Baltic States and the Soviet Union

HL Deb 06 February 1991 vol 525 cc1231-68

7.44 p.m.

Baroness Cox rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what is their response to the changing circumstances in the Baltic states and the Soviet Union.

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I am most grateful that so many of your Lordships have agreed to speak at this relatively late hour. That so many noble Lords have done so is a reflection of widespread and deep concern over recent unhappy events in the Baltic states and in the Soviet Union.

I begin by paying tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, who has persistently brought these events to the attention of the House with his highly relevant Starred Questions, and also to my noble friend Lord Caithness for the principled robustness of his responses to those Questions. However, the situation in the Baltic states and the Soviet Union is so serious that it seemed desirable to have a little longer to consider the issues than is possible with a Starred Question.

Recent developments are of the utmost significance politically and in terms of human suffering but they tend to have been eclipsed by the inevitable preoccupation of Western governments and media with the tragic war in the Gulf. Indeed we may surmise that this preoccupation was part of the calculations of those in the Soviet Union who chose 15th and 16th January for an ultimatum to the Baltic states in the full knowledge that all eyes throughout the world would be focused on Saddam Hussein and his response to the United Nations deadline of 15th January. There were here shades of 1956 and the brutal Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising while most of the rest of the world was preoccupied with Suez.

I shall offer a brief overview of events and issues as a broader context in which your Lordships may wish to develop more specific aspects in greater detail. My starting point is the reaffirmation of the historic truth that the Baltic states were never legitimately a part of the Soviet Union. Their forcible incorporation and brutal repression was a tragic outcome of the notorious Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. By international law, therefore, they are independent states and deserve recognition as such. Therefore, I suggest, attempts by the Baltic states to realise their independence by peaceful means deserve not only our sympathy but also our support. The brutal repression to which they have been subjected deserves our condemnation. I shall therefore begin by summarising briefly some of the recent repressive measures adopted by the Soviet Union.

I refer, first, to Lithuania. As is well known, on 13th January Soviet troops and tanks attacked an unarmed crowd in Vilnius. The casualties were 14 dead and 346 wounded. The spine-chilling photographs of Soviet tanks crushing unarmed civilians will be indelibly etched on all our memories. Initially the Soviet ministry of defence put out its own version of those events in Lithuania. It was redolent of the worst kind of Soviet disinformation. Four days after the event, it claimed that no one had been killed; that those buried in the mass funeral in Vilnius on 16th January were victims of road accidents; and that the photographs of the man being crushed by a tank were "forged". Army violence has continued in Lithuania. There are reports of harassment and brutality. It is reported that six Lithuanian men seized at a roadblock were beaten up in military barracks. President Landsbergis has likened the Soviet troops to "a mob of bandits" and people are living in an atmosphere of fear.

In Latvia, atrocities have been mainly committed by the OMON black beret storm troops who, on 20th January, attacked the Latvian department of internal affairs in Riga, with four people killed and nine injured, one of whom has tragically just died. Previously, on 16th January, OMON units in armoured personnel carriers attacked vehicles on the Brasa bridge in Riga. A minibus with five passengers, including two small girls, caught fire. Although those passengers luckily escaped, another car was hit by automatic fire and its driver, Roberts Munieks, was killed. OMON black beret troops have also been deployed in Estonia and there are reports of harassment there. In all three Baltic states the parliamentary buildings are surrounded by barricades and by civilian volunteers taking a valiant but inevitably token stand in defence of independence—a tragic situation for freely elected parliaments.

These developments in the Baltic states have implications which reach far beyond the immediate human tragedy and political tensions in those countries. They include the exercise of power in the Soviet Union and its strategy vis-à-vis the Baltic states, general political developments in the Soviet Union and the appropriate response of the West in general and of Britain in particular.

I shall deal first with the Soviet Union's response to the developments in the Baltics. In a programme broadcast on the BBC World Service on 28th January, aptly named "Who's calling the shots in Lithuania?", Stephen Dalziel pointed out that, it took Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev 36 hours to respond to the news of the seizure of the Lithuanian TV centre in Vilnius, in which 14 people died. But far from expressing regret at what had happened—it was only this week at a short, hastily arranged press conference that he did that—he supported the troops' action, blaming the Lithuanian authorities for starting the trouble. This view was also presented by the Interior Minister, Boris Pugo, and the Defence Minister, Marshal Dmitry Yazov. With no censure of their actions forthcoming from Moscow, the military continued to exert their influence in Lithuania". Stephen Dalziel went on to suggest that the tone of those speeches made it clear that the Soviet leadership, including Mr. Gorbachev, had decided to adopt a hardline approach to quell moves towards independence in the Baltic states.

Other measures which are causing concern in the Baltic states include Mr. Gorbachev's insistence that an "all union" treaty be signed. That is being resisted, as it would indicate acceptance of Moscow's sovereignty. There is similar opposition in the Baltics to Mr. Gorbachev's demand that independence referenda be held on his terms. There is opposition to that because it is contrary to international law for an occupying power to make such a demand; because pro-independence parliaments have already been elected with free elections; and because those voting in such a referendum are likely to include Soviet troops and their families who are based in the Baltics.

Other more general moves are being made by the Soviet leadership throughout the Soviet Union to tighten its grip and to repress its citizens. For example, from 1st February joint army-police patrols have been on the streets in Soviet cities. That development is viewed with great fear by Soviet citizens because, although the soldiers are supposed to be armed only on public holidays or when demonstrations are expected, local commanders can extend provisions at their own discretion.

Another repressive measure is Mr. Gorbachev's decree which gives the KGB and interior ministry officials the right to enter and search business premises. Although the ostensible justification for this is that it is an attempt to tackle crimes associated with the black market, there is clearly an alternative possibility of harassment of many non-governmental organisations and democratic enterprises. As Stephen Dalziel has pointed out: It is difficult to see these latest moves as anything other than a further tightening of the screws on democracy—and two more nails in the coffin of perestroika". The confidence and ruthlessness with which the Soviets planned their strike against Baltic independence may well have resulted from the West's acquiescence in excluding the Baltic delegates as observers at the CSCE conference in Paris on 19th November. In retrospect, that cruel and unnecessary humiliation of the Baltic peoples may have convinced the Soviet authorities that they could enjoy a free hand.

I suggest that all those developments are particularly ominous, coming as they do in the wake of previous measures which have given Mr. Gorbachev the most complete powers ever held by a Soviet leader. There is now in place both the formal provision and the proven ability to extend the major crackdown against democratic reforms which could return the Soviet Union to the harsh totalitarianism of its recent bloody past.

I do not have time to discuss other recent repressive developments, such as the closure of channels of media communication like Interfax and the takeover of printing works, or the harassment of citizens like the assault on Alexander Podrabinek who is editor of Express Kronika and whom I am deeply privileged to regard as a friend. These are all deeply disturbing developments: they cannot be condoned.

In conclusion, I should like to ask my noble friend the Minister the following questions. First, does my noble friend believe that it is right for the CSCE conference, scheduled for later this year, to be held in Moscow? Will the Government do all in their power to try to change the location, unless or until the Soviet Union demonstrates its commitment to genuine democratic reforms? Secondly, will the Government initiate a debate in the United Nations on the situation in the Baltic states and press for their recognition and participation given that they were full members of the League of Nations and that their forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union was a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and was contrary to international law?

Thirdly, will the Government state that the Soviet Union's actions in the Baltic states are a clear breach of the CSCE Helsinki process, the most recent summit of which was held in Paris last November? Fourthly, will the Government extend some recognition of the freely elected Baltic governments; for example, as a first step at consular level, as has already been done by Scandinavian governments to their great credit? Fifthly, will the Government encourage cultural, sporting and educational contacts with the Baltic states; for example, by opening British Council offices in the area? Sixthly, and more generally, will the Government expand links with, and support for, non-governmental democratic organisations within the Soviet Union and the Baltic states to encourage the development of democratic institutions and a free economy?

My seventh question concerns aid. Will the Government reconsider their policy on aid, particularly food aid, to the Soviet Union, bearing in mind the fact that the Soviets had an outstandingly good harvest last year and that the problems of shortages are a result of the malfunctioning of the system? Is my noble friend aware that it is reported that much of the food aid has been used to replenish military stocks and that it has not been made available to citizens who are in most need? It seems ironic that we should be providing generous aid to a nation which is proposing to increase its spending on defence by about 20 per cent. this year when its defence expenditure is already running at about 25 per cent. of its national income.

Finally, if the Soviet Union is moving into a new era of hardline repressive communism, should we not be revising, albeit sadly but as a matter of urgency, our approach to our own defence? Can my noble friend confirm that the Soviet Union is still producing new offensive weapons at an alarming rate—a new submarine every six weeks, together with two aircraft, six tanks and one missile every day? Can he also confirm that armaments removed from Europe are massed, potentially still ready for use, east of the Urals?

I am most grateful for having had the opportunity to raise these issues which are worrying many people who are concerned for the future of democracy in the Baltic states, in the Soviet Union and, indeed, in Europe. There are some who resist a strong response by the West to recent developments in the Soviet Unions because they fear that that will undermine Mr. Gorbachev. But surely our support for President Gorbachev has been based on his initiatives which have appeared to promote democracy and freedom. It is those fundamental principles to which we are committed and which we must continue to support even—and, perhaps, especially—if Mr. Gorvachev jettisons them. I can do no better than to finish with a quotation from Mark Almond's booklet entitled Retreat to Moscow which is published by the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies. It reappraises Mr. Gorbachev and admonishes us: it would be wise to remember Montaigne's dictum that the worst form of servility is to be grateful to rulers who return some part of their subjects' liberty to which they had no right in the first place". At present, when there is no sign on the horizon of even a return to liberty for the Baltic states or for the Soviet Union, can we condone their humiliation and support a ruler and regime that inflict it?

8 p.m.

Lord Kagan

My Lords, we are indebted to the noble Baroness for introducing this subject. I was born in Lithuania. The dramatic, passionate struggle for freedom is understandable against the background of Lithuania's ancient history. Lithuania became a kingdom in 1200 at the time of Magna Charta. By the 15th century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under its ruler, Vytautas the Great extended from the Baltic Sea to the Caspian Sea. After the union of Lublin in 1569, when Lithuania joined Poland, it became the largest country in Eastern Europe. Then, of course, Moscow started expanding. By 1795, under Catherine the Great, Lithuania lost its battle and became a province of the Czars. Intense russification followed. Lithuania was a Catholic country. The Catholic Church was forbidden. It was driven underground. The Russian Orthodox Church was imposed.

