Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill

HL Deb 02 July 1991 vol 530 cc902-14

3.17 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (The Earl of Arran)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Earl of Arran.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]

Clause 1 [Arrangements for the carrying on of certain activities]:

Lord Williams of Elvel moved Amendment No. 1: Page 1, line 22, after ("company") insert (", being a company registered under the Companies Act 1985 and beneficially owned as to 95% or more of the shares by United Kingdom citizens resident in the United Kingdom and, so far as it is not owned by individuals, by a company or companies which are themselves so registered and owned,").

The noble Lord said: Before explaining my amendment I shall leave a short interval for those Members of the Committee who are not interested in the debate and who, no doubt, will not participate in its conclusion. I beg to move Amendment No. 1 standing in my name, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, and my noble friend Lord Kennet. I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 4 and 9 which are consequential upon Amendment No. 1 for reasons that I shall explain.

Perhaps I may remind the Committee that on Second Reading Members gave approval to the principle of the Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill. In summary, that principle is that the Government will continue ownership of the establishments in question and will contract out to third parties the production of the product. The establishments are those which at present produce our nuclear warheads for all purposes; for example, Polaris. They will in future be entrusted with the production of nuclear warheads for the Trident programme.

The first general point that I wish to reiterate is that we are dealing with a most important industry. We are not dealing with an establishment that makes some kind of toy but one that produces nuclear warheads for our strategic defence. The activities that it is proposed to contract out to third parties are spelt out in Clause 1(2). It states: any activities connected with the development, production or maintenance of nuclear devices or research into such devices or their effects". That is the provision with which the prime contractor must deal. Immediately we ask ourselves: who will be the prime contractor? There is no doubt that the prime contractor will carry a heavy responsibility for the future defence of this country.

My amendments are directed to the ownership of the company or consortium which will be the prime contractor for this purpose. We debated that question on Second Reading. When pressed the Minister gave what I thought to be a somewhat ambiguous reply. I do not quote the noble Earl's words because they are in the Official Report but I do not believe that I misinterpret what he said. He said that the prime requirement of a contractor should be security, that the Government should be satisfied that the prime contractor has sufficient security and provisions for security to allow it to take on that task. On that, we have no quarrel with the Government whatever; we endorse that.

He went on to say: Secondly, we shall not rule out any company on grounds of nationality in itself. However, given AWE's close co-operation with the US, it is more likely that US companies will meet our rigorous security requirements than companies from other countries".—[Official Report, 14/6/91; col. 1313.] That was the point which we reached on Second Reading. We believe that that is not a sufficient assurance. The amendments which I move address themselves to that problem.

The ownership of the prime contractor is of fundamental importance. It is not just a question of whether the prime contractor meets the security requirements laid down by the present Government. If there is foreign ownership of any substantial nature in the prime contractor, in our view that could lead to leakage of information about the manufacture of our nuclear warheads and, indeed, about our research into the effect of those warheads.

There is also a general principle, which I shall state as clearly as I can, that in our view the prime contractor should be of UK origin with UK citizenship and owned by UK residents. I do not believe that it is in the interests of this country that our nuclear warheads should be manufactured by a consortium or company which is to any substantial extent in foreign ownership.

I understand that the Government have very rigorous security requirements and, as I said, I accept that. I understand that, for example, the French have equally rigorous security requirements. After all, they have been manufacturing nuclear warheads for the past 30 years. There is no reason to suppose that the French industry is not equally security conscious. It is possible that a French company may wish to participate in the prime contract which the Government are to let.

I use the example of France because that is the nearest one which comes to mind. Members of the Committee can easily imagine other countries which are either manufacturers of nuclear warheads in their own right or which have aspirations to manufacturing nuclear warheads. They could, by one means or another, gain access to technology by virtue of having a large shareholding in the prime contractor.

