Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non- Proliferation

HL Deb 13 January 1992 vol 534 cc78-105

7.25 p.m.

Lord Kennet

rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will review the roles of the non-proliferation treaty and the anti-ballistic missile treaty in the context of a non-proliferation regime.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we can only hope to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons if we look at reality without confusion or sentiment and, above all, without double standards.

In 1945 Mr. Attlee decided to start up the United Kingdom nuclear weapons programme because President Truman went back on the perfectly clear agreement about nuclear weapons between Churchill and Roosevelt. Attlee said later, We could not allow ourselves to be wholly in their hands, and their position wasn't awfully clear always. The direct motive for nuclear proliferation is the fear of some other country's nuclear weapons—China, India, Pakistan, Israel, the whole Arab world and Iran. The indirect one is an unwillingness to depend on one's senior ally. The two are not mutually exclusive. The British and French learnt that in 1945. In the 1950s the Chinese learnt that they could not rely on the Soviet Union. Israel is now surrounded by unfriendly countries, some far richer, on which the United States depends for oil. Unless those motivations are understood and respected, there can be no hope of curbing proliferation, and that is why we still have proliferation.

The partial test ban of 1963 did not succeed. Massive testing continued underground. The nonproliferation treaty of 1966–68 did not succeed because, as the non-aligned countries put it at the time, it was a case of, the drunken pastor preaching abstinence". They had been arguing for the control of vertical proliferation as well as horizontal. The French Foreign Minister called it a treaty to castrate the impotent. Few of the nuclear weapon-capable powers signed. Canada and Sweden did. Most notably, the United States' client state, Israel, was not required to sign. A large number of the truly impotent did sign, hoping to see their security increased.

However, many of those optimistic signatories are now objecting to the nuclear threats that they perceive and have been refusing inspection rights to the International Atomic Energy Authority. Syria seeks a small reactor without safeguards until Israel accepts safeguards too. Iran states that it has a right to develop nuclear weapons if it wishes. Algeria is suspected. I shall deal with North Korea later. That Argentina and Brazil have agreed to reciprocal inspections under IAEA auspices is a rare instance of statesmanlike foresight.

A web of mutual fear suffocates the world and smaller things get caught in it. One of those is President Reagan's strange and silly dream of an ABM deployment, perhaps by many countries, which would have broken the anti-ballistic missile treaty of 1972 and introduced a general hair-trigger threat to the whole world. The United States was still proposing to what remained of the Soviet Union only last autumn that the treaty should be replaced so as to allow deployment. Still to this day, the United States is paying already nuclear Israel to work on a miniature version called Arrow. Britain has been tagging along in the hope of financial crumbs. If Arrow ever is deployed, it will destabilise the Middle East just as the full Reagan pipedream would have destabilised the whole world. But perhaps after three test failures it will not be deployed.

In 1991 the START agreement reduced the former super-powers' strategic missiles, but at United States insistence it did not reduce their warheads, any more than the earlier INF agreement had done. Last year the five permanent members of the Security Council discussed arms transfers and non-proliferation and made some worthy joint statements. Our Government say that they: have no reason to doubt that all five governments intend to observe the spirit of these agreements". But those governments are still arranging the shipment of arms to the Middle East for many billions of dollars. The Gulf states want 25 billion dollars' worth; Saudi Arabia wants 18 billion dollars' worth and Syria wants Scuds. In truth the big five have learnt nothing and are still acting as though the economic health of their arms industries was their principal concern.

The problem of controlling and perhaps eliminating the former Soviet Union's possible 30,000 nuclear warheads is horrendous, and concerns the whole international community. The Minister may tell us what monitoring of the destruction of tactical nuclear weapons is taking place. Several of the republics will not allow the residual Commonwealth military authorities to take charge, let alone the Russian Republic. The very temporary commander-in-chief of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Colonel-General Shaposhnikov, suspects that the new republics' governments want to gain control over the former Soviet armed forces in their territories in order to sell the weapons.

Certainly they need the money. Meanwhile, our Government have decided that Russia is the legally valid successor state to the Soviet Union. Mr. Yeltsin, who was elected president and also declared himself prime minister and unlawfully took over all the Soviet KGB and interior ministry files, now sits in Moscow issuing decrees like a thistle shedding its down. They are not effective even within the Russian Republic. He is less effective this year in Russia than was Gorbachev last year in the whole Union. Why did our Government jump so eagerly to recognise his Russia as the heir of the Soviet Union? If it is true that it was to avoid triggering wider changes in the Security Council, it is something that they may live to regret.

Elsewhere, there are a few good signs. They are principally in Korea. The British Government and others have long been protesting to North Korea about its refusal to allow the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities, as it should have done since it signed the non-proliferation treaty. Those protests were part of the bad old world of humbug and double standards. What did we expect? The United States silently but conspicuously kept nuclear weapons in South Korea and was proposing to conduct the annual Team Spirit exercise even this year. Consequently, and because its vulnerability was increased by the collapse of the Soviet nuclear umbrella, a North Korean nuclear programme was only to be expected. American talk of "taking out" the North Korean programme was smartly and correctly rejected by both China and South Korea.

But all that hypocrisy was unnecessary. The United States has now unilaterally decided to withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea, and indeed elsewhere. Just as Western negotiators have always rightly insisted on foolproof verification of arms control agreements, so North Korea has been promised verification of the US withdrawal in return for inspection of its own nuclear facilities. It would be renewed humbug if the Americans were now to try to insist on North Korea dismantling enrichment facilities which they appear content to see Japan possess on a far greater scale.

What are the chances that an equal realism might be displayed in the Middle East? Israel has had a nuclear weapons programme for several decades, and now holds probably well over a hundred. It also has long-distance missiles which it claims can reach southern Russia. The United States has always tolerated and sometimes assisted that programme. It still does so. The British Government, at least since 1979, have feigned ignorance. For those reasons Arab countries have taken trouble to acquire nuclear weaponry and delivery systems. Iraq has done so more than most.

In 1981 Israel bombed and destroyed the Osiris nuclear establishment in Iraq. The attack went unpunished. That no doubt finally convinced Iraq and other countries that the United States did not intend to abide by either the spirit of the non-proliferation treaty or the letter of its own anti-proliferation laws, in so far as those affected its assistance to Israel. From that there followed the hidden Iraqi programme that the United Nations is now uncovering and destroying. The threat which Israel's neighbours see in the Israeli programme is now exacerbated by the Arrow programme: ABMs are an adjunct to a first strike posture, as well as having a defensive use. The Israelis think they need Arrow because of the Iraqi Scuds. This is a nuclear arms race in operation.

Unless the international community is wiser than usual, Iraq's motives for developing nuclear weapons will be inherited by Iran. With the scattering of Soviet nuclear and other weapons scientists, it will probably be easy for oil-rich governments to buy expertise. The United States nuclear weapons programme is also shedding experts.

The non-proliferation treaty itself comes to a kind of end in 1993. What then? Neither the treaty nor the general regime are self-sustaining. Three things are necessary for a state to live in virtue: to sign this treaty, to ratify it, and to admit International Atomic Energy Authority inspections. The Arab countries score low in all three. Israel scores nil in all of them.

I turn now to the totality of the regime of which the non-proliferation treaty is part. Is the anti-ballistic missile treaty a central part of it? Our Government say that they are fully convinced that the treaty has been a valuable source of stability. I think we would all agree with that. But the Bush Administration apparently still want to renegotiate it. What is the Government's view? Do they favour cancelling the treaty (which is what it amounts to) and, along with the remains of the Soviet Union, deploying a global protection against limited strikes—GPALS for short—which would presumably be built by the United States and paid for by the rest of us?

