§ 3.19 p.m.
§ The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (The Earl of Arran) rose to move, That this House takes note of the White Paper on the Defence Estimates (Cm 1559 I and II) and the White Paper on Britain's Army for the 90s (Cm 1595).
§ The noble Earl said: My Lords, this year's White Paper marks the clearest break from the past in any year since the end of the Second World War. Previous White Papers have reported changes in strategic doctrine, force structures or equipment purchases. On other occasions my predecessors have reflected on the changing relationship between East and West. There have been periods of hope and improvement but equally there have been times of tension and crisis.
§ The relationship was founded, not merely in great power rivalry—a commonplace in the history of Europe—but more intractably in ideological conflict. That framework overshadowed all else in both Europe and the developing world. It infused almost all aspects of international relations. Today that is at an end. The rigid divisions and mutual antagonisms which characterised the European security environment of the past 45 years have all but evaporated. The demarcation between East and West is increasingly irrelevant. Many, many issues remain to be resolved but most seem capable of resolution. We welcome unreservedly the opportunities which now present themselves, but in doing so our optimism is hope tinged with caution.
§ SDE 91 is obviously not merely a review of those events, crucial as they have been. It carries, and we believe lives up to the title, Britain's Defence for the 90s. It contains our analysis of the demands of the new strategic environment. It sets out, with great clarity, the dramatically altered conditions under which we have been able to reassess and restructure our defence forces. Together with the Army White Paper, Britain's Army for the 90s it contains our response to the new challenges with which we are faced. We recognise that the situation is dynamic. Change which would once have taken a decade now unfolds month by month. Few could possibly anticipate the speed and breadth of those changes.
§ Since I spoke in the corresponding debate last year the pace of change has quickened. Germany has been united. The Warsaw Pact has dissolved itself voluntarily. Soviet forces are withdrawing from 1101 Eastern Europe. They have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia. They are due to leave Poland by the end of 1992 and what was East Germany by 1994 at the la test. That process should be complete by the mid-90s and we estimate that by 1995 Soviet forces from the Atlantic to the Urals will have fallen by nearly half, from 138 divisions in 1989 to a maximum of 70–75 divisions. NATO now faces well over a million fewer troops. Ten days ago President Gorbachev announced a reduction of 700,000 in the manpower of the Soviet armed forces and there are some within the Soviet Union who are talking about even more swingeing reductions.
§ The Soviet Union has signed the CFE and START treaties. The independence of the Baltic states has introduced some technical difficulties in the process towards ratification but we are confident that those can be resolved and the treaties implemented; and, on 27th September, President Bush unveiled an historic new Western initiative, to achieve unprecedented reductions in the superpower's nuclear weapon holdings, and greater security and stability in the remaining force structures. Your Lordships will no doubt join me in applauding that initiative which you will recall included the destruction of all US ground-launched short-range nuclear weapons, the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from submarines and surface warships, and an end to 24 years of round-the-clock standby for US strategic bombers.
§ We are equally glad that President Gorbachev has been able to make such a positive response, picking up many of the challenges set by the American President. Your Lordships will be aware that we are making a significant contribution to that process, with the reduction of our strike aircraft squadrons form 11 to eight with the withdrawal of all our maritime tactical nuclear weapons to land storage, and by giving up our battlefield nuclear capability. Indeed, we have played all along a leading role in shaping the alliance's nuclear strategy. It was after all the London declaration which indicated the alliance's willingness to eliminate all its nuclear shells from Europe provided that the Soviet Union reciprocated, which foresaw a revised alliance strategy placing reduced reliance on nuclear weapons generally, and which signalled NATO's readiness to give up all battlefield nuclear weapons.
§ The results of NATO's review of its nuclear requirements, set in train by the London summit, will be considered by Defence Ministers when they meet in Sicily over the next two days. Large cuts into the NATO nuclear stock pile are in prospect, including the in-the-air delivered element which will remain when the ground systems are eliminated. As my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence made clear in another place on Monday, we shall again be playing our full part in those reductions.
