HL Deb 16 May 1991 vol 528 cc1748-60

3.31 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Mackay of Clashfern)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]

Clause 1 [Recognition of corporate status of certain foreign corporations]:

Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 1: Page 1, line 8, leave out ("of a") and insert ("applied within a").

The noble Lord said: For many of the ideas behind these amendments I am indebted to the Law Society which in turn has had the benefit of the views of several prominent members of the legal profession engaged in international commercial affairs who formed themselves into a small working party to deal with matters arising from the Bill.

I wish to deal with the phrase "the laws of a territory" This Bill is of a technical nature and obviously every single word deserves concentration to make sure that we are not doing something which makes the duties of the court more difficult than they should be and also to show to practitioners in this field that we have studied the wording of the Bill very carefully in order to see that doubts do not arise which can be avoided. Therefore, I wish to ask whether it is satisfactory that the words in the Bill should be "the laws of a territory" instead of "the laws applied within a territory".

The reason for the amendment is that in my submission the present wording does not cover a situation in which there are two competing authorities which claim to have jurisdiction. Peculiarly enough, unless I am wrong, a most suitable example is one of the territories which, as I understand it, we are endeavouring to cover in this Bill. I am referring to Taiwan. The People's Republic of China could claim that its laws are the laws of Taiwan and for their part the authorities in Taiwan could say that their laws are the laws of China as a whole; China being a recognised state.

Therefore, I believe that my amendment has the benefit of imposing a purely factual test. Indeed, it is along the lines of the Australian legislation, which is of a similar nature to the Bill now before this Committee. That would avoid the problem set by two governments claiming theoretical jurisdiction over the whole of a recognised state. In case I forget to mention it, I have used similar wording in Amendment No. 4 to which we shall come very shortly. I beg to move.

Lord Wilberforce

I suggest that this amendment is worthy of consideration for two possible reasons. First, the words used in the Bill, "the laws of a territory", are vague and undefined and the words "applied within" are much more concrete and capable of being established.

At the beginning of a case evidence must be given to a court as to the legal situation in the territory in question. Such evidence is most likely to be what the courts in that territory are doing. Therefore, to say "applied within the territory" is more suitable to the factual evidence which will be required when the case comes to be considered.

The second reason that I support the amendment is that the words are found in subsection (1) (b): are at that time applied by a settled court system". That test is therefore already adopted there. For consistency, should it not also be adopted in paragraph (a)?

The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, mentioned the Australian legislation. It may be noted also that the American legislation of 1979 dealing with Taiwan—which, parenthetically, I venture to think is much simpler and more satisfactory than this Bill—uses the phrase "the law applied by the people of Taiwan". "The people of Taiwan" is an expression understood in the United States. It uses the words "the laws applied by". In agreement with the noble Lord I suggest that that is more satisfactory than mere use of the word "of". I support the amendment.

The Lord Chancellor

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, for bringing forward this matter and also to my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce for his additional comments. Obviously I shall consider this further with the draftsman. However, so far we believe that the phrase: "the laws of a territory or country" is a well known phrase in statute. For example, Section 4 of the Civil Evidence Act 1972 talks about expert evidence as to the law of any country or territory. If dispute arises as to what is the law of a territory, the court must determine that question as a matter of fact whether dispute arises because of doubts as to recognition of the territory as a state or for some other reason.

As my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce pointed out, subsection (1) (b), which must be read with subsection (1) (a), already points courts and others to the laws applied by a settled court system in the territory. We shall come to an amendment dealing with that in due course. Accordingly, we are inclined to the view that the present wording is satisfactory. However, if the noble Lord is prepared to leave this with me, I shall consider it further in the light of what has been said.

Lord Mishcon

I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, for supporting the amendment. I have listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said in reply on behalf of the Government.

I do not believe that this is so much a matter of the parliamentary draftsman thinking that they are tidy words, because there is a precedent for them. The amendment was specifically intended to deal with a situation where two competing jurisdictions or countries are saying that theirs is the law of that territory. It is a simple question of fact to decide the law which is "applied within" that territory. One makes a complex situation for oneself by asking what is the law "of" that territory, the former being a matter of fact.

