Lords Sitting of 4 February 1991

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Southwark.

Fraud: Investigative Resources
Earl Alexander of Tunis Earl Alexander of Tunis asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether there are adequate resources, in terms of both manpower and funds, to combat fraud.
Lord Reay: My Lords, within the record levels of financial support and manpower available to the police service since 1979, the police give such priority to combating fraud as chief officers decide is required. The Serious Fraud Office ensures that attention is given to the most serious cases. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and Her Majesty's Paymaster General also have statutory responsibility for fraud cases. We have no evidence to suggest that the investigation and prosecution of fraud is hampered by lack of resources.
Earl Alexander of Tunis: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that Answer. However, is he aware of a report in the Daily Telegraph last week which stated that annually fraud amounts to £4,000 million or four times the cost of theft, burglary and robbery? Does my noble friend not consider it essential for the future of the financial services industry that the City of London should enjoy greater confidence worldwide?
Lord Reay: My Lords, it is difficult to collect firm evidence but notifiable offences of fraud and forgery in England and Wales between October 1989 and October 1990 show an increase of 6 per cent. over the previous year. I agree that it is extremely important for the reputation of the City of London, and hence for the economic health of this country, that London is perceived to be a place where fraud is actively and vigorously pursued.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, I am sure the City will welcome the assurance of the Minister that adequate resources will be made available to the serious fraud squad. However, is the Minister aware that it is more than four years since the Serious Fraud Office commenced its investigations into the Guinness affair? As a result of those investigations, individuals involved in the affair have been charged but have not yet been tried. Does this not suggest that there is undue delay in pursuing alleged fraud occurrences?
Lord Reay: My Lords, I do not believe I should comment on cases that are sub judice. On the question of delay, it takes time to investigate cases and it is more or less axiomatic that the cases which are dealt with by the Serious Fraud Office are time consuming and difficult to investigate.
Lord Allen of Abbeydale: My Lords, if the Government are so keen to deal with fraud, will the Minister think again about the reply he gave to a
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Question I asked last week and consider introducing a charities Bill at an early date, given that the main purpose of such a Bill would be to deal with fraud in quite an important area?
Lord Reay: My Lords, as the noble Lord admits, that matter was the subject of another Question which we dealt with last week.
Baroness Ewart-Biggs: My Lords, is the Minister aware that in 1988–89 the number of recorded offences of fraud and forgery in the Metropolitan Police area increased by 8 per cent. while the number of people arrested in connection with such offences fell by 6 per cent? Will the Minister explain that trend?
Lord Reay: My Lords, I am aware that the City of London police reported that attempted fraud increased last year. However, they also reported that the amount of money which fraudsters obtained fell while the amount that was recovered rose sharply. Therefore the news is not all bad: the report suggests that some impact may be being made.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the fundamental thrust of the Question is whether there are funds and manpower available to deal with a situation which is bringing grave discredit on the City of London? Are the funds and manpower available, or will they be made available?
Lord Reay: My Lords, the Government are most strongly committed to combating fraud. As I said in my original Answer, we have no evidence to suggest that resources are lacking for that purpose.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, will the Minister tell the House how many cases of securities fraud have been reported to prosecuting authorities by the Securities Association and other bodies? How many prosecutions have the prosecuting authorities initiated? And what has been the result?
Lord Reay: My Lords, the House will appreciate that that is a broad question which covers the work of several different departments. I do not have the precise figures that the noble Lord asks for. I shall look into the matter and report back to him.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, will the Minister give the House an assurance that the fraud squad is employing an adequate number of trained professional accountants to assist in this vital matter?
Lord Reay: My Lords, I have no reason to suppose that it is not.

Oil Pollution in the Gulf
2.42 p.m.
Lord Campbell of Croy Lord Campbell of Croy asked Her Majesty's Government:
What action they have taken to help reduce the damage to wildlife and the environment caused by the Iraqi release of oil into the Gulf.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of the Environment (Baroness Blatch): My Lords, the release of oil into the Gulf constitutes

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environmental terrorism by Iraq. That said, the Gulf states have substantial oil pollution clean-up skills and resources. However, the Government have responded promptly to requests for assistance. Experts on pollution control have been sent; the RSPCA is advising on the protection of birds; 90 tonnes of equipment from industry stocks held at the Oil Spill Service Centre at Southampton has been sent; and we are actively helping to co-ordinate the international response through United Nations bodies, the European Community and other bodies.
Lord Campbell of Croy: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for her reply. Can she clarify whether Iraq has released more oil from new sources in the past week? Is she aware that the Saudi Arabian official concerned, Mr. al Gain, is well acquainted with international co-operation and is known to some of us because he is the vice-chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Pollution of the Sea. Does she agree that that should be helpful?
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, there has been a further release of oil into the Gulf from the Mina al-Bakr loading terminal. It is the third oil slick in recent weeks. I am aware of Mr. al Gain's record. We must congratulate ACOPS on the work it has done. It was one of the first bodies concerned with marine pollution. I am also aware of my noble friend's connection with the organisation.
Baroness Nicol: My Lords, the noble Baroness said that the RSPCA had offered its expertise. Is any other non-governmental organisation sending help? If so, will the Government be prepared to help them out with finance if necessary and to give them every facility?
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, I cannot be specific. We are in touch with many voluntary organisations. As expertise is requested we are facilitating the provision of that assistance and its urgent dispatch to the Gulf.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, can the noble Baroness say whether oil is still flowing from that third source and whether there are other suspected sources of oil which might be turned on by the Iraqis?
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, I cannot say what the Iraqis will get up to next and whether they will put yet more oil into the Gulf. All the evidence suggests that the third slick is very large indeed. It threatens the shallow and vulnerable areas of the northern Gulf and is therefore a substantial threat.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, in the second part of her question my noble friend Lady Nicol asked whether adequate financial resources would be given to non-governmental organisations taking part in any clean up operation. She did not receive an answer. Will the Minister be good enough to indicate that government financial support will be forthcoming since she was good enough to say that the work of the non-governmental organisations was welcome?
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, the presumption in favour of meeting the costs lies with the Gulf states. So far the cost of sending people out to the Gulf has not been at issue. The Government are doing nothing to inhibit the sending of appropriate expertise to provide assistance.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, what view do the Government take as to why the Iraqis are pumping the oil into the Gulf? Does the noble Baroness agree that until we have a reasonable assumption about the reasons it is difficult to know how many more tonnes of oil will be poured into the Gulf, for what purpose and what we should do about it?
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, better minds than mine—and perhaps than of the Government—have spent considerable time and energy trying to read the mind of Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi army. We cannot predict what he may do next.
Baroness Seear: My Lords, the noble Baroness said that the Government would not stand in the way of the non-governmental organisations. Will she answer the question as to whether the Government will give them financial help?
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, the Government have met the requests for assistance that have been made so far. We presume in favour of the Gulf states meeting the costs. So far the Government have done nothing to inhibit the appropriate assistance being sent to the Gulf. If requests are made for funds they will be considered.

Mineral Extraction Rights: IDOs
2.47 p.m.
Lord Molloy Lord Molloy asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they will extinguish mineral extraction rights held under interim development orders.
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, the Government are aware of the concern about interim development orders. As was said during the second day of the Committee stage of the Planning and Compensation Bill on 29th January, powers already exist to revoke or modify old minerals permissions. Those powers are under review, but in the light of the concern about permissions granted under interim development orders the Government are considering whether some action should be taken in advance of the findings of the review. We expect to report our conclusions during the passage of the Bill.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, to a degree that is an encouraging Answer. But does the Minister acknowledge that there was an error in the Town and Country Planning Act, which failed to compel local authorities to register interim development orders, with the result that farmers who bought farms find their farms being taken away and people who have nurtured homes have lost those homes because of mineral rights in their area? Are the Government prepared to say that

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this is now a matter of grave urgency and that no single person should suffer any longer than is necessary?
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, I indicated that we are gravely concerned about the issue. We have set in train a thorough review. We also believe that there is some urgency about bringing forward an interim proposal. We propose to do so before the end of the passage of the Bill.
Baroness David: My Lords, is the Minister aware that we were very grateful for what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate said about these orders last week? When I moved amendments on that occasion I asked whether it would be appropriate to make the EC directive on environmental assessment applicable to the review of IDO permissions. Will that be considered?
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, I cannot either prejudge the outcome of the review or judge what the review will take into account. All I can say is that there will be an opportunity when the interim proposal is brought before the House to consider those proposals.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, will the Minister be gracious enough to consider getting in touch with the Royal Geographical Society, whose magazine explained the situation in great detail? It is not by any means a magazine which exaggerates but a great geographical magazine. I am sure that the secretary general of the Royal Geographical Society would be prepared to help her department.
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, I am confident that those carrying out this review will make sure that they consult the appropriate sources for information.

Baltic Republics: Withdrawal of Russian Forces
2.50 p.m.
Lord Hylton Lord Hylton asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they are continuing to press the USSR to withdraw its armed forces from the three Baltic republics.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (The Earl of Caithness): My Lords, yes.
Lord Hylton: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for his laconic answer. I should also like to thank the Government for the actions that they have taken. Together with those of other governments they have been helpful. Does the Minister agree that there is still a need to press for self-determination and for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, which are often ill disciplined and lend themselves to acts of provocation?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, we shall continue to press this matter. We welcome the fact that the Soviet Government are sending delegations to the three Baltic capitals. As I have said on more than one occasion in your Lordships' House, we very much hope that negotiation will be the way forward.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, can the noble Earl confirm that this problem will be on the agenda of the current foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels? Can he say whether Her Majesty's Government have any specific proposal to put to that meeting? Can he also say whether President Gorbachev has set up a commission to seek to negotiate with the leaders of the three Baltic states? If so, does he agree that that too is an encouraging step forward? Is it possible that either Her Majesty's Government or a representative acting on behalf of the Community might seek to hold a meeting with President Gorbachev to make clear the view of the Community about the violence which has taken place in the two Baltic states?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, I can confirm to the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition that the question of the Baltic republics is on the agenda of today's foreign affairs council. As a result of that and the action that the Community has already taken, I am sure that messages will be passed to the appropriate bodies and to Moscow. We continue to keep in touch on a regular basis. I agree with the noble Lord that the fact that there will be delegations to the three Baltic states will mean, we hope, further progress toward a peaceful solution of this problem.
Lord Orr-Ewing: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that recent signals intercepts have suggested that Russian military forces up to 2,000 in strength are still being employed in aid of Iraq and in recent operational intercepts in tank battles Russian commanders were taking a very active part? Could the pressure extend to that activity as well as to the desperately bad and poor activity in the Baltic republics?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, that is a slightly different Question, but I note my noble friend's point.
Lord Grimond: My Lords, are the Government aware of exactly what the consultations that are taking placing between the Soviet Government and the three republics cover? Is independence on the agenda or is it merely a question of the position they will occupy within the Soviet empire?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, so far as the British Government are concerned, the legal position with regard to the three Baltic states is well known to your Lordships following earlier Questions. It is for the parties concerned—the three Baltic states and Moscow—to sort out exactly what will be the future.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, is there a difference in the Government's attitude to each of the three Baltic states or do they take an identical view concerning each one?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, I was referring to the legal position.

Business
2.55 p.m.
Viscount Davidson: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House to know that the Committee stage of the Planning and Compensation Bill will be

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adjourned at about 7 p.m. for about one hour and that during that adjournment the Financial Services Act 1986 (Delegation) Order 1991 will be taken.

Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Bill [H.L.]
The Lord Advocate (Lord Fraser of Carmyllie): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. It is a consolidation measure. It consolidates the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1949 and other enactments relating to agricultural holdings in Scotland. It is pure consolidation and it is intended to make no change in the existing law. If your Lordships approve, it will be referred to the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills which will consider it and make its report to the House in due course.
Moved, That the Bill be now read a second time.—(Lord Fraser of Carmyllie.)
On Question, Bill read a second time, and referred to the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills.

Planning and Compensation Bill [H.L.]
2.56 p.m.
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Baroness Blatch.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]
Schedule 3 [Development Plans]:
[Amendment No. 163 not moved.]
Baroness Hollis of Heigham Baroness Hollis of Heigham moved Amendment No. 164:
Page 79, line 24, leave out sub-paragraph (3).
The noble Baroness said: With Amendment No. 164 I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 167, 176, 177 and 192. The Bill rightly requires that all local authorities should produce local plans and that those local plans should be statutory and shaped with proper consultation, on the one hand, and, on the other, with a presumption in their favour that such plans would make planning more predictable. As the Committee will recall, that is one of the main themes of this Bill.
These amendments bring together two aspects of that issue. Amendments Nos. 164 and 167 refer to the power of the Secretary of State to determine what may or may not be considered by a structure plan. The amendments from this side of the Chamber would allow greater flexibility to the county councils and the metropolitan authorities in the content and considerations that would inform their structure plans and would therefore reduce the amount of central direction from the Secretary of State. We suggest that
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that is a theme consistent with the fact that structure plans need no longer be submitted to the Secretary of State.
In our view the second cluster of amendments, Amendments Nos. 176, 177 and 192, is even more important. Amendment No. 176 requires that an inquiry into a structure plan must —not as the present wording of the Bill says "may"—be held in public. Amendment No. 177 would permit rather than, as the Bill does at present, forbid people to be heard at a public inquiry. Amendment No. 192 seeks to ensure that documentation concerning mineral workings should be publicly available for scrutiny. Amendments Nos. 176, 177 and 192 together require that consideration of local and structure plans should be held in public, not behind closed doors, and that under certain circumstances third parties should have the right to be heard.
We believe that this amendment is so transparently virtuous that the Government will accept it. As the Bill stands, if these amendments are not accepted a district council, for example, let alone voluntary organisations or third parties, would not have the right to debate in public the issues which inform the structure plan. That would mean that the press, charge payers and the like would be excluded from a discussion of the very plans that are meant to determine the planning framework. If planning is to be informed and seen to be fair, it cannot be right that local authorities, the press, charge payers and third parties should not be able to debate those issues in public; otherwise planning will not carry consent. I beg to move.
Baroness Blatch: I can assure the noble Baroness that it is not our intention here to restrict the scope of structure plans unnecessarily. We want structure plans to address the whole range of strategic land use planning issues, as is clearly shown in the list of topics that we published in Planning Policy Guidance, note 15, last May. Any use of the power provided by these new clauses would be based on that list. Of course, we can foresee instances where a county may have to deal with special circumstances and the provisions will allow the Secretary of State to make specific exceptions in such cases.
Under the current provisions of the 1990 Act, the Secretary of State is able to direct individual authorities to take particular matters into account in preparing their structure plan proposals. The provisions of Schedule 3 at this point provide greater flexibility, allowing the Secretary of State also to prescribe additional matters that authorities generally must take into account. He might wish, for example, to draw the attention of authorities to the impact of global warming and its effect on sea level. The provisions of new Section 31(5)(d) are similar to the current ones for local plans in the 1990 Act.
These are both important provisions which should be retained. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Amendment No. 176 is designed to place a duty on county planning authorities to hold an examination in public (EIP) into their draft structure plans. The Bill as it stands reflects the present position; that an EIP

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may be held but is not obligatory. I assure the noble Baroness that there is no intention that a debate should take place behind closed doors.
We accept that generally an EIP will be desirable where significant alterations are being made to a structure plan and there is substantial public interest or controversy. We also recognise that the Bill's proposals for self-adoption of structure plans by counties will generally make it all the more important that draft plans are examined in public by an independent panel before being adopted. Therefore, the public will be reassured that different points of view have been considered on the key issues before final decisions are taken.
However, we have reservations about making an EIP obligatory in all cases. There will be instances where one simply is not necessary, even in the new circumstances of self-adoption. We have had cases recently where alterations to structure plans have been uncontroversial and have not justified an EIP. We want to leave that possibility open.
Nevertheless, I understand the concern that the decision of the county on the need for an EIP could be less disinterested and impartial than that of the Secretary of State under the present arrangements. For that reason we have included in the Bill a power to enable the Secretary of State to direct that an EIP shall be held in a particular case to consider a particular issue. That appears in subsection (2) of new Section 35B. It should, I believe, be sufficient. But I should like to take the point away and look at it again in the light of today's discussion. It may be that a slightly different approach would meet the anxieties being expressed while still retaining the flexibility that we wish to see in the system.
Amendment No. 177 is, I take it, intended to confer on objectors to a structure plan a right to be heard at the EIP. Again, the Bill as it stands reflects the present position; that all written objections are considered but that appearance at the EIP is by invitation. I believe that the proposed change would be undesirable. The EIP is designed as a mechanism for examining key strategic planning issues on a selective basis. It is not the occasion for considering objections to detailed land use proposals on a map which may affect the interests of particular individuals. In that sense, there is a clear distinction between the function of the EIP and that of the public inquiry into a local plan or unitary development plan where objectors do have the right to be heard and will continue to have that right.
It is, of course, important that issues of substantial controversy are examined at the EIP and that a full range of views is heard on the particular topics selected for examination. But they should be views which are representative of the various interests concerned rather than the individual views of all objectors. As we state in our code of practice:
"the basic criterion will be the significance of the contribution which, from their knowledge or the views they have expressed, organisations and individuals can be expected to make to the discussion of the matters to be examined".
As I said, the Secretary of State will have a reserve power to ensure that this happens: he can direct that particular issues are considered at the EIP. Moreover, the Secretary of State will appoint the panel which
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conducts the EIP. That panel will have a right to invite participants to the EIP independent of, in particular, any decisions taken by the planning authority. It will, therefore, be open to the chairman of the EIP panel to ensure that participants represent the full range of views and interests which need to be taken into account. I hope that the noble Baroness is reassured by that explanation.
I should add that there is an important practical reason for not granting a general right to be heard at the EIP. One of our aims is to streamline the system and reduce delays in plan preparation and adoption. On the whole, the actual conduct of EIPs has not been the cause of delay; most EIPs are over within a week or two. This is precisely because they examine broad strategic issues and invite participants on a selective basis. If we were to confer a right to be heard at the EIP we should transform EIPs into something much closer to the local plan inquiry. In other words, EIPs could be expected to take many times longer than they do now and reporting arrangements would inevitably be much more time-consuming and elaborate. That would be completely counter to our desire—which I am sure the Opposition shares—to streamline the system and reduce delay.
In the light of that explanation and of my undertaking to give further consideration to the point raised by Amendment No. 176, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Finally, I turn to Amendment No. 192. It introduces additional wording into new Section 37(2) of the 1990 Act, stipulating that a local minerals plan shall be made available for inspection in accordance with regulations. The general provisions in the new Section 39(2), relating to the deposit of local plans for public inspection, will apply to all types of local plans including minerals plans. I believe that the amendment is unnecessary and should be withdrawn.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham: I thank the Minister for that extremely full and helpful reply and for the recognition that we share a common concern that the planning process should be streamlined while being properly accessible to public opinion. We shall be trying to balance those two desires throughout the debate and often decisions will be matters of discretion and judgment. As regards Amendments Nos. 164 and 167, I am not entirely reassured by the Minister's comments about the residual powers of the Secretary of State. We may wish to return to that matter on Report.
I was pleased to hear the Minister's response to Amendment No. 176. If she were able to take on board the spirit of that amendment and return at a later stage, that would be appreciated by the public. Amendment No. 177 relates to provisions in the Bill forbidding people to be heard at a public inquiry. I ask the Minister to reconsider the phrasing of the provision. Forbidding people to be heard permits no discretion in the system. I understand that the Minister would welcome some discretion while not opening the door to unlimited rights of appeal which would turn the issue into a local planning inquiry. Our

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needs would be met if the Minister came back on Report with a revised wording of the provision permitting discretion where appropriate.
I must accept the Minister's reading of Amendment No. 192. I am satisfied with her assurances. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 164.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 165:
Page 79, line 28, leave out ("such other matters as may be prescribed or") and insert ("—

(a) such diagrams, illustrations or other descriptive or explanatory matter in respect of the general policies as may be prescribed; and

(b) such other matters").

On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendments Nos. 166 and 167 not moved.]
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 168:
Page 79, line 37, leave out ("them to take into account").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Stanley of Alderley Lord Stanley of Alderley moved Amendment No. 169:
Page 79, line 37, at end insert:
("(5A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (5) above the authority shall have regard to any planning policy guidance given by the Secretary of State for the purpose of encouraging the development and application of renewable sources of energy.").
The noble Lord said: I must first declare an interest. I have a planning application for a wind farm before my local borough council. The effect of the amendment would be to alter Section 31 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 dealing with the content of structure plans. There would then be specific references to planning policy guidelines from the Secretary of State for the purpose of encouraging the development of renewable sources of energy.
This amendment suggests that renewable energy projects should, like minerals, be a county matter and subject to the county structure plan. The problem which faces both planners and those attempting to meet the Government's objective of setting up alternative sources of energy, in particular wind farms, is that neither have any idea of where such projects should be sited from an environmental or indeed visual point of view or what criteria should be taken into account—for example, employment, wealth creation and farm diversification.
It is revealing that so far every wind farm, with one possible exception, has been refused planning permission and is to appeal. I am told that the average cost of obtaining planning permission for a wind farm is between £50,000 and £60,000. Surely that alone is a reason for the Secretary of State to give some guidelines.
As an example, I cite the Cemaes wind farm in Powys. Although that was supported by the planning authority, it was objected to by the Countryside Commission and the CPRW. As a result, there is to be a public inquiry involving the following publicly funded organisations: Powys County Council, the Department of the Environment, the Department of
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Energy, Montgomery District Council, Snowdon National Park, the Welsh Office, the CPRW and the promoters of the scheme.
I accept that the Government may not wish to put such an amendment as this on the face of the Bill. However, a policy statement in the guidelines to planning authorities would surely reduce some of the enormous waste of time and money.
Dyfed County Council has recently commissioned a report by the Open University on the pros and cons of renewable energy for the guidance of its planning committee. Gwynedd Council has recently issued an internal memorandum on the subject. With this amendment I ask that the Department of the Environment should consult with the Department of Energy to discover what is needed in the way of renewable resources. Guidelines should then be issued to county councils for inclusion in their structure plans. I beg to move.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I was going to express disinterest, in the correct sense of the word, in the noble Lord's planning application. However, I am advised by my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition that there is nowhere better than Anglesey for a wind farm because it has the strongest winds in Britain. Without wishing in any way to intervene in the negotiations, I believe that on Anglesey, where some years ago there were 100 windmills, wind farms should generally be supported.
However, there are other reasons for supporting the noble Lord's amendment. First, it is an unfortunate side effect of the Electricity Act 1990 that, with the writing-off of investment in other forms of energy, the relative advantages of renewable sources of energy like wind energy have become fewer and the incentive for investment has decreased. That was a most unfortunate effect of the privatisation of the electricity industry.
Secondly, the Government's own White Paper on the environment last year pointed out that wind energy on land has the potential to supply up to 10 per cent. of current electricity needs. It went on to say that there are planning constraints because technically favourable sites are often in areas of natural beauty or importance to wildlife.
We cannot resolve that sort of conflict. However, we can anticipate the possibility of it. One way of achieving that would be to provide that the consideration of renewable sources of energy should be part of the plans. In that way, the matter could be debated in public before any particular application is put forward. The kind of complication to which the noble Lord referred in Powys could be, if not avoided, then truncated. To that extent it seems to me that there is a special case for putting renewable sources of energy on the face of the Bill.
Baroness David: We had an extremely interesting session of the all-party conservation committee last week or the week before when the prime matter for consideration was renewable sources of energy, particularly wind. One point which emerged was that there are no planning guidelines, which, as the noble

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Lord, Lord Stanley, said, seems very important. The Government should direct their attention to that, and I hope that this amendment will do just that.
3.15 p.m.
Viscount Astor: I recognise that the amendment is designed to aid the cause of renewable energy. However, when drawing up a structure plan a local authority will be required by new Section 31(5) to have regard to the current national policies, which will include planning policy guidance given by the Secretary of State. I know that the noble Lord was concerned that a local authority should mean a county council.
The Government are addressing the need for planning policy guidance on the specific issue of renewable energy resources. Officials in my department are working on that with Department of Energy officials and will produce guidance. As I have explained, local planning authorities will have to take such advice into account. Accordingly, I believe that the noble Lord's amendment is redundant. I hope that he will be satisfied by my answer and will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: I am very pleased to hear that answer, as I believe will be the noble Lord and the noble Baroness opposite and representatives of the county councils to whom I have spoken. They would like some form of guidance. I am very pleased that it should be widened to county level rather than merely be a district matter. I should like to impress upon my noble friend that this guidance should be published quickly because, as the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, said, one snag is that there is a capital problem due to privatisation. The sooner the guidelines are issued, the less money will be wasted on useless public inquiries involving a lot of people. Meanwhile, I am pleased to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 170:
Page 80, line 23, leave out ("proposal which affects the general policies in the structure plan") and insert ("of their proposals").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Meston Lord Meston moved Amendment No. 170A:
Page 80, line 34, leave out ("or") and insert ("and").
The noble Lord said: The declared purpose of Clause 22 and Schedule 3 is to streamline the development plan system. Under the substituted Section 31(5) of the principal Act, which is to be found on page 79 of the Bill, a local authority must have regard to regional or strategic guidance given by the Secretary of State and also to national policies.
However, conformity with such guidance and such policies is not an express requirement of that part of the proposed new section. However, it is important that a county plan or alterations to it should not be adopted until specifically approved by the Secretary of State. Otherwise, there seems to be a risk of a county plan being adopted although it departs in some way from national guidance and although it may not meet the needs of the county. In turn, that could result in a failure to ensure that district plans meet such needs.
As the Bill is drafted in the new proposed Section 32(7), proposals for the alteration or replacement of a structured plan shall not become operative unless adopted by the authority or approved by the Secretary of State. This amendment seeks to change the word "or" and substitute the word "and" because I believe it is important that the Secretary of State should ensure that county plans provide a sound basis for district plans. In moving the amendment, I readily accept that, as a matter of drafting, other amendments may be necessary to perfect what the amendment seeks to achieve. Subject to that, I beg to move.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I confess that I am totally puzzled by the amendment. Section 35A refers to the power of the Secretary of State to call in plans if he thinks it appropriate. If the amendment is carried presumably the Secretary of State will have to call in all plans. I am sure that that was not the noble Lord's purpose.
Baroness Blatch: The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, is right in his deduction. There are two main reasons for our proposal that in future counties should be free to adopt their own structure plans. First, we want to encourage opportunities for local choice in planning matters. We want communities at county and district level to take their own decisions about the form and location of new development. Secondly, we are concerned to speed up the planning process; to provide procedures which will make it easier for local authorities to keep their plans up-to-date.
At present it takes on average almost two-and-a-half years for the Secretary of State to deal with a structure plan from the time it is submitted to him to the time it is finally approved. Delays of that order can make it difficult to keep plans up to date. While some of the same procedural steps will still have to be gone through, there is little doubt that if counties are allowed to adopt their own plans they may be able to reduce the time-scales significantly.
Concerns regarding self-adoption are that counties may be tempted to ignore national and regional policies and pull up the drawbridge and that structure plans not approved by the Secretary of State will not have sufficient weight and authority to ensure consistency at the level of district local plans. I do not believe that those concerns are well founded. They ignore other aspects of our reform package which need to be taken together with the proposals for self-adoption.
First, we intend to develop a much clearer planning framework at the regional level which will provide the context for county structure plans. Regional planning guidance is already in place in the metropolitan areas and in the South East. We shall shortly be issuing guidance for East Anglia and developing the same approach in other regions.
Secondly, the legislation will provide that in preparing the structure plans authorities must have regard to current national policies and regional planning guidance. We shall have the means to ensure that that happens. The Secretary of State will have

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reserve powers enabling him to object to a draft plan, to direct that it is modified or, in the last analysis, to call it in and approve it himself.
Thirdly, in Schedule 3 we are providing that local plans must be in general conformity with the structure plans. Again there will be mechanisms to ensure that that happens. The county will issue a statement of conformity when a local plan is put on deposit. If it is pointed out that the local plan does not conform to the structure plan that will count as an objection to the local plan to be considered at the local planning inquiry. Again, the Secretary of State will have very full reserve powers which he will be ready to use if necessary.
The delays associated with structure plan approval have dogged the planning system for 20 years. We are making a proposal for reform which, while giving counties the right to self adopt, embodies safeguards to ensure that wider considerations are not ignored. The amendment would strike at the heart of our reform package and cling to the unsatisfactory status quo. In the light of that explanation I hope that the noble Lord will not press his amendment.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: I listened with great attention and respect to everything said by my noble friend. Her response does not seem to make total sense in view of what we know regarding the reserve powers of the Secretary of State to deal with the matter. We hear words upon words which do not go to the substance of the amendment. It is not a matter on which the Committee should divide; however, I see no reasoned objection to the amendment.
Baroness Blatch: The amendment asks that the Secretary of State approve all proposals for the alteration or replacement of county structure plans; in other words, it takes us even further back than the present situation. Every single modification or replacement of a structure plan would be subject to detailed scrutiny by the Secretary of State. We are saying that where a structure plan flies in the face of all the procedures laid down, the Secretary of State has reserve powers to call in a proposal and that it is a question of balance regarding flexibility in allowing local authorities to determine their own plans within the context of regional guidance. The amendment would mean that every single plan would have to be called in and be subject to detailed scrutiny by the Secretary of State.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: That is so, but in the context of judicial review being the only controlling power, it is important.
Lord Meston: I am sorry if I bewildered the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey. This is a probing amendment. It may be that the amendment goes too far for his liking. It may be also that as a matter of drafting it is in the wrong part of the Bill. Subject to that, I reiterate that it is a probing amendment which seeks to discover how the provision is intended to work in practice. The object of a streamlined system designed to produce continuity is that the policy
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guidelines filter the whole way through the system. It was not my purpose to propose anything which would create undue delay.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, said, calling-in is a last resort. The amendment is designed to suggest that the input of the Secretary of State might come at an earlier stage, particularly as the wording of the Bill for the new section of the principal Act only requires the local authority to have regard to national guidelines. It is a detailed matter which needs to be considered further. I do not propose to take any additional time of the Committee today. I may wish to come back to it at a later stage; meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 171.
Page 80, leave out lines 37 to 45.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 172:
Page 81, line 23, after ("by") insert ("or determined in accordance with").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 173:
Page 81, line 49, leave out from ("them") to end of line 3 on page 82.
The noble Baroness said: This is a technical amendment. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 174 and 175:
Page 82, line 13, leave out ("consider modifying") and insert ("modify").
Page 83, line 3, at end insert:
("(5A) For the purpose of taking into account any objection or matter, the Secretary of State may, but need not, consult with any local planning authority or other person.").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
[Amendments Nos. 176 and 177 not moved.]
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 178:
Page 83, line 38, at end insert:
("Duties to notify authorities responsible for local plans.

35C.—(1) An authority responsible for a structure plan shall, where any proposals of theirs for the alteration or replacement of a structure plan are adopted or approved—

(a) notify any authority responsible for a local plan in their area that the proposals have been adopted or approved; and

(b) supply that authority with a statement that the local plan is or, as the case may be, is not in general conformity with the altered or new structure plan.

(2) A statement that a local plan is not in general conformity with a structure plan shall specify the respects in which it is not in such conformity.

(3) An authority responsible for a structure plan shall, where any proposals of theirs for the alteration or replacement of a structure plan are withdrawn, notify any authority responsible for a local plan in their area that the proposals have been withdrawn.

(4) Nothing in this section requires an authority to notify or supply a statement to themselves.

(5) For the purposes of this section an authority shall be regarded as responsible—

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(a) for a structure plan, if they are entitled to prepare proposals for its alteration or replacement; and

(b) for a local plan, if they are under a duty to prepare a local plan or are entitled to prepare proposals for its alteration or replacement.").

The noble Baroness said: This is a technical amendment. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 179
Page 83, line 43, leave out ("consist of") and insert ("contain").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendments Nos. 180 and 181 not moved.]
3.30 p.m.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 182:
Page 83, line 47, at end insert ("and for the provision of relevant transport, recreational and social infrastructure in advance of developments or changes of use of land").
The noble Lord said: There are two ways in which infrastructure for development can be provided. One is through the provision of adequate land—that is the zoning issue—and the second is the issue of investment. Provision for land use is already an accepted part of local plans. I have no criticism of the drafting of the Bill or indeed preceding legislation in that regard. When a local plan provides for development to be permitted it is relatively common, although perhaps not universal, for adequate consideration to be given, for example, to road access or recreation space.
But there is not only the issue of whether the land will become available for the infrastructure but also whether there will be sufficient investment. That is a problem which has concerned the National Association of Local Councils which is advising me on this amendment. It has pointed out that it is quite common for plans, which are not drawn up by villages but by the wider councils, to permit development in a village but not to make adequate provision for the infrastructure. Such facilities as public transport, water and sewerage facilities, pavements, street lighting and, more importantly, the provision for education and social services, should all be preconditions of the possibility envisaged in a local plan which says that there should be development. When development is proposed, especially in rural areas, the question to be asked is: what are the preconditions that will make the development acceptable? Development should not be permitted unless it is clear that at the same time or in advance the necessary infrastructure will become available.
It is not enough for the local plan to be silent on the matter. If it is silent there will be unnecessary dissension when a specific proposal for development comes before the local planning authority. There will be unnecessary disagreement between the people of the village and those in the district council area. It would be much better for the possibility of the infrastructure and the question of what infrastructure
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is necessary to be foreseen in the local plan rather than to leave it as a matter for debate when a specific proposal comes forward.
I hope that the Government will think that this is a useful extension to the provisions which already exist in local plans for the consideration of land use for infrastructure. We hope that the Government will agree that the inclusion of an amendment on these lines will go a considerable way to calming some of the fears which local people, particularly in rural areas, very often have about developments in their localities. I beg to move.
Baroness Blatch: Subsection (2) of new Section 36 defines a local plan as consisting of a written statement of the authority's detailed policies for the development and use of land in the area, and goes on to say that this should be taken to include the improvement of the physical environment and the management of traffic. We believe that this broad definition is sufficient to allow the authority to include detailed infrastructure policies wherever they are needed. However, we do not believe that they would be needed in every plan. That is a matter for the local planning authority to decide on, after public participation and in the light of objections to its deposited plan. It would not be appropriate to include an additional, mandatory requirement in the primary legislation, as envisaged by the noble Lord in this admendment. However, the need for and relevance of such policies is a matter that the Secretary of State may wish to take up in his guidance to local authorities on the content of their local plans. I hope that the views of the noble Lord will be met in that way. I therefore hope that he will not press the amendment.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey; I fear that the noble Baroness has not fully understood the amendment. When she says that it would be undesirable for every single local plan to contain a mandatory statement on the,
"provision of relevant transport, recreational and social infrastructure"
I agree with her. However that is not what the amendment says. It says that it would be,
"in advance of developments or changes of use of land".
If there were to be no developments or changes in the use of land, I agree that there would be no need for such a statement.
I am equally unconvinced by what she said about paragraph 36(2). As the noble Baroness said, it includes the phrase,
"(including the improvement of the physical environment and the management of traffic)".
But that is only a small part of the kind of infrastructure to which I referred. I was quite specific in saying that it is not enough to consider the land use implications of the infrastructure. The investment implications must also be considered. On the whole I find the Minister's reply to this perhaps imperfect amendment quite unsatisfactory. It may be a matter to which I shall return at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 183 not moved.]
The Chairman of Committees (Lord Aberdare): If Amendment No. 184 is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 185.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 184:
Page 84, leave out lines 1 to 5 and insert:
("(4) A local plan shall not contain—

(a) any policies in respect of the winning and working of minerals or the depositing of mineral waste, unless it is a plan for a National Park;

(b) any policies in respect of the depositing of refuse or waste materials other than mineral waste, unless it is a plan for a National Park or for an area where such depositing is not a county matter for the purposes of Schedule 1.").