Does our Government intend to go along with the desire of the United States for its allies to extend their co-operation on theatre missile defence work? The noble Earl, Lord Arran, referred to it on 14th November in those terms; he said that we must "extend our co-operation on theatre missile defence". That presumably means collaboration with the Israeli-Arab programme. Or do they think that ABM technology should be included in the Missile Technology Control Regime, which would be an opposite and beneficial action? That regime, together with COCOM and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, constitute supply side anti-proliferation. But what we need now is action to remove the demand.

The proposal of the Prime Minister and now the United Nations for an arms export register is good. May we take it that Britain's arms exports will now be published and that Ministers will answer questions on them?

On a global scale, the International Atomic Energy Agency must now be shoved swiftly right into the forefront of world affairs. Clearly it cannot continue as before. It has been alleged that its two roles—to encourage the availability and safety of civil nuclear power, and to establish that neither technologies nor materials spread from the civil side to the military—are incompatible. There has to be an early UN inquiry into that question and early action on its findings. Either way, the duties of the IAEA are now closer to the heart of world security than they have ever been. Perhaps there will be jobs for unemployed American and former Soviet weapon makers.

The IAEA needs its own sources of information. Proposals for an international monitoring agency have long been on the table. Now is the time for it. The still partial test ban has to be completed. The United States opposes it on increasingly implausible grounds: the wish to produce a third generation of nuclear weapons, to make nuclear weapons "cleaner" and smaller, to improve reliability upwards from 75 per cent., and so on.

Now that the Soviet Union is out of the race, many governments see the completion of the partial test ban as the test of US bona fides; and they are right. In the interests of obtaining an effective non-proliferation regime, our Government should now slide away from their automatic support of this and other unjustifiable US positions. Minimum nuclear deterrence does not require more sophisticated weapons.

Last Thursday the noble Lord, Lord Cavendish, made an important statement in this House. He said that the Government have suggested to the Secretary General of the UN that a consultative committee of some of the signatories to the Fourth Geneva Convention should be called. That is the 1949 convention concerning belligerent occupation of territory. It would examine ways "to ensure Israeli respect" for that convention. [Official Report, 9/1/92; col. 1677.]

I congratulate the Government on deciding to do that. The Government are now calling not just for the specific Security Council resolutions to be applied to the Arab/Israeli conflict, but for one of the general laws of civilisation to be applied. That is good. But will they go further and make it a point of British foreign policy—an identifying point—that all the laws of civilisation must apply in the Arab/Israeli conflict? They include the non-proliferation treaty. That is why I ask my question today.

7.41 p.m.

Lord Wade of Chorlton

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for bringing the matter before us to debate today. As he so rightly said, it could turn out to be one of the most vital matters for the world. With the changes that are taking place, this issue could affect the lives of everyone.

Since the end of the Gulf War, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the regime of which it is part has been closely scrutinised and heavy criticisms such as those of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, have been levelled against it. The inability of the international community to prevent Saddam Hussein from attempting to achieve a nuclear weapons capability has been held up as an example of the failure of the non-proliferation treaty and the threat of proliferation by other states such as North Korea. It has also been held to demonstrate the redundancy of the NPT.

However, it is my belief that the NPT continues to play an important role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the primary concern in relation to our security. Undoubtedly proliferation threats exist and are growing ever greater. However, in criticising the NPT I believe that there has been too much discussion about what the non-proliferation treaty does not do: I suggest that there has not been enough emphasis on what it achieves. There is a danger that, in criticising the NPT for not preventing certain states from attempting to obtain a nuclear capability, the baby may be thrown out with the bath water. I suggest that the NPT is the linchpin of the non-proliferation regime without which the other elements of the regime cannot prove effective.

I wish to emphasise the importance of the non-proliferation regime for our security. Let us be clear what it is. The NPT is a political vehicle which enables the international community to identify nuclear proliferators as acting outside the accepted international norms of behaviour. It identifies what is legal and illegal within the nuclear industry. It legitimizes action by the international community against states such as Iraq which renege on their agreement not to manufacture nuclear weapons. It identifies those states which have not signed the NPT and which have a nuclear weapons programme as acting outside those accepted international norms of behaviour.

Some people appear to believe that the NPT, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency, should act as a world policeman, scouring the globe for fissile material and the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons. That is simply not acceptable or feasible in the world of independent nation states in which we live. It would be impossible to enforce. The NPT should be accepted and applauded for what it is—the means through which a line can be drawn on the sand beyond which potential proliferators know that it is unacceptable for them to take further steps to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

Of course the NPT is not the only element of the non-proliferation regime. There are the export control groups for the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons and the control of missile technology—the missile technology control regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency can and should be strengthened to enhance the non-proliferation regime. However, without the treaty itself the nonproliferation regime is in danger of appearing to be a suppliers' cartel, and, moreover, a cartel that is rapidly losing its control of the marketplace to new and perhaps less particular suppliers. The treaty represents the international political consensus against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If this consensus is destroyed, it will be impossible to contain potential proliferators.

The treaty holds a review conference every five years. It is right and proper that Her Majesty's Government too should review the contribution that the NPT makes to our security. However, I believe that it would be extremely inadvisable to attempt any amendment of the NPT as part of this review process, since the fragility of the consensus that the treaty represents could be destroyed by such a move. The numerous contentious issues between the 140 and more signatories that would be opened up in the amendment process would make it practically impossible to achieve a new consensus.

However, in such an area as this, where technical developments lead to new areas of concern and provide new avenues for circumventing present surveillance and controls, it is appropriate that the methods and procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be improved and updated and that other elements of the regime such as the monitoring and control of exports and technology should be continually reassessed. I therefore ask Her Majesty's Government to reiterate their commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as the linchpin of the non-proliferation regime.

Further, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is to be considered for extension in 1995. In order to reach agreement on its extension, it is important that consensus between the states parties to the treaty is maintained. Many developing states resent the perceived inequalities inherent in the treaty and are seeking concessions from the nuclear weapon states and other developed states to redress this perceived imbalance. In conjunction with that, many have severe reservations over the value of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty to their own security. Will the Government let us know what steps have been taken to ensure that the necessary consensus is being achieved and that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty will be extended in 1995?

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, also referred to the anti-ballistic missile treaty. I am sure that the noble Lord understands that it is a treaty only between the United States and the Soviet Union and that the United Kingdom Government were never a signatory to the treaty but lent their support to it because of the contribution it has made to preventing vertical proliferation.

In the post-cold war, post-Gulf War era, that contribution must now be reviewed. The fear of vertical proliferation is past. Fear of a massive nuclear exchange between the super powers is also fading. The deployment of an ABM system on the scale envisaged by the Strategic Defence Initiative project is therefore no longer contemplated. The primary concern of the United States and Europe is now the existence of rogue undeclared nuclear weapon states and the presence of perhaps loosely controlled nuclear weapons in the states of the former Soviet Union. Europeans—in particular Southern and Eastern Europeans—may be tempted to consider the utility of a limited ABM system to counter the threat of limited nuclear weapon strikes by developing countries. Since the rationale behind the ABM treaty depended on the bipolar global political structure, such contravention of the treaty does not raise the same fears of vertical proliferation as it did in the past.

However, the debate surrounding the ABM treaty raises a number of questions about ABMs in a broader context; that is, it raises fears related to horizontal proliferation. If the developed states acquire ABM systems while the developing world does not obtain them, suspicions and resentments are likely to be raised which may damage the non-proliferation consensus.

