Nuclear Capability (Hansard, 24 February 1992)

Earl Howe
My Lords, the Government are committed to the principle of minimum nuclear deterrence. The Trident programme is entirely consistent with that. The prospective reductions in the superpower arsenals will reverse a nuclear arms race in which the United Kingdom was never a participant.

§ Lord Jenkins of Putney
My Lords, why do the Government consider it necessary to build up to a destructive power some 3,000 times that of the Hiroshima bomb at a time when the majority of states—including Australia, Canada, Germany and Japan—are without such a weapon? If those countries do not possess nuclear weapons why do the Government feel it necessary at this time to increase our nuclear capability to such a stupendous extent?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the calculation of our minimum deterrent need has to allow for anti-ballistic missile defences. The CIS deploys the world's only operational system. At present it is limited by treaty to 100 launchers, but that may be renegotiated. The intentions of the present Russian Government are not at issue but we have to bear in mind the systems which could be deployed over the next 30 years.

§ Lord Mellish
My Lords, will the Minister be good enough to confirm to the House that our deterrent, in comparison with those of the Americans and the Russians, is negligible?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the noble Lord makes a very good point. We are not in the superpower league. President Bush's proposals imply the United States retaining over 2,000 warheads in 18 submarines, and that is only one of three legs of America's strategic triad. Our four-boat Trident force is our only strategic system and it will ensure that only one submarine, with no more than 128 warheads, is on station. There is no comparison.

§ Lord Marlesford
My Lords, is my noble friend aware that many of us on this side of the House are convinced that for four decades the nuclear stalemate 8 kept the peace and that it is essential in the uncertain times following the dissolution of the Soviet empire to make sure that our independent nuclear deterrent is up to date? Does he agree that if the Labour Party—in whose government the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, served as a distinguished Minister—is in any way ambivalent or doubtful on that point that would be a very good reason for it not to be elected?

Earl Howe
My Lords, my noble friend made a very good point. Even assuming that the cuts which have been proposed are agreed, we estimate that the Russians could retain at least 15 times the number of nuclear warheads which the UK will have even after Trident has been brought into service.

§ Lord Williams of Elvel
My Lords, can the noble Earl confirm that the whole point of the new Trident programme is to be able to penetrate the ABM defences around Moscow? If so—and as I understand it that is the only justification for Trident; otherwise we would be content with the Polaris fleet and the Polaris capability—can the noble Earl conceive of any circumstances in which we would wish to make such a strike without the co-operation of the United States and outside NATO?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the noble Lord asked a hypothetical question. The increasing likelihood of a revision of the ABM treaty, with the possibility of consequent further improvements in ABM defences, confirms the wisdom of replacing Polaris with a successor force capable of ensuring our minimum deterrent needs.

§ Lord Mayhew
My Lords, the Minister mentioned Trident, but why do the Government in addition insist on spending huge sums of money on a new airborne sub-strategic nuclear weapon system, especially when the same role could be performed perfectly well by Trident at no extra cost?

Earl Howe
My Lords, we have discussed that very question in this House on many occasions. Trident is a strategic system. The great advantage of a submarine-based strategic deterrent, provided there are sufficient boats to maintain a continuous patrol, is its ability to remain undetected until its use and hence its virtual invulnerability to pre-emptive attack. Using Trident for a sub-strategic strike would increase the risk of the submarine being detected, thus exposing our strategic capability to the danger of pre-emption.

§ Lord Stoddart of Swindon
My Lords, will we be able to target our nuclear deterrent without the assistance of United States satellites? If not, will it be truly independent?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the UK deterrent is and will remain operationally independent and under the absolute control of Her Majesty's Government. Although we have undertaken that the system will be operated in defence of NATO, we have reserved the right to use it independently of that role if supreme national interests so require.

§ Lord Stoddart of Swindon
My Lords, will the noble Earl please answer my question? He did not answer it. 9 It is no good muttering. I want an answer to my question. I asked the noble Earl whether it was possible for our deterrent to be targeted without the assistance of United States satellites. Will he answer that question please?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the United Kingdom has its own national targeting capability. It is inappropriate for me to discuss the details.

§ Lord Mayhew
My Lords, arising from the reply which the noble Earl gave to me about the vulnerability of Trident under sea, does he suggest that Trident under the surface is more vulnerable than the airfields and aircraft whose position is known and which will be built under the Government's plan?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the Government have taken no decision on the sub-strategic system that we may wish to order once our stock of free-fall bombs has been phased out. What I said was that once a nuclear submarine is used for any type of strike, the position of that submarine becomes all the more apparent. It is therefore more vulnerable.

§ Lord Jenkins of Putney
My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that, although quite a large number of people continue to think—I believe mistakenly—that it is necessary for this country to continue to possess nuclear weapons, an increasing number of people do not think it necessary for this country to keep strategic nuclear weapons? Will he address himself to that point? What is the use of this country possessing a strategic nuclear weapon at a time when other countries are dispensing with it? As my noble friend pointed out, it is inconceivable that this country would operate without the agreement of the United States. Why cannot we leave it to the United States in the unlikely event of a strategic nuclear weapon being required?

Earl Howe
My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord's question is common sense. There have been many encouraging changes in the security environment in recent years. But those same changes have brought about their own risks and uncertainties. I believe that it would be quite disastrous for the Government to abandon a long-standing policy held by successive governments.