The noble Viscount said: The local plan provisions set out in Schedule 3 to the Bill require local planning authorities to draw up detailed development plans for their area covering the types of land use and development for which they have development control responsibility. The one exception to this is waste disposal development in the English counties. Amendments Nos. 184 and 200 fill this gap by requiring the appropriate development control authorities to draw up waste local plans. This responsibility will rest with the county planning authorities in England because they, not the districts, are responsible for deciding planning applications relating to waste. In Wales development control responsibility for waste disposal lies with district councils and they will be required to include their waste planning policies in their general local plans. The amendment also makes special provision for the national parks which will be able to choose between preparing a separate waste local plan or including their waste planning policies in their general park-wide plan. Both counties and national parks will be able to combine their waste local plans with their minerals plan if they wish to do so.
The new plans will set out authorities' detailed land use policies for the disposal and treatment of waste within the broad strategic framework provided by the structure plan. They will ensure that planning authorities consider the land use implications of their waste policies from a strategic point of view rather than deciding applications in isolation. This will help authorities in deciding planning applications for new waste disposal facilities and as a consequence reduce the number going to appeal. Where applications do go to appeal or are called in by the Secretary of State, then the plans will provide better guidelines for the inspector.
I am sure that this will be of great benefit to the waste disposal industry, both because the planning process will be speeded up, and, perhaps more importantly, because they will have guidelines on the types and location of waste facilities that are likely to be acceptable in planning terms. The new plans do not, however, replace the plans which waste authorities are required to draw up under the Control of Pollution Act 1974—a requirement which has very recently been strengthened in the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The two plans will be complementary.
The development plans will address the land use implications of authorities' waste policies. In
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particular, they will consider the need for sites and facilities in particular areas; the types of locations that are likely to be appropriate (and of course those that would not be suitable) as well as the planning criteria that would be expected to apply to such developments, and the geological, hydrological and other considerations that will need to be taken into account. The two plans will clearly need to be consistent, and subsection (5) of the new clause will enable the Secretary of State to require authorities to take into account their environmental protection plans in drawing up their local plans. This is important because it will ensure that authorities are not able to shy away from making adequate land use provision for the waste disposal facilities they are likely to need and which they have enunciated in their environmental protection plan.
We have consulted interested parties on these proposals, and I am glad to say that there was an almost universal welcome for them, both from the relevant planning authorities and from the waste disposal industry. A number of detailed comments have been made on the way in which the new arrangements should operate. These will be important for the formulation of guidance on plan preparation, but they do not pose any difficulties for the main proposition. Waste disposal facilities, whether they be landfill sites, incinerators or civic amenity sites and the like, are never popular, but we cannot avoid making adequate provision for them. I hope that this new clause will discourage authorities from taking a NIMBY attitude, and to plan strategically for their waste disposal. I urge noble Lords to support it.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I am encouraged to learn that the Government have consulted interesting parties on these amendments. I rather suspect that they consulted some boring parties as well, but that is their problem not ours. We are not opposed to the elimination of duplication in this matter and we welcome these amendments. If the Government are so keen on avoiding duplication I am bound to ask why they were so resistant to the amendment moved by my noble friends Lady Nicol and Lady David about coastal areas. In that case it was not simply a matter of duplication, it was much worse. There were some aspects of coastal area conservation which were not covered adequately by any authorities. I hope they will see their rethinking on this matter as an opportunity for them also to rethink on the earlier matters we discussed.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendment No. 185 not moved.]
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 186:
Page 84, line 6, leave out from ("contain") to end of line 12 and insert ("—

(a) a map illustrating each of the detailed policies; and

(b) such diagrams, illustrations or other descriptive or explanatory matter in respect of the policies as may be prescribed,

and may contain such descriptive or explanatory matter as the authority think appropriate.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 187 to 191:
Page 84, line 22, leave out ("which") and insert ("as the").

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Page 84, line 24, leave out ("them to take into account").
Page 84, line 38, leave out ("local minerals") and insert ("minerals local").
Page 84, line 39, leave out ("local minerals") and insert ("minerals local").
Page 84, line 39, leave out ("consist of") and insert ("contain").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
[Amendment No. 192 not moved.]
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 193 to 197:
Page 84, line 43, at end insert ("within such period (if any) as the Secretary of State may direct").
Page 84, line 44, leave out ("local minerals") and insert ("minerals local").
Page 84, line 50, leave out ("local minerals") and insert ("minerals local").
Page 84, line 52, leave out ("which") and insert ("as").
Page 84, line 53, leave out ("them to take into account").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 198 and 199:
Page 85, line 2, leave out ("local minerals") and insert ("minerals local").
Page 85, line 5, leave out ("local minerals") and insert ("minerals local").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 200:
Page 85, line 8, at end insert:
("Waste policies.
37A.—(1) In this section—
"waste policies" means detailed policies in respect of development which involves the depositing of refuse or waste materials other than mineral waste; and
"waste local plan" means a plan containing waste policies.
(2) A local planning authority other than an excluded authority shall, within such period (if any) as the Secretary of State may direct—

(a) prepare a waste local plan for their area; or

(b) include their waste policies in their minerals local plan.

(3) A local planning authority are an excluded authority for the purposes of subsection (2) if they are an authority—

(a) for a National Park;

(b) for an area where waste policies are not a county matter for the purposes of Schedule 1.

(4) A local planning authority for a National Park shall within such period (if any) as the Secretary of State may direct—

(a) prepare a waste local plan for their area; or

(b) include their waste policies in—

(i) their minerals local plan; or

(ii) their local plan.

(5) In formulating their waste policies, the authority shall have regard to such information and other considerations as the Secretary of State may prescribe or, in a particular case, direct.
(6) Subsections (3), (5), (9) and (10) of section 36 apply with respect to waste local plans as they apply with respect to local plans.
(7) The following provisions of this Chapter apply with respect to waste local plans as they apply with respect to local plans, but as if references to a local planning authority were references to the authority who arc entitled to prepare a waste local plan.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendment No. 201 not moved.]
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 202:
Page 85, line 15, leave out ("notified under section 32(7) that a structure plan has been altered or replaced") and insert ("supplied with a statement under section 35C that the local plan is not in general conformity with the structure plan").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 203:
Page 85, line 24, at end insert:
("(5) Subject to the following provisions of this Chapter and section 287, proposals for the alteration or replacement of a local plan shall become operative on the date on which they are adopted.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 204:
Page 85, line 38, leave out ("subsection (4)") and insert ("section 46(1)").
The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 204, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 205, 206, 207, 210, 214 and 215. These amendments are all concerned with the relationship between structure and local plans and revise the provisions already in Schedule 3 relating to a local plan's conformity or non-comformity with the structure plan. I beg to move.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: If the noble Baroness will forgive me, she referred to Amendment No. 205. That is not part of this group.
Baroness Blatch: I apologise to the Committee. I am speaking to Amendments Nos. 206, 207, 210, 214 and 215. With that explanation, I commend the amendments to the Committee.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
3.45 p.m.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 205:
Page 85, line 43, at end insert:
("(aa) send a copy of the relevant documents not later than the date at which they are made available for inspection to the council of any parish or community which or part of which is within the area to which the local plan relates").
The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 205, I should like to speak also to Amendment No. 209. Amendment No. 205 provides that the council shall send a copy of the relevant documents to a parish or community which is within the area to which the local plan relates at the same time as or earlier than the date on which it is made available for inspection. Amendment No. 209 provides that details of any amendments shall be made available to the parish or community council.
We recognise that the parish and community councils are statutorily entitled to be consulted on local plans or revisions of local plans. We recognise that in the vast majority of cases district councils behave well in the preparation of their local plans and give local councils adequate notice. It has been brought to our attention by a number of parish and community councils that sometimes the observation of the right to be involved is more in the letter than in

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the spirit. What is really required, we are told, is that the parish councils should get copies as of right of the plan at an early enough stage to do something about it and to consult their local people. Unless they do that they will not fulfil their obligations under their own constitution to make informed comments about planning applications in their area.
These amendments would give parish councils a necessary status in the preparation of local plans. They do that by giving them a right to their own copy of the draft and not simply the right to inspect a draft, which is what formally happens now. It gives them a statutory right of objection at the formulation of the new plan rather than at a later stage. In most cases district councils will behave well and will be doing this already. However, to deal with the minority of cases where there is not that degree of co-operation, it seems to the National Association of Local Councils that it would be desirable to put this extra provision—not a very onerous provision—on the face of the Bill. I beg to move.
The Earl of Selkirk: I think there is a great deal in what the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, says. One of the problems of all planning is to see that people know what is happening and what is the effect of the plan. That is very important. In many cases it does not come out very easily because there are no normal places where people meet and hear the gossip about what is being done. I do not know how this will work out but I think the principle behind it is desirable if planning is to be accepted and effective.
Viscount Astor: These amendments—perhaps I should say "interesting" amendments—would require the planning authorities to send a copy of their deposited plan proposals to parish or community councils in their area and would specify that councils may make objections in acordance with regulations.
Provision will be made in regulations for parish and community councils, along with other public authorities in the area, to be consulted on the local plan proposals before they are put on deposit. It will then be open to those bodies to object or make representations when the deposited proposals are advertised. New Section 39 simply clarifies that the Secretary of State may make an objection. There is no need for similar clarification or special provision in the legislation at this point in the case of parish or community councils. They, like any other body, may object to local plan proposals. I believe therefore that the amendments are unnecessary and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw them.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I am grateful for the assurance that the regulations will include sufficient instruction to the local planning authority to ensure that the rights of parish and community councils are protected. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 206 and 207:
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Page 85, line 50, leave out ("of conformity or non conformity supplied under section 46") and insert ("supplied under section 46(2)").
Page 86, leave out lines 1 to 7.
The noble Baroness said: I spoke to these amendments with Amendment No. 204. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 208:
Page 86, line 13, after ("by") insert ("or determined in accordance with").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendment No. 209 not moved.]
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 210:
Page 86, leave out lines 22 to 24.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 211:
Page 86, line 35, leave out first ("for").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendment No. 212 not moved.]
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 213:
Page 87, line 2, at end insert:
("(2) In subsection (4) of that section for "consider modifying" there is substituted "modify".").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 214 and 215:
Page 87, line 17, leave out from ("46") to end of line 48 and insert ("to 48 (conformity between local plan and structure plan) there is substituted—
"Conformity between plans.
46.—(1) An authority responsible for a local plan shall not make copies available as mentioned in section 39(2) unless—

(a) they have served on the authority responsible for the structure plan in their area a copy of the plan or the proposals; and

(b) such period as may be prescribed has elapsed since they served the copy of the plan or proposals.

(2) Where a local planning authority have been served with a copy as mentioned in subsection (1) they shall, before the end of any period prescribed for the purposes of that subsection, supply the authority responsible for the local plan with—

(a) a statement that the plan or the proposals are in general conformity with the structure plan; or

(b) a statement that the plan or the proposals are not in such conformity.

(3) A statement that a plan or proposals are not in such conformity shall specify the respects in which the plan or proposals are not in such conformity.
(4) Any such statement shall be treated for the purposes of this Chapter as an objection made in accordance with the regulations.
(5) Nothing in this section requires an authority to serve a copy on or supply a statement to themselves.
(6) Where—

(a) a local planning authority propose to make, alter or replace a local plan;

(b) copies of proposals for the alteration or replacement of the structure plan for their area have been made available for inspection under section 33(2); and

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(c) the authority mentioned in paragraph (a) include in any relevant copy of the plan or proposals a statement that they are making the permitted assumption,

the permitted assumption shall, subject to subsection (9), be made for all purposes (including in particular any question as to conformity between plans).
(7) In this section "the permitted assumption" means thy: assumption that—

(a) the proposals mentioned in subsection (6) (b); or

(b) if any proposed modifications to those proposals are published in accordance with regulations made under section 53, the proposals as so modified,

have been adopted.
(8) For the purposes of subsection (6) (c) a copy is a relevant copy of a plan or proposals if it is—

(a) served under subsection (1) (a); or

(b) made available or sent under section 39(2).

(9) The permitted assumption shall not be made at any time after the authority mentioned in subsection (6) (a) know that the proposals mentioned in subsection (6) (b) have been withdrawn.
(10) The provisions of a local plan prevail for all purposes over any conflicting provisions in the relevant structure plan unless the local plan is one—

(a) stated under section 35C not to be in general conformity with the structure plan; and

(b) neither altered nor replaced after the statement was supplied.

(11) The Secretary of State may make regulations with respect to cases where provisions in a local plan conflict with provisions in—

(a) a minerals local plan; or

(b) a waste local plan.

(12) Subsection (5) of section 35C applies for the purposes of this section as it applies for the purposes of that."").
Page 88, line 1, leave out paragraph 23.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 216:
Page 88, line 18, leave out ("county") and insert ("local").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment Nos. 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222 and 223:
Page 88, line 19, leave out ("under section 32(8)") and insert ("and supply a statement under section 35C").
Page 88, line 27, leave out ("a") and insert ("the provisions of the relevant").
Page 88, line 37, leave out ("be").
Page 88, line 39, at end insert:
("(2) The Secretary of State may direct that proposals for the alteration or replacement of a structure plan or a local plan shall not be prepared in relation to the area of an urban development corporation.").
Page 89, leave out lines 27 to 29.
Page 90, line 4, leave out ("paragraph 2 is omitted") and insert ("for paragraph 2, there is substituted—
"2. The functions of a local planning authority—

(a) under sections 30 to 35B, 37A(2) and 50(1), (4), (5) and (7) shall be exercisable by the county planning authority and not by the district planning authority;

(b) under section 36, 38, 39, 42 to 44 and 50(6), (7A) and (8) shall be exercisable by the district planning authority and not by the county planning authority;

and references to a local planning authority in those sections shall be construed accordingly."").
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Page 90, line 6, leave out from ("paragraph") to end of line 8 and insert ("6(a) for "Part II" there is substituted "sections 30 to 35C, 46(2) and 50(1), (4), (5) and (7)"").
The noble Baroness said: These amendments were spoken to previously in connection with other amendments. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 23 [Simplified planning zones]:
On Question, Whether Clause 23 shall stand part of the Bill?
Baroness Hollis of Heigham: I ask Members of the Committee not to permit Clause 23 to stand part of the Bill. If one looks at this clause in conjunction with Amendment No. 176, which we discussed earlier this afternoon, it seems to suggest that there is a worrying subtext to the Bill; namely, that the best and sometimes the only way in the eyes of the Government to streamline planning is to reduce public consultation. We on this side of the Committee argue that the best way to streamline planning, along with the Carnwath proposals which we willingly accept, is to provide additional staff on the one hand and to reduce frivolous appeals and twin-tracking on the other.
The provisions of Clause 23 restrict public consultation on the making of simplified planning zones. I believe that it is widely agreed that such planning zones, SPZs, have not worked. The Government believe—wrongly in my view—that SPZs have not worked because the consultation process is at fault. The argument is that if you cut out consultation, SPZs will be widely adopted. Hence the introduction of this clause.
We argue that not only is consultation essential to planning by consent, which is a theme we have argued in connection with various other related amendments, but also that SPZs fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the planning process. SPZs basically offer zoning; that is, the granting of advanced planning permission for certain types of specified development. Therefore, a developer would not have to submit a planning application or pay a fee. Behind it is the belief that planning development is not occurring in run-down or derelict areas because of the rigidity or cumbersome and negative nature of the planning process—cumbersomeness, of course, includes public consultation. The Government believe that if they make planning easier then development will occur.
We on this side of the Committee do not necessarily object to zoning. I had experience of the process when working in the United States. However, the proposal to abolish or reduce consultation suggests a misunderstanding of why SPZS have so far not worked. At present there are just two of them in England in Corby and Derby, there is one in Scotland and one proposed for Wales. Ten more are being considered and two local authorities—namely, Walsall and Enfield—have considered SPZs and, as I understand it, have rejected them.
The question therefore is whether the Government are right to believe that the reason SPZs have not been more widely adopted is the failure of the consultation process. It may help if we were to look at what has been happening in regard to the two SPZs which were

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rejected and also at the one at Derby which is regarded as successful. I suggest that in all three cases, contrary to the Minister's view, the issue of consultation is irrelevant.
In Walsall the SPZ was initiated by the developer, but I understand that he found that the planning process was faster. The local authority found that, as his application involved metal salvage, in the public interest they needed to retain environmental controls offered by the planning process but reduced by SPZs. One of the reasons why zoning in the United States involves very extensive public inquiry is precisely to retain such environmental controls.
The second SPZ which was considered by a local authority but rejected was in Enfield. There the local authority proposed the SPZ on former industrial, Gas Board land. However, one of the land owners objected, preferring the security of the existing planning process. In other words, in both cases the parties preferred the existing planning system as being simpler, quicker and offering better safeguards for all of the interests involved. In both cases a jointly prepared planning brief was preferred to an SPZ.
The third example to which I should like to draw the attention of the Committee is that of Derby. The SPZ which was introduced there appears to be widely successful: it zoned 21 acres for small freehold units. However, as I understand it, Derby council suspects that it was the city grant—that is, the financial bait and carrot—rather than the SPZ framework which made the venture such a success. The council believes that an OPP, an outline planning permission, may have had the same effect with rather less work being involved.
As I said, we on this side of the Committee have no objection to zoning as such, although we suspect that OPPs within the framework of the local plan can have the same advantages. However, we believe that SPZs are failing because they carry no financial attractiveness which would make them analagous to enterprise zones. I suggest that most developers are more concerned with the level playing field as regards other developers than they are with the reduction of planning consultation which the clause suggests.
Any clause which suggests that SPZs would be more attractive and more widely adopted by local authorities simply by reducing public consultation is, I suggest, a serious misjudgment. The Walsall experience and the examples of other areas where local authorities have rejected SPZs show that it is precisely the environmental issues of design, covering, landscaping and car parking that should not be eroded from public debate. If Members of the Committee accept this clause, such considerations will be eroded. It is the more dubious developers that may seek SPZs and it is precisely such developments which need to be brought within proper planning consultation procedures. As the National Housing and Town Planning Council has said, it is the possibility of public inquiry that keeps planning standards high. SPZs would undermine that process. I hope that the Committee will not accept Clause 23.
4 p.m.
Baroness Blatch: The noble Baroness is very negative about SPZs; indeed, she has concentrated on the negative aspects involved. Clause 23 brings into effect Schedule 4 to the Bill which contains measures for streamlining simplified planning zone procedures. These measures stem from proposals set out in our White Paper on The Future of Development Plans and from the recommendations of a research report commissioned by the department last February to look at the efficiency of SPZ procedures in practice. That report was published on 22nd January.
Simplified planning zones are designed to quicken the pace of development of areas where it is most needed. They remove uncertainty for prospective developers by granting planning permission for the types of development specified in the scheme, thus enabling development to go ahead without the need for a separate planning application, or a related planning fee. The success of schemes in Derby and Corby has proved how useful SPZs can be in promoting development and encouraging valuable new business and employment opportunities. I understand that Derby is planning a second SPZ.
Despite such success, some local authorities and developers have hesitated from proceeding with SPZ proposals because of what they perceive as cumbersome and time-consuming procedures. Speed and simplicity is the essence of SPZs. Our streamlining proposals seek to improve the balance between that and the need for adequate public participation.
The key provisions are to make public participation before deposit optional, and to remove the mandatory requirement for the local planning authority to hold a public local inquiry into objections. The first of them will bring SPZ procedures into line with the improvements which we have put forward elsewhere in the Bill in respect of local plans and unitary development plans. It will allow the local authority flexibility to decide what initial consultations are appropriate to each scheme before placing it on deposit for formal objection.
The second key provision, which allows the local authority discretion on whether or not to hold a local inquiry, may be causing some Members of the Committee some concern; indeed, it certainly appears to be worrying the noble Baroness. I understand the concern. However, I can reassure the Committee that the provision is not designed to limit in any way the requirement for duly made objections to be fully considered. Of course, there has never been a right for third party objectors to planning applications to be heard at a public inquiry, unless the application has been called in by the Secretary of State.
SPZ schemes are in many respects analogous to planning applications and I believe it is appropriate that they should be treated in a similar way. Indeed, experience has shown that for many schemes there are likely to be only a handful of objections and these could be dealt with quite adequately on the basis of written representations. In such cases a public local inquiry would only be a waste of time and effort. Local

899
authorities will of course need some guidance on these matters and we intend to issue advice on when it would normally be appropriate to hold an inquiry (for example, where the scheme represents a substantial departure from the development plan; raises strategic planning issues; where there is substantial controversy; or where it involves a substantial area of land in the authority's ownership). In addition, the Secretary of State will have power to direct that an inquiry is held in a particular case if he considers that a planning authority is being unreasonable in declining to hold one.
These simplified and more flexible procedures were widely welcomed when we announced them in August in a consultation paper, particularly the proposals for changing the requirement for public participation at the pre-deposit stage and the more detailed improvements to adoption procedures. I hope that Clause 23 will be allowed to stand part of the Bill.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham: I have to say that I have some difficulty in accepting the Minister's reading of the success and relevance of SPZs. They have not been successful and the reason is, in my understanding, that developers prefer the planning process by negotiation that currently exists rather than any particular reluctance by local authorities to go down that line. I repeat that the Derby evidence suggests that it is not so much the SPZ streamlined patterning which is attractive to developers as the financial inducements which were offered. Wherever local authorities have offered financial inducements, whether through enterprise zones or through rent and rate rebatements on their own sites, this has had much the same effect.
Nor, I would suggest to your Lordships, is it the case that under SPZs individual developments will be treated in the same way as developments under individual planning applications. The point about SPZs is that the ground is cleared in advance, which may indeed be desirable, and this means, therefore, that individual developments do not come within the process of public consultation. Many of those individual developments will be entirely appropriate, uncontroversial and problem free, but there is a lot of suspicion on the part of local authorities that SPZs will attract precisely those developments that are doubtful and dubious.
They may be socially necessary but they are nonetheless what we would call nonconforming usages: they may be salvage or waste disposal or may involve metal spraying, for example, and the like. Therefore they are precisely the sorts of usages that should come within the planning process so that individual conditions may be attached to them. By passing this clause we would allow marginal and dubious activities to go ahead against the public interest without the protection of individual controls. I hope that the Minister will think again on this. I should therefore like to test the opinion of the Committee.
4.4 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 23 shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 126; Not-Contents, 69.

Division No. 1

CONTENTS

Acton, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Aldington, L.

Layton, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Long, V.

Arran, E.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Astor, V.

Luke, L.

Atholl, D.

Lurgan, L.

Attlee, E.

Lyell, L.

Auckland, L.

Lytton, E.

Bauer, L.

McColl of Dulwich, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Beloff, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Belstead, L.

Mancroft, L.

Bessborough, E.

Manton, L.

Blatch, B.

Margadale, L.

Blyth, L.

Masham of Ilton, B.

Borthwick, L.

Merrivale, L.

Boyd-Carpenter, L.

Mersey, V.

Braye, B.

Milverton, L.

Brigstocke, B.

Monteagle of Brandon, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Mottistone, L.

Butterworth, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Caithness, E.

Munster, E.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Murton of Lindisfarne, L.

Campbell of Croy, L.

Nelson, E.

Carnegy of Lour, B.

Norrie, L.

Carnock, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Cavendish of Furness, L.

Onslow, E.

Clanwilliam, E.

Orkney, E.

Cochrane of Cults, L.

Orr-Ewing, L.

Cockfield, L.

Oxfuird, V.

Coleraine, L.

Palmer, L.

Constantine of Stanmore, L.

Park of Monmouth, B.

Cornwallis, L.

Pender, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Polwarth, L.

Davidson, V. [Teller.]

Porritt, L.

De Freyne, L.

Pym, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Quinton, L.

Eccles, of Moulton, B.

Reay, L.

Effingham, E.

Renton, L.

Elles, B.

Rodney, L.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly.

Errol of Hale, L.

Selkirk, E.

Faithfull, B.

Shaughnessy, L.

Flather, B.

Skelmersdale, L.

Fraser of Carmyllie, L.

Stanley of Alderley, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Strange, B.

Gainford, L.

Strathmore and Kinghorne, E

Gainsborough, E.

Strathspey, L.

Gray of Contin, L.

Sudeley, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Swansea, L.

Terrington, L.

Henley, L.

Thomas of Gwydir, L.

Hesketh, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Hives, L.

Trumpington, B.

Hood, V.

Ullswater, V.

Hooper, B.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Howe, E.

Waddington, L.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Wade of Chorlton, L.

Jeffreys, L.

Westbury, L.

Killearn, L.

Whitelaw, V.

Kimball, L.

Wolfson, L.

King of Wartnaby, L.

Wynford, L.

Kinloss, Ly.

Young, B.

Knollys, V.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addington, L.

Broadbridge, L.

Airedale, L.

Bruce of Donington, L.

Ardwick, L.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Aylestone, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Blackstone, B.

Clinton-Davis, L.

901

Cocks of Hartcliffe, L.

Lockwood, B.

David, B.

Longford, E.

Dean of Beswick, L.

McIntosh of Haringey, L.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

McNair, L.

Dormand of Easington, L.

Mason of Barnsley, L.

Ennals, L.

Mishcon, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Molloy, L.

Ezra, L.

Morris of Castle Morris, L.

Falkland, V.

Nicol, B.

Gallacher, L. [Teller.]

Northfield, L.

Galpern, L.

Phillips, B.

Gladwyn, L.

Richard, L.

Graham of Edmonton, L. [Teller.]

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Ross of Newport, L.

Grey, E.

Sainsbury, L.

Grimond, L.

Seear, B.

Hampton, L.

Serota, B.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Shepherd, L.

Hayter, L.

Soper, L.

Hirshfield, L.

Stedman, B.

Hollis of Heigham, B.

Stoddart of Swindon, L.

Houghton of Sowerby, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Hughes, L.

Taylor of Gryfe, L.

Jeger, B.

Tordoff, L.

Jenkins of Hillhead, L.

Turner of Camden, B.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Underhill, L.

Kearton, L.

White, B.

Kilbracken, L.

Williams of Elvel, L.

Leatherland, L.

Winchilsea and Nottingham, E

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Winterbottom, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and clause agreed to accordingly.
4.12 p.m.
Schedule 4 [Simplified Planning Zones]:
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 224:
Page 90, line 32, after ("prescribed") insert ("or as the Secretary of State may, in a particular case, direct").
The noble Baroness said: I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 225, 226, 227, 229A and 272. Amendments Nos. 224 to 227 introduce some minor consequential changes to Schedule 4 which simplify and improve procedures for the preparation, adoption and alteration of SPZs in England and Wales.
The purposes of Amendments Nos. 229A and 272 are to introduce a new clause and schedule making provision for SPZs in Scotland in equivalent terms to those for England and Wales in Clause 23 and Schedule 4. I beg to move.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I realise that the Minister is helping the Committee by moving rapidly through the business, but although we have taken a decision on the principle that we are not opposed to Schedule 4 or Clause 23, we should not let significant amendments to Schedule 4 go through without question. I refer in particular to Amendment No. 226. It is difficult to interpret the amendments because they are amendments to a principal Act and we have to look back not just to the Bill but to the principal Act.
My understanding of Amendment No. 226 is that it strengthens the Secretary of State's existing power to direct local planning authorities which are thought to be out of line in producing their SPZs. We do not need to go into the principle of SPZs all over again, but surely the only acceptable justification for SPZs is that they are produced by agreement between the local planning authority and potential developers. If the Secretary of State is to have strengthened powers to direct local authorities—in other words, in effect to
902
have the possibility of overruling local authorities and imposing SPZs, where there will be reduced rights of public consultation on planning applications—that surely is a further step in a dangerous direction, and one that should be opposed.
Baroness Blatch: Amendment No. 226 introduces a new sub-paragraph to paragraph 7 of Schedule 4 which modifies the provisions of paragraph 9(1) of Schedule 7 to the 1990 Act for the adoption of SPZ proposals. Paragraph 9(3) of that schedule empowers the Secretary of State to direct an authority:
"to consider modifying the proposals",
to such an extent as may be specified in the direction before adopting them. Amendment No. 226 clarifies that position by deleting the word "consider". That is in line with similar amendments proposed in relation to the adoption of UDPs and local plans.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: The Minister has been helpful in clarifying the amendment, but what it says more clearly now is that the Secretary of State can direct a local planning authority to modify its proposals for SPZs. In other words, he is taking away that last vestige of responsibility of the local planning authority in the designation of SPZs. I am bound to say that I find that unacceptable. If it had been spelt out clearly at the beginning, I believe that other Members of the Committee would also have found it unacceptable. As we have taken a decision on a vote on the principle of Schedule 4, it is probably not appropriate to divide the Committee, but that was an unsatisfactory answer to an unsatisfactory amendment.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 225, 226 and 227:
Page 92, line 8, leave out ("For paragraph 9(1)") and insert (" (1) In paragraph 9 for sub-paragraph (1)").
Page 92, line 14, at end insert:
("(2) In sub-paragraph (3) of that paragraph for "consider modifying" there is substituted "modify".").
Page 92, line 29, leave out ("13(2)(e)") and insert ("13(2)—
(a) after paragraph (b) there is inserted—
"(bb) make provision with respect to the circumstances in which representations with respect to the matters to be included in such a scheme or proposals for its alteration are to be treated, for the purposes of this Schedule, as being objections made in accordance with regulations;" and
(b) in paragraph (e)").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 41 [Power to remove or obliterate placards and posters]:
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 228:
Page 51, line 32, at end insert:
("(6) Any person duly authorised in writing by the planning authority may at any reasonable time enter any land for the purpose of exercising a power conferred by this section if—

(a) the land is unoccupied; and

(b) it would be impossible to exercise the power without entering the land.").

The noble and learned Lord said: Amendment No. 228 is necessary because of the deletion of Clause 36 where an equivalent provision was originally located. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 41, as amended, agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 229:
After Clause 41, insert the following new clause:
Listed buildings, conservation areas and hazardous substances
(". Schedule (listed buildings, conservation areas and hazardous substances: Scotland) to this Act, which makes amendments to the 1972 Act in respect of listed buildings, conservation areas and hazardous substances, shall have effect.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 229A:
After Clause 41, insert the following new clause:
Simplified planning zones
(".Schedule (Simplified planning zones -Scotland) to this Act which—

(a) modifies the procedure for making simplified planning zones, and

(b) makes minor and consequential amendments to Schedule 6A to the 1972 Act,

shall have effect.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 24 [Orders as to costs where right to be heard exercised]:
The Chairman of Committees: If Amendment No. 230 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 231.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 230:
Page 30, leave out lines 9 to 14 and insert:
("; and
(c) the development the subject of the decision is a minor development.
(2) Such an order shall specify that the costs incurred by the party teat requested a local inquiry or hearing shall exclude those costs relating to the preparation for and conduct of the inquiry which would not have been incurred had the case been resolved by written representations if—

(a) a local inquiry or a hearing is held at the request of either the person concerned or the local planning authority; and

(b) the other principal party has expressed in writing a desire for the case to be decided by written representations rather than a local inquiry or hearing; and

(c) an order is made under subsection (1) in favour of the party that requested a local inquiry or hearing." ").

The noble Lord said: I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 230 and 233. I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Stanley, might feel it appropriate if we were to deal with Amendment No. 231 at the same time ince his amendment could not be moved if Amendment No. 230 was carried. All the amendments relate to the same subject, as does the Motion in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, and the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, who intend to oppose the Question that Clause 24 stand part of the Bill. Although there will inevitably be a second debate on that matter, it may well be that it could be curtailed if we were to deal in one debate with the principle of Clause 24 as well as the amendments. Clause 24 relates
904
to costs where someone who has the right to insist upon a public inquiry does so and, in the words of Clause 24, does so "unreasonably".
We have had the benefit of a press release and a lengthy consultation document from the Department of the Environment published on 11th January. I am sure that all Members of the Committee have read every word of that press release and consultation document with devout attention. It is clearly a difficult matter. On the one hand, there is the problem that public inquiries are time-consuming and expensive and detract from the ability of the planning process to achieve justice quickly. On the other hand, there are the rights of those who wish, and need, to participate in planning inquiries and who should not feel inhibited from demanding a public inquiry.
Some people for whom I have a lot of respect feel that the principle of ordering costs against those who insist unreasonably on a planning inquiry is wrong. I refer in particular to Justice, the British section of the International Commission of Jurists, whose views on most matters I respect profoundly. I understand that a number of professional organisations also take that view, and I suppose that that is the view behind the proposal that Clause 24 should not stand part of the Bill.
I have to say from the outset that our approach is to seek to amend Clause 24 rather than to take it out of the Bill. We shall seek to propose and to argue for our amendments, but whether or not the clause is amended I do not think we shall be following into the Division Lobby those who wish to take out Clause 24 as a whole. I shall deal with the individual amendments and try to avoid casting more gloom on the already complex subject of orders as to costs.
Amendments Nos. 230 and 233 seek to limit the scope of Clause 24 to cases of minor development. Amendment No. 230 specifies the conditions under which a decision about a minor development shall be taken at a local inquiry and the way in which costs shall be provided for. Amendment No. 233 adopts as a definition of "minor development" the same terms as those used by the Chief Planning Inspector to distinguish categories of minor developments and major developments in his annual report. I am not aware that there has ever been any difficulty about that distinction. I suggest that it is useful to try to ensure that in imposing the conditions of Clause 24 they should be restricted to those developments which are necessary. I stress that it is not our intention in moving Amendments Nos. 230 and 233 to rescind the clause as a whole. Some people have formed that view, but these are not intended to be wrecking amendments.
We are looking for the achievement of a rule that a party which insists on an inquiry can claim only for the costs that would have been incurred if the matter had been dealt with by written representations. It will be seen by looking at the annual report of the Chief Planning Inspector that it is relatively rare for decisions to be issued by the Secretary of State contrary to the inspector's recommendations and that 90 per cent. of appeals are in the minor category and 10 per cent. only in the major category. So

905
Amendments Nos. 230 and 233 are relatively modest and I hope will find approval with the Government and with the Committee.
Amendment No. 232 is perhaps even more modest. It deals with the specific case of an appeal or grounds of refusal being withdrawn late in the planning appeal process but before the actual inquiry takes place. At present, subsection (3) of Clause 24 deals with withdrawal of an appeal by a prospective developer and refers to the case of a local inquiry being cancelled. Subsection (4) deals with the withdrawal of grounds of refusal and does not refer to whether the inquiry was cancelled.
It could be that Clause 24 means that "the person concerned" includes a local planning authority. We have the curious fact that the word "person" in legislation does not mean what it means in real life. Just as the Secretary of State is always called "he", so even a local planning authority or a company can be called "the person". This seems as remote from everyday speech as some of the alternatives which I have proposed to the way in which we address the Secretary of State.
Lord Renton: It might interest the noble Lord and other noble Lords to know that in law a person is not necessarily human.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: The noble Lord has expressed much more concisely and vividly what I was trying to say in my roundabout way. The point behind Amendment No. 232 is still valid. In this amendment we are trying to allow the reimbursement of abortive expenditure incurred either by the local planning authority or by the developers when the other side, at a late stage but before the opening of the inquiry, causes the cancellation of an inquiry or hearing. As we understand it, the present situation is that costs can be reimbursed only if the inquiry has been opened. We are seeking to secure that they can be reimbursed if the process of the public inquiry is aborted before it actually opens. This seems to be a relatively non-controversial matter and I very much hope that it will find favour with the Government even if our other amendments do not.
Amendment No. 231 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stanley, would seek to replace the word "unreasonable" by "vexatious". I am very fond of the word "vexatious", which rolls round the tongue beautifully, but I am impressed by the detail into which the Government have gone in describing the definitions that there could be of unreasonable behaviour. I was forcibly struck by the fact that the first example they gave of unreasonable behaviour was that of multiple applications or duplicate applications, with which we have dealt in earlier consideration of the Bill, where a new application is the same or substantially the same as the previous one. Here it is being said that there could be costs against an applicant who insists on a public inquiry for an application which is the same or substantially the same as a previous one. That is the clearest and most dramatic example, but in the Department of the Environment's consultation paper there are other
906
examples of unreasonable applications and unreasonable insistence on a public inquiry. This makes me feel that on balance it is better to seek to amend Clause 24 in the way we have proposed rather than to take it out as a whole. I beg to move.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: I think it would be for the convenience of the Committee if I speak to Amendment No. 231. In doing so, I have to say that I very much dislike the whole clause, and considerably more than the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, disliked it. I should prefer to follow the advice given to a young guardsman: "If it moves, shoot it; if it doesn't, paint it". I should prefer to paint out the whole clause.
The threat of costs is bound to deter some applicants from exercising their right to be heard. Such a right should be available to all because applicants should have the opportunity to cross-examine local planning officers on how they have applied planning policy. That is not possible in the case of written representations. Certain applicants find it easier to present their case in person rather than in writing, in particular those who are unfamiliar with the planning system, which is highly complex, or who cannot afford professional representation. Many people, particularly the small and relatively inarticulate applicant, do not express themselves well on paper.
The choice of how to appeal has a significant influence on the chances of success. I believe the department's figures show that an appeal is statistically more likely to succeed if the applicant opts for an informal hearing. His chances are even further improved if he appeals by way of a public inquiry. The Government's consultation paper states that it may be unreasonable for applicants in "minor" applications to exercise their right to be heard. However, that statement ignores the definition of "minor". For a council house dweller a small garden shed is no more minor than, say, a new orangery for a Member of the Committee. It is difficult to define "minor". I see that the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, is puzzled. I shall explain what I mean to him afterwards. Seriously, it is difficult to define what different people mean by the term "minor". All things in life are relative.
As I have said, I dislike the clause intensely. However, if the Government insist on retaining it, I suggest that they accept my Amendment No. 231, which would allow costs to be awarded only if the applicant had acted vexatiously. I do not intend to define "unreasonable". I believe the noble Lord the Chief Whip could better define that word. However, there is a precedent for the use of "vexatiously" in Section 5 of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1954.
4.30 p.m.
Lord Renton: I have only one comment to make about this whole matter, including the contents of Clause 24 which is that the costs will be awarded at the discretion of the Secretary of State or the inspector holding the inquiry. They do not follow the event.