The noble and learned Lord was kind enough to say that consideration would be given to the matter. I have no doubt that we shall have an opportunity to return to it at a later stage, either by government amendment or, if the Government do not seek to alter the Bill, by tabling an amendment at a subsequent stage. In the meantime, in view of what the noble and learned Lord kindly said, I ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 2: Page 1, line 12, after ("applied") insert ("or at any other relevant time have been applied").

The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 2 deals with the question of the timing which is provided for in the Bill and which is neither precise nor comprehensive. At present the Bill looks for determination of a question arising under Clause 1 only by taking the time at which a question arises; that is to say. whether at that time there were the necessary ingredients called for by Clause 1. With respect, that is neither right nor commercially safe for those dealing with corporate bodies in that territory. I submit that the test should be applied also when relevant obligations are entered into at the time when the relevant body corporate was formed.

The amendment extends the time provision; and "any other relevant time", as mentioned in the amendment, is defined in Amendment No. 6, which it may be convenient for the Committee to consider with Amendment No. 2. I apologise for the somewhat cumbersome wording in paragraph (ii) of Amendment No. 6. With the help of parliamentary draftsmen the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor may be able to improve upon it by Third Reading, but the intent is. clear. I beg to move.

Lord Campbell of Alloway

I support the amendment in the context of the first amendment moved and of the later one to be moved. The practical situation with regard to what happens, for example, with the Cameroons should be taken into account. Part of the territory is dominated by English law, which is applied to interpret local law, and another part of the territory is dominated by the French code, which is also applied to interpret local law. The concept of "territory" and the concept of "time" must be looked at in relation to the practicalities of subsequent commercial operations. In that context I hope that some regard may be had to the analogy of the situation in the Cameroons and that the amendment will be accepted.

The Lord Chancellor

The intention of the clause is to answer a question having regard to the time at which the question arises. We are dealing with territories which are not recognised here when the specific question arises. We solve that problem by looking at whether there is a settled court system in the territory. If so, we look at the laws which it applies. They may be predecessors of laws in force when the question arises. Any court may find itself having to look at a statute applying at the time of a transaction, although it may subsequently have been repealed. In passing, perhaps I should say that that is sometimes one of the difficulties of using statutes in force in the ordinary course of discussions in courts.

If the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, is intended to permit that, then the amendment is not necessary. However, if the amendment intends to look at earlier court systems and not merely at earlier laws, that is a refinement which will make matters more complex and lead to more problems than it solves. The amendment is using the conditions which the Bill lays down, as to whether there is a settled court system at the time the issue arises, to bring in earlier events.

We tried to guide the courts in such a way as to enable them to give effect to the reality of the situation. We did that by looking to the law in question at the time the question arises. Once more I am happy to look further at what has been said today. So far I have not been persuaded that it is right to change the provision. I certainly undertake to consider the matter carefully before the next stage of the Bill.

3.45 p.m.

Lord Mishcon

Again I am most grateful to the noble Lord who was kind enough to support the amendment. I am grateful also to the noble and learned Lord for the open-mindedness of his reply in which he said that he would reconsider the matter.

I wonder whether I have made myself clear. Perhaps I may be allowed to pose the question to the noble and learned Lord; it might help to economise on time when dealing with the amendment. As I read the Bill, there must be a question arising before the Act comes into operation. A question can arise in any number of ways. Obviously, whatever its nature, it is raised at a certain time. As I read the Bill, it means that the Act does not operate except at that time; namely, when the question arises.

What happens if a contractual obligation has been entered into before the question arises? What law then applies? The amendment endeavours to say that the "relevant time" is not only when the question arises, but may also be when the corporate body was formed—as I say in the amendment—or it may arise under the other definition of the "relevant time", to which I refer in Amendment No. 6; that is, when the obligations were entered into. That too must be a "relevant time".

