UN Charter: Collective Security

HL Deb 06 February 1991 vol 525 cc1162-98

2.57 p.m.

Lord Campbell of Croy rose to call attention to the terms and the application of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter on action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to leave to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

My object is to raise for debate the subject of collective security made topical by the actions of Saddam Hussein but looking to the future after the Gulf war has ended.

Six months ago a flagrant and unprovoked act of aggression was committed against Kuwait. For the first time since the founding of the United Nations 45 years ago, the five permanent members of the Security Council and a large majority of members united to oppose and undo the misdeed. The principle of collective security has been upheld more widely than ever before in modern history. That is welcome and gratifying although it means that we are engaged in a war and on a scale which we would not have wished.

Since 2nd August, the structure of the United Nations and the Charter have been used correctly, quickly and decisively in the resolutions adopted by the Security Council, especially Resolution No. 660 on 2nd August, and Resolution No. 661 four days later calling for economic sanctions.

I can easily visualise those meetings in New York because I was part of the small United Kingdom permanent mission to the United Nations there 41 years ago. I was at the emergency meeting of the Security Council on a Sunday morning in June 1950, the day after North Korea attacked South Korea and at the subsequent meetings. Our chief, Sir Alexander Cadogan, was not with us at the Sunday meeting; he was on retirement leave. A few days later my noble kinsman Lord Gladwyn, who had already been designated his successor, took over. I am delighted to see that he is to speak in this debate because he was also the first acting Secretary-General of the United Nations before Mr. Trygve Lie was appointed.

Immediate action by the United Nations was possible in 1950 because the Soviet Union was absent—deliberately absent —for several weeks as a protest that the Chinese representative had not been replaced by a representative of the new communist government. The necessary resolutions were adopted without Soviet opposition or veto. That there would have been Soviet opposition became clear from the speeches of the Soviet representative, Mr. Malik, after the Soviet delegation returned to the council five weeks later when it was the Soviet turn to take the chair. In the cases of Korea and the Gulf the Security Council resolutions were put into effect with strength because the United States sent substantial armed forces with speed.

In 1950 American forces were nearby in Japan. Other countries sent small detachments, as soon as they could, under the UN flag. We contributed a Commonwealth brigade which eventually became a division. In both cases, Korea and the Gulf, Chapter VII was invoked in the resolutions. I do not intend to discuss current military operations in the Gulf, which are best left to the commanders in the field. I agree with what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Carver, said in the debate on 21st January in that regard. However, I take the opportunity to say—and I am sure that I speak for the whole House—that we are acutely conscious of the key role of the British forces in the Gulf. We admire their dedication, professionalism and fortitude in a dangerous task of crucial importance for the future. Our thoughts and hopes are with them and their allies in the coalition forces.

My purpose today is to examine the structure of the United Nations and the terms of the Charter, virtually unchanged since 1946. They form the basis of international action to deter aggression and to deal with it if it happens. In the years 1948 to 1952, when I was a member of the United Kingdom mission in New York, we were involved in the application of the Charter for the first time. I found that I knew the wording of Chapter VII by heart. I do not suggest that noble Lords will need copies of the Charter with them today; my intention is to recall the essentials.

At that time the ideals of the United Nations received warm support from the public in the United States and the United Kingdom. We were trying to create a system which would prevent anything like Hitler's war, through which we had just passed, recurring. Chapter VII is the heart of the Charter. In dealing with aggression it prescribes progressive steps towards restoring peace and undoing the wrongs perpetrated. The first stage consists of provisional measures—Article 40. The second stage consists of measures not involving armed force—Article 41. Then comes Article 42 which provides that if previous measures are not adequate, action by armed forces may be taken.

That article has made clear over the years that the use of armed forces is the resort agreed upon for world security when necessary. I am sure that it has acted as a deterrent to potential aggressors with covetous eyes on their neighbours' territory. In that respect it has had a beneficial negative effect. However, although it is there', stark and clear in its terms, it has not been invoked directly. In the cases of Korea, and now the Gulf, it is the last article of Chapter VII—Article 51 —which has been directly quoted in the resolutions.

Article 51 provides for self-defence and has been regarded as a catch-all clause. One of the main reasons why Article 42 has not been referred to, despite the powerful influence which its existence exerts, is that it leads into Articles 43 to 47, which have not yet fully been put into effect. Those articles provide for a Military Staff Committee and for its role in directing specified armed forces allocated to the United Nations by member states in accordance with agreements to be negotiated.

The MSC was established when the United Nations was formed, consisting of military representatives of the five permanent members and co-option of other members as appropriate. However, nothing has been done in the intervening years in regard to earmarking forces or concluding agreements with members. That has not mattered. It has not reduced the effectiveness of the action of the United Nations authorised by the Security Council in Korea and the Gulf. We can feel relieved and reassured by that.

However, it has meant that Articles 43 to 47 contain references to pieces of the mechanism intended in 1945 which are missing. How did that happen? The Soviet Government agreed to the text of Chapter VII in 1945, but clearly changed their mind a few months later. They deliberately blocked any progress in the MSC. For years the MSC had its required regular meetings and did little more than adopt the agenda and arrange the date for the next meeting. It is significant that President Gorbachev stated a few months ago that he thought that progress might now be made on that point. That appears to me to be a change of heart.

The terms of the Charter were agreed by the nations which then existed as independent states and had won the war. Initial membership, around 50, was less than one-third of the present figure—159 at the latest count. Two of the largest and most influential countries in the world—Germany and Japan—did not join until some years later because they were ex-enemy states. In the same situation were Italy, Austria and some other European countries. Small changes only have been made to the Charter; in particular, increasing the size of the Security Council and the majority needed in voting there. The five permanent members of the Security Council remain the same regardless of size and influence in the world of today. The five can use the veto, which was always an essential part of the system. It was designed to avoid a situation where one of the great powers was at odds with most of the rest of the world; that might have produced the clash of arms which it was the intention of the United Nations to prevent.

It was hoped that Chapter VII would replace the functions of the pre-war League of Nations, the weakness and failure of which had been manifested in 1935 after Mussolini's attack on Abyssinia. When Saddam's folly is penalised and reversed by the armed forces of the United Nations—as I am sure it will be—collective security will be immensely strengthened in the world. We need be haunted no longer by the pale ghost of the League of Nations which will have been exorcised forever.

Before examining ways in which the community of nations can then consolidate, I should mention two additions to the mechanisms of the United Nations developed after the Charter was agreed. First, at the annual session of the General Assembly—that is, the plenary gathering of all members—in 1950 after the aggression in Korea, the United States introduced the "United for Peace" resolution, which was duly passed. The intention was to enable the General Assembly to agree upon action if the Security Council was blocked by the veto. The General Assembly can only make recommendations to members. This was, therefore, a second best and reserve arrangement designed to avoid inaction if the Security Council was paralysed. It has not detracted from the authority of the Security Council, enshrined in the Charter, to take the necessary decisions in times of world crisis.

The second innovation has been the introduction of peace-keeping forces, which again can be recommended by the General Assembly if necessary. That has been a valuable addition. These forces have served as a kind of military police, keeping antagonists apart or patrolling contested territory. They are of course very different from a punitive force, used under Chapter VII, with all necessary modern arms at sea, in the air as well as on the land.

We must also take into account two significant changes. Small and medium-sized countries can become possessors of nuclear weapons despite the non-proliferation treaty. A country's leader may be a fanatic or megalomaniac. We must not forget Idi Amin.

The other change, assisting in the opposite direction, is that troops and equipment can now be transported in large quantities by air, as was most effectively demonstrated by the United States in August. After this war, when Saddam has been subdued, the world should be safer but the UN should not relax. Conditions will be favourable for improvements in the UN's contingency planning. Flexibility should be paramount but member states should be more prepared and ready in future to contribute forces or financial and material help. The whole question of economic sanctions needs more consideration. It is clear that, even with the whole world united against an aggressor, a fanatic like Saddam could resist that pressure for months or years. It is all the more important to have armed forces clearly in immediate readiness as a deterrent in the hope that they will not have to be used.

The time factor must be taken into account in the early stages. The leader of the offending nation may have no respect for human life or care about the hardships of his people. As time passes he will be compounding his aggression by pillage, destruction and annexation, doing everything he can to make it irreversible. That has been foreseen in Chapter VII, which empowers the Security Council to decide when peaceful measures are or would be inadequate. That is in Article 42, which spells out the intention and procedure but which has not been directly invoked for reasons which we know.

The Security Council has that task and it is a very difficult judgment to make. If pressure from economic sanctions or other peaceful measures is likely to succeed within a reasonable period, the necessary time must be allowed. When such pressure is clearly not being effective and when the aggressor is strengthening his hold and the victim country is crying out for help from the rest of the world, the Security Council has to choose the moment to move to the use of armed force.

As regards forces at the disposal of the United Nations in the foreseeable future, the United States will be the only country which can field a large force speedily. Depending on the area of the world involved and other factors, it should be possible for other countries to provide support of various kinds without delay. That is the clear intention of the Charter.

On the question of the kind of help that can be given, I believe that in the cases of Germany and Japan, for example, which have made very large contributions, it need not have taken five or six months before they were forthcoming if such matters had been gone into beforehand.

In opening this debate, if I have seemed dissatisfied at times it is because I see opportunities for improving the United Nations' state of readiness and so more firmly maintaining peace after the Gulf war. I feel strongly that those opportunities should be pursued. I trust that the House realises that my remarks have been inspired and overshadowed by the momentous event that the Security Council has acted with almost complete agreement in a major case of aggression in the way originally intended by the founders of the United Nations. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

3.15 p.m.

