HL Deb 21 February 1991 vol 526 cc712-59

Interpretation

34. In this Part of this Schedule—

Unitary development plans

35.—(1) Where a local planning authority have, under section 13(3) of the old law, made available copies of proposals for the making, alteration or replacement of a unitary development plan but the proposals are not adopted or approved before commencement—

  1. (a) the proposals shall be treated on and after commencement as if made available under section 13(2) of the the new law; and
  2. (b) any other step taken before commencement for the purpose of complying with any requirement of the old law with respect to such making, alteration or replacement may be treated on and after commencement as having been taken for the purpose of complying with any similar requirement imposed by or under the new law.

(2) Sub-paragraph (3) below applies where, at any time within the period of two years beginning with the date of commencement—

  1. (a) a unitary development plan is in operation which by virtue of paragraph 4 of Part I or paragraph 17 of Part II of Schedule 2 to the old law includes a local plan (whether subject to alteration or otherwise);
  2. (b) proposals are made for the alteration or replacement of the unitary development plan;
  3. (c) the local planning authority who are making those proposals have published in the prescribed manner a statement in the prescribed form identifying a policy included in the plan as an existing policy; and
  4. (d) a local inquiry or other hearing is held for the purpose of considering an objection to the proposals.

(3) Where this sub-paragraph applies, the person holding the inquiry or other hearing need not allow an objector to appear if he is satisfied that—

  1. (a) the objection is to a policy identified in the statement published under sub-paragraph (2) (c) above;
  2. (b) the policy so identified is an existing policy; and
  3. (c) there has been no significant change in circumstances affecting the existing policy since it was included in the unitary development plan.

(4) In this paragraph "existing policy" means a policy or proposal the substance of which (however expressed) was contained in a plan included as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (a) above.

Structure plans

36.—(1) Where a local planning authority have, under section 32(3) of the old law, submitted to the Secretary of State copies of proposals for the alteration or repeal and replacement of a structure plan but the proposals are not approved before commencement—

  1. (a) the submission of the proposals shall on and after commencement be treated for the purposes of the new law as the sending of the copy under section 33(2) (b) of that law; and
  2. (b) any other step taken before commencement for the purpose of complying with any requirement of the old law with respect to such alteration or repeal and replacement may on and after commencement be treated as having been taken for the purpose of complying with any similar requirement imposed by or under Part II of the new law.

(2) Where sub-paragraph (1) above applies the proposals may be adopted or approved under the new law as if they had been prepared after commencement.

Local plans

37. Where a local planning authority have made available under section 39(5) or 40(2) of the old law copies of proposals for the making, alteration, repeal or replacement of a local plan but the proposals are not adopted or approved before commencement, the proposals may after commencement be adopted or as the case may be, approved as if the old law were still in force.

38.—(1) A local plan which—

  1. (a) immediately before commencement is in operation in the area of a local planning authority, or
  2. (b) is brought into operation after commencement by virtue of paragraph 37 above,
(in this Schedule referred to as "a saved local plan") shall, subject to the following provisions of this paragraph, continue in operation.

(2) Where a saved local plan—

  1. (a) complies with section 36 of the new law and was prepared by the authority who are entitled to prepare the plan required by that section, or
  2. (b) contains only those policies required or permitted to be included in a minerals local plan or a waste local plan in accordance with sections 36 to 38 of the new law and was made by the authority who are entitled to prepare a minerals local plan or, as the case may be, a waste local plan,
it shall be treated as if it were a local plan, a minerals local plan or, as the case may be, a waste local plan which had been adopted or, as the case may be, approved under the new law (and accordingly may be altered or replaced under the new law).

(3) In sub-paragraphs (4) to (8) below the references to saved local plans do not include a reference to saved local plans treated, by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) above, as if adopted or approved under the new law.

(4) Any saved local plan shall have effect subject to a local plan, minerals local plan or waste local plan which is adopted or approved under the new law and shall not be treated as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) above (and accordingly may not be altered or replaced under the new law).

(5) Where the last of the plans, or the plan, required to be prepared for an area under sections 36 to 38 of the new law is prepared for that area—

  1. (a) any saved local plan, and
  2. (b) any old development plan,
shall cease to have effect in relation to that area.

(6) If the Secretary of State so directs, any specified provisions of a saved local plan shall continue in operation—

  1. (a) for such period as may be specified or determined in accordance with the direction;
  2. (b) in relation to the area or any specified part of the area to which the saved local plan relates.

(7) The Secretary of State may revoke any direction given under sub-paragraph (6) above.

(8) Before giving or revoking any such direction the Secretary of State shall consult any local planning authority for the area in which the plan is in operation.

(9) A saved local plan shall, while it continues in operation, be treated for the purposes of the new law, any other enactment relating to town and country planning, the Land Compensation 1961 and the Highways Act 1980 as being comprised in the development plan in respect of the area in question.

(10) In this paragraph—

39.—(1) Sub-paragraph (2) below applies where after commencement—

  1. (a) there is in operation in the area of a local planning authority a saved local plan which does not fall within paragraph 38(2) (a) above;
    2. 715
  2. (b) proposals are made in pursuance of the new law for the making, alteration or replacement of a local plan for that area;
  3. (c) the local planning authority who are making those proposals have published in the prescribed manner a statement in the prescribed form identifying a policy included in the plan as an existing policy; and
  4. (d) a local inquiry or other hearing is held for the purpose of considering any objection to the proposals.

(2) Where this sub-paragraph applies, the person holding the inquiry or other hearing need not allow an objector to appear if he is satisfied that—

  1. (a) the objection is to a policy identified in the statement published under sub-paragraph (1) (c) above;
  2. (b) the policy so identified is an existing policy; and
  3. (c) there has been no significant change in circumstances affecting the existing policy since it first formed part of the saved local plan.

(3) In this paragraph "existing policy" means a policy or proposal the substance of which (however expressed) was contained in the saved local plan falling within sub-paragraph (1) (a) above.

Minerals and waste local plans

40.—(l) Sub-paragraph (2) below applies where after commencement—

  1. (a) there is in operation in the area of a local planning authority a saved local plan which does not fall within paragraph 38(2) (b) above and which contains—
    1. (i) any detailed policies for development consisting of the winning and working of minerals or involving the depositing of mineral waste; or
    2. (ii) any waste policies;
  2. (b) proposals are made in pursuance of the new law for the making, alteration or replacement of a minerals local plan or a waste local plan for that area;
  3. (c) the local planning authority who are making those proposals have published in the prescribed manner a statement in the prescribed form identifying a policy included in the plan as an existing policy; and
  4. (d) a local inquiry or other hearing is held for the purpose of considering any objection to the proposals.

(2) Where this sub-paragraph applies, the person holding the inquiry or other hearing need not allow an objector to appear if he is satisfied that—

  1. (a) the objection is to a policy identified in the statement published under sub-paragraph (1) (c) above;
  2. (b) the policy so identified is an existing policy; and
  3. (c) there has been no significant change in circumstances affecting the existing policy since it first formed part of the saved local plan.

(3) In this paragraph "existing policy" means any policy falling within sub-paragraph (1) (a) above the substance of which (however expressed) was contained in the saved local plan falling within that sub-paragraph.

Duty of structure plan authority to notify authorities responsible for saved local plans etc.

41.—(1) Where at any time after commencement any proposals for the alteration or replacement of a structure plan are adopted or approved, the authority concerned shall—

  1. (a) notify any local planning authority in their area that the proposals have been adopted or approved;
  2. (b) supply that authority with a statement that the saved local plan is or, as the case may be, is not in general conformity with the altered or new structure plan.

(2) A statement that a saved local plan is not in general conformity with a structure plan shall specify the respects in which it is not in such conformity.

(3) Where at any time after commencement any proposals for the alteration or replacement of a structure plan are withdrawn, the authority concerned shall notify any authority who prepared any saved local plan which is in operation in their area that the proposals have been withdrawn.

(4) Nothing in this paragraph requires an authority to notify or supply a statement to themselves.

(5) The provisions of a saved local plan shall prevail for all purposes over any conflicting provisions in the relevant structure plan unless the saved local plan is one—

  1. (a) stated under sub-paragraph (1) above not to be in general conformity with the structure plan; and
  2. (b) neither altered nor replaced after the statement was supplied.

(6) Sub-paragraph (5) above is subject to any regulations made by the Secretary of State with respect to conflict between plans.

Consultation

42. Any consultation undertaken before commencement for the purposes of any provision contained in or made under Part II of the old law shall be as effective for the purposes of any similar provision contained in or made under Part II of the new law as if undertaken after commencement.

The Isles of Scilly

43. An order under section 319 of the new law may make transitional provision in connection with any development plan in force in the Isles of Scilly.").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 207: Page 31, line 14, at end insert: ("(3) If the person concerned causes a local inquiry or hearing to be cancelled after the date on which the Secretary of State notified his decision on the date of the opening of the inquiry or hearing, such an order may require the person concerned to pay the costs of preparing for that inquiry or hearing incurred by the other principal party and by any other persons who have given notice in writing to the Secretary of State of their intention to appear at the inquiry or hearing.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, it is necessary that this amendment be taken with Amendment No. 208. Should both amendments be carried, Amendment No. 207 would have been removed together with the rest of Clause 24. In any case, it is important that we consider the whole issue of Clause 24. It is an issue that aroused a good deal of controversy at Committee stage; that is, the issue of costs at public inquiries.

The Government's purpose in introducing Clause 24 was well explained by Ministers at Committee stage. In summary, they are seeking to provide that if the inquiry procedure is adopted unreasonably, there should be the possibility for costs of other parties to be awarded against those who behave unreasonably in that respect. The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and others expressed the strongly felt concern of the Law Society that this was a provision which would make it difficult for smaller people to use their rights to appeal to a public inquiry.

Amendment No. 232 was unsatisfactory in all kinds of ways, and I am bound to say that the more I think about the matter, the more I am inclined to the view that the power to award costs against those who go to a public inquiry should be restricted as far as possible. There was talk of an amendment at this stage to replace the word "unreasonable" by the word "vexatious". On reflection, if that had been put forward, we would have supported it. If the noble Lords, Lord Coleraine and Lord Stanley, want to pursue the argument that Clause 24 should be taken out, I am less opposed to that point of view than I was. I shall have to listen very carefully to the arguments before advising my friends what to do.

However, the issue raised in Amendment No. 207 is different. There should be protection against people being dissuaded from going to appeal. Those who start on the process of appeal and who wait until the Secretary of State has set a date for it and then withdraw, are likely to be the developers. The people who lose out are likely to be the objectors and the local planning authority. I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Coleraine and Lord Stanley, will agree with me that the boot is on the other foot here, and that in this case what appears to be an extension of the power to award costs is a justifiable extension which should not be taken on the same footing as the other objections raised to Clause 24.

Therefore, I hope that the Government and other noble Lords who are concerned with the implications of this clause—it is a very difficult point on which to reach a firm and wholehearted conclusion—will agree with me that there is justification for the provisions in my Amendment No. 207. I beg to move.

6.30 p.m.

Lord Coleraine

My Lords, I was interested by the way in which the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, introduced his amendment. He referred to mine and said that the effect of moving my amendment might be to delete his. The noble Lord the Deputy Speaker did not refer to that fact. I have always understood the situation to be that if the noble Lord's amendment is passed, my amendment, which seeks to undo it, cannot be called.

Lord Mottistone

My Lords, of course it can.

Lord Coleraine

My Lords, I understand that that is incorrect, and that my amendment can be called. I do not oppose the noble Lord's amendment. It resembles an amendment to which he spoke in Committee. In fact, it appears to be near enough in the shape my noble friend the Minister said it should be as a prerequisite of her accepting it. I note the perverse reference in the previous amendment to the Secretary of State as an "it". That is as if the Secretary of State were the kind of person whom the noble Lord might refer to as "a chair" or "a spoke". I note that the reference has now been taken out of the amendment as though in anticipation that it was going to press forward into legislation.

I am glad to learn that even if the noble Lord's amendment is accepted today, I can continue and put to the House the question whether Clause 24 should be deleted from the Bill. The clause is unfair and it is likely to operate exclusively against a small builder or house owner wishing to extend his property. That is a matter which may seem simple; but it is just the sort of question where the reasonable requirements of the owner have to be balanced scrupulously against considerations of housing policy, aesthetics and the reasonable requirements of neighbours and the community.