The Latin alphabet was forbidden in school books, bibles and so on. The cyrillic alphabet was imposed. That brought official education almost to a dead stop because the Lithuanian population would not accept the cyrillic alphabet and could not use the Latin one without risk of being sent to Siberia, even in those days. However, despite repression, the Lithuanian language and culture were kept alive and survived.

Not until the Versailles Treaty in 1918 did Lithuania re-emerge as a nation. It was recognised by the League of Nations as an independent state on 16th February 1919. Lithuania happened to be on the crossroads between the Kaiser's Germany and the Czar's Russia. It was the battlefield. The armies moved over it both ways. The country was destroyed and ravaged to such an extent that my grandfather, who was born in the house, after the war could not identify the spot where his family house had stood. He had to bring surveyors to identify it from the remnants of chimney. From such beginnings, Lithuania started to rebuild its future.

On one side, Lithuania had Stalin's dictatorship. On the other side, for a time, it had the German Weimar Republic, Germany's inflation and total industrial ruin. It subsequently became Hitler's Germany. Lithuania was wedged between two of the most vicious of dictatorships, but it had the courage to set up a democratic government.

From a razed base, between 1919 and 1940 Lithuanian agriculture succeeded in becoming the largest exporter of bacon in Europe—even greater than that of Denmark. Lithuania's currency became the strongest currency in Europe. Eighty per cent. of it was covered by gold; in other words, it was similar to the gold sovereign. Budget after budget was balanced.

Lithuania had various presidents. It was not a command economy. There was a benign, enlightened autocracy. From 1926 to 1940 Antanas Smetona was president. During that time Lithuania's prosperity and peace continued. Despite having Hitler on one side and Stalin on the other, Lithuania had the courage to open its doors—it became a sanctuary for the new refugees from both dictatorships. If Mrs. Thatcher had seen Lithuania she would have praised it as a market economy. It was an incentive economy. Achievement was encouraged.

In 1940 we had the Hitler-Ribbentrop pact. Ten per cent. of the population, especially those with any education or achievement, was deported to the gulags and Kazakhstan. The terror was total; overt resistance impossible. Then came Hitler's occupation and Stalin's return in 1944 until 1985 when Gorbachev emerged.

Mr. Gorbachev realised, for his own reasons, that the Soviet economy had to change. In a competitive world, Russia could not afford a command economy. The problem of Russia and Gorbachev was that he could not just introduce reforms by decree. A market economy has to have a culture and a population that is willing and able to use it. It was obvious to him that if he could win over Lithuania it would be the seed bed, the showcase, the part of Russia which would most easily adapt, exploit and use perestroika.

In 1986 perestroika was introduced and in 1987 and 1988 glasnost was introduced. Mr. Gorbachev travelled across the world and was rapturously received in Berlin, Washington and London. I am sure that when he went to Lithuania and told them, "I am the man who let you out of the cage; I am the man who opened the prison doors; I want to give you the opportunity to be the leaders of this new freedom", he assumed that he would be received with the same rapture as in Berlin.

Now perhaps we may look at how it was perceived in Lithuania. Basically, after 70 years of terror in the USSR and 50 years of terror in Lithuania, people were in the same position as a man in a diving bell pushed right down. Suddenly the diving bell is brought up without gradual decompression and there is an explosion. The heady atmosphere did not allow the people to take a reasoned look at the situation.

When Gorbachev approached Lithuania and said, "This is what I want to do, this is your opportunity. After all, the greatest guarantee is our joint common interest", the reply was, "We want independence, we are entitled to it". Nobody in the world could doubt that, but they said, "We want it now, instantly". However, it was not his to give; he would not have survived 48 hours if he had given it.

Gorbachev returned and said, "Look, can we change the agenda and not make it independence and economy but economy and independence? I promise you that". They said, "No, we don't trust any Russian and we don't trust you". Gorbachev then introduced the law of recession to which the noble Baroness referred. He went back to Vilnius in January 1990 and thought he would talk to the newly elected members of the Lithuanian government. However, they were not free to reason with him. They were elected to their parliament with a clear-cut mandate: independence now, nothing less than total independence. The members were not even free to negotiate, and a deadlock resulted.

Thus, Gorbachev introduced the new law of secession on 12th March. On 11th March, the Lithuanian parliament was called together and declared UDI. Right was and is 100 per cent. on the side of Lithuania, but politics is the art of the possible.

One should never face a person on one's side or the opposite side of the table with a demand which cannot be carried out.

The situation was not due to ill will or deception; it arose because two peoples—Lithuanians and Soviets —started to run democratic lives without having their L plates removed. They went at speed. After all, even in the past 12 months or two years, one has an impression that the Almighty has pressed the fast-forward button on history. Neither the Soviets nor the Lithuanians had a tradition of freedom. They could not handle the heady atmosphere. It is one of the historic tragedies that Lithuania could have been the conduit for the Soviet Union to Europe. It could have had all the benefits which Finland has; it could have been the Switzerland of the Soviet Union. What is more, the latter needed Lithuania badly but because neither could handle the problem they ended in confrontation.

I agree with the noble Baroness regarding the western approach. If the world were as it should be we should simply be able to say, "Look, this, that and the other". However, in the real world we cannot do that. I would not presume to teach Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Mr. Major or Mr. Bush the right and prudent course regarding Lithuania.

Is it too late? Has the historic opportunity gone? Last Sunday there came on the television screen the teletext announcement that Mr. Landsbergis had agreed to discussions without preconditions; Moscow had agreed to the same. I do not believe that there is a good, realistic alternative. If Mr. Gorbachev is dislodged, who or what is the alternative? I said in this House four years ago that the Soviet Union would end up with a military dictatorship or a Napoleonic solution. It is beginning to look that way.

One aspect that has misled Lithuania is that as soon as the country had its flag there was enthusiasm, as could be expected after 50 years of terror, and the world applauded: but it also applauded Czechoslovakia, the Prague spring, and Hungary! Unless and until we have the will and the means to back up people we should refrain from encouraging them to climb on to the barricades. It is easy to be a spectator patriot, but who foots the bill?

8.18 p.m.

Lord Hylton

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Kagan. He has given us some fascinating insights into both the history and current affairs of the Baltic states. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, for raising the wider Question tonight. I thank her for her kind personal reference to me.

In view of the war in the Middle East, I thought it necessary by means of Starred and Written Questions to keep the three Baltic states before your Lordships' attention. Tonight's debate enables us to range a little more widely and deeply. In many ways, the history of the Russian empire and that of the British empire in India is remarkably similar. The Russians had suffered greatly from Tartar invasions and raids. From the 1550s onwards, the rulers of Muscovy expanded continuously until the late 19th century. In the process, they overran Siberia, they conquered Trans-Caucasia and much of central Asia.

The English, on the other hand, established their first trading post in India in the early 1600s. By 1850 we dominated the whole Indian sub-continent. Both great powers made the mistake of intervening in Afghanistan; both suffered a good deal as a result. From 1900 onwards the British evolved the concepts of dominion status and colonial self-government.

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and renounced worldwide revolution and domination, they seem to have had little idea of what to do with their historical land empire beyond perhaps some vague notions of federalism. The new deal offered by the Communist Party included more open and responsive government; the ending of arbitrary imprisonment and censorship, and greater freedom for the press and media.

There has been much talk of economic reconstruction, but without fully legalising private property and investment and without going wholeheartedly for a market economy or even for a social market. The resulting ferment has let loose nationalist desires which had long been kept firmly suppressed. The problem of the minorities is now acute, just as it was in Europe after the fall of the Prussian and Austrian empires. That problem is still acute to this day in India and Pakistan. We have seen ethnic tension in central Asia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Moldavia and to a lesser degree in the Baltic states. I wonder what the future trend will be. My intuition tells me that the trend will be towards stronger republics with a gradually weakening centre.

The influence of the party, the KGB and the army will no doubt slow down the movement. But given the apparent bankruptcy of Marxism as a unifying philosophy, it is difficult to see how the reactionary forces will succeed in stopping the trend completely. In the European parts of the USSR one can foresee three or four major republics, depending perhaps on whether the east and west Ukraine manage to hold together. In Transcaucasia there are likely to be at least three units. It remains to be seen whether the Russian republic will succeed in keeping control over Siberia with its strategic oil, gas and minerals. The Moslem areas of central Asia are likely to want to control their own destinies with, no doubt, many local rivalries.

How should Her Majesty's Government respond to this situation? I submit that the USSR is far too vast to be covered by just one embassy in Moscow. In addition the Ukraine and Byelorussia are already theoretical members of the United Nations Organisation. We need to be represented in such places as Kiev, Leningrad, Minsk and perhaps also in Siberia. Other European states that have opened offices in republican capitals have found them rewarding in terms of contracts won. If the objection to this idea is the usual one of cost, surely it should be possible for the European Community as a whole to be represented in these vitally important capitals of the major republics. If this is to be the approach, the representatives will have to have major political as well as economic competence. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will be able to comment further this evening on this question of representation.

A second approach lies through the English language which holds the key to so much of the world of computing and high technology generally. Here we have a major product to market. The British Council and British institutes have a definite part to play, as the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, indicated. They could help overcome the obvious problem of our non-acceptance of the Soviet claims to jurisdiction over the three Baltic states.

I was a little disappointed by the Government's reply in Hansard of 31st January to my Question for Written Answer on this matter. Can the noble Earl now assure me that this point will be kept under active review, not only as regards the Baltic states but also more widely within the Soviet Union? Her Majesty's Government also have at their disposal other diplomatic means of action. The USSR and its component republics, as they rejoin the rest of the world economy and the community of nations, will increasingly want to join the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and many other specialised international bodies. I trust that our Government will be absolutely firm in resisting any such requests until they are satisfied that a fair and just relationship has been worked out, and is functioning, between any central Soviet government and its component republics. Can the noble Earl give me any hopeful sign on that?

Soviet applications to join specialised bodies should not just be looked at on their own merits. I suggest that they should be closely related to improvements in human rights throughout the whole of the USSR. Conversely we should be active in sponsoring the Baltic states as members of international bodies.