Lord Hatch of Lusby

My Lords, I am sure that I am expressing the views of the whole House when I say that we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, for introducing this subject, particularly at this very topical moment. The present conflict is being characterised, at least by the press and the governments involved, as a United Nations' operation. I do not believe that it is. I believe that this scepticism is shared by the majority of people outside this country and the United States. As we see the effects of the conflict spreading from America across to the Maghreb, the Middle East, Pakistan, and the Philippines, we are surely witnessing a conflict which is affecting the vast majority of the world and which may affect many more nations outside this country and its media.

How is the present conflict and the decision to participate in military activity seen? It does not need me to outline the feeling of most of the population of the world that those who have pursued this military conflict are acting as hypocrites. One has only to recall Afghanistan, Grenada, Panama, Nicaragua, Namibia, South Africa and many other countries to recognise that when this conflict is looked at from outside the participating countries, it appears that the permanent members of the Security Council, who are the larger powers in the world, pick and choose as to how they are going to use the powers that they have within the United Nations.

I refer in specific terms to the Question that I raised in this House yesterday afternoon concerning Indonesia and East Timor. Surely that is a clinching example of hypocrisy. After the cold war there is no excuse for saying that this or that cannot be done because of the cold war. Britain and America are supporting the Indonesian Government and providing arms for them. Yet as long ago as 1975 the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution declaring Indonesia to be an aggressor, condemning that aggression and the occupation of East Timor, and calling on Indonesia to vacate the territory of East Timor. What has been done by the Security Council since 1975? Why is the issue of Indonesia and East Timor different from that of Iraq and Kuwait?

During the ensuing years, according to the British Government's figures, between 60,000 and 100,000 East Timorese have lost their lives as a result of that aggression. What has been done by Her Majesty's Government and the Security Council? I will not argue, as some of my colleagues have done, that because we have not done anything in Indonesia, Namibia, Grenada or Afghanistan, we should not support the responsibility of the United Nations in Kuwait. That is a line which I have never taken and I do not take it now. I simply point out that to the rest of the world it appears that the permanent members of the Security Council discriminate as to when and in what circumstances they will apply the power of the United Nations, and also when it does not seem to be in their interests to do so. That attitude is contemporary; it is being applied in Indonesia now while military activity is taking place in the Gulf.

I am not arguing that United Nations' responsibility should not have been taken in the Gulf. I believe that it should. I also believe that the United Nations has been sabotaged in its efforts in the Gulf. It has been sabotaged because right from the start it was discovered that at long last the international organisation had a weapon which was non-military and which at least stood a good chance of reversing that aggression and persuading or compelling the Iraqis to leave Kuwait. I know that this cannot be proved —nor can it be proved that military means were needed—but that weapon was there. It was discovered and supported unanimously within the Security Council and by the United Nations. According to the testimony of James Schlesinger, when sanctions were first imposed last summer the United States Administration believed that it would take 12 months for those sanctions to work adequately. It was the director of the CIA, William Webster, who only a few weeks ago gave testimony to the effect that sanctions were already damaging the military machine of the Iraqis, that by April that military machine would be seriously damaged and that within 12 to 18 months there was a good chance that by the use of sanctions the United Nations could implement Resolution 660.

That effort, that great promise for the future of having found a means of peacefully solving international conflict, was thrown away in November when the United States President doubled the number of United States forces in the Gulf and put them on the offensive. Until then they had been on the defensive, it having been stated that they were there not to attack Iraq or Kuwait but to defend Saudi Arabia. When that decision was made it sabotaged the great promise that had come to the United Nations out of the use of sanctions.

If I go back half an hour, I recall that the noble Earl who is to reply to this debate was unable to give the House any details—nor has anyone else—as to the evidence on which that decision was taken. I have repeated that there was evidence—I have given him the evidence: the evidence of James Schlesinger and the evidence of the director of the CIA—that sanctions were working and should be given time.

As to the relevance of this picture to Chapter VII, I emphasise the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, in his opening statement. Article 42, which provides for the use of military force, depends on Article 41 because Article 42 starts by saying: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 [that is non-military measures] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate"— we have had no proof—then it may take action. But that depends on Article 41 having been put into effect first and given a chance to work. If one goes on from Article 42 to the succeeding articles, as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, pointed out, there is then provision for the setting up of a military staff committee.

I ask the noble Earl who is to reply whether the military staff committee of the United Nations has been consulted. Has it been given the authority to organise a United Nations peace keeping force in this instance? We know it has not. But I should like the noble Earl to address himself to that point. If he intends to rest his case on Article 51 then I would point out to him that Article 51, while giving the right of self-defence, also includes the following words: Until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to obtain international peace and security"— self-defence until the security council has acted— measures taken by members in the exercise of the right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council"— and this is the important point— and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action that it deems necessary". My contention is that the members of the United Nations have not gone through the exercise laid down in Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII, nor have they followed what is laid down in succeeding articles, leading to the setting up of a defence committee. They have not followed the articles preceding Article 51. They have not done so because they have been using the United Nations as an umbrella for their own decision, a decision taken by President Bush in November, which, I repeat, has sabotaged the most constructive and far seeing developments which came with the imposition of sanctions against Saddam Hussein. By sabotaging that effort they have very seriously damaged the ability of the United Nations to carry out its responsibilities after the war is over.

3.26 p.m.

The Lord Bishop of Manchester

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, for giving us an opportunity to discuss the role of the United Nations as it relates to Chapter VII, not only in this present tragic war, but in the years that lie ahead. It reminds us that the moral basis for present action in the Gulf conflict depends on the United Nations and its role. I wish I could share the optimism of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, that the world will be a safer place at the end of this war than it was at the beginning. I am afraid that I rather doubt it. One reason for my doubt is that in the eyes of millions of people in the world today this does not look like a genuinely United Nations operation.

I have no doubt at all that there is overwhelming support in this country as expressed through your Lordships' House and the other place for the action which is now being taken. There is not the slightest doubt about that and public opinion polls will stress it. A minority of people in this country are doubtful about the moral basis for the present action as concerns military force. Where I think there is universal agreement is when we look back to the time of the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, the rape of that small country and the terrible things that took place. There was then complete unanimity about the actions of the United Nations, the resolution of the Security Council and how this gave us a new hope for the world. There was hope in regard to that case in particular but also in regard to nations standing together in collective security. It was a real sign of hope. In particular, the adoption of sanctions and the way in which they were enforced as a peaceful yet powerful method of bringing pressure in order to achieve an evacuation of Kuwait was widely supported universally from some quite surprising places. For example, Jordan was prepared to go along with the sanctions resolution.

It is worth mentioning that many people have been doubtful —but doubtful unnecessarily—about the way in which sanctions through the United Nations have worked in years gone by. There is ample evidence of the effectiveness of sanctions in certain situations. We think especially of Southern Africa. It is very doubtful whether South Africa would have withdrawn from Angola and Namibia but for the steady cumulative effect of sanctions over those years. The remarkable changes we are seeing in South Africa at the present time surely owe something to the operation of international sanctions. It is a matter of shame that the British Government have been so lukewarm, and even opposed, to the imposition of effective sanctions on South Africa.

There is now a great sign of hope for our world. The United Nations, through the Security Council, representing nations of different cultures and colours both rich and poor, has been able to bring such countries together and condemn such an act of aggression. Much Arab public opinion was behind that move.

In my view the Christian faith has within it a powerful basis for a vision of a world community. It seems to me to be natural that Christians should be deeply sympathetic to any measure which supports a world order and which helps to enforce such an order against aggression. The Christian faith is realistic about the evil and wickedness to be found in the world. I refer not simply to the evil in one man—that is, in one brutal dictator—but the wickedness which has deep ramifications and which has contributed to the present tensions in the Middle East.

When we look at the United Nations Charter and we see how in a case such as this nations have been able to come together through their representatives in order to support resistance to aggression, there is, as I said, hope for us all. However, Resolution 678 was issued on 29th November. It was undoubtedly based on the UN Charter and it authorised the use of force. The Security Council, should it consider that measures provided for in Article 41 (which governs sanctions) are inadequate, or have proved to be inadequate, may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

War is a different matter and it widens differences of opinion in our community. In this country we had a responsible, agonised debate about military action before it took place on 16th January. For example, in this House we heard the case for pacifism expounded as powerfully and movingly as it could be by the noble Lord, Lord Soper, who is sitting on the Benches opposite. He takes an attitude which many of us cannot share. However, his stance was greatly respected in this Chamber. I, too, cannot share that pacifist stance. I welcome the fact that there is a provision within the charter for resort to force in certain circumstances through the United Nations.

However, what is deeply worrying is the way in which such action was taken. It is significant to note that many of those who care most deeply for the United Nations in this country and beyond are disturbed and agonised by what has taken place. I shall quote from a resolution of the United Nations Association Executive in this country dated 27th October. It reads: We urge adequate time to assess whether sanctions are working and rejection of pressures for premature military action". The feeling expressed there was that if military action was resorted to, it may bring the United Nations into discredit and may prove to be counter-productive in all that it was supposed to do.

I have no more means of telling than the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, or anyone else, whether sanctions would finally have forced Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait; indeed, the indications are to the contrary. However, having said that, the balance of military action had to be weighed against the possible consequences which would follow. Such consequences are not irrelevant now as we try to look to the future. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, is right to urge us to consider the future and not concentrate solely on the Gulf situation. The way in which we view what is happening now affects the urgency of our search for peace and an early cessation of military operations. It also affects how we see the United Nations operating in the years ahead. It must not appear simply to be hijacked by major powers with enormous military might at their disposal. That is how the situation looks to many people in the world today.

