HL Deb 11 February 1993 vol 542 cc769-80

3.41 p.m.

Earl Ferrers

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Earl Ferrers.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]

Clause 4 [Housing of asylum-seekers and their dependants]:

Baroness Hamwee moved Amendment No. 9: Page 3, line 23, leave out ("or has available for his occupation").

The noble Baroness said: There are two arguments which I ask the Committee to consider. One is a technical point and the other a humane point. The clause adds an extra test for asylum-seekers to that which other applicants for housing must meet. An applicant will have to show that he has no accommodation at all available to him. I believe that that is unnecessary because, under Section 60 of the Housing Act 1985, housing authorities already have a duty to consider whether an applicant has made himself intentionally homeless and whether he has accommodation available.

Under Section 58(2A) of that Act, a person shall not be treated as having accommodation unless it is accommodation which it is reasonable for him or her to occupy. Section 58(2B) provides that housing authorities may have regard to the general circumstances prevailing in relation to housing in their area when they are considering whether it is reasonable for someone to occupy accommodation.

In addition to the legislation, there is a code of guidance which local authorities have a duty to consider. It states that there is no simple test of reasonableness; each case must be looked at on its merits. Thus, we already have the intentionally homeless test, we also have definitions of availability. So why is it necessary to have the words in the clause?

The second point, which is perhaps more a matter of common humanity, is that the additional test is vague. I believe that it is discriminatory to add a series of additional tests for a particular group of applicants for housing. Those requirements will add to the uncertainty faced by asylum-seekers, by applicants in need of assistance. They could also be interpreted to mean that almost any accommodation could potentially be available. Church halls, recreation centres and community centres are used on occasion to provide emergency shelter for asylum-seekers. Voluntary agencies, friends and acquaintances provide space overnight on a floor. Is that accommodation which is available for occupation?

It is perhaps worth pausing on the point that the Home Office provides financial assistance to voluntary agencies to allow asylum-seekers to be accommodated overnight, pending referral to local authorities. Is that accommodation which is available for occupation? Or is there some hidden agenda here that the grant is not to be continued? Is it the Government's intention that housing authorities should be able or required to speculate about the availability of accommodation? I believe that they should not and I ask the Committee to consider those words. I beg to move the amendment.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I appreciate that we are only debating Amendment No. 9 at the moment, but the criticisms which the noble Baroness rightly made of Clause 4(1)(b) are much more broadly based than Amendment No. 9 alone. I hope that the Committee will forgive me if I refer also to my Amendment No. 11, which attempts to achieve the same objective by excluding any accommodation which is not occupied by the applicant at the time the application is made. It seems to us that the way in which the Bill is phrased at the moment, including the words, has available for his occupation", and including the phrase to which we shall come later, "however temporary", strikes at the heart of any attempt by humanitarian bodies—charities, local authorities or any bodies concerned with the requirements of those most in need —to provide temporary or emergency accommodation for people coming to this country and finding themselves in need.

The question has to be asked whether the Bill would exclude an asylum-seeker coming to the country and finding accommodation under the auspices of Crisis at Christmas. It seems to me that as the Bill is drafted, such a person would be excluded from rights under the homelessness legislation.

The fundamental failing of Clauses 4 and 5 and the whole housing provision in the Bill is that they seek to impose on local authorities a duty which they bitterly resent and have no wish to acquire of deciding about homelessness cases in terms not of the need but of the status of the applicant. They are bitterly resentful of the idea that they should be put in a position of having to decide whether they will treat people differently, "not because you are most in need but because you are an asylum-seeker". The local authorities do not know the definition of "asylum-seeker". It is not their job to determine whether someone is an asylum-seeker, their job is to deal with housing problems. They do not desire those additional duties and responsibilities. I hope that the Government will see fit to mitigate the severity of the Bill as it is drafted in that respect.

The Lord Bishop of Ripon

I too wish to speak to Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 together. Like others in the Committee, I have considerable reservations about Clauses 4 and 5 but I wish to speak in particular on the words, has available for his occupation any accommodation, however temporary". It seems to me that the accommodation is likely to be of two kinds. As the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, said, it may be accommodation available through charities or churches. Church halls are sometimes made available for that purpose. My understanding is that if the phrase, "however temporary" is left in the Bill, it means that accommodation provided by a charity or church is regarded as sufficient.