Trade is another matter that should enable our Government to exercise a positive influence. I believe we still import considerable quantities of Russian timber. We could take Soviet oil, if any is available for export. Oil and possibly refrigerated natural gas from this source could reduce our dependence on the volatile Middle East at a time when our own North Sea supplies may be beginning to diminish. Trade could and should be increased as it would constitute an incentive to civilised behaviour by our suppliers. Similarly the release of credits for Soviet purchases should be closely linked to observance by the USSR of the Helsinki, Paris and CFE agreements.

I turn now to the particular matter of the Baltic states. I am personally grateful to Her Majesty's Government for the firm and resolute line they have taken. I believe this has, in concert with our European partners and others, induced some second thoughts in the Soviet authorities. The positive signs are Mr. Gorbachev's public expression of regret over the unnecessary deaths and woundings; the withdrawal of some at least of the special forces, and the appointment of negotiators to treat with each of the three republics.

A letter in the Independent newspaper of 31st January signed by Mr. Markov of the Novosti press agency in Moscow was also encouraging. It stated that the events, that is the shootings: are being painstakingly investigated, and those to blame will be punished according to law". Against all this we have to balance Mr. Gorbachev's ruling that the Lithuanian independence poll and the provocations in Latvia associated with Mr. Alexander Nevzorov are illegal. In and around Moscow there has been interference with the relatively free news agency, Interfax, and also with Radio Russia. I am sorry to say that in the past five months three well-known orthodox priests have been murdered—Fathers Men, Solnyshko and Shlykov—in possibly sinister circumstances. It would be interesting to hear how Her Majesty's Government evaluate these conflicting signals.

In the short-term there are several matters on which I hope our Government will continue to press the Soviet Union. They are compensation for the Baltic families of those killed and wounded by Soviet forces; repayment of the money stolen by Soviet forces from Marcus Warren, Brian Killen and Anatol Lieven of the Daily Telegraph, Reuters and The Times respectively; accountability for their actions by the Soviet forces; and the complete withdrawal of ministry of the interior and other special units from the Baltic states. The CSCE Helsinki process may be a suitable means for making progress on these matters.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, I wish to look at the longer term position. I start from the clear statement made in the House of Commons by Mr. Waldegrave on 5th April 1990 at col. 1361 of Hansard. He said that the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop protocol of 1939, implemented in 1940 by the forcible annexation of the Baltic states, was illegal. The Baltic peoples have a legal right to their independence. The question is therefore how they are to achieve it. The task is delicate, as was indicated by Sir Michael Howard in yesterday's Times. It need not necessarily be a precedent leading to a rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The right honourable gentleman, Mr. David Owen, suggested in today's Daily Telegraph that the International Court of Justice should be invited to rule on the special status of the Baltic republics. I support that suggestion. It may even be in the long-term interest of the USSR that the Baltic states should be treated as a special case.

We should also remember that their total population amounts only to some 8 million. They have shown remarkable restraint and self-discipline in the face of great provocation. Nevertheless we have also to understand the fears of the Soviet military leaders. They look on the Baltic as important to their security. They have access to that sea, both from Leningrad and from Kaliningrad in former East Prussia. There may well be a case for allowing the USSR to have some strategic sovereign bases within the independent republics which otherwise should remain as neutral as Finland or Austria. It may be right for NATO to give certain guarantees about spatial limits for the ships and aircraft belonging to the alliance.

The question for the Soviet Union is: does it accept that the Baltic states are a special case? Does it repudiate the crimes of Stalin just as much as those of Hitler? Can it see that neutral neighbours can be a source of strength to it rather than just a weakness? Her Majesty's Government have already made a promising start in their important task of persuading the USSR. I wish them still further success. At this point, perhaps I should add that it is appropriate for us to thank the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, for the stamina he is showing in replying to two debates on the same day.

8.32 p.m.

Lord Thomas of Swynnerton

My Lords, I, too, should like to thank my noble friend Lady Cox for introducing this extremely interesting debate on the issue of the Baltic states. I want to make my speech in relation to what our attitude should be in the light of the history of the Baltic states and of our own part in it.

I do not think I need dwell very much more on the history of these nations, since the noble Lord, Lord Kagan, did that admirably for us earlier on. I would only say that it is perhaps worth while to point out that Lithuania was created at the partition of Poland in the 1790s—I do not think the noble Lord mentioned that—and we are all aware that that is looked upon as one of the most unjust acts of great power policy in history.

As for Lithuania and Estonia, they have been a part of the Russian empire since much earlier times, since the 1720s. But no one in this House would think that the 1720s was a very long time ago, and no one would think that injustice is improved by having continued for a long time. Anyway, such injustices were recognised as being unacceptable in 1920 when Lenin himself accepted by a treaty that these states should be independent. They, of course, became such and were full members of the League of Nations, as my noble friend Lady Cox has pointed out. They were, too, in a rather roundabout manner, absorbed in Russia by another infamous action, which my noble friend Lady Cox has mentioned—the Russo-German pact of 1939.

This is where our own part in the history of our allies becomes suddenly relevant, because, when the Soviet Union absorbed the Baltic states in 1940, our first reaction was naturally that that action was as bad as the invasion of Czechoslovakia or Austria by Germany, and that is indeed what Lord Halifax told the Cabinet when it happened. A similar line was taken by President Roosevelt when he said, Independence has only been suspended provisionally. Lithuania will be free again and sooner than you think". He said that to a group of Lithuanian Americans in 1941.

As we know, that line was not sustained. The then British ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, was extremely anxious that we should overlook the action of absorption in the interests of our long-term friendship with the Soviet Union, which he argued forcefully was essential for winning the war. Stalin stressed the same when he saw Sir Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, in December 1941, arguing, in a way which no Soviet leader had done between the wars, that the Baltic states had been, as it were, snatched from Russia illegally in 1920. This wrong should be undone after the war.

The consequence was that the British government hesitated and, it seems to me, made a mistaken decision, not in recognising the absorption of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union, but in agreeing, in the first and subsequent drafts of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, that the frontier of the Soviet Union after the war should indeed be that of June 1941, the day of entry of the Soviet Union into the war, rather than that of 1939.

The United States, being further away and, in those days at least, perhaps more principled, for a time took a stronger position. I found a letter from the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to Sir Anthony Eden in early 1942 arguing that to accept the Soviet position would be to destroy the meaning of one of the most important clauses of the Atlantic Charter. Nevertheless, that principled decision of the United States government was soon modified.

I came across another reference to policy in, as it were, evolution, when I found President Roosevelt suggesting to his Secretary of State that perhaps a compromise could be reached whereby the territory could be recognised as being Soviet but the population could be allowed to emigrate. This was called by his own Under-Secretary a Baltic Munich, and indeed the idea did not get very far since Mr. Molotov turned it down.

Not long after that we found Under-Secretary of State Sumner Wells stating publicly that the United States had no vital interest in opposing the union of the Baltic States with the Soviet Union, and that concession was fundamentally made at the Tehran Conference in 1943 by both ourselves and the United States. That was the first, but by no means the last, of the major concessions of principle made to Stalin by the two major Western allies during the course of the Second World War.

It may well be argued, as President Roosevelt did at the time, that, The fact, surely, is that by the time the war comes to an end the Soviet Union will be occupying the Baltic States anyway, and we will not be able to do anything about it". Nevertheless there was a concession of principle which must have been of assistance to Stalin in summing up the long-term plans of the Western allies in the subsequent part of the war.

I found another note in one of the briefs made for the Potsdam Conference by a Foreign Office official: We hope very much that this question"— that is, the question of the Baltic states— will not be raised". And indeed it was not. That attitude, it seems to me, was the position of Her Majesty's Government up till two or three years ago.

I recall that when I first came to this House a friend of mine, the late Lord St. Oswald, told me that he had decided in 1981 to put down a Question in this House, asking what would be Her Majesty's Government's policy at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations towards the question of the Baltic states. He told me that when he put it down the Foreign Office approached him and said: "Please do not do so. This would rock the boat terribly. We are trying to do something extremely interesting at the moment with the Soviet Union and this will not be helpful". And indeed he withdrew the Question.

Given this past, what should be our current policy towards the Baltic states? I have some suggestions which I do not think have been mentioned so far, although if I am wrong I apologise. I think we should approach the Soviet Union in a very businesslike and "ex-imperial" way, if I can put it like that. We should say that we perfectly understand Mr. Gorbachev's difficulties in dealing with the subject peoples of the nations of which the Soviet Union is composed. We ourselves, as an imperial power, had the same difficulties and experienced similar crises throughout the world towards the end of our declining empire.

We should he resolute and point out that the loss of empire does not necessarily mean the loss of national identity: indeed, far from it, as our own statesmen and also General de Gaulle, in relation to France, have been able to prove very effectively. I think we should say that we are very flattered by the use which some Soviet commentators have made of the concept of the Commonwealth, as something which could play a part in the future evolution of the Soviet Union, although we ourselves have some doubt about what the Commonwealth means. We might well throw that in.

We should certainly insist—I think that history is important here—that we know very well what the history of the Baltic states has been between 1919 and 1945. Any suggestion that these are faraway countries of which we know nothing should be banished from our approaches and discussions with the Soviet Union. We should point out forcefully that bloodshed by an empire in decline practically never delays the inevitable day of judgment and probably only makes martyrs—martyrs whose names may be quite embarrassing for the imperial power, when their representatives travel down the avenues of the capital of the country concerned, since the names will be very clearly indicated on the side of the streets.

We should insist that, in an age of nationalism which is still going on and which is a development in which the Soviet Union has itself played a large part in encouraging—there is no question about that—the long-term goals of the independence movements in these countries are not likely to be stopped by some rather hesitant and inadequate use of force which is afterwards withdrawn. These are quite unnecessary and ineffective methods of indicating policy. After all, Solzhenitsyn himself—and who would deny that he was a very great Russian and certainly a very patriotic one?—said that the Baltic states, if they wished, should be allowed to separate from the Soviet Union.