I recognise one point which the noble Earl made on Second Reading; namely, that we have a very close relationship with the United States in the technology of those warheads. Whether they are of wholly British design or partly British and partly US design is a matter which we have debated previously at Question Time. I understand that the final version which the noble Earl is able to give is that the warheads are of British design but they draw on US technology. Therefore, there must be a relationship with the United States. After all, the warheads will probably be tested in the United States when made. There can easily be a contractual relationship with the United States and with US firms which have the technology without necessarily inviting those firms into the ownership of the prime contractor.

Perhaps I may refer now to the amendments which I am to move. Amendment No. 1 seeks to ensure that the prime contractor initially should be a company registered under the Companies Act 1985 and beneficially owned as to 95 per cent. or more of the shares by United Kingdom citizens resident in the UK. In other words, it looks through the initial consortium to the parents, grandparents and great grandparents to make sure that there is no foreign ownership beyond 5 per cent. coming in by stealth. Amendment No. 4 is purely consequential on Amendment No. 1.

On the other hand, Amendment No. 9 seeks to ensure that, even if a prime contractor in the initial stage is 95 per cent. UK owned, that principle is enshrined for the future, since, if at the initial stage it is 95 per cent. UK owned, there is a possibility that one of the UK companies or UK-owned companies —because they need not necessarily be owned entirely by UK citizens—may well be taken over. In our view that should trigger a retirement of the contract and the Secretary of State should take it back.

In an exchange of correspondence which we have had in The Times and which your Lordships may have read, the noble Earl has said that we can rely on the Government to ensure the security of the country and that we need not worry too much about putting anything on the face of the Bill.

However, the noble Earl recognises that this is an important problem and that it will not go away. We believe that Parliament should assert its right on this matter. If Parliament believes that it is proper that there should be foreign ownership of the prime contractor to any major extent making our nuclear warheads and researching into other devices, then Parliament will reject my amendment. On the other hand, if the Committee believes that Parliament should put into the Bill a requirement that any Secretary of State and any future Secretary of State, whoever he or she may be and of whatever political colour, should be bound by an Act of Parliament and that in order to change that he must come back to Parliament, then the Committee will join with me in approving the amendment.

Lord Mayhew

It is strange enough that the Government should wish to hand over the production of weapons of mass destruction and their associated development and research to a private commercial company. Even stranger is their willingness to hand it over to a private company with substantial foreign shareholding.

At previous stages of the Bill and in the noble Earl's letter to The Times, to which the noble Lord, Lord Williams, referred, the noble Earl gives us the assurance that the Government will look closely at any foreign connections which the United Kingdom contractor may have. We have been told on numerous occasions that if shareholders are seen to be objectionable by the Government, the Government will cancel the contract.

Those assurances are inadequate. First, how will the Government know who are the foreign shareholders? How can they be sure that the purchasers of shares in London, New York or wherever are unobjectionable and that they are not being fronted by less objectionable agents? I doubt whether Saddam Hussein wishes to buy into the contracting company but I assure the noble Earl that, if he wanted to, his agents would not have the slightest difficulty in doing so. The Government would not know.

If the Government did know, what would they do about it? What powers do the Government or a private company have to require shareholders to sell their shares? I am not aware of those powers any more than the chairman of ICI at this moment is aware of powers to induce shareholders to sell their shares. The Government are aware of that point. Their sanction is to cancel the contract. What good will that do? In the first place, it is almost certain to be unfair to the contractor. The contractor does not want undesirable shareholders any more than the Government want them. and probably less so. Why should the contract be annulled for reasons with which the contractor is incapable of dealing? Having annulled the contract, the Government will find a successor contractor. But the same problem will arise with the successor. It too cannot control the ownership of its shares.

The cancellation of the contract is no small matter. It means another wholesale change of management on the production, research and development of our nuclear weapons. I said that Saddam Hussein would not wish to buy into this company. He might think differently if he knew that his buying shares in the company, and notification of that to the British Government, would disrupt and delay the production of British nuclear weapons.