I have no doubt that there is right and justice on the side of the coalition forces in the Gulf. But that does not make it a just war in the way that is being claimed at present; neither does it make it necessarily a wise or right decision to have resorted to military action under the terms of the charter which we are considering today. Some of us think that it was not. What I have said is not simply water under the bridge; it affects our attitude towards the future.

In my view it is a shame when people in this country are criticised for raising questions about the rightness of the present operations as if to do so means that they are somehow being disloyal to our Armed Forces in the field. I support everything that has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, about their courage and sense of duty. We pray for them, for their success and for their safety. We realise that they are doing their duty backed by an overwhelming parliamentary majority and a decision properly made in this country.

However, wars must be judged by other criteria, apart from the justice of the cause. It is important to consider under whose auspices the war is being fought. Part of the tragedy of today's situation is that the United Nations has not been more fully involved in the conduct of operations and the way in which things have been carried out. That is why what is taking place does not seem to many people to be a United Nations operation. Further, are the means being used proportionate? Is it possible to have faith in the United Nations if it authorises, for example, the bombing of water supplies of a great city such as Baghdad? One can argue that electricity supplies are part of the means of maintaining the military potential of such a country; but what questions are being raised about the importance of water for such cities in the Middle East when we know about the danger of disease? While I agree to some extent that military operations are best left to those in the field, I believe that it is incumbent upon the rest of us to raise such crucial questions.

So far as concerns other likely consequences of the present operations, it is distressing to hear some people say, "There you are, the consequences prophesied by people like Mr. Edward Heath have not in fact taken place". How do we know that that is true? Indeed, some have taken place and some have not. I should like to point out that in the famine situation in East Africa at present, relief agencies are reporting that thousands of people are dying as an indirect result of the operations in the Gulf. That is because the world's attention is being concentrated on that area. A fraction of the money being spent on the crisis could be used to save lives in East Africa at present.

I return now to Chapter VII. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, is right to draw our attention to other sections of the Charter in order to point out that we must consider them in respect of the kind of world which lies ahead. We must not assume complacently that this world will be a safer place at the end of the Gulf War.

3.38 p.m.

Lord Wilberforce

My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, for raising this subject today and for analysing so brilliantly Chapter VII of the Charter. It is a very remarkable and central chapter. As noble Lords will appreciate, it gives wide discretionary powers to the Security Council either to operate under Article 41 (without using any force) or, if it considers that such measures are likely to be inadequate, to invoke other articles including, but not limited to, Article 42. We know that the Security Council has acted under Article 41 by imposing sanctions in August and, under succeeding articles, by authorising the use of force in November.

In the time available to me I do not intend to discuss whether, while sanctions were operating under SCR 661, the Security Council was wise to pass Resolution 678 on 29th November or whether, in doing so, the United Nations has been sabotaged or something of that nature. Of course, I should like to do so, but time does not permit.

I shall confine myself to considering one point; namely, the operation of Article 41, the sanctions article, in a modern context. I believe that it is valuable to do so for three reasons. First, I do not believe that anyone would doubt that it is preferable, if possible, to use the weapon of sanctions under Article 41 than it is to use force.

Secondly, having been shown for the first time that the permanent members of the Security Council can agree, we may hope that that will not be the only time and that they will be able to do so again in future cases. Thirdly, I suggest that it is important for the future of peace-keeping to understand whether sanctions under Article 41 can work or whether they cannot. That question may still be relevant to the present situation. Those articles are still operating; and sanctions are still operating. The question whether they are, or have been, effective has not been addressed.

Let us look at Article 41 for a moment. In 1945, when it was framed in rather simple language, Lord Jowitt said of it that it did not bear the hallmarks of having emanated from Lincoln's Inn—something with which I think we all agree. It is drafted in simplistic language, and speaks in terms of the interruption of economic relations and of communications —simple and uncomplicated stuff. We may note with interest that even matters such as demonstrations and blockades are not dealt with under that article, but under Article 42. Since then, the picture has changed enormously. We now have over 150 independent states as members of the United Nations. Trade and commerce have become global in character. Financial relations have become global in character. Communications are not just a matter of sending a telegraph from one place to another. Communications, by which one means the transfer of information—the lifeblood of finance and commerce—have become vital to states' existence and depend upon internationally available technology of a most elaborate kind.

Because all those matters have become global in character, it must follow that international action, if achievable, must be effective against such organisations. Let us have in mind that we are not concerned in the case of the Gulf only with an invasion of a small state, or even only with the seizure of important oil fields—vital though those matters and issues are—but with the takeover of a vast financial empire—that of Kuwait—which is in the world league as such matters go, and which has ramifications in all sections of the world economy.

One has to ask how Article 41—that simple article—can be fitted into that picture. Putting it briefly, each member state is asked, at short notice, to introduce measures which will not just stop physical trade by sea, air or computer, but which will prevent the aggressor from receiving the benefit of all Kuwait's assets, whether tangible or intangible, wherever they may be; and to do that probably without any experience of the kind of action which it is practical and legal to take in such circumstances and without having any of the legal infrastructure necessary.

We are aware of course that the United States has available a powerful panoply of executive orders, well tried in other situations, which can be instantly issued. It has issued such orders in this case. The United Kingdom has available a machinery under emergency Acts, and under the United Nations Act 1946, which can be, and has been, used. That can even be extended to territories such as Hong Kong or the Caribbean tax havens. The French have quickly operated similar techniques. The European Community made an order in August, but one relating to physical trade only.

It is remarkable then to note that, without any of those procedures, over 100 states have done something to carry out the Security Council resolution. I have a list of the main ones that have done that and of the instruments that they have used. I should like to pay tribute to Mr. Jeremy Carver, an eminent City solicitor, who has researched and is researching into what has been done on his own account with the assistance of his firm.

However—and this is the only point that I want to make—all of that raises great problems. We can see that from our experience and that of the Americans. The Bank of England, which is charged with implementing the restrictions, and which has extraordinary skill and expertise in such matters, is flooded with inquiries and conundra which both in quantity and quality have put enormous pressures upon it. How then, one must ask, can other states—even those in Europe, not to mention those outside—unused to taking that kind of action, manage to be effective? Many will have no infrastructure. They will have to devise and pass primary legislation. How are they to translate United Nations requirements into national law—let us think of Islamic law and the elaborate constitutions of some countries which inhibit legislation—at short notice? Many will have no enforcement machinery, and many will not have the lawyers, accountants or experts without which restraints will not work. Most of them will not have the resources to monitor and see to what extent the controls are being effective.

Two things are necessary. The first is information. The United Nations is endeavouring to deal with it. I was disappointed that the noble Earl was defensive on the subject. It may be true that the United Nations Sanctions Committee is not responsible for ensuring that measures are effective. The United Nations sent out a questionnaire which was responded to by over 100 states. It asked for information as to what those states had done. Our lawyers —again Mr. Jeremy Carver—and a number of United States lawyers have their own data and are collecting them. I hope that those measures will be assisted. There is no need for secrecy. The United Nations Sanctions Committee may be confidential, but why be secret about it? Everyone should know what is being done and to what extent the measures taken are effective or ineffective?

I come to the second requirement. If the system is not to be a one-off one—I hope that it will not be—and not be the only case in which the permanent members agree, we and the United States, should make available to other countries, through the United Nations, the European Community or otherwise, in a systematic way, full knowledge of the measures and techniques required in those cases. They should be collected in a permanent form which can be brought out and used next time.

We must be optimistic. We must hope that this is not the last time, as it has been the first time, that the Security Council has been able to obtain agreement on sanctions. If any lesson is to be drawn from the present situation, it is not certain to be in favour of the use of force. The armoury of Article 41, which is a valuable one, must be kept alive and in usable form. I remain grateful to the noble Lord for initiating the debate.

3.48 p.m.

Lord Beloff

My Lords, I wish that I could find it possible to follow the command of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, and be optimistic, because optimism was also the keynote of the speech of my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy when introducing the debate. For once noble Lords may be surprised to hear that I find myself in some sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby; not in his belief in a conspiracy theory of recent history but in calling attention to the fact that nations behave as they have always behaved, and probably always will behave—so long as there are independent nation states—in the light of their own interests as they perceive them to be at the time.

My noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy gave a clue to the problem when he mentioned two facts about the United Nations: first, that the composition of the Security Council reflected the immediate situation in 1945.

Anyone now debating who should be permanent members of the Security Council, for instance, would find it difficult to come up with the same five. More important and perhaps even more relevant is the fact that the last occasion on which the authority of the United Nations was powerfully exercised —the Korean war—was made possible only by the accidental absence of the Soviet Union. That country could not have been fully informed as to what was likely to happen in the absence of its representative.

I feel that again we now have or had in the Security Council a concatenation of accidental circumstances which have made these resolutions possible without a veto. That is because the wishes, intentions, and desires of the five permanent members are not identical; nor is their forward view always similar. In the case of the Soviet Union in particular there is no doubt that there has been considerable pressure on the Soviet Government to choose between their recent desire, for economic reasons, to stand well with the major Western powers and their own perception of what might happen if one of their client states in the Middle East were to be largely destroyed, perhaps as a result of economic action but, more particularly now, by military action.

I do not propose to enlarge upon the position of the Soviet Union because I wish to take advantage of the Unstarred Question of the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, to explain later why I think it unlikely that we can look forward to a similar alignment of Soviet and American policy in other circumstances.

Perhaps even more surprising is the non-exercise of the veto by China. Undoubtedly China was trying to edge back into some kind of respectability after the massacre of its dissidents and thought that nothing much would be gained by again antagonising the United States over a matter to which the American Government attached such importance. There is no reason to believe that the view of the world held by the Chinese Government is identical to that likely to be held by any major Western government.