907
Therefore in cases of hardship a discretion can be exercisx1 not to award costs at all. One should bear that in mind.
Perhaps another factor to bear in mind is that until about 30 years ago the only judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals in whose jurisdiction costs could be awarded at all were the ordinary courts of law from the House of Lords' Judicial Committee right down to the magistrates' courts. There was a wide power to award costs throughout those courts. But the extension of costs to tribunals of one kind and another is something which has gained momentum over recent years, and rightly so in my opinion. Otherwise people would not have the opportunity of taking advantage of the rights which Parliament has given in Acts of Parliament.
This question of the award of costs works both ways as a rule. However, there is one instance in this clause where it will not work both ways and it goes against the individual. That is the point which my noble friend Lord Stanley of Alderley quite rightly has in mind and to which he has drawn the attention of the Committee. We should realise that the provision is discretionary and that that is in the interests of justice in a broader sense.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I am always interested in what the noble Lord says about the development of the law and legal practice. He has already told us that a person need not be human. Is he now telling us that a Secretary of State need not be human?
Lord Renton: No, I am saying nothing of the kind.
Lord Ross of Newport: I was rather reassured by the Government's paper on this matter which I believe was issued about two or three weeks ago. I remember conducting a planning appeal for a client whose next door neighbour was a deputy clerk of the county council concerned with the appeal. Halfway through the proceedings he walked through the door and demanded to give evidence. He also demanded costs. That frightened me to death. We had a perfectly valid planning appeal but just because the deputy clerk lived next door to the applicant and was a legal luminary, he put the idea into the mind of the inspector that the case should be found against us and that costs should be awarded against us. That factor worried me intensely, although, fortunately, costs were not awarded against us.
I like the term "vexatious". I have also sat on agricultural tribunals. At one hearing a landlord was trying to impose an enormous rental increase on a tenant. The landlord was totally out of court and the whole thing fell apart at the arbitration stage. That landlord should have had costs awarded against him as he was vexatious. The term covers that situation precisely. I feel strongly that we should write the word into the Bill. I do not believe the Government have any evil intent in mind as regards this matter. I believe there is a case for costs, as I have said in earlier debates on the Bill. However, this is a tricky area where things can easily go wrong.
Lord Norrie: I wish to support Amendments Nos. 230 and 232. I support Amendment No. 230 because
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it does not intimidate developers wanting to exercise their right to be heard. I also support Amendment No. 232 because it is a thoroughly reasonable measure to prevent worthless appeals. It will prevent developers wasting the time and money of local authorities and—this is just as important—of bodies such as the Nature Conservancy Council or even parish councils. There is a slender chance that it may also apply to late withdrawals by local authorities. At present amenity and conservation bodies can spend hours raising precious fighting funds, and can waste thousands of pounds on expert advice, and then lose it all if an appeal is withdrawn before the public inquiry opens. That cannot be right.
Lord Coleraine: I was interested to hear the explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, of his Amendment No. 230. If I understood him correctly, he said that the small man who is perhaps appealing against the refusal of permission to erect one house should be subject to the cost regime, but that the large developer developing a large estate will be treated on a different basis. Those remarks surprise me coming from the Benches opposite. It is particularly important that a small man should feel that he has been fairly treated when he makes an appeal. From my limited experience of planning appeals I feel that the value of a hearing lies in the fact that an inspector should go out of his way to understand what the appellant is saying and should make it quite clear that he understands. If that is done, the appellant, even if he loses his case, will come away with a strong sense of having been treated fairly. However, he will not feel he has been treated fairly if he has to proceed by the written representations procedure. We must start off with a strong predilection in favour of the oral hearing for the small applicant.
Amendment No. 230 suggests separating unnecessary costs, which would not have been incurred if the written representations procedure had been followed, from those which would have been incurred in any event if the written representations procedure had been followed. The matter of costs is a most difficult part of the planning procedure, as one is sent to the courts to settle costs after everything else is over. Costs take a long time to be settled. The advice I have received from the Law Society is that it would be difficult to separate costs in the way that the noble Lord's amendment seeks to do. I hope, on reflection, he will consider there was some merit in suggesting that the whole clause should be taken away.
My noble friend's amendment suggests that "vexatious" should replace "unreasonable". I believe that "vexatious" has no real meaning in this context. Appeals may be conducted vexatiously as well as unreasonably. In such cases there are already powers to award costs. However, I very much doubt whether there is any meaning in suggesting that the decision to go to oral hearing rather than making written representation is one that is taken vexatiously. If there is any meaning in it I very much doubt whether it would ever apply. I hope that my noble friend will be even more persuaded that the clause should be taken out of the Bill altogether.

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The Law Society considers the right of appeal by way of a hearing to be of fundamental importance to anyone involved in the planning process. I do not argue that appeals should be conducted vexatiously, unreasonably or improperly. The existing cost regime already covers that aspect. However, I submit that the right of the applicant to a hearing before an inspector should not be fettered in any way by the possibility that his choice of method of obtaining his hearing may of itself result in his being ordered to pay the planning authority's costs. That could occur irrespective of the merits of the appeal or whether the appeal has been conducted reasonably.
Behind the proposed change in procedure is a desire to cut down the number of planning hearings and inquiries. The department makes that clear both by its words and by its deeds. It does so by its words because the consultation paper speaks of bringing greater discipline to appeal proceedings and of instilling a greater awareness of the resource implications of holding a public inquiry or public hearing. Those are described in the consultation paper as the main purposes of Clause 24.
It is clear from its deeds that that is what the department intends because I am advised that it is not necessary to introduce Clause 24 in order to bring about change. The possibility of costs being awarded on that ground already exists in statute. I am advised that all that is necessary is to delete paragraph 24 of departmental Circular 2/87 which deals with costs in relation to planning appeals. The paragraph provides that costs will not now be awarded simply because one of the parties to an appeal has asked for a hearing.
The effect of Clause 24 is insidious because it throws particular emphasis on the aspect of costs. It is bound to have the effect of frightening potential appellants and deterring them from appealing by way of oral hearing.
In the interests of natural justice, as paragraph 11 of the consultation paper puts it, the department is to introduce an early warning system. The department will send early warning letters to make clear to each applicant who asks for an oral hearing that he runs the risk of an award of costs. It is right that appellants should be aware that they run the risk of an award of costs, but that they should be specifically warned of that risk in a letter which can only be termed a "frightener" is hardly conducive to the broader interests of natural justice. It is invidious that Clause 24 is itself against the interests of natural justice because it reduces the rights of appellants to pursue their right to an appeal.
There are other objections which can be made to the proposal. First, there is often no way of knowing until the appeal has been decided whether or not it was reasonable for there to have been an oral hearing. Secondly, a successful applicant will run the risk of an order for costs if it is found that he could have been as successful if he had relied on written representation. That is neither fair nor reasonable.
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I hope that the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, will consider that the clause needs further consideration than is provided by his amendments.
Lord Wade of Chorlton: I should like to support my noble friend Lord Coleraine on this issue. Although no one wishes more than I do to see the planning process speeded up, I believe that it would be very wrong to take away the rights of those who do not have resources. As my noble friend so rightly said, the effect would be to frighten away those who ought to have as much opportunity as anyone else to make their views known. Therefore I hope that on this issue the Government will consider very seriously the points raised by my noble friend and look at the matter again.
4.45 p.m.
The Earl of Lytton: I have given notice that I intend to oppose the Motion that Clause 24 stand part of the Bill. It may be for the convenience of the Committee if I speak to that point now rather than later bearing in mind what has been said and the ground that has been covered.
I should like to assure the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, that it is not my intention on this clause to stir him from his seat. He will be able to sit quietly and listen without the threat of my dividing the Committee. That is not my intention. I am interested only in hearing the Government's reasoned response or persuading them that there is no reasoned response that they can give.
There is no doubt in my mind that Clause 24 as currently drafted represents a threat in the sense that the test of reasonableness or unreasonableness is highly subjective and may not be apparent until an appeal has been dealt with. That is an impossible position in which to place an appellant. He needs to have some idea of where he will stand.
As already mentioned, the right to explain oneself to the best of one's ability and to make the best case is an integral part of natural justice. The facility to examine and cross-examine the parties to an appeal is a very significant factor in adducing relevant information.
The DoE's own Circular 2/87 states that,
"costs will not be awarded simply because one of the parties to an appeal has asked for an oral hearing. The exercise of that right will not be regarded as unreasonable conduct even if the appeal could have been adequately dealt with by written representation".
Obviously something has happened to change the Government's view. Clause 24 represents a very significant departure from that statement. The passage of time since the publication of the circular is not sufficient for those circumstances to have been totally altered.
It is not for me to say whether the question of grossly unreasonable behaviour—or vexatious behaviour, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Stanley—is an appropriate alternative. However, it is my understanding that there is already provision for costs to be awarded against an unreasonable appellant. Those powers are rarely used, possibly because of the difficulty of interpretation. It would be more

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appropriate to adapt the existing powers rather than to introduce another provision such as that provided by Clause 24 of the Bill, which will be a clear disincentive to an appellant.
Many appellants are ordinary people. They may be householders; they may be responsible for small businesses. In broader national terms or in terms of major developments their affairs may not be considered particularly important. However, to the appellants themselves they are of crucial importance, as the noble Lord, Lord Stanley, pointed out. The clause acts as a significant deterrent to the perfectly legitimate pursuit of their aims and objectives.
It cannot have escaped the attention of the Committee—I am sure many Members have greater knowledge of this than I —that the chances of winning an appeal at an oral hearing are considerably greater statistically than when written representations are relied on. This is probably due to several contradictory factors. But I think that when people elect to have a formal hearing they do not do so frivolously because, if nothing else, they have to bear their own costs. Unless there is an award of costs in their favour they will be saddled with their own costs. Those costs can be very significant in terms of the professional fees and everything else which may be involved. In case the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, should pick me up on this, I can safely say that I do not have to declare an interest because I do not get involved directly with planning appeals, although I advise people professionally on planning matters.
I consider there are areas in which Clause 24 is fatally flawed, because it militates against the principles of natural justice and fair dealing, and this Chamber has always been known for protecting those principles. Because of its deterrent nature I believe that the Committee cannot accept that this clause shall stand part of the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, made the point that there appears to be no provision for the automatic exoneration from costs of the successful appellant. An individual may elect to go to appeal and to have the matter dealt with by formal hearing because he has received an adverse decision from the local planning authority and feels that the only way of getting at the reasons behind the decision is by means of a formal hearing so that the planning officer and others can be examined on the nature of the planning authority's policy. If he is successful in his appeal, how can one square the decision that in planning terms his case was justified with the possibility that costs may ultimately be awarded against him? That is simply not acceptable. I must press the Minister strongly on this point. If believe Clause 24 is not a proper provision. There are provisions elsewhere in legislation which should be used, not the present Bill.
Baroness Blatch: The amendments of the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh (Nos. 230, 232 and 233) would make substantive changes to the new Section 322A. First, by adding a new paragraph (c) in Section 322A(1), Amendment No. 230 would restrict the exercise of the Secretary of State's power to award costs it those cases involving what is termed "minor
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development" as that expression is used in the Chief Planning Inspector's report. Secondly, it would remove the discretion currently in Clause 24 to award costs where the party's request to be heard was regarded as unreasonable. This power would be replaced by provisions which would restrict the amount of costs which could be awarded to a party who asked to be heard when the other party would have preferred the written representations procedure. The amount of costs would be limited by excluding the preparation and inquiry costs of the inquiry which the party would have incurred by being heard instead of using the written representations procedure.
Amendment No. 232 would provide (by subsection (3)) a power to award costs where a local inquiry was cancelled by the appellant after notification had been given of its scheduled starting date. This would be complemented by a power (in subsection (4)) to require the local planning authority which withdrew a ground of refusal of planning permission after notification has been given of the opening date of the inquiry to pay the other appeal party's preparation costs as regards contesting that ground of refusal.
We recognise that these amendments are based on recommendations in the National Housing and Town Planning Council's recently published report entitled Costs Awards at Planning Appeals. We have studied the report and considered the amendments very carefully.
We appreciate that the purpose of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) in the proposed subsection (2) is to limit an award of costs in inquiry cases where the party against whom costs are awarded did not wish an inquiry to be held. At first sight, this may appear acceptable, but it begs the question which Clause 24 seeks to address—namely, whether the request to be heard was reasonable. We also think that the proposed restriction of this new power to cases involving only minor development is undesirable on the grounds of policy. While we accept that major development often involves complex issues which should be examined at an inquiry, it may sometimes turn on straightforward planning grounds, or it may even have been the subject of a previous local inquiry.
In those circumstances, we think that the exercise of the proposed new power when a principal appeal party requests to be heard should not depend on the scale of the development. Since other parties in a major inquiry may have had to incur very substantial expenditure as a result of one party's unreasonable insistence on being heard, we feel that this part of the amendment cannot be justified on policy grounds. Indeed, the power might be especially apt in a major inquiry. I therefore hope that the noble Lord may agree not to pursue this part of the amendment and the associated definition of "minor development" in the proposed subsection (4).
The second part of Amendment No. 230 would leave out subsection (2) of the new Section 322A(2) so that the Secretary of State would not be enabled to award costs in cases where he considered, at the conclusion of the proceedings, that a party's request to be heard was unreasonable. In its place, Amendment No. 230 would effectively impose a statutory

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limitation on the quantum (or amount) of awardable costs in specified circumstances. The amendment no longer provides for an award of costs to be made simply for unreasonably requesting to be heard as Clause 24 proposes. Because the amendment would completely alter the purpose of the clause, we cannot accept it.
Amendment No. 232 would insert new subsections (3) and (4) into new Section 322A. These would provide for an award of preparation and inquiry costs in the event of an inquiry's cancellation, or abortive work caused by late withdrawal of an appeal or grounds of refusal. We understand the reason for these amendments. It is right that appeal parties who are found to have caused others to incur unnecessary expense in preparing for cancelled inquiries (as a result of late withdrawal of the appeal), or inquiries curtailed in scope (because of late revision of evidence), should have to pay those abortive costs. But we should like an opportunity to consider more thoroughly the drafting and substance of subsections (3) and (4). For instance, they take no account of inquiries necessarily cancelled without any specific request or action by the person concerned because the planning authority has withdrawn an enforcement notice, or an advertisement discontinuance notice, which leaves no appeal issues to be determined. If these problems can be satisfactorily resolved we may be able to table an amendment acceptable to the noble Lord at a later stage of the Bill. On this understanding, I hope the noble Lord will not press his amendment.
The amendment of my noble friend Lord Stanley (No. 231), would effectively restrict the scope for awarding costs in accordance with the new Section 322A to those cases where a party's insistence on being heard was considered vexatious rather than unreasonable. A narrower test of unreasonableness in this context goes wider, as can be seen from the current policy guidance in my department's Circular 2/87. To narrow the scope of new Section 322A in this way runs counter to the Government's aim in introducing these provisions, which is to instil a greater sense of discipline in planning proceedings by extending the criteria of reasonableness to requests to be heard.
Much has been said about the "What's in a word?" syndrome, as I would like to call it, in relation to "unreasonable", "vexatious" or whatever. I welcome the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, who described how difficult it was to find an appropriate definition in these circumstances. I understand that before DoE Circular 2/87 was issued the relevant policy statement (in Ministry of Housing and Local Government Circular 73/65) referred to circumstances where a party behaves unreasonably, vexatiously or frivolously. In 1987 the view was taken, in revising the policy guidance in the earlier circular, that vexatious or frivolous conduct might also be unreasonable. Consequently, the term unreasonable was regarded as sufficient in this context. We are very reluctant to revert to the previous criterion, which has now been effectively superseded.
The basis on which we propose to exercise this new power has been set out in a DoE and Welsh Office
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consultation paper issued on 11th January 1991. I welcome the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Ross, about that consultation paper. A copy of the paper has been placed in the Library of the House.
Examples of unreasonable insistence on the right to be heard are given in that paper. These examples will help to make clear why we do not consider it appropriate to restrict the circumstances in which the power may be exercised only to those cases which could be defined as "vexatious" rather than to the wider range of cases which are considered "unreasonable".
I understand the reservations that have been expressed about Clause 24. First it is said that many appellants who legitimately want an inquiry into their appeal will be deterred by the threat of costs from asking for one. We accept that the majority of people who ask for an inquiry are justified in their request. We are not concerned in this clause with the reasonably minded majority. If this clause is enacted, we would make it absolutely clear in publicly stated policy guidance that the provisions are not a deterrent and will not be used as such. We have already given a clear indication in my department's consultation paper issued on 11th January of how the proposed new discretionary power would be exercised. We shall consider the comments from the wide range of organisations that are now being consulted.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: My noble friend has lost me completely. If she says that in the consultation paper they will make it quite clear that this clause is not there as a deterrent, what is the point of having the clause?
5 p.m.
Baroness Blatch: The point of having the clause is that in rare cases behaviour is unreasonable, vexatious or frivolous. It is a long stop to make sure that those cases are addressed. I emphasise our concern not to put any inexperienced or unrepresented appellants at a disadvantage when an inquiry or hearing is plainly justified for their appeal, not least in enforcement appeals.
The concerns expressed by all Members of the Committee in the course of the debate reflect similar concerns expressed by the Council on Tribunals, the Local Government and Planning Bar Association and the Law Society. We recognise that these are serious concerns which cannot simply be brushed aside. Therefore they must be addressed. To put it very simply, they consider that someone who believes that his case cannot be properly expressed without an inquiry or hearing must never be deterred from asking to be heard by any threat of a costs award. They have argued their case against the clause eloquently and sympathetically.
I should like to take the opportunity between now and Report stage of the Bill to consider most carefully in consultation with my ministerial colleagues all that has been said during the debate on this clause. I should also like to look again at the written submissions which the Council on Tribunals and the organisations representing the legal professions have made to me

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and my ministerial colleagues. I undertake to come back at Report stage with a fully considered reply about the Government's intentions for this clause.
In the light of that promised consideration between now and Report stage, I hope that the amendments will not be pressed and that the Committee will allow this clause to stand part of the Bill.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: We have had a most constructive and thoughtful debate on this clause and these amendments. I am particularly grateful to those noble Lords who pointed out the flaws in the thinking as well as the drafting in my Amendments Nos. 230 and 232. Certainly I should not have wished—the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, recognised this—to discriminate against small applicants for the sake of doing so. I was concerned to reduce the number of occasions on which a quite unnecessary inquiry is undertaken—unnecessary because the subject matter itself is so straightforward.
Paragraph 9 of the consultation paper of January this year makes that clear. Apart from the duplicate applications, the examples that it gives include those where there is a relatively minor material change of use, where there is no appeal on legal grounds or planning policy, where there is little third party interest and where the appellant is professionally represented. Under those circumstances I think that I was probably ill advised to go in for the concept of a minor application as opposed to the more useful definitions which the department put forward in its consultation paper. On these Benches we all have our own orangeries, so we shall certainly not agree that an orangery is a minor application; no more would I agree that my wife's hat in her garden shed on her allotment is a major application. That points to the difficulty that lies in making a distinction of that kind.
I shall beg leave to withdraw Amendments Nos. 230 and 233 without any qualms and certainly I do not propose to come back to them in that form. I am grateful to the Minister for what she said about Amendment No. 232, which received a friendly reception from her. I accept that there could be drafting implications and I should be pleased to discuss them with her before the next stage of the Bill. I believe that we could come forward with a form of words which would meet our requirements and those of the Government and which could make a significant improvement to the Bill. However, I revert to the conclusion to which I came at the beginning; namely, that on balance Clause 24 certainly deserves further consideration, but not further consideration by being taken out of the Bill at this stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Stanley of Alderley Lord Stanley of Alderley moved Amendment No. 231:
Page 30, line 14, leave out ("unreasonable") and insert ("vexatious").
The noble Lord said: I should just like to add that I am advised that the word "vexatious" in this context is used to mean that someone is abusing the procedures of the tribunal regardless of the merits of his case. I hope that that clears the point certainly for
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my noble friend on the Front Bench, if not for me. As it does not clear the matter for me, I should prefer to remove the clause.
Lord Renton: I am sure that we are grateful to my noble friend Lord Stanley for the precision with which he has enlightened us about the meaning of the word "vexatious". However, I should point out—it is relevant in the context of this clause—that "vexatious" has a very much narrower effect than "unreasonable". The Minister wants it to have a narrower effect, but I think that we should be conscious of that fact.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: Of course I am conscious of that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 232 and 233 not moved.]
On Question, Whether Clause 24 shall stand part of the Bill?
The Earl of Lytton: I have already spoken to this matter. There is nothing further for me to add other than to thank the Minister for the sympathetic way in which she usually answers the questions that have been raised. My concern remains. There is not very much that can be done with Clause 24 to rectify it. The basic injustice will remain. Clearly it would be churlish of me not to accept her offer to reconsider this matter and come back with further proposals later in the Bill. I look forward to seeing them when she has been able to produce them.
Clause 24 agreed to.
Baroness Nicol Baroness Nicol moved Amendment No. 234:
After Clause 24, insert the following new clause:
("General environmental duties
.—Before section 326 of the principal Act there is inserted—
"General environmental duties.
325A.—(1) It shall be the duty of a local planning authority in formulating or considering any proposals relating to its functions under this Act—

(a) so to exercise its powers in relations to such proposals as to further the conservation and enhancement of natural beauty and the conservation of flora, fauna and geological or physiographical features of special interest;

(b) to have regard to the desirability of protecting and conserving buildings, sites and objects of archaeological, architectural or historic interest; and

(c) to take into account any effect which the proposals would have on the beauty or amenity of any rural or urban area or on any such flora, fauna, features, buildings, sites or objects.

(2) In this section "building" includes a structure." ").
The noble Baroness said: In moving this amendment, with the permission of the Committee I shall speak also to Amendment No. 235 to which my name is added. Both the amendments have the same purpose: namely, to place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State and planning authorities to further conservation and amenity. In both cases that includes historic buildings, archaeological sites and so on. In the case of Amendment No. 235, in addition we should place a duty to further the conservation of energy and natural resources.
The general statutory duty of furthering conservation and amenity would bring local authorities into line with other bodies on which such a duty is laid; for instance, the Forestry Commission in the Wildlife and Countryside (Amendment) Act 1985, the National Rivers Authority in the Water Act 1989, British Coal and private opencast companies in the Electricity Act 1989 and agricultural departments in the Agriculture Act 1986. There are other examples, but I shall not give them.
Under Section 11 of the Countryside Act 1968 and Section 66 of the Countryside (Scotland) Act 1967, local authorities are required to:
"have regard to the desirability of conserving the … countryside".
But that is a weak and ineffective provision. It needs strengthening to meet the greater pressures that exist in 1990.
In our debate on Amendment No. 104 we drew attention to the damage that has been caused to important conservation sites by activities which had planning permission. I shall not repeat the evidence. Many local authorities accept their responsibilities and ensure that sensitive sites are protected. However, many do not, and therefore it is time to impose a mandatory duty to ensure a basic standard of care in line with that already placed on other land use agencies.
The wording of Amendment No. 235 is stronger than that in Amendment No. 234. It requires local authorities to include conditions to mitigate the effects of any authorised processes. That might be a useful requirement. The energy conservation requirement in Amendment No. 235 is consistent with the stand that the Government took in their White Paper. Paragraph 634 states:
"The Government has already asked local authorities to have particular regard to the conservation of energy as an issue in development plans".
The amendment would place that duty firmly where it belongs.
The Government may not be happy with the wording of either amendment. However, in view of the sympathetic response that I received to Amendment No. 150, I hope that the Minister will accept the principle of this amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Norrie: I shall speak to Amendment No. 235. It is unfortunate that this crucial amendment is being dealt with so late in the Committee stage of the Bill. The environment should provide a context within which the whole planning system is conducted. The amendment places a duty on local planning authorities and the Secretary of State to take into account the impact of structure, local plans and planning applications on the countryside, wildlife, amenity and heritage, and to ensure that those interests are furthered and not damaged. As the Committee has heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Nicol, similar duties apply in at least five other Acts concerning the countryside, agriculture, coal, water and electricity.
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The amendment also places a duty on local planning authorities to plan for the conservation of energy and natural resources, such as minerals or water, and to ensure that any grant of planning permission has conditions to minimise the use of energy and other resources. If the planning Bill is to be shaped to meet the new environmental challenges of the 1990s, we must have placed on the face of the Bill a duty to conserve natural resources. This amendment would provide a visible response to widespread public anxiety for the environment. Although planning is one of our key environmental policies the word "environment" does not appear in the legislation.
The amendment would set limits on the nature and scale of change at the level beyond which irretrievable natural resources would be damaged. These limits would be translated into development plan policies and decisions on planning applications and appeals. In essence, the amendment places a duty of stewardship on the local authorities and the Secretary of State. That duty lies at the heart of the recent environment White Paper. I hope that we can see it placed at the centre of the planning system which, after all, is one of the most important ways of implementing environmental policy.
Decisions made by the planning system have a major influence on the amount of energy that we use or the volume of minerals that we consume. Choices about the scale and location of new housing, employment and roads will influence the amount of driving that we shall do, the amount of energy that we shall use to heat our homes and offices, and the types of industries that will be established. Therefore, the way in which we plan new development has a strong bearing on the way in which we use natural resources.
The amendment would place an environmental duty on the authorities in making such important choices. However, it would not put the environment above economic and other anxieties. I wish to assure the Committee about that issue. Planning decisions are already made within an economic framework and the amendment would merely put the environment on a par with economic and other anxieties. At present the Government offer virtually no advice on the way in which local planning authorities should help in the conservation of energy and other resources. I hope that Amendment No. 235 will rectify that situation.
5.15 p.m.
Lord Howie of Troon: I support Amendments Nos. 234 and 235 but I must quibble about them. We have debated amendments of this nature on a number of occasions. On each occasion I argued that it was inadequate to use the words:
"archaeological, architectural or historical interest",
as in subsection (b) of new clause 325A proposed in the amendment. I have argued that we should insert the word "engineering" after the word "architectural". Certain artefacts are principally of engineering interest rather than of architectural or historical interest. They are, nonetheless, important and worthy of preservation.
It was as a result of such previous debates that "building" became defined to include the structure. I

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am pleased that the locution has survived in subsection (2) of Amendment No. 234. However, it is too obscure a locution for simple engineers to follow. They would better understand the situation if the word "engineering" appeared in addition to "architectural" on the fact of the Bill.
I wish to give two brief examples. The first is the iron bridge at Ironbridge. It is a structure and is clearly included in subsection (2) of the amendment. It is of historic interest. Some people might argue that it is of architectural interest—I would not—but most certainly it is of engineering interest for reasons which are not historic nor architectural. Members of the Committee will recall that the iron bridge is a semi-circular arch made of cast iron. Incidentally, it is an unsuitable form for the bridge and it is surprising that it has lasted for so long. The reason is that it has been propped horizontally at the base with reinforced concrete. The point of engineering interest about the bridge is that, structurally, it is a timber-design bridge made of cast iron. Its designer designed a timber bridge and then used cast iron to build it. Therefore, the interest in the bridge is engineering rather than historic or architectural.
I wish to mention two other artefacts also at Ironbridge. There are two beam engines which are, in a sense, historic —if that word means merely that they are old. They are certainly old. I do not believe that there is anything particularly historic about them. The interest in those beam engines is not that they are old but that they are beam engines. They are of engineering rather than historical interest.
I shall not pursue the matter further. I hope that the Government can accept these two amendments in some form. Perhaps they should be cannibalised together. I also hope that the word "engineering" will be slipped in adjacent to the word "architectural". If so, I promise that I shall not raise this matter again.
Lord Montagu of Beaulieu: It may be of interest to the noble Lord that English Heritage covers industrial archaeology. Indeed it recently gave evidence in a planning inquiry which involved the iron bridge. The appeal as regards the building of a new bridge was dismissed by the Secretary of State. I assure the noble Lord that where archaeology is written in, we believe that that includes industrial archaeology.
Lord Howie of Troon: I am grateful to the noble Lord but I am not satisfied with that. I want the inclusion of the word "engineering" because the interest is an engineering interest and not to do with industrial archaeology, worthy though that is.
Lord Renton: I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Howie of Troon, will forgive me if I do not follow him on his rather specialised point on this very important pair of amendments.
To my mind, Amendment No. 235 is the most important amendment tabled to this Bill. With great respect to the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, in whose name the other amendment stands, I prefer Amendment No. 235 because Amendment No. 234
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merely places a duty upon the local planning authorities whereas Amendment No. 235 also places a duty upon the Secretary of State.
It so happens that there are eight precedents in overlapping branches of the law intended to protect the environment in one way or another in which the Secretary of State or another Minister has had that duty imposed upon him. Therefore, if we wish to follow the precedents, we should accept Amendment No. 235 because that places a duty upon the Secretary of State.
After all, the Secretary of State is publicly committed to protecting the environment. As we are dealing with his duties in relation to planning law, surely it is right that we should make it clear that it is the intention of Parliament that, like the local authorities in performing their functions, the Secretary of State should further the conservation and enhancement of natural beauty and the conservation of those various other matters mentioned.
I hope it will not be thought that I am too prejudiced in favour of those precedents when I say that when, in another place, I had the honour of being Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Power as long ago as 1957, I introduced the provision which became the first of those precedents. That was in the Electricity Act 1957.
I do not believe that there is very much more for me to say. However, I believe that my noble friend Lord Norrie—who would have moved the amendment in the first place had it not been grouped with Amendment No. 234—the noble Lord, Lord Ross, and the noble Baroness, Lady Nicol, will agree with me that the drafting of the amendment is capable of improvement because it contains a small degree of repetition which should always be avoided. In view of the great importance of ensuring that the application of our planning law protects the environment to the maximum extent possible, I hope that on this occasion there will be a sympathetic response from my noble friend on the Front Bench.
Lord Ross of Newport: As regards the iron bridge, I found out recently that Abraham Darby was an ancestor of mine. Therefore I hope that extra protection and publicity for which the noble Lord calls will be given.
I am pleased to support Amendment No. 235. It is comprehensive in its application. I cannot believe that it does not attract the Government because it is totally in accord with their current thinking as outlined in the recent White Paper. Therefore I hope that they will accept the amendment or its principle.
Baroness Blatch: Amendments Nos. 234 and 235 would require local planning authorities to take account of a specific range of environmental factors before reaching their decisions on planning matters. I hope to persuade the Committee that these amendments are unnecessary. Authorities are already required to take into account all the issues mentioned in the amendments.
Section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 requires local planning authorities, in

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dealing with planning applications, to have regard to the material provisions of the development plan. That will include policies on environmental matters and all other material considerations. Each of the subjects mentioned in the amendments is likely to constitute a material consideration in many planning applications. They will therefore be taken into account as appropriate under the general planning law.
A number of existing provisions already cover the topics in the amendment. Section 11 of the Countryside Act 1968 requires authorities to,
"have regard to the desirability of conserving the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside".
My department's Circular No. 27 of 1987 explains that this term embraces the conservation of flora, fauna, geological and physiographical features, all of which are mentioned by the amendment.
There are also already statutory provisions in the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 and in the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 protecting buildings of special architectural or historic interest, conservation areas and ancient monuments. These are backed up by detailed guidance in the department's Circular No. 8 of 1987 and in Planning Policy Guidance Note No. 16 which explain how the powers should be used and draw attention to the relevant policy considerations.
Members of the Committee will be aware that we have just agreed to accept amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Nicol, which would introduce a reference to natural beauty and amenity into the general description in the Act of the scope of development plans. I believe that is an appropriate insertion. But to go further, as in these new clauses, would run the risk of distorting a process which must already take all material planning considerations into account.
The relative weight to be given to the factors mentioned in the amendments will be a matter for judgment in each case. Planning guidance issued by my department helps local planning authorities to give proper weight to environmental considerations. The environment White Paper This Common Inheritance affirmed the importance which the Government attach to environmental issues. We are now giving substance to that commitment by preparing several new planning policy guidance notes.
I sympathise with the intentions behind Amendments Nos. 234 and 235. However, I believe that they could both confuse and detract from the arrangements that already exist in the planning system for protecting the environment. County planning officers have pointed out that, although those environmental objectives are important for any planning authority, they are not the only objectives. Any such general duty may need to be balanced by a duty to do with the need for development in appropriate cases.
However, between now and Report stage I shall be happy to discuss these issues in a constructive spirit with my noble friends Lord Renton and Lord Norrie and the noble Lords, Lord McIntosh and Lord Ross. At this stage I hope that the amendments will be
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withdrawn. It will not be easy to arrive at a satisfactory form of words and I remain to be convinced that such a duty would serve a useful purpose. However, in view of the promise which I have given constructively to use the time between now and Report, I hope that these amendments will not be pressed.
5.30 p.m.
Lord Renton: Before the noble Baroness, Lady Nicol, or my noble friend Lord Norrie reply, perhaps I may ask the Minister to clarify one point. When inviting our attention to the various other statutory provisions she mentioned in passing the general development order. A general development order is not primary legislation. It is made under the powers already given by Section 70 of the 1990 Act. It can be varied from time to time. Admittedly, when it is varied it has to be laid before Parliament and my recollection is that it requires an affirmative resolution.
Of the various provisions mentioned by my noble friend that is the only one which applies specifically to all planning matters. The other provisions apply to some planning matters and not to others. Even the provisions of the countryside Act, although they are important and cover a lot of the ground, cannot be said to apply to all planning decisions. Therefore, in the Minister's further thoughts on the matter perhaps she will bear in mind that it is important to have this provision stated in primary legislation and not to have to rely merely on a general development order.
Baroness Blatch: My noble friend is right. I named primary and secondary legislation and guidance notes in the course of addressing the amendment. However, I shall incorporate consideration of those matters in the time between now and Report stage so that we can properly convince all noble Lords that the Bill, when it reaches the statute book, gives proper environmental consideration at all appropriate stages.
Baroness Nicol: Naturally I am a little disappointed that the noble Baroness did not see the need, as we do, to include the amendment in the Bill as it stands. When moving the amendment I drew attention to the existence of the present requirements to have regard to the desirability for conservation; that is not the same as the requirement expressed in Amendments Nos. 234 or 235. They ask that powers should be exercised so as to further conservation. That is a very much stronger provision.
However, perhaps I should explain that the existence of Amendment No. 234 was by accident in that my noble friend and myself were working in parallel on the same objectives. When we found that both amendments had been tabled we thought it would widen the debate to leave them, and so we did.
Perhaps I may also tell my noble friend Lord Howie that I sympathise with him. Although I felt reasonably satisfied with the reply given by the noble Lord, Lord Montagu, I would not wish to see structures such as the ones I love on the Fens—the old pumping stations which are a joy to watch and which can only be called

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engineering—disappear. I would wish to see them protected, and I am sure that there is a wide range of other things which come under that heading.
As usual, the noble Baroness gave a full reply, and in some cases was quite encouraging. I should like to consider her remarks. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Norrie, wishes to move Amendment No. 235, but I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 234.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Norrie Lord Norrie had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 235:
After Clause 24, insert the following new clause:
("General environmental duty
. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State and local planning authorities in discharging any of their functions under this Act to so exercise their powers as to:—

(a) further the conservation and enhancement of natural beauty and the conservation of flora, fauna and geological and physiographical features of special interest and the protection of sites, buildings and objects of architectural, historic or archaeological interest;

(b) further the conservation and efficient use of energy and natural resources; and

(c) ensure, so far as possible, that any authorisation includes such conditions as are required to mitigate any adverse effect which the processes may have on the natural beauty of the countryside or any such flora, fauna, features, sites, buildings, structures or objects and to minimise the use of primary energy sources and natural resources.").