It is no answer to these and other objections that may be made to foreign shareholdings for the Government to say that the Bill leaves open the way for American participation. It leaves open the way also to other participants of whom the Government and Parliament might not approve. I make this humble suggestion to the noble Earl. At a later stage the Government may incorporate in the Bill the suggestions made by the noble Lord, Lord Williams, that cur relationship with American help should be by contract. Or, if they wish, they could amend the Bill along the lines of the amendments tabled, forbidding all foreign participation other than American. That would somewhat diminish the hostility felt on this point towards the Bill.

I must make clear that we on these Benches feel that the success of the Trident project is already too dependent on American goodwill. The Bill will increase that dependence; these amendments will decrease it. It is our view that such weapons of mass destruction, which are British, should be handled by British people and British companies and not by foreigners.

3.30 p.m.

Lord Kennet

I rise to make two points only having said most of what I wish to say at Second Reading. My first point concerns sovereignty. In the case of the European Community, the Government are extremely watchful of any process which may cause sovereignty to drain away from Parliament and its elected government to any other quarter. I am one of those who believe that it is right to be watchful and, although one may adjust the speed from time to time, by and large one should not go too fast in that direction.

In contrast with the Government's caution towards Brussels, in this case we see what appears to be an extraordinary example of a lack of caution towards the United States. We realise that the Government share our opinion that one is talking mainly of a possible United States contractor if one is thinking of allowing foreign-based contractors. I wonder why it is right to be cautious about the gradual passage of sovereignty towards Brussels and yet wrong to be cautious about an immediate, sudden outright cession of sovereignty at the very heart of the military integrity of this nation; namely, in the fabrication of nuclear warheads.

Secondly, on the question of United States versus other foreign countries which might own the contracting company, the noble Earl, Lord Arran, was kind enough to write to me after the Second Reading debate. In his letter he said that the Government would set their face against foreign contractors. He went on to say that the United States is an exception.

The history of United States/British collaboration in the manufacture of nuclear weapons is far better known to the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, than probably anybody else in the Chamber at the moment. It has had its ups and downs. Its long history began in 1941 and since then it has not been plain sailing by any means. The generation of the independent British nuclear production programme was due to one of the downs in that relationship. However, I am not arguing on strategic or political grounds that the United States should be treated the same as other foreign countries in the context of the Bill, so much as on environmental grounds. I risk recapitulating what I have already said at Second Reading, so I shall be brief.

The United States is the only country in the world which has experienced the prolonged use of private contractors in the manufacture of nuclear warheads. Environmentally that has been disastrous. The strong man, Admiral Watson, was brought in two years ago to rectify matters. He had to close down a great many plants and the reclamation programme of poisoned earth and so forth is likely to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Even the end of the beginning is not yet in sight in that country. There is a considerable risk that if we permit a US company to become a contractor in this country there will be a strong temptation for all those who have lost employment under Admiral Watson's programme of dismissals to seek employment here. I wonder whether the Government are confident of their own ability to prevent the employment of persons whose incompetence has been proven already in the United States.

I leave the matter there. I have been long enough in this House to believe that when the Government agree that something should be done, that is enough for the proper functioning of parliamentary government. If the Government agree that something should be done it is best that that be incorporated in an Act of Parliament. To the same extent that the Government agree that it should be done, they will not mind it appearing in such an Act of Parliament.

The Earl of Arran

These amendments to lines 22 and 24 of page one of the Bill would have the effect of imposing, by statute, a requirement for the AWE employing company, and the contractor acquiring it, and any parent company of that contractor, to be 95 per cent. UK owned. The further amendment to line 24 of page two of the Bill would impose a statutory restriction on any subsequent transfer of the contractor's shares to non-United Kingdom nationals.

To the extent that these amendments reflect a concern that United Kingdom national security interests must be fully safeguarded in the contract arrangements, I have no argument with those who tabled them.

I think I am correct in saying that the noble Lord, Lord Williams, said that we are dealing with a very important industry. He is quite right. It is of absolutely paramount importance that the information about the UK's nuclear weapons must continue to be protected just as rigorously as it is now, and that such information should not fall into undesirable hands, whether foreign or otherwise. I must oppose these amendments, not because of any opposition to the security concerns which lie behind them, but because the amendments would be neither a suitable nor an effective way of safeguarding those concerns.