Not only will that mean that someone who is put up in a church hall is unable to apply for any further housing, but also charities and churches will be put in great difficulty. Either they offer the accommodation with the possibility that it will be used for a considerable time and in the knowledge that the only way in which someone being housed can be brought under the provisions of the local authority is to put them out on the streets; or, alternatively, such accommodation will be used long-term. That is not the intention of the charities or the churches. We cannot provide that kind of long-term accommodation.

Also, it seems to me that the phrase, "however temporary" creates a difficulty for those who provide the crisis accommodation which should be available for people when they first arrive in the country. It seems to me that the other kind of accommodation which might be available is that which comes from families or friends. Once again the same situation applies. If a family puts up a relative, however briefly, maybe squeezing him on to the floor of the home, that will be regarded as accommodation, however temporary. The only way such a person can then be given local authority provision is for the family to put that person out on the street. That is not a humane way of treating people as they come to this country; I hope therefore that the amendments will receive support.

Lord Renton

While, on Tuesday, I strenuously opposed the pleas of the Opposition parties and the right reverend Prelate, I have a great deal of sympathy for what has been said with regard to the amendments now being considered. It is quite right, as the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, said, that we should consider Amendments Nos. 9, 10 and 11 together. They raise the principle of whether homeless people who belong to this country anyway and asylum seekers should be treated differently or in the same way. The amendments mean that they would all be treated the same. I believe that that is right. I would, however, point out to the noble Baroness, the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, and the right reverend Prelate that the amendments would make it rather more tough for asylum seekers than the Bill does. It is a concession to asylum seekers which I understand other homeless people would not have that they can prove that there is accommodation available, not merely that they have it. They will be given the opportunity of having available any accommodation, however temporary.

That is a concession to asylum seekers which, as I understand it, local people do not have under the general law relating to accommodating homeless people. It would be granted to asylum seekers. I must confess that so far I have an open mind on the issue. I am interested to hear what my noble friend has to say. But I believe that a very strong point has been made in favour of consistency in our laws relating to homeless people. We should not treat one kind of homeless group differently from another kind.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

I tremble at the thought of disagreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Renton, about the wording of legislation. But I think he has it wrong on this occasion. Clause 4(1) is so drafted that the conditions,

  1. "(a) that he is an asylum-seeker or the dependant of an asylum-seeker, and
  2. (b) that he has or has available for his occupation any accommodation, however temporary",
do not provide a concession to asylum seekers. The conditions go on to remove from local authorities the requirement that they should make accommodation available for such a person or persons under the homelessness legislation. So it is the exact reverse of the position as the noble Lord understands it.

The wider the definition of those who come under paragraphs (a) and (b), the wider is the removal of obligation on a local authority to provide accommodation under homelessness legislation. We are seeking to narrow the definition of asylum seekers under (a) and (b) in order to restrict the removal of obligation. I am sorry to express it in double negatives, but there is no other way of doing it—to restrict the removal of an obligation of a local authority to provide accommodation under homelessness legislation.

Lord Renton

I respectfully disagree with the noble Lord in his interpretation of Clause 4. I know that the side-note is intended only as guidance to the legislators and users of statutes. But the side-note says: Housing of asylum-seekers and their dependants". It does not refer to the housing of all homeless people. The beginning of Clause 4 also states: If a person ('the applicant')". As I understand it, the applicant in this case is a person to whom the Bill applies. The clause has to be read in the context of the Bill. It is undoubtedly a concession, the applicant merely having to prove that he has available—not "has" but "has available"—accommodation, "however temporary". That, I understand, is a concession which the more general law does not give. That is why I say, as I thought the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, had said, that we were making an exception from the general law relating to homelessness.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

If the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, will forgive me, I must pursue this point. The present situation is that whether people are asylum seekers or not, if their need is such that they require housing under the homelessness legislation, local authorities are required to give them such housing. What is proposed is an exception to the requirement that local authorities should house certain people. The wider the exception is, the more people come outwith the requirement on local authorities to provide housing under homelessness legislation.

Lord Beloff

I simply say, then, that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey. I cannot understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Renton. What the passage says is that if accommodation exists for those people, however temporary, then the obligation of the local authority lapses. Surely that is a discrimination against the asylum seekers, and not in their favour.

Lord Roskill

I do not wish to comment critically on what the noble Lord, Lord Renton, said. It is a matter of the construction of the statute. But with respect to the noble Lord, clearly the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, is right. There is here a provision which excludes an obligation which otherwise exists upon the local authority. The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, and the noble Baroness are concerned to narrow the width of that exception. That is what the amendment is designed to do.