My anxiety relates to the dissemination of the ABM systems to the developing world, a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. The perceived success of the Patriot system during the Gulf War and fear of the proliferation of ballistic missiles both conventional and nuclear at a reasonable level has encouraged developing states to seek ABM systems off the shelf. Others such as Israel are being helped to develop their own systems. Many developing states are thus now eager to obtain anti-ballistic missile systems or anti-tactical ballistic missile systems.

I believe that the dissemination of the ABM systems to the developing world may have severe consequences for the non-proliferation regime. There is a danger that the dissemination of anti-ballistic missiles and anti-tactical ballistic missiles will lead to the dissemination of technology required to build offensive ballistic missiles. The publicity surrounding the illicit production of nuclear weapons often ignores the fact that a significant nuclear capability does not exist without the capability to deliver the weapons.

Thus the transfer of such technology is a danger to the non-proliferation regime. For example, Taiwan is believed to have constructed a surface-to-surface ballistic missile from ABM technology supplied to it by the United States of America. The missile technology control regime prohibits the transfer of key ballistic missile components. The transfer of a complete ABM or anti-tactical ballistic missile system would provide a potential proliferator with a substantial amount of the know-how required for a delivery system for nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, that technology, once outside the control of states dedicated to preventing nuclear proliferation or with less strict security and controls, could more easily transfer to third countries which are potential proliferators. I should be most grateful if Her Majesty's Government would express their views on that matter.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, also referred to the breakdown of control in what was formerly the USSR. Quite clearly that will have enormous implications for the non-proliferation regime. I understand that Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine have reaffirmed their intention to observe the provisions of the NPT and their intention to support the non-proliferation regime. However, we must accept that a number of redundant nuclear aeroplanes and facilities are already available in the world markets. I understand that last year it was possible to buy plutonium from certain sources in Switzerland and that clearly it was coming out of the Soviet Union. There are some 3,000 to 5,000 people in the former Soviet Union who hold sensitive information on the design and operation of installations for plutonium production and uranium enrichment. What will they do now that their jobs and opportunities are at stake?

I believe that this issue must be tackled with the utmost urgency by the British Government, the American Government —which have already indicated that they will do so—and by NATO. I welcome the recent comments made by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister on this issue. We must consider what, if suddenly we were to wind up our own industry, or if the Americans were suddenly to have no further armies or centralisation, the people employed in them would do. I hope that, as a result of the debate, the Government will form a more serious view of how Western nations can take a grip on the issue, build upon existing non-proliferation and aim to take more control of what might be a serious and dangerous situation for us all.

7.54 p.m.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has rightly identified one of the major international political problems that faces this and many governments in the world. In this context I concentrate mainly on what the noble Lord has called horizontal proliferation; that is, the spread of nuclear weapons to those countries which do not at present have a nuclear weapons capability from those which do. In this post cold war period I regard that as being by far the greatest threat to international security and stability.

Furthermore, several matters germane to the issue were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. I must take issue with him or at least put a slightly different emphasis on some of the points that he made. The noble Lord mentioned the arguments that have circulated for more than 20 years about vertical and horizontal proliferation. He mentioned the derision with which some smaller non-aligned and non-nuclear countries refer to the non-proliferation treaty as being in a sense the preaching of total abstinence by drunkards. I recognise that argument; it was familiar in Geneva in the 1960s and remains familiar today. However, I must point out that the object of Article 6 of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which was deliberately inserted in the treaty to try to meet some of those worries—the article refers to the control of the nuclear arms race and the requirement upon the nuclear powers to reduce their own nuclear capability —is to some extent under way.

Before the current events in the Soviet Union it and the United States—the two major nuclear weapons powers—were reaching a whole series of agreements to reduce their own nuclear capabilities. They did so perhaps in response to enlightened self interest rather than in response to Article 6 of the treaty. Nonetheless, some of the worries of the non-aligned and non-nuclear powers at the time of the signing of the non-proliferation treaty were being addressed.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has always had a special and somewhat hostile view of the concept of the strategic defence initiative. In its earlier manifestations I could understand a good deal of his feelings. The original concept of creating some kind of nuclear carapace over the Western alliance in such a way that it became invulnerable to an enemy nuclear strike, always seemed to me to be somewhat ambitious. However, I am not entirely sure that I should regard it as being totally destabilising. Indeed, I should advance a view perhaps somewhat diametrically opposed to the noble Lord's: it may well be argued that the strategic defence initiative and the reaction to it by the Soviet Union was the beginning of the developments which have lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It would not be too extreme to say that the SDI, which postulated the use of the enormous technological skills and industrial base of the United States of America, was the first time that the Soviet Union began to realise that it could not win the arms race against the United States of America. It is not too extreme to argue, therefore, that it was then that the Soviet Union began to realise that the future of the USSR, apart from the rest of the world, relied not upon an arms race with the United States of America, but upon some kind of accommodation with the West.

In any event, whether or not that is true, the idea of the space-based, four-phase nuclear system, which was at the heart of President Reagan's strategic defence initiative, has now lost any relevance or validity, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Wade. It was intended as a means, by defensive instead of retaliatory methods, of deterring the Soviet Union from attack on the West. I think that everyone will agree that the likelihood of a first strike by the Soviet Union is now extremely remote.

However, we are now entitled to look at what one might call the relevant spin-off from the strategic defence initiative in the form of point defences and theatre defences. Surely if we can, within reasonable limits of expense and resources, construct defensive systems against nuclear attack, it would be foolish in the extreme not to do so especially, as the noble Lord, Lord Wade, said, if we are to be faced with innumerable, perhaps maverick, nuclear powers which would not even be as responsible in their use of nuclear blackmail as was the Soviet Union.

I suspect that the United States has now realised that the useful spin-off from the SDI will be a form of limited ballistic missile defence. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will go along with that if it appears to offer a successful defensive system as a result of further United States development.

The noble Lord mentioned the 27,000 or 30,000 nuclear weapons still existing in the commonwealth of independent states—the former Soviet Union. That is where a great deal of the problem lies. It is not simply that those states still pose a potential threat. It would be unwise to forget that. As I have said on many occasions in your Lordships' House, when assessing the future actions of a potential enemy, one must consider both their intentions and their capabilities. The intentions of the Soviet Union as it used to be —the intentions of Russia—may now be pacific in the extreme. However, intentions can change overnight.

Capabilities are a different matter. A country which still has on the soil of four of its republics 27,000 to 30,000 nuclear warheads and which are continuing to produce nuclear weapons daily and the missile systems to deliver them cannot be considered by any prudent military and political planner as anything but a potential threat. We must regard it as such until it disappears.

Also, I refer briefly to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, on the dangers of proliferation in the Middle East. Those are very grave dangers. In the debate which we had a few days ago in your Lordships' House some noble Lords concentrated on that aspect of the Middle Eastern problem. I suggest with all diffidence to the noble Lord that it is rather perverse to expect Israel to take a lead in that by some form of unilateral renunciation of a nuclear capability. We are all aware of the general belief that Israel already has a nuclear capability but I do not believe that we can argue from that that the reasons which led President Saddam Hussein to attempt to construct his own nuclear capability was entirely in response to that. Nor do I suppose that the clandestine enrichment operations which are going on in Iran at present are entirely a reaction to the Israeli nuclear capability. If that were so, it is not applicable to countries like Pakistan which, according to Benazir Bhutto, has a nuclear capability, nor to India, and is hardly applicable to other countries in the world which are regarded as near nuclear powers.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves the Middle East, I hope that he understands that I was not calling for Israel to engage in unilateral nuclear disarmament. That was not what I was saying. But would he not recognise that in any given part of the world the first country to obtain nuclear weapons bears a special duty to take a lead in getting rid of them in that part of the world?