First, I must reassure those Members of the Committee who fear that we might be about to let the AWE contact to a foreign company. I can assure them unequivocally that the contract will be let to a company which is based in the UK, and it will also be a company whose controlling share interest is in British hands. This is not, therefore, a debate on whether the AWE contract should be let to a British company or a foreign one. It will, without doubt, be let to a British company. The debate is really about how we should ensure that whatever UK-based company we select meets our security concerns.

The noble Lords who propose these amendments have chosen to focus narrowly on the question of share ownership. But the issue of security is far too complex and important to be dealt with in such a simplistic way. We shall take a close interest in the share ownership of the contracting company. Indeed it is likely that we may specify in the contract that shares in the contracting company should not be transferred without the consent of the Secretary of State. That was a point that the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, was concerned about. We would certainly reserve the right to terminate the contract of the ownership if the contracting company were to change in a way that was prejudicial to our security concerns.

But the ownership of shares is only one of many considerations that are relevant to security and, given that the controlling interest will in any case be in UK hands, it is by no means the most crucial. The holding of shares in the contracting company would not of itself confer any rights of access to AWE information. In any case, a company could be 100 per cent. UK owned and yet still have connections with undesirable foreign interests; or it could fail to meet our security requirements for other reasons. The most important safeguards for our nuclear weapon information are the stringent vetting procedures which must be undergone by all personnel before they can receive it and the principle that even among security-cleared personnel information is restricted to those who have a need to know.

Nevertheless, we will, as I have said, take a close interest in the share ownership of the contracting company and, in practice, the need to be absolutely sure that UK nuclear weapon information was protected would count against any company in which there was a substantial foreign shareholder. The United States is an exception in this case. Under the UK-US defence agreement of 1958, with which the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, will be familiar, the United Kingdom and United States Governments have co-operated closely on nuclear weapons matters for many years and will continue to do so. We would not therefore rule out participation by firms in which there was a US minority shareholding. An example is the Hunting-BRAE consortium which is 36 per cent. owned by Brown & Root UK, a company whose US connections are well known.

Hunting-BRAE is currently at AWE under the interim management contract which started last October. It has provided some 20 senior management personnel, including the AWE chief executive, who are seconded into the Civil Service at AWE for the planned two-year period between last October and vesting day for full contractorisation, the latter event depending of course on the Committee's approval of the Bill. The amendment relating to 95 per cent. British ownership of the contractor would presumably rule out the Hunting-BRAE incumbent company.

It is the job of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence to safeguard Britain's national security. The Committee may rest assured that the protection of our nuclear weapon information is of paramount concern to him. He does not need a statutory obligation in order to do everything necessary to protect that information. The amendment would therefore be unnecessary, even if it were appropriate. But in fact it is misguided. The best way to protect our nuclear weapon information is by the careful and thorough examination of a wide range of security considerations, of which share ownership is only one, and not by the blunt instrument of a statutory share ownership threshold.

The noble Lord, Lord Williams of Elvel, sought to distinguish security from leakage of information, arguing that while a contractor may be acceptable on the former ground, he may not be acceptable on the latter. That is a false distinction. The need to prevent leakage of information is part of our security concerns; indeed it is paramount among them. If there were a danger that to choose a particular company would lead to leakage of information, that company would not meet our security requirements. That is why we have consistently stated that security must be the prime concern when it comes to the selection of the contractor.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, talked about the EC. I can assure the Committee that we shall not be obliged by the EC to let the AWE contract to a non-UK EC company. I realise that not everyone in the Committee or elsewhere is an uncritical admirer of the EC Commission in Brussels. But surely the Commission, even if it were to have its way in defence matters generally, would hardly be likely to want us in the UK to pass our national nuclear warhead information around the Community through the backdoor. In any case there is already an interim management contract with the Hunting-BRAE consortium which covers the provision of 20 senior managers, including the chief executive, seconded from industry into the Civil Service at AWE. That arrangement corresponds approximately to the solution advocated by the unions and the Opposition—that is to say, keeping AWE staff in the Civil Service while reinforcing the senior management from industry.