§ Within the Soviet Union the momentum of change has been no less phenomenal and, as the ideological home of communism, all the more radical in its range and depth. The impetus that was created by President Gorbachev through his reform programme has gathered in pace. The Soviet people have fed on the 1102 freedoms unveiled to them by glasnost and perestroika. What has developed is not yet democracy as we understand it. Democratic institutions and values cannot be created at will. They take time to establish themselves within the political culture of a society. Individualism and self-expression, the seeds of liberal democracy, were never part of the political tradition of either Czarist Russia or the Soviet Union. But we are hopeful that true democracy will emerge in time and that greater enterprise, self-reliance and the growth of a market economy will become the bedrocks of a new democratic culture.
§ The attempted coup against President Gorbachev may yet prove to be the final blow for the old guard; the death throes of a discredited system; the end for those who support a closed society and a closed economy. We applaud the bravery of those who stood against the coup. We welcome the outcome: the maintenance of legitimate government against those who would overthrow it by force. Though we cannot yet be certain that the hard-liners will not try again to reassert their power, the omens are good. The monopoly of the communist party is at an end. Its influence within the armed forces is to be eliminated. The Soviet defence ministry is to be placed under civilian control. The KGB is to be reformed and its activities severely restricted.
§ The litany of change seems never ending, but not all is based on altruism. The Soviet system has failed. To use a phrase which communist hard-liners would understand: it was undermined by its own inherent contradictions. Not only was it unjust, it was inefficient and unresponsive to change. Today its economy is in tatters, unable to sustain existing levels of defence expenditure and perhaps more importantly in the eyes of the average Soviet citizen, unable to feed its own people, not because the Soviet system of agriculture produces too little food but because it is incapable of distributing it efficiently.
§ But, however welcome, the very process of change creates its own uncertainties. For all its past ills, the Soviet Union was a relatively stable superpower. It had enormous military capability, but at least in Europe it was rarely adventurist. The new USSR, or whatever state succeeds it, is almost certain to be less stable if not an immediate military threat. The post-war settlement in which there were two dominant powers with distinct spheres of influence lasted for nearly half a century. It is no more. In its place we see a re-awakening of nationalism and a desire for national self-determination. We welcomed the independence of the Baltic states and gave formal recognition to them on 27th August; but nationalism can have a destructive dimension. In Yugoslavia it has found expression in bloody civil war. Tension, ethnic division and territorial ambition are widespread in the Balkans and threatened elsewhere. Further afield the conflict in Iraq and that of nine years ago in the Falkland Islands illustrate that crises are of their very nature often unexpected. The timing and the location of conflict are in the hands of the aggressor, not ourselves.
§ Thus the legacy is mixed. The world remains turbulent and uncertain; but it has altered, 1103 irreversibly. The magnitude of change was not contemplated three years ago and its full implications cannot yet be known. It would be implausible and mistaken to have continued as if nothing had occurred. The opportunity to move away from confrontation might have been lost for ever. But this has not been an impetuous scurry to grasp some ill-defined "peace dividend". Our response has been to adapt to new circumstances so that we do not endanger our security. SDE 91 outlines a positive approach which balances our enhanced confidence in the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union with our recognition of their political instability and continued military strength.
§ From a military and strategic perspective the immediate Soviet threat in the central region has all but disappeared, although we should not forget that it retains the largest and most powerful armed forces of any state in Europe. In such circumstances Britain has reassessed the strategic environment. We have done so not unilaterally but in close consultation with our allies. This process has been vindicated by events in the Soviet Union, not least the failure of the attempt to overthrow President Gorbachev.