If the amendment is not accepted, I respectfully suggest that it produces a hiatus and indeed a vacuum. There may be a case where we would want to help in our legal jurisdiction, as laid down in the Bill, but we would be unable to do so because, for example, there was not a settled law at the time the question arose but there was a settled law when the obligations were entered into or indeed when the body corporate was formed. The question of "relevant time" is therefore material.

It is not a useful exercise of the Committee's patience to debate the matter at this stage. I hope that I have made my position clear to the noble and learned Lord. If he says that the intention in the amendment is clear to him, even though he may disagree with it, and that he will give it further consideration, I shall take a certain course.

The Lord Chancellor

I followed closely what the noble Lord said. He always speaks very plainly. Like nature I abhor a vacuum. On the other hand, we are concerned in the Bill with the question of a body which purports to have or, as the case may be, appears to have lost, corporate status under the laws. It should be regarded as having legal personality. The Bill is not generally concerned with obligations undertaken by corporations at various times. The question relates to the status of a corporation at a particular time as either having corporate status or having lost it. The noble Lord's amendment and the way in which he has expressed it, particularly a moment ago, may be contemplating a wider question than that to which the Bill is directed.

Having said that, I shall consider carefully what the noble Lord has said. I agree that this may not be the best forum for carrying forward the detail of the discussion in the light of other business in which I am sure other noble Lords are more interested, interesting though this Bill is.

Lord Mishcon

Both of us are concerned with the next item on the agenda, so far as the House is concerned. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 3: Page 1, line 13, leave out ("a settled") and insert ("an established").

The noble Lord said: This amendment deals with the question of a simple word. The Bill refers to "a settled court system" being the material consideration which has to be given by the courts. Is there a settled court system in that territory? I wondered whether "settled" was a very good word to use or whether there was not a better one. The word "settled" is difficult to define although it has occurred in other statutes. I wondered whether that word could be held not to apply where there is a court system in existence, and has been for some time, but is capable of being changed constitutionally in the territory concerned. Is that a settled court system? Does not "settled" imply that the court system is there in rather a monolithic way and not to be altered? Whether or not that is right, it seemed to me that "established court system" was a better phrase and nearer what was intended by the Bill. I beg to move.

Lord Wilberforce

I have only qualified support for this amendment. I say that it is qualified because it seems that the paragraph is undefined as the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, explained at Second Reading. In reality, one wants to know whether in the territory in question (say, Taiwan), there is a court system dealing with commercial law or corporations. The Bill simply refers to "a court system". It may deal with anything in the world. It may be a system of religious courts administering the Sharia or tribal courts. Therefore the test is not a satisfactory one either way. If the matter is to be left no particular harm can be done. If there are Sharia courts and there is no law dealing with corporations, the necessary evidence will not be obtainable. If one is to have a test, then my preference between "settled" and "established" is 51 per cent. in favour of the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. I cannot carry the matter further than that.

The Lord Chancellor

That is certainly a narrower adjustment of the odds. I do not believe that "settled" implies that the court system needs to be that of the Medes and the Persians, which to some extent was unalterable. The idea of the use of the word "settled" is simply that there is within the territory a court system working which deals with the question of whether a body corporate has or has lost corporate status. If other questions are dealt with, so much the better or worse; but it is not important. The important question is whether "settled" gives corporate status to the body.

The word "established" has the connotation of looking at what it is and by what mechanism the court was set up. That may be an unnecessary inquiry for the existing situation. Once again, I am very happy to look at the matter closely in the light of all that has been said. In view of the way in which my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce has expressed it, the question is a narrow one and a matter of judgment. I am happy to attempt to judge the issue again, with advice from parliamentary counsel.

Lord Mishcon

The noble and learned Lord will remember that I won by a very short head as regards the preference of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, for the word "established" as against the word "settled". It is a very narrow victory; but, coming from that source, I hope that it will receive due respect. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 4: Page 1, line 16, at end insert: ("(1A) For the purpose of determining any material question relating to a body corporate, the laws of a recognised State shall be taken to include the laws applied within any part of the territory comprising the recognised State which are acknowledged by the federal or other central government or the courts of the recognised State.").