The Government have found themselves in some difficulties over this clause. At Second Reading my noble friend said that the department would be publishing for consultation the criteria to be used in deciding whether someone's insistence on an inquiry or hearing is unreasonable".—[Official Report, 27/11/90; col. 908.] It may be that we read too much into that in thinking that what was to be published for consultation was a list of criteria. What we have in fact is a consultation letter issued five weeks ago which says that it deals with the criteria for exercise of the discretionary power". But it does not put forward any criteria at all.

The consultation paper gives as examples four cases where it might be considered unreasonable for a hearing to be asked for. The first two are similar. The first is where an application which has already been decided on appeal, following a public inquiry, is repeated in substantially the same form. The second is where an enforcement notice is appealed on the grounds that planning permission should have been given where only recently there has been an unsuccessful planning appeal for the very same permission. I have no wish to suggest that it is reasonable for the time of the inspectorate or the planning authorities and others to be taken up with oral hearings in either of these cases. These cases can surely be dealt with already under the existing powers because it is the appeal in each case which is unreasonable, not the manner in which it is to be heard.

I shall quote the third example in full. It is An enforcement notice appeal involving a comparatively minor material change of use, or minor building operations, when no appeal is made on 'legal grounds', there is little third party interest, and the appellant is professionally represented. That is clearly designed to deter the small man from appealing, as is the fourth example, but I cannot see what criteria can justify it. Neither do I consider this to be a case where the fact that the appellant is professionally represented should have any bearing at all. I ask: what sort of law is it which would put a solicitor, for example, under a duty to his client to advise that if the client wishes to have an oral hearing he may do better to conduct his own case?

The fourth example is of a straightforward minor planning appeal—that is to say, a house extension, where there is no planning policy dispute, no third party interest and the appellant is again professionally represented. Again I ask: what are the criteria that could justify applying Clause 24 to such an appeal beyond the fact again that it is the small man who is likely to be caught? I have already indicated my feeling that housing extension applications should not be treated almost by definition as straightforward minor planning appeals. Is the fact that an appeal is considered straightforward and minor to preclude the individual house owner from his hearing? I do not see how that is to be justified.

I hope that my noble friend the Minister will forgive me if I dwell a little longer on the consultation letter. I do so now because the letter gives some idea of what the department understands Clause 24 to mean. I understand that the reasonableness or otherwise of the decision to ask for a hearing must be judged in the light of what the appellant thought and knew when he asked for the hearing. As I interpret the clause, what happens during the hearing cannot ex post facto have any bearing at all on whether the decision was reasonable although it may be relevant in establishing what was in the mind and to the knowledge of the appellant at the outset.

In paragraph 8 of the consultation letter—and here I explain what I have just been saying—I read that whether an appeal party has "unreasonably" requested the right "to be heard" in a particular case will only be apparent at the conclusion of the proceedings. It will then be possible to decide whether the party made, effective use of the opportunity to be heard". Whether the party made effective use of the opportunity to be heard is totally irrelevant to the question whether the decision to ask for a hearing was reasonable. I hope that I carry my noble friend with me on this point. I am glad to see that my noble friend Lord Stanley of Alderley has put his name to the amendment. In Committee he was prepared to support the principle behind Clause 24, but only where the request for an oral hearing was vexatious.

I sought to persuade the Committee that the concept of a vexatious request is unsatisfactory and unlikely to bite in the way intended. Neither I nor the Law Society, which share my views, wish to support vexatious appeals let alone vexatious and frivolous appeals. It is the vexatious appeals themselves, and not the manner in which they are brought, which should be struck at, and which are, I believe, as I have already sought to show, already likely to result in a costs order being made without the need for Clause 24.

In Committee the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, also confessed to a fondness for the word "vexatious", and he has done so again this afternoon. On that occasion he said that he thought it unlikely that he would be able to follow the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, and myself into the Lobby should we decide to oppose the Question that Clause 24 stand part of the Bill. His attitude was to seek to amend the clause and, as I understood him at the time and have sought to understand him since—I have to say that the report is not entirely clear—he felt that it was only in the case of appeals of the minor category that the appellant who asked for a hearing should be in jeopardy as to costs. I felt that we were not very far apart at the beginning of the debate in Committee and that the positions of the noble Lord and myself were drawing closer towards the end. He has indicated that he is coming further this way and I hope he has not gone back the other way after hearing what I have had to say.

I have not repeated lengthy arguments which can be found in the report of the Committee stage debate, but I hope that my noble friend will feel able to tell the House that she will take Clause 24 away, because it is largely unnecessary. If there are instances where it may do a little good, in terms of the cost of running the planning inspectorate, nevertheless it will have done so at the cost of loss of rights enjoyed by the man in the street, and some diminution in natural justice.

Lord Stanley of Alderley

My Lords, the reason why I have decided to put my name to the amendment of my noble friend Lord Coleraine to remove Clause 24 rather than argue whether the correct word is "unreasonable" or "vexatious", as I did at Committee stage (as the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, reminded me) is that, having read the report of those debates, I really do not see that the clause achieves anything at all. In particular the comment of my noble friend Lady Blatch at col. 914 of the Official Report particularly worries me. She said: If this clause is enacted, we would make it absolutely clear in publicly stated policy guidance that the provisions are not a deterrent and will not be used as such".—[Official Report, 4/2/91; col. 914.] If the clause is not intended as a deterrent, why have it at all? Moreover, I believe that the problem of unreasonableness, if I may call it that, is already dealt with in Section 320 of the Town and Country Planning Act which I believe refers to Section 250 of the Local Government Act 1972. Indeed, the problem of unreasonableness is dealt with in guidance contained in planning circular No. 2 of 1987. All in all, I think the Government should put this clause in the nearest litter bin.

The Earl of Lytton

My Lords, I should like to associate myself with the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Stanley and Lord Coleraine, and in so doing make an apology to the House and to the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, for not having heard the whole of what he said on his amendment, which I shall touch on subsequently.

With regard to Clause 24, I still feel that the points of substance that I made previously remain outstanding. At Committee stage we were told that the matter would be considered by the Minister and that she would come back and let the House know what she felt about it. It remains the case that this provision of costs is a threat to an appellant who would otherwise have a good case. It is something on which it is very difficult to be clear in terms of definition until after the event of the appeal. There is the conundrum that if the appellant wins on planning grounds, he can be penalised on costs. As the noble Lord, Lord Stanley, said, there is existing provision. I therefore wait with interest to hear what the Minister says about those points.

I turn now to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, in his Amendment No. 207. I did not hear everything he had to say, but I understand the intention behind the amendment is actively to discourage those people who use the appeals system without any intention of proceeding with it, and therefore cause a great deal of cost and trouble at public expense. I am sympathetic to the amendment if that is the sole intention behind it. Certainly the principle ought to be supported. I am not quite sure that I understand that the noble Lord's amendment completely removes the possibility of the element of threat, but I wait with interest to hear what the Minister has to say.

6.45 p.m.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, noble Lords will recall that when we discussed Clause 24 during the Committee stage considerable misgivings were expressed that the threat of a possible award, against an appellant, of the planning authority's inquiry costs would deter some appellants from requesting an inquiry or hearing when the circumstances of the appeal fully justified the request. Particular concern was expressed about deterring inexperienced or unrepresented appellants from asking to be "heard". Similar misgivings have been expressed to my ministerial colleague, the Minister for Housing and Planning, by the Council on Tribunals, the Local Government and Planning Bar Association and the Law Society. At Committee stage, I undertook to consider most carefully, with my ministerial colleagues, all these representations, and to give a fully considered reply about the Government's intentions on Report.

On further consideration we recognise that the provisions of this clause may conceivably have some of the effects which critics of it have suggested. We accept that people who wish to exercise their right of appeal may feel unfairly deterred from asking, in some cases, to be heard. Accordingly, we have concluded that the right course is not to proceed with the clause in its present form.

Noble Lords will also recall that in Committee we undertook to consider further the drafting and substance of Amendment No. 232 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh. His amendment would have provided costs to be awarded in appeal proceedings where inquiries or hearings are cancelled or curtailed because of the late withdrawal of an appeal or a late revision of evidence. We accepted the force of the arguments for enabling costs to be awarded in these circumstances and agreed to table a suitable amendment. Appeal parties may incur very considerable costs in preparing for an important inquiry. Those costs are wasted when the inquiry does not proceed. There is, at present, no provision in force in our planning legislation to enable the Secretary of State to order that "wasted" costs be recovered from the party whose action has resulted in cancellation of the inquiry. The noble Lord's proposals will remedy that unsatisfactory situation.

At first sight, Amendment No. 207 seems acceptable; but we need to scrutinise all its effects. For instance, the restriction of costs awards only to parties who have given written notice of their intention to appear at an inquiry or hearing may be an inappropriate limitation. This may have the effect in certain circumstances of ruling out, on a technicality, interested parties who may have incurred substantial wasted costs, but have not been advised that they are required to given written notice of their interest or have overlooked the need. We do not think such parties should be precluded from recovering abortive expenditure because of a procedural technicality. On the understanding that we still accept the principle of Amendment No. 207, and will table an acceptable amendment, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

On Amendment No. 208, in the light of my undertaking that we shall not proceed with the clause in its present form I hope noble Lords will agree that Clause 24 should remain part of the Bill. We can then bring forward an amendment along the lines of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh. In that event, Clause 24 will stand alone with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh. There will therefore be a Clause 24 in the Bill but not as presently drafted.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

My Lords, I think we are all struggling to some extent, but very much in the same direction. I am personally grateful to the Minister for what she said about Amendment No. 207. I accept that she is right about the provision that the notice should be in writing. I think it may be necessary to put into my amendment something about "unreasonable" as well, which is not there at the moment; but perhaps I am muddying the water even further.

I do not know what the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and his colleagues think, but the commitments that the Minister has given to a radical rethink of Clause 24 are very far reaching. It looks as though we may land up with a Clause 24 which consists of my amendment in a slightly different form and nothing else. In that case we would probably all be satisfied. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Coleraine moved Amendment No. 208: Leave out Clause 24.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have spoken to this amendment and I am grateful to my noble friend for saying that she does not propose to pursue the clause in its present form. She suggested that Clause 24 should stay in the Bill and undertook to bring forward at Third Reading a provision which would bring in the amendment just withdrawn by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh. I do not for the moment see why the clause should not now be taken out of the Bill. What will come forward at Third Reading will be something entirely different from Clause 24 as it stands at the moment. I beg to move.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, if I may intervene now I think it will help the House. I believe that it is possible to take Clause 24 out of the Bill as it stands. It is possible to reconsider the wording of Amendment No. 207 and for me to bring forward in the name of the Government an amendment which will be consistent with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh. At this moment I see nothing to preclude my putting a new Clause 24 into the Bill at Third Reading. That would be one way to proceed.

Lord Coleraine

My Lords, I feel sure that my noble friend is correct.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 209 not moved.]

Schedule 5 [Planning compensation repeals: minor and consequential amendments]:

Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendments Nos. 210 to 217: Page 108, line 20, at end insert:

("Public Expenditure and Receipts Act 1968 (c.14)

2A. In Schedule 3 to the Public Expenditure and Receipts Act 1968 (variation of fees) in paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (b) is omitted.