Some kind of contract seems inevitable under such options, even if it is only a contract to provide a chief executive or other senior staff reinforcements. Any snags which Members of the Committee opposite perceive in the letting of a contract for AWE would therefore apply to their proposed solutions as well as that advocated by the Government, since the letting of some kind of contract appears to be in common.

Those are the reasons why we resist very strongly this amendment. I urge the Committee not to accept it.

3.45 p.m.

Lord Peyton of Yeovil

Will my noble friend go a little further as regards three points which he made? He referred to the fears that the Government might let the AWE contract to a foreign company. He went on to say emphatically, as I understood him, that it would be let to a British company. I wonder why that should not be put on the face of the Bill.

My noble friend also said that the Government would take a very close interest in the share ownership in the contracting company. Again, why cannot the Government go further and say what kind of interest they would take and how they would make sure that that interest is effective?

My noble friend also said that Secretaries of State do not need statutory obligations to safeguard national security. I regard that as a very odd doctrine. Secretaries of State change from time to time and their performance also varies from time to time. I do not believe that Parliament has ever been particularly easy to persuade to abdicate its responsibilities simply on the premise that whoever the Secretary of State may be and whatever party he might belong to, he will do his duty. I believe that in asking Parliament to pass such a measure as this and others, the Government should be careful not to ask for sweeping powers. If they declare that their purposes are so impeccable, as I am sure they are, why should not those purposes find a place on the face of the Bill?

The Earl of Onslow

Can my noble friend tell me this: would Israel, the United States, France or any other nuclear and capitalist country allow the same outside ownership of shares in their atomic warhead manufacturing as we do? If they would not, why are we being what can only be described as lax in the circumstances?

Lord Zuckerman

Can the noble Earl say whether the Americans are as concerned about the ownership and the nature of the contracting company as the Committee is? Can he further say whether any infringement of the 1958 agreement would imperil our total relationship with the US over the whole defence field? Can he also say whether any of the 20 individuals referred to who have already been transferred—on, I presume, a temporary basis—are American citizens?

The Earl of Arran

In answer to my noble friend Lord Peyton I say again that the overriding importance of the whole of this piece of legislation—it is a very important Bill—is security. That is what it is all about. To suggest that we should have some kind of special shareholding, or some pre-arranged understanding of shareholding ownership, would not be sensible in this case; it is all to do with security. From the security point of view that would rule out many other countries. As I said, the AWE contract will be let to a UK-based and UK-controlled prime contractor. As regards any foreign connections this contractor may have, whether through shareholdings or in any other way, we shall assess the security implications carefully to ensure that there is no risk of nuclear warhead information falling into undesirable hands, foreign or otherwise.

My noble friend then referred to the various Secretaries of State for Defence who will be coming forward in the future. To whatever party he belongs, that Secretary of State will have the same paramount concerns at heart regarding the sensitivity of this extremely important weapon.

As regards the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, I think he knows well that we have always had very friendly relationships with our United States counterparts in regard to nuclear affairs. We look forward to that continuing in the future, however that may affect us.

The Earl of Onslow

Is it possible for my noble friend to answer the question that I asked him? I shall put it in a slightly more vivid way. Would the Kuwait Investment Office be allowed to buy shares in the Israeli atomic weapons manufacturing company?

The Earl of Arran

I should have thought that extremely unlikely.

The Earl of Onslow

Will my noble friend please go on to answer the question that I asked him? I have now asked him a second time. I expect an answer.

The Earl of Arran

With respect to my noble friend, am not quite sure what that second part of his question was.

Lord Chalfont

Can the noble Earl say, on a point of information, whether there is in this debate any relevant position to be taken on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty? A great deal has been made about foreign ownership and about security. However, is it not a fact that under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty Her Majesty's Government—and indeed all governments of nuclear weapons states—are forbidden to transfer nuclear weapons, or the knowledge of how to make them, to any other power. Would that not override any considerations of ownership or even of security in the case which is now before the Committee?