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The process of reassessment has developed in a cumulative fashion. We have built on the analysis of change which I have just outlined. We acknowledge that there has been a move away from a clear and quantifiable threat and have sought to redefine what is needed to maintain the security of the United Kingdom and its dependencies. That goal remains paramount and will not be abandoned in an attempt to secure short-term financial savings. This is not to say that prudent economy and cost-effectiveness are ignored. As my right honourable friend the Secretary of State said in his evidence to a committee of the other place, our deliberations,
have been strategy-led but resource disciplined".
Where savings can properly be made we will welcome them but they remain secondary to our primary task, which is to maintain the security and interests of the nation.
§ We retain our belief in the primacy of NATO. It has been the instrument of collective defence and peace for over 40 years. It has been the institution through which the United States and Canada have expressed their belief that the security of Europe is indivisible from that of North America. Its role is well defined. It draws strength from this when so much else is new. Nothing is immutable. NATO is nearing the end of a review process covering every aspect of its activities, military and civil, from strategy to infrastructure.
§ Much has been said of the need to strengthen the European pillar of security. The practical implementation of that widely held belief requires further definition, but clearly the Western European Union will have its part to play. The role which it has undertaken in, for instance, mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf illustrates its potential if political and organisational difficulties can be overcome. In the future we must of course look also to the over-arching security structures provided by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United 1104 Nations. They also have their parts to play in ensuring continued peace and stability. The CSCE summit of November 1990 has, through its charter for a new Europe, already provided a workable framework for confidence and security-building between member states. The United Nations, as the Gulf conflict demonstrated, has a new-found determination to uphold the rule of law in the international sphere.
§ A pivotal factor in those deliberations has been the extent and nature of our existing defence commitments. These have been reviewed as part of the continuous dialogue with our allies and that has resulted in a series of key announcements. First, there was the London Declaration of July 1990, issued by the leaders of the NATO nations, which outlined the fundamental principles in determining future NATO force structures.
§ Secondly, later in July my right honourable friend the Secretary of State set out his initial thoughts on our future force levels in his Options for Change announcement. They were refined and developed in a series of statements culminating in this year's Britain's Army for the 90s White Paper and SDE 91. The main features of that process are complete and we are now in the period of implementation.
§ Thirdly, in May this year NATO Defence Ministers, meeting in Brussels, agreed new force structures for the alliance. These will comprise a new triad of reaction forces, main defence forces and augmentation forces. They will be more flexible and more mobile than existing formations. They will place much greater emphasis on multinational co-operation, not merely in the most senior reaches of political and military command but at ever wider levels of subordinate command and organisation. No doubt this will pose new challenges. Servicemen of different nations will work together more frequently. Equipment will need to be more widely inter-operable than at present. But such co-operation can succeed. It was practised successfully in the recent Exercise "Certain Shield". It was proven by coalition forces in the Gulf, embracing, as they did, many nations of diverse culture and military tradition.
§ The process will continue. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister will attend a meeting of heads of state and government of the NATO nations in Rome on 7th and 8th November to conclude the fundamental review of the alliance's political and military strategy which they mandated at the London summit. We shall then be in a position to bring to a conclusion much of the work which is in progress within the alliance, including the streamlining of the command structures and the review of the crisis management procedures and reinforcement planning.
§ Britain's principal contribution to restructured NATO forces will be in the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, for which we will provide the commander and much of the headquarters infrastructure. The UK contribution will include an armoured division based in peacetime in Germany, a predominantly mechanised division based in the UK, an airmobile brigade, also based in the UK, and a corps combat support, including communications, reconnaissance, depth fire and air defence units. In all, this 1105 is a contribution of 55,000 regular soldiers, in addition to a substantial number of individual reservists and Territorial Army units. German, Belgian and Dutch contributions are planned for an airmobile division within the RRC, and a second multinational RRC division will be formed from forces from NATO's southern regions nations.
The decisions we have taken about our contribution to NATO forces on the mainland of Europe have been the principal factor which has led us to our conclusions about the most appropriate size for the Army of the 90s.