Post Office Act 1969 (c.48)

2B. In Schedule 9 to the Post Office Act 1969 (transitional provisions) in paragraph 27(7) for "Parts V and XII of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990" there is substituted "Part XII of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990"."). Page 109, line 8, at end insert: ("10A. In section 90(3) (development with Government authorisation) for "Parts V and" there is substituted "Part"."). Page 110, line 16, at end insert: ("19A. In section 262(4) and (7) (a) (meaning of "statutory undertakers") "123" is omitted. 19B. In section 263(3) (meaning of "operational land") "123(3) and (4)" is omitted."). Page 111, line 4, at end insert: ("27A. In section 315(2) (power to modify Act in relation to minerals) the words from "and in relation" to "in respect of such land" are omitted. 27B. In section 318(5) (ecclesiastical property) for "112, 133 or 327" there is substituted "or 112"."). Page 111, line 12, leave out ("definition of "new development" is") and insert ("definitions of "new development" and "previous apportionment" are"). Page 111, line 13, at end insert: ("32A. In Schedule 1 (distribution of functions) in paragraph 16(1) "114" is omitted."). Page 111, line 34, at end insert: ("36A. In section 32(4) of that Act (purchase notices) for "new development" there is substituted "development (other than any development specified in paragraph 1 or 2 of Schedule 3 to the principal Act)"."). Page 112, line 1, at end insert: ("39A. In section 91(2) of that Act (interpretation) "new development" is omitted.").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendments Nos. 210 to 217, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 218 to 223, 293 to 301, 303 and 304. These are all further minor but necessary technical amendments which are consequential on the planning compensation repeals set out in Clause 25, which applies to England and Wales, and Clause 46, which applies to Scotland. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 10 [Planning compensation repeals: minor and consequential amendments—Scotland]:

Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendments Nos. 218 to 223: Page 132, line 8, at end insert:

("Public Expenditure and Receipts Act 1968 (c.14)

2A. In Schedule 3 to the Public Expenditure and Receipts Act 1968 (variation of fees) in paragraph 7, sub-paragraph (a) is omitted.

Post Office Act 1969 (c.48)

2B. In Schedule 9 to the Post Office Act 1969 (transitional provisions) in paragraph 27(7) for "Parts VII and XII of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972" there is substituted "Part XII of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972"."). Page 132, line 29, leave out paragraph 6. Page 132, line 37, at end insert: ("8A. In section 37(2) (development with Government authorisation) for "Parts VII and" there is substituted "Part". 8B. In section 40(3) (date when development is begun), for paragraph (b) there is substituted—

Page 132, line 42, leave out paragraph 11. Page 136, line 39, at end insert: ("19A. In section 179(2) (purchase notice on refusal or conditional grant of listed building consent) for "new development" there is substituted "development (other than any development specified in paragraph 1 or 2 of Schedule 6 to this Act) 19B. In section 231(3) (validity of orders etc.), paragraph (c) is omitted."). Page 137, line 17, leave out ("definition of "new development" is") and insert ("definitions of "new development" and "previous apportionment-' are").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 224 and 225 not moved.]

Schedule 6 [Planning in England and Wales: minor and consequential amendments]:

Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 226 and 227: Page 112, line 22, at end insert:

("Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c. 57)

2A. In section 7(5) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 paragraph (a) (iii) is omitted.").

Page 112, line 26, leave out from ("171C") to end of line and insert ("173A, 187A, 187B, 196A to 196C and 324(1) (b) and (c) and (7).").

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 226 and 227 and will speak to Amendments Nos. 229, 230, 232 to 236, 238, 239, 242, 244, 245 and 248 to 257. These are all essential drafting amendments to Schedule 6 to the Bill, consequential on provisions being introduced or changes made elsewhere in the Bill. For that reason I do not propose to spend any more time on them now, but if any noble Lord wishes to query any one of them I shall be happy to explain it. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 228: Page 112, line 26, at end insert:

("Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 (c. 30)

3A. In section 33 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, in subsection (1) for paragraphs (a) to (c) there is substituted—

  1. "(a) is executed for the purpose of securing the carrying out of works on land in the council's area in which the other person has an interest, or
  2. (b) is executed for the purpose of regulating the use of or is otherwise connected with land in or outside the council's area in which the other person has an interest,
and which is neither executed for the purpose of facilitating nor connected with the development of the land in question."").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, Amendment No. 228 was discussed with Amendment No. 64. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 229 and 230: Page 112, line 33, leave out paragraph 6 and insert: ("6.—(1) In section 5(1) for "300 and 324(1) (b) and (c) and (7)" there is substituted "and 300". (2) In section 5(3)—

  1. (a) for "sections 36 to 49, 50(6) to (9), 51" there is substituted "Part II, sections",
  2. (b) for "64 to 72" there is substituted "65, 69 to 72",
  3. (c) for "81" there is substituted "79",
  4. (d) after "106" there is inserted "to 106B, 171C",
  5. (e) after "173" there is inserted "173A",
  6. (f) after "184" there is inserted "187A, 187B",
  7. (g) for "215" there is substituted "214, 215",
  8. (h) after "299" there is inserted "299A", and
  9. (i) for "316(1) to (3) and 324(1) (a)" there is substituted "316, and 324(1) and (7)".").
Page 112, line 37, at end insert: ("7A. In section 63(5) "65, 71(1) or" is omitted.").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 231: Page 113, line 14, at end insert: ("13A. In section 174(6) "in writing" is omitted.").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, Section 174 of the 1990 Act already provides for someone who occupies land under a written licence to have the right of appeal against an enforcement notice. In response to the concern expressed by noble Lords during the Committee stage of the Bill, we have decided that the right of appeal should be extended to those who occupy under an unwritten licence. This change would be effected by this small amendment to Section 174. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 232 to 236: Page 115, line 4, leave out from ("omitted") to end of line 7 and insert:

Page 115, line 19, leave out from beginning to ("there") in line 24 and insert:
  1. ("(a) in subsection (1) "an application referred to him under section 192(5) or" is omitted and for "applicant or appellant (as the case may be)" there is substituted "appellant",
  2. (b) in subsection (2) for "an established use certificate on such a reference or" there is substituted "a certificate under section 191 or 192 on",
  3. (c) in subsection (3) "application or" is omitted,
  4. (cc) in subsection (4) for "established use certificates"").
 Page 115, line 32, at end insert:

("Part XI

28A. Section 266(3) is omitted.").

Page 115, line 37, at end insert:

Page 115, line 39, leave out ("(2)").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Ross of Newport moved Amendment No. 237: Page 116, line 6, at end insert: ("31A. In section 288, at the end of subsection (3) there is added—

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Section 288 of the 1990 Act is concerned with appeals to the High Court against decisions of the Secretary of State, on the grounds that they are wrong in law or that the correct procedure has not been followed. At present, appeals must be brought within six weeks of the decision being taken, which is interpreted by the courts as being the date on which the decision letter is typed, signed on behalf of the Secretary and date-stamped. The period is absolute, so that if the appeal is brought outside the six-weeks' period it must fail.

In Committee, I cited a case where some unfortunate person was not informed and fell outside the date, and therefore lost completely. It was admitted that it happened because of an error in the department of the local authority. Although the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate expressed some sympathy, he said that it was far too long a period to allow, and that he might consider some amendment of a few days.

This revised amendment takes account of the debate by allowing 14 days to bring an appeal from service of the notice. It is fair to say that this is roughly the time on which people might be on holiday or recovering from a small illness. It also allows appellants to have time to consult legal advisers, which often takes quite a few days. So I hope that this amendment might meet with a rather more favourable response from the Government than my previous attempt. I beg to move.

Lord Fraser of Carmyllie

My Lords, when we previously considered this matter I had to indicate that I could not accept the previous amendment because of the length of time, as the noble Lord indicated, and I was also concerned that it would introduce uncertainty. That was because, if the time ran from the date of the notification, it might not be possible to ascertain when that was.

I have some sympathy with the noble Lord's objective of ensuring that an individual or a local authority, who may wish to challenge a decision in the courts, should have an adequate time to make up their mind without the fear of an administrative slip-up or postal delays cutting into that time. Accordingly, I should like to take the opportunity to consider this more carefully and to allow for wider consultation. An undertaking is given to do that. With that, I hope that the noble Lord will be able to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Ross of Newport

My Lords, I am very grateful. I hope that what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has said will produce the desired result and I am obliged to him. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 238 and 239: Page 116, line 9, leave out ("296(2) (a)") and insert ("296, in subsection (1) (c) after "VII" there is inserted "except sections 196A and 196B". (2) In subsection (2) (a) of that section"). Page 116, line 21, at end insert:

("Part XIV

34A. In section 306(2) (b) and (3) after "VII", in both places where it occurs, there is inserted "except sections 196A and 196B".").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 240: Page 116, line 28, leave out paragraph 36 and insert: ("36. For section 319 there is substituted—

"The Isles of Scilly.

319.—(1) This Act applies to the Isles of Scilly subject to such exceptions, adaptations and modifications as the Secretary of State may by order direct.

(2) An order under this section may in particular provide for the exercise by the Council of the Isles of Scilly of any functions exercisable by a local planning authority or mineral planning authority.

(3) Before making an order under this section the Secretary of State shall consult with that Council.").

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, Amendment No. 240 was spoken to with Amendment No. 94, but the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, asked me one technical question on the amendment. He asked me why the amendment does not say that the order shall provide. The amendment makes clear that planning law applies to the Scillies but, because of their special circumstances, enables the Secretary of State to make an order making such exceptions, adaptations and modifications as he may direct. Since the basic power to make such an order is properly expressed within the word "may", the subsidiary power relating to the designation of council functions is also expressed in that way. This is a standard form for such a provision. I said in reply to the noble Lord that the council has had these functions in the past, and the order-making power will be used to ensure that it continues to have them. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to. [Amendment No. 241 not moved.]

Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 242: Page 117, line 7, after ("(9)") insert ("for "in Part V of Schedule 16" there is substituted "of Parts III, VII and VIII" and").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

7 p.m.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 243: Page 117, line 7, at end insert: ("(4) In subsection (10) for "sections 324(2) and" there is substituted "section".").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 244 and 246: Page 117, line 15, at end insert: ("(3A) In paragraph 7(1) for "sections 70 and 71" there is substituted "section 70"."). Page 117, line 39, leave out from first ("any") to end of line 41 and insert ("body having the function of taking enforcement action in respect of the breach in question"."). Page 117, line 41, at end insert: ("(9) For paragraph 20(3) there is substituted—

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 247 to 251 inclusive: Page 118, line 2, at end insert: ("(da) in sub-paragraph (1) (d) for "and (8)" there is substituted "to (8A)""). Page 118, line 21, leave out ("and") and insert:

Sections 106 to 106B.", Section 192. Sections 196A to 196C.", Sections 214A to 214D.", Page 118, line 23, at end insert ("and Page 118, line 28, leave out sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) and insert: Sections 187 to 187B". (4) In Part III— Sections 109 to 112.", Section 328. (5) Parts IV and V are omitted. (6) In Part VI— Section 65.", Section 291.", and Page 118, leave out lines 34 to 36.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule II [Planning in Scotland: minor and consequential amendments]:

Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 252 to 257 inclusive: Page 141, line 21, at end insert: ("23A. Section 214(3) is omitted."). Page 141, line 25, at end insert: ("25A. In section 242(2) (b) for "sections 97" there is substituted "sections 91A, 91B, 97"."). Page 141, line 28, leave out ("subsection (2) (a) of"). Page 141, line 29, after ("land)") insert ("in subsection (1) (b), after "Part V" there is inserted "except sections 91A and 91B of this Act and in subsection 2(a)". Page 142, line 25, after ("Part II") insert ("(i)"). Page 142, line 25, at end insert: ("(ii) after the entry relating to section 56 there is inserted— Sections 83A to 83D."

Section 87AA.".

On Question, amendments agreed to.

The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 257A: After Clause 48, insert the following new clause:

Purchase notice: serious injury from works.

(" .—After section 64 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 (extension of grounds for challenging validity or compulsory purchase order) there is inserted—

"Purchase notice: serious injury from works.

64A.—(1) Where the owner of an interest in land claims that the enjoyment of the land is seriously affected by—

  1. (a) the carrying out of works by—
    1. (i) the authority for the construction or alteration of any public works, or
    2. (ii) the authority for the construction or improvement of a highway, or
  2. (b) the use of—
    1. (i) any public works, or
    2. (ii) a highway which the authority have constructed or improved,
the owner may serve on the responsible authority or the highway authority, as the case may be, a notice (in this section referred to as a purchase notice) specifying the land and the nature of his interest in it and the affection by reason of which it falls within this section requiring that authority to purchase his interest in the land in accordance with this section.

(2) Without prejudice to any wider meaning of the words "seriously affected" for the purposes of section 26 of this Act and section 246 of the Highways Act 1980, land is seriously affected for the purposes of this section if—

  1. (a) the enjoyment of it is affected by any of the physical factors mentioned in subsection (2) of section 1 of this Act as extended or limited, as the case may be, by subsections (5), (6) and (7) of that section or by interference with the drainage of, or natural flow of water to, the land, and
    2. 730
  2. (b) the Lands Tribunal is satisfied that the land cannot continue to be occupied without material detriment to its enjoyment.