The Earl of Arran

The noble Lord raises a very important point. Indeed, it is a point that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, raised at Second Reading. I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, that our intention is to let the contract to a UK-based company or consortium which will have to satisfy very strict security requirements. The need to prevent classified information about the UK's nuclear weapons from falling into undesirable hands is paramount among our security concerns. The fact that we are bound by a non-proliferation treaty reinforces that concern, but is not its sole justification. It is also important that such sensitive UK information should not fall into the hands of countries which already possess nuclear weapons or, for that matter, terrorist groups within the United Kingdom. In practice, the need to protect UK nuclear weapons information would count against any company in which there was a major foreign shareholder, since such a company would be unlikely to satisfy all our security concerns.

Lord Williams of Elvel

I am very grateful to those noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I find myself somewhat at a loss because my wind-up speech was made by the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, in the first place, the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, in the second place, and the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, in the third place. I have very little to add to what they said. The Government seem to persist in the view that it is enough that this should be dealt with by contract. The noble Earl has conceded our case. If this is to be dealt with by contract let us—for goodness sake!—govern this Secretary of State, (a most honourable man) the next Secretary of State (who, no doubt, will be a most honourable man) and any future Secretary of State, so that Parliament has its say if and when we wish to give any considerable degree of foreign ownership to the prime contractor. That would have to come back to Parliament. Putting that into the Bill would answer the question of the noble Earl, Lord Onslow. In my view, no other country in the world would do what the Government are proposing to do at the moment. I believe that this is a proposal that the Committee should accept.

The noble Earl keeps saying, "We shall do this; we shall do that; we shall do the other". The noble Earl is undoubtedly an honourable Minister, and the Secretary of State is undoubtedly an honourable Secretary of State, but the tenure of office of Ministers is, as we know, ephemeral. Other Secretaries of State and other Ministers in the place of the noble Earl may react in a different way.

I believe that this is a matter of fundamental importance; of such fundamental importance that I shall invite the Committee to divide on the issue. I believe it is time that Parliament asserted itself in a matter of such great importance and should instruct the Secretary of State what he can and cannot do in respect of this very important industry.

3.56 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No.1) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 110; Not-Contents, 126.

Division No. 1
CONTENTS
Addington, L.	Grey, E.
Adrian, L.	Grimond, L.
Ailesbury, M.	Hampton, L.
Aylestone, L.	Hanworth, V.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Harris of Greenwich, L.
Beloff, L.	Hayter, L.
Birk, B.	Henderson of Brompton, L.
Blackstone, B.	Hilton, B.
Blease, L.	Hollis of Heigham, B.
Bonham-Carter, L.	Houghton of Sowerby, L.
Boston of Faversham, L.	Howie of Troon, L.
Bridges, L.	Hunter of Newington, L.
Brightman, L.	Hylton-Foster, B.
Briginshaw, L.	Jacques, L.
Bruce of Donington, L.	Jay, L.
Campbell of Eskan, L.	Jeffreys, L.
Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.	Jeger, B.
Carter, L.	Jenkins of Hillhead, L.
Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.	Jenkins of Putney, L.
Cocks of Hartcliffe, L.	John-Mackie, L.
David, B.	Rennet, L.
Dean of Beswick, L.	Kinloss, Ly.
Desai, L.	Kirkhill, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.	Leatherland, L.
Ennals, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.
Ewart-Biggs, B.	Lloyd-George of Dwyfor, E.
Fisher of Rednal, B.	Longford, E.
Fitt, L.	McCarthy, L.
Gallacher, L.	McFarlane of Llandaff, B.
Galpern, L.	Mackie of Benshie, L.
Gladwyn, L.	Mallalieu, B.
Glenamara, L.	Mar, C.
Graham of Edmonton, L.	Masham of Ilton, B.
[Teller.]	Mason of Barnsley, L.
Greenhill of Harrow, L.	Mayhew, L. [Teller.]