The noble Lord said: I thank the Minister for her invitation to discuss the matter with her, which I look forward to doing. I shall not now move the amendment.
[Amendment No. 235 not moved.]
Lord McIntosh of Haringey Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 235A:
After Clause 24, insert the following new clause:
("Effect of ministerial statements
—.The Secretary of State may by regulation state which types of ministerial statement are material considerations in planning decisions.").
The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 235A is of limited intention and application. It is designed to persuade the Government to make clearer what are the material considerations to be taken into account in making planning decisions. It is fairly well established that planning law does not consist simply of legislation. It consists also of regulations, planning policy guidelines, all sorts of written communications from the Department of the Environment in the form of departmental circulars and statements in Parliament. We have become resigned to the idea that planning law is so complex that it cannot be encompassed entirely in legislation. Some practitioners even take the somewhat cynical view that government policy is that which can be obtained from Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
However, there are occasions when we go a little too far. Such an occasion was brought to my attention by the National Housing and Town Planning Council. In 1985 in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court Mr. Justice Macpherson referred to a speech made by the then Secretary of State for the Environment, now the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of
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Roding —I am sorry that he is not in his place on this occasion —at a dinner of the county planning officers' society on 14th March 1985. He embroidered, not merely politically, but in his capacity as Secretary of State, on some of the content of legislation and development plans.
The judge thought it appropriate to take into consideration that after-dinner speech by the Secretary of State, although in the end he did not reach the conclusion which I suspect the Secretary of State wished him to. The application, which was for office development, had been turned down by the local authority; on appeal the inspector had recommended refusal and that refusal was upheld by the Queen's Bench Division.
We would like to be sure that there is no addition to the long list of matters which have to he taken into account and cannot be ignored if a local planning authority is to behave properly. We want to ensure that it is not an addition to say that consideration should be given to all the ministerial speeches made after dinner at the county planning officers' society or any other organisation, whether affiliated to the Conservative Party or not. I beg to move.
Baroness Blatch: I am not rising to the bait. Since 1948 local planning authorities, when determining planning applications, have been required to have regard to the provisions of the development plan so far as material and to any other material considerations. This formula may seem rather vague and elusive. However, the courts have established that relevant government policy, which is published in a circular or planning policy guidance note, comprises a "material consideration" for planning decisions.
However, other expressions of policy by Ministers are also capable of being material considerations. I believe this should remain the case. The noble Lord's amendment envisages that the Secretary of State would define in advance by regulation which types of ministerial statement could be taken into account in planning decisions. The Government consider that such an approach would be both unduly restrictive and impractical, given the variety of forms which ministerial statements can take. If the regulations were drafted in broad terms there would be no discernible advantage over the present position.
The Government are continuously reviewing and refining aspects of planning policy to reflect changing circumstances and demands. Ideally, new planning policy guidance should be available from HMSO immediately as a circular or PPG but in practice that is not always possible. I hope noble Lords will agree that new policy advice should not be delayed pending an approved vehicle for its dissemination. It is in everyone's interest that it should be announced as soon as it has been formulated. My department will strive to incorporate new policy in a circular or PPG as soon as practicable. Although I entirely understand the noble Lord's wish to make the rules for determining planning applications as clear as possible, I suggest that this amendment amounts to an

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unnecessarily bureaucratic approach which could delay the promulgation of new policy. I hope that he will not press his amendment.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: It is clearly not an amendment to be pressed. I am not sure that I very much like what I have just heard. It sounds to me as though Secretaries of State have complete freedom to make policy on the hoof. They can speak to anyone they like and make a new policy decision. Then the department will endeavour, as soon as possible afterwards, to embody that new policy in a planning policy guideline or circular.
Where does that leave Parliament? I believe that we have some rights in this matter and that there should be at least some lip service to the idea that Parliament is involved in making policy. Ministers, in seeking to give expression to policy, are responsible to Parliament. I am sorry that there was no reference to that in the Minister's reply. Clearly it is not a matter on which I would wish to divide the Committee. I believe that I have uncovered something which does not please me too much. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 25 [Planning compensation repeals]:
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 236:
Page 30, line 34, at end insert:
("(4A) Subsection (1) above shall have effect in relation to any compensation under Part V of the principal Act unless a claim for the compensation has been made in accordance with section 127 of that Act before the repeal of that section comes into force.
(4B) Any amount recoverable under section 133 of that Act which has not been paid, including any interest on any such amount, shall cease to be recoverable and any mortgage, covenant or other obligation by which the payment of any such amount, or interest on it, is secured is discharged.").
The noble and learned Lord said: These are all minor technical amendments consequential on the planning and compensation repeals set out in Clause 25 as they apply to England and Wales and Clause 42 which applies to Scotland. I beg to move.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: For the sake of good order it would be desirable for the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate to say to which amendments he is now speaking. There are some Bills when I require Ministers, in moving amendments that have already been spoken to, to indicate when they were spoken to. I have not done that this time because on the whole the groupings are not too complicated. However, when we start off it should be on record which amendments are being spoken to in this way.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: If we must insist on the matter being dealt with in that way, I am moving Amendment No. 236 and speaking to Amendments Nos. 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 273, 379, 380 and 383.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 237:
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Page 30, line 35, leave out ("the principal") and insert ("that").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 5 [Planning compensation repeals: minor and consequential amendments]:
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 238:
Page 93, line 6, at end insert:
("Gas Act 1965 (c. 36.)
1A. In Schedule 3 to the Gas Act 1965, paragraph 3 is omitted.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
The Earl of Lytton The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 239:
Page 93, leave out lines 7 to 22.
The noble Earl said: I have to make a slight apology as regards this amendment. It relates to a number of matters that will be debated in much more detail later on. In principle the amendment relates to the assumptions as to what the use of the property should be and therefore its value, for the purposes of Part I of the Land Compensation Act 1973. Members of the Committee will be aware that this provision relates to losses in value which arise from the use of public works. It is not their construction but their subsequent use.
There is one fundamental problem with this provision. It relates only to loss as against its existing use value and not against the loss in the open market value. This amendment sets out to remedy that deficiency. It will be more appropriate if I touch on this principle in much more detail later during the debate on matters of compensation. I now wish to speak to Amendment No. 341 which is grouped with Amendment No. 239.
At the risk of confusing the Committee, I can most easily explain this matter by saying that this amendment seeks to redress two separate injustices. The first relates to the provisions of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 where no land is taken. The Committee may be aware that under the interpretation which is generally known as the McCarthy rules (Metropolitan Board of Works v. McCarthy 1874), there is provision for compensation to be claimed by a claimant which is not attributable to land being acquired. It refers to the situation where no land is acquired. There is also a provision that under those rules the loss must be attributable and arising out of the land or an interest directly in it.
This amendment seeks to alter this provision. It is now established in compensation law through other provisions that where a claimant (if he can establish a claim), suffers a loss his loss is by and large his actual loss and not just the loss which arises from that incurred in the value of the land. A typical example would be where a business operation is being carried out and the works which affect the claimant affect not only the value of his land in terms of its rental value or ultimate capital value, but also his business.
The situation was brought into sharp focus recently in a case known to me personally. I was personally

927
involved in trying to advise the claimant. Substantial road building and redevelopment operations were taking place under statutory provision. There was no compensation for the very substantial losses that this claimant suffered. I have to skate over a great deal of detail which is probably relevant as an explanation. It is a highly complicated area of the law.
As regards the case to which I have referred, the McCarthy rules were considered by the House of Lords in 1973 in Argyle Motors (Birkenhead) Ltd v. Birkenhead Corporation. It was held that under the provisions of an earlier Act of 1845, the claimants were not entitled to compensation for the loss of profits.
This amendment goes to the heart of something about which I feel very strongly; namely, that the occupation of land, the running of a business or, for that matter, being a householder in occupation of a dwellinghouse, is not simply a selective amalgamation of various bits of that occupation. It has been recognised in principle concerning residential property that it is a question of the property on the one hand and any disturbance which causes a quantifiable loss on the other. However, in the case of a business the profitability, particularly in the present economic climate, can be balanced on a knife edge. It does not take very much to tip the balance of probability heavily against the business occupier. That might include someone who is quite legitimately operating a business from his own home, and that sort of situation.
This amendment seeks to reverse the decision in the Argyle Motors (Birkenhead) Ltd. case. In doing so it is intended to put the claimant in the same position as he would have been were it not for the particular work that has been carried on. This does not introduce a new category of claimant. It means that someone who is able to claim under the provisions of the McCarthy rules will be exactly the person who can claim under this additional provision. That is what the first part of Amendment No. 341 seeks to achieve.
The second part of it allows for compensation to be paid for depreciation of the market value of the interest and not just for the existing use value. I referred earlier, in connection with Amendment No. 239, to Part I of the Land Compensation Act 1973 and to the claim that would arise from the physical factors arising out of the use of the works. At the moment there are some significant problems. The market value may be represented by something which is not represented by existing use value. It may have a hope value. It may have some value as regards the longer term purposes of that particular claimant. There is no reason why a claimant should not be compensated for those losses. The second part of the amendment seeks to overcome that limitation of the Land Compensation Act.
A corollary to this is intended to extend compensation to any claimant with a legal interest in the land and not just that of an owner occupier. For instance, as I understand it, the moment where there is a landlord/tenant situation neither occupier nor landlord would be in a position to substantiate a claim which an owner occupier would be entitled to make
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and on which he would be entitled to receive compensation. Such an injustice cannot be allowed to continue.
I hope I have not confused the Committee too severely in covering fairly briefly something which is extremely complex and a minefield of inter-reacting pieces of different legislation. I beg to move.
Lord Ross of Newport: The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors was very grateful to the Government for the notice they took of the blue book which the institution published a year or two back. It called for a simplifying and strengthening of the compensation code. I accept that in the Bill the Government have taken a good deal of it on board. The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, who is more capable than I, has just explained one of the areas where we think the Government have still not gone far enough. He outlined a case which was heard by your Lordships' House in its judicial role in 1973 and on which a declaration was made in 1974. I refer to Argyle Motors (Birkenhead) Ltd. v. Birkenhead Corporation which arose because of the reconstruction of the Mersey Tunnel. Several such cases may be arising at the present time because of the major motorway construction schemes going on in this country. I suspect that there will be other cases. In that case the House of Lords disallowed a claim for loss of profits made because of the resulting loss of business. The garage was actually cut off from direct access to the motor car showrooms. Therefore the proprietors of the garage could recover compensation for the loss of business only in so far as it might have depreciated the value of the land. I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, that that seems unjust. It is surely only right that the claimant should be allowed compensation for disturbance and any other matter not directly based on the valuation of the land. I support the amendment.
Baroness Blatch: Amendment No. 239 would remove from the Bill an amendment to Section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 which Amendment No. 341 seeks to repeal. As I shall explain, we do not agree with subsections (1) and (3) of Amendment No. 341, which would have the effect of compensating claimants not only for depreciation in the value of their land but also for disturbance or losses which have no direct connection with that value. I refer to the kind of situation where a highway authority builds a much needed bypass around a town, the result of which is to divert traffic away from a petrol filling station and thereby reduce its trade.
Compensation for injurious affection already takes into account loss of business in so far as it affects the amount of depreciation in the value of the land; this is of course akin to normal land valuation procedure when land is sold on the open market and trade prospects are taken into account. I do not think the law could reasonably go further than that. While some people may be adversely affected by public development in this way, there will be others who gain from the benefits which such development can bring.

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In the bypass example, the improved quality of life created by the bypass might well have a positively beneficial effect on trade for many shops and services.
Subsection (2) of Amendment No. 341 would provide for all tenants, not merely those who own leases with at least three years left to run, to claim compensation for injurious affection relating to the use of public works. In our view this would not be a sensible proposition. The injurious affection provisions are designed to compensate those who own a marketable interest in their property: it would not in our view be practical to bring in those whose tenancy is short-lived and the value of whose interest is likely to give rise to only very small claims for compensation. However, where traffic noise is generated from new or altered roads, such tenants may be eligible for sound insulation, in lieu of compensation.
Finally, I refer to subsection (4) of Amendment No. 341 and with it the paving amendment, Amendment No 239, which I understand the noble Earl intends to withdraw. The effect here would be to remove from the statute book the long-established rule that compensation for injurious affection takes account only of the existing use value of the affected land and disregards any development potential.
This is not an easy issue. On one hand, it can be argued that since the purpose of the injurious affection provisions is to compensate for a fall in the value of land caused by public development, the assessment of value ought properly to take account of any development potential attaching to the property. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that there would in practice be any significant development potential in the great majority of injurious affection cases. Certainly we are not aware of any particular complaints or hardship arising from this aspect of the compensation code.
Given this and the fact that to introduce the concept of development potential into the injurious affection provisions could create an additional layer of legal complexity, we take the view on balance that there is no case for change. While I have some sympathy for the objectives of the amendments, it seems to me that the law already goes just about as far as is reasonable and practicable in compensating those who are adversely affected by public developments.
I hope therefore that when we come to it Amendment No. 341 will not be pressed.
The Earl of Lytton: I thank the noble Baroness for that extremely lucid reply. It is not my intention to press the amendments. I tabled them to find out what the Government's response would be. However, I am not at all satisfied by her response.
The question of losses being limited only to the value of land seems to limit artificially the scope on which compensation should properly be payable and in favour of an acquiring authority. That does not square very easily with my concept of natural justice and fair dealings in terms of the balance between the acquiring authority and claimants. There is a fundamental principle enshrined in compensation law
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that the claimant should be put in the same position, in so far as money or money's worth can make it, as he would have been but for the works which have affected his business. That is generally applied in situations where land is taken.
I have been seeking to encourage the Government to extend that principle further. I know that that has resource implications, and I am strongly of the view that that is the reason for the Minister's response rather than the points which she actually made. In my view the Government are, and should be, in a position to go a great deal further in the matter.
I should like to see an even playing field where claimants are not expected, as happens now, to subsidise the activities of public authorities. I believe that that is what is taking place at present. I shall not press the amendment at this stage. However, I feel very strongly about the matter and propose to return to it at a later stage of the Bill's proceedings. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6 p.m.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendments Nos. 240 to 247:
Page 93, line 31, leave out ("(c)") and insert ("(b)").
Page 93, line 33, leave out ("(c)") and insert ("(b)").
Page 94, line 9, leave out second ("and").
Page 94, line 43, at end insert:
("16A. In section 198(4) (a) (tree preservation orders) "80, 81" is omitted.
16B. In section 220(3) (a) (advertisement regulations) "80, 81" is omitted.
16C. In section 284(3) (validity of orders, etc.) paragraph (c) is omitted.").
Page 95, line 8, at end insert:
("(3) This paragraph does not affect the operation of Schedule 3 to the Planning (Consequential Provisions) Act 1990 in relation to any private interest or Duchy interest (as defined in section 293 of the principal Act).").
Page 95, line 13, at end insert:
("(2) Any amount recoverable under that section, by reason of a notice registered under section 132(1), which has not been paid shall cease to be recoverable.").
Page 95, line 28, at end insert:
("26A. In section 328(1) (settled land, etc.) for "112, 133 or 327" there is substituted "or 112".").
Page 95, line 38, at end insert:
("28A. In Schedule 16 (provisions referred to in sections 314 to 319)—
(a) in Part I for the entry relating to sections 114 and 115 there is substituted—
"Section 115",
(b) in Parts III and VI, the entries relating to Schedule 12 are omitted.").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Schedule 5, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 42 [Repeal of certain compensation provisions of the 1972 Act]:
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendments Nos. 248 and 249:
Page 51, line 35, after ("is") insert ("(with the exception of section 145 (determination of claims))").
Page 51, line 44, at end insert:

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("(6) Schedule (planning compensation repeals -Scotland: minor and consequential amendments) to this Act shall have effect.
(7) Subsection (1) of this section shall have effect in relation to any compensation under Part VII of this Act unless a claim for the compensation has been made in accordance with section 143 of the 1972 Act before the repeal of that section comes into force.
(8) Any amount recoverable under section 148 of the 1972 Act which has not been paid, including any interest on any such amount, shall cease to be recoverable and any security by which the payment of any such amount, or interest on it, is secured is discharged.").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 42, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 26 agreed to.
Lord Montagu of Beaulieu Lord Montagu of Beaulieu moved Amendment No. 250:
After Clause 26, insert the following new clause:
("Power for Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England to bring legal proceedings
. Where the Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England considers it expedient to do so, in relation to works which appear to it to contravene section 7 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, it may prosecute or may appear in legal proceedings and, in the case of civil proceedings, may institute them in its own name.").
The noble Lord said: On Second Reading I raised a number of key points of concern to English Heritage and gave notice that I intended to introduce amendments in Committee. I also said that I hoped the Government would look sympathetically on these amendments and that Members of the Committee would support them. I have reason to believe that my hopes may be realised this afternoon. Amendments Nos. 250 and 251 are not fundamental, but they would certainly help English Heritage to do a better job, which I am sure is the Committee's wish.
Amendment No. 250 relates to the power of English Heritage to bring legal proceedings. As Members of the Committee will be aware, "English Heritage" is the popular title of the Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England set up by the National Heritage Act 1983. One of English Heritage's principal duties laid down by Parliament is to secure the preservation of historic buildings and ancient monuments. I submit that that fact alone should justify giving power to English Heritage to bring legal proceedings in its own name. When English Heritage was first established in 1984 as an independent body, we assumed that the right to initiate legal proceedings was implicit in the nature of the duties imposed upon it. However, after taking legal advice, we discovered that we were wrong in that assumption. The amendment proposed would provide such powers.
The weapons available to English Heritage to defend the built heritage are varied and many; but the absence of this particular weapon from our armoury has proved to be a serious deficiency. The amendment proposed would give English Heritage a power to seek injunctions and a general power to prosecute where it appears that unauthorised and damaging works have been, or are being, carried out to a listed building.
Perhaps I may remind Members of the Committee that such powers are already conferred on local authorities. For its part, English Heritage would seek to exercise the power either jointly in collaboration with a local authority or by itself, as may be necessary on rare occasions, in default of action by a local authority. I hope that neither the scope nor the wording of the amendment as tabled will need adjustment. In the end, I trust that Members on all sides of the Committee would like to be certain that it provides exactly the additional power required by English Heritage to fulfil the duties placed upon it by Parliament. I beg to move.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham: I support Amendment No. 250, which was ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Montagu. I also speak as a commissioner of English Heritage, as well as a member of a local authority. I strongly support the point made by the noble Lord that when English Heritage was established it was designed to be an agency of last resort in terms of protecting and conserving historic buildings and areas and ancient monuments. It is precisely because it is an agency of last resort that it needs reserve powers to initiate legal proceedings when unauthorised works are proposed, or have been started, on listed buildings. Normally local authorities would and should take on such a responsibility. However, in some cases they cannot or will not do so. I suggest that, in such a situation, it is entirely right that English Heritage should have those reserve powers. I very much hope, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Montagu, that this is indeed an amendment which is pushing at an open door.
Lord Harmar-Nicholls: I trust that the hope expressed by my noble friend that this amendment would be accepted will be fulfilled. English Heritage was given a very important task. If we want to preserve the things which we know ought to be preserved, it is outstandingly important that English Heritage should have the ultimate power to ensure that any reasonable desires have the backing of law, if necessary. Now that we are aware of the situation, I do not believe that we would for a moment want to put English Heritage into a position weaker than that of the local authorities when carrying out such a task.
Baroness Blatch: I understand my noble friend's concern about the fact that, at present, there is no explicit power for English Heritage to seek prosecutions for infringement of listed building control, although it has been established as our statutory adviser on matters relating to the preservation of listed buildings, conservation areas and ancient monuments and has a statutory duty to secure the preservation of ancient monuments and historic buildings so far as practicable. I should like to take this opportunity to say how much my department values the work of English Heritage carried out under the very able chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Montagu.
It is admittedly somewhat anomalous that English Heritage should not have that power in question when it would be open to a local amenity society, say, or a private individual, to take such action. I can see that

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there may be cases where the absence of such powers could inhibit the preservation of a building—a point made by the noble Baroness. For breaches of legislation relating to ancient monuments, however, English Heritage is able to prosecute and indeed has done so successfully on a number of occasions.
To a certain extent, the Bill already deals with the situation so far as concerns injunctions. The new provision in Schedule 2(7) which specifically empowers local planning authorities to seek injunctions against breaches of listed building control is also applied to English Heritage in London by virtue of paragraph 17. That reflects its specific functions in respect of listed buildings in London, which it inherited from the Greater London Council. The amendment of my noble friend Lord Montagu would, however, go beyond that.
The department did, in fact, go out to consultation in 1989 on a proposal that English Heritage should be empowered to prosecute and seek injunctions for breaches of listed building consent. The greater majority of respondents were in favour of this, although some local authority interests thought that it would be useful for the local planning authority to be consulted first before English Heritage acted. In the light of that, we are sympathetic to the proposal in principle. We would, however, like to look carefully at the drafting to ensure that it covers appropriately the types of case which we have in mind. My noble friend has already indicated that, on reflection, he considers the scope of the amendment as tabled is not quite as extensive as he would wish. If he is content to withdraw it now, I can assure him that we are prepared to bring forward at a later stage an amendment of our own which will achieve the same objective.
Amendment No. 251 would enable English Heritage to seek information about ownership or other interests in land to enable it to pursue public prosecutions, or other legal proceedings. Local planning authorities, and the Secretary of State, already have powers under Section 330 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to seek information about ownership in land to enable them to serve any notices or documents which they are empowered to serve under the legislation. The same provision applies to notices under the listed building legislation by virtue of Section 89 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. These provisions do not, however, apply to English Heritage even though it has powers of enforcement in London.
My noble friend Lord Montagu indicated in his speech at Second Reading that he was concerned to ensure that English Heritage was given the Section 89 powers for its work in London, so that if it wished to take action under its statutory powers it had a means of obtaining the necessary information about the ownership of the building. We are sympathetic to this; it seems quite reasonable that where English Heritage has been given statutory powers it should also be given the tools to use them adequately.
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The present amendment, as drafted, is somewhat different in scope from this, however, because it would empower English Heritage to require information for the purposes of prosecutions or other legal proceedings. We should like an opportunity to consider the drafting and the precise circumstances in which this power should apply and to bring forward an amendment of our own at a later stage.
With that explanation and, I hope, encouragement, I trust that my noble friend will not wish to press his amendments.
Lord Montagu of Beaulieu: I must apologise to my noble friend. I have not actually spoken to Amendment No. 251 as I had assumed the amendments were going to be taken separately. However, I thank my noble friend very much for what she has said. Perhaps I might just say that we feel that Amendment No. 251 is important. We are merely trying to extend a power which is at present available only to the Secretary of State and local planning authorities. To identify the name and address of an owner and to take action over a listed building are extremely important. This important power is missing, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness for pointing out that there may be some flaws in the amendment. I am also grateful for the fact that we shall be able to have further consultation in order that a government amendment may be brought forward at Report stage. That is something I should certainly welcome. In view of what my noble friend has said, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 250.
Baroness Blatch: Just before my noble friend sits down, I hope he will forgive my presumption. I assumed that both amendments were being spoken to. I had taken as my guide his Second Reading speech.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 251 not moved.]
6.15 p.m.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 252:
After Clause 26, insert the following new clause:
("Crown development
. For Part XIII of the principal Act (application of Act to Crown land) there is substituted—
"Crown Development.
293. This Act shall bind the Crown except as provided by a development order." ")
The noble Lord said: This amendment is one in a long and quite honourable line of legislative proposals, some from government and some from other sources, which have sought to restrict the immunity of the Crown from various types of legislation. We had some very good examples of the reduction or removal of Crown immunity in the Environmental Protection Act 1990. It seems to us that this Bill provides a good opportunity for further removal of Crown immunity, which is now quite outdated.
This has of course nothing to do with the Crown: we are talking about the Government here. The present situation is based on a quite false antithesis between the interest of the Government as expressed

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through the Crown and the interests of the public as expressed through the rest of legislation. I recognise that there are some cases where the Crown should not be bound by normal planning law, as, for example, there are obvious cases of national security which are thought to be excluded from legislation. However, the way in which this amendment has been drafted—in other words, to include the Crown except as provided by development order—makes it perfectly possible for the Government to draft a development order which provides, for cases of national security or other cases as they may think necessary.
The general principle that the Crown should be included in legislation of this kind, particularly when the legislation is rightly put forward as an advance in the coherence and "workability" of planning law, is a sound principle and one which ought to be adopted unless there are very good and specific reasons to the contrary. It is unfortunately the case that the Crown development, at least since the time of Nash and certainly in London, which I know best has often been of poor quality both in aesthetic terms and in terms of planning, thinking and even aptness for its purpose.
I must weigh my words carefully when speaking in the presence of those who have to work in the three most horrible buildings within sight of Westminster—the three towers of Marsham Street. I rather think they are going to have to move out shortly. Not only are the buildings hideous from the outside but they do not work very well and their roofs do not work very well. After far too short a period the buildings are to be at least partially evacuated so that something can be done to put them right. But the correct thing to do would be to pull them down altogether.
However, leaving that extreme example on one side, it is still the case that the Crown/Government use or misuse the exemption from large parts of normal planning law to do things which would not be accepted by any proper planning authority, which would not achieve public support if exposed to public scrutiny and which ought therefore, with as much force as possible, to be exposed to public scrutiny and to the disciplines of the planning law which is the subject of this Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: While the noble Lord is indeed correct in saying that in recent years there has been an erosion or alteration in the position of the Crown in relation to a number of statutory provisions, I am sure he will appreciate that in this area what he is proposing is a change with far-reaching implications. It is a change which, before being introduced, should have the widest possible consultation.
He is correct in many respects in saying that the Crown is in an anomalous position in regard to the planning system, but that is not altogether surprising. As was said earlier, there are particular arrangements under Clause 17 of the Bill for local authorities and any development by them. There are special arrangements for statutory undertakers as well. So there are special arrangements in the planning system for bodies with particular duties to perform and particular services to provide. The position of the Crown should be viewed in that context.
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As the noble Lord has clearly spelled out, the Crown is not wholly excluded from the statutory framework either north or south of the Border. The amendment is of course restricted to the 1990 Act, and what I have to say therefore refers specifically to England and Wales, although I should make it clear that for the planning framework in Scotland the position is similar.
Under Section 299 of the 1990 Act the Crown may, for example, apply for planning permission on disposal of its land. This Bill also provides in Clause 12 for the Crown to be able to enter into planning obligations in England and Wales. Department of the Environment Circular 18/84 sets out the special procedure for obtaining planning clearance for development by Crown bodies. That would seem to me to provide adequate safeguards while preserving the necessary rights and privileges of the Crown.
Crown bodies send the local planning authorities a notice of their proposed development. The proposal is then considered in a similar way to a planning application in relation, for example, to notice and publicity, except that the local planning authority does not grant or refuse permission in the ordinary way but rather signifies whether or not it finds the development proposal acceptable. If it objects to the proposal and its objections remain unresolved, the Secretary of State decides whether planning clearance shall be given. He may take his decision after receiving written representations or after holding a meeting between the parties, or he may hold a non-statutory public inquiry. So in many ways there is a parallel with an ordinary planning application for planning permission.
I should say that few complaints are received about these arrangements. They are generally considered to work well and as at present advised we see no need to change them. I shall not follow the noble Lord in his aesthetic appreciation of the buildings in Marsham Street. I hope that with that explanation he will not be minded to insist upon his amendment.
Lord Harmar-Nicholls: There is a clear conflict of view between the mover of the amendment and my noble and learned friend. The amendment seems to be unnecessary in view of the reply that we have just received. Before we accept the amendment we should have some evidence as to where matters have gone wrong in the past. My noble friend said that the local planning authority was in a position to stop the matter. Unless we have evidence that the indications given by the Crown authorities have pushed against the local authority's general view, we should not consider a change.
I am a great believer—the noble Lord who moved the amendment is not in the same category as I am—that if something is proved to be working as well as this law has over the years, why change it unless he can bring evidence to show that the procedure has done some damage in the past or has been unfair?
The Earl of Kinnoull: My noble friend makes a good point. I remember a case some years ago, although I suspect that it was before 1984 and the circular that my noble and learned friend quoted. The Ministry of

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Defence sought to build a block of offices in an open field in the green belt just outside Beaconsfield. It caused tremendous local concern. So far as I know the proposal did not go before any planning authority. It is still an eyesore.
My noble and learned friend talked about a non-statutory public hearing. What is the difference between a non-statutory and a statutory public hearing? Does a non-statutory public hearing reduce the rights of those who wish to appear? Have there been many public hearings in such cases within the past five years?
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: I cannot give the number of such inquiries, but they are held. Non-statutory inquiries are those without a statutory basis. They mirror what my noble friend would experience if he attended a planning inquiry that followed an application for planning permission in the ordinary way. If he were to wander into an inquiry not knowing whether it was statutory or non-statutory, the procedures and the way matters were being considered would to all intents and purposes be identical.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: That little exchange gives me great encouragement. It is nice that after some years of the ascendancy of the radical Right, now happily in full retreat, we on these Benches are the ones accused of being conservative. When we were faced with attacks on the powers, rights and responsibilities of local authorities, we were accused of supporting the status quo. We were the ones who were saying, in words that the noble Lord, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, did not quite use, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it". We now propose a change—we are not the conservatives—the tide of opinion is fortunately changing and we are returning to constructive rather than destructive change.
As the noble and learned Lord rightly says, the amendment is part of a trend which has continued for a considerable period of time and which will not go away. He challenges me to produce evidence of objectionable developments by the Crown and of discontent. I do not have the same resources as the Government; I cannot issue consultation papers and obtain similar replies, as they can. I shall return with the suitable evidence at another stage. I shall withdraw the amendment on that basis.
I am convinced that the trend towards the involvement of Crown property (government property) in the normal legislative process is one which will proceed. It is not enough to say that the Crown may apply for planning permission when it seeks to dispose of land. It is only "may" apply; not that it shall do so. It is not enough to say that the Crown may now be involved in planning agreements. As the noble and learned Lord is aware, when that was proposed during earlier proceedings of the Committee, we welcomed that change. We need to go further than that now. We need to involve the Crown more seriously in the planning process. We shall return with suitable evidence which I hope will convince the
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Committee that the change is a worthwhile one which is now well overdue. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 252A not moved.]
Schedule 6 [Planning in England and Wales: minor and consequential amendments]:
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 253:
Page 96, line 27, at end insert:
("Agricultural Land (Removal of Surface Soil) Act 1953 (c. 10.)
Local Government Act 1972 (c. 70.)
. In Part III of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972, in the definition of "protected informant", for "172(3)" there is substituted "171A".").
The noble Viscount said: I should like to speak also to Amendment Nos. 254 to 260, 262, and 265 to 269. Schedule 6 is concerned with minor and consequential amendments to the planning Acts in England and Wales. These are all minor, technical amendments to improve the practical operation of various provisions elsewhere in the Bill or to remedy errors and deficiencies in the Bill as published. I need not detain the Committee with detailed descriptions of every amendment, but I am happy to try to answer any points arising from them. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 254 to 259:
Page 97, line 5, at end insert:
("4A. In section 56(3) after "87(4)" there is inserted "89".").
Page 97, line 10, at end insert:
("7A. In section 74(2) "section 71 of this Act and" is omitted.").
Page 97, line 39, leave out from ("whether") to ("lawful") in line 43 and insert ("on the date on which the appeal was made, any existing use of the land was lawful, any operations which had been carried out in, on, over or under the land were lawful or any matter constituting a failure to comply with any condition or limitation subject to which planning permission was granted was").
Page 98, leave out lines 1 to 3 and insert:
("(1A) The provisions of sections 191 to 194 mentioned in subsection (1B) shall apply for the purposes of subsection (1) (c) as they apply for the purposes of section 191, but as if—

(a) any reference to an application for a certificate were a reference to the appeal and any reference to the date of such an application were a reference to the date on which the appeal is made; and

(b) references to the local planning authority were references to the Secretary of State.

(1B) Those provisions are: sections 191(5) to (7), 193(4) (so far as it relates to the form of the certificate), (6) and (7) and 194".").
Page 98, leave out line 41 and insert:
("(c) in subsection (8) for "172(6)" there is substituted "172".").
Page 99, line 3, after ("(c)") insert ("to").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Lord Ross of Newport Lord Ross of Newport moved Amendment No. 259A:
Page 99, line 28, at end insert:
("21A. In section 215 at the end of subsection (2) there is added "end may require the doing (while the notice remains in force) at such times or intervals, or within such periods, of any such thing as may be so specified."").
The noble Lord said: This is a small matter but I believe that it is worthwhile because it would save local authorities some extra bureaucracy. During the passage of the Environmental Protection Bill we discussed the extension of litter controls to private land (Hansard col. 1646; 27th June 1990). In response to a point that I made the noble Lord, Lord Reay, said that the powers were available under the Town and Country Planning Act (col. 1648). That is true, but it is a one-off power.
Section 215 of the Act allows an authority to serve a notice requiring a land owner to clear his land of refuse or whatever else may be covering it. However, once that notice has been served, if the land becomes covered with litter again, a new notice must be served. The amendment would allow the authority to specify, for example, that the land should be cleared monthly or bi-monthly, thus saving it time and trouble in continually have to serve notices to remedy that type of problem.
I am thinking of an area of property or land which is constantly being covered with litter or rubbish. One notice would therefore serve to ensure that the land was cleared on a monthly or bi-monthly basis. The local authority would not have to return each time the ground became covered with litter. I came down from Shrewsbury this morning by train. I do not know when the control of environment and litter clauses will have any effect on the general public, but they are not having any effect yet. There are areas which will become covered with litter after having been cleared until we get the message over. The amendment is a sensible one, and I beg to move.
6.30 p.m.
Viscount Astor: I know that the noble Lord, Lord Ross, it particularly concerned about litter. Indeed, we have had some interesting debates on the subject during the passage of this Bill and the Environmental Protection Bill through this House. It was then that my noble friend Lord Reay pointed out that a provision existed in the town and country planning legislation that would enable authorities to deal with the problem of litter on private land, including farmland, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ross. However, I regret that I cannot accept the noble Lord's amendment.
Section 215 is not specifically for litter but refers to the proper maintenance of land as a whole. Any littering would have to be exceptionally severe to warrant a Section 215 notice. It would more usually be used in cases of dumping or abandoned vehicles. A few fertiliser bags are unlikely to be sufficient to be considered detrimental to the amenities of an area.
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As the noble Lord will be aware, there are provisions in the Environmental Protection Act 1990 for tackling the problem of litter on private land. Power for local authorities to designate litter control areas will cover those areas of private land most likely to be littered and which will have the biggest visual impact on the public. Such areas might include supermarket car parks, shopping centres and motorway service stations but would not include land to which the public are not permitted access.
Furthermore, to issue a notice with a continuous liability —for example, to clear away any litter on land every two weeks or once a month—would be an invitation for unscrupulous individuals to dump litter or refuse on the land in the knowledge that the unfortunate landowner would be under a statutory obligation to remove it. One must take a balanced view about whether it is reasonable to place what might be an onerous continuing liability on a private individual. In these circumstances we take the view that it would be unreasonable.
In most instances a time limited notice would be sufficient to ensure that the land is restored to a proper condition, and it is unlikely that it would return to the previously poor condition within a short space of time. The noble Lord may argue that landowners may wait until the period of notice is up and just leave the land to return to its previous condition but unless he is suggesting that under his amendment a notice imposing a regular requirement would not have a finite life, the unprincipled landowner may do that in any case.
Much as I share the noble Lord's desire to see our country free of the menace of litter, I cannot accept this amendment. Therefore, I must ask him to withdraw it.
Lord Swinfen: I understand my noble friend to say that local authorities already have power to make people remove litter from their land. This power does not always appear to be used. Can he say what steps the Government are taking to ensure that local authorities use such powers? Some parts of this attractive island of ours are in a terrible mess.
Viscount Astor: Under the Environmental Protection Act local authorities have an obligation to designate such areas and tackle the problem of litter.
Lord Ross of Newport: Obviously there are arguments against the amendment, which I accept, but the point put by the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, is very pertinent. Are we waiting for an order for some of these powers to be implemented or does the Act apply now? I do not have that knowledge, but if the Act is operating now, the noble Lord is absolutely right: nothing seems to be happening.
Viscount Astor: I think I am right in saying that the implementation date is 1st April.
Lord Ross of Newport: That is an appropriate date. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 260:

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Page 99, line 40, leave out from first ("section") to end of line 41 and insert ("286—

(a) in subsection (1), paragraph (b) is omitted and in paragraph (c) for "an established use certificate under section 192" there is substituted "a certificate under section 191 or 192", and

(b) in subsection (2), after "183" there is inserted "or a breach of condition notice under section 187A".").