(3) The authority shall before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of service of the purchase notice serve on the owner by whom the purchase notice was served a counter-notice stating either—

  1. (a) that they are willing to comply with the notice, or
  2. (b) that for reasons specified in the counter-notice they object to complying with the purchase notice on the ground—
    1. (i) that the owner is not the owner of an interest in the land, or
    2. (ii) that the land is not land which is seriously affected for the purposes of this section.

(4) Where a counter-notice has been served under subsection (3) the owner may require the objection to be referred to the Lands Tribunal.

(5) An objection—

  1. (a) on ground (i) specified in subsection (3) shall not be upheld by the Lands Tribunal unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the objection is well-founded;
  2. (b) on ground (ii) specified in subsection (3) shall be upheld by the Lands Tribunal unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the land is seriously affected land for the purposes of this section.

(6) If the Lands Tribunal determines not to uphold the objection in respect of the whole or any part of the land the Tribunal shall declare that the purchase notice is a valid notice for the land or for that part.

(7) Where no counter-notice has been served in time under subsection (3) or such a counter-notice has been withdrawn or the purchase notice declared to be valid by the Lands Tribunal the responsible authority, or the highway authority, as the case may be, shall be deemed—

  1. (a) to be authorised to acquire compulsorily under the appropriate enactment the interest of the owner in the land or in that part comprised in the declaration of the Lands Tribunal, and
  2. (b) to have served notice to treat in respect of the land or that part on the date on which the period for service of a counter-notice expired or the date of withdrawal of the counter-notice or the date of the declaration of the Lands Tribunal, as the case may be.

(8) A notice to treat deemed to be served by virtue of subsection (7) shall not be capable of withdrawal.

(9) A person who has served a purchase notice under subsection (1) may withdraw it at any time before it has been declared valid under subsection (6).

(10) For the purposes of this section—

  1. (a) "public works", "responsible authority" and "relevant date" have the same meaning as in section 1 of this Act (right to compensation) except that "public works" does not include a highway;
  2. (b) "highway authority" has the same meaning as it has for the purposes of section 246 of the Highways Act 1980.

(11) A purchase notice under this section shall not be served before the expiration of one year from the relevant date and no subsequent purchase notice after the first shall be served until three years after the service of the last previous notice.

(12) Once a purchase notice has taken effect under subsection (7) of this section no further purchase notice shall be served under this section in respect of the land for which the purchase notice has taken effect provided that notice of the taking effect of the purchase notice has been registered as a local land charge in the local land charges register of the appropriate local authority.

(13) Where compensation has been claimed under section 10 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (further provision as to compensation for injurious affection) or under Part I of this Act (compensation for depreciation caused by the use of public works) any compensation payable consequent upon such claim shall be taken into account in assessing the compensation payable in consequence of a notice to treat deemed to be served under subsection (7)." ")

The noble Earl said: My Lords, this amendment is really a return to Amendment No. 291 which I moved at the Committee stage, but withdrew. That amendment attempted to provide that where an interest in land is seriously affected by public works the owner can serve a notice on the appropriate authority requiring the purchase of that interest. There was provision for reference to the Lands Tribunal in the case of disputes.

The amendment was intended to build on powers already in the Land Compensation Act 1973 and the Highways Act 1980, which are in any event being extended under Clause 48 of this Bill. These allow an authority to purchase land by agreement which "in their opinion" will be seriously affected. However, I am not happy just to leave the matter at that point so that the acquiring authority has total discretion as to whether they will purchase the land or not. I do not think that giving them that total discretion is necessarily fair or just. I am particularly concerned that possible financial I considerations might outweigh justice.

Therefore Amendment No. 291 sought to amend that position, but three objections were put forward on behalf of the Government by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate. First, he referred to a lack of definition and the need for greater detail in specifying the naming of "serious injury" and "seriously affected", although I would point out that the latter term appears in Clause 48 of the Bill in any event.

Secondly, the objection was put that it could not simply be left to the Lands Tribunal to determine the point of principle and the caseload on the Tribunal could be substantial. Thirdly, the objection was put forward that the amendment as then drafted would apply both to the construction stage of works, which of course might be short lived, as the noble and learned Lord pointed out, and to the period after the scheme of works had come into final use. It was felt to be inappropriate to require an authority to purchase on this basis, quite apart from possible financial consequences.

In consultation with the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, I addressed myself to those criticism s and the result is this amendment, which attempt; to overcome them. First, it sets out to define the term "seriously affected". In the context of the amendment as now drafted, the definition is deliberately limited to the physical factors which are those specified in the Land Compensation Act 1973. Your Lordships will know that this refers to dirt, dust, noise and various similar factors.

Secondly, it provides that the Lands Tribunal has to be satisfied that occupation cannot continue without material detriment to the enjoyment of the land. In doing this, it ties in with Section 8 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, where the Lands Tribunal has the authority to determine just such provisions.

There is another point, which is that in subsection (5) of this amendment it is intended to put the burden of proof on the claimant rather than on the acquiring authority. It was felt that this was an important safeguard. Finally, it provides that the notification procedure cannot be implemented until after the expiry of one year from the date when works come into use. It also provides for a time limit —a window—during which the notice can be served by the claimant.

I believe there can be no substantial objection to this amendment. Apart from the wording and the technical points involved, it will apply to very few cases in practice and certainly I do not think it can be seen as imposing a major financial burden on acquiring authorities. Furthermore, if it is considered appropriate under Clause 48 of the Bill as it now stands to give a discretionary power for an acquiring authority to purchase land, it must be right for there to be a provision when the worst effects of public works in their final use can be assessed so that someone with an interest in the property concerned can insist upon the authority acquiring that also if it fulfils the criteria and satisfies the tests which are already provided for in statute.

The alternative is that the person who is affected —it may be a householder or a business, but there is no distinction between different categories of potential claimant—may be entitled to compensation but only for some of his loss. It cannot be right for a householder to be left with a home he cannot sell and an environment he did not choose, and indeed would not have chosen, while I feel that acquiring authorities are likely to be conservative in their implementation of the discretionary powers which are currently covered by Clause 48 because of financial reasons. Therefore my amendment seeks to put the whole matter on a footing which I believe is in line with existing legislation and is capable of being scrutinised by the Lands Tribunal as final arbiter.

In so doing, I am trying to ensure that the consequential costs of public works are not in some way exported to the private citizen and that there is a reduction in what I believe are a significant number of hidden subsidies by the private individual to acquiring authorities. I feel that this is a most important safeguard, which will apply only in a limited number of cases, and I beg to move.

Lord Fraser of Carmyllie

My Lords, with this amendment the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, argues once again that an owner of property which is seriously affected by public works should have the right to serve a notice requiring that the responsible authority purchase the land. As I indicated when the noble Earl moved a similar, though not identical, amendment in Committee, the Land Compensation Act already provides for owners of land to be compensated for any loss of value attributable to physical effects arising from the use of public works.

There is also an entitlement to noise insulation for properties affected by noise disturbance at or above the specified level. In addition to that, as he has mentioned, there exists a discretionary power under which the responsible authorities may acquire land by agreement if it is seriously affected by public development. Clauses 48 and 60 extend this power so that it becomes available to authorities at an earlier stage in their project than at present applies. Clearly the noble Earl remains of the view that these provisions do not yet provide an adequate safeguard for landowners and that the solution is to place authorities under an obligation to purchase seriously affected property if required to do so by the owner.

I readily admit that the noble Earl has sought to address one of the objections that I raised when we discussed the issue in Committee, namely, the absence of any definition of "serious affection". However, the definition he proposes does not seem to me to be sufficiently precise. The provision would still present the Lands Tribunal with an unreasonable task in terms of the volume of cases that it could be called upon to deal with and the nature of the determinations it would be required to make. It would not be sufficient merely to leave it to the Lands Tribunal to decide whether the land could continue to be occupied without material detriment to its enjoyment.

Furthermore, the right to serve the purchase notice would still apply, as I read subsection (1) of the proposed new clause, during the construction stage of a project. Yet, as I said in Committee, the adverse effects of construction work will be, by definition, temporary. It seems to me that to require authorities to purchase properties at that stage would be altogether unreasonable. As a remedy, it would be out of all proportion to the grievance temporarily experienced.

While I am in no doubt as to the strength of the noble Earl's feelings on the matter, I am afraid that I still cannot accept the principle that there should be an obligation on authorities to purchase properties affected by public development. It remains our clear view that the right approach is to leave authorities free to look carefully at the circumstances of each case and to use their discretion to acquire—as extended in the Bill—where there is a clear case for so doing. That, together with the right compensation for loss of value caused by public works offers a reasonable degree of protection to owners of land affected by public development. Although I have said that the noble Earl addressed at least one of the complaints that I made in Committee, I hope that with that explanation he will not press the amendment.

The Earl of Lytton

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. It will not surprise him to learn that I am totally dissatisfied with it. I accept that provisions exist which give a right to compensation in the circumstances that he has outlined. That is common ground between us. However, in going on to suggest that the definition is inappropriate, he has not suggested an alternative definition. The definitions I have sought to attach to the amendment are those already enshrined in statute. It is extraordinary that my amendment should be criticised for being devoid of definition when at least part of the wording exists in Clause 48.

If my amendment is incapable of definition on that ground, it is clear that there is something else in the Bill that is also incapable of accurate definition. However, I bow to the Minister's greater knowledge of legal matters, and I cannot pursue that point further. In moving the amendment, I pointed out that it had been my intention that it should not apply to the construction stage but should apply only after the works had come into use. I thought that the wording of the amendment made that point abundantly clear. I am surprised that the Minister should make the same criticism of my amendment as he did of the earlier one in Committee. Clearly, it would be churlish of me to seek the opinion of the House on an amendment which is highly technical, especially bearing in mind that the hour is marching on.

I shall reconsider the point. I must reserve my position on it. I am not satisfied that it is appropriate, as the Minister has said, to leave matters solely in the hands of the acquiring authority which will be acting as judge and jury in its own cause without there being any form of recourse for a complainant who can suffer serious injury, and in the case of the residential occupier, serious injury to his daily existence. I feel strongly that it is an issue with which the Government must come to terms. It does not have major resource implications. I am surprised at the Minister's response. As I said, it is not my intention to test the opinion of the House, although in other circumstances I might seek to do so. I reserve my position, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

7.15 p.m.

Clause 49 [Advance payments of compensation and interest]:

Lord Stanley of Alderley moved Amendment No. 258: Page 57, line 18, leave out ("£1,000") and insert ("£500").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I moved two amendments in Committee to try to persuade the Government that their present method of paying outstanding sums of compensation awards did not put the owner or occupier of land in the same position as he was before the compulsory purchase order. My noble and learned friend said that the amendments were unacceptable because they were too complicated to administer. So, I have done as my noble and learned friend suggested and made the period one year, which is the same as at present, and to cut the amount from £1,000 to £500. I hope that my noble and learned friend will not consider £500 too petty a sum to bother about, because that is not the case for farmers today, most of whom would consider £500 a most acceptable sum.

Only the day before yesterday my noble friend Lord Strathclyde made great play of the generosity of the increases in hill livestock payments to sheep farmers. Those payments are worth about 50p a ewe to me and so in one year for the 1,000 ewes on which I am entitled to claim—that is the maximum—I would receive £200. That is less than £500. The Government say that that £200 is a generous sum. They must logically accept that £500 is even better and should be paid out when the compensation amount reaches that level. If my noble and learned friend disagrees he may want to encourage the Government to increase the hill livestock payments. I beg to move.

Lord Fraser of Carmyllie

My Lords, tomorrow evening I have to address the Angus NFU when I have no doubt that the point on which my noble friend has concluded will be made yet again and probably at least as forcefully.

It may be helpful if I briefly remind your Lordships how the Bill's provisions in respect of interest payments will operate. Where a compulsory purchase claimant exercises his right to ask for an advance payment of compensation under the existing provisions of the Land Compensation Act 1973 he will in future also be entitled to be paid any interest which is due to him at that point. That entitlement will apply regardless of the actual amount of interest which has accrued. Thereafter, the claimant will be entitled to be paid, at annual intervals, any further interest which has became due, provided that the amount of interest stands at more than £1,000 or such other sum as the Secretary of State prescribes. If, however, the authority makes any further advance payment of compensation, it will again be required to pay off any outstanding interest at the same time, regardless of the actual amount involved.