With regard to the non-permanent members of the Security Council, no doubt there are different reasons why each of them should have been willing to go along with the, others—some of them part of the way and most of them, hitherto, all the way; but only in some cases. I believe that the right reverend Prelate was perfectly correct in saying that it was only in some cases and that they risked internal political problems by taking up a cause about which their peoples had doubts.

Therefore, in considering, as we should, how the world is to be made more secure and stable after the war is over, I share the right reverend Prelate's doubts in that respect, although the war was inevitable, necessary and right. In considering that, we should not think of the United Nations Charter, as it now stands, as a possible foundation for action. It seems to me that we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that we live in a world divided into regional cultures and different sets of ideologies. It is important to find methods by which the regions can be reconciled and, where they are not reconciled, they can find regional answers to at least some of their problems.

The powers of the United Nations are enormous, as we have seen on this occasion. They are also vulnerable. Noble Lords have mentioned sanctions. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, that with sanctions we need to know how they are operating and we need to plan the technical side. However, sanctions are a weapon which cannot normally be relied upon for a simple reason with which I am afraid I have bored your Lordships on previous occasions, but I must do so again. Using sanctions as a peaceful method of settling disputes presupposes that both parties to the dispute have a similar wish to remain at peace. I found that difficult to believe in the case of Iraq. It always seemed to me that if the period were prolonged, as the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, wished, Saddam Hussein would have seized some appropriate moment when we were off our guard to initiate military conflict rather than to suffer the humiliation of seeing his army immobilised by a total lack of fuel.

The example to which the right reverend Prelate referred with approval—sanctions against South Africa—is quite different. The South African Government have shown that in the last resort they do not want their people to suffer economically. They have taken the view, rightly, that the only way of getting back into the world economy is to make major internal changes. If Saddam Hussein were like President de Klerk, the scenario would look different. However, we are likely to find more Saddam Husseins than President de Klerks and we must therefore look with hope, but not optimism, at what must be done to construct a safer world order when the war is over.

3.57 p.m.

Lord Gladwyn

My Lords, we must all be grateful to my noble kinsman, Lord Campbell of Croy, for raising the vexed question of the correct application of Chapter VII of the Charter. I am also grateful to him for his kind remarks about myself. Perhaps I may add that I was not only the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations in 1945 but also took part in the negotiations and the actual drafting of the Charter at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. Therefore, the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter are graven as much on my mind as on his!

On one point I think we can all agree: as the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, has just said, the situation is very different now from what it was in 1945 when the Charter was agreed and duly came into force. Then the United Kingdom and France, though much weakened by the war, were still world powers, along with the United States of America and the Soviet Union; China was at best the most populous state. India was not independent. No other state had the slightest claim to be a world power. It was clear therefore that these five powers should be given prime responsibility in the Security Council for the preservation of world peace. That was generally agreed in 1945.

What was not generally agreed then was that each of these powers should have the power of veto. Yet I was myself convinced at that time, and remained convinced thereafter, that without the power of veto there would have been no United Nations at all. The Russians always insisted on that. At the beginning of the negotiations the Americans appeared to resist it, but they would certainly not, in the event, have accepted majority voting in the Security Council. If they had done so, the whole Charter would not have been ratified by the Senate and the United States might have gone into isolation, as it did in 1919.

The veto—slightly modified by the Yalta voting formula for which I can claim a certain responsibility—remained, and after 46 years has still remained a prominent feature of the landscape. It was never in itself of course the reason why the United Nations has, up until recently, failed to function as the authors of the Charter intended. That reason was the apparent belief of Stalin that the United States was solely intent on using the United Nations for its own purposes and, more certainly, that the United States alone stood in the way of his own efforts to promote pro-Soviet governments throughout the world.

Fortunately the cold war has now, for the time being at any rate, apparently ended. We have succeeded to a large extent in using the United Nations for the main purpose for which it was originally designed; namely, successful and general resistance to obvious and unprovoked aggression. Why then do we not leave it as it is, confident in its future ability to fulfil this role in the probable event of some future crisis, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere? Unfortunately there are many reasons why we should be rash to bank on anything of the kind.

In the first place, the veto-wielding members of the Security Council now consist of one genuine super power, one former super power, two medium sized powers and an enormous state which seems to be chiefly preoccupied with its own interests. If and when the war in the Gulf is won by the application of immense American force with, for the most part, British assistance, the Security Council is thus likely to be regarded in the world as a whole—and certainly in the Middle East—not as a body, the decisions of which must be respected and obeyed, but rather as a manifestation of Anglo-Saxon dominance in world affairs.

Further, although the United Nations has, with great difficulty, effectively authorised the use of force against Iraq, this is not—this has already been pointed out by many speakers—strictly speaking, a United Nations war under Article 42 of the Charter. Theoretically such a war should be conducted under the auspices of the Military Staff Committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council, or their representatives. However, regrettably, the Military Staff Committee does not in practice exist, and although we must all hope that it will be revived one day, there is seemingly no intention and no likelihood of reviving it. A United Nations force might nevertheless be formed—as in Korea—with a supreme commander nominated by the Security Council. However, this has not been done and, in spite of the hopes of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, there seems little chance of that being done in the future.

Still, if the projected conference on the Middle East, which is due to follow on the cessation of hostilities, is to have any success, it should surely be organised under the auspices of a Security Council which is both powerful and generally respected. This, on the face of it, would seem to require a certain change in the operation of the Security Council. Sir Anthony Parsons has had a creditable shot at how this might be done in an article in today's edition of The Times. However, it is not entirely clear how his "new kind of force", which he states should be at the disposal of the existing Security Council, would in practice be organised.

I myself, before venturing any definite opinion on this very difficult and contentious matter, would like to ponder over the collective wisdom of your Lordships as expressed in the debate this afternoon.

4.7 p.m.

Earl Attlee

My Lords, when I put my name down last week to speak in this debate, it appeared to me that I must be one of the few speakers who had never even heard of Chapter VII. However, thanks to the ever helpful staff in the Printed Paper Office, I obtained a little book which I have read diligently.

I wish to congratulate two speakers who obviously are very knowledgeable about this subject. I admit that I am not so knowledgeable about the subject. I did not realise before this debate that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, had taken such an active part in the matter we are discussing. I am impressed by that.

I read the book that I was given very carefully. It states that the aims of the charter are to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.

That sentence rang a bell with me. This morning I found a similar passage in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address of 19th November 1863. That address contains some of the most beautiful words that have ever been written on this subject. It states: Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure". That address may be better written than the preamble to the United Nations Charter, but the passages are similar. I find it interesting that way back then people conceived the idea that if you want freedom for all people you have to fight for it. As a child, I remember the League of Nations and what a pathetic organisation that was. It was a laughing stock. Whatever one wants to say about the present war in the Gulf, it shows that the United Nations can fight back. In saying that, many brave men are losing their lives. I recall being in Vancouver, Canada, and going ashore from my ship. They have, as most towns have, a war memorial and all it said on that war memorial was, They gave their todays for our tomorrows. That again stands true today.

There has been talk not only in this House but in other places about sanctions; that if we had allowed more time the sanctions would ultimately have worked. I do not believe that sanctions have ever worked, nor do I believe that they ever will work. They did not work in Rhodesia and they did not work in South Africa.

To take the case of Rhodesia, who were the main sanctions busters? If sanctions were imposed on behalf of the black countries surrounding Rhodesia, it was they who broke those sanctions by feeding through their countries the goods and supplies that Rhodesia required. Why, my Lords? It was because they were making money out of it. That is a simple fact.

Sanctions are like blockades. They never work either. In two world wars, the might of Germany was unable to run a successful blockade of this country, which is a small island. Blockades do not work and sanctions will never work.

The right reverend Prelate was shocked by the fact that the allied forces had bombed water reservoirs in Baghdad. He said that particularly on humanitarian grounds. Yet the Iraqis have set forth tens of millions of gallons of oil which will despoil the whole of the sea coast there, probably for generations to come. A simple reservoir can be rebuilt, but there is a danger that the oil in the Gulf now will foul up all the machinery which produces fresh water for the whole of Saudi Arabia. I ask your Lordships to compare that alone, leaving out the millions of animals and seabirds which have been slaughtered or are suffering a terrible lingering death, with the bombing of one reservoir. The bombing then seems a very small thing.

I shall now turn to the subject matter in hand which is Chapter VII. I should like to make one point with regard to Article 51. I read it only last week and I marked the beginning which states: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. I take that to mean that we have a pact with Kuwait and that that pact states, "If you attack Kuwait, we will defend it. If someone attacks us, Kuwait will defend us." If, as some people claim, the United Nations have no right to do what they are doing now, I say that we in this country have every right. We are fulfilling our treaty obligations.

Many noble Lords here will remember that at the time of the Second World War we did not go to the defence of small countries when we should have done, and we all know the result. Someone has attacked a country with which we have a treaty. We are reacting. Thankfully the major power in the world, the United States of America, is helping to lead that attack. If Saddam Hussein thinks that he can rape the Middle East, he has been shown that it is a very dangerous thing to do.

Lord Hatch of Lusby

My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down, surely he recognises that he has cast a gross calumny on the black neighbours of Rhodesia. Was it not the South Africans who were supplying the bulk of materials to Rhodesia? Did we not leave Zambia 13 months after independence totally linked economically to Rhodesia? Were not this country and the United States themselves responsible for breaking sanctions? Has the noble Earl read the Bingham Report?

Earl Attlee

My Lords, all I know is that there was trade passing through the black countries. But if we are on that subject, perhaps I may make one point? For whose benefit were the sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa? Basically they were for the benefit of the black people. But if you cut off the raw materials, how do the black people earn their living? They cannot do so. It is ridiculous. If you want to save the black people, you want to invest in South Africa. You do not want to take investment out of South Africa. That is cutting the throats of the blacks.