The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, with the leave of the Committee, I shall speak to Amendments Nos. 5 and 7. I am not sure that I entirely understand the intention behind Clause 1(2) (b) as it stands at present. However, on any view it deserves to have a separate subsection as I give it in the amendment. After all, its subject matter is not strictly necessary to explain or clarify Clause 1(1). If it is intended to do more than that, then the introductory words in subsection (2), For the purposes of subsection (1) above are inappropriate.

In the amendments before the Committee, I have assumed that the draftsman intended to do more than merely state the fact that recognition of a federal state includes recognition of its component parts. I assumed that the provision intended to cover a situation where, notwithstanding some dispute as to the sovereignty of, say, a breakaway region of a recognised state, the authorities of that recognised state acknowledge, presumably on some de facto basis, the laws applied within that territory. My amendment so provides, and I hope that it does so clearly.

Perhaps I may explain to the Committee that the reference in the amendment to the federal courts is to cover the possibility that, depending on the nature of the state in question, the acknowledgment referred to might be by the judiciary rather than by the government or the legislature. I beg to move.

Lord Wilberforce

Like the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, I had some difficulty in determining the purpose of this part of the Bill. It may be that I had not understood it and, if so, I am in good company. It cannot be merely to deal with a situation of recognised federal states. One does not need a passage in the Bill to say that the laws of the United States include the laws of. the constituent states, or that the laws of the Cameroon include the laws of the different parts of the Cameroon.

I understood the provision to be dealing with the case of the unrecognised state, such as Taiwan, which we are dealing with here. We know that Taiwan has divisions. There are the Taiwan Islands and the Pescador Islands. There are a number of subdivisions. If the Bill is attempting to say that the laws of Taiwan are to be treated as including the laws of the Pescador Islands, if recognised by the central government in Taiwan, then I can understand the purpose. In that case, the provision should be differently drafted. Instead of referring to the laws of a recognised State the Bill should refer to the laws of the territory. We are not dealing here with a recognised state but an unrecognised one in a territory.

It may be that I have missed the point of the provision. If that is what it is supposed to deal with in the case of Taiwan, then it needs redefinition by putting in the territory or by referring to the law of a state deemed to be recognised by this Bill.

I support the proposition of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, in so far as he wants to move the subsection to a different place. That does seem more logical. The addition of the words "the courts of the recognised State" seems quite satisfactory. However, I have some residual doubts as to the purpose of the clause as a whole.

4 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor

I shall seek to explain what I understand to be the purpose of this subsection. That may help to resolve the matters raised in the amendment. Clause 1 talks of a body corporate which purports to have corporate status under the laws of a territory which is not at that time a recognised state. The question that can arise concerns what may happen, for example, within a federal territory, which is recognised. The corporation will often be established under the law of the state—the unit under the federation—rather than under the law of the federation itself. I shall give, as an example, Canada. In Canada, a company is incorporated not under the laws of Canada but under the laws of, for example, Ontario. We do not recognise Ontario as an independent state. It would therefore fall within subsection (1) (a) as being a territory which is not at that time a recognised state. However, we have no difficulties about recognising corporations from places like Ontario—Ontario forms part of the territory of Canada, to which we do accord recognition. The Bill seeks only to deal with situations where a corporation might not be accorded legal personality here, because we do not recognise the territory from which it comes as a state. Therefore the object of subsection (2) (b) is to take out of the scope of subsection (1) (a) the kind of situation which I have described; to remove, for example, Ontario from the scope of subsection (1). There may be other ways of doing it but that is the purpose. That is why I do not think it is necessary, having regard to that very narrow purpose, to do more.

I shall look carefully at what has been said and see whether we can make this plain as it does disturb me if the purpose of the subsection is not clear. When one has in mind the phrases used in the early part of the clause, the purpose of the clause becomes somewhat clearer.