Our reason for specifying both a minimum amount and a minimum interval for interest payments, other than those linked to an advance payment of compensation, is merely to ensure that the new procedure does not impose an unreasonable administrative burden on authorities. A requirement to make frequent payments of relatively small sums would carry a heavy administrative cost for authorities which I do not think would be defensible from the point of view of the cost-effective use of public resources.

As I said previously, it is a matter of judgment as to what the appropriate minimum amount of interest should be. However, we are generally satisfied that the £1,000 we propose represents a reasonable choice in terms of both fairness to claimants and the sensible use of public resources. The lower figure my noble friend suggests tilts the balance too far in the claimant's favour.

The £1,000 and annual interval were explicitly referred to in the department's consultation paper of 1989 and gave rise to no general disagreement. The Bill's provisions in respect of interest payments represent an important new safeguard for claimants. While my noble friend may not accept our conclusions, I hope that he will accept that we have made a considerable improvement and will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Stanley of Alderley

My Lords, I must withdraw the amendment although I do not wish to. I did not think that my noble and learned friend's answer was particularly good. I made an effort to ensure that his Civil Servants were not overburdened; it would happen every year, as it does under the Bill. The amount would simply drop from £1,000 to £500, the administrative costs are no greater.

I have to withdraw the amendment but I hope that when my noble and learned friend goes to Scotland tomorrow he will be asked—indeed I shall try to ensure that this happens —whether he takes the attitude that £500 is as good as £1,000. If so, will he do the same for Scottish hill farmers? With regret, I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 51 [Certification of appropriate alternative development]:

The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 258A: Page 59, line 18, after ("but") insert ("if and so far as this is appropriate having regard to the provisions of the development plan and to any other material considerations,").

The noble Earl said: My Lords, this is a revised version of the principle behind an earlier series of amendments moved at the Committee stage. The objective of these amendments was to alter the effect of certification procedures under Section 17 of the Land Compensation Act. That provides that where land is compulsorily acquired the claimant may apply to the local planning authority for a certificate to ascertain what other developments or planning permissions might have been forthcoming but for the compulsory acquisition. This procedure was not available in certain circumstances but in many instances the situation was covered under Section 16 of the Act.

The reason for extending Section 17 of the Land Compensation Act is that there are often site-specific factors affecting possible alternative uses rather than general policy factors enshrined in the local development plan. The development plan itself may not be sufficiently up to date to give accurate current guidance in individual instances.

The Government moved their own Amendment No. 297 at the Committee stage and I warmly welcomed it. However it had one serious deficiency in the form of subsection (2) which is now in Clause 51, which amended subsection (4) of the Land Compensation Act 1961. This effectively provided that a planning authority could certify that planning permission would have been granted for a development of a specified type. That is in addition to the purpose for which the land was acquired. But the important point is that the permission must also certify that no other development would have been permitted. Bearing in mind the number of alternative types of development, the alternative uses that might be considered in any instance and the breadth of interpretation possible within, say, Class B.1—to quote one example of the Town and Country Planning Act use classes order—I believe that this is a recipe for gross unfairness and for a string of appeals to the Secretary of State. Therefore I feel that it is not acceptable to leave the Government's original amendment in that form. It does not provide a perfect answer to the purpose behind the amendments that I intended to move.

The Government's reasons for objecting to my previous amendments related primarily to the conflict of interest which would arise between the contents of a Section 17 certificate and the development plan assumptions. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate admitted that the risk was probably not great and, if anything, it was set to reduce. I agree; I do not believe that the risk is great.

Amendment No. 258A seeks to reconcile the problem by inserting the words printed in the Marshalled List so that a negative opinion is included in the certificate of alternative developments only if it is clearly appropriate. This may make matters marginally more difficult for valuers in terms of agreeing the appropriate value that arises from a possible differential basis of value. However, it should allay the conflict which concerns the Government. I think that it will greatly reduce the burden on the local planning authority which would be put in an impossible position as the Bill stands and it would reduce the burden on the Secretary of State in handling possible appeals. I beg to move.

Lord Fraser of Carmyllie

My Lords, we are concerned here with the provisions added to the Bill regarding the procedure for certifying what, if any, alternative development would have been permitted on land to be compulsorily acquired.

The main purpose of the new provisions is to remove the exclusion on the issue of a certificate in respect of land which is included within a development plan. Our grounds for making this change are that the designation shown on a development plan may not always provide a sufficiently precise or up-to-date indication of the planning status of an individual site for the purpose of establishing its value.

As I made clear when we discussed the matter in Committee, in extending the scope of the certification procedure to include land covered by development plans, we need to establish a basis for resolving any potential conflict between the content of a certificate and an assumption derived from a development plan. We have sought to achieve this by providing for the certificate not merely to specify what, if any, alternative development would have been permitted but also to make clear that permission would not have been granted for any development other than that specified. The contents of a certificate will thus override any contrary assumptions arising from a development plan.

The noble Earl expressed concern over the requirement that the certificate should exclude all development other than that specified. But it seems to us that this approach provides by far the most satisfactory means of resolving any conflict between a certificate and a development plan. The noble Earl's amendment would provide for the certificate to exclude development other than that specified only in cases where it is considered appropriate, having regard to the development plan and other material considerations. However, such a formula would in my view leave matters far too vague and open-ended and thus cut right across what we seek to achieve— namely, a greater degree of precision as to the planning status of land to be compulsorily acquired. From what the noble Earl said, I believe that at one point he was prepared to accept that if his approach were to be adopted, it would make for greater difficulties for those who have responsibility for valuing. We wish to make this clear in order to eliminate unfairness and to give a degree of precision that will enable the task to be satisfactorily and clearly carried out.

I hope that the noble Earl will accept that the approach we have adopted in these provisions provides the best means of achieving the desired objective. Even if he does not care for my rejection of his amendment, I am grateful to him for what he said about the general improvement that he accepts we have introduced in these provisions.

The Earl of Lytton

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for that. I fully accept that there must be a reasonably clearly defined basis on which to establish the planning use. However, with a central area redevelopment with a basket of possible uses there will be problems in insisting that the local planning authority must certify one use and also certify that all other uses are to be excluded. In practical planning terms, that is almost incapable of being achieved other than on a "suck-it-and-see" basis, "We'll stick that one in because it's the most likely use". I feel that an element of unfairness creeps in with the amendment which the Government have already made to the Bill. That is the issue I seek to address.

There is a problem and there will be a problem in the sense that there will be appeals. People will say, "I should have been allowed such-and-such a use and I shall appeal to the Secretary of State because it is not included on my certificate". I proposed the amendment as an attempt to improve and streamline the legislation, not to try to create difficulties nor to cut across a provision which is a cardinal tenet of government policy. I wish to make that clear.

I do not believe that we are at odds on the principle behind the legislation, it is purely a technical matter of how to deal with the provision. It is not particularly difficult for valuers to get to grips with alternative uses in the context of valuing according to a Section 17 certificate. It is often the case in valuation terms that to produce an open market value one must make one or other of a series of assumptions regarding planning. In my professional life I do it all the time. I may not be typical but I suspect I am. Therefore I do not see that this creates the problem that I suspect the noble and learned Lord is trying to proffer to the House. I shall reconsider this matter. I reserve my right to return with the provision at a later stage. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

7.30 p.m.

Schedule 12 [Compensation where permission for additional development granted after acquisition]:

Lord Northbourne moved Amendment No. 259: Page 143, line 11, leave out ("ten") and insert ("twenty-one").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, once again I stand in for the noble Lord, Lord Cornwallis, on this modest amendment which is an amendment to the welcome Amendment No. 287 accepted in Committee. That amendment was proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch.

We are pressing this amendment today because we feel that a question of fairness is involved. Many development schemes take more than 10 years to complete. A motorway is but one example. If the scheme is not completed before the end of 10 years, it is unlikely that the authority will know whether land is surplus until that time. Therefore the landowner is open to the real danger of an abuse of the statutory power by the compulsory purchasing authority. There will even be a strong temptation for the purchasing authority to take just a little extra land in order to be safe. That may be by a process of—as children say —mistake on purpose. The purchasing authority may take such a step with a view to selling the land off afterwards and thereby helping to cover the cost of the project.

Where a scheme takes fewer than 10 years perhaps it takes six or eight—there will be a temptation to wait the final two years before applying for further planning permission in order not to have to pay the vendor a fair share of the additional value relating to new planning permission. That danger is made greater by the fact that many of the bodies which will have statutory powers in the future are not the old fashioned statutory undertakers but new PLCs. Those PLCs have shareholders pressing for a profit and a dividend. I believe the PLCs will regard this provision as a loophole in the legislation.

Long ago the private sector recognised that 21 years was a fair and reasonable time for deferred compensation. I find it hard to understand why the Government should take a different view. I remind the House that we are talking about compulsory purchase here. We are therefore talking about an unwilling seller. My argument is that the Government have to accept responsibility for being extra fair in that case. I believe that a period of 21 years is much more likely to provide a fair solution than 10 years. I beg to move.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, the noble Lord's amendment relates to the revised provisions of the Land Compensation Act 1961, under which a former owner of compulsorily purchased land can claim additional compensation in the event of its value being increased by a planning decision within 10 years of the acquisition. The noble Lord proposes to extend this 10 year period to 21 years.

As I indicated in response to a similar amendment in Committee, there is no simple basis for deciding over what period planning decisions should be taken into account for the purpose of establishing an entitlement to additional compensation. Certainly we want to ensure that the provisions offer adequate protection for the interests of those whose land is compulsorily acquired. On the other hand, we do not think it would be sensible to allow the entitlement to additional compensation to become too detached in time from the actual acquisition of the land. A ten year period seems to us to strike a reasonable balance between these two considerations. It is of course double the amount of time allowed under the original 1961 Act provisions. By contrast, the 21 years advocated by the noble Lord would seem to go too far in separating the question of additional compensation from the actual acquisition of the land.

The noble Lord has argued that, where an interest is reserved against future development in the private sector, the period is usually 21 years. I am not sure I can agree with this assertion. It is our impression that, in so far as such arrangements operate within the private sector, the agreed period will vary from case to case but will not normally be as long as the noble Lord suggests. It has been asserted that 21 years is the maximum period allowed under the Land Compensation Act. I am afraid that I am not clear as to what is meant by this. I am not aware of any specified period in existing land compensation legislation which would be a relevant precedent for the purpose of these provisions.

I believe the noble Lord suggested that he felt that what he was asking for was fair. I shall advocate a provision that we suggest is also fair. I hope the noble Lord will accept that the approach we have adopted here is basically a fair one, and that he will not think it necessary to press the amendment.

Lord Northbourne

My Lords, the noble Baroness will not be surprised to hear that her reply disappointed me. I disagree on the issue of fairness. It remains for me to provide some evidence in writing to support the assertions that I have made. I hope that that may lead to a reconsideration of the matter at a later stage of the Bill. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 260: Page 144, line 17, leave out ("the Land Compensation Act 1961") and insert ("this Act").

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this is purely a drafting amendment relating to Schedule 12 of the Bill, which reinstates the former provisions of Part IV of the Land Compensation Act 1961. Provision is made for interest to be paid on outstanding amounts of additional compensation under Part IV at the rate prescribed under Section 32 of the 1961 Act. As the provision is already contained in the Act, however, there is no need to repeat the title of the Act: hence the amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 54 [Home loss payments]:

Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 261: Page 60, line 32, at beginning insert: ("(1) In section 29(1) (e) of the Land Compensation Act 1973 (home loss payment where person displaced from dwelling) after the words "Housing Act 1985" there shall be inserted "or, in the case of a housing association, under ground 6 of schedule 2 of the Housing Act 1988".").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 261, I wish to speak also to Amendment No. 262. We return here to the issue of home loss payments for tenants as well as owner occupiers. We had an interesting and, in some ways, encouraging debate in Committee when I proposed a number of amendments which appeared to be defective. Perhaps I had not found the perfect form for those amendments. However, the principle I sought to achieve was that home loss payments should be available to tenants as well as to owner occupiers on the basis enunciated by the Minister when she said that the fundamental consideration was the distress and disruption caused to people when they were deprived of their home after they had lived in it for a long time. It appears to us that if the criterion is the period of time spent in the home, that should apply equally to tenants as to owner occupiers. Owner occupiers of course also obtain the value of the home. The home loss payment is an additional payment.