Lord Hatch of Lusby

My Lords, what is happening now?

4.17 p.m.

The Earl of Winchilsea and Nottingham

My Lords, I rise to speak in this valuable and timely short debate because I have had considerable personal experience of the plight of a people ignored by the world, even though they and their case have been the subject of numerous United Nations motions and resolutions. Several noble Lords will know the people to whom I am referring. But first imagine, if you will, that my home country has been brutally invaded by overwhelming military force and captured by the foreign power next door which is a full member of the UN.

I have been forced to flee into the open desert leaving all my possessions behind. I have been pursued by enemy planes and bombed and strafed. Thousands of my countrymen, women and children have been killed outright with many more dying later of wounds or lack of medical attention, food or water. Relatives were left behind who have been imprisoned and tortured. My country has been looted, raped and pillaged.

Am I a Kuwaiti? No, my Lords, I am not. I am a Saharawi from the western Sahara at the other end of the Arab world from the Gulf and I do not have the benefit of being oil rich; so I am not ensured that the free world is arrayed against the invader, my conquering neighbour. It is precisely that kind of situation which has given the UN such a bad name among those who are victims of invasion and oppression by countries that are members of the UN, sworn to uphold its basic underpinning principle of respect for other people's national boundaries and their basic human right of living unmolested in their own country.

Morocco invaded the western Sahara 16 years ago. Why was no task force sent out to repel the invader? Why was there not an immediate outcry at the UN against the invader? It was because the western Sahara had nothing that the rest of the world wanted and Morocco was of strategic importance to NATO.

Are we really prepared only to defend freedom and basic human rights when we are offered an economic return for our support? Do we put a price tag on those commodities as we would do for weaponry? Are we really prepared to continue to turn our collective blind eyes to all the millions of people who are the victims of other peoples' aggression? Double standards are very much in evidence and they make the United Nations a bitter pill for helpless people to swallow.

I do not for one second deny the agonies of Kuwait and its people, and I know that most of us support their struggle. My heart cries out to those who have been cast into the desert, because I have been there and I know what they are experiencing. But I should like your Lordships to weigh what the world is doing for the Kuwaitis against what it has failed to do for the Saharawi, the Timorese, the Palestinians, the Nicaraguans, the Hungarians in 1956 and the Czechs in 1968. We stand accused by most of the under-developed world of having double standards, and they are right—we do.

It is time we changed that. Freedom must not be for sale to the highest bidder. Perhaps one good thing that could come out of the Gulf war is that freedom, democracy and basic human rights will not have to pay a price to be upheld and enforced. I quote Ian McEwan from the Observer last Sunday, 3rd February. He wrote: A moral principle has no validity if it is applied selectively and self-servingly. Saddam's genocidal use of poison gas against the Kurdish nation did not lead to his ostracism from the community of nations, nor did it deter western governments from continuing to sell him arms. He was needed at that time to do battle against Iran"— a battle which he started— Now the need is for low-priced oil". It is a great pity that President Bush's outrage over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not mindful of United States actions over Nicaragua, Grenada and Vietnam, to name but a few. It would sound a lot more convincing if it were. Can we please abandon these outrageous practices of selecting those areas of conflict in the world where we will actively seek a solution based on what is in it for us and start applying the rules laid down in the United Nations Charter with impartiality for all?

However, I fail to see how the poor United Nations can ever hope to succeed in fulfilling the role for which it was created when the developed nations of the world persist in selling the under-developed nations assorted armaments and weaponry which are then, inevitably, used aggressively either on neighbouring countries or on those citizens of its own country who are opposed to the current regime; and, in the case of Iraq, on us the people who supplied them. That might have something to do with the fact that there are hardly any democracies in the underdeveloped world, and none whatever in the Arab world from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf. Yesterday's Question and the answers concerning East Timor were timely and revealing.

4.23 p.m.

Baroness Elles

My Lords, the House owes a debt of gratitude to my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy, not only for introducing this subject for debate today but also for his own personal, helpful and historical contribution.

I felt it was regrettable that this particular debate should have been confined to 2½ hours in view of the number of your Lordships who have served long years in the United Nations and who have great experience from which we could all benefit, especially because of the many complex and difficult issues that are raised: for example, the question of sanctions, which was so ably addressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce; the question of blockade by land, sea and air forces; the question of the right to self-defence and the right to resort to all measures necessary to restore peace in the region. What does that mean in legal and political terms?

Then there is the need for humanitarian aid to the thousands of refugees who have suffered in the past few months. Whatever the publicly expressed views of the Jordanian people may be—which may not be in conformity with our feelings in this House and in this country—towards the British forces in the Gulf, to whom we all pay warm tribute, tribute should be paid to all those Jordanians who are helping to relieve the sufferings and anxieties of the thousands of refugees who have poured into that poor and small country.

The adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945 brought a new legal and political perspective to international relations and in particular, through its Chapter VII, to the settlement of disputes between nations. Lord McNair said in 1925: It is an illusion that law has a monopoly in the settlement of international disputes". That is still partly true today; but certain parameters have been laid down within which armed force may be used legitimately against aggression. In the current situation in the Gulf, this is aggression which includes massive destruction, torture, murder and the expulsion of thousands of Kuwaitis from their homeland. It is relevant here to consider sanctions. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, that it has not been economically proved whether sanctions have yet worked against Iraq. One has to consider that while sanctions were applied, for instance, to Rhodesia and South Africa, neither of those countries was in a state of war. They did not have their troops in other countries where people were daily being killed, tortured, massacred and expelled from their country. We have to look at sanctions in a very different light in the case of Iraq. We know what was going on in Kuwait and that was not going on in Rhodesia and South Africa. I do not say whether they were right or wrong, but I certainly think we must discriminate between cases where sanctions are applied—

The Lord Bishop of Manchester

My Lords, would the noble Baroness forgive me? Concerning sanctions in Southern Africa, she would appreciate—would she not?—that there was a war raging in Namibia under colonial occupation, and that many people were suffering.

Baroness Elles

My Lords, it is true that there was a war in Namibia; but I would not compare it with the position in Kuwait, especially considering the timescale that was bearing upon Kuwait with the rest of the world standing by, watching them being eliminated. That could have been considered a form of genocide, which is a crime against humanity far greater than any other crime mentioned in the United Nations Charter.

The role of the Security Council has been and is central to any action that may be taken. For the first time, as many of your Lordships have said, the five permanent members have been able to exert together the primary responsibility which is conferred upon the Security Council by all members of the United Nations in Article 24 of the Charter. That includes the provision that in agreeing to carry out its duties under this responsibility, the Security Council acts on their behalf. We should remind ourselves that all members of the United Nations take responsibility for the decisions of the Security Council when they are taken, as in this present case.

Further, and remarkably, the Security Council has shown that it can act speedily. Those of us who have served from time to time at the United Nations will often have deplored the long time lag between talking, decision and action. But in this case the Security Council condemned on the same day, in Resolution 660, on 2nd August the act of aggression committed by Iraq. Within four days, on 6th August, an economic embargo was imposed on Iraq, applicable to all member states of the United Nations.

This resolution and successive resolutions up to Resolution 678 all fall within the provisions of Chapter VII, culminating in the imposition of the deadline on 15th January. In this connection, we recall the enormous efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement. I am sure that many of us will recall the picture of the Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, after his return from Baghdad, having made a final effort for peace which, alas, failed.

The United States, with the sacrifice of the lives of its people and its vast financial contribution, supported fully by the United Kingdom, deserves support in helping the international community as a whole in its efforts to restore Kuwait to its people. It could have been more comprehensible to the world public in general—if there is such a thing—if the armed forces had been sent under the United Nations flag.

My noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy reminded us that in the case of Korea, a similar situation, the United Nations forces went to Korea under the United Nations flag but with the decision of the Security Council to hand over military decisions to the United States. If this had happened in this case it would have given a much better understanding—I do not say impression, because that would be the wrong word—of the role of the allied forces in the Gulf today if they had come under the United Nations flag and not primarily under the United States.

Further on this question of who is taking part in this fight, we are very much at the mercy of news presentation. We see night after night American bombers and our own troops engaged in fighting. This is quite right and proper, and the world should be informed. However, it gives an uneven picture and an inevitable imbalance of what is happening. We are not reminded daily of what the Iraqis have done and are doing in Kuwait, or what they are doing to their own people, or to the dangers to which they are submitting their own people and troops. Therefore, we are imbued with this news the whole time of the might of the American forces without always taking into account the reasons why they are so necessary, and taking into account the work that they are doing and which they intend to complete.

At the conclusion of hostilities, whoever is in control of Iraq at the time, with the elimination of troops from Iraq there will be pressing considerations deserving and needing international support to restore peace in the region, as well as the settlement of long-standing problems without which there will never be, and could not be, peace in the region. For instance, the territorial borders of the Arab states, including Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and of course Israel must be respected and ensured so that Christian, Jew and Moslem can live in peace in the region without the threat of force or oppression from any one particular country.

The problem of vast numbers of refugees returning to their homelands, the restoration of massive material destruction that has taken place, will be major tasks not only for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees but for the world community as a whole. Is it conceivable that all these tasks, and indeed many others, could be undertaken under Chapter VII of the charter? I was thinking in particular of Article 45 concerning agreements regarding contingency forces of member states being available for the maintenance of peace. In this connection, I would think of the emphasis on Arab states contributing.

Are state members being requested at the conclusion of this conflict to provide troops—and again I say particularly from the Arab states—for a police-keeping force in the region, with greater powers than were hitherto generally available to the United Nations peace-keeping forces? Can these provisions of Article 45 referring to combined international enforcement action apply in terms of peace as well as during an armed conflict?