Merrivale, L.	Shannon, E.
Milner of Leeds, L.	Shepherd, L.
Molloy, L.	Skelmersdale, L.
Monkswell, L.	Stallard, L.
Morris of Castle Morris, L.	Stedman, B.
Mulley, L.	Stoddart of Swindon, L.
Ogmore, L.	Strabolgi, L.
Onslow, E.	Taylor of Blackburn, L.
Peston, L.	Thurlow, L.
Peyton of Yeovil, L.	Thurso, V.
Phillips, B.	Tordoff, L.
Porritt, L.	Turner of Camden, B.
Prys-Davies, L.	Underhill, L.
Redesdale, L.	Wallace of Coslany, L.
Richard, L.	Whaddon, L.
Ritchie of Dundee, L.	White, B.
Robson of Kiddington, B.	Williams of Elvel, L.
Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly.	Wilson of Langside, L.
Seear, B.	Winchilsea and Nottingham, E.
Serota, B.	Zuckerman, L.
Shackleton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Aldington, L.	Hives, L.
Alexander of Tunis, E.	Holderness, L.
Alport, L.	Hood, V.
Ampthill, L.	Hooper, B.
Arran, E.	Howe, E.
Astor, V.	Ilchester, E.
Astor of Hever, L.	Ironside, L.
Attlee, E.	Johnston of Rockport, L.
Aucklarid, L.	Kimball, L.
Bessborough, E.	Long, V.
Blyth, L.	McColl of Dulwich, L.
Boardman, L.	Mackay of Ardbrecknish, L.
Borthwick, L.	Mackay of Clashfern, L.
Boyd-Carpenter, L.	Macleod of Borve, B.
Brabazon of Tara, L.	Manchester, D.
Brougham and Vaux, L.	Margadale, L.
Butterworth, L.	Marlesford, L.
Caithness, E.	Melville, V.
Campbell of Alloway, L.	Mersey, V.
Carnock, L.	Middleton, L.
Cavendish of Furness, L.	Morris, L.
Cayzer, L.	Mottistone, L.
Chalfont, L.	Mountgarret, V.
Clanwilliam, E.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Cockfield, L.	Munster, E.
Colnbrook, L.	Murton of Lindisfarne, L.
Colwyn, L.	Nelson, E.
Constantine of Stanmore, L.	Newall, L.
Cottesloe, L.	Norrie, L.
Crawshaw, L.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Cumberlege, B.	Orkney, E.
Davidson, V. [Teller.]	Oxfuird, V.
Denham, L.	Pender, L.
Denton of Wakefield, B.	Plan of Writtle, B.
Dilhorne, V.	Pym, L.
Ellenborough, L.	Reay, L.
Elliot of Harwood, B.	Renton, L.
Elliott of Morpeth, L.	Renwick, L.
Erne, E.	Rippon of Hexham, L.
Erroll of Hale, L.	Rodney, L.
Fanshawe of Richmond, L.	Roskill, L.
Flather, B.	Sanderson of Bowden, L.
Flowers, L.	Savile, L.
Fraser of Carmyllie, L.	Sharples, B.
Fraser of Kilmorack, L.	Shaughnessy, L.
Gainford, L.	Sherfield, L.
Gainsborough, E.	Shrewsbury, E.
Gisborough, L.	Slim, V.
Gridley, L.	Soulsby of Swaffham Prior, L.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone,	Strathclyde, L.
L.	Strathcona and Mount Royal,
Halsbury, E.	L.
Hardinge of Penshurst, L.	Strathmore and Kinghorne, E.
Harmsworth, L.	Strathspey, L.
Harvington, L.	Sudeley, L.
Henley, L.	Swansea, L.
Hesketh, L. [Teller.]	Swinton, E.

Teviot, L.	Waddington, L.
Thomas of Gwydir, L.	Wade of Chorlton, L.
Thorneycroft, L.	Wedgwood, L.
Tombs, L.	Westbury, L.
Trumpington, B.	Wilberforce, L.
Ullswater, V.	Wise, L.
Vaux of Harrowden, L.	Wynford, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

The Earl of Strathmore and Kinghorne: I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.