Lord Wilberforce

I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord. It comes as a complete surprise to me that in this day and age we are dealing with companies formed under the laws of Ontario or the state of Delaware, which have been in existence for many years and which have caused no problem whatsoever. I thought—I am obviously wrong—that subsection (1) (a) dealt, and dealt only, with unrecognised states or unrecognised federal states. However, as the noble and learned Lord has said that he will think about it, I am quite willing also to do some counterthinking on my part. I thought it right, however, to raise such doubts on the wording of the clause as appeared to me to exist.

The Lord Chancellor

I am much obliged to my noble and learned friend. There is no question but that the Bill is intended to deal with unrecognised situations. However, the phraseology that is used might be thought to cover in a federation that part of the federation—for example, Ontario—under the laws of which a company might be incorporated. It is to make clear that that is excluded that we have subsection (2) (b).

Lord Mishcon

The noble and learned Lord may be more encouraged to look carefully at the wording of the Bill, not because of anything I have said but because of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, said about the meaning of the clause not being very clear to him. His doubts are shared by leading commercial lawyers who have written to me and who themselves say that neither is the intention behind this clause clear to them.

I appreciate the courtesy with which the noble and learned Lord has, throughout this Committee stage, said that he will be prepared to consider the amendments that have been put down, I hope not uselessly, this afternoon. All of us want to make this a good Bill. I believe I am right in saying that, subject to the approval of the House, the Report stage may be taken this afternoon. I am happy to agree with that, but it will save time if I say at this stage that the amendments are of sufficient import for them to have to be considered very carefully at the Third Reading, which will now be the next stage. I know that the noble and learned Lord will be good enough to let those of us who are interested in this Bill know his decisions on these amendments in good time so that we can consider our position again well before Third Reading. I ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 5 to 8 not moved.]

On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord Kennet

I shall detain the House for two minutes with the greatest trepidation as a layman on what is pre-eminently a lawyers' Bill. I hope the Committee will be patient. I apologise also for the fact that I was prevented, to my great distress, from attending the Second Reading of the Bill.

I have misgivings because I suspect there may be a basic paradox concealed in, so to speak, the basement or the foundation of the Bill itself. The Government look at a given territory and say that there is no recognised state. But by this Bill, lo and behold, we can discern an effective or established system of law courts, whichever word we choose. (As a layman, I am inclined to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, that "established" may be better than "settled".)

If the Government see that, if litigants see that, or if the courts think they see that, they see, presumably, a legislature to make the law and set up the courts; they see a judicature, because that is what they are looking directly at; and they see an executive to enforce the judgments of the courts in that territory. What is a social entity which has a legislature, a judicature and an executive? Is it not a state? I think that it is and nothing set out in the Bill or said at Second Reading tells me that it is not.

I note that at Second Reading the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate said: I stress that the Bill does not affect by one iota the Government's policy on the recognition of states".—[Official Report, 22/4/91; col. 68.] If in a given case a government are aware or are made aware of the existence of the three established arms through which a state normally operates, how can this Bill not blow back on recognition policy itself? The British practice on recognition is that a government is recognised when it is visibly in control of the country concerned. How can there be laws which are applied in a settled court system when no government is in control of the country? Is it not the case that Her Majesty's Government have something different in mind? If so, what? With what countries are they really concerned? We have so far had mention only of Taiwan. However, when the Bill passes, will not the courts be instantly concerned also with, for instance, North Korea, the purportedly independent Bantu homelands set up by South Africa, and the Baltic states?

All these are different from one another in various ways and they should have been separately considered at the drafting stage of the Bill. I hope they were. I should be grateful if later on some account could be given of the considerations which apply to each of those categories of states, if not others, when this Bill comes into effect. In short, will the Government say what is this statehood, the recognition of which they desire to withhold in certain cases, and give us some idea what those cases are?