We should say that we have an obligation to see and entertain Baltic leaders who come here, since we are in many ways sympathetic to their ideas. The Soviet leaders may insist that this is a ridiculous posture and that these countries are far too small. I have heard people—not Soviet citizens—who are not sympathetic to these independence movements say "that is a Stalinist suggestion, since Stalin himself was the person who insisted that some small countries give a very great deal of trouble". He was talking about Poland when he said that but obviously it applies to the Baltic states as well. Strategic access to the Baltic was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Hylton, but we might point out that the Soviet Union has access to the Baltic without using the Baltic states.

Finally, when discussing these questions with Soviet leaders, we should argue that there is a difference between these states and most of the other nations of the Soviet Union. These were independent states with different cultures, and were recognised as such for 20 years during the golden age of the Soviet Union between 1920 and 1940, as Lenin himself admitted. If the Baltic states were to achieve some kind of economic and cultural association with the other states which border on the Baltic it might well be that they would give far less trouble to the Soviet Union in future than if they remained within the embrace of the prison house. An approach along these lines should surely inform our policies in discussion them with the Soviet leaders.

8.45 p.m.

Lord Bridges

My Lords, I welcome the very apposite Question which the noble Baroness has put to the Government this evening. I entirely share the feeling of revulsion and dismay which she has so eloquently expressed about recent events in the Baltic states. However, I do not entirely share the conclusions she has drawn from the situation. The points I should like to put to the Government are summarised under four headings, and I hope that the Government may be able to take account of them in their consideration of this very important question.

My first plea would be for care, because the stated views of our Government on this issue, I believe, will be noted with much attention by the Soviet Union. Our power and influence in the world declined very much in the last generation but, for strange reasons, we still loom rather larger than life in the Soviet Union. There are a number of historical reasons for this which I will not go into now, but the stated position of our Government will attract much attention in the Kremlin. We should be aware of that. Policy making "on the hoof" on this subject is best avoided, and I do not think we can act with the freedom of some other governments such as the Scandinavian governments mentioned by the noble Baroness.

Next, I think we need to remind ourselves of the particular constitutional position of this problem in the Soviet Union. The USSR is a unique phenomenon in the modern world, as a vast assemblage of peoples and territories spread across two continents: an entity which is polyglot and multi-ethnic. Perhaps the closest parallels in this century have been the Ottoman empire and the Austro-Hungarian empire—not parallels which would appeal very much to the Russians but which I think are just.

Unlike these two empires, the Soviet Union has a written constitution of apparently open character, and it has two very important articles on the right of a member republic to secede. Article 72 specifically includes that right, although Article 73 reserves the determination of state frontiers to the Soviet state. It is clear that, as a state on the periphery of the union cannot secede without altering the state frontiers, it will be difficult to find a legal way to exercise the right to secede without co-operation from the centre. This in fact is what has been going on in the past two years. President Gorbachev has been seeking some way in which the right to secede could be expressed, while safeguarding the vital interests of the Soviet state. I noted with much interest what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Kagan. He seemed to believe that this was the right way for us to hope for progress. That is certainly my own belief."

Thirdly, I think we should reflect most carefully on the effect of what we say in public on the turmoil now prevalent in the Soviet Union. This upheaval involves all the key policy areas in the Soviet state, including the future place of their constituent republics in the Union. The history of the past century in the world at large suggests that in the end the centre must yield. It will not be able to hold this disparate grouping of peoples together indefinitely. But I hope that our Government will agree with me that the most satisfactory outcome will be recognition by all the peoples of the Soviet Union of the need for constitutional change. This will be an enormously difficult task but, if unnecessary bloodshed is to be avoided, a new agreement will have to be reached in the end.

However much we sympathise with their sufferings and aspirations—and clearly all of your Lordships who have spoken tonight feel that way, as I do myself—it would, I believe, be a serious mistake for any of us in the West to seek to play a direct role in what happens except in relation to the agreements to which both we and the Soviet Union are parties, such as the CSCE treaty, the United Nations Charter, and so on.

I recognise that these feelings may be unwelcome to some of your Lordships, but I place much emphasis on this because there are those in the Soviet Union who are already looking for signs of Western interference. Noble Lords will, I expect, have noticed a recent statement to this effect by the head of the KGB. In this country we need to be particularly careful because of our role of military intervention in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution. We may have forgotten about this episode of history here, but the Russians have not. It is in their school history textbooks, and practically every Soviet citizen I have spoken to remembers it.

Next I should like to say a separate word about the Baltic states. It was suggested recently in this House that we have never recognised their incorporation into the USSR. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, has just reminded us in his most interesting historical exposition, that is emphatically not the case. We have recognised the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR de facto if not de jure. If I can add one detail to the full and interesting account that the noble Lord gave, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, informed Joseph Stalin of this in December 1941 in terms, in the conversation to which he referred, and this has been our position ever since. I am no international lawyer but it would seem to me that, after a lapse of 49 years, the boundary between de facto recognition and de jure recognition must be a pretty thin one.

Thus, I believe that the words of caution that I have spoken about non-interference apply particularly to the question of the Baltic states. Any suggestion that we are trying to detach the Baltic states from the Soviet Union could, I believe, be extremely dangerous in the current situation in the Soviet Union. We cannot tell what this turmoil will lead to, but if we were to give this historical evolution a character directed against the West, it could have far-reaching consequences.

Your Lordships may think that I am a little too cautious on this matter, but I would emphasise that we are dealing with extremely long-term issues here. To illustrate what I mean in relation to the history of that part of Eastern Europe, I should like to refer to two earlier decisions made by Britain, which it may be salutary to remember.

The first concerns a little-known episode during the Crimean War when, in order to open a second front, the British Government sent a naval expedition in two successive years with the object of bombarding the Russian forts on the Aaland islands and at the approaches to Helsinki and St. Petersburg. In order to make this campaign more successful it was intended to invite the Swedish Government to join this expedition, with a promise that Finland would be allotted to Sweden in the event of success, Finland then, of course, being part of the Czarist empire. The expedition failed mainly, it seems, because the King of Sweden declined the terms offered to him. The interesting part of this little episode is the opinion held by scholars in many Nordic countries that if the offer had been taken up and the expedition had been successful, Finland would now be a part of the Soviet Union.

The second illustration, a more recent one, concerns the 1939–40 winter war when the USSR invaded Finland. I expect that many of your Lordships will recall the strong pressure that was exerted on the British Government of that time that we should send aid to Finland, with whom of course public opinion in this country greatly sympathised. But after prolonged and agonised deliberation the government of the day decided that it would be imprudent to engage on a campaign of that nature against the USSR, just because the consequences were so unpredictable. That view was surely as sensible and correct, unheroic though it may have been, as the earlier decision to invite the Swedes to engage with us in war against Russia was perhaps imprudent in the last century.

I mention these two historical events as I believe, as I said a little earlier, that the public attitudes expressed by Her Majesty's Government on the issues raised by the noble Baroness are of great long-term importance. It is a sad fact that Russian history has been characterised by an inability to make political changes in a peaceful way. Instead political change in that country has sadly nearly always been accompanied by violence and disruption. My suggestion is that our actions should be carefully calculated to make a peaceful evolution more likely and not less likely. If we can make a contribution in that direction, we will have served our country well.

Lord Hylton

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I put to him two questions? Does he accept overall the Soviet view of the situation of these republics? Secondly, does he think that national self-determination is perhaps rather too dangerous?

Lord Bridges

No, my Lords, I do not take that view. I would certainly agree that a great injustice was done to the Baltic states in 1940, but I think that the injustice is part of history and we have to accept the situation that flowed from it as being a reality with which we have to deal. In other words, we are emotionally engaged but we should not allow our emotions to govern our reason. On the noble Lord's second question, I certainly believe that constitutional change is necessary and I believe that it should come about, but I think it can come about most effectively as a result of what happens inside the Soviet Union rather than external prompting, which can be so readily misinterpreted.

8.58 p.m.

Lord Beloff

My Lords, I join with others in thanking the noble Baroness for raising this subject, which has enabled all of us to improve our knowledge of a difficult and important problem. I should like to begin by reassuring the noble Earl that he need not worry about what I am going to say because I have no suggestions to make to Her Majesty's Government and am prepared, for the time being at any rate, to leave this difficult matter to their discretion, understanding, as I think we all must, the priority that Her Majesty's Government, the government of the United States and other members of the alliance at present engaged in war, place upon keeping the Soviet Union on board. In the light of that overriding priority, it would, I feel, be unreasonable, even if we thought it otherwise reasonable, to expect a major démarche on a subject of this kind.

I think it is difficult—and the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, has helped us there—to start with the Baltic states. The evolution of the Soviet Union over the last few years, and our assessment of what has been happening and where it is going, are surely more important than even the undoubted issues of principle and national self-determination that we consider when we look at the Baltic states.

According to an insert in this evening's television news, apparently Mr. Gorbachev went on air unexpectedly this afternoon in the Soviet Union to stress the importance that he attached to preserving the national unity—the state unity, if you like—of the Soviet Union. That is a useful reminder because his definition of the Soviet Union would undoubtedly include its present frontiers; that is to say, it would include the Baltic states and all the other republics—Moldavia and the Transcaucasian republics—which, to varying degrees, have stressed their wish for independence.

That means—and it is something which I believe has been characteristic of the Soviet position in the United Nations and elsewhere—that such matters are wholly matters of domestic concern and that any expression of opinion from outside on the internal relations of the Soviet Union is to be regarded as interference. When there is, as there is here, a clear divergence of major principle—what to the Soviet Union is regarded as a wholly internal matter, a local domestic matter, is regarded by much of the rest of the world as of international significance—it is very difficult to see how progress can be made.

It seems to me that, if there is to be any external input into this situation, it can only be as a result of not so much the United Kingdom alone but the Western world generally having a strong bargaining position. One can get results by a bargain. In circumstances where issues of principle are involved one cannot expect to get results by persuasion.

In my view, over the past few years—I have said this in this House before but I repeat it because it is relevant to this evening's discussion—the West has wholly misinterpreted what is happening in the Soviet Union. It was argued that the clear signs that the Soviet Union was withdrawing more and more rapidly from some external positions in Eastern Europe, Afghanistan and overseas denoted a major change in the Soviet perception of itself; that is to say, that the Soviet Union was in the process of re-entering on equal terms and in the same spirit the family of nations. I did not think that that was plausible and the remarks made by the noble Baroness about the Soviet Union's interpretation or misinterpretation of recent arms control treaties would seem to bear me out.