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, within limits, yes. Perhaps I should preface my response to the noble Lord by saying that I have never been a great believer in regional arms control. I do not believe that that is the correct approach to any form of arms control although he may point to the Treaty of Tlatelolco which has created a nuclear free zone, so far at any rate, in Latin America. However, if one is aiming at a nuclear free zone in the Middle East, it is indeed true that Israel has a very special responsibility, but the noble Lord will know that the Israeli Government have already offered to participate fully in a regional nuclear free zone. One hopes that that may have some effect on the rate of proliferation in that area.

However, the point that I wish to make is that the real danger of proliferation in the Middle East lies in the fact that a number of countries, many of them hostile to Israel, are and have been developing for some time a nuclear capability. The proliferation process cannot be halted by Israel. There must be a broader and more universal approach to the problem of arms control, especially in the Middle East.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, I do not wish to continue to interrupt the noble Lord, but does he recognise that Israel is not alone in saying that it would be willing to see a denuclearised zone? That has been proposed by Egypt on many occasions over many years and it was also proposed by Iraq long before the beginning of the recent war.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, it was indeed proposed by Iraq at the very moment that it was attempting to construct an advanced nuclear capability.

I point out also to your Lordships, in the context of what the noble Lord has just said, that in the Middle East there is the greatest concentration of countries which have either not signed or not ratified the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Leaving the Middle East for a moment, for the sake of clarity I revert to one point made by the noble Lords, Lord Kennet and Lord Wade. Unless I am much mistaken the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, referred to the NPT ending in 1993. In fact it ends in 1995, the year of the review treaty. The reason for that is that although the treaty was signed in the late 1960s, it did not come into force until 1970. Therefore, the review treaty, as provided for in the NPT, will take place in 1995 and not 1993.

In that context, I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Wade, about the folly of attempting at that time to engage in any piecemeal amendments to the non-proliferation treaty. It took many years and many long and weary hours of negotiation to complete. I believe that it was Ernest Bevin, when Foreign Secretary, who once said of an international issue, "If you open that Pandora's Box, you never know what Trojan Horse will jump out". I believe that that is particularly true of the non-proliferation treaty.

As I understand it, the options open to the review conference are to terminate the treaty, to extend it for an indefinite period—in other words, for ever—or to extend it for a prescribed period. I hope that those three options will be concentrated upon and that there will be no attempt, as the noble Lord said, to meddle with the details of the treaty.

I conclude by saying that I believe that a number of steps can be taken to enhance the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime and to underpin its impact. The first concerns the increased use of intelligence systems to detect proliferation. It is now time that much of the highly sophisticated intelligence effort that was in the past devoted to attempting to detect the military developments and intentions of the Soviet Union should now be released to try to find out precisely what is happening at any given time in any of the near nuclear powers or any power suspected of engaging in clandestine programmes. New methods of intelligence gathering are so sophisticated and effective that if they were to be properly put into effect it would be difficult for any non-nuclear or near-nuclear power to achieve a nuclear weapons capability without the knowledge of the Western and for that matter Soviet or Russian intelligence systems.

I can go further than that. I hope that Her Majesty's Government, in concert with other friendly and allied powers, will seriously consider the possibility of releasing intelligence gathered on these subjects, suitably sanitised, to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The one thing that that body needs if it is to be properly effective—here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet—is access to the kind of intelligence that sophisticated modern intelligence-gathering agencies can provide.

Finally, perhaps I can take this opportunity to congratulate the Government—when I say, "the Government", I mean not only this Government, but British governments for some considerable time past —on the efforts made in the field of non-proliferation. It is no exaggeration to say that much of the intellectual stimulus for arms control and disarmament for the past 20 years or more has to some extent had its seed in the British Foreign Office. A great deal of serious and profound thought on this subject goes on there. Noble Lords may be surprised, on examining the various arms control treaties signed since the 1960s, to find how many of them contain clauses and concepts which had their origin in our own government and Foreign Office. In saying that I pay tribute not only to this Government, but to all British governments which have been engaged in this process in recent years.

As the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said and the noble Lord, Lord Wade, repeated, the major problem threatening international security and stability is the spread of nuclear weapons. Within that general proposition is another problem. But the major problem about proliferation of nuclear weapons now comes from the instability of what used to be the Soviet Union—the Commonwealth of Independent States. There are 27,000 to 30,000 nuclear warheads; there are technicians of enormous skill and subtlety, many badly in need of food and money. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that nuclear weapons, warheads and certainly nuclear technology and know-how may be sold out of a disintegrating Soviet Union into areas of the Middle East which are especially sensitive and explosive.

In that context I hope that Her Majesty's Government will confirm that they regard proliferation as one of the most serious problems on the international horizon and that if there is serious disintegration in the Commonwealth of Independent States—as I said in the debate in your Lordships' House last week, I confidently forecast that there will be a cataclysmic upheaval in those countries before long—Her Majesty's Government will confirm that they recognise the threat to international security and stability which springs from that.

8.14 p.m.

Lord Kagan

My Lords, we are not dealing with a non-proliferation regime; we are dealing with non-proliferation anarchy. I do not believe that even the Soviet military know how many weapons it possesses. I returned from Lithuania last week. I am told that there have been active sales of T.72 tanks for the price of £30,000 which previously sold for £1 million.

I am sure that there is no difficulty in negotiating with either Yeltsin or Kravchuk, or any other leaders. The problem is whether or not they can deliver. With regard to intercontinental ballistic missiles, before anybody can press the button the chief of staff must be consulted and so on. But with regard to the small atomic weapons—land mines and artillery shells—some of them weigh less than 40 kilos each. Two of those can be transported in a mini-van. Above all, they are mostly operated by mechanical locks by the local commander and soldiers.

When I was there a few months ago I was told that some of the Lithuanian people who deal with Kazakhstan, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, found that they could not obtain accommodation in hotels in Minsk, Kiev and Kazakhstan. The reason was that the place was full of Pakistanis, Libyans and Iranians all shopping around for what the noble Lords, Lord Chalfont and Lord Wade, described as skilled people who can be seduced or induced to come down.

In Kazakhstan, which is a Moslem country where fundamentalist Moslems are active, it may be not only a matter of simple bribery or commercial considerations; they may think that it is fair to allow a fellow Moslem country such as Iran to have the benefit of atomic weapons. I am told that shells can be fired from any standard Soviet artillery piece. They will probably not be aiming for the United States right across the Atlantic, but any threat may arise from a quarrel between two generals.

The likelihood of Yeltsin or Kravchuk eventually staying in power is at best a moderate one. Eventually it will be a showdown between military men who believe that they are able to impose order where at the moment anarchy rules. Therefore, first, no treaty can be negotiated with people who cannot deliver. We are looking at a shifting situation. How does one counteract it? As the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, pointed out and as the noble Lord, Lord Cheshire, mentioned in his memorable maiden speech, the best way is active intelligence on the spot. It is not difficult. At one time one did not even know where the atomic weapons were constructed. Now, if one goes to Vilnius in Lithuania, they will tell you where the plutonium is made, where the steel cases are made and so on. It is all quite open. What is required is the monitoring of precisely what is happening.

Perhaps I may tell your Lordships a joke that I was told in Vilnius. Two chaps were in the market place selling brooms. One said to the other, "I steal the stems; I steal the string; I steal the bristle and you undercut me". The other chap said, "Yes, because I steal complete brooms". Unlike Saddam Hussein, one no longer needs large amounts of capital to build up atomic capability; one can find the ready made articles and hire the total team. It only requires nine men to handle one of those units.