We also sought to update the provisions in the Bill. It provides at the moment for statutory tenants. The Housing Act 1988 is progressively replacing statutory tenancies by assured tenancies at different speeds in different parts of the country. That is the Government's intention. As no one in his right mind who has a statutory tenancy would choose to replace it with an assured tenancy—as an assured tenancy provides less security of tenure and less security against rent increases—we believed that those who were put in the position of having an assured tenancy should have protection. That is the intention of one part of Amendment No. 262.

There are a number of grounds whereby tenants of housing associations may lose their tenancies. There is a particular ground concerning permanent removal from their homes if the homes are declared unfit for human habitation. We did not believe that provision was covered by the Bill as drafted and we felt that it should be covered.

Finally, in the latter part of Amendment No. 262 we cover the question of spouses with rights of occupation under the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983. There appeared to be an imbalance in that the husband normally has the tenancy but the wife does not have the same written tenancy and therefore is not entitled to home loss payments in the same way as the husband would be.

Again, there was discussion of the matter in Committee. The Minister sought to persuade me that it was not a problem and she has been kind enough to write to me since then. However, I am still not convinced that the matter is entirely clear. I believe that it is desirable for her definitive position on this matter to be spelt out in the House and to be available in Hansard as a result.

We should like to find a way of securing that the degree of home loss payment should be proportional to the length of time the tenant has been in the home, in the same way as it will be for owner occupiers. If I have not found a satisfactory way of achieving that objective I apologise to the House, but I shall certainly go on trying. I beg to move.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, in relation to Amendment No. 261 I should first make clear that any housing association tenant who is displaced from his home because the property has been compulsorily purchased for purposes of public development, for example a road scheme, will receive a home loss payment on the same basis as any other tenant.

The noble Lord's amendment relates, however, to the position of registered housing association tenants who are compelled by the association itself to move to enable the property to be redeveloped. Whether or not the tenant in those circumstances receives a home loss payment currently depends on the nature of his tenancy. A tenant with an old-style secure tenancy under the Housing Act 1985 is entitled to payment, whereas a tenant with a new-style assured tenancy under the Housing Act 1988 is not.

As I explained to your Lordships in Committee, the difference in the position as between old- and new-style tenancies reflects the shift in our overall approach towards the voluntary housing movement. Our policy has been to avoid applying additional statutory provisions to assured tenancies granted by registered housing associations which are not part of the general assured tenancy regime (which also covers lettings by commercial landlords). However, I entirely accept that a housing association tenant with an assured tenancy who is displaced for redevelopment purposes ought to receive financial compensation on similar terms to those applying in respect of old-style tenancies. As I indicated in Committee, we consider that that requirement can best be met by way of the tenants' guarantee. That is the general framework of guidance, formulated by the Housing Corporation on a statutory basis, with which all registered housing associations are expected to comply in managing their properties.

We have asked the Housing Corporation to make provision in the tenants' guarantee for housing association tenants with assured tenancies who are displaced to be compensated on a similar basis as would apply if they came within the scope of the statutory home loss payment scheme. We have no reason to expect that the Housing Corporation will be unwilling to comply with that request.

The issue is being considered as part of a general review of the guarantee which we hope will have been concluded by the time the Bill concludes its passage through Parliament. I hope that the noble Lord can accept my undertaking in that respect and will not press Amendment No. 261.

Amendment No. 262 seeks to add to those people who already qualify for home loss payments a further three groups. The first group is statutory tenants within the meaning of the Rent Act 1977. As I said in Committee, it is not necessary to extend the home loss payment provisions expressly to that Act. Although the provisions refer to the Rent Act 1968, tenants under the 1977 Act also qualify by virtue of the fact that the 1977 Act was a consolidation of the 1968 Act and other Acts. The link is provided by the Interptetation Act, as is usual where legislation has been revised or re-enacted. There is thus no need for the noble Lord's amendment.

The second group would be those occupying a dwelling under a contractual licence. In our view, there is no case for bringing licensees within the scope of the home loss payment scheme. We are talking here about people living in a dwelling under a casual or short-term arrangement—for example, a lodger, a paying guest, or a student in term-time digs. Such people have no legal interest in the property, they do not have security of tenure, and in general one would not expect that in their case loss of the accommodation would give rise to the sort of personal distress with which the home loss payment scheme is concerned. There is also, as I explained in Committee, the possibility of such persons leapfrogging relatively easily from one home to another, ahead of an authority which requires possession of those properties, simply in order to gain entitlement to a home loss payment on each occasion.

The third group to which Amendment No. 262 refers is deserted spouses with rights of occupation under tile Matrimonial Homes Act 1983. I have given a good deal of thought to this matter since the noble Lord first raised it in Committee and I have listened carefully to the arguments he has advanced this evening. I have to agree that there is an issue here which we ought to look into further. I cannot at this stage make any firm promises, but I am prepared to go away and consider the problem in consultation with colleagues, to see whether there is any scope for us to come forward with a suitable provision in another place which would meet the noble Lord's concern.

I hope that the noble Lord will not wish to press his amendments in view of the response I have given. I rest my case.

7.45 p.m.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

My Lords, we are not in a court of law yet; and I am certainly not on trial! That answer is three-quarters satisfactory. What the Minister said about the request made to the Housing Corporation goes further than what she was able to say at Committee. She said then that she proposed to make a request to the corporation and she now tells us that she has made that request. She recognises the justice of the assured tenancies, which we are agreed nobody moves to from choice, as being recognised for home loss payments in the same way.

What is required is for the Housing Corporation to continue to provide funding to the housing association movement to pay those home loss payments to assured tenants as well as to secure tenants. That is an issue which will no doubt be dealt with at another time. Therefore I shall beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 261.

In connection with Amendment No. 262 I am very satisfied with what the Minister said in connection with the definition of statutory tenant within the meaning of the Rent Act 1977, and I shall not return to the matter again.

I am not really satisfied with what she said about contractual licence because I am not convinced that contractual licences are always short term, as she suggested. A number of cases have been drawn to my attention, particularly of elderly people who have been in their homes for a very long time and have nothing in writing. They could be retired people who have been in a tied home and the position has never been regularised. They will still run the risk of loss of their home without adequate compensation. That is a matter to which I may have to return at a later stage.

I am grateful for what the Minister said about the rights of spouses under the Matrimonial Homes Act and I look forward to seeing the amendment that is brought forward in another place. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, be leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 262 not moved.]

The Deputy Speaker (Lord Skelmersdale)

My Lords, if Amendment No. 263 is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 264.

Lord Coleraine moved Amendment No. 263: Page 61, leave out lines 3 to 11 and insert:

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 263 I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 265, 267, 268 and 269 in my own name, and also to Amendment No. 266 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, and the noble Lord, Lord Ross of Newport. I understand that we shall also be discussing Amendments Nos. 264 and 270 in the name of my noble friend Lord Mottistone.

There is very little between my own amendment and the amendment of the noble Lords, Lord McIntosh and Lord Ross, in terms of what they seek to achieve. The Bill provides considerable improvements in the position of tenants in relation to their right to receive a home loss compensation payment. On the other hand, the compensation—the home loss payment—which tenants will receive has hardly changed in many cases since 1973. In Committee I did not feel that that was a point that my noble friend took on board. I hope that this evening she will say something to encourage me to believe that we shall get somewhere in this respect. She said: A number of the amendments reflect concern that our proposals do not involve sufficiently generous treatment of tenants as compared with owner-occupiers. While it is undoubtedly true that nearly everyone is distressed when they have to move home against their will it seems to us that the distress will normally be greater for those who have substantially invested in their homes". [Official Report, 4/2/91; col. 1081.] That seems to me to be unkind. I wonder whether my noble friend has confused distress with financial loss. But I do not make that point.

I shall not worry your Lordships with details of figures, because I am trying in my amendments and the other amendments to deal with the principles involved. My amendments provide for home loss payments to be fixed partly by fixed payment and partly by a percentage of the value of the interest acquired. One point that I raised in Committee was that it is only with this new Bill that the home loss payment provisions applying to tenants have been separated from those applying to owner occupiers by the introduction of what seems to be a slightly irrelevant dividing line between the interests of an owner and those of others.

In Committee I drew attention to various types of tenancy in which there were anomalies; namely, between tenants who might fall on one side or the other of the dividing line. If home loss payments are to be dealt with in a sensible way we should try to return to the position in which the distinction is not made. In that respect I prefer my amendment to the noble Lord's amendment whereby the distinction to be introduced by this Bill is maintained.

There is one other way in which I am not altogether happy with the noble Lord's amendment. It is very easy to award payments based on the number of years of occupation. I think that it is not right to suggest that as a general rule the distress which is occasioned on the loss of a home is to be measured by the length of time that one has lived in it. This is a case where one should adopt the legal tag that equality is equity and provide a similar payment for distress for all who have suffered it. I beg to move.

Lord Mottistone

My Lords, my amendment is slightly different. I shall speak solely to Amendments Nos. 264 and 270 in my name. As was said in Committee by my noble friend Lord Coleraine, the Minister made much of the fact that this clause was in aid of compensating people for personal distress and inconvenience. I drew your Lordships' attention to the point that there is a wider issue involved. It is imperative to the future success of British business competing on the home, European and worldwide markets that development proposals, in particular for major infrastructure projects, should not be hindered. That can occur when home owners object to the proposals on grounds that they are being offered inadequate compensation payments to move house. Adequate payments can help to smooth out the anxieties and reluctance of some home owners toward a future development in their local vicinity.

I must however stress that the level of compensation payment must be sufficient to satisfy all relevant home owners as potential objectors and an appropriate level chosen to discourage them from formally opposing development proposals. I feel that that level should be 25 per cent. I urge my noble friend to appreciate that point.

As I told the Committee, France gives 20 per cent. It seems to me that in a typical British way we have selected the figure at 10 per cent. as the least that can be given to appear to compensate for personal distress and inconvenience suffered by people who are forced to move, as referred to in Committee by my noble friend. That does not address the problem of discouraging formal opposition to a move by an enraged householder. It takes only one dissatisfied owner to object to and delay in a most considerable manner such British developments as are vital to the future economic success of our country. I do not believe that the difference between 25 per cent. and 10 per cent. in cash terms will be vast. It is not as though the whole of the country was to have roads and railways run across it. It is only a selected area that would be affected.

I honestly believe that the principle that I am trying to voice is worthy of very serious consideration by my noble friend. When I move my amendments, provided that previous amendments are not agreed to, I hope that she will agree to them.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment No. 266 standing in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Ross. I listened with care to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and his observations about the differences between Amendment No. 266 and his amendment, Amendment No. 263. I accept that both amendments are trying to do the same thing; namely, to bring the sliding scale into operation for tenants as well as for owner-occupiers. Therefore, in one sense I do not mind very much which of the two amendments is accepted, provided that the Government are in favour of the principle. From what the Minister said in Committee I think that they were in favour of it and that we can be reasonably relaxed about the form of words that is used.

The difficulty about my amendment—I am not sure that I understand the noble Lord's amendment—is that by my amendment residence in previous homes counts only towards the minimum home loss payment and not when counting additional years. Therefore to that extent my amendment is the more modest. I hope that one of the two amendments, or at any rate the principle of a sliding scale for tenants, will be acceptable to the House.

Lord Ross of Newport

My Lords, I do not have very much to add to what has already been said. At the end of the day I hope that this House decides to give to tenants a more generous allocation in home loss payments. I supported the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, because I was specifically asked to do so by someone from the tenants' association, who drew the matter to my attention in the first place. I suspect that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, is preferable and I certainly go along with it.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, the amendments of my noble friend Lord Mottistone, Amendments Nos. 264 and 270, would provide for the home loss payment for owner-occupiers to be set at 25 per cent. of the value of the property rather than at 10 per cent. The amendment of my noble friend Lord Coleraine would involve a substantial restructuring of the home loss payments provisions. As I understand it, he proposes that the payments in all cases—owner-occupiers and tenanti—should be £5,000 plus 10 per cent. of the market value of the property above £50,000 without any upper limit.