Lord Strathclyde

As Members of the Committee who have followed the Bill will know, I come fresh to Clauses 4 and 5 which deal with housing. I thought it would be useful to preface my remarks to the amendments by explaining what they do. Although the number of asylum seekers accepted under the homelessness legislation is not great, it concentrates on a few authorities—mostly those facing great pressure on their housing stock for other reasons. The clauses limit the initial entitlement of asylum seekers under the homelessness legislation to temporary accommodation. That will allow authorities to make better use of their permanent housing stock in providing homes for other homeless families.

The Bill ensures that homeless asylum seeking families will continue to be able to rely on local authorities to provide them with accommodation. Temporary accommodation does not mean poor accommodation. Increasingly it is of a standard at least as good as much of the permanent stock into which homeless families are subsequently moved. Moreover, with the speedier procedure for the resolution of applications believed to remain that will follow from the passage of this legislation, asylum seeking status will be a short-term affair.

I should also point out to the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, that there is nothing in the Bill that prevents a local authority from offering an asylum seeking family permanent accommodation from day one if it so chooses. But we believe that, as a result of the modest delay in right of access to permanent housing for any individual asylum seeker, housing authorities will find the extra flexibility useful in managing their housing stock that will result from the measure.

I turn to the amendment. I have a slight confusion. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, proposed Amendment No. 9. The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, spoke to some extent on his Amendment No. 11 and my noble friend Lord Renton spoke to Amendments Nos. 9, 10 and 11. I am delighted to direct my remarks to the order in the original list or in whatever way the Committee prefers. I can group all three amendments together or take them one at a time. I am not receiving much guidance from noble Lords.

Baroness Hamwee

I shall be happy to take all three amendments together. I was wondering whether to refer to the next amendment in responding to the Minister. The arguments are not dissimilar and it is certainly clear that other Members of the Committee are directing their minds to all three amendments.

4 p.m.

Lord Strathclyde

On that basis I shall do the same. Amendment No. 9 would remove the idea of accommodation being "available for his occupation". I draw your Lordships' attention to subsection (1) of Section 60, and Section 75 of the 1985 Act from which the phrase is drawn. The idea of availability is intended as a defence against someone making himself intentionally homeless in order to take advantage of the homelessness provisions. The same applies in this legislation and I would expect local authorities to apply similar tests. I believe that it is right to treat asylum applicants in a similar way to other homeless applicants.

There is an understandable anxiety over what sort of accommodation can be regarded as being available to asylum seekers when an assessment is made of whether or not they are homeless. I recognise that, but believe it is based on a misunderstanding. The Bill makes clear that accommodation must be "reasonable … to occupy." Use of that term in subsection (1) (b) of Clause 4, parallels the phrasing of Section 58(2A) and Section 60 of the 1985 Act. The term recognises that there are different housing conditions in different areas. It might be reasonable for a family with two or three children to expect accommodation with three bedrooms in somewhere like Manchester, whereas (in the prevailing circumstances) a smaller unit might be acceptable in inner London. It is for local authorities to decide what is reasonable in the light of prevailing local circumstances, and their decisions are open to challenge in the courts through judicial review.

With regard to the concept of reasonableness in relation to the accommodation of asylum seekers, that is new ground. Local authorities may feel it appropriate to recognise that until such time as an application for asylum has been approved the need for accommodation need be only temporary, so that at that stage only a limited level of security of tenure is required. But they must still have regard to meeting adequate standards. I doubt whether sleeping on a friend's floor or in a make-shift dormitory in a church hall —as suggested by the right reverend Prelate—would be regarded as "reasonable accommodation", particularly when we remember that the prime beneficiaries of the homelessness legislation in this context are families with children.

The noble Baroness quite rightly mentioned the Code of Guidance on Homelessness. That is a theme that will recur during the course of our discussions on the clauses. Once the Bill has received Royal Assent we shall be amending the Code of Guidance on Homelessness, to which the local authorities are required by statute to "have regard". We will take account of the provisions of the new legislation and we will consider what needs saying on the matter.

The term "however temporary" is used in subsection (1) (b) of Clause 4 in distinction to the requirements that flow from Part III of the Housing Act 1985, under which someone is defined as homeless if he has no interest in a property, or licence to occupy it—in broad terms, if he has no degree of security in his existing accommodation. Such a concept is the necessary complement to the duty that the 1985 Act imposes on local authorities to secure permanent accommodation for those it accepts as homeless and in priority need.