On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Ross of Newport Lord Ross of Newport moved Amendment No. 261:
Page 99, line 41, at end insert:
("27A. In section 288 for subsection (3) there is substituted—
"(3) An application under this section must be made within six weeks from the date on which the applicant was notified of the order or decision." ").
The noble Lord said: Under this amendment I am seeking to amend Clause 288(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 with the words that appear on the Marshalled List.
Under the Act, in regard to proceedings for questioning the validity of orders, decisions and directions an application must be made within six weeks from the date on which the order was confirmed. The problem is that people who wish to appeal do not always get notified.
The Association of Metropolitan Authorities has asked for evidence on this. A case occurred in the courts in 1988. It seems to be very unfair that an appeal must be instituted within six weeks of the decision being taken. I understand that that is interpreted by the courts as the date on which the decision letter is typed, signed on behalf of the Secretary and date-stamped. The period is absolute so that if the appeal is brought outside the six weeks it must fail.
In the case to which I referred the High Court rejected the argument that, as a result of a flawed consultation procedure, the Secretary of State was without jurisdiction to determine the appeal. The fact that the applicant was unaware that the local authority had made an appeal and only found out when it was too late meant that he lost his case, which seems to be unfair.
I should have thought that if we put in the word "notified" it would make it abundantly clear that when notification was received an applicant had six weeks from that date. In the case of which I am speaking, the person did not know that the local authority had made an appeal against the decision and so was ruled out of court when he went to law. I beg to move.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: I listened with interest to the noble Lord. He will appreciate that the rule provided for in Section 288 is a long-standing one. Indeed, it goes back to the 1962 Act. In addition, it has the merit of clarity. The period runs from the time of the Secretary of State's decision or order. The date should thus be clearly recorded and there should be no dispute about it. All those involved can be clear that risk of High Court challenge is over once the six-week period has expired. Where there is such a risk, a developer may be anxiously waiting to start his development until he is sure that it is safe to do so.
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I am concerned that this amendment would introduce uncertainty as to time. As I understand it, the noble Lord is proposing that the time would run from the date of notification, which is not defined. Indeed, in certain circumstances it might be very difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain it precisely. That must be undesirable.
The noble Lord would gain greater sympathy for his proposal if the period in question were a very short one, say two or three days, but where there is a duration of six weeks it would seem appropriate to have a fixed time running for six weeks from the date of the decision.
Lord Swinfen: Could my noble friend say what steps are taken to ensure that the applicant is notified?
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: As I understand it, he would be notified. There may be cases where the notification is not instantaneous and is not necessarily given overnight and where there are delays of some few days. It was for that reason that I indicated that if the period in question were five days or a week I could see greater force in the amendment that is being proposed if through inadvertence or minor incompetence the decision was not immediately notified to the applicant. In such circumstances one might wish to rely on something other than a fixed period of time from the date of the order, but where there is a period of six weeks, even if there has been a short delay—and I do not think that there has been more than a short delay in the past—it would be better to keep to the rule provided, which has the merit of clarity and people know without doubt from which point the decision begins to run.
Lord Swinfen: I thank my noble friend for what he has said, but he has not answered the question I asked. I asked what steps are taken to ensure that the applicant is notified.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: I indicated that notification should be given to the applicant in the ordinary way. It is not a matter of notification being sent by recorded delivery or registered post, or being personally served on an applicant. As I understand the situation, the applicant is notified in the normal manner.
Lord Ross of Newport: We know that things can go wrong with the post. However, in the case that I referred to, the local planning authority admitted that it had not notified the applicant of its appeal to the Secretary of State. The applicant was in total ignorance of that. I have heard what the noble and learned Lord has said. I hope that we can bring forward a slightly different amendment on Report. I believe this area should be covered. I realise that one cannot cover every eventuality but, in the case I referred to, the applicant lost out because of the present wording of the law. He should not have lost out. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 262:
Page 100, line 4, at end insert:
("29A.—(1) Section 299 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for "determination under section 64" there is substituted "certificate under section 192".
(3) In subsection (2) for "or determination" there is substituted "or certificate".
(4) For subsection (4) there is substituted—
(4) Any application made by virtue of this section for a certificate under section 192 shall be determined as if the land were not Crown land."
(5) In subsection (5) (a) for "determinations" there is substituted "certificates".
(6) In subsection (6) for "determination" there is substituted "certificate".").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Ross of Newport Lord Ross of Newport moved Amendment No. 263:
Page 100, line 25, at end insert:
("( ) in the definition of "building operations" after the words "includes" there shall be inserted "demolition or" ")
The noble Lord said: This amendment concerns a rather more important matter as it relates to the obtaining of planning consent for demolition. I am aware that this matter has been debated in another place. A Private Member's Bill has been introduced in another place to cover this situation. I believe that it was introduced in the previous Session.
At present it is considered that the demolition of a building does not usually require planning permission because it is not a building operation as defined in the 1990 Act. In the report Control of Demolition of 1974 by Mr. George Dobry QC, a recommendation was made that demolition should be brought under control. However, that recommendation has never been implemented. The amendment before us this evening would bring demolition under control as recommended in the report. It would stop someone demolishing an existing building in order to force a planning authority's hand. Further, the gap in the legislation inhibits proper planning of an area. Furthermore, the amendment would prevent premature demolition of houses and other buildings in advance of firm proposals for the redevelopment of a complete site, and the demolition of buildings within a community such as shops, cinemas and other such buildings.
If the amendment were passed, the general development order of 1988 could also be amended to provide exceptions for minor operations or those which do not materially affect the external appearance of a building. We do not wish to be too niggardly about this matter but some alarming cases have been brought to my attention. I am sure the Minister will be aware of a case in North London where half of a semi-detached house was pulled down. The people living there went through absolute hell as they were exposed to the elements. However, there was little they could do about the matter. I have received photographs of that house.
The National Housing and Town Planning Council worked with Mr. John Wilkinson MP, on his Private Member's Bill to try to bring such situations under planning control. The council has stated that it wants,
"to establish a system that would be genuinely effective in controlling demolition, without being unduly onerous in cases where demolition did not matter. We were inclined to the view
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that prior notification had advantages, but did not wish to rule out other possibilities, including amending the definition of development (or building operations).
We have been disappointed that the Government has not followed up the responses to that consultation with any proposals for action"
in this legislation.
I draw the Minister's attention to the article that was written by Mr. Hugh Dykes MP entitled Nightmare on Elms Road. That illustrates how appalling it is when half someone's house is taken away. This matter should be given serious consideration while we are debating this legislation. On the whole it has the support of the Association of Metropolitan Authorities. That body believes demolition should be brought under planning control. Obviously I shall listen to what the Minister has to say. I hope I shall obtain some support for this matter in this Chamber. I beg to move.
6.45 p.m.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I give my strong support to this important amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Ross, has said, this matter has come before Members in another place on a number of occasions. As the Minister will no doubt make clear, it is a matter which has been discussed within the department, and it is a matter on which there has been consultation. I believe that a consultation document was produced last summer which proposed a number of different alternative solutions for dealing with this complex and potentially serious subject.
The consultation document suggested, first, that more conservation areas should be established. By that it meant areas where special consent was needed to demolish a building. Secondly, the document suggested there should be more closely defined special development areas where planning permission was required before a building could be demolished. Thirdly, the document suggested there should be some system of prior notification. Fourthly, it was suggested there should be a code of practice and, fifthly, that there should be further planning policy guidance which made it clear that there was no planning advantage in demolishing a building. In other words, demolition did not give the applicant the right to assume that he would obtain permission for a more intensive or different use, or that his case would be strengthened by the fact that he was now dealing with a vacant site rather than an existing building.
The proposal behind my amendment—that is, to change the definition of development—appeared only as the sixth alternative in the consultation document. I do not know whether the Minister is in a position to analyse the results of the consultation. Certainly the view of the Association of Metropolitan Authorities is that the sixth alternative—that is changing the definition of development—is the right course to follow because demolition that is intended to bypass or circumvent the planning laws can be an extremely damaging procedure in towns, cities and villages. It can create vacant sites which are eyesores and can be health hazards. It can involve the loss of large houses which need not necessarily be architecturally

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distinguished in themselves but which make up the character of an area. The character of an area can be dramatically changed if they are removed in a random and haphazard way.
Developers and others may make the supposition that demolition without permission is being carried out in order to force the hand of the local planning authority. There is no doubt that local planning authorities are under pressure to give permission for some other use when the alternative is an empty site which is an eyesore. There may already be light at the end of the tunnel. I read last month in the Local Government Chronicle that Mr. David Widdicombe QC, who is well known and well beloved by the Government, allowed an appeal by Cambridge City Council in its attempt to stop a developer from converting two houses near a new office complex into a car park. Mr. Widdicombe stated that the question of whether demolition constituted development was,
"a ghost which haunts planning law. The time has now come for the ghost to be laid".
I do not know whether there will be a further appeal on the case which came before Mr. Widdicombe. However, it would be to the advantage of everyone concerned, and would make the planning law clearer, if the Government now recognised that the evasion or avoidance of planning controls by unauthorised demolition can no longer be ignored, and that unless this is put right there will be a major gap in the effectiveness of our planning law. I hope the Government will agree with the proposals contained in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ross.
Baroness Blatch: The noble Lord, Lord Ross, supported by the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, has raised an issue which we know is a matter of concern in some areas of our towns and cities. The worry is that where prospects for redevelopment are commercially attractive—for instance, where large houses in older suburbs have sites which could accommodate several smaller modern houses—developers may try to force the hand of the planning authority by demolishing the existing property before they seek planning permission for redevelopment. The general assumption—at any rate until a few days ago—has been that they need no permission to demolish, unless the building is listed or is in a conservation area.
The concern is that the planning authority may in those circumstances be pressured into giving permission for redevelopment which it would not in ordinary circumstances have found acceptable. It may do so on the basis that the only alternative is to accept that the site will be left vacant and untidy.
Those arguments were put to us in support of a Private Member's Bill in another place last spring. As a result we undertook a consultation exercise aimed at establishing the real extent of the problem and what might be done about it. We made clear at the time that in our view the extent and gravity of the problem should determine the appropriate solution, and a change in primary legislation would only be justified
946
on the basis of systematic and general evidence of a problem going well beyond the natural process of demolition and redevelopment.
We had 175 responses to the consultation paper. Many of them argued for a change in the legislation, but they did not produce systematic evidence of a general and widespread problem. The problem of premature demolition appears to be most prevalent in certain areas of London and the South-East. We have evidence of problems also in some other areas but relatively few in rural areas and shire districts. Even in those areas where demolition has proved a problem, the number of cases giving rise to genuine concern appears to be fairly small.
Against that background, our view is that a great deal can be done to tackle the problem by the inclusion of appropriate policies in local plans and unitary development plans. If a developer knows that the stated policy of the planning authority is not to grant permission for more intensive development in a particular neighbourhood he will know that his chances of forcing its hand by speculative demolition are minimal. After all, it is always open to the planning authority to grant permission for no more than an exact replacement of the original dwelling house.
We intend to give new policy guidance on these matters in a revised and updated planning policy guidance note on housing which will be published shortly. It will make clear that the demolition of existing property does not in itself create any presumption that permission will be granted for more intensive redevelopment. It will also stress that local plan policies can make clear that the creation of an unsightly vacant site will not strengthen the case for redevelopment where on other planning grounds it would not be acceptable. Such policies can, we believe, help a great deal.
The question of legislation is more difficult. One crucial question is the exact significance of the present law. Noble Lords will know that the general understanding has been that demolition does not of itself require planning permission. However, as the noble Lord pointed out, a judgment was given in the High Court only a couple of weeks ago which appears to take the opposite view, at any rate in respect of certain types of demolition. We shall be studying the transcript of that case when it is available with great interest. That is an issue which we can take no further today.
Turning to the noble Lord's amendment, on the face of it it would go far wider than the problem that has been put to us. It would bring all types of demolition under planning control, in all areas. That, in our view, is far too sweeping a response to what seems a relatively limited problem. It would clog an already overloaded planning system with more applications, many of which would be unnecessary. I do not believe that such a step would be justified on the evidence we have of the scale of the problem. It would be preferable, in my view, to deal with the problem through policy guidance and through the policy framework set out in local plans and UDPs. If

947
we were to go down the legislative path I am quite sure that we would have to devise an approach which enabled planning controls over demolition to be applied selectively. I am not convinced at this stage that even that is necessary.
I hope following that explanation, the noble Lord will not press his amendment.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham: Before the noble Lord, Lord Ross, responds to the Minister, I hope that she will reconsider her answer to Amendment No. 263. The noble Baroness made much of the point that she had not heard much criticism from shire district councils. My experience, as an active member of the Association of District Councils, is very much to the contrary.
I have personally had to try to stop a developer from knocking down a house opposite mine which was built in the 1860s, and was not in a conservation area. I was able to do so by placing a preservation order on the trees. The house was saved because the site was wrecked for the purposes of the developers.
I believe that the Minister's hope that a vacant site will not produce a presumption in favour of development is not worldly and realistic. That is not what we have come to expect from the Minister. The amendment must be the only way forward and I very much hope that the Minister will reconsider her view before Report stage.
Lord Ross of Newport: I, too, was disappointed with the reply, particularly as it was Cambridge City Council which brought the case which has been mentioned. I hope that the appeal is overruled, in which case the Government will have to take action.
The situation may be easier now, and perhaps for the next year or two, while property speculation is in the doldrums. However, the problem will come back. One knows of cases in which the value of a property on a site is much less when the property is up than when it is down and if one turns the site into a private car park one would probably make a great deal of money.
I do not believe that we should allow the type of situation which occurred in Harrow, where people found that the house next door had suddenly disappeared and great pressure was placed on them by unscrupulous developers to get out of their own property. I believe that I am right in saying that in such a case it is up to the owner of the remaining property to make the outside wall watertight rather than being the job of the developer who has exposed the wall. That point should also be covered. I am very unhappy with the situation.
I accept that the amendment may be too wide. I understand that this is a very difficult area. One does not want to place more work on the planning authorities, who are already under enormous pressures. In my Second Reading speech I pointed out that they are very short staffed. It will be very difficult to get back some of the more experienced staff, particularly as local authorities are short of cash. None of us, on either side of the Chamber, want to
948
place unnecessary burdens on them, but I believe that planning authorities themselves would like to see such a measure brought in.
If it is a question of reconsidering the amendment and defining it more tightly, I shall accept that. However, it is a matter that we must raise on Report. I hope that noble Lords on the other side of the Chamber will support us. It was two Conservative MPs, representing suburban areas of London, who brought the matter forward in another place. I am sure that the problem occurs in other areas. That in itself should have made some impression on the Government.
While giving notice that I intend to bring the matter back, having consulted further, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 264:
Page 100, line 40, at end insert:

("(3A) In paragraph 8(1) after sub-paragraph (c) there is inserted "(d) or any amendment to any application, of which the council of a parish or community has been so informed" and after the words "in writing to the application" there is inserted "and of any amendment thereto".

(3B) At the end of paragraph 8(1) there is added "but the authority shall be treated as having satisfied the requirements of this sub-paragraph in any case in which it sends to the council a copy (whether obtained from the applicant or produced by itself) of the application submitted to it and in any case in which such a copy is sent the planning authority shall be entitled to refuse to supply any additional information (other than a copy of any amendment to the application) to the council or to answer any question about the contents of the documents comprising the application".

(3C) In paragraph 8(2) after sub-paragraph (b) there is inserted "(c) a local planning authority not to inform the council of a parish or community of any amendment which is insignificant, or has no substantial modifying effect on the application or is unnecessary to be notified to the council by reason of any comments on the application which it has already submitted to the planning authority".").

The noble Lord said: This is a special case in the series of amendments which I have been moving to protect the rights of parish and community councils. The particular complaint that we have received from a number of parish and community councils relates to the fact that they are notified of an application for planning permission but they have no assurance that they will be notified of any amendment to it.
Amendment No. 264 makes two changes which give parish councils the same basic right to be informed of the amendment to an application as of the original application. We do not want there to be useless notification of trivia, so we remove the duty to notify when the amendment is insignificant or is unnecessary because the parish council has covered its scope in its original comments.
I believe that the amendment is in line with the thinking of the Government on the relationship between parish councils and local planning authorities. I hope that it will therefore prove acceptable to Ministers. I beg to move.
Viscount Astor: The amendment represents a logical extension of the statutory requirement for local planning authorities to notify parish or community

949
councils of applications for planning permission. The Government are therefore content to accept the principle of the noble Lord's amendment.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I am most grateful.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
7 p.m.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 265 to 269:
Page 100, line 41, leave out ("the words") and insert (""serving" there is inserted "planning contravention notices under section 171C or" and after").
Page 101, line 16, leave out ("and").
Page 101, line 22, at end insert:
("(aa) In the entry relating to sections 61 to 64 for "64" there is substituted "63"").
Page 101, line 39, at end insert:
("Planning (Consequential Provisions) Act 1990 (c. 11.)
39. In Schedule 3 to the Planning (Consequential Provisions) Act 1990, paragraph 10 is omitted.").
The noble Baroness said: I beg to move Amendments Nos. 265 to 269 en bloc.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendments Nos. 270 to 273:
After Schedule 6, insert the following new schedule:
("Mines and waste - Scotland
1. The 1972 Act is amended as follows.
2. In section 27A (aftercare conditions on permission for winning and working of minerals)—

(a) in subsection (1) after "minerals" there is inserted "or involving the depositing of refuse or waste materials";

(b) in subsection (2) for "operations for the winning and working of minerals have been completed" there is substituted "the winning and working is completed or the depositing has ceased"; and

(c) in subsection (18) for the words from "carried out" to "under the land" there is substituted "won and worked minerals or deposited refuse or waste materials".

3. In section 38(3) (circumstances in which general condition limiting duration of planning permission does not apply) for paragraph (bb) there is substituted—
"(bb) to any planning permission for development consisting of the winning and working of minerals or involving the depositing of mineral waste which is granted (or deemed to be granted) subject to a condition that the development to which it relates must be begun before the expiration of a specified period after—

(i) the completion of other development consisting of the winning and working of minerals already being carried out by the applicant for the planning permission; or

(ii) the cessation of depositing of mineral waste already being carried out by the applicant for the planning permission;".

4.—(1) In section 41A (limit of duration of planning permission for winning and working of minerals), in subsection (1) for "consisting of the winning and working of minerals" there is substituted "—

(a) consisting of the winning and working of minerals; or

(b) involving the depositing of mineral waste,".

(2) In subsections (2) and (5) of that section for "development", in both places where it occurs, there is substituted "the winning and working of minerals or the depositing of mineral waste".
(3) In subsections (6) and (7) of that section the words "consisting of the winning and working of minerals" in both places where they occur, are omitted.
5.—(1) Section 49 (discontinuance orders, etc.) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1A), after "minerals" there is inserted "or involving the deposit of refuse or waste materials".
(3) In subsection (1B), for "of minerals" there is substituted "or depositing".
(4) In subsection (1C), after "minerals" there is inserted "or involving the deposit of refuse or waste materials".
(5) For subsection (1E) there is substituted—
"(1E) An order under this section may grant planning permission for any development of the land to which the order relates, subject to such conditions as may be—

(a) required by section 41A of this Act; or

(b) specified in the order.".

(6) In subsection (1F), for the words from "before" to "under it" there is substituted "before the development began";
(f) in subsection (7) at the beginning there is inserted "Subject to subsection (7A) of this section,".
(7) After subsection (7) there is inserted—
"(7A) Subsection (7) of this section does not apply where the order under this section relates to the discontinuance of a use of land consisting of the winning and working of minerals or involving the deposit of refuse or waste materials.".
6.—(1) For subsections (1) to (3) of section 49A (prohibition of resumption of winning and working of minerals) there is substituted—
"(1) Where it appears to the planning authority—
(a) that development of land—

(i) consisting of the winning and working of minerals; or

(ii) involving the depositing of mineral waste, has occurred; but

(b) the winning and working or depositing has permanently ceased,
the planning authority may by order—

(i) prohibit the resumption of the winning and working or the depositing; and

(ii) impose, in relation to the site, any such requirement as is specified in subsection (3) of this section.

(2) The planning authority may assume that the winning and working or the depositing has permanently ceased only when—

(a) no winning and working or depositing has occurred, to any substantial extent, at the site for a period of at least two years; and

(b) it appears to the planning authority, on the evidence available to them at the time when they make the order, that resumption of the winning and working or the depositing to any substantial extent at the site is unlikely.

(3) The requirements mentioned in subsection (1) of this section are—

(a) a requirement to alter or remove plant or machinery which was used for the purpose of the winning and working or the depositing or for any purpose ancillary to that purpose;

(b) a requirement to take such steps as may be specified in the order, within such period as may

951
be so specified, for the purpose of removing or alleviating any injury to amenity which has been caused by the winning and working or depositing, other than injury due to subsidence caused by underground mining operations;

(c) a requirement that any condition subject to which planning permission for the development was granted or which has been imposed by virtue of any provision of this Act shall be complied with; and

(d) a restoration condition."

(2) At the end of subsection (11) of that section there is inserted "or involving the depositing of mineral waste".
7. For subsections (1) to (3) of section 49B (orders after suspension of winning and working of minerals) there is substituted—
"(1) Where it appears to the planning authority—

(a) that development of land—

(i) consisting of the winning and working of minerals; or

(ii) involving the depositing of mineral waste,

has occurred; but

(b) the winning and working or depositing has been temporarily suspended,

the planning authority may by order (in this Act referred to as a "suspension order") require that steps be taken for the protection of the environment.
(2) The planning authority may assume that the winning and working or the depositing has been temporarily suspended only when—

(a) no such winning and working or depositing has occurred, to any substantial extent, at the site for a period of at least 12 months; but

(b) it appears to the planning authority, on the evidence available to them at the time when they make the order, that a resumption of such winning and working or depositing to a substantial extent is likely.

(4) In this Act "steps for the protection of the environment" means steps for the purpose—

(a) of preserving the amenities of the area in which the land in, on or under which the development was carried out is situated during the period while the winning and working or the depositing is suspended;

(b) of protecting that area from damage during that period; or

(c) of preventing any deterioration in the condition of the land during that period.".

8. In section 49F (resumption of winning and working of minerals after suspension order)—

(a) in subsection (1), for "in, on or under the land" there is substituted "or involving the depositing of mineral waste at the site";

(b) in subsection (2) for "development consisting of the winning and working of minerals" there is substituted "the development";

(c) for subsection (3) there is substituted—

"(3) The planning authority shall revoke the order if the winning and working of minerals or the depositing of mineral waste has recommenced to a substantial extent at the site in relation to which the order has effect.";
(d) for subsection (7) there is substituted—
"(7) If the Secretary of State is satisfied that the winning and working of minerals or the depositing of mineral waste has recommenced to a substantial extent at the site in relation to which the order has effect, he shall revoke the order."
9. In sections 100(1) (b) (enforcement of orders under sections 49, 49A and 49B) and 251(1) (power to modify Act in relation to minerals) after "minerals" there is inserted "or involving the depositing of mineral waste".
10.—(1) Section 167A (regulations as to compensation in respect of orders relating to mineral working etc.) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (4), at the beginning there is inserted "Subject to subsection (7A) of this section,".
(3) After subsection (7) there is inserted—
"(7A) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (3) (a) of this subsection may provide that where an order is made under—

(a) section 42 of this Act modifying planning permission for development involving the depositing of mineral waste; or

(b) section 49, 49A or 49B of this Act with respect to such depositing,

sections 153, 159, 167, 226 and 227 of this Act shall have effect subject, in such cases as may be prescribed, to such modifications as may be prescribed.
(7B) Any such regulations as are mentioned in subsection (7A) of this section may make provision—

(a) as to circumstances in which compensation is not to be payable;

(b) for the modification of the basis on which any amount to be paid by way of compensation is to be assessed;

(c) for the assessment of any such amount on a basis different from that on which it would otherwise have been assessed,

and may also make different provision for different cases and incidental or supplementary provision."
(4) In subsection (10) for "have effect until" there is substituted "be made unless a draft of the regulations is laid before and".
(5) In subsection (11) "or bodies of persons" is omitted.
11.—(1) In section 251A(1) (duty of planning authorities to review mineral workings) for the words from "site" where it first occurs to the end there is substituted "mining site in their area; and
(b) to consider whether they should make an order under section 42, 49, 49A or 49B of this Act, and if they do consider that they should make any such order, to make it."
(2) For subsection (2) of that section there is substituted—
"(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) "a mining site" means a site which

(a) is being used for the winning and working of minerals or the depositing of mineral waste;

(b) has been so used at any time during—

(i) the period of five years preceding the date of the beginning of the review; or

(ii) such other period preceding that date as may be prescribed; or

(c) is authorised to be so used."

12. In section 275(1) (interpretation}—

(a) in the definition of "buildings and works" for "or construction" there is substituted "construction, carrying out or demolition";"

(b) after the definition of "conservation area" there is inserted—

""depositing of mineral waste" means any process whereby a mineral-working deposit is created or enlarged and "depositing of refuse or waste materials" includes the depositing of mineral waste;
(c) the definition of "development consisting of the winning and working of minerals" is omitted;
(d) in the definition of "minerals" for "minerals and substances in or under land" there is substituted "substances"; and
(e) at the end there is inserted—
""the winning and working of minerals" includes the extraction of minerals from a mineral working deposit."").
After Schedule 6 insert the following new Schedule—
("Listed buildings, conservation areas and hazardous substances:
Scotland. The 1972 Act
1. The 1972 Act is amended as follows.
2. For section 53(5) (offences: penalties) there is substituted—
"(5) A person who is guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding £20,000, or both; or

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine, or both."

3. In section 56L(4) (offences)—

(a) for "the statutory maximum" there is substituted "£20,000"; and

(b) for the words following paragraph (b) there is substituted—

"(4A) In determining the amount of any fine to be imposed on a person convicted of an offence under this section, the court shall in particular have regard to any financial benefit which has accrued or appears likely to accrue to him in consequence of the offence."
4. In section 92, (power to serve listed buildings enforcement notice), for subsection (4) there is substituted—
"(4) A listed building enforcement notice shall specify the date upon which it is to take effect, being a date not less than twenty-eight days after the latest service thereof under subsection (3) of this section.".
5. After section 92 there is inserted—
"Variation and withdrawal of listed building enforcement notices
92A.—(1) A planning authority—

(a) may waive or relax any requirement of a listed building, enforcement notice issued by them and, in particular, may extend the period specified in accordance with section 92(1)(c) of this Act in the notice; or

(b) if it appears to them that such a notice no longer serves any useful purpose, may withdraw it.

(2) The powers conferred by subsection (1) of this section may be exercised after the notice takes effect and those conferred by paragraph (a) of that subsection may also be exercised before the notice takes effect.
(3) Those powers shall not be exercised unless the authority—

(a) have given notice of their proposal to every person who has been served with a copy of the listed building enforcement notice or would, if the notice were re-issued, be served with a copy of it; and

(b) have considered any representations made to them, within the period of 21 days beginning with the date of service, by any of the persons served with notice of their proposal.

(4) The planning authority shall, immediately after exercising those powers, give notice of the exercise to every person to whom they gave notice of their proposal.
(5) The withdrawal of a listed building enforcement notice does not affect the power of the planning authority to issue a further listed building enforcement notice."
6.—(1) Section 93 (appeals) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) for paragraph (b) there is substituted—
"(b) that the matters alleged to constitute a contravention of section 53(1) or (4) of this Act have not occured;
(ba) that those matters (if they occurred) do not constitute such a contravention;"; and
(b) paragraph (k) is omitted.
(3) For subsection (2) of that section there is substituted—
"(2) An appeal under this section shall be made either—

(a) by giving written notice of the appeal to the Secretary of State before the date specified in the listed building enforcement notice as the date on which it is to take effect; or

(b) by sending such notice to him in a properly addressed and pre-paid letter posted to him at such time that, in the ordinary course of post, it would be delivered to him before that date."

(4) In subsection (4) (power to correct notice on appeal), for paragraph (a) there is substituted—
"(a) the Secretary of State may—

(i) correct any defect, error or misdescription in the listed building enforcement notice; or

(ii) vary the terms of the listed building enforcement notice,

if he is satisfied that the correction or variation will not cause injustice to the appellant or the planning authority."
(5) In subsection (5), the words "or for varying the terms of the notice in favour of the appellant" are omitted. 7. For section 94 (penalties for non-compliance with listed building enforcement notice) there is substituted—
"Offence where listed building enforcement notice not complied with.
94.—(1) Where, after the end of the compliance period, any step required by a listed building enforcement notice to be taken has not been taken, the person who is for the time being owner of the land is in breach of the duty under this subsection.
(2) If at any time the owner of the land is in breach of a listed building enforcement notice he shall be guilty of an offence.
(3) An offence under this section may be charged by reference to any day or longer period of time and a person may be convicted of a second or subsequent offence under this section by reference to any period of time following the preceding conviction for such an offence.
(4) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section, it shall be a defence for him to show—

(a) that he did everything he could be expected to do to secure that all the steps required by the notice were taken; or

(b) that he was not served with a copy of the listed building enforcement notice and was not aware of its existence.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £20,000; and

(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.

(6) In determining the amount of any fine to be imposed on a person convicted of an offence under this section, the court shall in particular have regard to any financial benefit which has accrued or appears likely to accrue to him in consequence of the offence."
8. In section 95 (execution and cost of works required by listed building enforcement notice), at the end there is inserted—

955
"(4) Any person who wilfully obstructs a person acting in the exercise of powers under subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale."
9.—(1) In section 97B (power to issue hazardous substances contravention notice)—

(a) in subsection (3)(b) after "remedy" there is inserted "wholly or partly", and

(b)in subsection (8) after "before" there is inserted "or after", and

(c) at the end of subsection (9) there is inserted "or would, if the notice were re-issued, be served with a copy of it".

10. After section 97A there is inserted—
"Further provision as to rights of entry in relation to listed buildings
97AB.—(1) The provisions of this section and of section 97AC of this Act shall apply, in place of the provisions of section 266 of this Act, to rights of entry exercised under section 265 of this Act in relation to listed buildings and listed buildings control.
(2) If it is shown to the satisfaction of a justice of the peace on information on oath—

(a) that there are reasonable grounds for entering any land for any of the purposes mentioned in section 265 of this Act; and

(b) that—

(i) admission to the land has been refused, or a refusal is reasonably apprehended; or

(ii) the case is one of urgency,

the justice may issue a warrant authorising any person duly authorised in writing to enter the land.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b)(i) of this section admission to land shall be regarded as having been refused if no reply is received to a request for admission within a reasonable period.
(4) A warrant authorises entry on one occasion only and that entry must be—

(a) within one month from the date of the issue of the warrant; and

(b) at a reasonable hour, unless the case is one of urgency.

Rights of entry in relation to listed buildings: supplementary provisions
97AC.—(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, a person authorised to enter any land in pursuance of a right of entry conferred under or by virtue of section 265 or 97AB of this Act (referred to in this section as "a right of entry"—

(a) shall, if so required, produce evidence of his authority before so entering;

(b) may take with him such other persons as may be necessary; and

(c) on leaving the land shall, if the owner or occupier is not then present, leave it as effectively secured against trespassers as he found it.

(2) Admission to any land which is occupied shall not be demanded as of right by virtue of section 265 of this section unless 24 hours' notice of the intended entry has been given to the occupier of the land.
(3) Any person who wilfully obstructs a person acting in the exercise of a right of entry shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.
(4) If any land is damaged in the exercise of a right of entry, compensation in respect of that damage may be recovered by any person interested in the land from the person who gave the written authority for the entry.
(5) If any person who enters any land, in exercise of a right of entry, discloses to any person any information obtained by him while on the land as to any manufacturing process or trade secret, he shall be guilty of an offence.
(6) Subsection (5) does not apply if the disclosure is made by a person in the course of performing his duty in connection with the purpose for which he was authorised to enter the land.
(7) A person who is guilty of an offence under subsection (5) shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both.
(8) No person shall carry out any works in exercise of a power conferred under section 97 of this Act unless notice of his intention to do so was included in the notice required by subsection (2) of this section.
(9) The authority of the appropriate Minister shall be required for the carrying out of works in exercise of a power conferred under section 97 of this Act if—

(a) the land in question is held by statutory undertakers; and

(b) they object to the proposed works on the ground that the execution of the works would be seriously detrimental to the carrying on of their undertaking.

(10) Section 213(1) of this Act applies for the purposes of subsection (8) of this section as it applies for the purposes of section 266(6)(b) of this Act."
11. After section 97B ther is inserted—
"VAriation of hazardous substances contravention notices.
97BA.—(1) A planning authority may waive or relax any requirement of a hazardous substances contravention notice issued by them and, in particular, may extend any period specified in accordance with section 97B(5)(b) of this Act in the notice.
(2) The powers conferred by subsection (1) of this section may be exercised before or after the notice takes effect.
(3) Those powers shall not be exercised unless the authority—

(a) have given notice of their proposal to every person who has been served with a copy of the hazardous substances contravention notice or would, if the notice were re-issued, be served with a copy of it; and

(b) have considered any representations made to them, within the period of 21 days beginning with the date of service, by any of the persons served with notice of their proposal.

(4) The planning authority shall, immediately after exercising those powers, give notice of the exercise to every person to whom they gave notice of their proposal.
Further provision as to rights of entry in relation to hazardous substances control
97BB.— (1) The provisions of this section and of section 97BC of this Act apply, in place of the provisions of section 266 of this Act, to rights of entry exercised under section 265 of this Act in relation to applications for hazardous substances consent and hazardous substances control.
(2) If it is shown to the satisfaction of a justice of the peace on information on oath—

(a) that there are reasonable grounds for entering any land for any of the purposes mentioned in section 265 of this Act; and

(b) that—

(i) admission to the land has been refused, or a refusal is reasonably apprehended; or

957

(ii) the case is one of urgency,

the justice may issue a warrant authorising any person duly authorised in writing to enter the land.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b)(i) of this section admission to land shall be regarded as having been refused if no reply is received to a request for admission within a reasonable period.
(3) A warrant authorises entry on one occasion only and that entry must be—

(a) within one month from the date of the issue of the warrant; and

(b) at a reasonable hour, unless the case is one of urgency.

Rights of entry in relation to hazardous substances control: supplementary provisions.
97BC.—(1) A person authorised to enter any land in pursuance of a right of entry conferred under or by virtue of section 265 or 97BB of this Act (referred to in this section as "a right of entry")—

(a) shall, if so required, produce evidence of his authority before so entering;

(b) may take with him such other persons as may be necessary; and

(c) on leaving the land shall, if the owner or occupier is not then present, leave it as effectivly secured against trespassers as he found it.

(2) Any person who wilfully obstructs a person acting in the exercise of a right of entry shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary convinction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.
(3) If any land is damaged in the exercise of a right of entry, compensation in respect of the damage may be recovered by any person interested in the land from the person who gave the written authority for the entry.
(4) If any person who enters any land, in exercise of a right of entry, discloses to any person any information obtained by him while on the land as to any manufacturing process or trade secret, he shall be guilty of an offence.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply if the disclosure is made by a person in the course of performing his duty in connection with the purpose for which he was authorised to enter the land.
(6) A person who is guilty of an offence under subsection (4) shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both.
(7) The authority of the appropriate Minister shall be required for the carrying out of works in exercise of a power conferred under section 265(8) of this Act if—

(a) the land in question is held by statutory undertakers; and

(b) they object to the proposed works on the ground that the execution of the works would be seriously detrimental to the carrying on of their undertaking.

(8) Section 213(1) of this Act applies for the purposes of subsection (7) of this section as it applies for the purposes of section 266(6)(b) of this Act."
Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (c. 65.)
12. In Part I of Schedule 30 to the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, the following is inserted at the appropriate place among the provisions there listed: 92A; 97AB.")
After Schedule 6, insert the following new schedule—
("Simplified Planning Zones - Scotland
Part I
Modification of procedure for making or altering schemes
Procedure before and after deposit of proposals
1. In Schedule 6A to the 1972 Act (simplified planning zones) for paragraphs 5 and 6 there is substituted—
"Steps to be taken before depositing proposals
5.—(1) A planning authority proposing to make or alter a simplified planning zone scheme shall, before determining the content of their proposals, comply with this paragraph.
(2) They shall—

(a) consult—

(i) the Secretary of State; and

(ii) any local roads authority in whose area the proposed zone or any part of it lies,

as to the effect any proposals they may make might have on existing or future roads; and

(b) consult or notify such persons as regulations may require them to consult or, as the case may be, notify.

(3) They shall take such steps as may be prescribed, or as the Secretary of State may in a particular case direct, to publicise—

(a) the fact that they propose to make or alter a simplified planning zone scheme, and

(b) the matters which they are considering including in the proposals.

(4) They shall consider any representations that are made in accordance with regulations.
Procedure after deposit of proposals
6. Where a planning authority have prepared a proposed simplified planning zone scheme, or proposed alterations to a simplified planning zone scheme, they shall—

(a) make copies of the proposed scheme or alterations available for inspection at such places as may be prescribed;

(b) take such steps as may be prescribed for the purpose of advertising the fact that the proposed scheme or alterations are so available and the places at which, and times during which, they may be inspected;

(c) take such steps as may be prescribed for inviting representations or objections to be made within such period as may be prescribed; and

(d) send a copy of the proposed scheme or alterations to the Secretary of State and to any local roads authority whom they have consulted under paragraph 5(2) (a) of this Schedule."

Dealing with objections, etc.
2.—(1) For paragraph 7(1) to (3) (objections: local inquiry or other hearing) there is substituted—
"Procedure for dealing with objections
7.—(1) Where objections to the proposed scheme or alterations are made, the planning authority may—

(a) for the purpose of considering the objections, cause a local inquiry or other hearing to be held by a person appointed by the Secretary of State or, in such cases as may be prescribed, appointed by the authority, or

(b) require the objections to be considered by a person appointed by the Secretary of State.

(2) A planning authority shall exercise the power under sub-paragraph (1), or paragraph (a) or (b) of that sub-paragraph, if directed to do so by the Secretary of State."
(2) For paragraph 10(3) and (4) (consideration of objections, etc., by Secretary of State) there is substituted—
"(3) Where on taking the proposals into consideration the Secretary of State does not determine then to reject them he shall, before determining whether or not to approve them, consider any objections made in accordance with regulations (and not withdrawn) except objections which—

(a) have already been considered by the planning authority or by a person appointed by the Secretary of State, or

(b) have already been considered at a local inquiry or other hearing.

(4) The Secretary of State may—

(a) for the purpose of considering any objections and the views of the planning authority and of such other persons as he thinks fit, cause a local inquiry or other hearing to be held by a person appointed by him, or

(b) require such objections and views to be considered by a person appointed by him.

(5) In considering the proposals the Secretary of State may consult with, or consider the views of, any planning authority or any other person; but he need not do so, or give an opportunity for the making or consideration of representations or objections, except so far as he is required to do so by sub-paragraph (3) of this paragraph."