§ In recent weeks the debate has focused on the reduction in infantry battalions from 55 to 38. Will we have enough? Will there be overstretch? Perhaps I may give a few figures. By 1997 infantry commitments will drop by a third. The reduced threat in Germany will save seven battalions in BAOR and three in Berlin. The rundown in the garrison in Hong Kong will save four and we can reduce our commitment to home defence by five regular battalions because we will now have much longer to prepare for any conflict. Although we have reduced our commitment by 19 battalions we will reduce the Army by only 17 battalions. The extra two battalions will be available to support our role in the Rapid Reaction Corps.
§ In terms of manpower numbers the figures are equally convincing. Our commitment to Europe will be reduced by about 35,000 troops. On top of that we shall pull out of Hong Kong about 6,000 men and there will he substantial savings in Army support activities in the United Kingdom. Against that background the planned cuts amount to 40,000.
§ In the eternal debate about manpower, equipment and resources each service will lay claim to the largest possible portion of the budget. We fully accept this but in the Ministry of Defence we have a central defence staff which takes a tri-service view of these matters. Naturally those with direct responsibility or particular ties with a regiment or a squadron will be profoundly saddened by its loss and fight for its retention. It is a tribute to regimental tradition that they do so, but equally it has been a regimental tradition that they have always been prepared to accept change.
§ Changes in the size of the infantry must be looked at in this context. These have been difficult decisions, taken after extensive debate within the department and as part of the review process I have described. Serving officers have been fully involved in those discussions but of course final responsibility rests with Ministers. Changes will be gradually phased in over a number of years.
§ All this will help the problem of overstretch and ease the problem of emergency tours in Northern Ireland. Since we will have much greater warning time, our forces in Germany and elsewhere can be used more flexibly. The increased availability of the Royal Marines and the use of other arms will also reduce the burden of emergency tours.
§ The practical result of our re-assessment has been a restructuring of our forces. These will be smaller than in the past but our emphasis will continue to be on quality. The catchphrase "smaller but better" is not a blind but an accurate and concise summation of our 1106 intentions. We will retain strong professional forces supported by well trained reserves. Your Lordships will know that a Statement on the reserve and Territorial Army is expected later this year. Without prejudice to the detail of that announcement it is quite clear that even though their overall numbers will reduce in the long term to a figure between 60,000 and 65,000, the essential role of the reserve forces will be maintained in our new force structure. The decreased threat from the Soviet Union will allow them to carry out substantial portions of the defence of the United Kingdom, currently sustained by the regular Army. This will both increase the role of the reserves and reduce the overstretch on regular infantry battalions.
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Our servicemen will be better equipped than ever before. We will continue to modernise our forces to give them equipment based on the most advanced technology. As the all-party House of Commons Defence Committee affirmed in its recent report on the White Paper:
A fully Challenger-equipped Royal Armoured Corps, mechanised and armoured infantry battalions equipped with the most modern APCs, and artillery regiments equipped with AS90 Howitzers and MLRS would constitute a strikingly well-equipped Army".
In addition to this the Army will be improved by the acquisition of the Starstreak missile and Rapier Field Standard C and in the anti-tank role the ageing Lynx will be replaced by a new attack helicopter. The other services will also undergo substantial equipment modernisation. The new Boeing E-3D aircraft will improve our airborne early warning capability very substantially and by the end of the decade we expect the European Fighter to play a major part in the defence of the United Kingdom. The Royal Navy has seven new Type 23 frigates on order and we have invited tenders for three more. On 2nd September we announced an order for 44 Merlin ASW helicopters and in the longer term we would hope to introduce the Future Frigate in place of the Type 42.
§ This emphasis on quality rather than size is an essential feature of our new management strategy and extends into the headquarters and civilian staffs, both in the centre and in the support areas. The more recent Prospect Headquarters Study had as its task a study of the size and structure of the Ministry of Defence. Its recommendations make clear that we should continue the twin process of strengthening the centre but with less duplication of task and fewer people and wherever possible the delegation of management and financial responsibility.