In Resolution 665 of 25th August, reference is made to the Military Staff Committee. Here I ask a question of which I have given notice to my noble friend. Can the Minister tell the House what role, if any, this committee has so far played during the current situation, and is it envisaged to have a role at the end of the conflict not only to supervise and monitor any police peace-keeping force that may be established but also to assist in the regulation of possible disarmament as provided in Article 47(1) of the charter?

The United Nations, with its failings and its obvious weaknesses, perhaps with continued co-operation between the five permanent members of the Security Council, will be supported by the hopes of people who wish to see peace in the world. It is only the United Nations, so far as I can see, that has the combined task on behalf of the world community of peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace enforcing and peace building, and we wish them every success. If one cannot be an optimist, at least one can hope.

4.35 p.m.

Lord Greenhill of Harrow

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, has proposed a very timely debate. He has done so eloquently, drawing on his long and relevant experience, and the debate has already produced an important and interesting statement by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, on the problems of sanctions in the modern world. It has also given us an opportunity to pay tribute once again to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, for the part that he played in the creation of the United Nations. I was always impressed, reading the Charter, by the wisdom of those people who had that initial task.

Discussion of Chapter VII cannot, I believe, be undertaken in isolation. The United Nations Charter is a mature document. It is in fact older than the noble Earl on the government Front Bench, who will wind up for the Foreign Office. It is surprising that it has not been amended in any significant way. But can it continue unchanged much longer? In the past there have been suggestions for reform of the Charter, which would of course have included Chapter VII.

I was, on more than one occasion, with the noble Lord, Lord Stewart of Fulham—and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, was there also—when he suggested to Gromyko that some amendments to the Charter might be discussed between us. We were at that time looking for some new means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and improvement of Chapter VI. But Gromyko's response was always the same. It was the famous Soviet, "nyet". However, he gave what seemed to me a good reason. He spoke to Lord Stewart in a rather fatherly way on the following lines, "If you had known how terribly difficult it was to agree the existing text, you would not be suggesting that we start discussing it all over again".

Chapter VII, and particularly Articles 41 and 42, were designed to be the teeth of the Charter; the means by which the organisation disciplined those who wished to break the peace, and the discipline which could be imposed by the use of force. The authors of course envisaged a postwar world which never came about. As might have been expected the Charter reflected—and particularly in Chapter VII—the way in which the allies had successfully conducted World War II, and they assumed their harmony and the immense power of the new weapons would continue unchallenged and in their control.

It involved a military committee in New York, which would act like a combined chiefs of staff committee. In the event, this committee never had a chance of planning or running a United Nations war. It was not equipped to do so, and could not do so now. But times have changed. It looks very much as though the Security Council can, for the time being, act in unison, but it is by no means certain that this unity will continue.

A new and ugly factor is that many countries now possess sophisticated weaponry and cannot be intimidated into abandoning aggressive policies. The non-proliferation treaty is not universally accepted and could always be evaded. The plain fact is that Chapter VII is out of date and will, in the long term, need modernisation. What changes can usefully be made will depend upon the outcome of the present war, and for the time being we must carry on as best we can.

Reference has been made to Sir Anthony Parsons' perceptive article, which the noble Lord will have seen, in today's Times. No one is more qualified than he to speak because of his involvement in the Falklands war and the time he spent in New York. He underlines the inadequacy of the present system and explains where it has failed in the past.

However, once a revision of the Charter becomes a matter of international discussion, it is not only Chapter VII that will be called into question. Pandora's Box will be opened and there will be calls for changes from large numbers of the membership. First and foremost will surely be a call for a change in the composition of the Security Council, and British interests will be very much involved. Some people already speak of a single European seat. What role will Japan wish to play? There are other countries with populations of well over 100 million in Africa and South America which will wish to play a much bigger part than they have done hitherto. Gromyko's warnings come again to mind and will be seen to have some justification.

History will show the Gulf war to have been worth while only if eventually it leads to a redesigned United Nations which will have to show how world order can be assured and how a revised Chapter VII will be made to play its part.

4.40 p.m.

Lord Thomson of Monifieth

My Lords, I join with all noble Lords in expressing gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, who has performed a very timely service in initiating this debate on the future of the United Nations operations under Chapter VII of its Charter.

There has been a great deal of criticism of the United Nations during the course of this debate. The United Nations simply reflects the kind of world that we live in; a world of conflicting national interests, commercial rivalries and competing alliances. But it is the task of mankind to fulfil what I believe is the spirit that lies behind the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell; namely, to seek ways of creating a more civilised international order. That is a justification for the points that he put before your Lordships' House this afternoon.

Despite the many imperfections of the United Nations, it is important to remember that during its 50 years of existence it has provided a permanent and at times important forum for international debate and discussion in times of danger. One must remember that it has quietly gone on with its own technical assistance programme which has been very valuable to the countries of the third world. But, as a number of noble Lords have said, it is absolutely true that the United Nations has not been able to fulfil the high hopes with which it was born in terms of creating an effective international peace-keeping force. It was not able to develop the potential for peace-keeping in the various articles of Chapter VII, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell. As this debate has made clear, the reason was that the birth of the United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks in San Francisco took place only a short time before the beginning of the cold war, which deeply divided the permanent members of the Security Council with their powers of veto.

The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, gave a vivid first-hand account of the only major collective United Nations' action for peace which took place in the face of North Korean aggression in 1950. But now momentous changes within the Soviet empire have created a new situation. It is a situation with many risks and dangers as well as hopes, but with new possibilities of enabling the United Nations to pursue its original purpose as an effective world peace-keeping force. For the first time in United Nations' history both economic sanctions and collective military action against aggression are taking place with the full authority of the United Nations set out in a series of Security Council resolutions.

I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, intended this to be a debate on the Gulf war and I shall not talk, about that other than to say that there is no doubt that once Saddam Hussein is forced to withdraw from Kuwait, as undoubtedly he will be as a result of this collective security action, there will be an unrepeatable period of opportunity to build on that outcome. I welcome the words of the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, at the weekend to the effect that we must begin to prepare to use peace wisely. If the United Nations has had the authority to undertake the war in the Gulf, we should seek a United Nations responsibility for the peace that follows.

One immediate task will be to tackle the wider problem of establishing peace and security throughout the Middle East. I do not for a moment underestimate the difficulties involved and I do not intend to go into them in this debate. This debate relates to an even wider aim which goes beyond the Security Council resolutions relating to Kuwait and the Middle East in order to seek to make more of a reality of the peace-keeping articles of Chapter VII.

I agree with what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill; namely, that Chapter VII is now more than 50 years old and relates to a world that has changed tremendously. As Sir Anthony Parsons argues in the article just cited, it is no longer realistic to consider implementing some of the provisions of Chapter VII in the way that was thought possible at the time that the chapter was drafted. Either the chapter must be modernised with all the formidable difficulties that lie along that path, as the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, indicated, or, as has been done so often with the United Nations, we must modernise and adapt our international practice of diplomacy within the Charter. It was in that spirit that I think we all listened with very great interest to the ideas of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, that after Kuwait we must seek to make very much more effective the international pooling of information and techniques relating to sanctions through the United Nations. Again, there is a very real role for much more contingency planning for the future in these matters. There is a need to look again at Chapter VI of the charter with regard to steps in relation to the peaceful settlement of disputes.

These matters are urgent. They are practical issues. We are in a very new world situation. Since the start of the cold war, the safeguard against a major world conflict has not been the United Nations but the balance of nuclear terror between the two superpowers and the military alliances. That balance has been costly and frightening but for 40 years it has acted as a deterrent to a third world war. Now that the Cold War is ending there is a much less stable situation and an urgent need to create an effective form of world order. The only way to do that is through the United Nations. In any case, as we all know, the balance of nuclear power had its limits. Around it smaller and often bloody conflicts have taken place, sometimes fed by cold war rivalries. At times the blue berets of the United Nations have been called in to police the partial settlements with varying degrees of success, as noble Lords have said. Sir Anthony Parsons has some interesting ideas on how one might move forward to a more effective form of United Nations forces.

Again, the military technology and commercial rivalries of the international arms trade have made it possible for medium-sized and even small countries to acquire weapons of terror: chemical, biological and, ultimately, even nuclear. The United Nations has the particular responsibility of trying to bring about the regulation and limitation of the international arms trade. Countries, however poor and small, have a right to the means of conventional self-defence, but the weapons of modern terror are another matter. They demand urgent international regulation.

All those issues can be dealt with inside the present United Nations Charter but it needs adapting in fundamental ways. All noble Lords were fascinated to hear the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, who helped to draft the original Charter. His years have not dimmed his constructive zeal for progress in international order, nor the fertility of his mind in seeking practical reforms in the United Nations machinery.

The speech of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, reminded me that a companion of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, at the San Francisco conference was the then Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee. I read that he went to the conference as an idealist but not a starry-eyed idealist. He remarked that any hope for the United Nations depended upon the agreement of the great powers. That is now a cliché but perhaps not then so obvious.

For the first time since the foundation of the United Nations we have that agreement among the great powers, however temporary it may be. We all hope that it will last much longer. There has been a fateful act of will to go to collective war in the interests of peace. Surely it cannot be starry-eyed to urge that the sacrifices of life by both sides in the Gulf war should give us a powerful reason to seek to make the United Nations charter more effective in order to prevent any repetition of the kind of aggression through which Saddam Hussein has plunged his people, and many others, into such suffering.

4.52 p.m.