Part II Minor and consequential amendments
3. Schedule 6A to the 1972 Act is amended as follows.
4. At the end of paragraph 4(1) there is added "and, in either case, requires the planning authority to take all the steps required by this Schedule for the adoption of proposals for the making or, as the case may be, alteration of a scheme."
5. In paragraph 7(4) for "to hold a local inquiry or other hearing" there is substituted "for the purposes of this paragraph".
(6).—(1) In paragraph 8 for sub-paragraph (1) there is substituted—
"(1) After the expiry of the period for making objections or, if objections have been made in accordance with the regulations, after considering those objections and the views of any person holding an inquiry or hearing or considering the objections under paragraph 7, the planning authority may by resolution adopt the proposals (subject to the following provisions of this paragraph and of paragraph 9 of this Schedule)."
(2) In sub-paragraph (3) of that paragraph, for "consider modifying" there is substituted "modify".
7. In paragraph 9(2) (a) after "hearing" there is inserted "or any consideration of objections".
8. For paragraph 11(1) there is substituted—
"11.—(1) Where—

(a) a planning authority are directed under paragraph 3 to make a simplified planning zone scheme which the Secretary of State considers appropriate or to alter such a scheme in such manner as he considers appropriate, and

(b) the Secretary of State is satisfied, after holding a local inquiry or other hearing, that the authority are not taking within a reasonable period the steps required by this Schedule for the adoption of proposals for the making or, as the case may be, alteration of a scheme,

he may himself make a scheme or, as the case may be, the alterations."
9. In paragraph 12(2) —
(a) after paragraph (b) there is inserted—
960
"(bb) make provision with respect to the circumstances in which representations with respect to the matters to be included in such a scheme or proposals for its alteration are to be treated, for the purposes of this Schedule, as being objections made in accordance with regulations;" and
(b) in paragraph (e) the words from "for the purpose" to "5(3)" are omitted.").
After Schedule 6 insert the following new Schedule—
("Planning compensation repeals-Scotland: minor and consequential amendments
Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963 (c.51)
1. In section 23 of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963 (assumptions not directly derived from development plans)—
(a) for subsection (3) there is substituted—
"(3) Subject to subsection (4) of this section, it shall be assumed that, in respect of the relevant land or any part of it, planning permission would be granted—

(a) subject to the condition set out in Schedule 16 to the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, for any development of a class specified in paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to that Act; and

(b) for any development of a class specified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 6 to that Act."; and

(b) in subsection (4), paragraphs (a) and (b) are omitted.
(2) This paragraph shall have effect, or be treated as having had effect, in relation to compensation which fell or falls to be assessed by reference to prices current on 16th November 1990 or on any subsequent date.
Gas Act 1965 (c. 36)
2. In Schedule 3 to the Gas Act 1965, paragraph (3) is omitted.
Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1973 (c. 56)
3.—(1) In section 5 of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1973 (assessment of compensation: assumptions as to planning permission)—
(a) for subsection (2) there is substituted—
"(3) Subject to subsection (3) below, it shall be assumed that, in respect of the land in which the interest subsists ("the relevant land") or any part of it, planning permission would be granted—

(a) subject to the condition set out in Schedule 16 to the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, for any development of a class specified in paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to that Act; and

(b) for any development of a class specified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 6 to that Act."; and

(b) in subsection (3), paragraphs (a) and (b) are omitted.
(2) This paragraph shall have effect, or be treated as having had effect, where the relevant date for the purposes of Part I of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1973 fell or falls on or after 16th November 1990.
The 1972 Act
4. The 1972 Act is amended as follows.
5. In section 19 (meaning of "development" and "new development") subsection (5) (meaning of new development) is omitted.
6. In section 40(3) (date when development is begun), for paragraph (b) there is substituted—
"(b) development of a class specified in paragraph 1 or 2 of Schedule 6 to this Act;".
7. In the proviso to section 29(2) (permission to retain buildings or works or continue use of land), for "of sections 64 to 83 or of Part VII" there is substituted "or of sections 64 to 83".
8. Sections 35 and 36 (review of planning decisions where compensation claimed) are omitted.
9. In section 56G (deemed hazardous substances consent by virtue of authorisation of government department), in subsection (3) for "Parts VII and XII" there is substituted "Part VII".
10. In section 58(2)(a) (tree preservation orders) "35, 36" is omitted.
11. In section 231(3) (validity of orders etc.) paragraph (c) is omitted.
12. In section 106 (compensation on compulsory acquisition of listed building) the words from "other than" to the end are omitted.
13.—(1) In section 153(4) (compensation where planning permission modified or revoked) for "for development of the land of any class specified in Schedule 6 to this Act" there is substituted "—

(a) subject to the condition set out in Schedule 16, for any development of a class specified in paragraph 1 of Schedule 6;

(b) for any development of a class specified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 6."

(2) This paragraph shall have effect, or be treated as having had effect, in relation to claims made on or after 16th November 1990.
14. In section 155 (recording and apportionment of compensation for depreciation)—
(a) for subsection (3) there is substituted—
"(3) Regulations under this section shall make provision—

(a) for enabling the claimant or any other person to whom notice of the planning authority's apportionment has been given in accordance with subsection (1) of this section, or who establishes that he is entitled to an interest in land which is substantially affected by such an apportionment, if he wishes to dispute the apportionment, to require it to be referred to the Lands Tribunal;

(b) for enabling the claimant and any other person mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection to be heard by the Tribunal on any reference under this section of that apportionment; and

(c) for requiring the Tribunal, on any such reference, either to confirm or vary the apportionment and to notify the parties of the decision.";

(b) in subsection (5), the words from "and subsection (5)" to the end are omitted;
(c) after subsection (5) there is inserted—
"(5A) In relation to compensation for depreciation specified in a notice recorded or, as the case may be, registered under the preceding provisions of this section, references in this Part of this Act to so much of the compensation as if attributable to a part of the land to which the notice relates shall be construed in accordance with the following provisions, that is to say—

(a) if the notice does not include an apportionment under the preceding provisions of this section, the amount of the compensation shall be treated as distributed rateably according to area over the land to which the notice relates;

(b) if the notice includes such an apportionment, the compensation shall be treated as distributed in accordance with that apportionment as between the different parts of the land by reference to which the apportionment is made; and so much of the compensation as, in accordance with the apportionment, is
962
attributed to a part of the land shall be treated as distributed rateably according to area over that part of the land."; and

(d) in subsection (6), "and in section 156 of this Act" is omitted.
15. Section 156 (contribution by Secretary of State towards compensation in certain cases) is omitted.
16. Before section 157 there is inserted—
"Recovery of compensation on subsequent development.
156A.—(1) No person shall carry out any development to which this section applies, on land in respect of which a notice (hereafter in this Part of this Act referred to as a "compensation notice") is recorded or, as the case may be, registered under section 155(5) of this Act, until such amount, if any, as is recoverable under this section in respect of the compensation specified in the notice has been paid or secured to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State.
(2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, this section applies to any development—

(a) which is development of a residential commercial or industrial character and consists wholly or mainly of the construction of houses, flats, shop or office premises, or industrial buildings (including warehouses), or any combination thereof; or

(b) which consists in the winning and working of minerals; or

(c) to which, having regard to the probable value of the development, it is in the opinion of the Secretary of State reasonable that this section should apply.

(3) This section shall not apply to any development by virtue of subsection (2)(c) of this section if, on an application made to him for the purpose, the Secretary of State has certified that, having regard to the probable value of the development, it is not in his opinion reasonable that this section should apply thereto.
(4) Where the compensation specified in the compensation notice became payable in respect of the imposition of conditions on the granting of permission to develop land, this section shall not apply to the development for which that permission was granted.
(5) This section does not apply to any development—

(a) of a class specified in paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 which is carried out in accordance with the condition set out in Schedule 16; or

(b) of a class specified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 6.

(6) This section does not apply in a case where the compensation under section 153 of this Act specified in a compensation notice became payable in respect of an order modifying planning permission, and the development is in accordance with that permission as modified by that order.
Amount recoverable, and provisions for payment or remission thereof.
156B.—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, the amount recoverable under section 156A of this Act in respect of the compensation specified in a compensation notice—

(a) if the land on which the development is to be carried out (in this subsection referred to as "the development area") is identical with, or includes (with other land) the whole of, the land comprised in the compensation notice, shall be the amount of compensation specified in that notice;

(b) if the development area forms part of the land comprised in the compensation notice, or includes part of that land together with other land not comprised in that notice, shall be so much of the amount of the compensation

963
specified in that notice as is attributable to land comprised in that notice and falling within the development area.

(2) Where, in the case of any land in respect of which a compensation notice has been recorded, the Secretary of State is satisfied, having regard to the probable value of any proper development of that land, that no such development is likely to be carried out unless he exercises his powers under this subsection, he may, in the case of any particular development, remit the whole or any part of any amount otherwise recoverable under section 156A of this Act.
(3) Where, in connection with the development of any land, an amount becomes recoverable under section 156A of this Act in respect of the compensation specified in a compensation notice, then, except where, and to the extent that, payment of that amount has been remitted under subsection (2) of this section, no amount shall be recoverable under section 156A of this Act in respect of that compensation, in so far as it is attributable to that land, in connection with any subsequent development thereof.
(4) No amount shall be recoverable under section 156A of this Act in respect of any compensation by reference to which a sum has become recoverable by the Secretary of State under section 244 of this Act.
(5) An amount recoverable under section 156A of this Act in respect of any compensation shall be payable to the Secretary of State, and

(a) shall be so payable either as a single capital payment or as a series of instalments of capital and interest combined, or as a series of other annual or periodical payments, of such amounts, and payable at such times, as the Secretary of State may direct, after taking into account any representations made by the person by whom the development is to be carried out; and

(b) except where the amount is payable as a single capital payment, shall he secured by that person to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State (whether by heritable or other security, personal bond or otherwise).

(6) If any person initiates any development to which section 156A applies in contravention of subsection (1) of that section, the Secretary of State may serve a notice on him specifying the amount appearing to the Secretary of State to be the amount recoverable under that section in respect of the compensation in question, and requiring him to pay that amount to the Secretary of State within such period, not being less than three months after the service of the notice, as may be specified in the notice.
(7) Where, after a compensation notice in respect of any land has been recorded or, as the case may be, registered, any amount recoverable under this section in respect of the compensation specified in the notice, or any part of such amount, has been paid to the Secretary of State, or circumstances arise under which by virtue of any provision of this Act no amount is so recoverable in respect of the land specified in the notice or any part of that land, the Secretary of State shall cause to be recorded in the appropriate Register of Sasines or, as the case may be, registered in the Land Register of Scotland, a notice of that fact, specifying the land to which such fact relates, and, in the case of any notice of the fact that part only of such amount has been so paid, stating whether the balance has been secured to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State or has been remitted by him under subsection (2) of this section, and shall send a copy thereof to the planning authority."
17. In section 157 (recovery, on subsequent development, of compensation under section 153)—

(a) subsection (1) is omitted;

964

(b) in subsection (2), for "section 148 of this Act, as applied by subsection (1) of this section" there is substituted "section 156A of this Act";

(c) in subsection (3)—

(i) paragraph (a) is omitted; and

(ii) in the proviso, "paragraph (a) or" is omitted; and

(d) subsection (4) is omitted.

18. In section 169 (purchase notice on refusal or conditional grant of planning permission)—

(a) in subsection (2), for the words from "no account shall be taken" to the end there is substituted "no account shall be taken of any prospective development other than any development specified in paragraph 1 or 2 of Schedule 6 to this Act."; and

(b) subsection (3) is omitted.

19. In section 176 (special provisions as to compensation where purchase notice served)—

(a) in subsection (2), for "existing use value" there is substituted "Schedule 6 value"; and

(b) in subsection (5), for the definition of "existing use value" there is substituted—

""Schedule 6 value", in relation to such an interest, means the value of that interest calculated on the assumption that planning permission would be granted—

(a) subject to the conditions set out in Schedule 16, for any development of a class specified in paragraph 1 of Schedule 6; and

(b) for any development of a class specified in paragraph 2 of Schedule 6."

20. In section 244 (recovery from acquiring authorities of sums paid by way of compensation)—

(a) in subsection (1), for "147(5)" there is substituted "155(5A)"; and

(b) in subsection (2), the words from "subsection (4)" to "applied by" are omitted.

21. Section 245 (recovery from acquiring authorities of sums paid in respect of war-damaged land) is omitted.
22. In section 246 (sums recoverable from acquiring authorities reckonable for purposes of grant), "or 245" is omitted.
23. In section 247 (expenses of government departments), in subsection (1) (b) "Part VII or" is omitted.
24. Section 248 (payments under section 56 of Act of 1947 and Parts I and V of Act of 1954) is omitted.
25. In section 249 (general provision as to receipts of Secretary of State, "Without prejudice to section 248 of this Act, and" is omitted.
26. For subsection (1) of section 255 (supplementary provisions as to Crown interest), there is substituted—
"(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, where there is a Crown interest in any land, the provisions of sections 155 to 157 of this Act, and the provisions of Schedule 22 to this Act in so far as they relate to those sections, shall have effect in relation to any private interest as if the Crown interest were a private interest."
27. Sections 263 (assumptions as to planning permission in determining value of interests in land) and 264 (recovery, on subsequent development, of payments in respect of war-damaged land) are omitted.
28. In section 275 (interpretation), in subsection (1), the definition of "new development" is omitted.
29. In Schedule 6 (development not constituting new development)—

(a) paragraphs 3 to 9 and 12 are omitted; and

(b) in paragraph 14, for sub-paragraph (2) there is substituted—

"(2) This paragraph does not apply for the purposes of sections 157 and 169 of this Act.
30. In Schedule 19 (provisions referred to in sections 250, 251 etc.), in Part I, the entry relating to section 158 is omitted."
Civil Aviation Act 1982 (c. 16)
31. In section 53(1) (a) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 "158," is omitted.
Airports Act 1986 (c. 31)
32. In section 61(1) (a) of the Airports Act 1986 "158," is omitted.")
The noble and learned Lord said: Amendments Nos. 270 to 273 were spoken to with Amendment No. 114. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 43 agreed to.
Schedule 7 [Planning in Scotland: minor and consequential amendments.]:
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 274:
Page 102, line 4, after ("1.") insert ("The 1972 Act is amended as follows—
1A.").
The noble and learned Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 274, I speak also to amendments Nos. 275 to 286. These add to and amend Schedule 7 to the Bill. Schedule 7 makes a series of minor and consequential amendments to the 1972 Act for Scotland which are related to the provisions at Clauses 27 to 42 of the Bill. It also includes amendments which will enable subordinate legislation in particular cases to be made either by regulation or by development order. The additions to Schedule 7 made by these amendments either make essential drafting changes or are equivalent to the minor or consequential amendments in Schedule 6 for England and Wales. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendments Nos. 275 to 286:
Page 102, line 4, leave out ("of the 1972 Act").
Page 102, line 31, after ("(i)") insert:
("the words "Subject to the provisions of section 26(2) to (5) of this Act," are omitted;
(ia)") .
Page 102, line 36, at end insert:
("4A. In the proviso to subsection (2) of section 29 (permission to retain buildings or works etc.), for "or 57, or of Part VII" there is substituted "57 or 145".").
Page 102, line 45, at end insert:
("5A. In subsection (4) of section 32 (reference of applications to Secretary of State)—

(a) for the words from "23" to "28A" there is substituted "26, 27(1), 27A and 28A"; and

(b) at the end there is inserted "and regulations under this Act or a development order may apply, with or without modifications, to an application so referred any requirements imposed by such regulations or such an order by virtue of section 23 or 24 of this Act.".").

Page 102, line 48, leave out ("and").
Page 103, line 1, after ("(b)") insert:
("in subsection (5)—

(i) "23, 24" is omitted; and

(ii) at the end there is inserted "and regulations under this Act or a development order may apply, with or without modifications, to such an
966
appeal any requirements imposed by regulations or such an order by virtue of section 23 or 24 of this Act; and

(c)").
Page 103, line 12, at end insert:
("9A. Section 84(11) is omitted.").
Page 103, line 34, leave out from ("whether") to ("lawful") in line 38 and insert ("on the date on which the appeal was made, any existing use of the land was lawful, any operations which had been carried out in, on, over or under the land were lawful or any matter constituting a failure to comply with any condition or limitation subject to which the permission was granted was").
Page 103, line 39, at end insert:
("(c) after subsection (5) there is inserted—
"(5A) The provisions of sections 90 to 90C of this Act mentioned in subsection (5B) of this section shall apply for the purposes of subsection (5) (d) of this section as they apply for the purposes of section 90 of this Act, but as if—

(a) any reference to an application for a certificate were a reference to the appeal and any reference to the date of such an application were a reference to the date on which the appeal is made; and

(b) references to the planning authority were references to the Secretary of State.

(5B) Those provisions are: sections 90(5) to (7), 90B(4) (so far as it relates to the form of the certificate), (6) and (7) and 90C."; and
(d) subsection (11) is omitted.
10A. In section 87 (stop notices)—

(a) in subsection (4) (c), for "84(7) (c)" there is substituted "84AA(7)";

(b) in subsection (5), for the words "activity prohibited by the stop notice" there is substituted "relevant activity"; and

(c) in subsection (9), for "84(5)" there is substituted "84".").

Page 103, line 41, at end insert:
("11A. In subsection (2) of section 88 (execution and cost of works required by enforcement notice), "(as defined in section 84(2) of this Act)" is omitted.
Page 104, line 9, at end insert:
("13A. In subsection (1) of section 145 (determination of claims)—

(a) the words "this Part of", in both places where they occur, are omitted; and

(b) at the end there is inserted—

"(d) for requiring the Secretary of State to pay any compensation determined under this section to the person entitled thereto.".")
13B. In subsection (1) of section 166 (compensation for loss due to stop notice)—

(a) for the words "in any of the circumstances mentioned in subsection (2) of this section" there is substituted "subject to the provisions of this section,"; and

(b) at the end there is inserted "or, in a case to which subsection (2) (b) of this section applies, the prohibition of such of the activities prohibited by the stop notice as cease to be relevant activities".

13C. In subsection (2) of that section, for paragraphs (a) and (b) there is substituted—

"(a) the enforcement notice is quashed on grounds other than those mentioned in paragraph (a) of section 85(1) of this Act;

(b) the enforcement notice is varied (otherwise than on the grounds mentioned in that paragraph) so that any activity the carrying out of which is prohibited by the stop notice ceases to be a relevant activity within the meaning of section 87(2) of this Act;"

967
13D. In subsection (5) of section 201 (order extinguishing right to use vehicles on highway), the definition of "lawful access" is omitted.").
Page 104, line 12, at end insert:
("15. Section 234 is omitted.
16. In subsection (1) (b) of section 247 (expenses of government departments), for "Part VII" there is substituted "section 145".
17. In subsection (2) (a) of section 253 (exercise of powers in relation to Crown land), for "84" there is substituted "83C, 84, 84AB, 87, 87AA".")
18. In section 265 (rights of entry)—

(a) in subsection (1) (b)—

(i) "58 or" is omitted; and

(ii) for the words "either of those sections" there is substituted "section 61";

(b) in subsection (1) (c), for the words "Part V" there is substituted "sections 92 to 97BC and 101";

(c) subsection (2A) (a) is omitted;

(d) in subsection (4) (b), "or 99" is omitted; and

(e) in subsection (5) "Part VII of" is omitted.")

19. In subsection (3) of section 266 (supplementary provisions as to rights of entry), for "premises" there is substituted "land".
20.—(1) In subsection (1) of section 275 (interpretation)—
(a) after the definition of "authority to whom Part II of the 1959 Act applies" there is inserted—
""breach of condition notice" has the meaning given in section 87AA of this Act;
"breach of planning control" has the meaning given in section 83A of this Act;
(b) the definition of "established use certificate" is omitted; and
(c) after the definition of "owner" there is inserted—
""planning contravention notice" has the meaning given in section 83C of this Act;".
(2) In subsection (9) of that section, for "or 257" there is substituted ", 257 or 258".
21.—(1) In paragraph 2 of Schedule 7 (determination of appeals), in sub-paragraph (1) (a), for "subsections (3) and (5)" there is substituted "subsections (3), (5) and (7A)".
(2) In paragraph 3 of that Schedule, in subparagraph (2), for "section 26(3) (a)" there is substituted "section 26(3)".
22. In Schedule 19 (sections 250, 251 etc.)—

(a) in Part I—

(i) after the entry for section 26(1) there is inserted "Section 26A"; and

(ii) for "Sections 48 to 51" there is substituted "Section 49 to 50"; and

(b) in Part II, in the entry for section 33, for "and" there is substituted "to".

Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (c.65.)
23. In Part I of Schedule 30 to the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, the following are inserted at the appropriate places among the provisions of the 1972 Act there listed: 83C, 83D, 84AA, 84AB and 87AA.
Town and Country Planning Act 1984 (c.10)
24.—(1) Section 1 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1984 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for "determination under section 51 of the Act of 1972 (determination whether planning permission is required)" there is substituted "certificate under section 90A of the Act of 1972 (certificate of lawfulness of proposed use or development).
(3) In subsection (2) for "or determination" there is substituted "or certificate".
(4) For subsection (4) there is substituted—
"(4) Any application made by virtue of this section for a certificate under section 90A shall be determined as if the land were not Crown land."
(5) In subsection (5) (a) for "determinations" there is substituted "certificates".
(6) In subsection (7) for "determination" there is substituted "certificate".").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
On Question, Schedule 7, as amended, agreed to.
Viscount Astor: I beg to move that the House be now resumed. In moving this Motion, may I suggest that the Committee stage begin again at 8 p.m.
Moved accordingly, and, On Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

Financial Services Act 1986 (Delegation) Order 1991
7.4 p.m.
Viscount Astorrose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 19th December 1990 be approved [7th Report from the Joint Committee].
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, the purpose of the draft order before the House is to transfer to the Securities and Investments Board certain functions. The functions referred to in the order are those relating to an important civil remedy to protect the interests of investors.
The Financial Services Act was brought in by this Government in 1986 to provide a comprehensive framework of investor protection. The Act gives the Secretary of State powers to authorise and regulate the carrying on of investment business. However, the Act allows most of the Secretary of State's powers and functions to be transferred to a designated agency, if it appears to him that the designated agency is willing and able to discharge them and that certain other criteria are met. The majority of the powers and functions in question have now been transferred to the Securities and Investments Board which was set up for that purpose.
Section 61 of the Act allows the Secretary of State to apply to court for restitution orders against a person who has made profits, or caused investors to lose money, where this is the result of his contravening the conduct of business provisions in Chapter V of Part I of the Act.
Under subsections (4) and (5) of Section 61, the court may order the person concerned to pay a sum of money which appears to the court to be just, having regard to the loss suffered or profit made. The money may be paid into court or to the applicant for the order, or the court may appoint a receiver to recover it.

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Subsections (6) and (7) make provision as to how the money is to be distributed. The Secretary of State's functions in relation to restitution orders were largely transferred to SIB in May 1987, although the Secretary of State has retained the right to exercise the powers concurrently.
SIB's exercise of the restitution functions in relation to contraventions mentioned in Section 61 is subject to the limitation that they cannot be exercised against a person who neither is nor ever has been an authorised person or an appointed representative under the Act. Such persons may however contravene the relevant provisions.
SIB have now indicated that they would find it valuable also to be able to exercise these functions against persons who are not or never have been authorised.
The Government believe that augmenting SIB's powers in this way is in the interests of investors and of effective regulation. Article 3 of the draft order now before the House therefore has the effect of transferring functions under Section 61(3) of the Act in relation to such persons, subject to the functions continuing to be exercisable concurrently by the Secretary of State.
However the effect of Article 3(2) of the draft order is not to transfer these functions in relation to the Society of Lloyd's and Lloyd's underwriters in so far as they are exempt from authorisation by virtue of Section 42 of the Act. This reflects the findings of the Neill Committee that Lloyd's should not be accountable to SIB and that SIB should not exercise any power over Lloyd's. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 19th December 1990 be approved [7th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Viscount Astor.)
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Viscount for introducing this order. I am glad to see that I am speaking to the usual full House when it comes to financial services orders! Indeed, I am glad to see that the noble Lords sitting on my right, the Liberals and Social Democrats as I understand them to be, will be contributing to this debate.
My reaction to the noble Viscount's introduction is that I have no problem at all with the substance of the order. Indeed, the only problem I have is that perhaps the order should have been introduced a little earlier than it has been. My problems relate to the primary legislation. I accept that the noble Viscount was not responsible for the primary legislation. But there are some difficulties under Section 114 of the Financial Services Act. The noble Viscount said that his Government were responsible for introducing that Act. That is true. But he would have done better to consider rather more carefully the drafting of some of the clauses of the Bill when it was before your Lordships' House and then we would not be faced with the rather extraordinary things we have this evening.
I itemise the extraordinary things as follows. First, there appears to be no time limit imposed on the
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laying of this order. This order is subordinate legislation under Section 144(1), but that imposes no time limit at all. I do not quite understand how markets can operate if delegation orders of this nature are going to be laid by secretaries of state with no particular time limit upon them. We frequently find in legislation a time limit of 28 days from the time the order is laid, and if it is not passed by a Motion of both Houses, it lapses.
These are very market-sensitive orders, and it is very odd that the primary legislation does not impose a time limit. The Secretary of State can lay an order now and for the next 12 months, 18 months, two years, five years, or three millennia, it can remain on the table. The market perceives that the Government wish to do something, but the Houses of Parliament have not determined whether that should be done. That seems to be a very odd defect in the primary legislation.
The second difficulty is that this order clearly does not fall under Section 114(9) of the Act because it is not an order which requires the SIB to make rules and regulations. That we understand. But subsection (10) of the section that I have just quoted is a catch-all section which states that:
"The Secretary of State shall also before making a delegation order transferring any functions"—
and these come under "any functions"—
"to a designated agency"—
which in this case is the SIB—
"require it to furnish him with a copy of any guidance intended to have continuing effect which it proposes to issue in writing or other legible form and the Secretary of State may take any such guidance into account in determining whether he is satisfied as mentioned in subsection (9) (b) above".
So subsection (10) refers back to subsection (9) and particularly to paragraph (b).
I understand from the preamble to the order that:
"The Securities and Investments Board is not proposing to issue, in writing or other legible form, any guidance intended to have continuing effect".
I ask myself—and the noble Viscount—under these circumstances what is "is not proposing"? It may not propose to do so now. It is now Monday; suppose that the order goes into effect on Wednesday, because it has gone through another place. What happens if it issues guidance on Thursday? Is that something of which the Secretary of State should be advised? Should the House be advised of it? What is the treatment of that?
Let us suppose that the Securities and Investments Board says to the Secretary of State, "We do not propose to issue any guidance whatsoever on this for all time". Is the Secretary of State then required to give an opinion? Does he have any opinion on whether the order as promulgated by his office—and presumably passed tonight by your Lordships—is in the interests that are specified in subsection (9) (b) of Section 114 of the Financial Services Act; that is to say, that it,
"will afford investors an adequate level of protection"?
In the event of a non-issue of guidance at all does the Secretary of State have to be persuaded that investors are thereby properly protected?
I accept that the noble Viscount may not be able to answer all the queries that I have raised because they are comments on the primary legislation. However, I

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impress on him that a delegation order—an order delegating the powers of a Secretary of State to a governmental body (in this case, the Securities and Investments Board)—is an important order. It is not an order under social security regulations simply uplifting this rate or that. It is an important order and something to which the markets have to pay attention. I should be grateful if the noble Viscount could respond to my questions.
Viscount Astor: My Lords, I think I am right in saying that the noble Lord, Lord Williams, basically welcomes the draft order as laid before the House and therefore does not expect me to answer every technical question that he raised, particularly when it relates to the primary legislation. I explained with regard to time limits that that is not a new power but a transfer to the SIB of existing powers which are exercised by the Secretary of State and so the Secretary of State retains the right to act.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, I am sorry to have to intervene. I did not wish to do so. However, I understand that these are delegated powers. The Secretary of State already has these powers and he proposes to delegate them to the SIB. I understand that fully. But at what point are we to know that the Secretary of State in fact delegates those powers? Can he lay an order now, to lie on the table for two, three, four or five years? I said that it might be a millennium, but I exaggerated a little. In very simple terms, the market needs to know whether the SIB or the DTI will
Viscount Astor: My Lords, I shall try to answer that point in a moment. Perhaps I should just say that the SIB has requested a transfer of these powers. We do not think that any further powers will necessarily be transferred. With regard to the noble Lord's particular point, this order may be cited as the Financial Services Act 1986 (Delegation) Order 1991 and shall come into force on the day after the day on which it is made. I hope that that answers the noble Lord's point. I shall read very carefully any technical points that he made and I shall write to him.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, I am sorry to interject again but can the noble Viscount tell me when the order will be made?
Viscount Astor: My Lords, I believe that we are laying the draft order before the House. I am not sure that I can say when it will come into force. I might have to look at various papers. Obviously I understand the noble Lord's concern. It is a quickly changing world and business needs to know. My noble friend says, "When the Secretary of State says so". I think I can say no more than that that is the answer. I shall certainly look into that point and let the noble Lord know as soon as possible.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Viscount Astor: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
[The Sitting was suspended from 7.17 to 8 p.m.]

Planning and Compensation Bill [H.L.]
House again in Committee.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 287:
After Schedule 7, insert the following new schedule:
("Compensation where permission for additional development granted after acquisition
1. After section 22 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 there is inserted—
"Part IV COMPENSATION WHERE PERMISSION FOR ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANTED AFTER ACQUISITION Compensation where planning decision made after acquisition.
23.—(1) Where—

(a) any interest in land is compulsorily acquired or is sold to an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers and, before the end of the period of ten years beginning with the date of completion, a planning decision is made granting permission for the carrying out of additional development of any of the land; and

(b) the principal amount of the compensation which was payable in respect of the compulsory acquisition or, in the case of a sale by agreement, the amount of the purchase price, was less than the amount specified in subsection (2) of this section,

then, subject to the following provisions of this section, the person to whom the compensation or purchase price was payable shall be entitled, on a claim duly made by him, to compensation from the acquiring authority of an amount equal to the difference.
(2) The amount referred to in subsection (1)(b) of this section is the principal amount of the compensation which would have been payable in respect of a compulsory acquisition of the interest by the acquiring authority, in pursuance of a notice to treat served on the relevant date if—

(a) the planning decision mentioned in subsection (1)(a) of this section had been made before that date; and

(b) the permission granted by it had been in force on that date.

(3) No compensation shall be payable by virtue of this section in respect of a planning decision in so far as it relates to land acquired by the acquiring authority, whether compulsorily or by agreement—

(a) under section 142 or 143 of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (acquisitions by urban development corporations and by highway authorities in connection with urban development areas);

(b) under the New Towns Act 1981 (acquisitions by development corporations and by high-ways authorities in connection with new town areas); or

(c) where the compulsory purchase order included a direction under section 50 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 (minimum compensation where building deliberately allowed to fall into disrepair).

(4) If—

(a) in accordance with the preceding provisions of this section the person referred to in subsection (1) of this section would be entitled to compensation under this section; but

(b) before the planning decision in question that person has died, or any other act or event has occurred whereby the right to compensation
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under this section, if vested in him immediately before that act or event, would thereupon have vested in some other person,

the right to compensation under this section shall be treated as having devolved as if that right had been vested in him immediately before his death or immediately before that act or event, as the case may be, and the compensation shall be payable to the persons claiming under him accordingly.
(5) Compensation under this section shall carry interest at the rate prescribed under section 40 of this Act from the date of the planning decision in question until payment.
(6) The provisions of Part I of this Act (so far as applicable) shall apply (subject to the following provisions) in relation to the assessment of compensation under this section as they apply in relation to the assessment of compensation in respect of the compulsory acquisition of an interest in land.
Provisions as to claims under section 23.
24.—(1) For the purpose of facilitating the making of claims for compensation under section 23 of this Act—

(a) the person entitled to receive the compensation or purchase price in respect of such an acquisition or sale as is mentioned in section 23(1)(a) of this Act; or

(b) any person claiming under him as being a person who, if compensation under that section became payable, would be entitled to it by virtue of subsection (4) of that section,

may give to the acquiring authority an address for service under this section.
(2) Where, at any time—

(a) after a person has given an acquiring authority an address for service under this section; and

(b) before the end of the period mentioned in paragraph (a) of section 23(1) of this Act,

such a planning decision is made as is mentioned in that paragraph, the acquiring authority shall, subject to subsection (3) of this section, give notice of the decision in the prescribed form to that person at that address.
(3) If—

(a) an address for service has been given by such a person as is mentioned in subsection (1)(b) of this section; and

(b) the acquiring authority have reasonable grounds for believing that the person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) of this section is dead or that any other act or event has occurred as mentioned in section 23(4)(b) of this Act,

the acquiring authority need not give a notice to the person mentioned in subsection (1)(a).
(4) A claim for compensation under section 23 of this Act in respect of a planning decision shall not have effect if made more than six months after the following date, that is to say—

(a) if the claim is made by a person who has not given the acquiring authority an address for service under this section, the date of the decision;

(b) if the claim is made by a person who has given the acquiring authority such an address, the date on which notice of the decision is given to him in accordance with subsection (2) of this section;

but, where there is an appeal against the planning decision, the reference in paragraph (a) of this

975
subsection to the date of the planning decision shall be read as a reference to the date of the decision on the appeal.
(5) The references in subsection (4) of this section to an appeal against a planning decision include an appeal made by virtue of section 78(2) of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1990.
(6) Where—

(a) a person has given to an acquiring authority an address for service under this section; and

(b) that authority, before the end of the period mentioned in section 23(1)(a) of this Act, cease to be entitled to an interest in the whole or part of the land comprised in the acquisition or sale, without remaining or becoming entitled to a freehold interest in, or a tenancy of, that land or that part of it, as the case may be,

they shall notify the planning authority; and after that it shall be the duty of the planning authority to give notice to the acquiring authority of any planning decision of which the acquiring authority are required to give notice under subsection (2) of this section.
(7) Notice under subsection (6) of this section of a planning decision—

(a) in the case of a decision made by the planning authority, shall be given within seven days after the making of the decision; and

(b) in any other case, shall be given within seven days after the making of the decision has been notified to the planning authority.

Extension to planning permission where no planning decision made.
25.—(1) The provisions of sections 31 and 32(1) of this Act shall have effect in relation to any planning permission falling within column 1 of the following table for any development as if a planning decision granting that permission had been made on the date shown in column 2.

Planning permission

Date of decision

Permission granted by a development order

When development is initiated

Permission granted by the adoption or approval of a simplified planning zone scheme

When the scheme is approved or adopted

Permission granted by an order designating an enterprise zone

When the designation takes effect

Permission deemed to be granted by a direction under section 90 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990

When the direction is given

Permission deemed to be granted by a local planning authority

The occurrence of the event in consequence of which the permission is deemed to be granted

(2) Where the provisions of section 23 of this Act have effect as applied by subsection (1) of this section in relation to any planning permission falling within column 1 of that table for any development, then if—

(a) before the date shown in column 2, a person who (under section 24(1) of this Act as so applied) is entitled to give an address for service under that section has given such an address to the acquiring authority; and

(b) the development is proposed to be carried out by the acquiring authority or, if it is proposed to be carried out by a person other than the
976
acquiring authority, notice of that proposal is given to the acquiring authority by the person proposing to carry out the development,

it shall, subject to subsection (3) of this section, be the duty of the acquiring authority to give notice of that proposal in the prescribed form to the person mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection at the address given by him to the authority.
(3) An acquiring authority shall not be required by virtue of subsection (2) of this section to give notice of proposed development to the person mentioned in section 24(1)(a) of this Act if—

(a) an address for service has been given to them by such a person as is mentioned in section 24(1)(b) of this Act; and

(b) they have reasonable grounds for believing that the former person is dead or that any other act or event has occurred as mentioned in section 23(4)(b) of this Act.

(4) A claim for compensation under section 23 of this Act in respect of a planning permission falling within column 1 of that table shall not have effect if made more than six months after the following date, that is to say—

(a) if the claim is made by a person to whom notice has been given under subsection (2) of this section, the date on which the notice was given;

(b) in any other case, the date shown in column 2.

Extension to Crown development.
26.—(1) Where—

(a) any interest in land is compulsorily acquired or is sold to an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers, and before the end of the period of ten years beginning with the date of completion there is initiated any additional development of any of the land which was comprised in the acquisition or sale; and

(b) by reason of any such circumstances as are mentioned in subsection (2) of this section the development in question is development for which planning permission is not required,

the provisions of sections 23 and 24(1) of this Act shall apply as if a planning decision granting permission for that development had been made at the time when the additional development is so initiated.
(2) The circumstances referred to in subsection (1) of this section are either or both of the following—

(a) that the development is initiated by or on behalf of the Crown;

(b) that there is a Crown or Duchy interest in the land and the development is initiated in right of that interest.

(3) Where—

(a) the provisions of section 23 of this Act have effect as applied by subsection (1) of this section in relation to the initiation of any development; and

(b) before the development is initiated a person who (under section 24(1) of this Act as so applied) is entitled to give an address for service under that section has given such an address to the acquiring authority,

it shall, subject to subsections (4) and (5) of this section, be the duty of the acquiring authority to give notice in the prescribed form of the initiation of the development to the person mentioned in paragraph (b) of this subsection at the address given by him to the authority.
(4) Where—

977

(a) by virtue of subsection (3) of this section, it is the duty of a government department to give notice of development initiated by or on behalf of that department; and

(b) the Minister in charge of the department certifies that for reasons of national security it is necessary that the nature of the development should not be disclosed, except to the extent specified in the certificate,

the department shall give notice of development, but shall not be required to give any particulars of the nature of the development except to the extent specified in the certificate.
(5) An acquiring authority shall not be required by virtue of subsection (3) of this section to give notice of proposed development to the person mentioned in section 24(1)(a) of this Act if—

(a) an address for service has been given to them by such a person as is mentioned in section 24(1)(b) of this Act; and

(b) they have reasonable grounds for believing that the former person is dead or that any other act or event has occurred as mentioned in section 23(4)(b) of this Act.