But more significant and very closely connected with that was the belief that the economic changes which appeared to be coming about or planned in the Soviet Union were economic changes in the direction of a market economy and that Mr. Gorbachev was a major reformer with a goal which would bring the Soviet Union into the pattern of world trade, world financial relations and so forth. With that, it was believed—rightly, because the two things cannot be disconnected—that that would also imply a relaxation of single party rule and some kind (not necessarily on the Westminster or Washington model) of what we regard as a liberal democratic internal polity.

I have never been able to understand why people should think that Mr. Gorbachev, coming from where he did and having come up through the bureaucracy with close links with the instruments of internal repression, should believe these things; and indeed, to do him credit, he has never professed to do so. If one examines his writings and speeches, one finds that over and over again he has stressed that the Soviet Union must remain socialist, which of course means the repudiation of the market economy, and that the party must not abandon its leading role, which in Soviet terms means single party rule.

Let us consider the steps that appear to have been taken, which will show why I come back to the bargaining factor. It seems to me that the policy of the Soviet Union since Mr. Gorbachev took over has been one of trying to solve its internal economic problems by assistance from the West. The moves that have been made toward an accommodation of the Western outlook have been moves directed toward breaking down the inhibitions on the export of high technology and to securing financial and administrative assistance from Western countries while, as in the 1920s, holding out to Western capitalists the hope that they can find in the Soviet Union a useful field for investment activity.

However, unfortunately for the Soviet Union and its economic prospects, the policy will not work. In order to exploit the advantages of Western technology and management systems one needs a legal regime—for instance, of private property - and a series of institutions which, even if Mr. Gorbachev genuinely wished, it is doubtful whether the Soviet Union is capable of setting on foot.

I speak from the point of view of the ordinary Russian and not specifically about people in the Baltic states, who are slightly better off. For them the Gorbachev era has been marked by a steady fall in the standard of living. That has exacerbated the rivalries between the nationalities and the desire of an increasing number of Soviet republics to be allowed to follow their own path. It is clear that if in the case of the Baltic states and Georgia, and probably in some other cases, they were left on their own and suddenly allowed to become independent they might manage on a smaller scale to introduce the perestroika which has wholly failed in the Soviet Union itself.

Therefore, it has been increasingly necessary—and this is the background to the dismal and deplorable story outlined by the noble Baroness and others—to clamp down on the aspirations of the republics. If one gave them their head it is clear that even the Russian Republic, the heart of the Soviet Union, might strive for an area of economic independence. We have seen various moves towards collaborative arrangements between the governments of the several republics.

That is clear from what at one point was much the most successful and much the most acclaimed aspect of the Gorbachev era from the point of view of the West; namely, glasnost. For the first time since the revolution it was possible to see in the Soviet press, media and book publications many items which had been unavailable for three generations. But that freedom immediately and inevitably became caught up in the political and economic problems. If you allow freedom of speech and permit the media to flourish independently of government you must expect the bona fides of government to be challenged. Therefore, there has been a clamp down on publications, presses, television and radio not only in the Baltic states but in the heart of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the noble Baroness gave concrete details.

One would imagine that we are moving towards what Mr. Shevardnadze at his resignation called a dictatorship. It may take a military form, and that is closely related to what may happen in the Gulf. The noble Lord, Lord Kagan, reminded us that some years ago he spoke in this House about Bonapartism. Alternatively, it may take a civilian form or a combination of both. It looks as though we shall have a transitional period during which Soviet power will clamp down once more.

We need to consider what the European Community has been considering and what, no doubt, the United States will consider once its current preoccupations have come to an end; that is, whether anything useful can be done in respect of the co-operation to which the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, referred. As the political and economic problems of the Soviet Union will not be solved by dictatorship, will there be the possibility of entering into relations with the smaller units which may have a greater capacity for making something of the opportunities that have opened up?

These are grave issues. In the long run they are far more important than anything that we could do now by demonstrations, petitions or diplomatic moves on the part of the Baltic states. Therefore, my conclusion is no advice for Her Majesty's Government but some advice for those who look after our study of other countries. It is a concern that the next phase of Soviet development should be assessed more realistically than, I fear, have been the past five years.

9.13 p.m.

Earl Attlee

My Lords, when the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, began her speech I wondered why she had tabled such a Question. After listening to her I realise that she knows what she is talking about. I have never been to the Soviet Union nor to the Baltic states. Anything that I say is the result of what I have seen or feel.

In 1945, when I was in the Merchant Navy, a crewman had been torpedoed and had escaped back to this country via the Soviet Union. I remember him saying that in the Soviet ports he saw US vehicles and so forth entering the country to help in the fight against the Germans. As they came in and were unloaded, labels were stuck on them which said, "Gift to the United States from the Soviet Union." When the crewman got back to England he mentioned that to various people and he was pooh-poohed. It was said that of course that was not being done because the Soviet Union were our allies.

I have met only two Soviet citizens. One was the Soviet ambassador to the Court of St. James. I met him briefly. The other was an absolutely charming man who, I suspect, was the local KGB man. However, he was very pleasant.

When the Berlin wall came down and there was a feeling of euphoria, I did not believe that the Soviet Union had suddenly changed. I find it most peculiar that Gorbachev has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. When the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia, we were involved in the Suez crisis. Whenever there is trouble in the world and the eyes of the world are elsewhere, the Soviet Union uses that as an excuse to hold its own invasions. It has taken that action now in Lithuania and the other Baltic states.

I do not believe that I have heard the noble Lord, Lord Kagan, speak before. I know that he was born in Lithuania. It was very moving to hear him speak about his country of birth, its traditions and history, which is not normally taught in this country.

The noble Baroness, Lady Cox, mentioned the amount of money which the Soviet Union is spending. I have read that it is now spending more money on armaments than before the so-called relaxation. The Soviet Union was saying that it would get rid of 200, 300 or 1,000 tanks and that the West should make similar reductions. I said to people at the time that that sounded wonderful but that so many of its tanks were old, worn out and out of date that it was merely ridding itself of the dead wood and would end up with the most up-to-date tanks. I believe that that has happened, not merely as regards tanks but as regards all types of weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons.

I stress that that is my own personal view. I do not believe that the Soviet Union will ever change without violent internal disruption. If you put yourself in the position of the Soviet leaders, would you want to change a system in which you had a dacha and a chauffeur driven car and were able to buy any food you wanted in special shops and have it delivered to your home where you had servants and so on? Why would those Russians who are lucky enough to have that kind of life be willing to give it up? That does not stand to reason. I am a human being like everybody else. If I were in that situation in the Soviet Union, it may be that in my heart I would think it wrong that I was living the life of Riley, while the average Russian had to queue all day in the hope of buying a loaf of bread and an egg. However, would I give up that wonderful fat life? Quite honestly, I do not believe that I would, and I do not believe the Soviet leaders will.

We know that Gorbachev came up through the ranks of the KGB. I should love to know what is the real situation. Is he still running the country or, as is perfectly possible, is he now merely a figurehead with the army and the KGB pulling the strings? Is it a situation where he has no choice, where he wishes to stay where he is and he does as he is told?

We saw the pictures of a Soviet tank running over a Lithuanian. According to the Russians, that was Western propaganda. It was immediately claimed that the unrest in the Baltic states was inspired by the wicked Americans. It is very useful to have something like the United States of America. Whenever there is a shortage, whatever it is, it can be blamed on the "wicked Americans".

I saw recently on television, as perhaps did other noble Lords, that a number of Soviet troops had Asiatic faces. They were dealing in their own particular nasty way with the citizens of the Baltic states. I read not too long ago that in the United States of America the Hispanics are becoming the major party and that more people today speak Spanish in the United States of America than speak American. I believe the same could be happening in the Soviet Union. The Russian Russians are slowly becoming a minority who cannot trust their eastern brothers because many of them have a different religion.

I may perhaps be too pessimistic. I believe the outlook in the Soviet Union to be bleak. I regret to say, especially to the noble Lord, Lord Kagan, that it will be many years before the Baltic states can achieve the independence that they once had and which they undoubtedly deserve.

9.20 p.m.

Lord Pearson of Rannoch

My Lords, I too am grateful to my noble friend Lady Cox for this debate. I particularly congratulate her because the question we are debating separates the Baltic states from the Soviet Union. I am sure that that is how it should be.

I suggested on another occasion that events in the Soviet Union and the Baltic states should convince us of one of only two real possibilities. The first is that Mr. Gorbachev never was the reformer the Soviets fooled most people in the West into trusting him to be; the second is that Mr. Gorbachev has become the puppet of the regime that he was trying to overthrow.

Those still suffering from Gorby-mania, despite all the evidence, will claim that there is a third possibility; that Mr. Gorbachev is still the hero they thought he was, but that he is just passing through a rough patch with the KGB and the military, of which, I might add, he is the supreme commander. These naive Gorby-maniacs—if I may so call them—would therefore urge us to continue supporting him and his regime, as we have done in the past. I hope to show some reasons why that might be very foolish.

Perhaps it does not matter much whether the Soviets have been fooling us all along or whether a well-meaning Gorbachev has lost control to the old regime. The KGB is returning to power in the Soviet Union and therefore does it matter how it got back there? I fear it may matter, at least from the perspective of how we should deal with the Soviets in future. It is therefore worth examining the more sinister of the two possibilities, that the Soviets have been fooling us all along.

A good starting point could be a book written in the time of Brezhnev by the high ranking Soviet defector Anatoly Golitsyn. It was called, New Lies for Old. Many people criticised Golitsyn for crediting the KGB with too much visionary cunning, and for believing too much in the alleged Sino-Soviet pact. There may be some accuracy in those criticisms. But Golitsyn certainly knew how the Kremlin was capable of thinking; he had been part of it. He knew how long-range Kremlin thinking could afford to be, partly because its leaders do not suffer re-election every few years.

