Trident (Hansard, 31 January 1992)

§ Lord Mayhew
asked Her Majesty's Government:
Why they require Trident to be able, independently of allies, to penetrate the ABM defences of Moscow.

Earl Howe
My Lords, I have nothing to add to the Answer given by my noble friend Lord Arran to the noble Lord on 16th January.

§ Lord Mayhew
My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that it is quite understandable that the Government wish to discourage discussion of their follies on the issue? Is he aware that the Trident fleet, with the same fire power as Polaris, will for decades be able to inflict unacceptable damage on any adversary? Further, since the successful visit of Mr. Yeltsin, may we now assume that the Government have abandoned their plan to increase Trident's fire power beyond that point for the purpose, as everyone knows, of being able to penetrate the defences of Moscow?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the Government welcome the reaffirmation by President Yeltsin of the undertakings given by President Gorbachev last autumn. However, welcome though that is, it does nothing to alter the Government's policy for the defence of this country, which is to maintain a minimum deterrent alongside an adequate conventional capability within NATO.

§ Lord Glenarthur
My Lords, does my noble friend agree that whatever the target and whatever the anti-ballistic missile defences associated with it, there is great merit in having a deterrent ultimately controlled by a separate centre of decision-making to those of our other allies?

Earl Howe
My Lords, I fully agree with my noble friend. Deterrence is about creating maximum uncertainty in the mind of an adversary as regards the damage he might sustain were he tempted to commit aggression. Our independent nuclear deterrent reduces that temptation and increases that uncertainty. It provides a second centre of decision-making within the alliance.

§ Lord Mellish
My Lords, is the Minister aware that there are at least some on this side of the House who agree with the Government that we should have a minimum deterrent? Trident is just the job in that regard.

Earl Howe
My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord agrees with the Government's policies.

§ Lord Chalfont
My Lords, I wish to follow up the matter of a second centre of decision-making. Does the Minister agree that one of the major advantages of an independent British deterrent is that it provides 1551 such a second centre? Would it not be foolish in the extreme if that second centre of decision-making did not itself dispose of a fully effective and credible deterrent?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the noble Lord has expressed the position well.

§ Lord Kennet
My Lords, the Minister used the words "minimum deterrent". Do the Government agree that the question of what constitutes a minimum deterrent is affected by the existence or non-existence of the ABM round Moscow? If the ABM round Moscow were to be removed, along with everything else that President Yeltsin proposes to remove in agreement with the United States, would the Government then reflect again on what the word "minimum" means? If so, will they take care to be closely associated with the negotiations between the United States and Russia on these matters?

Earl Howe
My Lords, we shall follow developments with interest. However, the noble Lord appears to suggest that we should allow the security of this country to rest on short-term horizons and what may well be a transient phase in the state of nations. The Government will not gamble with the country's security. The enhanced capability of Trident enables us to keep our options open for the long term.

§ Lord Kennet
My Lords, when the noble Earl reads my words in the Official Report tomorrow, I hope he will recognise that I made no such suggestion.

§ Viscount Mersey
My Lords, is my noble friend aware that Mr. Yeltsin said yesterday that the number of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the United Kingdom is not really comparable with the number at the disposal of Russia, and therefore the matter is not worth discussing?

Earl Howe
My Lords, yes, I am aware of that.

§ Lord Williams of Elvel
My Lords, will the noble Earl reflect on the question of what a minimum deterrent is? Is it really the case that we need 128 warheads per boat, one boat presumably being on station? Given that we on this side of the House support a minimum deterrent, would it not be better to have a single warhead per Trident boat?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the noble Lord is leaping to conclusions. We have said that each Trident submarine will carry a maximum of 128 warheads. The actual number deployed is a matter for the Government to decide. We shall deploy no more than the minimum capability needed to ensure that any potential aggressor faces the prospect of unacceptable damage.

§ Lord Campbell of Alloway
My Lords, is my noble friend aware that there are those of us on this side of the House who happen to support 100 per cent. the Government's defence policies and rather resent the suggestion that they should be discussed as if they were follies?

Earl Howe
My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend's comments.

§ Lord Holme of Cheltenham
My Lords, does the noble Earl agree that these are legitimate questions which are being discussed in the United States and in the Soviet Union, both of which are disarming substantially in the nuclear field? The question which the Minister might address concerns whether minimum deterrence would not involve an assessment of the motives and levels of armaments of potential adversaries. Can he inform the House on what basis, in a new situation, the Government are working out minimum deterrents, which we, like the noble Lord, Lord Mellish, fully support?

Earl Howe
My Lords, I believe that I have already answered that question. The Government are following closely recent developments and will continue to do so. However, we are a long way from reaching the point at which the promises of major cuts in weapons achieve reality. It will take many years before those cuts are effected. In the meantime we must remain vigilant.

§ Lord Birdwood
My Lords, does my noble friend agree that at the end of the day Chevaline is detectable from space and Trident is not and that space-based sensors are now allowed under the American-written treaty of last year?

Earl Howe
My Lords, it would be inappropriate to comment too closely from across the Dispatch Box on that statement by my noble friend. Suffice it to say that we believe Trident to be the most appropriate form of strategic nuclear deterrent to replace Polaris.

§ Lord Chalfont
My Lords, I apologise for intervening again. Would the Minister care to remind the House that, of the many intentions expressed by President Yeltsin regarding cuts in the military and strategic capacity of the Soviet Union, the one item he did not mention as being on his list of cuts was the ABM defences around Moscow? Does the Minister agree that if President Yeltsin thinks them important we should too?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the noble Lord made a good point. Nor did President Yeltsin mention cuts in ICBMs.

§ The Lord Bishop of Worcester
My Lords, can the Minister comment on an innocent question —namely, that so often we have tried to fight the next war with the weapons of the last? Does he consider Trident to be an appropriate response to the type of situation we faced in the Gulf War, and may well face again, of a quick, effective response in cases where unacceptable governments have possibly acquired nuclear capability? Would Trident be appropriate in such a situation?

Earl Howe
My Lords, it is important to remember that alongside our strategic capability we also maintain a sub-strategic capability which, as I have said recently from this Dispatch Box, is a key plank in dealing with the type of situation to which the right reverend Prelate referred. It is the combination of conventional forces, sub-strategic capability and our 1553 strategic capability which should ensure that potential aggressors such as we have seen over the past few years are not tempted to repeat their aggression.

§ Lord Mayhew
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the Question is not about whether or not we need a nuclear deterrent or even about a minimum nuclear deterrent, on which we agree with the Government? The Question asks whether a minimum nuclear deterrent must include the ability to penetrate the ABM defences of Moscow. Ministers in another place have frequently said that the number of warheads needed for Trident is determined by anti-ballistic missile defences. They refer to those around Moscow, the only city in the world which has ABM defences. I ask again, since Mr. Yeltsin's visit have the Government abandoned their plan to increase greatly the number of Trident warheads for the purpose, known to everybody, of being able to penetrate the defences of Moscow?

Earl Howe
My Lords, as I said, the number of warheads must remain a matter for the Government to decide. We do not discuss any targeting plans which the Royal Navy may have. President Yeltsin's announcement is a welcome response to NATO's declaration last year that the Soviet Union was no longer regarded as an adversary. I can do no better than to quote the words of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, who said yesterday: I also assured President Yeltsin of our intention to maintain only a minimum nuclear strategic force threatening no one".