(6) A claim for compensation under section 23 of this Act in respect of the initiation of any development shall not have effect if made more than six months after the following date, that is to say—

(a) if the claim is made by a person to whom notice has been given under subsection (3) of this section, the date on which the notice was given;

(b) in any other case, the time the development is initiated.

(7) in this section "Crown or Duchy interest" means an interest belonging to Her Majesty in right of the Crown or the Duchy of Lancaster, or belonging to the Duchy of Cornwall, or belonging to a government department or held in trust for Her Majesty for the purposes of a government department.
Application of Part IV to certain cases.
27. The preceding provisions of this Part of this Act shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Third Schedule to this Act.
Regulations for purposes of Part IV
28.—(1) The Secretary of State may by statutory instrument make regulations for prescribing the form of any notice required by this Part of this Act to be given in the prescribed form.
(2) Any statutory instrument containing such regulations shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
Interpretation of Part IV.
"additional development", in relation to an acquisition or sale of an interest in land, means any development of the land other than the following, that is to say—

(a) where the acquiring authority are a local authority, and acquired the interest for the purposes of any of their functions, development for the purposes of the functions for which they acquired it;

(b) where the acquiring authority are not a local authority, development for the purposes of the project in connection with which they acquired the interest;

(c) development for which planning permission was in force on the relevant date;

978

(d) in the case of compulsory acquisition, development for which it was assumed (in accordance with the provisions of sections 14 to 16 of this Act) for the purpose of assessing compensation that planning permission would be granted; and

(e) in the case of a sale by agreement, development for which, if the interest (instead of being sold by agreement) had been compulsorily acquired by the acquiring authority in pursuance of a notice to treat served on the relevant date, it would have been so assumed;

"date of completion", in relation to an acquisition or sale of an interest in land, means the date on which the acquisition or sale is completed by the vesting of that interest in the acquiring authority;
"local authority" means—

(a) a charging authority, a precepting authority, a combined police authority or a combined fire authority, as defined in section 144 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988;

(b) a levying board within the meaning of section 74 of that Act;

(c) a body as regards which section 75 of that Act applies;

(d) any joint board or joint committee if all the constituent authorities are such authorities as are described in paragraphs (a) to (c); and

(e) the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple or the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple;

and includes any internal drainage board under section 6 of the Land Drainage Act 1976;
"prescribed" means prescribed by regulations under this Part of this Act;
"the relevant date", in relation to a compulsory acquisition of an interest in land, means the date of service of the notice to treat and, in relation to a sale of such an interest by agreement, means the date of the making of the contract in pursuance of which the sale was affected.
(2) In this part of this Act any reference to the granting of permission for the carrying out of development of any land is a reference to the granting of permission (including where applicable outline permission) for that development—

(a) either unconditionally or subject to conditions; and

(b) either in respect of that land taken by itself or in respect of an area including that land."

2. After Schedule 2 to that Act there is inserted—
"THIRD SCHEDULE APPLICATION OF PART IV TO CERTAIN CASES Disturbance, severance and injurious affection
1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Schedule, any reference in section 23 of this Act to the principal amount of any compensation shall be construed as including any sum attributable to disturbance, severance or injurious affection.
2. If the person entitled to the compensation under section 23 of this Act—

(a) as, at the time of the compulsory acquisition or sale mentioned in subsection (1) of that section, entitled to an interest in other land contiguous or adjacent to the land acquired or purchased; but

(b) is, at the time of the planning decision in question, no longer entitled to that interest, either in respect of the whole or in respect of part of that land;

979
any reference in section 23 of this Act to the principal amount of any compensation or the amount of the purchase price shall be construed as excluding so much of the compensation or purchase price as was or would have been attributable to severance or injurious affection of that land or, as the case may be, of that part.
Increase in value of contiguous or adjacent land
3. In determining for the purposes of section 23 of this Act the difference between the principal amount of the compensation specified in subsection (2) of that section and the principal amount of the compensation or the amount of the purchase price mentioned in subsection (1) of that section, in a case where—

(a) the compensation or the purchase price was or would have been reduced (whether by virtue of section 7 of this Act or otherwise) by reason of an increase in the value of an interest in contiguous or adjacent land; but

(b) at the time of the planning decision the person entitled to the compensation under section 23 of this Act is not entitled to the interest or is entitled to it only as respects part of the contiguous or adjacent land,

the amount specified in section 23(2) and the principal amount or purchase price mentioned in section 23(1) shall be calculated as if the circumstances by reason of which it was or would have been so reduced had not existed or, as the case may be, as if the interest in the contiguous or adjacent land had subsisted only in that part of the land.
Mortgaged land
4. Subject to the provisions of this Schedule relating to settled land, where, in a case falling within section 23(1) of this Act, the interest in land which was acquired or sold was subject to a mortgage, any reference (however expressed) in section 23 or section 24 of this Act to the person entitled to the compensation or purchase price shall be construed as a reference to the person who, subject to the mortgage, was entitled to that interest, and not as a reference to the mortgagee.
5. For the purposes of the application of section 23 of this Act, and of the provisions of this Schedule other than this paragraph, to a case falling within the preceding paragraph, any reference to the principal amount of the compensation which was or would have been payable in respect of any compulsory acquisition shall be construed as a reference to the principal amount of the compensation which would have been payable if the interest in question had not been subject to a mortgage.
6. No compensation shall be payable by virtue of section 23 of this Act in respect of a compulsory acquisition or sale by agreement where the interest acquired or sold was the interest of a mortgagee (as distinct from an interest subject to a mortgage).
Settled land
7.—(1) Where, in a case falling within section 23(1) of this Act, the interest in land which was acquired or sold was subject to a settlement, and accordingly the compensation or purchase price was payable to the trustees of that settlement, any reference (however expressed) in section 23 or section 24 of this Act to the person entitled to the compensation or purchase price shall be construed as a reference to the trustees for the time being of the settlement.
(2) Where sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph applies, section 23(4) of this Act shall not apply.
(3) Any compensation paid to the trustees of the settlement by virtue of section 23 of this Act in respect of a compulsory acquisition or sale by agreement shall be applicable by the trustees as if it were proceeds of the sale of the interest acquired or sold.
(4) In this paragraph "settlement" means a settlement within the meaning of the Settled Land Act, 1925, or a trust for sale within the meaning of the Law of Property Act, 1925.
Interpretation
8. References in this Schedule to sections 23 and 24 of this Act include references to those sections as applied by section 25 or 26 of this Act, and references to the time of any planning decision shall be construed accordingly."").
The noble Baroness said: I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 288, 288A, 293, 298, 354A, 362, 366 and 367. Government Amendments Nos. 287 and 298 consist of a new schedule and clause which together have the effect of reviving, in respect of England and Wales, Part IV of the Land Compensation Act 1961. This provided for additional compensation to be paid to owners of compulsorily acquired land, or those who sold under the threat of compulsory purchase, in the event of an increase in the value of the land resulting from a planning permission granted within a period of five years after the acquisition.
These provisions were first enacted in the Town and Country Planning Act 1959 and remained in force until repealed by the Land Commission Act 1967. It seems to us, however, that there is a powerful case for restoring them to the statute book. The argument for doing so runs as follows.
As Members of the Committee will be well aware, compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land is based on the current open market value of the land taking into account any existing planning permission and hope value but discounting the effects on value of the particular scheme for which the land is required. This is the central principle of the land compensation code and it is, in our view, an inherently fair one. Cases can, however, occasionally arise where land is required for a particular form of development but, in the light of a change of circumstances, it is subsequently decided that it can more appropriately be devoted to an alternative form of development.
Planning permission for that development is accordingly granted, but the effect of the new permission may well be to increase the value of the land above that on which the original award of compensation was based. A good example would be where an authority acquires land compulsorily for housing but because of changed circumstances decides that the land would be better developed for office or industrial use. Where an increase in value occurs in this way it seems wholly unfair that the original owner of the land should be unable to derive any benefit.
The purpose of the renewed Part IV provisions is to deal with this situation by giving the former owner a right to claim additional compensation in the event of the value of the land increasing as the result of a planning permission obtained after acquisition. The provisions are reinserted in the 1961 Act in a form broadly similar to that of the original ones. There is, however, one major difference; the original five-year period within which planning permissions were taken into account for the purpose of assessing additional compensation is now to be extended to a full 10 years.
There is no simple basis for deciding over what length of time the entitlement to claim additional compensation should operate. On the one hand, we obviously want to ensure that the procedure provides an effective safeguard for those whose land is acquired. On the other hand, I do not believe that it would be right for the question of additional compensation to become too detached in time from the actual acquisition to which it relates. From this latter point of view it does seem to me that the 21-year period suggested in Amendment No. 288 proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Cornwallis and Lord Stanley, is altogether excessive. I accept that any figure must involve some degree of arbitrariness. But it seems to us that 10 years—which is, as I have said, double the time originally allowed—strikes the right balance overall.
Amendment No. 366 adds the new provision for England and Wales to those compensation provisions listed in Schedule 10 to the Bill on which interest is payable.
The remaining government amendments in this group (Nos. 293 and 354A, and part of Amendments Nos. 362 and 367) make similar provision in respect of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963.
I turn now to Amendment No. 288A tabled by my noble friend Lord Stanley. The effect of this is to provide that, in considering the amount of compensation originally paid to the claimant for the purpose of assessing entitlement to additional compensation under the revived Part IV, any element within the total which related to disturbance should be left out of account.
I must say that this proposal appears to reflect a misunderstanding of the current compensation code and the way in which Part IV will operate. The effect of case law is that an owner cannot claim payment for disturbance in circumstances where the compensation that he is receiving for the land reflects a development value which exceeds the existing use value plus the cost of disturbance. For example, where farmland is acquired the owner cannot claim for disturbance if the land has a value for housing which exceeds its agricultural value together with any disturbance cost.
That being so, where the value of land is enhanced by a planning permission granted after acquisition and the former owner claims compensation under Part IV, it is entirely proper that in determining how much compensation is due, if any, account should be taken of the fact that the original compensation award included a payment for disturbance—given that, as I have said, the disturbance payment was only made on the assumption that the land had no value above existing use. To leave the disturbance payment out of account would in effect involve an element of double-counting.
The approach that we are adopting here is identical to that followed in the original 1961 Act provisions. I hope that my noble friend will accept that it is the only fair one. I also hope that the Committee will agree that our proposals constitute a significant improvement in the overall fairness of the compensation system. On that basis, I warmly commend the government
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amendments to the Committee and express the hope that the noble Lords, Lord Cornwallis and Lord Stanley, will not press their amendment.
Lord Cornwallis Lord Cornwallis moved, as an amendment to Amendment No. 287, Amendment No. 288.
Line 13, leave out ("ten") and insert ("twenty-one").
The noble Lord said: A long explanation of the amendment is unnecessary and, therefore, I shall not take up the time of the Committee. The government amendment allows 10 years from the date of completion of the sale as the period during which further development on the acquired land may trigger compensation. Often there are more than 10 years between the date of the acquisition of the land for development and the completion of the project. In many cases the timescale extends to 11 or 12 years. It would appear to be reasonable that the period during which additional payment could be triggered should extend beyond completion of the project.
Extending the period to 21 years would achieve two further objectives. First, it would bring the Bill into line with the usual practice in the private sector. Where an interest is reserved against future development the period is usually 21 years. Secondly, it would correspond to the maximum period of 21 years allowed under the Land Compensation Act. I hope that the Minister will reconsider her remarks. I beg to move.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: I think that it will be for the convenience of the Committee if I speak to my amendment now. I do not believe that I have failed to understand the present compensation arrangements, as suggested by my noble friend Lady Blatch. I believe that I understand them only too well; I believe them to be unfair. I suggest that my amendment takes a different approach and indeed is fairer, not least because if disturbance is included, that could prejudice the smaller man, particularly if he has developed his land or has the capability of so doing.
I shall try to explain the matter to my noble friend. The circumstances of the award of disturbance are related to the particulars of the claimant's agricultural, business or personal use of the land acquired at the time of the event, and not to the amount of development value attached to the interest to which these clauses relate. The amount of monetary compensation awarded for the disruption of the individual claimant's business 10 or 15 years before has nothing to do with the estimate of the development value attached to the land to which this measure is meant to relate.
That was recognised by Lord Justice Goddard in his dissenting judgment in the case of Horn v. Sunderland in 1941. That is now highlighted in the circumstances of these clauses, and against the history of land development over the 50 years since the majority Court of Appeal decision and 30 years since the passing of the Land Compensation Act 1961. It may also be said that that view has been expressed by other authoritative persons in the field. As I have said before, there is an inherent defect in the proposition that disturbance be linked to development value.

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I fully understand that I am putting forward an approach which is different from that of my noble friend. However, I hope that she may consider my amendment to be a fair approach to the matter.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: Before the Minister responds to those amendments to her amendment, I should explain why we have grave reservations about the approach in this series of amendments and about the whole approach taken in a large number of amendments with which we shall deal in the consideration of Part IV.
Those reservations can be very simply expressed. It seems to us that Members of the Committee are putting forward amendments which protect land and property owners from almost every possible adverse eventuality arising from planning laws or land compensation. In effect they are saying that if anything goes wrong because of the intervention of the public sector in land ownership or access to land, they must be compensated from now virtually until kingdom come, if one takes the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Cornwallis. And yet, they are the same people who took off the statute book the development land tax and all taxation which would have taken away some of the windfalls which fall to land and property owners as a result of public sector activity.
One cannot have it both ways. One cannot say, on the one hand, that land and property owners will reap all the benefits of changes in use and development and all activities of the public or private sector while on the other hand compensating them for anything which may go wrong. If that is some people's idea of the market place, it is not mine.
Until justice is restored in this matter and there is some recognition that benefits can be gained for land owners from public investment activity which should be shared with the public, we shall not support amendments which seek to protect land and property owners when the market goes down.
Baroness Blatch: I do not believe that it would be appropriate for me to enter into the differences of opinion between the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, and other Members of the Committee.
My noble friend and I must agree to differ about his amendment. I emphasise to the noble Lord, Lord Cornwallis, that we are doubling the length of time over which this measure would apply. It relates to other development being proposed on the land and is not comparable with that which arises in the private sector. I must rest my case and hope that the Committee will support it.
8.15 p.m.
Lord Cornwallis: I am very disappointed to hear those remarks, particularly those of the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey. We are not talking about land which is bought for the development of a particular project. We are talking about additional land which is often acquired unnecessarily at the outset and which is not, as a rule, returned to the land owner but is developed by an outside body at its considerable profit.
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There is an example of that in the development which took place at the Channel Tunnel terminal. Surely it is not equitable that land should be taken at existing use value and, having built the motorway, railway or whatever it may be, an outsider should then benefit from, for example, building a petrol station on that surplus land which was taken in excess of what was originally required.
Much land is sold by willing treaty for public sector companies at figures which are in excess of compulsory purchase figures and into which these agreements are happily written. It seems to me a pity that the basic principle that the length of time for which the original owner should be covered should not extend beyond the period over which the development takes place. As I say, in many cases a development from the date of purchase is longer than the 10 years proposed by the Government. I shall not press the point this evening but I may well return to it at a later stage.
Amendment to Amendment No. 287, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 288A not moved.]
On Question, Amendment No. 287 agreed to. Clause 44 agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No.289:
After Clause 44, insert the following new clause:
Advance payments of compensation and interest
(".—(1) In section 52 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 (right to advance payment of compensation) for subsection (5) there is substituted—
"(4A) Where, at any time after an advance payment has been made on the basis of the acquiring authority's estimate of the compensation, it appears to the acquiring authority that their estimate was too low, they shall, if a request in that behalf is made in accordance with subsection (2) above, pay to the claimant the balance of the amount of the advance payment calculated as at that time.
(5) Where the amount, or aggregate amount, of any payment under this section made on the basis of the acquiring authority's estimate of the compensation exceeds the compensation as finally determined or agreed, the excess shall be repaid; and if after any payment under this section has been made to any person it is discovered that he was not entitled to it, the amount of the payment shall be recoverable by the acquiring authority".
(2) After that section there is inserted—
"Right to interest where advance payment made.
52A.—(1) This section applies where the compensation to be paid by the acquiring authority for the compulsory acquisition of any interest in land would (apart from this section) carry interest under section 11(1) of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 or any bond under Schedule 3 to that Act or section 85 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845.
(2) If the authority make a payment under section 52(1) above to any person on account of the compensation—

(a) they shall at the same time make a payment to that person of accrued interest, for the period beginning with the date of entry, on the amount by reference to which the payment under section 52(1) above was calculated; and

(b) the difference between the amount of the payment under section 52(1) above and the

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amount by reference to which it was calculated is an unpaid balance for the purposes of this section.

(3) If the authority make a payment under section 52(4A) above to any person on account of the compensation, they shall at the same time make a payment to him of accrued interest, for the period beginning with the date of entry, on—

(a) the amount by reference to which the payment under section 52(4A) above was calculated; less

(b) the amount by reference to which the preceding payment under section 52(1) or (4A) above was calculated.

(4) Where the authority make a payment under section 52(4A) above on account of the compensation, the difference between—

(a) the amount of the payment; and

(b) the amount by reference to which it was calculated less the amount by reference to which the preceding payment under section 52(1) or (4A) above was calculated,

is an unpaid balance for the purposes of this section.
(5) If, on an anniversary of the date on which the authority made a payment to any person under section 52(1) above on account of the compensation—

(a) the amount of accrued interest on the unpaid balance under subsection (2) above or, as the case may be,

(b) the aggregate amount of the accrued interest on any unpaid balances,

exceeds £1,000, the authority shall make a payment to the claimant of the amount or aggregate amount.
(6) The acquiring authority shall, on paying the outstanding compensation, pay the amount of the accrued interest on the unpaid balance under subsection (2) above or, as the case may be, the aggregate amount of the accrued interest on any unpaid balances.
(7) For the purposes of subsections (5) and (6) above, interest accrues on any unpaid balance for the period beginning with—

(a) the making of the payment under section 52(1) or, as the case may be, 52(4A) above; or

(b) if any payment has already been made in respect of that balance under subsection (5) above, the date of the preceding payment under that subsection.

(8) For the purposes of this section—

(a) interest accrues at the rate prescribed under section 32 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 or, in the case of a bond under section 85 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, at the rate specified in section 85; and

(b) the amount by reference to which a payment under section 52(1) or (4A) was calculated is the amount referred to in section 52(3) (a) or (b) for the purposes of that calculation.

(9) Where any payment has been made under section 52(1) above on account of any compensation, the acquiring authority is not required to pay interest under section 11(1) of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 or any bond under Schedule 3 to that Act or under section 85 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845.
(10) Where the amount, or aggregate amount, of any payment under section 52 above made on the basis of the acquiring authority's estimate of the compensation is greater than the compensation as finally determined or agreed and, accordingly, the interest paid under this section is excessive, the excess shall be repaid.
(11) If after any interest has been paid to any person under this section on any amount it is discovered that he was not entitled to the amount, the interest shall be recoverable by the acquiring authority.
(12) The Secretary of State may from time to time by order substitute another sum for the sum specified in subsection (5) above; and the power to make orders under this subsection shall be exercisable by statutory instrument which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament." ").
The noble and learned Lord said: In moving this amendment I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 289A, 289B, 331, 345, 358, 362, 363, 364, 364A, 365 and 382. These amendments deal with the procedure whereby compensation can be paid to claimants at regular intervals.
As the Committee will be aware, besides adding substantially to the list of provisions under which compensation attracts interest, we are proposing to establish an entirely new entitlement under which claimants can be paid the interest which is due to them in annual instalments.
Provisions for the payment of interest in instalments are already included in Clause 53 of the Bill. This is, however, a complex matter and we have concluded that the provisions as they stand will not achieve what we want. It is therefore necessary to come forward with new provisions which will produce the desired result.
The substance of the new provisions in respect of England and Wales is contained in Amendment No. 289. This links the entitlement to interest to be paid in instalments to the existing provision in Section 52 of the Land Compensation Act 1973, under which claimants in compulsory purchase cases can receive an advance payment of compensation for their land pending the final settlement. The effect is to provide that, where a claimant receives an advance payment of compensation under these circumstances, he will also be entitled to be paid at the same time any interest which has become due to him up to that point. Thereafter the claimant will be entitled to be paid, at 12-monthly intervals, any further interest that has accrued, provided that the amount of interest owing exceeds £1,000 or such other sum as the Secretary of State may prescribe by order. The entitlement to annual payments of interest will continue until the compensation claim is finally settled.
I turn now to the various proposals put forward in Amendments Nos. 289A, 364 and 364A regarding the frequency of instalment payments and the specified minimum amount of interest which triggers the instalment entitlement. These would provide for payments to be made every six months rather than annually and would reduce the minimum amount from the £1,000 we propose to either £500 or £10.
It is clearly necessary that the interest instalment provisions should be framed in such a way as to ensure that the system does not become unduly burdensome in administrative terms for the responsible authorities. A requirement to make payments of small sums at relatively frequent intervals could well impose a serious administrative cost on authorities.
I accept that there is room for argument as to where the limits should be set. But the six-monthly interval

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and the alternative minimum amounts proposed by the noble Lords would not in our judgment be reasonable from the point of view of authorities. The £10 minimum amount suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Ross, would be particularly open to objection on that count. The 12-month interval and £1,000 minimum amount which we propose were both specifically referred to in the department's consultation paper and there was no widespread dissent from respondents.
I turn finally to my noble friend's Amendment No. 289B, which would provide for interest on compensation to be calculated on a compound rather than a simple basis. I fear that this is a proposal we could not entertain. A change to compound interest would mean placing an altogether unreasonable burden on the public purse. Simple interest is the principle firmly established not only in the statutory compensation code but also in other legislation which involves the payment of interest. It is also the basis on which interest is awarded by the courts. There is absolutely no ca se for adopting a different approach for the purposes of this Bill. Accordingly, I commend the government amendments to the Committee.
Lord Stanley of Alderley Lord Stanley of Alderley moved, as an amendment to Amendment No. 289, Amendment No. 289A:
Leave out lines 68 and 69 and insert ("exceeds £500, the authority shall make payment to the claimant of the amount, or aggregate amount and similarly at six monthly intervals thereafter.").
The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 289A, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 289B. Both amendments refer to the situation which arises when notice to treat has been given and 90 per cent. of the compensation has been agreed and paid. Therefore we are speaking of the 10 per cent. balance. I should say that that 10 per cent. balance can in certain cases be substantial.
The payment of interest on any outstanding balance of compensation is in no way a privilege conferred upon the claimant. The aim of compulsory purchase legislation is to ensure that the owner or occupier of land being acquired is no better and no worse off as a result of the development proposed by the acquiring authority. On this occasion I hope that I can carry with me the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh. I believe that this is what he would agree is fair compensation. He may help me on this amendment as opposed to the last time.
The amendments refer to a situation where an authority, following notice to treat, has entered into possession and has given an advance of up to 90 per cent. of the estimate of total compensation. That leaves outstanding the balance of 10 per cent. The process of negotiation, through no fault of the claimant and by its very nature, is often protracted. During that period the estimate is often revised resulting in further outstanding sums. Those sums can be quite substantial.
The range of opportunities for investment has changed greatly over the past decade—I address my remarks to my noble and learned friend—as well as becoming more mobile and extensive. If the claimant is to be placed in the position in which he would have
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been had he had a fair crack at the whip—if I may put it that way—and part of his capital had not been sterilised while negotiations were proceeding, the availability of compound interest to match such an outside investment would be essential.
I do not understand my noble and learned friend saying that it would be unfair to give compound interest. It is unfair on the person whose land is being acquired to do otherwise. The Government are getting a very good deal. I would not mind obtaining loans at fixed interest, particularly the fixed interest that one receives from Her Majesty's Government, which is remarkably low on most occasions.
I am sorry to be going backwards rather than forwards. In Amendment No. 289A, as my noble and learned friend said, we are suggesting that the payment, instead of being £1,000 every 12 months, should be £500 every six months. It may not be much money for the richer Members of the Committee, but for others £500 is a large sum of money. I do not see why its payment should be delayed for 12 months. If the sum is much larger than £1,000 it should be paid after six months. I beg to move.
Lord Ross of Newport: Linked with these amendments is Amendment No. 364A, to which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate referred briefly. As he said, Clause 53(2) obliges a person liable to pay compensation of any kind as described in Parts I or II of Schedule 10 to the Bill, if requested, to pay interest by yearly instalments provided that the interest due,
"exceeds £1,000 or such other sum as the Secretary of State may for the time being by regulations prescribe".
The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, for which I speak—I do not see why others should not agree—desires that instalments should be paid at six-monthly intervals, and that there should be no minimum limit on the instalment. That is the reason the £10 is there; it is really saying that there should not be a minimum. Amendment No. 364 provides for six-monthly instalments rather than yearly payments and substitutes the sum of £10 for £1,000 as a minimum payment, omitting any power for the Secretary of State to vary it. Why cannot we get it right today?
The Government appear to be going back on their original intention that in principle all kinds of compensation should be payable by instalments if requested. There is a strong case for payment at half-yearly intervals with no or a very small minimum. I suggest that, as at long last the Government have started paying interest on tax repayments due to us, and that if I were to put the money in a bank or building society I would be paid interest at once, the same should apply to HMG.
Lord Cornwallis: I wish to speak to Amendment No. 364. I shall not be moving the amendment. I support the noble Lord, Lord Stanley of Alderley, in his Amendment No. 289A.
I cannot follow the argument that it is burdensome to pay interest at six-monthly intervals. In the days of modern technology and computers, etc., the payment of sums of money on a regular basis is something that

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could be accomplished with comparative simplicity. A much fairer system would be for these sums to be paid on a regular six-monthly basis.
As an aside, we are still waiting for some of the payouts on the M.25.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: I cannot elaborate on what I have said in speaking to the Government's amendments and responding in advance to others. Clearly there can always be an argument whether six months or one year is appropriate, or whether £1,000 or £750 is appropriate. However, the Government have moved a considerable way forward on this matter and what is put forward is a reasonable amount. Similarly, the interval for payment is also reasonable.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 289A.
Amendment to Amendment No. 289, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 289B not moved.]
On Question, Amendment No. 289 agreed to.
[Amendment No. 290 not moved.]
8.30 p.m.
The Earl of Lytton The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 291:
After Clause 44, insert the following new clause:
("Purchase notice: serious injury from works
.—After section 64 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 (extension of grounds for challenging validity of compulsory purchase order) there is inserted
"Purchase notice: serious injury from works.
64A.—(1) Where the owner of an interest in land claims that the land is seriously affected land of a description falling under subsection (2) or subsection (2A) of section 26 of this Act (responsible authority may acquire land by agreement where enjoyment of land affected by public works) or subsection (2) or subsection (2A) of section 246 of the Highways Act 1980 (acquisition of land by agreement where enjoyment of land affected by works) the owner may serve on the responsible authority or the highway authority as the case may be a notice (in this section referred to as a purchase notice) specifying the land and the nature of his interest in it and the affection by reason of which it falls within one of those sub-sections, requiring that authority to purchase his interest in the land in accordance with this section.
(2) The authority shall before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of service of the purchase notice serve on the owner by whom the purchase notice was served a counter-notice stating either—

(a) that they are willing to comply with the notice, or

(b) that for reasons specified in the counter-notice they object to complying with the purchase notice on the ground—

(i) that the owner is not the owner of an interest in the land, or

(ii) that the land does not fall within any of the descriptions specified in subsection (1).

(3) Where a counter-notice has been served under subsection (2) the owner may require the objection to be referred to the Lands Tribunal.
(4) An objection on either of the grounds specified in subsection (2) shall not be upheld by the Lands Tribunal unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that the objection is well-founded.
(5) If the Lands Tribunal determine not to uphold the objection in respect of the whole or any part of the land the Tribunal shall declare that the purchase notice is a valid notice for the land or that part.
(6) Where no counter-notice has been served in time under subsection (2) or such a counter-notice has been served but has been withdrawn or the purchase notice declared to be valid by the Lands Tribunal the responsible authority or the highway authority as the case may be shall be deemed—

(a) to be authorised to acquire compulsorily under the appropriate enactment the interest of the owner in the land or in that part comprised in the declaration of the Lands Tribunal, and

(b) to have served notice to treat in respect of the land or that part on the date on which the period for service of a counter-notice expired or the date of withdrawal of the counter-notice or the date of the declaration of the Lands Tribunal as the case may be.

(7) A notice to treat deemed to be served by virtue of subsection (6) shall not be capable of withdrawal.
(8) A person who has served a purchase notice under subsection (1) may withdraw it at any time before it has been declared valid under subsection (5).
(9) For the purposes of this section 'responsible authority' has the same meaning as in section 1(4) of this Act (right to compensation) and 'highway authority' has the same meaning as it has for the purpose of section 246 of the Highway Act 1980; and 'relevant date' has the same meaning as in section 1(9) of this Act.
(10) A purchase notice under this section shall not be served before the expiration of one year from the relevant date and no subsequent purchase notice after the first shall be served until three years after the service of the last previous notice.
(11) Once a purchase notice has taken effect under subsection (6) of this section no further purchase notice shall be served under this section in respect of the land for which the purchase notice has taken effect provided that notice of the taking effect of the purchase notice has been registered as a local land charge in the local land charges register of the appropriate local authority.
(12) Where compensation has been claimed under section 10 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (further provision as to compensation for injurious affection) or under Part I of this Act (compensation for depreciation caused by the use of public works) any compensation payable consequent upon such claim shall be taken into account in assessing the compensation payable in consequence of a notice to treat deemed to be served under subsection (6)." ").
The noble Earl said: I shall speak briefly to this amendment, which is concerned with the provision of a purchase notice facility for those whose land suffers a material detriment in connection with public works. The concept behind this amendment is contained in the blue booklet published by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. It rests on the fact that in many respects there are those whose land is affected very adversely by public works. That is referred to as "material detriment". That can be defined as meaning that the property concerned is less useful or valuable in some significant degree. I stress that this can affect equally residential, commercial or agricultural property.
Under the provisions of the Land Compensation Act 1973 and the Highways Act 1980 there are already powers vested in local authorities which are responsible for public works to purchase land by agreement where they perceive the land to be seriously

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affected by the construction or the use of public works or a highway. These powers are extended by Clause 44 of the Bill.
The intention is that an authority will be able to acquire land which it considers to be seriously affected in the way described. The new section which this amendment proposes to insert takes the description "seriously affected" one stage further. Where an owner claims and can successfully establish that his land is seriously affected, and the land falls within the descriptions already provided for in the Acts of 1973 and 1980, he may then serve a purchase notice on the authority requiring the purchase of his interest in the land. This is the corollary which gives the facility for the person who sees his land affected to reverse the facility that a public authority already has.
That does not alter the category of land or claimant as against existing legislation. I feel very strongly that those who suffer this serious and detrimental effect on their land should have some facility for redress in the way suggested by the amendment. Quite frankly, it is totally unacceptable to me as a chartered surveyor and somebody who takes a fairly dispassionate line on this issue, that there should effectively be a cross-subsidy in this respect by those who stand to be affected in favour of the public authority in pursuit of its statutory function. I noted very carefully what the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, said earlier. It is a question of balance and having a reasonably even playing field. It is not a question of there being residential occupiers and therefore potential voters. It is a question of straightforward justice. That cuts through the political aspects of the measure, on which I am certainly not going to raise any point. I am not competent to do so.
Unless we have a system that operates fairly and with proper balance, then it does not make any difference whether there should be a special case for one or another. It is a point of principle which remains notable because of the fact that there is no redress given. That is the background to this amendment. It will be noted that it provides for the authority carrying out the work the opportunity to object to the notice as proposed and that any dispute can be settled by the Lands Tribunal. The matter is quite comprehensive and I commend the amendment to the Committee. I beg to move.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: As the noble Earl indicated, the Land Compensation Act or, in the case of road schemes, the Highways Act 1980 gives responsible authorities a discretionary power to acquire by agreement any land of which the enjoyment is seriously affected by the carrying out or use of public works. This discretionary power is used by authorities in appropriate cases to mitigate hardship arising from the adverse effects of works during the construction stage of the project or when the scheme has come into use. It is important to understand those two separate parts. As the Committee will be aware, we are proposing in Clause 44 of the Bill that the discretionary power should in future be available to authorities from a much earlier stage in the life of a
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development project; that is, from the point at which the proposed location of a scheme has been announced.
The noble Earl is arguing that the power for authorities to acquire property should become an obligation in the event of an owner serving a purchase notice. It seems to us that the discretion to acquire, as extended by the Bill in Clause 44, and the entitlement to compensation for loss of value together constitute an adequate protection for those affected by public development. To convert that important discretion to acquire into an outright obligation on authorities would, in the Government's view, be unjustified. It could lead to authorities being compelled to acquire substantial stocks of land. Such a requirement would have enormous cost implications and would hardly constitute a sensible use of resources.
The concept of "serious affection" is not in any way defined in the amendment and it is therefore hard to establish how widely the right to serve a purchase notice would extend. Perhaps I may anticipate the response that I am likely to get from the noble Earl. That concept appears within the 1973 Act similarly and without any definition. But as he will appreciate, that is only in the context of a discretion being given to the authorities to acquire. An actual obligation to purchase would surely require a more specific frame of reference. The number of people claiming to be "seriously affected" by any particular development scheme could be very large. It could be difficult to establish how the line was to be drawn. The noble Earl's amendment envisages that it would be left to the Lands Tribunal to settle the matter but I do not think that would be right from the point of view of either the principle itself or the substantial case-load burden likely to be involved.
It appears to be the intention that the obligation on authorities to purchase would apply both during the construction stage of a project and after the scheme had come into use. However, as I am sure the noble Earl appreciates, the effect of work at the construction stage, though unpleasant, may often be quite short-lived. It would therefore be wholly inappropriate in such circumstances that the authority should be obliged to purchase a property whenever the owner required. We in no way underestimate the difficulties and the misery which may be caused to others from the proximity to a major public development scheme. But it does seem to us that the existing compensation provisions, as extended by this Bill, do go just about as far as is reasonable and practicable in terms of safeguarding the interests of those affected. The right approach is to allow the authorities to weigh up each case on its merits and use the discretion they already have to acquire where there is good reason to do so.
With that explanation, I hope that the noble Earl will appreciate that I am not in a position to accept his amendment.
The Earl of Lytton: The noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has put forward a very compelling response. I accept many of the things he says and I agree that the amendment suffers from a number of

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defects in drafting. I hope that he will nonetheless accept that it is the principle behind the issue that I am trying to get at.
I would feel a little happier if circumstances were available whereby someone who was seriously affected in the way envisaged—I stress that the matter is already covered in statute law—could have access to some form of review. For instance, an authority exercising its functions in this way will, of necessity, seriously affect some people. It is not intended that that should be a free for all or that there should be major resource implications. That was not the intention behind the proposal. It seems to me that there is no review provision to allow an individual who considers that he has been particularly badly affected to go along to a higher authority to say that the local authority has declined to exercise its discretion in his favour and that it ought to exercise its discretion in that way. That is a defect in the present provision. However, I accept that what the Lord Advocate said covered many of the more serious areas.
I am particularly anxious because, as in all such matters, there are resource implications. I am especially concerned that an authority, in carrying out major works, might be influenced by the overall cost rather than necessarily by the consideration of plain justice for someone who was badly affected.
I reserve my position on this matter and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Cornwallis Lord Cornwallis moved Amendment No. 292:
After Clause 44, insert the following new clause:
("Confirmation of compulsory purchase of land
. The Secretary of State or the Minister shall not confirm an order for the compulsory purchase of any land or rights over land unless he is satisfied:

(a) that the acquisition of the land or rights in, on or over the land in question is essential to enable the purchaser to meet its statutory obligation;

(b) that there is no suitable alternative way in which the purchaser could meet those obligations; and

(c) that the owner in question of the land or rights in, on or over land in question is unwilling or unable to enter into an agreement to sell the land or the rights voluntarily.").