"However temporary" could mean that someone who was staying with friends, or in hotel accommodation, might not be regarded as homeless if it was "reasonable" for him to continue to occupy that accommodation. Reasonableness in that regard will take account of how satisfactory the friends' accommodation is and their willingness to continue to house him. The costs of the hotel will be looked at and the applicant's ability to afford it.

But the provisions of the 1985 Act in relation to threatened homelessness also apply; they state that someone is threatened with homelessness—and therefore falls within the ambit of the homelessness provisions—if he is likely to become homeless within 28 days. The Bill will not postpone the authority's duty to intervene under the homelessness legislation until the applicant is literally without anywhere to stay. So it is simply not true to suggest that a family would have to wait until it was literally out on the streets before a local authority has a duty to provide accommodation. Again it will be for the local authority to which the application is made to decide when to intervene on a case-by-case basis in the light of prevailing circumstances.

Amendment No. 11 covers similar ground to Amendment No. 9. As I said, we need the concept of "availability" in the legislation as a defence against someone making himself intentionally homeless in order to take advantage of the homelessness provisions. The reference to availability for only 28 days is, I feel, unnecessary. The provisions of the 1985 Act in relation to threatened homelessness continue to apply for asylum seekers. They state that someone is threatened with homelessness—and therefore falls within the ambit of the homelessness provisions—if he is likely to become homeless within 28 days. The Bill will not postpone the authority's duty to intervene under the homelessness legislation until the applicant is literally without anywhere to stay.

I re-emphasise a point I made earlier to the right reverend Prelate and other Members of the Committee who raised it. The scenario painted whereby an asylum seeker and his family are shifted round, possibly from one short-term lodging to another, without being able to qualify under the homelessness legislation should not happen. In that context I have already said that we shall be reviewing the homelessness Code of Guidance to take account of the need for legislation and will make it clear to authorities just what their responsibilities are. That is one of the matters we shall need to cover.

I accept that I have been rather lengthy in covering my responsibilities. I hope that I have explained what the clauses are about and dealt with the specific points raised in a way which will allow noble Lords and the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendments.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

We are grateful for the length at which the Minister considered the amendments. I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, agreed to take the three amendments together. That is the most sensible course.

In the course of his remarks the Minister twice fell into error; once in the level of his understanding of the nature of local authority finance and the homelessness legislation, and then simply as regards his understanding of the legislation.

The Minister said—I could hardly believe my ears when I heard it—that nothing prevents local authorities from treating asylum seekers, if they wish to, as though they fell under the homelessness legislation. I can only think that he has been concerned with these matters south of the Border for so short a time that he has not had an opportunity to visit any of the local authorities who have severe problems with homelessness. If he had made any investigation whatever he would have realised that, although local authorities support the homeless legislation and recognise its justice, they find great difficulty in putting it into effect.

The rising level of homelessness in this country means that local authorities which are concerned to carry out their legal obligations correctly find themselves in the position of putting those who have been in the housing queue to the back of that queue over and over again. Those who have been waiting, without being homeless, for council housing find it more and more difficult to achieve council housing. Local authorities do not reject homelessness legislation but they really cannot be expected to operate it on a discretionary basis. They cannot be expected not to take every opportunity that they can to reduce the legal obligations on them and to care for the people who have been on their waiting lists for a very long time. Anyone who does not understand that does not understand very much about the nature of housing need in this country.

The Minister went on for some time about the concept of intentional homelessness as if our amendments would break into the concept of intentional homelessness, which is of course an exception to the duties of local authorities under the homelessness legislation. There is nothing in the Bill and nothing in our amendments which removes the provisions of the homelessness legislation under which local authorities have no responsibilities to those who are intentionally homeless. That will be the case whether or not asylum seekers are included in the homelessness legislation. It is utterly misleading for the Minister to suggest that anything in the amendments removes the intentionally homeless provisions of homelessness legislation.

Lord Renton

I am sure that we are all anxious to get this right and I was attempting to do so. I still feel, having heard the lengthy explanation of my noble friend the Minister, that Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 would be contrary to the interests of the asylum seeker. I concede that Amendment No. 11 should be considered as something which helps them. But we want to be very careful indeed that we do not weaken the Bill from the point of view of getting this right for those who are genuinely seeking asylum.

My noble friend made a sensible plea to the noble Baroness and to the noble Lord to withdraw their Amendments Nos. 9 and 10. I do not know whether he was going further with regard to Amendment No. 11 at this stage. It is with great humility that I ever disagree with a noble and learned Lord but I think that perhaps both of us might have listened to the Minister first. I, having done so, now feel as I have just said.