What might deter is stabilisation of the country. At the moment there is one thing on which the Baltic countries and Ukraine are agreed, and that is anti-sovietism and anti-bolshevism which changed into anti-Russianism. When one is in Lithuania one has the feeling that it is not a country with one president and 3.5 million people, but a country with 3.5 million presidents trying to run the country in different ways.

One factor becomes very clear even when one is in the country for only a very few days. There is the feeling that things will not stay the same. When things move, the situation will go to extremes and become neo-fascist. Some of your Lordships may remember the days of the Weimar Republic. What is happening now in the East is inflation, anarchy, total disbelief that a government can deliver and total cynicism against any ruler or politician. People in the queues now refer not to the bad old days, but to the good old days because now they queue in bitter frost for three hours to buy bread. They say "at one time at least we used to have our ration and now we do not have that".

Stability is very fragile. Any change will be inevitably a change to the extremes. The only factor that could prevent that and allow the present governments which were democratically elected, especially in the Baltic states, to continue is if they could show a visible sign of improvement. I do not mean an improvement in terms of having the British standard of living, but an improvement in terms of having soap, razor blades and things of that kind.

The experience of Gorbachev has not been lost on everybody else. He relied on the West. Democracy is not now considered to be the panacea by the broad masses. If one took a conscious decision to show positive steps in helping the people to raise their standards of living and to alleviate their shortages, that could save the present situation, otherwise it will deteriorate.

The interesting point is that the Germans and the Japanese are the only countries which have moved in in force. The German Government are not necessarily sending food, but they are buying up complete plants and joint ventures. The Japanese are doing the same thing in the Far East on the Siberian side. If the West wants to give positive signs—taking an example from our way of life—if we were to deliver some signal, the situation might improve and the present rulers who are in charge now may have a chance to survive. If that does not happen then we can discuss from now until Doomsday what treaties should be made, but there will be no one to treat with. The failure to support Gorbachev when there was still a chance may be deemed by history to be the biggest mistake that the West has made. Now is possibly the last chance to do something about that.

8.25 p.m.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, I believe that we are all agreed that the problem of nuclear proliferation has become vastly more urgent and disturbing. We are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for raising the subject. We are probably also agreed that the major cause is the break-up of the Soviet Union closely followed by the related problem of the nuclear arms race in the Middle East. We are also worried because of the revelations, as a result of the Gulf War, of the limitations on the traditional methods of inspection and control of the IAEA.

I believe it was the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, who said that there are now four republics with nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. I believe that he was referring to strategic nuclear weapons.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, that is right.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, if we take tactical nuclear weapons into account I believe it is true to say that they are in at least seven of the new republics and it may be more. It may be that 11 of the new republics have them. It is a nightmarish situation. There are more than 25,000 nuclear warheads spread over at least seven, possibly 11, new republics. Some of the republics are very small and very unstable. Until quite recently there were hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons located in Georgia. Perhaps the Minister can reassure us about that because as far as I know they are still there, but under whose control? It seems doubtful that they are under the control of the Russians if they are in Georgia.

What about the Georgian Government and which Georgian Government? It is a nightmarish situation. Are these weapons beyond the reach of terrorists and of corrupt politicians? Are they beyond the reach of the agents of Libya and Iran? Perhaps I may ask a specific question of the Minister: can he confirm or deny that three tactical nuclear weapons have been sold to Iran for 150 million dollars? I very much hope that the Minister can deny that, but there is no reason to disbelieve it because it seems all too possible in the existing situation.

One begins to feel nostalgia for the old East-West balance of terror. How simple, effective and successful it was! It produced the splendid START agreement which is now falling apart as a result of the new developments in what was the Soviet Union. We have all been exchanging views on the nightmarish situation, but what can we recommend the Government to do? It is very difficult to say. I believe I heard someone say that the new republics should accede to the non-proliferation treaty. To do that while they still have nuclear weapons would result in the worst solution of all. That would mean seven or 11 new nuclear countries which would be proliferation on a gigantic scale. It would set an example to other countries, such as India or the Middle East countries, to do the same. The worst solution of all is to have the republics accede to the non-proliferation treaty while still keeping their nuclear weapons.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, I believe that there is a slight intellectual dichotomy or confusion here. The point of requiring the new republics to accede to the non-proliferation treaty is that they will become non-nuclear powers.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, of course the noble Lord meant that. In fact, I do not believe that he said it. If they accede to the treaty as non-nuclear powers, that is what needs to be done. But that means that they must get rid of their nuclear weapons first. First, catch your hen and then enjoy your egg. The difficult problem is what to do with the nuclear weapons which they now have. If they are yielded to the Russians, for instance, in the absence of an effective commonwealth, if, as they should be, these weapons are yielded wholly to Russian control, that is probably the safest thing. That is what the Government should go for. The weapons should be located and listed. There should be insistence upon complete Russian control of the nuclear weapons. It does not mean that the Russians have to withdraw them from the territories of the republics. The republics can still be non-nuclear members of the non-proliferation treaty and keep Russian nuclear weapons on their soil just as the Americans, for a long time, kept their nuclear weapons on German soil.

However, the essential thing that the Government should go for is Russian control over all these nuclear weapons, and no recognition either of Russia or any of the other republics until this is done in the nuclear field. That is vital and it is the best action I can think of to recommend the Government to take.

Before turning to the Middle East, perhaps I may pick up a remark from the very interesting speech of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. He said, in opposition to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that the old argument against vertical proliferation—indeed, about the whole system—that the nuclear powers were keeping their weapons and stopping the others getting them, was like a drunkard preaching temperance. I side here with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, because the reply of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, that the nuclear powers were reducing their nuclear weapons, is not true of this country.

It gives me an opportunity to remind the Government that so far from helping in this process with their nuclear policy, they are increasing enormously the nuclear capability of the United Kingdom. Not only is Trident a vastly more powerful system under their arrangements than Polaris, but they are adding an entirely new tactical air-to-surface nuclear missile system. What kind of a contribution to non-proliferation is that? That is vertical proliferation of the worst and least necessary kind.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again, but this is a very interesting debate and for once a real debate. The point about Article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty is that it requires the nuclear powers to begin the process of nuclear disarmament. My point was that that has begun. I fully accept that neither the French nor the British—nor, as far as I know, the Chinese—have any intention at the moment of reducing the level of their nuclear striking forces. But I make the point that the nuclear powers have begun this process in strategic arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. I do not want to go any further and become involved in the question of Trident.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, two of the nuclear countries have started the process of disarmament. But my point is a fair one that the others have not begun the process of disarmament, and the British have begun the process of increasing our nuclear capability in the ways that I have suggested. However, this is by the way.

I want to say a word about the nuclear arms race in the Middle East, which was well described by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. Here one has to avoid double standards. One has to begin by noting that there is at present an Israeli nuclear monopoly in the Middle East achieved with French and American assistance at a time when the United States was most emphatically insisting on non-proliferation all over the world; penalising the Pakistanis unless they agreed, and so on. It was turning a blind eye to the nuclearisation of Israel's defence forces.

I believe that a speaker said in this debate that Israel cannot be expected to achieve non-proliferation in the Middle East. However, it is the fault of Israel that she started the process of proliferation. But it has done no good to her. It may be that it can be argued that it backed up her territorial expansion. However, the weapons are, in practice, unusable except as suicide weapons. Yet inevitably—predictably—the Arab neighbours and Iran have responded and have searched for their own nuclear capability. They can hardly be blamed for that.