The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, Amendment No. 266, would provide for the home loss payment for non-owner-occupiers to be £1,500 multiplied by the number of complete years that claimant has occupied the property, subject to a maximum of £15,000.

Your Lordships will know that under our proposals owner-occupiers will receive 10 per cent. of the market value of their property, subject to a minimum of £1,500 and a maximum of £15,000. The payment to tenants remains at £1,500 but the residence qualification for all claimants is reduced from five years to one year. We are also broadening entitlement in various other ways, in particular by removing the bar on a home loss payment in the case of blight notice acquisitions.

These new arrangements apply to anyone displaced in qualifying circumstances as from 16th November 1990. I do not think anyone denies that our proposals represent a substantial improvement on the previous scheme.

I start by emphasising once again that we are not concerned here with a simple black and white issue. As your Lordships are aware, the essential purpose of the home loss payment scheme is to provide some monetary compensation for the personal distress and inconvenience involved in the enforced loss of one's home. Since there is clearly no way in which personal distress can be objectively measured, whatever level of compensation is chosen must in the last resort be arbitrary. We can make the choice only on the basis of a judgment as to what is reasonable in all the circumstances—reasonable from the point of view of the claimant who is losing his home, but reasonable too in terms of the burden which the taxpayer or local chargepayer is expected to bear.

Forming such a judgment is a far from simple matter and I freely admit that we did not find it easy to reach a decision. But overall it seems to us that the approach we have adopted achieves the right balance between the two key considerations that I have mentioned. I would be very doubtful indeed as to whether that could be said of some of the various alternatives proposed by my noble friends. I have to say that the formula advocated by my noble friend Lord Coleraine is particularly open to objection in that it would seem to involve an almost limitless call on the public purse.

A number of your Lordships remain unhappy about the position of tenants under our proposals. I do not lightly dismiss these anxieties, but I would say this in response. We are dealing, as I have said, with the distress caused by the loss of a home and it seems to us that such distress will be considerably greater among those who have bought their property—perhaps making considerable sacrifice in order to do so—than among tenants. Whereas tenants frequently have to live with the possibility of being required to move at some stage because the landlord requires possession of the property, the home owner normally expects to enjoy complete security of tenure. For him the enforced loss of his home at the hands of a statutory authority will generally come as a totally unforeseen blow.

Moreover, the owner-occupier who is displaced under statutory action is usually put to the trouble of finding an alternative property for himself, whereas a tenant can normally expect to be rehoused by the local housing authority—in many cases in accommodation of a superior standard to that which he has left.

On these grounds it seems to us right that the home loss payment for owner-occupiers should in general be higher than that for tenants. But let me also remind your Lordships that tenants stand to benefit from other aspects of our proposals. In particular, many more of them will not be eligible for a home loss payment as a result of the relaxation in the residence qualifications.

My noble friend Lord Mottistone proposes once again that the payment for owner-occupiers should be set at 25 per cent. of market value rather than the 10 per cent. that we propose. He has argued that to place the home loss payment scheme on a still more generous basis than we propose in this Bill would pay dividends in the form of a reduction in the extent to which major development proposals are resisted by those whose property stands to be acquired. Certainly, we wish to do all we reasonably can to minimise the cases in which people resist public development simply because they consider the terms of compensation to be unfair. Indeed, we hope that our proposals will yield important benefits in this respect. However, I would be very wary of putting too much emphasis on that aspect. There is no hard evidence as to how far the degree of resistance to public development is influenced by the terms on which compensation is available. After all, the people whose property is actually acquired for a public development are often only a very small proportion of the total number affected in some way by that development. But in any case it is our firm view that the crucial consideration in determining the level of compensation must be not what will prove effective in buying off resistance to projects, but rather what is fair as between the interests of the individual claimant and the community as a whole.

Despite what my noble friend has said about the French approach to land compensation, a comparison between the French system and our own is by no means straightforward. It is true that the French system provides for a general percentage supplement on top of market value for all claimants. This may in some cases be as high as 25 per cent., but only on the first 100,000 francs—that is £10,000. Otherwise, the percentage varies from case to case but is normally around 10 per cent. The French do not reimburse many of the incidental costs which are specifically covered by our provisions—for example, legal and surveying fees—and there is no provision for home loss or farm loss payments. So it is not at all clear that claimants do better in France than they do in this country.

My approach in responding to the various points which have been raised on the level of home loss payments is not to say that the Government's proposals are self-evidently right and the alternatives obviously wrong. These are undoubtedly difficult issues. However, I hope that your Lordships will accept that the provisions in the Bill represent a very substantial improvement on the terms of compensation offered to those who lose their homes and that they strike a reasonable balance between fairness to the claimant and a sensible use of public resources. I hope that on this basis noble Lords will not feel it necessary to press their amendments.

8 p.m.

Lord Mottistone

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I thank my noble friend for her answer to my amendments. The arguments seem plausible. Perhaps a figure halfway between 10 per cent. and 25 per cent. might be an answer. However, that would be a matter for another place.

Lord Coleraine

My Lords, my noble friend's reply was hardly nourishing. She has not answered the question of why compensation to tenants should be so little more than it was 18 years ago when the Act was originally passed.

She stated that tenants at some point must expect their leases to come to an end and the wicked landlord to shove them into the snow. Many tenancies end at a fixed time and the tenants have a perfectly good knowledge of when they will have to move. They can make their arrangements. Other tenancies have the protection of the law. I refer to assured tenancies or statutory tenancies. It cannot be said that those tenants can be chucked into the snow by the landlord. I did not find that part of her answer satisfying.

Nor did I find the answer satisfactory that an owner-occupier with his money will suffer more from being disturbed than the tenant. The owner-occupier by definition normally has the money with which to buy somewhere to which to move. The tenant is not in that position. He has to find another tenancy or go to the local authority for housing. I hope that the matter will be given further consideration and that it may be possible to produce a better provision in another place. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 264 not moved.]

The Deputy Speaker

My Lords, I have to inform the House that if Amendment No. 265 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 266.

[Amendments Nos. 265 to 269 not moved.]

Clause 56 [Home Loss Payments]:

[Amendment No. 270 not moved.]

Schedule 13 [Amendments relating to land compensation]:

The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 270A: Page 152, line 17, at end insert:

("Further provision as to compensation for injurious affection

. After subsection (2) of section 10 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (further provision as to compensation for injurious affection) there is inserted— (2A) Where a person has a right to compensation for injurious affection under this section that compensation shall include compensation for disturbance or any other matter not directly based on the valuation of the land." ").

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I return to the theme of Amendment No. 341 which I moved at Committee stage. I felt that it was submerged in a group of other amendments, and that it was proper to raise the matter again at this stage.

The amendment relates to losses to a business arising out of public works. In particular, it seeks to reverse the effect of the decision of this House in the case of Argyle Motors (Birkenhead) v. Birkenhead Corporation in 1975. The effect of the case was that although the claimant had no land taken, he had satisfied the requirements under Section 10 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 enabling him to make a claim for the loss in the value of his interest in land. That was accepted and was perfectly justified.

However, the claim for the loss to the business operating from those premises was disallowed. It was recognised that there was no right of compensation for an admitted loss even though other losses relating to land value had been accepted. It was also admitted that it caused undue hardship.

At Committee stage the Minister objected to my previous amendment. It was lumped together with other amendments. I wish to clarify that the issue has nothing to do with the general loss of business that might be incurred by the general construction of a bypass. It relates to a specific instance. It ensures that where a claim for loss in the value of land is admitted and established under the limited terms of Section 10 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 the consequential losses should also be taken into account. I believe that any other approach is entirely artificial. Why should somebody receive compensation for loss in the value of the land but not receive compensation for losses to the business that is being conducted from it? That appears to be an anomaly. I wish to make it clear that Amendment No. 270A does not create a new category of claimant.

Claims under Section 10 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 can be made only in a few cases where no land is taken but where a legal right has been interfered with. Why should the provision be limited to that, and that alone? Surely, if land is taken, the profits from a business form part and parcel of that claim. At present an anomalous situation exists because where land is taken one can claim for the loss of business, but if one merely has a right of access interfered with, one cannot. How can that be right? I believe that an indefensible hardship is being created and that the Government should consider the position most carefully. I beg to move.

Lord Fraser of Carmyllie

My Lords, the noble Earl was anxious that the point that he made in Committee had been lost. It may have been lost on everyone else but it was not lost on me. From the way in which he has again argued the point it is clear that he understands the issue causing anxiety.

The noble Earl argues once more that compensation for injurious affection under Section 10 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 should take account of disturbance or any other matter not directly based on the value of the land. As he has explained, compensation claims can be made under Section 10 in cases where land is not taken but is, nevertheless, injuriously affected by the carrying out of public development. The provision is relevant mainly to business claimants.

The basis of compensation under Section 10 is the depreciation in the value of land due to the execution of the development. In the Argyle case, to which the noble Earl has referred, it was held that, where access to a motorcar showroom was permanently hindered by the reconstructed approach roads to the Mersey Tunnel, the compensation claimed under Section 10 could reasonably include loss of profitability in the business, in so far as it affected the value of the land on which the showroom stood. However, as the noble Earl has clearly said, actual loss of profits should not be taken into account. His amendment is designed to reverse the Argyle decision so that actual cash losses can be taken into account in an award of compensation under Section 10. I understand that while his amendment might expand the claim it does not introduce a new class of claim.

I regret to say that the Government are not persuaded that there is a case for changing the law in this respect. On balance it seems to us right that compensation in this context should relate to the value of the property concerned. If the owner of the business has been adversely affected by public development, that adverse effect will normally be reflected in a depreciation in the value of the property, including the business. Where such depreciation occurs, the owner can cliam compensation under Section 10.

A businessman affected by public development in this way will still of course be able to run his business. He may need to adjust his commercial strategy to take account of his changed situation and thus maintain his profits. But that is no different from what would be required in the event of, for example, the establishment of a rival business.

It is our view that Section 10, as it has been interpreted by the courts, provides a reasonable basis for the assessment of compensation in injurious affection cases. I know that the noble Earl will understand the argument. I cannot agree, as he would urge, that the basis for compensation in such cases should be further extended.

The Earl of Lytton

My Lords, I appear to be having a bruising experience at the tongue of the noble and learned Lord. There is no disagreement between us on the extent of the provision, what it does and what it seeks to remedy. I felt that it was of limited application and accept that to some extent that cuts both ways. If it is of limited application, why legislate to put something right? On the other hand, one gross unfairness is one gross unfairness too many. That is why I return to the fray on this issue. I shall reconsider the situation because the Minister's reply is not entirely satisfactory. I recognise the point he makes that someone can continue the business that they are running. While reserving my position, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

8.15 p.m.

The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 270B: Page 152, line 17, at end insert:

("Notice requiring entry

. After section 12 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (unauthorised entry) there is inserted—

"Notice requiring entry.

12A.—(1) Any person served with a notice to treat under section 5 of this Act (notice to treat, and untraced owners) shall be entitled at any time after the expiration of the period of one year from service of that notice and before it ceases for any reason to have effect to serve a counter-notice on the acquiring authority requiring the authority to take possession of any land included in the notice to treat and specified in the counter-notice, of which he is entitled to give them possession, on a date specified in the counter-notice being a date not earlier than the latest date on which the authority are entitled to withdraw the notice to treat under section 31 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 (withdrawal of notice to treat).

(2) Unless the acquiring authority withdraw the notice to treat under section 31 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 (withdrawal of notice to treat) the counter-notice shall take effect on the date specified in it and the authority shall be deemed to have entered on and taken possession of the land on that date as if they had served a notice of entry under section 11 of this Act (powers of entry).

(3) If the notice to treat is withdrawn as mentioned in subsection (2) the counter-notice shall be of no effect." ").