Lord Strathclyde

Perhaps I may butt in. Whether or not the amendments are grouped together, they are taken separately, so at least we can discuss them all at once at this stage. I hope that that will not confuse my noble friend Lord Renton.

The point of this clause is to change the current right which asylum seekers have to permanent accommodation. They will have a new right to temporary accommodation. I explained in my preface why the Government feel that that is desirable. Essentially, that is what we are talking about in these clauses. The discussions that we have had so far explain the Government's view vis-a-vis these amendments.

Perhaps I may say to the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, that I am aware of the tremendous strains that are put on local authorities through homelessness legislation. But the debate today has nothing to do with overall policy on homelessness. What it has to do with is the rights of asylum seekers. All I said—the noble Lord has not disagreed with it—is that if local authorities so choose, they can continue to treat asylum seekers in the same way.

Baroness Hamwee

This has been a very interesting debate which will certainly bear reading and rereading. The Minister made two statements at the start of his comments which seemed to be contradictory and added to my cause for concern. He said that the provisions will allow local authorities to make better use of their stock for other homeless families. He then went on to say that local authorities will have the right to treat asylum seeking applicants in a similar way to other applicants. It is that different approach in the different tests which are applied to asylum seekers which worries me and, I believe, other noble Lords.

The Minister made some welcome comments—it would be churlish of me not to acknowledge that—about church floors and friends' floors not amounting to reasonable accommodation. He said that it would be appropriate for a local authority to take account of the willingness of a provider to provide a floor or whatever it might be and the cost of the accommodation. But this is to be a matter for a code which, by definition, we have not seen. We must look at the words which will appear on the face of the Bill and on the face of the Act.

Perhaps I may make one or two more comments and also move to Amendment No. 10. The temporary nature of the accommodation is a test which no other housing applicant faces. Our homelessness legislation which it is intended should apply to these applicants as well as others defines the threat of homelessness as being likely to occur within 28 days. So is "however temporary" less than 28 days? As a matter of common sense, the English language tells me, for one, that it is.

One point may or may not have been made—perhaps the right reverend Prelate made it—so I think it is worth repeating. I refer to the possible effect of discouraging existing providers of accommodation. They may think that by providing a floor for asylum seekers to sleep on, or a perch for them to perch on, temporarily, they may be causing those asylum seekers —those housing applicants—additional problems because they will disenfranchise themselves from the rules which would otherwise give them the ability to be considered had they not had that accommodation. That is a cause for concern in that it might deter those of good will who are hoping to help asylum seekers in that situation.

The comment was made that it will be for different housing authorities in different areas to decide what is reasonable and that there will always be recourse to judicial review. I am tempted to wonder aloud about the availability of legal aid for that but I will not do so this afternoon. I am sure that noble Lords would not want to see additional pressure brought on the courts by using such a sledgehammer to crack this nut.

Finally, I wish to come back to the matter of the common sense interpretation of these words. I believe that they provide a double test for these applicants. In fact, one might say that they put them in double jeopardy. Given the interest and concern that have been shown, I should like to test the opinion of the Committee.

4.18 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 9) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 111; Not-Contents, 138.