The noble Lord said: I am asked by the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, to give his apologies to the Committee for not being here. He did not realise that the amendment would be called up this evening.
Compulsory purchase powers are obviously essential to enable undertakings to fulfil their statutory duties, particularly where they are met with intransigent resistance to that which they need to do to carry out those duties. However, those powers should not be used as the easy way either to draw their plans or to abandon careful consideration of whether what they want to do is the best way of doing it or it is even necessary to do it at all. The amendment tries to ensure that due consideration is given both to the need to carry out certain works and to the method and route by which those works are to be executed.
Paragraph (c) places an obligation on the undertaker to try to purchase the land or buildings by negotiation and private treaty and to do that in advance of seeking compulsory powers. A great many people will negotiate willingly if they do not feel they are under duress. Psychologically they are more amenable if they do not feel threatened. Any negotiation must take place before compulsory powers are invoked since negotiated payments above CPO level cannot be paid once they are invoked. Extra payments are barred under Section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 1961.
I am sure I shall be told that all this will bring about intolerable delays. In fact it is far more likely to speed things up. If this were not the case, why do so many undertakers who have compulsory powers negotiate rather than use them and find that extra payments are a commercially viable answer which actually save them both time and money? The Government themselves have indirectly admitted the viability of this principle by paying bonuses to firms completing roadworks and so on ahead of time. How much more could be saved for the benefit of the country and the owners by speeding up the starting time of many projects! The undertaker would quickly know whether or not the owner was going to be a willing negotiator. Under present conditions an owner can hold up a project for months or even years while haggling over the details of compulsory purchase in which he is sure he is being unfairly treated. Most people are fair minded and, approached properly, are willing to negotiate and come to agreement. Compulsory powers must be a reserve against those who are obstructionists, but it is as reserve powers that they should be used and not as the spearhead. I beg to move.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: I warmly support the amendment because an important point of principle is involved. If one can get people to negotiate without the stick of compulsory powers held immediately over them, they will do so more easily. It is a perfect carrot and stick situation. If the Government were prepared to look along this line I am sure, as the noble Lord has already said, that settlements would be much quicker and, in the long run, much cheaper.
8.45 p.m.
Baroness Blatch: This amendment would require the authority confirming a compulsory purchase order to be satisfied that acquisition of the land, or rights over the land, is essential for the fulfilment of a statutory obligation; that there are no suitable alternative means of fulfilling any such obligation; and that the owner is unwilling to sell by agreement.
Powers of compulsory acquisition are spread across a large number of enactments and relate to a wide range of authorities and purposes. Broadly speaking, however, the powers of acquisition are couched in terms of land which is "required" by the authority for a particular purpose. The word "required" is a fairly strong one and it has been interpreted by the courts as implying that the acquisition in question must be one

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which is needed to accomplish the relevant authority's purpose. It is not enough, the courts have held, for the authority to argue that acquisition is merely desirable.
The need for compulsory acquisition is of course a matter on which the Secretary of State or Minister has to satisfy himself before confirming a compulsory purchase order. The law provides for objectors to an order to be heard at a local inquiry or hearing at which arguments as to whether the acquisition is needed can be properly aired.
The noble Lord's proposal would involve confining the use of compulsory purchase powers to cases where acquisition were shown to be "essential". This would in our view constitute an unreasonably rigid test, since authorities would in practice rarely be in a position to demonstrate that the acquisition of a particular piece of land was truly essential in the strictest sense. The effect would be to make it very difficult, if not impossible, for many desirable development projects which depended on compulsory purchase to proceed at all.
The amendment would further provide that the authority must have attempted to acquire the land by agreement before proceeding with compulsory purchase. Authorities will very often seek to negotiate for a voluntary sale of land without waiting for completion of the compulsory purchase procedures. But to make it a statutory requirement that negotiations take place in all cases before a compulsory purchase order could be confirmed would not in our view be a sensible proposition. I do not see that such a requirement could make any substantive difference to the situation as between the owner of the land and the acquiring authority.
The noble Lord has indicated that the effect of his proposal would be to provide an opportunity for negotiations to take place between the parties on a proper open market basis. But the reality is surely that there can never be a genuine open market situation when both parties know that there is ultimately the prospect of a compulsory acquisition in the event of negotiations breaking down. The fact that the authority was not at that point allowed to use compulsory powers would hardly alter the position. The acquiring authority would not generally be prepared to offer more for the land than it would expect to have to pay in the event of a compulsory purchase.
In these circumstances the requirement proposed by the noble Lord would seem to offer no significant benefit to the owner of the land. All it would do would be to add an extra stage to the acquisition process, with a consequent risk of unnecessary delay to important public development projects. From that point of view I see the noble Lord's proposal as being positively harmful. Although I know that that explanation will be less than helpful both to my noble friend and to the noble Lord, Lord Cornwallis, I hope that they will not press the amendment.
Lord Cornwallis: I take note of the noble Baroness's response. I believe that you can have a relatively open negotiation even with the threat of compulsory
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purchase powers in the background. If that were not so I would entirely fail to understand why those organisations which have been privatised but which still retain compulsory purchase powers almost invariably do not use such powers. In fact, they negotiate their acquisitions freely with the owners concerned and find, first, that it speeds up the process considerably and, secondly, that it proves to be cheaper than going through all the processes of necessary planning inquiries and so on. It is a fact of life that this is indeed already happening.
I am sorry about the Minister's attitude towards the amendment. However, if possible, I should like her to think very carefully about paragraph (c) of the amendment. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 51 agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 293:
After Clause 51, insert the following new clause:
Compensation where permission for additional development granted after acquisition
.—(1) Schedule (Compensation where permission for additional development granted after acquisition) to this Act (which revives Part V of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963) shall have effect.
(2) This section applies to an acquisition or sale of an interest in land if the date of completion (within the meaning of that Part) falls on or after the day on which this section comes into force.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 294:
After Clause 51, insert the following new clause:
Time limit on validity of notice to treat
.—(1) A notice to treat under section 17 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845 shall, for the purposes of any compulsory purchase to which the provisions of the first Schedule to the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) (Scotland) Act 1947 apply, cease to have effect at the end of the period of three years beginning with the date on which it is served unless—

(a) the compensation has been agreed or awarded or has been paid or paid into a bank;

(b) a general vesting declaration has been executed under paragraph 1 of Schedule 24 to the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972;

(c) the acquiring authority have entered on and taken possession of the land specified in the notice; or

(d) the question of compensation has been referred to the Lands Tribunal for Scotland.

(2) If the person interested in the land, or having power to sell and convey it, and the acquiring authority agree to extend the period referred to in subsection (1) of this section, the notice to treat shall cease to have effect at the end of the period as extended unless—

(a) any of the events referred to in that subsection have then taken place; or

(b) the parties have agreed to a further extension of the period (in which case this subsection shall apply again at the end of the period as further extended, and so on).

(3) Where a notice to treat ceases to have effect by virtue of subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the acquiring authority—

(a) shall immediately give notice of that fact to the person on whom the notice was served and any other person who, since it was served, could have made an agreement under subsection (2) of this section, and

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(b) shall be liable to pay compensation to any person entitled to such a notice for any loss or expenses occasioned to him by the giving of the notice and its ceasing to have effect.

(4) The amount of any compensation payable under subsection (3) of this section shall, in default of agreement, be determined by the Lands Tribunal for Scotland.
(5) Compensation payable to any person under subsection (3) of this section shall carry interest at the rate prescribed under section 40 (rate of interest after entry on land) of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963 from the date on which he was entitled to be given notice under that subsection until payment.").
The noble and learned Lord said: In moving this amendment I should like to speak also to Amendment No. 368. Amendment No. 294 inserts a new clause for Scotland which makes parallel provision to Clause 46 of the Bill for England and Wales. Clause 46 limits the period during which a notice to treat has effect and, as the Committee will appreciate, its substance will be considered shortly. Amendment No. 368 makes a consequential addition to Schedule 10. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 45 [Planning assumptions in connection with highway schemes]:
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 295:
Page 53, leave out lines 12 to 20 and insert:
("(7) The determinations referred to in subsection (5) of this section are—

(a) a determination, for the purpose of assessing compensation in respect of any compulsory acquisition, whether planning permission might reasonably have been expected to be granted for any development if no part of the relevant land were proposed to be acquired by any authority possessing compulsory purchase powers, and

(b) a determination under section 17 of this Act as to the development for which, in the opinion of the local planning authority, planning permission would or would not have been granted if no part of the relevant land were proposed to be acquired by any authority possessing compulsory purchase powers.").

The noble and learned Lord said: In moving this amendment I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 296, 297, 299, 301 to 306, 350, 355 and 381. Amendments Nos. 297, 350 and 381 are government amendments which contain modifications to the provisions set out in Part III of the Land Compensation Act 1961 under which the owner of land which an authority proposes to acquire compulsorily or by agreement—or the acquiring authority itself—can apply to the local planning authority for a certificate stating what development, if any, would have been permitted on the land if it were not being acquired by the authority. The statement in the certificate—usually referred to as a Section 17 certificate—is then taken into account in valuing the land for compensation purposes.
As the law stands, the certification procedure is not available where the land concerned comes within an area designated in the development plan as either an area of comprehensive development or as an area allocated for residential, commercial or industrial use or a combination of such uses. In such cases the
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planning position for valuation purposes is determined on the assumption that permission would be granted for any development that is consistent with the contents of the development plan.
The argument has been advanced that this restriction on the certification procedure is no longer reasonable since in practice the designation shown on a development plan may not always provide a sufficiently precise or up-to-date indication of the planning position in respect of an individual site. The Government accept the force of this argument. The main purpose of the new provisions is therefore to extend the certification procedure to include land covered by development plans. The amending provisions are structured in such a way as to ensure that, broadly, where a Section 17 certificate is issued, its contents will override any contrary planning assumptions arising from the development plan which would otherwise have to be taken account in establishing the planning potential of the land.
These provisions also modify the certification procedure to provide for the reimbursement of costs which have been reasonably incurred by the claimant in connection with a certificate. In general, the legal and surveyors' fees arising from a compensation claim are included. However, the Court of Appeal has held that costs incurred in connection with the certification procedure cannot be recovered. That seems to us an anomaly and we are therefore proposing that it should be rectified. These changes were foreshadowed in our 1989 consultation paper on compensation and met with general approval. Similar modifications are made to Scottish legislation by Amendments Nos. 305 and 355.
I turn now to the two amendments concerning the certification procedure tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, Amendments Nos. 299 and 306. These have the same basic object as the government provisions which I have described and are drafted on similar lines. There is, however, an important difference in that the noble Earl's provisions do not appear to address the possibility of a conflict between the content of a Section 17 certificate and a planning assumption derived from a development plan. It is certainly the case that the chances of such conflict should be much reduced by virtue of the new development plan procedures introduced under earlier provisions in the Bill, but the risk cannot be ruled out altogether. Hence the need to provide, as our amendments do, that where a Section 17 certificate is issued it will override any contrary planning assumptions arising from a development plan. I have to say that the noble Earl's amendments are defective in not dealing with that aspect of the certification procedure and I hope in the circumstances that he will not feel it necessary to press them.
I turn finally to deal with a separate series of government amendments. I refer to Amendments Nos. 295 and 301 to 304. These make necessary technical modifications to the provisions already in the Bill; namely, Clause 45 in respect of England and Wales and Clause 50 in respect of Scotland. They are

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intended to exclude the existence of an imaginary alternative when determining the value of land to be acquired for a highway scheme. I beg to move.
The Earl of Lytton: The noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has said much more cogently than I could have done almost all that I needed to say about Amendments Nos. 299 and 306 which are tabled in my name. I thank him for doing so. However, can he clarify whether he is saying that the principle behind those amendments is defective. I do not believe that that was what he meant to say. If I understood him correctly, he was saying that apart from the fact that the two amendments are deficient in that they do not resolve the position regarding conflict with the development plan, they are, nonetheless, very much along the lines of those which he has tabled. If that is the case, it seems to me that we are at one on the principle, involved and that it is merely a question of bringing into line what in effect is a provision for England and Wales and making it equal to the one which he proposes for Scotland.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: I should point out to the noble Earl that I am also dealing with England and Wales. In using the word "defective" it is possible that he has taken it in the rather narrower sense which we tend to use in Committee; namely, to indicate that the drafting is defective. What I am indicating is that it seems to me that, by omitting the one provision that is not mirrored in the government amendments, he is leaving open a possibility of conflict which the Government consider to be an undesirable risk. It may not be a very great risk, for the reasons I have given, but the possibility is there. For this reason we would consider it very much more desirable to follow the pattern laid down in the fuller amendments that we have provided.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
9 p.m.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 296:
Page 53, line 22, after ("construction") insert ("alteration or improvement").
The noble and learned Lord said: I have spoken to this amendment. I beg to move it formally.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 45, as amended, agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 297:
After Clause 45, insert the following new clause:
Certification of appropriate alternative development
(" .—(l) For section 17(1) of the Land Compensation Act 1961 (certificate of appropriate alternative development may be issued only if land is not in an area defined in development plan as an area of comprehensive development or shown in the plan as allocated for residential, commercial or industrial use) there is substituted—

"(1) Where an interest in land is proposed to be acquired by an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers, either of the parties directly concerned may, subject to subsection (2) of this section, apply to the local planning authority for a certificate under this section".

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(2) In subsection (4) of that section (certificate stating that permission for development would or would not be granted) for paragraphs (a) and (b) there is substituted—

"(a) that planning permission would have been granted for development of one or more classes specified in the certificate (whether specified in the application or not) and for any development for which the land is to be acquired, but would not have been granted for any other development; or

(b) that planning permission would have been granted for any development for which the land is to be acquired, but would not have been granted for any other development,

and for the purposes of this subsection development is development for which the land is to be acquired if the land is to be acquired for purposes which involve the carrying out of proposals of the acquiring authority for that development."

(3) After subsection (9) of that section there is inserted—

"(9A) In assessing the compensation payable to any person in respect of any compulsory acquisition, there shall be taken into account any expenses reasonably incurred by him in connection with the issue of a certificate under this section (including expenses incurred in connection with an appeal under section 18 of this Act where any of the issues on the appeal are determined in his favour)".").
The noble and learned Lord said: I have already spoken to this amendment. I beg to move it formally.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 298:
After Clause 45, insert the following new clause:
Compensation where permission for additional development granted after acquisition
(" .—(1) Schedule (Compensation where permission for additional development granted after acquisition) to this Act (which revives Part IV of the Land Compensation Act 1961) shall have effect.
(2) This section applies to an acquisition or sale of an interest in land if the date of completion (within the meaning of that Part) falls on or after the day on which this section comes into force.").
The noble and learned Lord said: I have already spoken to this amendment. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendment No. 299 not moved.]
The Earl of Lytton The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 300:
After Clause 45, insert the following new clause:
("Compensation for loss where order not made or notice to treat not served
. After section 3 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (acquisition by agreement in pursuance of compulsory purchase order) there is inserted—
"Compensation for loss where order not made or notice to treat not served.
3A.—(1) Where an acquiring authority have resolved to make or have taken any statutory step initiating the procedure for making a compulsory purchase order for any land but have not thereafter made an order which has become operative within a period of four years or earlier notified the owner of any interest in the land that they do not intend to make the order the authority shall be liable to pay compensation to any such owner for any loss or expenses occasioned to him in consequence of the resolution or the statutory step between the date of the resolution or the taking of the statutory step whichever is the earlier and the expiration of the said period of four years or the date of any such notice whichever is the earlier.
(2) The amount of any compensation payable under subsection (1) shall, in default of agreement, be determined by the Lands Tribunal.
(3) Compensation payable to any person under subsection (1) shall carry interest at the rate prescribed under section 32 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 from the date of the resolution or statutory step referred to in subsection (1) whichever is the earlier.
(4) Where a compulsory purchase order has become operative but no notice to treat is served within the period specified in section 4 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (time limit) or the acquiring authority have not earlier notified the owner of any interest in land comprised in the order that notice to treat will not be served the authority shall be liable to pay compensation to any such owner for loss or expenses occasioned to him between the date on which the order was resolved to be made or the first statutory step to initiate it was taken whichever is the earlier and the date of the expiration of the period specified in the said section 4 or the date on which the authority gave notice that no notice to treat would be served whichever is the earlier in consequence of the resolution, the initiation of the first statutory step and the making and coming into operation of the order.
(5) Subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall apply to compensation to be assessed under subsection (4) as they apply to compensation to be assessed under subsection (1).
(6) Subsection (4) and (5) do not apply where a blight notice is served and becomes valid under Chapter II of Part VI of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (interests affected by planning proposals: blight) in consequence of the land being blighted land within paragraph 22 of Schedule 13 of that Act." ").
The noble Earl said: The principle behind Amendment No. 300 is that it provides for compensation to be paid for a demonstrable loss where a compulsory purchase order is not in fact made or notice to treat is not in fact served. There is very little more I can add to it, other than to say that when an acquiring authority or prospective acquiring authority sets off down the road of obtaining compulsory powers it can involve claimants and potential claimants in a very significant amount of expense in terms of protecting their interests.
This provision is something which is already, as I understand it, implemented by a number of authorities where they decide for whatever reason to withdraw from or not to proceed with a compulsory purchase order. Although the amendment appears to be a very long one, its import is quite limited. I beg to move.
Baroness Blatch: At the risk of over-simplifying what I think the noble Lord intends by these amendments, I would say that, largely, they all seek to make further provision for compensating owners who are facing compulsory purchase but who are nonetheless in a period of uncertainty as to whether or when the authority will proceed with the acquisition of their property.
Amendments Nos. 338 and 339 concern the steps that owners should reasonably be required to take in order to mitigate their compensatable losses. I agree that it is desirable for the owner and the authority to work out in advance of compensation being assessed what are reasonable steps to take to mitigate losses, and when they are best taken. However, I am not convinced that these are matters which need to be
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enshrined in the law. The courts have already concluded that expenses incurred by owners in connection with compulsory purchase should be reasonably direct and not too remote. That seems to me to be a sufficient legal basis on which to assess such compensation. I therefore do not support the idea of amending the provisions as they stand.
Amendment No. 300 seeks to provide compensation for owners' expenses incurred from the date when the authority initiated the procedure for making a compulsory purchase order if, within four years of that date, the order has not become operative nor has the authority formally abandoned its proposal, or, alternatively, if the order has become operative but notice to treat has not been served within the statutory three-year period nor formally withdrawn by the authority. Again, I can appreciate the good intentions behind the noble Earl's amendment. However, it is our view that an adequate safeguard is already available in the form of the statutory blight provisions, under which owners can normally ask the authority to purchase their property in advance of compulsory purchase. Where this occurs it is a well-established principle that expenses incurred before notice to treat are recoverable, provided they are not unreasonable, unnecessary or too remote.
It would appear from the form of Amendment No. 300 that the liability to pay compensation would be triggered even before an authority had firmly committed itself to making a compulsory purchase order. Thus the liability would presumably arise in relation to proposals which were published simply for the purposes of public discussion. This would scarcely be conducive to openness and participation in the planning system.
I turn finally to Amendment No. 342, under which an owner who has been served with notice to treat and who therefore can no longer require the authority to purchase his property under the blight provisions would be able to require the authority to take entry on to his property. It is certainly not right that an owner who has had notice to treat served on him should then be left to face a substantial period of uncertainty as to precisely when the authority is going to take possession of his property.
It is for this reason that we have introduced a provision at Clause 46 of the Bill under which notice to treat shall cease to have effect if the authority have failed to act on it within three years of its service. The clause further provides for compensation to be paid to affected owners where notice to treat lapses in these circumstances. In our view this provision strikes the right balance—on the one hand, not leaving owners in the dark for an excessive period and, on the other hand, allowing authorities sufficient time to take stock of their requirements for the proposed scheme and to carry out the complex processes that are necessary when land is compulsorily purchased. We hope that the three-year time limit will act as an incentive for local authorities to complete transactions as soon as possible. To do as the noble Earl suggests would be to impose an unreasonable constraint on acquiring

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authorities. I hope that that explanation is helpful to the noble Earl and that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Ross of Newport: I do not find that a very satisfactory response. It seems that the Government are saying that if the local authority, or whatever body it is which serves the compulsory purchase order or passes a resolution that it intends to go forward with compulsory purchase proceedings and then does not actually carry out that intention nor serve a notice to treat, the compensation to the owner who is affected might be triggered by serving a purchase notice. Why should the owner serve a purchase notice if in fact he dearly loves his property and does not wish to abandon it? It seems to me that there is a gap. Perhaps I have not completely taken in everything the noble Baroness has said but, as I understood her explanation, if the authority passes a resolution that it intends to make a compulsory purchase and then does not serve a notice to treat, messes about and finally abandons the project, the owner of the property, unless he serves a purchase notice, actually gets no compensation whatsoever. That surely cannot be right. He should have some recognition that he has suffered through this. There has been a blight on their property, and there is no way that they can sell it. Suddenly, the whole thing is off. The procedure may take three or four years and they receive nothing. That is wrong.
The Earl of Lytton: I listened with care to what the Minister said. Perhaps I may apologise to her for not having spoken to all the amendments to which, obviously, I should have spoken. I thank her for her courteous reply to all the amendments to which I did not speak and to the one to which I did speak. I apologise to the Committee for that.
There is an unresolved problem here, as has rightly been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Ross of Newport. It brings into sharp focus the type of problem that I have encountered when dealing with claimants in respect of small road-widening schemes and such matters. Bearing in mind that in the South East of England there is a high turnover of residential properties—people do not tend to remain on average for more than three or four years—the chances are that, within a scheme involving several hundred properties, several people may wish to move on whose homes are blighted by the provision whereby a resolution has been made but nothing further has happened.
Such people are left in an invidious position. They can cut their losses and run or, if the acquiring authority is trying to acquire by agreement, they can settle for whatever they are offered in order to get rid of the problem that is hanging over them. It is an imposition in the sense that draconian powers are being exercised which in many respects clearly prejudice the interests of individuals. I am especially interested in residential occupiers who may stand to lose a piece of front garden or something like that.
While I do not wish to press the amendment, I feel that there remains a case that the Minister has not yet answered. I ask her further to consider the matter
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carefully to see whether something can be done to improve the operation of the blight provisions so that they can catch up with even a few of the hard cases.
Baroness Blatch: Perhaps I may apologise for the second time today for being presumptuous; but there was an agreement that we would discuss Amendments Nos. 338, 339 and 342 at the same time. I thank the noble Earl for dealing with those amendments. I shall of course read everything that has been said during the course of the debate, without commitment and without prejudice to the outcome of any deliberations, between now and Report stage. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Ross, and repeat what I said when speaking to the amendments, that it is our view that an adequate safeguard is available in the form of statutory blight provisions where an owner can require the authority to purchase the property in advance of compulsory purchase.
The Earl of Lytton: I assure the Minister that the mistake over the groupings of the amendments was entirely mine. I did not read what was on the list. She stands completely exonerated on that score, and on that basis I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 50 [Planning assumptions in connection with acquisition of land by roads authorities]:
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendments Nos. 301 to 304:
Page 60, line 14, leave out ("for the purpose of providing") and insert ("for the purpose of, or in connection with, providing, altering").
Page 60, line 16, after ("purpose") insert ("or in that connection").
Page 60, line 25, after ("purpose") insert ("or in the connection").
Page 60, line 26, leave out subsection (7) and insert:
("(7) The determinations referred to in subsection (5) of this section are—

(a) a determination, for the purpose of assessing compensation in respect of any compulsory acquisition, whether planning permission might reasonably have been expected to be granted for any development if no part of the relevant land were proposed to be acquired by any authority possessing compulsory purchase powers, and

(b) a determination under section 25 of this Act as to the development for which, in the opinion of the planning authority, planning permission would or would not have been granted if no part of the relevant land were proposed to be acquired by any authority possessing compulsory purchase powers.").

On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 50, as amended, agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 305:
After Clause 50, insert the following new clause:
Certification of appropriate alternative development
.—(1) For section 25(1) of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963 (certificate of appropriate alternative development may be issued only if land is not in an area defined in development plan as an area of comprehensive development or shown in the plan as allocated for residential, commercial or industrial use) there is substituted—
"(1) Where an interest in land is proposed to be acquired by an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers, either of the parties directly concerned

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may, subject to subsection (2) of this section, apply to the planning authority for a certificate under this section".
(2) In subsection (4) of that section (certificate stating that permission for development would or would not be granted) for paragraphs (a) and (b) there is substituted—

"(a) that planning permission would have been granted for development of one or more classes specified in the certificate (whether specified in the application or not) and for any development for which the land is to be acquired, but would not have been granted for any other development; or

(b) that planning permission would have been granted for any development for which the land is to be acquired, but would not have been granted for any other development,

and for the purposes of this subsection development is development for which the land is to be acquired if the land is to be acquired for purposes which involve the carrying out of proposals of the acquiring authority for that development."
(3) After subsection (9) of that section there is inserted—
"(9A) In assessing the compensation payable to any person in respect of any compulsory acquisition, there shall be taken into account any expenses reasonably incurred by him in connection with the issue of a certificate under this section (including expenses incurred in connection with an appeal under section 26 of this Act where any of the issues on the appeal are determined in his favour)".").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendment No. 306 not moved.]
Clause 46 [Time limit on validity of notice to treat]:
Baroness Hollis of Heigham Baroness Hollis of Heigham moved Amendment No. 307:
Page 54, line 12, at end insert:
("(2DD) The Secretary of State shall satisfy itself in respect of any financial year in which this section has effect that the resources available to local authorities are adequate to enable them to fulfil the requirements of subsection (2C) (b) above without detriment to other services provided by any such authority").
The noble Baroness said: I should like to speak also to Amendment No. 322. We support the intent of Clauses 46 and 47, but the amendments seek to ensure that local authorities have sufficient resources to implement them. Clause 46, as the Committee will be aware, limits the validity of a CPO notice for three years, which is probably sensible. Should the implementation of the CPO notice be delayed, not necessarily through the fault of the local authority—for example, as a consequence of a substantially reduced capital allocation, a fate befalling many of them at the moment—the CPO notice may expire, and the whole procedure may have to be repeated later at considerable additional cost, because local authorities will have had to reorganise their capital and financial programmes.
Amendment No. 322 amends Clause 47 which we support. Clause 47 increases tenant compensation from £1,200 to £1,500. It will make occupants eligible for that compensation after one year rather than five and will ensure that they will be paid more quickly. We support all of that, but as it means that more
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people will claim compensation—more compensation and faster compensation—there will obviously be costs for the local authority.
Therefore, both amendments require the Secretary of State to ensure that local authorities have the resources available to do what we should all wish. Otherwise, we fear that this will simply be one more item in a long list of dogs, litter, community care and environmental protection in which duties —highly desirable duties but ones which have associated costs—are imposed on local authorities without additional resources, putting them at risk of charge-capping.
I am sure there is general agreement that resources should be commensurate with responsibilities. That is what these amendments seek to ensure. I beg to move Amendment No. 307.
9.15 p.m.
Baroness Blatch: The amendment as drafted begs some important questions. Exactly how is the Secretary of State to satisfy himself of the facts? If he is not satisfied, what is he to do about it? What exactly is meant by "detriment", and how is it to be judged?
Nonetheless, the underlying thought is clear enough: it is that when central government impose new burdens on local government, they should also ensure that local government has the resources it needs in order to put those burdens into effect. I agree with that view. But this amendment is not remotely helpful in enabling it to be carried out.
Every year there is a financial settlement in which the Government determine how much they think local authorities need to spend and how much they will give them in support of that expenditure. Before the settlement is made, the Government review all the circumstances including, among other things, the new burdens which they have placed on authorities for the coming year. They also go through an extensive consultation with local authorities and their representatives.
In other words, it is already the case that new burdens are included in the settlement to the extent that the Secretary of State thinks appropriate. There is no need for us to legislate to spell this out. Indeed, it would be odd to spell it out with regard to these particular burdens, which are certainly important matters but are not in the overall scheme of things major items of local authority spending. From this point of view, the amendments are at best unnecessary and are out of proportion with the other factors which the Secretary of State is bound to take into account.
There is another hidden implication in the amendments which I wish to draw out. It is that each year's settlement includes specific provision for each item of spending by local authorities. That is simply not the case. The settlement is determined as an overall figure, taking account of a wide range of factors—new burdens, certainly, but also the level of inflation, the scope for improved efficiency, the cutting out of wasteful expenditure and, more generally, what the country as a whole can afford.
These amendments speak of avoiding detriment to other services. To satisfy himself on this score the

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Secretary of State would have to assess in some detail exactly what it would cost local authorities to provide a "non-detrimented" service—I apologise for that word but it is the only one that will do—for each of these functions. He would in effect have to second-guess local authorities' own decisions about their local priorities. I am sure that if we on this side had come up with such a proposal it would have been fiercely opposed by Members opposite on the grounds that it undermined local discretion and democracy. We do not intend to fall into that trap.
I hope the noble Baroness will not be surprised at my reply and will not press the amendment.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham: I appreciate some of the points made by the noble Baroness, but I have to say that she shares with me a concern that local government more generally is having additional burdens imposed upon it. This may not be the best way of addressing that problem. As she does, I fear increasing centralisation by central government over local government. I am delighted to see that the noble Baroness is a convert to our side in trying to hold at bay central government, and of course we should welcome her spirited support for that position.
Nevertheless, I was slightly concerned at the Minister's comment that the new burdens were included in the settlement to the degree that the Secretary of State thought appropriate; and then the Minister indicated that what was appropriate was inflation, savings and what the country can afford. That leaves out the additional responsibilities imposed on local authorities by the Minister.
I hope that what the Minister may take from this fairly brief exchange is that central government must think hard before asking local authorities to take on additional responsibilities, desirable though they may be, if their annual allocations, their capital allocations, their PES forecasts, their standard spending assessments for local authorities and the like neither keep pace with inflation on the one hand nor are commensurate with increased responsibilities on the other.
Over the past three years every local authority association has complained to the joint consultative council that the financial settlement by central government to local government has not fully compensated for the additional burdens that central government have imposed on it. If as a result of this exchange the Minister would accept that issue and bring it to the attention of her colleagues in another place, I think we should be well served. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 46 agreed to.
[Amendments Nos. 308 to 311 not moved.]
The Earl of Lytton The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 312:
After Clause 46, insert the following new clause:
("Payment of additional sum
.—(1) After section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 there is inserted—
"Additional sum.
.—(1) In addition to the total compensation in respect of any compulsory acquisition assessed in accordance with the rules in section 5 of this Act there shall be paid by the authority paying such compensation to any person to whom such compensation is paid an additional sum calculated as 10 per cent. of such compensation subject to a maximum additional sum of £25,000 to assist in the re-organisation of his affairs having regard to the fact that the paying authority have or are deemed to have a compulsory power of acquisition whether exercised or not and whether or not consequent on the service of a purchase notice or a blight notice under Part VI of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (Rights of owners etc. to require purchase of interests).
(2) Where a person is entitled to an additional sum under this section and a home loss payment under section 29 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 (Right to home loss payment where person displaced from dwelling) only the higher of the two amounts shall be payable and not both."
(2) At the end of section 10 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (Further provisions as to compensation for injurious affection) there is inserted—
"(4) Section—of the Land Compensation Act 1961 (Additional sum) shall apply to the total compensation payable under this section as it applies to the total compensation on a compulsory acquisition of land assessed under section 5 of that Act (Rules for assessing compensation) but having regard to the fact that the injurious affection is compulsorily imposed on the claimant's land."
(3) At the end of section 20 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (Tenants at will etc.) there is inserted—
"(7) Section—of the Land Compensation Act 1961 (Additional sum) shall apply to the total compensation payable under this section as it applies to the total compensation on a compulsory acquisition of land assessed under section 5 of that Act (Rules for assessing compensation) but having regard to the fact that the claimant is compulsorily required to give up possession of the land."
(4) At the end of section 4 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 (Assessment of compensation: general provisions) there is inserted—
"(6) Section—of the Land Compensation Act 1961 (Additional sum) shall apply to the total compensation payable under this section as it applies to the total compensation on a compulsory acquisition of land assessed under section 5 of that Act (Rules for assessing compensation) but having regard to the fact that the depreciation is compulsorily imposed on the claimant's land." ").
The noble Earl said: In moving this amendment I must say that I was greatly heartened by the comment just made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, that she considered local authorities should be fully compensated for the shortfall that she believed existed. Amendment No. 312 seeks to achieve exactly the same objective. The amendment attempts to rectify what is certainly perceived by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors and many other bodies to be a deficiency in the fundamentals of the compensation system.
The principles that are at stake here are as follows. First, under a compulsory purchase order or a threat of compulsion the vendor is likely to act unwillingly. However, it must be said that no regard is to be paid to compulsion in assessing compensation. Secondly, the vendor is refunded only his cash costs and the price

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of his land and buildings at valuation. That fails to address the principle that there is more to the business of land and property ownership and the occupation and ownership of a dwelling house than a crude assembly of all the various bits and pieces. That omits the concept of the personal trauma or inconvenience that is suffered by a claimant and the temporary blight—on the admission of the Minister the latter is not taken into account—and unquantifiable losses which may occur and which are not necessarily reflected in the value of the land. One also has to take into account loss of view and such considerations as historic ownership. No amount of compensation can ever reinstate those considerations.
The measure obliges a claimant to sell at a time and at a value which are not necessarily of his choosing. He is totally under the control of the acquiring authority regarding the date and timing of the particular acquisition which then fixes the valuation date. The amendment seeks to remedy an imbalance between the public and private interests in so far as it is not already taken into account. I believe there is a compelling argument for saying that the existing measure is deficient in a material respect.
I did not move Amendment No. 308. This amendment differs from Amendment No. 308 only in that it applies a flat rate increase to the totality of compensation. The aim of this amendment is the same as that of Amendment No. 308, but I feel that, administratively, it is a lot easier to handle. The percentage uplift is there to reflect the compulsory nature and the unquantifiable factors of the compulsory acquisition process.
The amendment safeguards against paying double compensation; for instance, in the event of home loss payments. The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, may wish to leap to his feet and tell me that residential property is a special case and should be treated as such. I do not wish to pre-empt what he may say. I believe there are provisions in the world of compulsory purchase and compensation that make every claimant something of a special case. However, I agree that the householder may require specific fall-back provisions which are not applicable elsewhere. I do not accept that the concept of a payment to reflect the compulsory nature of the acquisition is such a fall-back provision.
My amendment provides for a ceiling to be placed on this additional amount. The ceiling is specified as £25,000. The purpose behind setting such a ceiling was quite deliberate in the sense that one of the obvious criticisms that could be made of the amendment would concern its resource implications. The cut-off point is intended to address that criticism. I know that there are others who do not agree with that and I shall not comment further on what they may have to say in that respect.
There is a compelling reason for an additional sum being payable. It has resource implications and I do not want to make light of the provision. It is not my place to make the process more expensive than it need be.
I should like to pick up a point made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Cornwallis. Unless claimants can rest assured that the system will treat them in a self-evidently fair manner in respect of compensation payable there will be continued resistance to compulsory acquisition at every stage—at the making of the compulsory purchase order and on disagreements over value—with the consequential factors of public inquiries and references to the Lands Tribunal.
We cannot continue down that road. It requires an act of faith to break that vicious circle of on the one hand authorities wielding extensive powers and on the other hand the claimant who is in a relatively vulnerable position. There are reasons to believe that savings which may not be immediately quantifiable will be produced by an amendment such as this and they should be taken into account.
Amendment No. 334 is consequential on this amendment. I do not believe that I need to say more about it. I beg to move.
Lord Cornwallis Lord Cornwallis moved, as an amendment to Amendment No. 312, Amendment No. 313:
Line 9, leave out from ("compensation") to ("having") in line 11.
The noble Lord said: I support the principle behind the previous amendment but with reservations. I see no reason for there to be a cut-off point in compensation payments. Surely injurious effect upon one's business or home is bound to be in proportion to the size of the asset taken. In the case of land the financial damage to the viability of the remainder of the area and the quality of the land must also be taken into consideration.
The view may be taken, and has been taken by the noble Earl, that the proposal will help people at the bottom end of the market. So it will. However, does that mean that the remainder should not be placed on an equal footing? As already mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Stanley of Alderley, in 1941 the Court of Appeal in Horne v Sunderland held that the vendor must be in no worse state than he was prior to the acquisition. That ruling must surely hold across the board.
Equally, it seems that no one must be worse off but some must be more equally worse off than others if the amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, is agreed as it stands. I am thoroughly in favour of helping those at the bottom end of the scale, but we seem to have an obsession that the rest must be penalised in order to do so. It is that very principle which has placed the CAP in such a mess and is bedevilling current negotiations. We should look at the wealth creators—and I do not mean money—just as much as the others. The wealth creators tend to be the larger enterprises.
I have reservations about the sentence which refers to,
"the re-organisation of his affairs".
However, I understand that that has sympathetic Inland Revenue connotations and I would hate to upset anything that had sympathetic Inland Revenue connotations. I beg to move.
Lord Ross of Newport: I should like to speak briefly in support of Amendment No. 312 as I added my name to it, and also to Amendment No. 326ZA in the unavoidable absence of my noble friend Lord Meston.
Amendment No. 312 is intended to write into legislation what often but not always happens in practice, and quite sensibly so. I do not have experience of the acquisitions made in connection with the Channel Tunnel and its access roads, but I suspect that the compensation paid there was often up to twice the current market value. I may say it is very difficult for valuers to try to assess values at 87/88 or at 73/74, because values seem to be increasing almost overnight. That is another reason why there should be some extra money written in, because if in 1987 somebody had accepted a market price, had completion and then went off trying to find somewhere else to live, he would have had a shock, because every time he put an offer in he would probably have been gazumped.
Another reason for this amendment is that it smooths the path. Time costs money. If you have a reluctant vendor and a rather tough-minded purchaser—somebody who is going to be pretty mean—the chances are that it will be long held out and the matter in the end will probably have to go to arbitration. