument to allow the creation of new criminal law. I make that observation in the hope that anyone who is tempted to seek to do this again in some other Bill may hesitate as to the probable consequences when it comes before your Lordships' House.

I wish this vast enterprise well. I too congratulate all those concerned in it and I can only say that I look forward to travelling through the tunnel on many occasions in complete safety.

6.23 p.m.

Lord Graham of Edmonton

My Lords, Perhaps I can first explain that it is in the absence of those who normally speak from these Benches on transport that I have this opportunity of taking part in what I hope the Minister will agree is not merely another order on another aspect of primary legislation, but one of the most crucial orders. When one looks at the scope and listens to the fair, full, frank and helpful exposition, it is more like a Bill than an order. If the Minister agrees with me that clearly what we are looking at is the product of consultation and reflection, it is a model that I hope some of his colleagues in other departments will choose to follow. hope that in future, before we are presented with Bills, there will be as much care taken by those involved in obtaining agreement on what is acceptable as was clearly obtained here.

The noble Lord quite fairly asked the House to accept that substantially we are looking at an extension of the powers, the provisions and regulations that apply to other major forms of transport. That is absolutely right. But I am sure that the Minister will recognise in this instance, because it is so new, revolutionary and far-reaching, that a great interest has been taken in the matter. He must accept also that it only needs what the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, described as a "maniac" — I would use the term "nutter"— or a fanatic, someone with no responsibility but imbued by zeal of one kind or another, wanting to make a name for himself or his organisation, and one could be faced with a catastrophic situation.

We are considering what the Minister and those who advise him say is needed in the legal framework to give peace and security of mind to the many people— I agree in that regard with the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder— who will want to give this new mode of travel from England to France and beyond a fair try. The Minister certainly satisfied me as to the seriousness of the Government's intent. The noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, said that one may be accused of scaremongering by asking questions. But the function of this stage is to ask questions— not in order to produce headlines but in order to ensure that those people outside the House who have genuine anxieties have those: anxieties put to rest.

The briefing for Eurotunnel in regard to safety and security states that its philosophy is, To integrate safety with every stage of planning, design and operation. The safety of passengers and staff is paramount". That is a fair objective. However, I should like the Minister to satisfy me and others that, in order to compete effectively with other forms of travel across the Channel, risks are not being taken in the: interests of speed; that is, turn-round, which will mean more passengers carried and therefore more profit. I trust the Minister will say that he and his colleagues have been guided and advised that all the elements in place have the philosophy of passenger safety as paramount. The question of security must be considered along with the overall safety of the system. It is a general point, which, among others, concerns the Consumers' Association. We believe that the safety of passengers must be paramount. In fact, there should be no other consideration such as speed, commercial viability or being the best among the other forms of transport entitling it to take precedence.

The Minister may be aware that there is not complete public unanimity that the tunnel will be safe or secure. That is not an exaggeration because I am told that in some surveys the public believe that the tunnel will be almost as vulnerable to terrorist attack as flying, and much more vulnerable than ferries. Under half— 44 per cent. — thought ferries were vulnerable compared with 61 per cent. for the Channel Tunnel and 64 per cent. for flying. In a later survey Mintel, which has a fine reputation as a market analyst, found that three out of four adults said that they are never likely to use the tunnel, with many saying that they would be frightened of venturing inside. Half of the respondents were worried that the tunnel would be a target for terrorists.

In the general domain, all those matters 'will only be tested in practice. The Minister must assure the House that the question of safety is something which he and his colleagues took fully into account. The viability of the Eurotunnel project hinged from the start on approval being given for the non-segregation of cars and passengers. The safety authority claimed that it always kept an open mind on the question. But it would have been difficult not to give approval because that could have placed the whole future of the project in jeopardy. I know that the Minister will take the point fairly and kindly that the fact that cars and passengers are not segregated, which may be safer, in the minds of the general public means that there may be a little more danger.

I was interested when the Minister spoke to us about the arrangements for security. I wonder whether the noble Lord can satisfy the House and those outside as to the quality and standards of the training which will be carried out. In the recent past we have had some experience of hitherto state-provided security in the prison service being superseded by a private security arrangement, Group 4. By comparison, the quality of the training has left much to be desired. The Minister may tell us that that was unfortunate, that it will not be repeated, and that the Government are looking at the matter very closely. The noble Lord has an obligation to assure the House and, I hope, the millions of people who will travel that the Government have made absolutely certain that the quality and content of the training are such that they can feel absolutely confident that their lives are safe in the hands of those who operate the tunnel.

My noble friend Lord Ewing is not here but he asked me to raise a matter. Is it correct that certain goods carried in bulk will be prohibited? My noble friend mentioned that gas, fuel and whisky are among the goods that cannot be carried in bulk. What is the rationale for denying the ability to transport such products in bulk through the tunnel?

The noble Lord has satisfied me that the Government take fully on board their responsibilities in these matters. At the end of the day, if there is a major disaster, despite all that has been done, the Government will carry the blame. It will be no good saying that it was some authority's responsibility; they will say it of course, but it will be no good saying it. It will be no good saying that they made every endeavour. Tragically, if a maniac, a nutter or a fanatic causes terrible damage, we— Parliament and the Government — will carry a major responsibility. We recognise that this is a major development which is welcomed by many people. But there are still many others who will have to be persuaded that travelling by this mode will be as safe as travelling by ferries, air and so on. I am not talking about a safety record. They all have a good record. However, the Minister needs to go some way to assure us on the safety aspects.

Rabies is part of the context of this matter. I am told that in Europe only foxes are known to transmit the disease and that there has been an EU-wide inoculation programme for several years now. Its success can be judged by the fact that the cases of rabies reported in France in 1993 were 80 per cent. less than in 1992. That is all very well, but if the figure has gone down from 5,000 to 1,000, which is 80 per cent. less, a figure of 1,000 is still worrying. What are we talking about— the number of cases falling from seven to two, or from 15 down to three? Rabies is still a feature of life and the possibility of rabies coming through the tunnel is there. I have read the excellent Explanatory Memorandum and I know that there are steps designed to prevent animals coming through. The systems are all in place. What the Minister has to tell the House and the public, however, is that the Government will make sure, even when it will mean money, time and men, that people travelling through the tunnel have had their best interests looked after. We certainly give the order a welcome and we look forward to the Minister's answer.

6.34 p.m.

Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Wigoder and Lord Graham of Edmonton, for their welcome not just to the order before us but also to this project which is coming to fruition and for which the order is a major, almost second last step, before we can try out a day trip to France through the Channel Tunnel.

The noble Lords asked a few questions and I shall try to answer them as quickly and as best I can. I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, exercised the usual judicious balance of a lawyer and hedged his bets by having a small number of shares in both surface and underground systems of getting between the United Kingdom and France. He rightly drew attention to some of the scaremongering that goes on from some quarters around the project and he rightly pointed out how absolutely unfounded it was. I shall return to one or two of the specific issues that perhaps deserve an answer, and I hope that I shall be able to do that.

As the noble Lord rightly said, it would be wrong to ask— and I certainly would not answer— a question on how the security will work. We have a lot of experience of security at airports and security at the ferry ports. A lot of the experience we have gained in those two fields of transportation has been used in constructing the system for the Channel Tunnel. Indeed, as I mentioned, the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 has been very closely followed.

I fully understand the noble Lord's argument about such a fairly substantial piece of secondary legislation coming before your Lordships' House. As one of the original members of the scrutiny committee on these matters, I well understand the argument. Perhaps I may say in defence that this piece of legislation was well foreshadowed in Section 11 of the 1987 Act and it follows very closely the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990. So there is good precedent for what is in the order. We are breaking a lot of new ground in the fact that it is a tunnel, but we are not breaking very much new ground in the security aspects because we have attempted to translate the principles of one into the practice of the other.

The noble Lord, Lord Graham, raised a number of points. On the question of rabies, for example, which is a little away from the kind of security the order refers to but is probably one of the issues that people most often raise with me, considerable steps have been taken to ensure that animals do not enter the tunnel, and, if they do, that they will not get very far into the tunnel. The constructors have invested around £ 500,000 in experimental work on rabies defence measures. The CNVA centre in France and our own Wildlife Laboratory Centre at Worplesdon in the United Kingdom have carried out various items of research into matters concerning deterring not just foxes but also rodents. We believe, as do the operators, that they have designed a fairly elaborate system which ought to protect the tunnel against animals. Should animals get through the fences and so on which will surround the exterior entries to the tunnel, they will then come across some electrified grids inside the tunnel which one hopes would deter them from going any further. But the fact that trains will be passing through the tunnels at very frequent intervals and at quite a high speed is perhaps a good guarantee against animals progressing very far into the tunnel. We are well aware of that problem, but we believe that it has been seriously and successfully addressed. The whole question will be kept under careful review as the tunnel begins to operate.

The noble Lord, Lord Graham, asked me about the training of security staff. We have a lot of experience on the training of security staff. On my trips up and down to Scotland I am subjected all the time to the security at Heathrow and other airports. I can assure the noble Lord and your Lordships that proper training is being carried out and that training is being approved by government officials.