Lord Richard

My Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, for introducing the debate today. No one can disagree with the fact that it is timely. It is extremely helpful and useful to discuss at this time the role of the United Nations. The discussion is not confined to the Gulf war but extends to the lessons that can be drawn from the way in which the UN has behaved in relation to it which will serve us well in the future.

The United Nations, analysed as it has been by many noble Lords during the past six months, has come in for considerable criticism. As always I enjoyed the eloquent pessimism of the noble Lord, Lord Beloff. Again he told the House that nations are moved by their perceptions of national interest. Of course they are; no one questions that for an instant. However, I am sure he will agree that perceptions of national interest are not static; they change. It may be that a number of countries now perceive their national interests to lie in having an effective and efficient mechanism at an international level for settling international disputes. I am conscious of the fact that the Soviet Union now clearly perceives the United Nations as being a body which it is in its national interests to support. I do not say that that view will be permanent, that it will be written in tablets of stone in the Kremlin wall, and that hereafter the Soviet Union will always behave with the degree of rationality that we in the West hope for. However, I am saying that for the first time since 1945 perceptions of national interests held by the world's major countries appear to be converging.

I have always understood that one of the UN's objectives is to provide an international institution for settling situations where perceptions of national interest differ. One must have some way of resolving a dispute between countries which may feel equally deeply about their national interests. If there is no way of settling such disputes by peaceful means, the outlook for the world is sad.

I wish to make a general point. My noble friend Lord Hutch of Lusby, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and other noble Lords castigated what the United Nations has done and is doing in the Gulf. The right reverend Prelate said that it does not look like a genuine UN operation; rather that the UN appears to have been hijacked. I wish to make a small plea. If we have a situation in which the Security Council agrees with the United States we must not assume that the Security Council has gone wrong. If one looks at the history of the resolutions dating back to 2nd August it is instructive to consider the wealth of experience of the various countries which are members of the Security Council. The council does not consist only of the five permanent members; there are 10 non-permanent members. Most of the resolutions that were passed relating to the Gulf episode received the conscious approval of all the non-permanent countries.

Which countries have been hijacked by the United States and the United Kingdom during the past few months? I shall name them, and your Lordships can draw your own conclusions. Three are African countries; Zaire, Ethiopia and the Ivory Coast. That is a fair spread of African opinion and it is interesting to note that there is not one Anglophone country among them. There are two Western countries, Canada and Finland, and one Eastern European country, Romania. There are two Asian countries; Malaysia and the Yemen, and, finally, a Caribbean and a South American country, Cuba and Colombia. If one adds to those countries the five permanent members one has a fair spread of international opinion that will be difficult to emulate and almost impossible to surpass.

What happened when the issue came before the Security Council? It is extraordinary that the original resolutions —even going back to Resolutions 660 and 661—were expressed to be under Chapter VII of the Charter. When I was in New York I was vigorously instructed that no language that even hinted at action under Chapter VII would be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government. That appeared to be a recurrent instruction sent to all UN ambassadors. However, I must confess—and I do not do so with pride—to having cast three vetoes in one morning. I and two other Western ambassadors cast a total of nine vetoes in 12 minutes. All related to southern African resolutions not because they fell under Chapter VII but because they merely hinted at action under that Chapter.

We have now reached the stage when the world community as a whole, faced with an act of aggression, can almost immediately move international action under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. That is extraordinarily encouraging—

The Lord Bishop of Manchester

My Lords, I made clear in my remarks the fact that I too found most encouraging the initial coming together of all those nations in the Security Council. However, I made the point that the military operation did not look like a United Nations operation because of the strength of the American involvement.

Lord Richard

My Lords, with respect, I regard that as being about a point and a half down the road this afternoon.

I wish to make a further comment about the way in which co-operation appears to be developing in the United Nations. I hesitate to say that it is a case of cause and effect but the situation has improved enormously since I left. The degree of co-operation, discussion and co-ordination that is now taking place among the five permanent members of the Security Council is extraordinary. One has reached a stage where there is almost a rotating chairmanship of one of the five permanent members. There are regular meetings; I believe that there is even a rudimentary secretariat. One has reached a situation in which the spirit of the Charter is being implemented by the five so-called most powerful countries on earth although it is possible to argue whether Britain and France should still be included in that category. I accept that argument. I accept also that if one looks at amendments to the Charter, one is opening a Pandora's Box and that, as Ernest Bevin once said, "Who knows what Trojan horses will come out of it?" The fact is that at present the Charter is beginning to operate in the way envisaged.

Perhaps I may deal with a point raised by the right reverend Prelate. If one looks at the enforcement provisions of the Charter, it is clear that prima facie the direction of action must lie with the Security Council. It is clear also that there are a number of articles in the Charter and a number of hoops through which one must go before one reaches a stage of a UN war. I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, that this is not a UN war under Article 42 of the Charter. If it were, the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council would be playing a much more active part. The words of Article 47 are: The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked Out subesquently". Therefore, if it is an enforcement provision under Article 42, then prima facie the Military Staff Committee must be involved in that way.

I must say to your Lordships that I do not believe that that is possible at present. Whether one believes it to be desirable as an intellectual exercise that a war should be run by a Military Staff Committee consisting of the five chiefs of staff of the five permanent members is one question. However, the technology of warfare has outstripped the decision-making process as envisaged in the treaty. Matters are progressing too quickly on a technological level on the battlefield for a Military Staff Committee as at present constituted to be able to exercise the control which the Charter seems to envisage.

I come to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill. If out of the Gulf war there emerges a general feeling that the Charter needs to be looked at again so that those enforcement provisions and the difficulties of grafting the Charter's provisions on to the technology of modern warfare can he overcome, then some good will come out of the war not only in relation to Kuwait but more generally.

I conclude by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, for raising the issue. There is a club of people who at some stage have worked for the United Nations. I believe that we should have a tie so that we are all recognisable. However, in the time honoured phrase, very few of us who have worked there have failed to go native. One goes native because the UN is a unique organisation in which one sees a genuine attempt to create an international consensus at the highest possible level. I found my work there inspiriting. It was occasionally depressing but—if I may say this to the noble Lord, Lord Beloff—I was more optimistic about the organisation when I came out than when I went in.

5.3 p.m.

The Earl of Caithness

My Lords, I too am grateful to my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy with his great experience for initiating this debate and indeed to those of your Lordships who have taken part in it. It is timely because Chapter VII of the UN Charter has never been invoked as much as in the past six months. Through the handling of the Gulf crisis, parts of the UN Charter regarded by many commentators as a dead letter have been shown to possess unexpected life and potential.

The preamble of the UN Charter begins by noting the determination of the people of the United Nations: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". The question of how to do this is the specific subject of the 13 articles of Chapter VII. They therefore form a cornerstone of the Charter as a whole.

As the Motion states, Chapter VII deals with: action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". Together with Chapter VI, dealing with the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", it sets out the special powers accorded to the Security Council so that the council may exercise the: primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security conferred on it by the members of the United Nations under Article 24 of the Charter.

The provisions of Chapter VII reflect the concerns of the drafters of the Charter, at the San Francisco conference in 1945, to set up a system for the maintenance of international peace and security which would be more effective than that of the League of Nations. The League's provisions in this area had shown themselves to be inadequate. Under the League's covenant, each member state had been allowed to reserve the right to determine for itself whether the hostile actions of another state amounted to a breach of the covenant, and whether or not to comply with the League's recommendations—for they were no more than that on how to respond. The events of the 1930s had demonstrated all too clearly the fatal shortcomings of such a system.

With the drafting of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, these shortcomings were tackled by explicitly concentrating the power to take decisive action on the Security Council. The council was given the power to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and what should be done about it. Moreover, under Article 25 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations are bound to accept and carry out the council's decisions. Under Article 103, obligations arising under the Charter prevail over a member's obligations under other international agreements.

Action may only be taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII where there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. All decisions of the Security Council on non-procedural matters require the concurring votes of the five permanent members. It is chiefly for this reason that the council has so rarely determined that such a situation exists. Through the long decades of the cold war, occasions when the five permanent members—in particular the United States and the Soviet Union—took a common view were rare. Before the present crisis in the Gulf erupted on 2nd August last year, the council had only done so explicitly in six cases: Palestine in 1948, Korea in 1950 (in the absence of the Soviet Union), Southern Rhodesia in the late 1960s and 1970s; South Africa in 1977; the Falklands in 1982; and the Iran/Iraq war in 1987.

Where a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression exists, the Security Council has the choice of either making recommendations for action or deciding on mandatory measures. These mandatory measures can be ordered under Article 41, which covers measures not involving the use of armed force, such as complete or partial interruption of economic, transport and communication links, and the breaking of diplomatic relations. The economic sanctions against Rhodesia and the arms embargo against South Africa are examples of this.

If non-forcible measures are insufficient, Article 42 provides for the Security Council to take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. However, the five permanent members have never been able to agree which forces should be put at the council's disposal and what they should do. Articles 43 to 45, relating to agreements between member states and the Security Council for the provision of forces and other assistance, have never been implemented.

Perhaps it may be opportune to pause and consider a quotation from the then Sir Gladwyn Jebb, now the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, one of the founding fathers of the Charter, which he made in the Security Council on 7th July 1950 in connection with the Korean war. He said: Had the Charter come fully into force and had the agreement provided for in Article 43 of the Charter been concluded, we should, of course, have proceeded differently, and the action to be taken by the Security Council would no doubt have been founded on Article 42. As it is, however, the Council can naturally act only under Article 39, which enables the Security Council to recommend what measures should be taken to restore international peace and security". Subsequent articles of Chapter VII also remain unfulfilled. Articles 46 and 47 deal with the Military Staff Committee, consisting of the chiefs of staff of the permanent five members or their representatives, and tasked according to Article 47 with: advising and assisting the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament". The Military Staff Committee was duly established in 1945, and has continued to this day to meet roughly twice a month. However, in the absence of any forces placed at the council's disposal on the basis of the special agreements referred to in these articles, it has never exercised the responsibilities orginally envisaged for it.