Some of what Golitsyn wrote in 1982 makes disturbing reading today. He considered how the Kremlin might behave if it became convinced that the decrepit Soviet economy could no longer afford to compete in the arms race, and particularly to compete with the United States on the strategic defence initiative. He said that the Kremlin would buy time from the West while it regathered its forces within the Soviet Union. He forecast that, Brezhnev's successor may well appear to be a kind of Soviet Dubcek". He forecast that under this new leader the Soviet Union would withdraw from Afghanistan; would release its Warsaw Pact allies; would tolerate the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany. He forecast that some form of market economy would appear to be tolerated for quite some time. He even forecast that Sakharov, who had then been exiled in Gorki for two years since 1980, would be invited to join the government. All this was to be part of a liberalisation campaign which would be spectacular and impressive, but which would be aimed solely at deceiving the West. Golitsyn warned that it might be difficult for Nato to survive for long under such apparent liberalisation in the Soviet Union. Finally, he warned that the KGB would merely have remained in the background and would have been able to retake possession of the Soviet Union at any time. Whatever one may think of Golitsyn, the fact is that he got all that right, and so he can no longer be dismissed entirely as an over-excited conspiracy theorist.

Perhaps his forecast which concerns us most in this debate is that the KGB would have been able to repossess the Soviet Union at any time. That is certainly happening now. We have heard examples from my noble friend Lady Cox and from the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, and others, of what is happening in the Soviet Union in that regard at the moment. I do not think that I need trouble noble Lords with repetition. I would like to join my noble friend Lady Cox and others in asking my noble friend the Minister for his views on the fact that the Soviet military machine continues its massive build-up, as indeed it did throughout the glasnost era.

The Gorbymaniacs used to excuse their hero for this fact by saying that he was doing his best, but of course he could not be expected to stop the huge Soviet war machine overnight. Now that the KGB's day has dawned again, his chances must be even slimmer, assuming that he ever intended to take them, which must be doubtful. Soviet deception about their military strategy was in fact nicely confirmed on 16th November 1990 in a published interview with an official Soviet economist, Mr. Victor Belkin. Part of what he said is worth quoting. He said: The Soviet military sector has always devoured the strength of our economy. Military expenses in our country absorb one-third of the national income and one-fourth of the gross national product—and if one takes into account the priority given to this sector and the quality of the production, it will be even more. Sixty per cent. of our machine production is taken up by the military sector (as opposed to 5 per cent. for consumer goods). You have to remember that all our good quality resources and all the capital of talent and intelligence which we have are entirely turned over to the military sector. In contradiction with all our pacifist declarations the peak of military spending was in 1989—a full 'perestroika' year. The planned cuts of our armed forces and the military industry are very small; there has been much talk about conversion of military industries into civilian ones but this is happening only sporadically and in homeopathic doses, and not a single industry has actually been taken out of the military sector: simply they are ordered to turn over part of their production for civilian needs. It is clear that non-military production is considered second rate and nobody is interested in it". I repeat that that is what an official Soviet economist said last November.

So it really does seem that Golitsyn may have been right, and that it was only President Reagan's refusal to abandon the strategic defence initiative programme which brought the Soviet Union to its knees economically and which led to the massive deceptions of glasnost and perestroika. One of the odd things, as my noble friend Lord Beloff has pointed out, is that Gorbachev himself has never really denied this. He has always declared himself to be a good Leninist. Perestroika was always about restructuring and improving the existing communist system. Indeed, in GorbLchev's first western interview with Time magazine he quite openly asked the West to cut its arms programme so that the Soviet Union: could have a breathing space and catch up". Everyone in the West assumed that he wanted to catch up with production of the needs of his population which now must seem doubtful. Sakharov himself was always convinced that Gorbachev's main reason for releasing him from Gorki was that he, Sakharov, was genuirnely against the strategic defence initiative, both Soviet and American, and that he would speak against it, as indeed he did when released.

These are all perhaps separate bits of a puzzle, but I am afraid it is not much of a puzzle any more. What if anything should we try to do about it? I have three humble suggestions for Her Majesty's Government. First, we should be very careful about continuing to plan for any military reductions which assume that the cold war is over. It may be starting again. Secondly, we should not send aid of any sort to the Soviet Union as such. We should send it to the separate republics, all of which have set up agencies which make sure that the aid will get where it is intended to go. If it is sent through official Soviet channels it will either replenish the Soviet strategic reserves or it will be highjacked by the KGB and the nomenclatura.

Thirdly, I join my noble friend Lady Cox in suggesting that we should boycott the Helsinki Round of the Human Rights Conference which the Soviets plan to hold in Moscow in September and October this year. I was very shocked to hear from the Foreign Office only this morning that, because of what the Foreign Office calls "the marked improvement in human rights in the Soviet Union", it is more than likely that Britain will attend that conference. The decision will be reviewed in the summer, but at the moment we plan to go.

That cannot be right. If the Government want to support human rights in the Soviet Union I suggest that they support another conference, one which Mrs. Sakharov is attempting to organise to commemorate what would have been her husband's seventieth birthday on 21st May. Mrs. Sakharov hopes that this conference will discuss human rights, nuclear energy and the transition by the Soviet totalitarian state to democracy and the rule of law. I believe that if we support Mrs. Sakharov's conference and boycott the official Soviet conference, which can only be a charade of the most cynical kind, we would at least be sending the right message to the devious strategists in the Kremlin.

9.32 p.m.

Baroness Park of Monmouth

My Lords, I have been offered the opportunity before the winding up speeches to say a few words. The important things about this issue have been said, and said admirably by many noble Lords, especially by the noble Baroness, Lady Cox. I am speaking only because there cannot be too many of us speaking as strongly as we can in order to keep what is going on in the Baltic states before the eyes of the world.

I perfectly understand, as I think we all do, that the Government are doing what they can hut, in plain terms, they must think very carefully before jeopardising the delicate balance between us and the Soviet Union on the issue of the Gulf. The Russians could indeed do great damage to the at present solid and united position of the coalition in the United Nations. They know that and we know it. But we must not send wrong signals. Nothing should prevent us in this House from expressing what I believe to be a fairly widely held view in the country that the actions of President Gorbachev and his government in the Baltic states in the past year, and especially in the past five weeks, are a mockery of glasnost and of the whole concept of liberty for which Mr. Gorbachev has purported to stand. Perhaps I may say at this juncture that I entirely agree with the interpretations on this issue of the noble Lords, Lord Beloff and Lord Pearson of Rannoch. We should not allow our own policy to relate to the supposed personality of Mr. Gorbachev alone. We are dealing with a party which has not changed.

I should like to see a concerted move by all those who are at present engaged in whatever degree in sending help and giving support to the USSR—I do not only mean official aid, I mean the universities and the cultural and voluntary organisations—to pause and to distinguish between, for instance, the Baltic states and the central government and to give their support with discrimination. It always struck me as a bitter joke that, as we were told, the KGB would be in charge of the distribution of food aid. One wondered whether they would set aside some of it for their own particular parish in the USSR, the camps which still exist in the Gulag Archipelago. It is not too late—nor is it a waste of time—to say again loudly and clearly that we are deeply concerned and that not even our natural preoccupation with the situation in the Gulf will prevent us from drawing conclusions from Soviet behaviour in the Baltic states, which must have adverse long-term consequences for their international objectives.

Let us not forget that the liberals in the USSR are themselves protesting. They are looking to us, not for irresponsible support and encouragement to take action where we cannot help them, but to keep the issue before the eyes of the world and to remember them when we deal with the USSR. The question is whether the Helsinki agreement was a serious Soviet commitment rather than a cosmetic exercise. That does not seem to me to be an unreasonable question to continue to pose. It is right that we should not be silent now and that we should remember that the Russians are, after all, pragmatic. They recognise the fact that they too need us to some extent. However, they must be made to understand that our support in the areas where they need us will not be blind or unconditional.

Finally, perhaps I may say—and not for the first time—that any efforts we make to influence events will be successful only in proportion to our strength. We cannot afford to reduce that strength. As I have indicated on other occasions, the leopard has not changed its spots. However, that does not wholly rule out all hope that we can influence events if we are tough, calm and pragmatic. Where we have bargaining power, we must use it.

9.35 p.m.

Lord Bonham-Carter

My Lords, I should like first to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, for giving us the opportunity to discuss this extremely important and difficult problem. I am especially grateful for what I have learned from listening to the speeches which have been made this evening, especially those of the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton and Lord Bridges.

I truly wish that I was as confident about anything as the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, is about what is happening in the Soviet Union. I found his analysis neat but hardly convincing. I cannot pretend that I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, that the Soviet Union is going back to, "a hardline repressive communism"; nor can I believe that Mr. Gorbachev has complete power. My picture of what is happening in the Soviet Union is rather different: it is one of incoherence and confusion. The changes in the Baltic states and the changes in Soviet policy towards those states seem to me to be examples of both that confusion and that incoherence. There is also the difficulty of discovering who in fact is making policy in the Soviet Union and who is in control.

If there is the danger of a dictatorship in the Soviet Union —which is indeed a possibility that may emerge from the chaos—I believe that it is unlikely to be communist. In my view it may be a military dictatorship or, alternatively, it may be a kind of authoritarian regime; that is, a Christian orthodox regime such as Solzhenitsyn would love and such as I should abhor. It would be a regime dominated by the Easterners within the Soviet Union and the kind of regime which Mr. Sakharov would have found repellent. That is a genuine prospect and it is one at which we should look with some apprehension. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, wishes to intervene. I am happy for him to do so.

Lord Pearson of Rannoch

My Lords, I feel that I must put a word in here on behalf of Alexander Solzhenitsyn who I happen to know fairly well. I can assure noble Lords that the kind of regime which the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter holds out as being one which would be favoured by Alexander Solzhenitsyn is not at all what he would favour.

Lord Bonham-Carter

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention. However, I happen to have read Solzhenitsyn's manifesto. I have also published many of his books and read all of them. Moreover, I have read in Mr. Sakharov's memoirs, about the differences between both their political and their ideological beliefs. Therefore, I shall not move from the position I stated.

However, having said that, I turn to the comments which have been made about Mr. Gorbachev. In my view, the prospect of getting anyone much better than him is extremely remote, whereas the prospect of getting someone much worse than him is extremely likely. A person like Yeltsin would be a change very much for the worse. Having recently been talking to the leaders of certain Baltic states and having discussed that possibility with them, I can tell noble Lords that they strongly share that view.