The noble Earl said: My Lords, the amendment relates to an amendment that I moved at an earlier stage. The purpose was to enable a claimant who had had a notice to treat served upon him under the provisions of a compulsory purchase order to serve a counter-notice on the authority requiring it to take possession of the land. The reason is that there may be a gap of months or years between the service of the notice to treat and entry by the acquiring authority. During debates at an earlier stage it was recognised by the Minister that the situation caused hardship. Unfortunately, I was unable to persuade her of the merits of my amendment.

In the meantime a claimant is caught in a period of indecision where he can neither seek alternative premises nor make any medium or long-term plans. The previous amendment was objected to, although the inequity of the situation was recognised, principally because of the provision in the Government's Clause 46 (now Clause 53) that after three years the notice to treat will cease to have effect. Three years is a substantial period of uncertainty and is highly disruptive. In this respect I am concerned in particular about householders because they are most at risk. I fail to understand that it is reasonable to protect the public interest in this way by penalising a certain sector of society.

In order to obtain a compulsory purchase order an acquiring authority must in any event be satisfied and prove that the land is required. I cannot accept that an authority can merely change its mind three years after serving a notice to treat and walk away from the natural consequences of that action. My amendment seeks to provide that after a certain period of time a claimant should require an authority to take possession of his land in order to introduce an element of certainty to the proceedings. It seeks to accommodate what I understood to be the Government's feelings and reservations about my original amendment. In addition, it seeks to provide the essential safeguard to claimants who must wait more than one year from the service of the notice to treat without entry being taken. That is an ample period.

I welcome the fact that a three-year rule has been introduced and I give the Government credit for that. Not everyone wishes to sell up as opposed to remaining in occupation for as long as possible. However, in other cases a severe hardship is caused by the acquiring authority not having taken possession. I know that it is contrary to the Government's philosophy to have the facility for somebody to put a requirement on the acquiring authority as opposed to it having full discretion in these matters. However, hardship must be avoided and, in all fairness, something must be done even if this amendment is not the best vehicle. I beg to move.

Baroness Blatch

My Lords, the amendment is similar to that which the noble Earl moved in Committee except for the fact that the owner's right to require acquisition would be delayed until one year after the service of notice to treat. That would leave a period of two years in which the owner could take such action before the notice to treat would lapse by default by virtue of Clauses 53 or 62 of the Bill.

I do not want to give the impression that the Government are unsympathetic to the position of owners who have been served with notice to treat but who are uncertain and worried about when the acquiring authority will actually take possession of their property. On the contrary, we are sufficiently concerned to have introduced provisions, which put a three-year limit on the effectiveness of notice to treat if no constructive progress has been made by the authority in that time. The noble Earl accepted that. Indeed such a time limit was among the recommendations put forward by the RICS in its memorandum on land compensation published in 1989. We believe that it is a fair and reasonable timescale for both claimant and authority.

However, in making provision for claimants, we must take care to ensure that we are not burdening authorities with unnecessary bureaucracy and costly administrative responsibilities which, in financial terms, outweigh the perceived advantages to claimants. A right for owners to intervene and insist that the acquiring authority enter on to the land as and when he chose would, in our view, tip the balance too far against authorities. The co-ordination of public development is normally a complex and time-consuming process and it seems to us that to accept the noble Earl's proposal would mean adding a further layer of complication which it would be very difficult to justify.

The noble Earl has been extremely patient this evening. He has put his case very well and the Government are not without sympathy for it. However, in this instance we argue for a balance between both parties. I hope the noble Earl will not press his amendment.

The Earl of Lytton

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply and for putting it in such courteous terms, as she always does. After consultation with the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors I decided to retable this amendment in its present form. It is true that it was originally suggested that three years was probably a satisfactory period. I believe it was felt that that was the best that could be achieved at the time rather than what was necessarily considered to be fair, particularly to the claimant, in the circumstances.

This is a difficult question of balance. I shall consider the matter further. I thank the noble Baroness for her kind comments and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Stanley of Alderley moved Amendment No. 271: Page 153, line 28, at end insert:

("Disturbance payments

. Section 37(7) of the Land Compensation Act 1973 is omitted.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I apologise for not raising this matter before. I had not appreciated the point until we discussed tenants' compensation in Committee.

If a claimant for compensation has a greater interest than a tenant for a year or from year to year, he must be served with a notice to treat. That being so, Section 20 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 will not apply. Those holding up to five-year tenancies under Section 5 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 are in such a position. There is a strong argument that they should be no worse off than a yearly tenant. The statutory means of achieving that is vague and extremely complicated. For a reason which I do not understand, agricultural interests were excluded from the provisions of Section 37 of the Land Compensation Act 1973. That enabled those without "compensationable" interest to be paid disturbance.

It is considered that while such an exclusion may have been justified under conditions prevailing in 1973, the increased number of short-term tenancies now becoming apparent require a change and the removal of Section 37(1) would be a step towards that.

I hope that my noble friend will say that I am correct to pose this problem. If I am and the Government will not accept this amendment, which I believe would make the position absolutely clear, will she say whether the Government have other ideas to deal with the problem?

There is an additional anxiety. On 12th February this year my right honourable friend the Minister responsible for agriculture published a consultation paper which, if accepted, would put all future tenants in the same category as those I have in mind as regards this amendment. I realise that my noble friend cannot give me a specific answer to that point as she will say that that depends on what the Government eventually decide to do after consultation. However, perhaps she will assure me that representatives of her department will take a walk over to the Ministry of Agriculture to discuss the problems of these new tenants as regards compensation. Her department could be landed with some fairly burdensome problems if that does not take place. Perhaps wrongly, I feel that the Department of the Environment does not always deign to talk to other departments, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture. I beg to move.

Bareness Blatch

My Lords, it would appear that the reason why agricultural land was omitted from Section 37 was that disturbance compensation in respect of agricultural interests which would not otherwise be covered by Section 5 of the 1961 Act were already provided for under existing agricultural legislation.

In our view, provision for disturbance for tenant farmers displaced by compulsory purchase is adequately dealt with under agricultural legislation in those cases where it is not covered by the land compensation code.

I know that my noble friend is also concerned about the levels of compensation which might be payable to tenant farmers following the reform of agricultural tenancy law which my right honourable friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food has recently published. I can assure my noble friend that the Department of the Environment will be keeping in close touch with the Ministry of Agriculture over these issues and that they will look carefully at any interaction between the statutory land compensation code and agricultural legislation. I hope my noble friend will agree that it would not be appropriate to address these matters in this Bill. If I promise my noble friend that I shall go walkies across to MAFF in his interests, I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.

Lord Stanley of Alderley

My Lords, I am very grateful for that answer which is exactly what I wanted to hear. I do not believe that short-term tenancies are covered by the land compensation code. However, if the Minister is prepared to take that walk to the Ministry of Agriculture, no doubt she will iron out the problem. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 272: Page 154, line 38, leave out paragraph 14 and insert: ("14.—(1) In Schedule 13 to that Act (blighted land) for paragraph 16 there is substituted—

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, in moving this amendment I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 273 to 278. These are essential drafting and consequential amendments relating to the service of blight notices in respect of highway proposals by the Secretary of State. Also included are some minor amendments in respect of compensation for ecclesiastical property. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 273 to 277: Page 155, leave out line 30 and insert:

Page 155, line 32, at end insert ("and, in either case, shall be applied", and Page 156, line 24, leave out paragraph 27. Page 156, line 26, leave out ("that") and insert ("the principal"). Page 156, line 39, leave out paragraph 30.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 15 [Amendments relating to land compensation in Scotland]:

Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 278: Page 168, line 46, at end insert: ("15A.—(1) In section 181 of the 1972 Act (blighted land) for paragraph (h) of subsection (1) there is substituted—

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 279: After Clause 65, insert the following new clause:

Consequential amendment of section 91A of Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988

(". In section 91A of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (waste disposal: restoration payments)—

  1. (a) in subsection (4) (b) for "any term of a relevant agreement" there is substituted "any relevant obligation"; and
  2. (b) for subsection (7) there is substituted—
(7) For the purposes of this section a relevant obligation is—
  1. (a) an obligation arising under an agreement made under—
    1. (i) section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, as originally enacted;
    2. (ii) section 50 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972;
  2. (b) a planning obligation entered into under section 106 of the Act of 1990, as substituted by section 12 of the Planning and Compensation Act 1991;
  3. (c) an obligation arising under or under an agreement made under any provision—
    1. (i) corresponding to section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, as originally enacted or as substituted by the Act of 1991; and
    2. (ii) for the time being in force in Northern Ireland."").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I have spoken to this amendment with Amendment No. 64. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 66 [Short title, commencement, etc.]:

Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 280: Page 73, line 42, at end insert: ("(4A) Nothing in any provision of this Act affects the punishment for an offence committed before the provision comes into force.").

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this amendment inserts a new subsection (4A) in Clause 66 of the Bill, so as to safeguard anyone who is convicted of an offence under the principal Act which he committed before any provision of the Bill, following its enactment, comes into force. This is the usual procedure where Parliament approves an increase in the maximum penalty for offences.

It would be inequitable if an increased maximum penalty provided by the Bill were imposed by the court for an offence committed before the new penalty takes effect. This amendment effectively retains as the maximum penalty the maximum applicable at the time the offence was committed, irrespective of the date of the conviction. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 281: Page 74, line 2, after ("Act") insert ("apart from section (Consequential amendment of section 91A of Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988)").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I have spoken to this amendment with Amendment No. 64. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 17 [Repeals]:

Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 282: Page 174, line 21, at end insert:

("1976 c. 57. Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976. In section 7(5) paragraph (a) (in).").

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 282, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 283 to 292, 302 and 305. These amendments to repeal a schedule are, as always, consequential on provisions in the Bill or in amendments which have already been discussed. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 283 to 292: Page 175, line 13, column 3, at end insert:

("In section 63(5) "65, 71(1) or".").
Page 175, line 19, column 3, at end insert:
("In section 176(4) "in writing".").
Page 175, line 31, column 3, leave out (""such a reference or" (in subsection (2))"). Page 175, line 43, column 3, at end insert:
("Section 266(3).").
Page 175, line 47, column 3, leave out ("Section 285(2)") and insert ("In section 285, in subsection (2) "(6) to (8)" and subsections"). Page 176, line 35, leave out second ("and"). Page 176, line 38, at end insert:
("and in the entry relating to section 285 "except subsections (5) and (6)"; and in Part III, the entries relating to sections 312(2) and 324(4); and Parts IV and V."
Page 176, line 40, column 3, at end insert:
("In section 38(2) "within such period as may be so specified." In section 39(7) "in writing". Section 42(7).").
Page 176, line 50, column 3, at end insert:
("In section 36(5) "Subject to subsection (6)".").
Page 176, line 51, column 3, leave out ("3, paragraph 10") and insert ("2, paragraphs 3(2) and 35(1) (b).").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 293 to 300: Page 177, line 6, at end insert:

("1968 c. 14. Public Expenditure and Receipts Act 1968. In Schedule 3, paragraph 7(b).").
Page 177, line 22, column 3, at end insert:
("In section 198(4) (a) "80, 81". In section 220(3) (a) "80, 81". In section 262(4) and (7) (a) "123". In section 263(3) "123(3) and (4)". Section 284(3) (c).").
Page 177, line 34, column 3, at end insert:
("In section 315(2), the words from "and in relation" to "in respect of such land".").
Page 177, 38, column, 3, leave our ("definition") and insert ("definitions"). Page 177, line 39, column 3, at end insert
("and "previous apportionment". In Schedule 1, in paragraph 16(1) "114".").
Page 177, line 42, column 3, at end insert:
("In Schedule 16, in Parts III and VI, the entries relating to Schedule 12.").
Page 177, line 49, column 3, at end insert:
In section 91(2) "new development".").
Page 177, line 50, column 3, after ("Schedule 2") insert ("paragraphs 12(3) (a), 18, 24(3) (a) (i) and").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 301 to 305: Page 178, line 26, at end insert:

("1968 c. 14. Public Expenditure and Receipts Act 1968. In Schedule 3, paragraph 7(a).").
Page 179, line 53, column 3, at end insert:
("Section 214(3).").
Page 180, line 22, column 3, leave out ("and"). Page 180, line 23, column 3, at end insert
("and "previous apportionment".").
Page 181, line 18, column 3, leave out ("paragraph 3(a)") and insert ("in paragraph 3, sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) (iii)").

On Question, amendments agreed to.