Perhaps my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy, as a military man, would agree that it is difficult to believe that the five members of the Military Staff Committee could have undertaken the strategic direction of armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council with anything like the speed and efficiency of the coalition commanders.

Articles 48 and 49 concern implementation of Security Council decisions by the members of the United Nations. Article 50 deals with the question of assistance to states which find themselves confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of measures taken by the Security Council. This article was invoked by various front line states when sanctions were placed on Rhodesia. Finally, Article 51, the chapter's concluding article, records the important principle that the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence remains unimpaired by the other provisions of the Charter, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

I turn now to the present. The application of Chapter VII during the Gulf crisis has shown that it has sufficient versatility to cope with circumstances that might not have been directly anticipated by its drafters in 1945.

The present crisis in the Gulf represents the seventh occasion when the Security Council has made an explicit formal determination that there exists a breach of international peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter. It was undoubtedly right to do so. A more unequivocal breach of the Charter than Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait is hard to imagine. It is also the third occasion when the Council has proceeded to call for mandatory measures under Chapter VII, imposing comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq and occupied Kuwait under Security Council Resolution 661. These were subsequently reinforced by maritime enforcement measures under Resolution 665 and an air embargo under Resolution 670. Resolution 665 also provided for the use of mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee. On five occasions in the second half of 1990 ad hoc meetings of the Military Staff Committee provided a forum for the exchange of information on the measures taken by maritime forces to enforce the embargo.

Other articles of Chapter VII have also been invoked as part of the council's response to the Iraqi invasion. Resolution 669 led to the establishment of a special working group of the council's Sanctions Committee, to consider requests for economic assistance under Article 50, from states suffering economic disruption as a result of applying sanctions. The working group dealt with applications from 19 countries in the last quarter of the year.

Article 51 of Chapter VII was invoked in Resolution 661, affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in response to Iraq's armed attack on Kuwait. This inherent right provided a firm legal basis for the government of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to request the assistance of the armed forces of other states following the Iraqi invasion.

The comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by Resolution 661 represent only one form of the mandatory measures under Chapter VII called for by the council in response to the Gulf crisis. Since 15th January the member states co-operating with Kuwait have been authorised to use all necessary means to that end in the face of persistent Iraqi intransigence. They have resorted to military force in order to see the council's resolutions implemented and upheld.

The council has not invoked Article 42 explicitly and the command and control arrangements of the forces continue to be handled by host nations and contributing countries for reasons of military efficacy. Nevertheless—and the noble Lord, Lord Richard, made the point to the right reverend Prelate better than I can—it is because of Resolution 678 that the forces are operating just as much on the basis of UN authority as if they were under UN command.

I have no doubt that when the present crisis is over much thought will be given to its lessons and the issues raised in this debate will be much discussed. One theme will be the lessons learnt from the implementation of sanctions. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, majored on this in a most interesting and apposite speech. He drew attention to the importance of Article 41 in the scheme of Chapter VII and the considerable practical and legal difficulties of imposing economic sanctions.

Sanctions have been, quite rightly, a central pillar of the international community's response to the Iraqi invasion. The operation of the embargo represents a comprehensive indictment of Iraqi aggression. Sanctions have been almost universally enforced. Iraq has suffered considerable economic dislocation. Its oil exports have been effectively stopped; its imports reduced to a trickle, and its access to foreign exchange drastically cut back. But, as my noble friend Lord Beloff reminded the House, the key test of their effectiveness would have been whether sanctions forced Saddam Hussein to change his policies and to comply with the Security Council's resolutions. This they did not do. Nor was there any evidence that sanctions alone would do so. There are many who would agree with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that they would never do so. Iraq has taken steps to increase its domestic food production. Key military industries, supplying one of the world's largest armies, have been insulated from the effects of the embargo. And meanwhile the ordeal of the Kuwaiti people continued.

Sanctions were, and remain, a significant element in the international pressure on Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. In terms of their effectiveness, they mark the most thorough and comprehensive application of sanctions ever. And yet even they were not conclusive. Economic pressure alone was an inadequate match for military aggression. In these circumstances, and with the UN's authority, it was right to resort to the use of force.

Nevertheless the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, claimed that he had given me evidence that sanctions would work. He has not. He has now summarised on three occasions what Judge Webster said to the House Armed Services Committee on 5th December, and each time he has changed the wording of what was said. In contrast to the inaccurate generalisations that he has made let me quote from Judge Webster's statement. He said: Our judgment has been and continues to be that there is no assurance or guarantee that economic hardships will compel Saddam to change his policies". It is impossible to predict at this stage how the Security Council will respond to future crises. But we must be realistic. There is no immediate prospect of the conclusion of the special agreements on the provision of forces and other assistance referred to in Articles 43 to 45. Consequently—as will be deduced by my noble friend Lady Elles from what I have said—the full activation of the Military Staff Committee or the establishment of a standby UN deterrent force is not on the short-term agenda either.

Lord Hatch of Lusby

My Lords, with the leave of the House, perhaps I can ask whether the noble Earl intends to take just that small section of the quotation from Judge Webster.

The Earl of Caithness

My Lords, I quoted exactly from Judge Webster's statement. I did not make a generalisation, as did the noble Lord.

Lord Hatch of Lusby

My Lords, that is being selective.

The Earl of Caithness

My Lords, it would be wrong to conclude from this that Chapter VII has been in some sense deficient. The noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, described it as out of date. I would submit that the council's handling of the Gulf crisis suggests the opposite. To the noble Lord, Lord Thomson of Monifieth, I would quote one great expert on the Charter, Sydney Bailey, who said: The challenge is not to draft a better Charter: it is to make better use of the Charter we have". I take issue with those noble Lords who argued that Chapter VII is out of date in the sense that it needs revision. The Charter is a flexible instrument and has proved its worth on this occasion. It would be very dangerous to open the Pandora's Box, to which some noble Lords have already referred. The noble Lord, Lord Richard, with his profound experience of the UN, reminded us that response has been unprecedented, and of the hope that that offered.

A series of 12 powerful resolutions have been adopted under Chapter VII, all unanimously or with overwhelming majorities. There has been the closest co-operation between the council's five permanent members. Ad hoc mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee have proved their worth for the exchange of information on naval deployments and the maritime embargo. Resolution 678 has shown that there are ways of giving a multi-national force the authority of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter, while retaining the military advantages of leaving responsibility for command and control arrangements with the nations involved.

In his speech the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, drew attention to the preamble to the Charter and surely its most poetic part. If we read on we come to these words, which I believe are particularly relevant to what the noble Earl, Lord Winchilsea and Nottingham, said: To live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security. I do not follow the noble Earl down the path which he wanted to go in comparing cases. They are all different. The United Nations itself as an institution certainly cannot be blamed if it fails to resolve all the disputes in the world. Unfortunately, there has not always been unanimity among the members of the United Nations on past occasions. The world has changed radically since the Charter was drafted and will no doubt go on doing so. I agree with my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy that the important matter is that the Charter is sufficiently flexible to tackle specific situations quickly and effectively. The Security Council has shown in the past six months that this is indubitably so. It is no exaggeration to say that it is at last acting with the vigour, determination and authority which its drafters envisaged.

5.21 p.m.

Lord Campbell of Croy

My Lords, I would like to thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I have a few minutes left in this limited-time debate, but it is difficult to say as much as one would wish. I wish to reply to two or three points raised about my opening speech. I pointed to the fact that the Military Staff Committee, although formed, had never operated with agreement as intended. I would like to make it clear that I do not suggest that it should do that. I think that the time for formal agreements, with contingents earmarked, is well past. I agree with what has been said about that. Whether or not more is done in the MSC, there should be a focus for provisional consideration of suitable contributions from members in a crisis. A great deal more work could be done on that in peace-time. That can be done in all kinds of fields. I refer, for example, to the financial and medical side, because field hospitals and the like are greatly needed.

That need not affect the command structure. I should like to make it clear again that my interpretation of Article 47, quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Richard, allows for command matters to be worked out subsequently, as stated. To my mind that means separately. What happened both in Korea and in the Gulf is that a commander was appointed outside and not connected with the MSC. That is in line with my interpretation of that part of the Charter.

I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Richard, for his contribution to the debate based on the five years of his distinguished career as our ambassador at the United Nations. He spoke of a club of people who had worked there. Perhaps I may give an illustration of that in my own case. After having been a junior Minister in a Conservative Government in another place, I was asked immediately after the election to join, and I served on, the panel of advisers on the United Nations which the Labour Party set up in accordance with its election manifesto.

There has always been a bi-partisan approach within British politics to United Nations' affairs. That is to be welcomed and is most refreshing. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Caithness for his reply, knowing that he has just come back having spent five days in the Far East. He dealt with most of the important points, if not all of them. As we are now engaged in a war, perhaps I may mention that his father and I were in the same brigade of a Scottish division for two years. We took part in some major military actions which we both had the good luck to survive. I am now delighted that my noble friend is taking a leading part in the world's councils.

I agree with what he said at the end of his remarks. The main and realistic course is to make better use of the Charter as it is. We can see what has not been done and what could be better done. We might redraft it if we had another chance now, as the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, said in a very thoughtful speech. The most realistic policy is to make it work as best we can. That has been done in the case of the Gulf crisis, but I believe that a great deal of work needs to be done when that crisis is over. Work should be done under the Charter in improving arrangements for any future situation of the same kind. My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion for Papers.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.