It must be admitted that those who pretend that nothing has happened over the past five years are really talking nonsense. Indeed, a great deal has happened which cannot be reversed. The withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe is a matter of the utmost significance. The possibility of independence for the Baltic states—even the degree of independence that they have enjoyed during the past few years—would have been inconceivable 10 years ago. The fact that we are discussing it now as we are indicates that something important has happened. Having said that, that is not to deny that Soviet policy and its ambitions are difficult to read.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, pointed out, the Soviet Union's policy swings in one direction then another in a totally unpredictable manner. We have the shootings in Vilnius; then the Baker-Bessmertnykh talks; then a slight softening and 120 troops are withdrawn—that is nothing, given the number of troops there—then there is the promise of delegations to the three states; and then yesterday we had the statement by Mr. Gorbachev that the poll is illegal, and we have his proposal for a referendum which is phrased in a ludicrous way and in which the army in those states can vote.

I do not pretend that all this is not a puzzle. What I am saying is that few of us can read the significance of that puzzle. That is something which we should accept. We should not seek to find in the evidence what we want to find. That seems to me to happen all too frequently when we discuss the Soviet Union and its policies. When we look at this situation, the relevant question is: what, in these confusing, difficult circumstances, can we do that is of any assistance? In that respect, I was interested in the approach suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, as to how we should discuss the matter with the Soviet Union.

In the light of what the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, said: that we in this country have some standing in the eyes of the Soviet Union, the words that we express, as many noble Lords have said, and the way in which we express them are of significance. In that respect, despite this country's rather shabby record in respect of the status of the Baltic states, it is useful to emphasise to the Soviet Union their special status; the history which sets them apart as semi-autonomous under the old regime; as independent and democratic in the 1920s and 1930s; and as having been absorbed by Stalin in 1940—an event with which, as I said the other day, the only analogy I can think of is the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. We should say that, because that is a moral position which is of some significance. When we think of how we can help, I believe that we have only two weapons at our disposal. They are, first, discussion and moral persuasion; and, secondly, economic pressure.

The USSR is anxious to be well regarded in the West. It is anxious for economic aid. In both areas we have cards which we can play, cards which we should play and cards which we should not hesitate to play. What is required on both is a common European attitude; but, in developing that attitude, there is one rule by which we should abide rigorously—that is, we should not raise false hopes. The great danger is that we shall raise false hopes that we cannot fulfil. That is the ultimate irresponsibility.

The approach from the European angle is extremely important. Mr. Gorbachev has said that he wants a common European home. If he is to have a common European home, Europe can say what kind of home that must be. I believe that this is a matter of importance. He is anxious for economic aid, trade and knowhow. The European Community is a source of that aid, of trade and of knowhow. If that is what we say to the Soviet Union, we must also say to the Baltic states, "Look, all we can try to do is to get the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. We cannot do more than that under present circumstances. All we say to you is that you must be ready to negotiate". That is how we should use our leverage.

The Foreign Ministers of the European Community met in Brussels on 4th February. During their meeting they discussed the Baltic position at length. I tried to find out what conclusions they came to and the only one I could find yesterday or today was this statement: The European Community and its member states welcome the decision to hold a referendum in each of the Baltic States and express the hope that this will favour the opening of a meaningful and constructive dialogue between the central authorities of the USSR and the Baltic States. They consider such a decision is in conformity with the spirit of the Paris charter for a new Europe". I must confess that I regard this as a rather inadequate conclusion to a meeting which, I gather, discussed the matter at considerable length. I hope that in his reply the noble Earl will be able to expand on the statement and tell us what slightly more positive thoughts emerged from the conference.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Foreign Secretary gave a long and interesting statement to the press about the general tenor of the discussions. In it he stressed the need for greater unity within Europe in its response to what he called "the problems". He pointed out that this was particularly important in relation to Central and Eastern Europe, of which the Baltic states are a part. He quite rightly said that in the years to come many problems would arise there. He then proceeded—in my view, rather unfortunately—to pour cold water on developing new machinery to co-ordinate that common response. He was talking about the development of a common security and foreign policy.

I must point out that no one who advocates moves in that direction suggests that such policies should extend to all areas of security. They would only have to cover specific areas. Nor do I think that advocates of that view suggest that disagreements can be abolished by changes of machinery, as the Foreign Secretary suggested.

We say that the machinery for political co-operation within the Community—the procedures—can and should be improved and it is important that they be improved in order to find better means of reaching more promptly the agreements which will be required in the situations which will arise in post-Gulf Europe. That is what we must consider. Europe after the Gulf war will be part of the world, a community which will have crucial importance for this country because there can be no doubt that after the Gulf, the United States will pursue its withdrawal from Europe. Europe will have to assume greater responsibility for its own political and defence postures and, whether it is the Baltic states or something else, the post-Gulf world will demand a European response. The Community will be an important institution, indeed the chief institution through which the policies appropriate for the defence of the interests of this country can be effectively pursued. In discussing the Baltic states I do not believe that we should forget that aspect of our policy.

9.50 p.m.

Lord Richard

My Lords, I believe I can speak relatively briefly. This is a repeat act so to speak on the part of the noble Earl and myself. We played this role earlier today in the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Beloff. I believe I accused the noble Lord earlier of being eloquently pessimistic. Having listened to him in this debate, I should say that rather than being pessimistic he was positively melancholic. Not only was the noble Lord melancholic; his recipe for government activity verged on the comatose. The "when in doubt do nothing" principle may be legitimate on some occasions in one's personal affairs, but it is hardly a guiding rule which a government can pursue in the reactive world in which we live.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, for introducing the debate. However, I do not share many of her views on the situation. Nor do I share those of the noble Baroness, Lady Park of Monmouth. I certainly do not share the views of the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch. I found his certainty breathtaking. It verged almost on zealotry. If he can seriously contend that in the past six years what the Soviet Union has done is merely to fool us all the way along the line, I can only say that a little more foolery in that respect might do for the Baltic states what that foolery has done for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany and the other formerly subject peoples of Europe.

It is right that we should have this debate tonight. We cannot but strongly deplore the violent actions of the Soviet authorities and the so-called salvation committees in the Baltic republics. We are all appalled at the shootings and the attacks on unarmed civilian protesters in Lithuania and Latvia. We are also concerned at the threat posed to the continuation of democratically elected parliaments in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and the more general moves towards greater powers for the military and the KGB throughout the Soviet Union.

I believe that most of us accept that any further use of force would gravely jeopardise both the development of democracy and human rights in the Soviet Union and international relations. It would consequently seriously reduce the prospects for building the common European home which is so often called for by President Gorbachev.

What has emerged in relation to the Baltic states from this debate is that we all seem to be agreed that the only acceptable way forward by which the issue of the relationship between the Baltic states and the Soviet Union can be resolved, and should be resolved, is by returning to dialogue and negotiation. This is a rare debate, as far as I am concerned, for one other reason. It is rare that one sits in a debate where one learns something factual that one did not know before. I, and I am sure others, will emerge from this debate tonight more knowledgeable about the history of Lithuania. For that I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, and particularly to my noble friend Lord Kagan who made a moving, perceptive and thoughtful contribution to our proceedings.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bridges. I did not know about the expedition to St. Petersburg at the time of the Crimean War. That is one of those little vignettes of British history which so often escape us, but which in a sense indicate the real nature of the government at that time.

The break-up of the Soviet empire will cause immense economic, social, political and perhaps even military difficulties. I hope there will be no military difficulties. What we are observing at the moment is an exercise in managing change. In judging whether or not the changes that are taking place can be managed in what we would consider to be a sensible and rational way, we must not forget how recently the Soviet empire was established. People tend sometimes to regard it as a great monolith that has been there for many years. That is not the case. The incorporation of the central Asian republics into Russia, and subsequently into the Soviet Union, took place barely a century ago. The Baltics only go back some 50 years. The transcaucasian republics were only relatively recently incorporated into the Soviet Union. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, remarked, the British of all people should be prepared to recognise the problems which are caused by the abandonment of the imperial role. I am not sure that I follow the noble Lord in his suggestion that we should tell the Soviet Union how to manage their relaxation and abandonment of the imperial role.

Nevertheless there are certain possible analogies. The first and most obvious one is that the time of greatest danger for any authoritarian rule is when it is in the process of being relaxed. That is the time when all sorts of movements, all sorts of ideas, all sorts of political parties, may emerge from the deprivation that they have been suffering for some time past. I venture to suggest that this is what we are faced with in the Soviet Union at the moment.

How the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, can say that nothing has happened, when what we are observing are the difficulties caused by something that has happened—namely, the relaxation of the regime inside the Soviet Union and the abandonment of the imperial role of the Soviet Union—I find difficult to understand.

Lord Pearson of Rannoch

My Lords, I did not say that nothing had happened. I am fairly close to the events in Poland and Czechoslovakia. What I suggested was that the Soviet Union had released its grip on those Warsaw Pact countries because of the extreme failure of its economic system thanks to the pressure from the United States, particularly on the strategic defence initiative. I would also point out that life in the Soviet Union has not improved all that much, and that what we may be looking at is a return to precisely the dictatorship that we saw before.

Lord Richard

My Lords, I listened very carefully to the noble Lord. What he said, among other things, was that the Soviets have been fooling us all along. If he is talking about illusory change rather than real change, that may fit in with the rest of his speech. But I do not see how anybody, looking at what has happened in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe over the last five or six years, can doubt that the changes have been immense.

Of course, the Soviet Union has to recognise that the nationalities' problem can only be resolved by patience and by negotiation over a long period of time. But we must recognise on our side that Mr. Gorbachev's achievements in his six years in power have been immense and they are continuing. The country, Europe and indeed world politics have been transformed in that time.

I give two or three examples so far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Can one doubt that press and media freedom, the freedom to talk and communicate, is infinitely greater than before Mr. Gorbachev came into power? Can one doubt that there has been a reform of political institutions in the Soviet Union which gives far freer rein to genuine popular feeling and opinion? Can one doubt that there is a reform in the relationship between the centre and the individual republics? Can one conceive that, in the Brezhnev era, Mr. Yeltsin would have been capable of trying to take the republic of Russia out of the Soviet Union? Merely to state what has happened in the Soviet Union almost proves the proposition.

I am bound to say, though it may not meet with much favour from the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, that I find Mr. Gorbachev's leadership over the past six years to have been courageous and vigorous. Like the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, I do not see any real alternative to our continuing to support that leadership and indeed to giving it our backing.