The great problem is how on earth to avoid a major nuclear arms race in the Middle East. It has to involve all the countries in the Middle East, including Israel. Any idea that one can ban Moslem atomic bombs and permit Jewish atomic bombs is so impracticable and unprincipled as to be not worth discussing. It has to be all countries. All the countries of the region have to be organised into a non-nuclear region. It is not impossible. It has been done before, but it requires statesmanship from Israel.

Here I come on to the next point that I want to make. It requires a very great strengthening of IAEA. I think here I parted company from the noble Lord, Lord Wade. Surely the experience in Iraq shows that vastly stronger powers need to be given to the IAEA. That must be so. If in the Middle East we are to have a non-nuclear zone, we are not going to get Israel to dispense with its nuclear weapons unless it is 100 per cent. certain that the new non-proliferation regime, that the powers of the IAEA are sufficient to make certain that her neighbours and Iran and Pakistan do not have these weapons.

Lord Wade of Chorlton

My Lords, surely that is the whole point. How can one strengthen the atomic energy regime without giving it such power that it itself has to have force? The purpose of having the treaty is to be able to isolate those countries that are not conforming to the treaty. Then there can be international activity against them. That I think is accepted and understood. However, when it is said that we must give the Atomic Energy Commission more authority, from where will that authority come? Who is going to give it the power to force the point? That is the difficulty.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, the authority will be the Security Council: the same body that has given the IAEA authority to take the most drastic measures against Iraq. It might be worth my reading out Security Council Resolution No. 687 laying down the powers of the IAEA in relation to Iraq. The Security Council granted the agency: inspection rights such as unlimited movement of inspectors within Iraq, full access at any time to all locations, persons and information as deemed necessary by the IAEA for verification purposes, including unannounced inspections, ongoing notification of inventories of nuclear materials and installations and of the changes therein; the right to restrict or bar movement of suspected material or equipment; and submission of information on planned installations six months before starting construction". That is draconian. I do not deny that that is interventionist.

However, I ask: is it not worth paying the price to have something on these lines applicable universally? We are not going to get nuclear-free zones in the Middle East unless people can rely on the observance of IAEA's restrictions by other countries. It can be done. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, mentioned Korea. That is a very good example.

However, considering the outlook for nonproliferation and for this agency, I feel that apart from the Middle East and apart from the break up of the Soviet Union, in recent years, there has been a success story. Korea was a success story. The South Africans have agreed to accede to the treaty; and there is a prospect now of the whole continent of Africa being nuclear-free. The Argentines and the Brazilians have agreed to accede and to exchange mutual information. That opens the prospect of an entirely nuclear-free Latin America and Caribbean. Those are achievements. The French have recently agreed to accede. The Chinese are about to accede to the NPT and thus end their wicked career of supplying nuclear technology to Algeria, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. These successes can be built on. Perhaps I may say at this point how glad I am to see that the noble Earl, Lord Arran, is taking a keen interest in this debate. It shows an appreciation of the topicality and importance of this subject.

Good guidelines on the powers needed in Iraq are necessary for an effective, universal, non-proliferation regime. I am glad to know that the board of governors and the director general of the agency are to discuss next month just this question of strengthening those powers in that way. I note that the director general said recently that the world could have an effective, universal, non-proliferation regime in place by 1995. He may be optimistic but it is the duty of all of us to do all we can to see that he succeeds.

8.41 p.m.

Lord Williams of Elvel

My Lords, the House is grateful to my noble friend, Lord Kennet, for asking this Unstarred Question. I say without qualification that it is the most important question facing the international community today. As the noble Lord, Lord Wade of Chorlton, said, we have to recognise that there is a serious danger of nuclear proliferation and we have to try to do what we can to stop it. Even though the attendance has been small and the attention from the Press Gallery has been limited on this important topic, this has been one of the most constructive and interesting debates that I have attended in the House. I believe that the Government will read with enormous interest what has been said by noble Lords.

The main question which arises from the debate is to what extent the treaties cited by my noble friend in his Unstarred Question have relevance today in the light of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, rightly pointed out that the non-proliferation treaty has had many successes. The noble Lord and my noble friend Lord Kennet pointed to Korea and South Africa. They pointed also to France and China. We must welcome those developments. Nevertheless, my noble friend Lord Kagan put his finger on the point when he said that the old Soviet Union, which is disintegrating into anarchy, and the successor republics cannot be relied upon to observe any of the treaties signed by previous administrations of the Soviet Union or indeed previous administrations of the republics themselves. That is the point we must consider today.

Where exactly are we in this connection? There are 3,000 to 5,000 Soviet scientists with direct experience of nuclear technology, the production of plutonium and uranium enrichment. A further 2,000 are experts in weapons design. As my noble friend Lord Kagan pointed out, the head-hunters are already in place. Iraq, Libya, Syria and possibly Algeria—and even Israel, I understand—are head-hunting in the former Soviet Union. What do we do about the Soviet nuclear brain-drain? If we can do nothing about it—it is difficult to see what we can do about it—what do we do about the outright sale of nuclear materials? As the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, said, what do we do about the sale of tactical nuclear weapons out of the Soviet Union? I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Cavendish, will be able to reply.

Even if we can answer those questions, what do we do about the problem of the delivery systems that are not ABMs or anything of that kind but are simply housed in suitcases? What do we do about a terrorist who appears in Whitehall or in the Champs-Elysées with a suitcase which happens to contain a newly-constructed nuclear device? These questions will have to be answered within the next decade or else the whole world will be blown up.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, I confess that I have no specific answers. The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, made the same point. We must rely on what we have. We have the non-proliferation treaty. It has been to a certain extent a success, but to make it a greater success we have, as other noble Lords have argued, to make sure that the enforcement procedures are much stricter than they are at present. I do not object to the idea put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, that the IAEA should have the power of inspection by challenge. It should be able to go in at any point, use the authority of the United Nations Security Council and say, "We believe that you are doing something against the NPT and we want to know about it. We have the right to do so". I do not believe that we can operate any system other than severely controlled satellite-based intelligence techniques, maintained and developed under the IAEA. Certainly suitable information—I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, used the word "sanitised" —should be made available to the public.

I do not believe that we can operate a system to control what is an enormously difficult situation—that is especially so in the Middle East—unless we accept that we ourselves in the United Kingdom must stop nuclear testing. We have to make a gesture. The gesture that I suggest is that we should stop testing and invite everyone else to do the same.

The post-Gulf War investigation in Iraq showed that the existing techniques of monitoring who is developing a nuclear weapon capability are sadly deficient. The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, argued that we should not muck about with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the 1995 revision. Nevertheless, I believe that the rules of the nuclear suppliers' club, known as the London Club, should be included in any revision of the treaty.

My noble friend has raised an extremely complex and important problem. Most noble Lords have said what I intended to say. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Wade, made a very impressive contribution. I believed half of what the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said, although I would differ with him on the role of the SDI as a mechanism for ensuring that the Soviet Union broke up and finally disappeared. I agreed almost entirely, unusually so, with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew. His were words of very great wisdom and great persuasiveness.

I very much hope that we shall have another debate on the matter. I also hope that such a debate will be one of the full House at a proper time and in a manner which is dignified for this House. I return to what I said at the beginning. In my view, this is the most important issue facing this country and our world at this time. I think that it is a shame and a disgrace that we should be having a debate in this House at this time of night on a matter which is of such great importance.

Nevertheless, having said that, I must again express my gratitude to my noble friend Lord Kennet for raising the issue. It is to be hoped that the noble Earl, Lord Arran, who is sitting courteously on the Front Bench will take the matter away for the Government and will stimulate from that side of the House a further debate in the not too distant future.

8.52 p.m.