There is another difficulty. It concerns the question whether the court system in the given country is a settled one. In this respect, on Second Reading on 22nd April at col. 71, the noble and learned the Lord Advocate said: that will have to be a matter for the British court". Can the Government say how the British court is to make the necessary inquiries? Will it just hear evidence from returning travellers? Will it rely upon the press? Will it ask the Foreign Office? Will it be empowered and have funds to be able to send someone to investigate? Further, will it ask the Foreign Office to send someone? If so, how would the Foreign Office do so without extending recognition? We must remember that the judgment whether a given court system is settled or established is a political and not a legal question. It will be most interesting to know the opinion of the Foreign Office on the Bill and the way around these difficulties.

My final question concerns the Australian Act which has been introduced. That is the only one that has been offered to us. Have cases been brought under it as yet? If so, what has been the outcome? I know that my noble friend agreed that we should elide the Report stage this afternoon. Therefore, it is to be hoped that we shall receive some answers on Third Reading.

Lord Wilberforce

With the indulgence of the Committee, I should like to make one short point which is more closely related to the scope of Clause 1. It is regrettable that Clause 1, and indeed the Bill as a whole, deals only with the case of incorporation of companies. We have heard that it is thought to be necessary to clarify the situation of certain Taiwan banks. No doubt that is a very beneficial purpose. However, if one is to legislate, I believe that it is more desirable to deal in a general way with the situation of an unrecognised state such as Taiwan—no one has suggested that it directly affects any other countries—than to concentrate upon one particular case.

If one is dealing with a state such as Taiwan—which ought to be recognised but is not—why not simply say that all civil matters arising such as births, marriages, deaths, wills, transfers of property and so on, shall be treated in the courts of that country as if Taiwan was a recognised state? That is what the Americans have done. Their Act is perfectly clear and works satisfactorily. Moreover, it does not leave a yawning gap, as this Bill does, between the one case of corporate companies (which is dealt with by the Bill) and all other cases of civil matters (which are not dealt with by the Bill) which I suppose have to be dealt with by the courts under their ordinary powers as was explained by this House to some extent in the Carl Zeiss case.

I asked whether it would be possible to amend Clause 1 so as to extend it to cover civil matters generally. However, I was told that it was not possible, having regard to the Long Title. Nevertheless, I could not let Clause 1 pass without expressing a certain regret that it is so narrowly drafted and not drafted so as to deal with other civil matters which may well arise in relation to such a case as Taiwan, Northern Cyprus or any other case which one may care to mention.

4.15 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor

The purpose of Clause 1 is to allow the question of whether a body purporting to have corporate status has that status where it is related to a territory which is not at that time a recognised state. "A recognised State" is defined for the purposes of subsection (1) as, a territory which is recognised by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as a State". As the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said, what is involves in a state for the purposes of recognition is certainly something along the lines which he described. However, in addition, there is the judgment that it is appropriate for the Government in the United Kingdom to recognise that particular unit as a state. Where that has not happened, as for example in Taiwan, there is still a court system operating. That is why we have sought to direct attention to the court system and why, with all respect to those who have suggested the opposite, I venture to think that the phrase a "settled court" system is better than an "established court". If one uses the word "established", one is in the situation of asking by what authority, and so on. We seek to direct attention to the matter of fact; namely, whether there is a court system in that particular territory with sufficient continuity and cohesion to operate as a system.

That question is narrower than and different from the question of recognition as a state. We believe that it is wise especially in connection with corporate status, to have regard to that principle. The purpose of the Bill is to do that in relation to corporate status. I regard this as important. Bodies claiming corporate status on that basis operate in the United Kingdom. It is therefore important that the law in regard to them should be settled.

On the wider question raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce, that is certainly an issue for consideration. Many points of view have been expressed in favour of more general consideration. However, the matter is of particular importance because, as I said, bodies purporting to have corporate status are operating. Therefore, it is necessary to deal with the matter. It was felt that attempting to deal with the more general problem to which my noble and learned friend referred might well create a great many additional questions than those which we have had an opportunity to consider in the light of the need for this Bill at present. That is why the Bill is restricted to this particular question and why I ventured to point out earlier that more general questions are not raised. The Bill focuses on a particularly narrow question and one which happens to be of present and rather immediate importance.

Clause 1 agreed to.

Clause 2 agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported without amendment; Report received.