The noble Lord asked me an interesting question about gas, fuel and whisky on behalf of his noble friend Lord Ewing. I am not very sure whether or not gas and fuel are used as a cover for the more serious question of whisky. I could not find the answer, but my recollection from some of the papers that I have read is that gas and fuel will not be carried through the tunnel. I am not sure about whisky which is not quite such a volatile liquid as gas and fuel. As there is not too much time for people to consume whisky in the quick journey through the tunnel, I do not believe that there will be much of a security danger in that regard. I shall certainly write to the noble Lord on that question.

I believe that have covered most of the points raised. Perhaps I may deal with the general point about the use of the tunnel and the survey which the noble Lord, Lord Graham, mentioned. I also read the survey and how people appear to be frightened of the idea of being in the tunnel. I can quite understand that. My wife takes the view that when she passes through the Clyde tunnel, which is a good deal shorter than the Channel Tunnel, she ought to do so as quickly as possible. She has not yet put that defence to the local constabulary when she passes through the tunnel in the car. I can understand that many people will feel that the Channel Tunnel is different from the long tunnels which one can drive through in, for example, the Alps and Northern Italy.

The difference is that one realises that above there is not just rock but the English Channel and a great deal of water both from the North Sea and the Atlantic. I can understand the fears. I believe that they will quite quickly disappear. Some people remain frightened of flying. Many people were afraid of flying at the beginning, but now fly without any trouble. The same is true of ships. Some people are quite frightened of them. I do not believe that such fear will be a lasting factor in keeping people away from the tunnel, although I fully accept that there will always be some who would prefer to go to the Continent by other means. Equally, there will be a great many who will be more than happy to try the tunnel as a method of getting to France and experience the excitement of being one of the first to make a journey in a fixed link between these islands and the continent of Europe. My history is not very good and nor is my geology, but I believe that this is the first time that that has been possible for many thousands of years since we were once linked to the Continent.

I believe that the problems of people being slightly nervous about crossing the Channel will disappear. I am sure that, as with other forms of transport improvement, the number of people crossing the Channel one way or the other will increase with this additional link between us and the mainland of Europe. As the noble lord; Lord Wigoder, mentioned, it is an important psychological step forward for this country to be connected directly to the Continent. I believe that it will act as an important sign to people that we are now fully part of the European Union. It will enable us to think in a more European way which will be to the benefit of us all, both economically and socially.

Lord Graham of Edmonton

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. A number of his remarks have certainly given me comfort. Can he help me on one point? It is the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority which has responsibility for making sure that the safety measures are adequate. Responsible organisations have great difficulty in discovering the basis and validity on which the measures have been taken. I am not talking about commercial confidentiality or security. As the noble Lord, Lord. Wigoder, said, those aspects are not in question. It will ease the minds of many people if it were possible either to vet, consult or prove the basis on which measures have been taken. At this stage the Minister may be unable to reply fully. Perhaps he can write to me in answer to that question.

Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish

My Lords, I shall see what I can do about that question. A great deal of engineering work has gone into the construction of the tunnel. Among those who understand the technicalities of the civil engineering in the tunnel the safety measures which have been incorporated are fairly common knowledge. I can assure the noble Lord that both ourselves, the French Government and the company itself, for its own interest, have attempted to ensure that the highest modern standards of safety have been built into the construction of the tunnel and into the way in which it will be worked.

To some extent the fear about the safety aspects— if that is the word— which exists in some sections of the population who are potential users, leaving aside the security question, is a fear that tunnel travellers themselves will have to work to dispel in much the same way as in previous years people had to work to dispel a fear of flying, of trains and at one stage, a fear of the motor car itself. I was about to say that noble Lords will recall that, but obviously they will not. However, they will know from the history books that when the motor car first appeared a red flag was used to warn everyone away from it. I do not believe that we are quite at that stage as regards the Channel Tunnel. I do not think that a red flag is necessary. If I can say anything more positive to the noble Lord, I shall certainly write to him.

Lord Graham of Edmonton

My Lords, I do not doubt for a moment that everything which has been done has been done correctly. It is a question of openness. Perhaps publicity is the wrong word. But the question is the ability or the willingness to have that which has been done in the name of safety looked at by bona fide organisations. I shall be grateful if the Minister would write to me on that.

Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish

My Lords, I certainly shall. Eurotunnel will read these remarks and realise that it has a job to do to satisfy some people that everything has been done in a proper and safety-conscious way. With those remarks, I commend the order to the House.

On Question, Motion agreed to.