Lord Cavendish of Furness

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for bringing this extremely important issue of non-proliferation before the House tonight. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Williams, said, it has been an excellent debate. My colleagues will read what has been said with the greatest possible care. The Gulf War has brought home to all of us the importance of non-proliferation of all forms of weapons of mass destruction and has highlighted the need for the international community to redouble its efforts to achieve this objective.

Iraq's billion dollar endeavours to try to build an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction are a sobering reminder of what a ruthless and dedicated proliferator can do.

Further, the implications for the non-proliferation regime of the disintegration of the Soviet Union are still far from clear. There is plainly a danger that it will lead to a proliferation of weapons, weapons technology and, as has been said, the movement of key scientists. We and our NATO allies have impressed upon the newly independent republics our concerns. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary will be reinforcing that when he visits Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan later this week. I accept that there are few issues which rank as important as the one which we are debating tonight.

The House will need no reminding of the uniquely destructive nature of nuclear weapons in particular. The prospect of such instruments in the hands of irresponsible and irrational men is a very frightening one. It was with the purpose of trying to avoid just such an eventuality that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concluded in 1968, entering into force in 1970.

The NPT has since become the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As a depositary state for the treaty we have a special interest in it and we attach the greatest importance to our responsibilities in this field.

We should recognise the great success of the NPT. Here I take issue a little with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. It remains the most successful arms control treaty in existence. Well over 140 countries are now states parties to the NPT. The NPT has established nuclear non-proliferation as the norm and ensured that proliferators cannot claim respectability.

Since it is germane to this debate, I should like to take this opportunity to correct a few points of detail raised in the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, in the House last Thursday when he talked about those states which have not signed or ratified the treaty. I hope that he will not mind me pointing out that, contrary to what is in the Official Report, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar are already parties to the non-proliferation treaty. The noble Lord also raised the question of Algeria. Although that country is not a party to the NPT, it has stated clearly that the reactor which China is supplying will be placed under IAEA safeguards. We understand that the agreement will be put to the board this February. We hope that the IAEA will be able to visit the site in the very near future.

The noble Lord, Lord Williams, asked as a sort of broad question, reflecting what I believe he felt to be the whole tenure of the debate, whether any of these treaties were still relevant. After reading the background to the debate and listening to what has been said, I am struck by the fact that, even if we cannot look for guarantees or even if I cannot stand here and say that we can attach this or that amount of weight to any particular guarantee, it is significant when a new nation seeking the respectability about which I was talking is asked to address a problem and says that it will do so. It is trying to make its way in the new world in which it finds itself.

I continue now to talk about the success of the treaty. There are still only five states which have declared that they have nuclear weapons—the same number as when the treaty was opened for signature over 20 years ago. We should not forget that the prospect of 20 or 30 states equipped with nuclear weapons, which so many people foresaw in the 1960s, has not come to pass. We should be grateful for that fact.

Further, the significant accessions to the treaty since the Gulf War, including that of South Africa, as well as the decisions of China, as has been mentioned, and France in principle to accede, are eloquent testimony in themselves of the international community's continuing faith in the NPT.

As a depositary state for the treaty, the United Kingdom has worked hard to encourage such accessions and will continue to work for others. The NPT remains the only global instrument through which states can make a formal commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. It provides a framework for stability and it remains an indispensable feature of regional and global security.

Nevertheless, the experience with Iraq has highlighted certain shortcomings in the workings of the regime. These need to be addressed urgently if international confidence is to be maintained. Those issues are being tackled and the United Kingdom is playing an active role in the process. Work is going on in the International Atomic Energy Agency on the strengthening of safeguards. Together with our European Community partners and other like-minded states, we have given strong support for this process, and put forward our own specific proposals. These include the greater use of special inspections, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Elvel. Such inspections can provide a mechanism whereby undeclared but suspect nuclear sites can be visited.

The problem of undeclared sites is fundamental and limits the effectiveness of the present safeguards system. Special inspections can help to ensure that other states parties to the NPT do not follow Iraq's example and pursue an entirely covert nuclear weapons programme. The UK has long advocated greater use of such inspections and stands ready to provide whatever help it can to the IAEA to make sure that such a system will work.

Other things are also being done to buttress the non-proliferation regime. Supplier controls play a vital role in restraining the transfer of equipment for use in a covert weapons programme. Again, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Williams, mentioned that point.

The UK has always been a strong advocate of strict controls and we have been active in promoting them. We therefore welcomed the reactivation in 1991 of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and strongly supported work to draw up a regime to control nuclear dual-use items. The use of such items seems to have been key to Iraq's programme. We have played our part in this work and hope that it can be finished before the full NSG meets again next spring.

In this context I should like to draw to your Lordships' attention the fact that, in an effort to strengthen the barriers against nuclear proliferation, the UK decided on 24th September last year to adopt a policy of full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. This means that Britain will not allow the export of any significant new supplies of nuclear materials to any country, other than the nuclear weapons states, where there are any nuclear installations not subject to IAEA safeguards.

We are not complacent. There will no doubt be other challenges. As I have said, the implications for the non-proliferation regime of the disintegration of the Soviet Union are still anything but clear. In the face of such challenges the proposed improvements I have described obviously cannot guarantee that the non-proliferation regime will be watertight. The UK cannot solve the problems unilaterally, but, with vital international co-operation between supplier countries to stem the kind of procurement activity carried out by Iraq and others, we are optimistic that the improvements will make a significant contribution to such an objective. We believe that it is by seeking to strengthen the existing instruments of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, not by seeking to create new ones, that we can best pursue our objectives. I sense that that was the mood of the debate tonight. In the final analysis our best hopes lie in universal adherence to the NPT and full compliance with its provisions. It is because of our faith in the treaty that we shall work for its indefinite extension in 1995. We call upon all like-minded nations to join us in this endeavour.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has also raised the question of the anti-ballistic missile treaty. Before I address that question specifically, I should like to say something about the missile technology control regime. We and our G7 partners established the missile technology control regime in April 1987. The regime is designed to prevent the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The use by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of missiles against civilian targets has further underlined the need to prevent the spread of these uniquely destabilising systems. The MTCR has an important role to play in countering that threat.

The regime has had significant successes. The efforts of MTCR members have led to some missile programmes being stalled or even abandoned. But there is clearly much more which can be done to reduce this threat and we and our partners are seeking every opportunity to improve the regime yet further.

As a result of the drive to expand the regime, launched in London in 1989, membership has grown to 18 countries, thereby bringing into the regime a number of key suppliers of missile technology. We hope to see further expansion, and continue to urge all states to abide by the MTCR guidelines. We are also looking at how to involve the other major suppliers and emerging suppliers of missile technology, who are not currently members.

There is also concern about missiles with payloads below the current MTCR parameters, which could be used to deliver chemical and biological weapons. While we and our partners agree that it would be desirable to cover these, it may be that changes to the scope of the regime would create practical difficulties and undermine the present effectiveness of the regime. In consequence, we are urgently examining these issues with our partners.

We continue to look at ways to toughen implementation. We have recently adopted a revised and updated list of the technology covered by the regime, and are looking at ways to improve harmonisation of implementation by all the member countries.

As far as the ABM treaty is concerned, US activity on ballistic missile defence was centred originally on the concept of a strategic layered defensive system against attack from long-range missiles. We know that Soviet research was focused on similar areas.

In response to the much reduced threat of an all-out Soviet nuclear attack, President Bush announced in January 1991 the refocusing of the SDI programme as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The more modest objectives of GPALS are to protect against accidental, unauthorised or limited ballistic missile attacks against the US and its allies, and threats of the sort which the world faced in Iraq 12 months ago.