§ The concept of "smaller but better" of course presents another challenge—implementing reductions while minimising personal hardship for those affected. Much will be achieved by natural wastage but a requirement for a substantial redundancy programme cannot, I am afraid, be avoided. Precise numbers cannot yet be determined, but in excess of 10,000 service personnel are likely to be affected between now and the mid-1990s; it is hoped that most will be on a voluntary basis though some compulsory redundancies are likely.
§ A whole range of new measures to help those being made redundant are under very careful consideration. These will be in addition to the resettlement briefings 1107 and up to 28 days of training which service personnel would receive on normal completion of engagements. The first of these we are hoping to announce shortly. The financial terms for redundancies—which are the same as for all previous service redundancy schemes since 1975—will be fair to all those concerned.
§ On the question of housing, there may be redundant servicemen and women who will experience difficulty in meeting their housing needs, and we are again looking at a range of new measures to assist, including giving priority to those wishing to buy married quarters under the discount scheme. Equally there will be civilians who will be affected. Some 20,000 United Kingdom Civil Service posts will be lost by 1996–97, over and above the accumulative loss of 40 per cent. of such posts since 1979. Inevitably there will be some redundancies and as much as possible will be done to advise and assist those who lose their jobs. Wherever possible alternative employment will be found within the Civil Service. To help those for whom this is not possible we hope to introduce a redundancy and outplacement service in the near future. I trust noble Lords will join me in paying tribute to the civilian workforce of the Ministry of Defence, a very large part of whom work in direct support of uniformed servicemen and equipment projects. They are an integral part of our overall defence capability.
§ I turn briefly to an issue of particular concern to many noble Lords; namely, HMS "Endurance". She is now 35 years old and following damage in 1989 no longer satisfies the stringent safety standards necessary for ships which operate in ice. We have concluded that it will not be possible for her to return to the Antarctic. Since there is no suitable replacement flying the White Ensign we have chartered the Norwegian Ice Breaker MV "Polar Circle" to continue the work of HMS "Endurance". She will be taken into commission by the Royal Navy for the period of her charter. Decisions beyond this season's deployment will depend on an assessment at the end of the season.
§ To conclude let us consider for a moment the activities of the services over this past year. Their work is always arduous, often dangerous and all too often unsung. In the past year we have seen the most comprehensive deployment of British forces since the Second World War. In all, some 45,000 British personnel saw active service in the Gulf. The success of the coalition in achieving the objective of liberating Kuwait was the result of the widespread international support for a firm response to Iraq's aggression, an act which threatened hopes for a new, stable and peaceful international order based on the rule of law. The remarkable campaign which reversed that aggression is, I am sure, still fresh in all our minds, and the victory over Iraq stands as a tribute to the dedication, skill and professionalism of our soldiers, sailors and airmen. It was not achieved without cost, however, and our thoughts remain with the families of those who lost their lives during the campaign.
Finally, we must never forget that the Armed Forces continue to support the Royal Ulster 1108 Constabulary in the fight to defeat terrorism in Northern Ireland. The statistics which noble Lords will have read in SDE 91 give only the dimmest reflection of the human misery which the terrorists' campaign of violence and intimidation has brought about in all sections of the community. Equally, the figures can only hint at the bravery and professionalism of the security forces in the face of such an insidious threat. The story of Warrant Officer Barry Johnson, whose heroism in a dangerous bomb disposal operation won him the first George Cross for 11 years, is set out on page 49 of SDE, and for many encapsulates the spirit which makes our Armed Forces so exceptional, and of which—I am sure noble Lords will agree—we should all be immensely proud. I beg to move.
§ Moved, That this House takes note of the White Paper on the Defence Estimates (Cm 1559 I and II) and the White Paper on Britain's Army for the 90s (Cm 1595).—(The Earl of Arran.)