I see two alternatives. The first, is that we continue with Mr. Gorbachev; the second is that we may well be faced with something worse. I am wary of the dangers that lie ahead, particularly the possibility of a right wing backlash inside the Soviet Union. I hope that I have never fallen prey to that illness about which the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, talked so much, namely, Gorby-mania. I have tried to look at the problems inside the Soviet Union and to approach them with as analytical and careful a mind as one can.

If one wants further indication of how much change there has been, there was very recently a debate in the Council of Europe on the issue of the Baltic states. One delegate, Mr. Soell, said that we have no divisions of troops, but we have something which the Soviet leadership permanently lacks—our firm faith in the moral principles. We must approach the events in the Baltic states according to those principles. First, we must resolutely condemn the brutal use of military force against the civilian population. Secondly, we must reinforce our commitment and engagement to the principles of freedom, independence, human rights and the right to self-determination in correlation with the Baltic situation.

Thirdly, we must approach the parties with a view to starting immediate talks and re-establishing the nation al sovereignty of the Baltic states.

That was a delegate speaking at the Council of Europe. If one wishes evidence of the change which has taken place over the last six years in the right direction, I merely tell your Lordships that the speaker was Hungarian.

10 p.m.

The Earl of Caithness

My Lords, the Government welcome today's debate, introduced so ably by my noble friend Lady Cox, and I thank all your Lordships for having taken part. An enormous wealth of experience and knowledge has been expressed and I, for one, have certainly learnt a great deal from tonight's discussion. Recent events in the Baltic states and developments in the Soviet Union more widely have, quite rightly, caused profound concern. The war in the Gulf must not prevent us from taking account also or the importance of what is happening in the Soviet Union and its implications for the future of Europe.

The noble Lord, Lord Richard, reminded the House of some of the events that have happened in the past five or six years. The process of reform initiated by President Gorbachev brought an end to the cold war; led to a new, co-operative spirit in international relations (exemplified by the coalition against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait); gave back to the countries of eastern Europe the independence which they had lost in the 1940s; and opened the way to the Soviet Union becoming a more open and liberal society.

Our welcome for these changes was strong and unequivocal. They were good for Britain and the West; good for eastern Europe; and good for the Soviet people. We believed that, by making the state the servant of the citizen rather than the reverse, it would he possible to exploit fully the enormous human and natural resources of the Soviet Union. Freed from the constraints of a discredited and inefficient system, the Soviet people would begin to enjoy the prosperity which their country had always been capable of providing. Democratic institutions would give people at every level the power to decide their own destiny. In response, we held out the prospect of an increasingly close and productive relationship with the western world: a co-operation agreement with the Community; association with the international financial institutions; a totally new relationship with NATO.

These are all gains which we must seek to protect, in so far as we are able. The West should reiterate, not withdraw, its support for reform in the Soviet Union. We would like to build on the network of co-operation already established; but we shall not be able to extend co-operation with the Soviet authorities if those same authorities are taking the Soviet Union backwards. Co-operation needs the right political climate. The recent tragic events in the Baltic states have affected that climate and cast a cloud over East-West relations.

As this House knows well, the British Government believe the Baltic states to be a special case and have never recognised de jure the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. We have repeatedly underlined the need for the Baltic people to be able freely to decide what their own future should be. Very substantial progress has been made in this direction in the past two years. For the first time since 1940 the Baltic people had democratically elected representatives. They were gradually establishing greater economic independence and political autonomy. They were pursuing their legitimate aims without using threats or force. While important differences with Moscow remained, the divide was not unbridgeable. We looked forward to the day when the Baltic states could take their place beside the other nations of Europe in the CSCE.

Against that background we totally condemn the arbitrary use of force to repress the Baltic peoples. We deplore the tragic loss of life in Lithuania and Latvia. Whatever the exact sequence of events, there can be no question but that ultimate responsibility for what happened must rest with the central authorities.

We have made the strength of our concern crystal clear to the Soviet authorities, most recently when my right honourable friend the Secretary of State saw the Soviet Ambassador on 31st January. I can tell my noble friend Lady Cox that we have underlined the incompatibility of repression in the Baltic states with Soviet CSCE commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter.

In close consultation with our partners and allies, we have taken a series of measures designed to bring hope to the Soviet leadership—including President Gorbachev personally—that our support for reform is not unconditional; that the rewards of East-West co-operation cannot continue if there is a return to old-style repression.

Perhaps I may identify some of the measures taken. The bulk of the United States 1.6 billion dollar package agreed at the Rome European Council has been suspended; the EC/USSR Joint Commission has been postponed sine die; we have invoked the human dimension mechanism, which gives CSCE states the right to demand an explanation of apparent human rights abuses; we are keeping our bilateral co-operation under close review.

At this point perhaps I should explain a little more fully about the aid programme, because I believe there to be some misunderstanding of the true position. The Community has decided, as I have just said, to suspend implementation of most of the package agreed at the December European Council, with the exception of humanitarian assistance. Food aid will be provided only where there is a clear need and where we are sure it will reach its rightful recipients. There is no British Government-to-government aid. We are keeping the know-how fund under review, but this is designed to assist reform directly and help the move to a market economy, not to prop up existing structures.

The Russians can be in no doubt about the deep disappointment felt in Parliament and more widely in this country. It is essential that the Soviet authorities should, without delay, remove their troops from the streets and begin serious and peaceful negotiations with the democratically elected representatives of the Baltic peoples. The noble Lord, Lord Bridges, should, I hope, be reassured that it is our firm belief that it is only through such negotiations that a lasting settlement, acceptable to all involved, can he achieved. This is our clear and unambiguous message to Moscow and to the Baltic leaders.

There are other causes for anxiety. Market-oriented economic reform is stalled. We have seen the resignation of many leading liberals, most notably Mr. Shevardnadze; the introduction of new joint army-military patrols on 1st February; and the wide-ranging powers given to the KGB to counter so-called economic crimes.

The Soviet Government has said publicly and repeatedly that perestroika is not being abandoned and that it is seeking to resolve its problems by political means, not force. Soviet leaders have appealed for greater Western understanding. Of course we understand President Gorbachev's desire to prevent growing disorder in the Soviet Union. We are under no illusions about the enormous scale of the task that he is undertaking. He is seeking to introduce changes in many ways more revolutionary than those of 1917.

The noble Lord, Lord Kagan, used the analogy of the man in the diving hell. We have always been clear that it would be a matter of decades, not months or years, for these to take root. Our support too has been for the long haul. But it is support for reform, for democratisation, for civil and political rights, for self-determination, for the freedom of the individual, and for the principles of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

My noble friends Lord Beloff and Lord Pearson of Rannoch, and the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, warned the Government about what they believe are the true motives of the Russian authorities. We believe that it is still too early to draw firm conclusions about the Soviet Union's future direction from recent events. As the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, said, the evidence is conflicting, and in places confusing. There are, I admit, many worrying signs, but the attempt to supplant the elected authorities in the Baltic states has not—at least as yet—been followed through.

Moscow's decision to send delegations to the three Baltic states is a welcome step in the right direction. Parts of the Soviet media continue to cover events honestly and to criticise the authorities trenchantly. In the republican parliaments genuine debate continues. After five years of gradual liberalisation, it is increasingly difficult to see how the genie can be put back in the bottle. This must provide some grounds for hope that we may be witnessing a serious hiatus in the process of reform, not its total abandonment. We very much hope so. We are not a fair-weather friend. Our commitment to working for mutually beneficial long-term co-operation is unshaken. Fundamental reform in the Soviet Union is in our interest as well as theirs. The benefits of more co-operative East-West relations are apparent in the Middle East, southern Africa and South-East Asia—not just Europe. And, as the barriers of distrust and misunderstanding have been broken down, there has been unprecedented progress on arms control.

At this stage I should like to respond to some of the specific points raised in the debate, although I am clearly conscious that I shall not be able to respond to them all. My noble friend Lady Cox and the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, asked about our representation outside Moscow. We are looking to expand our representation outside Moscow, whether through consulates or British Council offices, but we have no immediate plans to open offices in the Baltic states. However, I reassure my noble friend Lord Thomas of Swynnerton that we are in regular contact with elected Baltic leaders. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister saw the Latvian foreign minister, Mr. Jurkans, on 23rd January. Our embassy in Moscow keeps in close touch with the Baltic representatives there.

In reply to my noble friends Lord Pearson and Lady Cox, who asked specifically about the human rights conference later this year, we shall only attend the planned human rights conference in Moscow this autumn if the Soviet authorities return to the path of reform and consolidate the very considerable progress made in recent years. We urge the Soviet authorities to negotiate peacefully, not to threaten or use force and to stand by their commitments which they accepted at the highest levels in the Paris Charter and other instruments.

We remain concerned by the continuing level of Soviet military output, as mentioned by some noble Lords this evening. We have consistently urged the Soviet authorities to cut their defence expenditure, both to help reduce tension and to allow resources to he used more productively elsewhere in the economy. Without a major shift from military to civil expenditure we see little prospect of economic reform succeeding.

Let me say to my noble friend Lord Pearson of Rannoch that full Soviet compliance with CFE and other arms control agreements is essential. We have underlined to the Russians our concern on a number of aspects of CFE implementation.

In conclusion, I stress that we are determined to do everything possible to prevent the barriers of the past being rebuilt. We are supporting an upsurge of direct contacts between individuals and institutions. We are actively looking for ways to help not the central Soviet authorities but those who are actively implementing reform on the ground, at republican and lower levels. In the Baltic states alone we have already supported the development of management training programmes, provided advice on the creation of a small farm sector and offered help with port privatisation. We are providing an English language training support project in Estonia, as the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, will be pleased to hear. As long as there are effective ways to help real reform we are in no doubt that Britain should continue to offer carefully targeted assistance.

However, if it became clear that the Soviet authorities were determined to attempt a return to full-blooded authoritarianism, there might no longer be any reform for us to support. They say that that is not their intention, and it would indeed be a sad day for the West and a tragic one for the Soviet people if it were. There is no doubt that reform must eventually come if the aspirations of the Soviet people are to be met. The only questions are when and how. The right answer is as quickly as possible, through a peaceful and democratic process involving all the people of the Soviet Union. That is the only way to resolve the differences between Moscow and the Baltic states and the only way to build a new Soviet Union based on consent and not coercion.