Division No. 1
CONTENTS
Acton, L. Jay of Paddington, B.
Addington, L. Jeger, B.
Airedale, L. Jenkins of Putney, L.
Archer of Sandwell, L. John-Mackie, L.
Ardwick, L. Kennet, L.
Attlee, E. Kilbracken, L.
Aylestone, L. Kinloss, Ly.
Barnett, L. Lawrence, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L. Listowel, E.
Beloff, L. Liverpool, Bp.
Birk, B. Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B
Blackstone, B. Lockwood, B.
Bonham-Carter, L. Lovell-Davis, L.
Boston of Faversham, L. Macaulay of Bragar, L.
Bottomley, L. McCarthy, L.
Broadbridge, L. McIntosh of Haringey, L.
Bruce of Donington, L. McNair, L.
Campbell of Eskan, L. Meston, L.
Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L. Milner of Leeds, L.
Carter, L. Mishcon, L.
Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. Molloy, L.
Cocks of Hartcliffe, L. Morris of Castle Morris, L.
Craigavon, V. Mulley, L.
Cudlipp, L. Murray of Epping Forest, L.
Darcy (de Knayth), B. Nicol, B.
David, B. Ogmore, L.
Dean of Beswick, L. Palmer, L.
Desai, L. Pitt of Hampstead, L.
Diamond, L. Plant of Highfield, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
Donoughue, L. Prys-Davies, L.
Dormand of Easington, L. Richard, L.
Eatwell, L. Ripon, Bp.
Elis-Thomas, L. Ritchie of Dundee, L.
Ennals, L. Rochester, L.
Falkender, B. Roskill, L.
Falkland, V. Russell, E.
Fisher of Rednal, B. Russell of Liverpool, L.
Fitt, L. Sainsbury, L.
Foot, L. Seear, B.
Geraint, L. Sefton of Garston, L.
Gladwyn, L. Serota, B.
Graham of Edmonton, L. [Teller.] Shannon, E.
Stedman, B.
Guildford, Bp. Stoddart of Swindon, L.
Hampton, L. Taylor of Blackburn, L.
Hamwee, B. Thurlow, L.
Harris of Greenwich, L. Tordoff, L. [Teller.]
Hayter, L. Turner of Camden, B.
Healey, L. Underhill, L.
Hollis of Heigham, B. Wallace of Coslany, L.
Holme of Cheltenham, L. Wedderburn of Charlton, L.
Hooson, L. White, B.
Howell, L. Wigoder, L.
Hylton-Foster, B. Williams of Elvel, L.
Jay, L. Williams of Mostyn, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Aberdare, L. Arran, E.
Ailesbury, M. Astor, V.
Aldington, L. Astor of Hever, L.
Alexander of Tunis, E. Auckland, L.
Alport, L. Belhaven and Stenton, L.
Archer of Weston-Super-Mare, L. Blatch, B.
Blyth, L.
Boardman, L. Lyell, L.
Braine of Wheatley, L. Macfarlane of Bearsden, L.
Brentford, V. Mackay of Ardbrecknish, L.
Bridgeman, V. Mackay of Clashfern, L.
Brigstocke, B. Macleod of Borve, B.
Brougham and Vaux, L. Marlesford, L.
Butterworth, L. Merrivale, L.
Cadman, L. Mersey, V.
Caithness, E. Middleton, L.
Campbell of Alloway, L. Monckton of Brenchley, V.
Campbell of Croy, L. Montagu of Beaulieu, L.
Carnegy of Lour, B. Morris, L.
Carnock, L. Mountevans, L.
Chalfont, L. Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Chalker of Wallasey, B. Moyne, L.
Chesham, L. Munster, E.
Chilver, L. Murton of Lindisfarne, L.
Clanwilliam, E. Nelson, E.
Cockfield, L. Newall, L.
Colnbrook, L. O'Cathain, B.
Cork and Orrery, E. Orkney, E.
Crathorne, L. Orr-Ewing, L.
Cross, V. Oxfuird, V.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L. Park of Monmouth, B.
Cumberlege, B. Pender, L.
Dacre of Glanton, L. Peyton of Yeovil, L.
Davidson, V. Plummer of St. Marylebone, L.
Denham, L. Prentice, L.
Denton of Wakefield, B. Rankeillour, L.
Derwent, L. Reay, L.
Downshire, M. Renton, L.
Elibank, L. Renwick, L.
Ellenborough, L. Rodger of Earlsferry, L.
Elles, B. St. Davids, V.
Elton, L. Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly.
Erne, E. Sandford, L.
Erroll of Hale, L. Sandys, L.
Ferrers, E. Skelmersdale, L.
Finsberg, L. Spens, L.
Flather, B. Stewartby, L.
Fraser of Carmyllie, L. Stockton, E.
Fraser of Kilmorack, L. Strange, B.
Gainford, L. Strathclyde, L.
Gainsborough, E. Strathmore and Kinghorne, E. [Teller.]
Geddes, L.
Gisborough, L. Swansea, L.
Goschen, V. Swinfen, L.
Hacking, L. Swinton, E.
Haddington, E. Tebbit, L.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. Terrington, L.
Teviot, L.
Harding of Petherton, L. Thomas of Gwydir, L.
Hemphill, L. Trefgarne, L.
Henley, L. Trumpington, B.
Hesketh, L. [Teller.] Ullswater, V.
Hood, V. Vaux of Harrowden, L.
Hooper, B. Vivian, L.
Howe, E. Wade of Chorlton, L.
Jenkin of Roding, L. Wakeham, L.
Kimball, L. Walker of Worcester, L.
Lane of Horsell, L. Westbury, L.
Lauderdale, E. Wise, L.
Leigh, L. Wolfson, L.
Long, V.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

Viscount Goschen

I beg to move that the House do now resume for the Statement.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.