The development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems by the US and the Soviet Union is governed by the ABM treaty and its 1974 protocol which, among other things, prohibits the testing or deployment of space-based ABM interceptors and limits the permitted numbers of fixed ground-based launchers. By maintaining confidence in the deterrent capability of strategic nuclear arsenals, the ABM treaty has made an important contribution to stability and to the reduction of tension and prevention of large-scale war.

However, given developments in technology and the threat presented by the wider proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities, the US has frequently spoken of the need to re-examine the treaty in its existing form and has on occasion discussed this with the Soviet Union, without result. For instance, the US Congress has urged the President to begin negotiation of some amendments to the treaty provisions in order to accommodate defences against new potential threats. The US has also indicated its intention to deploy an ABM treaty-compliant system for defence of the US before the end of the century.

Although the ABM treaty's interpretation and future is a matter for the two signatories, we do of course have a strong interest in the treaty in so far as it affects the effectiveness of our own deterrent. We and our NATO partners have been kept closely in touch with the re-orientation of SDI towards GPALS, and would be consulted about any review of the treaty which the US was considering.

The United Kingdom continues its full support for the SDI programme and has, along with other US allies, participated in SDI-related research. UK participation is intended to enhance our research capability in areas of high technology relevant to both defence and civil programmes. It has resulted in awards of research contracts to British companies.

At present GPALS remains a research initiative. Deployment of space-based elements would be a matter for negotiation. We hope that the dialogue which the United States has established hitherto with the authorities in the Soviet Union—that is the old Soviet Union—will lead to improved understanding on strategic defences.

Lord Williams of Elvel

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt, but could the noble Lord please explain what he means by "the old Soviet Union"? Which authorities are being engaged in discussion?

Lord Cavendish of Furness

My Lords, we are talking with everyone. As the noble Lord may have heard me say, we are dealing with Russia as the continuation of the Soviet Union. We are also dealing with the various republics. We have given recognition to the republics in some cases but in other cases, for reasons which I have given, we have not yet done so. We still feel dialogue is relevant and will make a contribution to overall strategic stability. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked me to comment on what might be done in respect of nuclear weapons situated in the old Soviet Union—I hope that I may use that term again. We and our allies have made clear to the leaders of the former Soviet republics the importance we attach to ensuring safe, responsible and reliable control of nuclear weapons and to preventing their proliferation. At the North Atlantic Council Meeting on 19th December, NATO foreign ministers announced that the Alliance was ready to respond as fully as possible to requests for practical assistance in achieving those objectives. The President of the United States has already offered to discuss the safe transportation, storage and dismantling of nuclear weapons with the relevant authorities. The US Congress has voted 400 million dollars for practical assistance with that task.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, why is this being done through NATO and not through the United Nations?

Lord Cavendish of Furness

No, my Lords, I cannot answer that at present. I should be able to answer the noble Lord, but I shall certainly inquire about the matter and write to him. Reference has also been made to the proposals between Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev. We welcome the far-reaching proposals of Mr. Bush and the positive response made by President Gorbachev which together will mean the global elimination of nuclear artillery shells and nuclear warheads for short range missiles, the withdrawal of maritime tactical nuclear weapons and the standing down from alert status of strategic bombers.

Those proposals mark a potential turning point and fully accord with our own policy of working for secure defence at a lower level of armaments. I particularly wish to emphasise that point as leaders of the new Commonwealth have undertaken to honour Gorbachev's proposals to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons. The commitment made at Alma-Ata to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons by July 1992 for dismantling under joint supervision is a positive step forward in this objective.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, what the Minister is saying surely is a little outdated. I am afraid that the agreement on tactical nuclear weapons with Mr. Gorbachev is meaningless. There is no one now to carry it out.

Lord Cavendish of Furness

My Lords, I made the point that nothing is certain any longer in that part of the world. I cannot say the news is all good news, but I am saying that the people who even for the time being are taking responsibility have at least made the gesture of accepting the responsibilities of the former leaders. To that extent I believe that the commitment I have mentioned must be described as encouraging news. It is for the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, to decide how much weight he wishes to attach to it. I cannot guide him on that.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, I apologise for again intervening, but this has been such a good debate that it would be a shame if anything confusing were left in the air. Perhaps I may approach the matter in another way. Have Her Majesty's Government any reason to believe that the Republic of Russia under Mr. Yeltsin will honour any of the agreements arrived at between the United States and the Soviet Union? If they have information to that effect, it is of course encouraging.

Lord Cavendish of Furness

My Lords, I can go no further than say that I think the indications are that the new leaders wish to take that responsibility. That is what we, our allies and partners are working for. To that extent we can feel encouraged. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked about our involvement with Arrow. The co-operation between the United States and Israel on the Arrow programme is carried out under the terms of a bilateral memorandum of understanding between those two countries. Interpretation of the ABM treaty is not in this context a matter for the UK. I hope the optimism—

Lord Kennet

My Lords, we know that. The point is we want to know what the British Government's policy is towards the action of the United States in helping Israel to develop a medium range ABM system. Are we helping that development? If we are not helping it physically or financially, do we think the policy of the United States is correct or incorrect? I asked that question in my speech and I also asked it in a letter that I wrote to the Minister in advance of this debate.

Lord Cavendish of Furness

My Lords, the noble Lord has asked the question on a number of occasions. As I said, the matter is subject to the memorandum between the United States and Israel, and from our point of view it is a defensive development so far as concerns Israel. I am afraid that I cannot be drawn further on that matter.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, can the noble Lord help me once more? Does he know whether we are helping physically or financially in the Arrow development? If he does not know, will he find out and let the House know in due course? If he does know, will he tell us fairly and squarely whether or not it is confidential?

Lord Cavendish of Furness

My Lords, it is a bilateral agreement. That has been made perfectly clear to the noble Lord on a number of occasions. I am sorry that we cannot go further.

The noble Lord also asked me about North Korea. I hope that the optimism which has been expressed about North Korea is well founded. We understand that North Korea is about to sign a safeguard agreement with the IAEA. We welcome that news. We look forward to the agreement's speedy ratification and implementation.

My noble friend Lord Wade spoke of the danger of proliferation of ABM technology. I can assure him that ABM technology is closely held between the United States and the signatories to the bilateral memoranda.

Several questions were asked and there was some speculation about how the NPT will be taken forward, renewed or brought to an end. It is my understanding that it does not end but is extended in phases. The next extension conference will be in 1995. My noble friend Lord Wade raised the question of proliferation resulting from the exodus of Soviet nuclear scientists. Naturally that is a matter giving rise to great anxiety. The UK is consulting closely with the United States and our other NATO partners on ways to prevent proliferation. We have made our anxieties known. the possible effects of Soviet scientists selling their expertise is one of the major problems which is receiving attention. We have made it clear to the individual republics that their approach to nonproliferation will be crucial in developing our bilateral relations with them.

I noted with interest the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, that advanced intelligence currently targeted on immediate defence should be switched to give additional strength to the nonproliferation effort. I should be very pleased to investigate that matter and see whether any further thought has been given to it.

The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, spoke of an alleged sale of tactical nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union to Iran. I can say that I am aware only of the press reports and have no confirmation of the matter. Having been alerted to the possibility we shall continue to monitor the situation.

I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Mayhew and Lord Chalfont, that all republics except Russia should fulfil the commitment which most have already made to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, leaving Russia as the continuing nuclear weapon state. That is what we are urging them to do.

I hope that I have dealt with the questions which have been raised. These are vital issues. They touch on the security of this country and on the security of the whole world. I can assure your Lordships that the Government will continue to place the highest possible priority on meeting the challenges which the non-proliferation regime will undoubtedly face in the years to come.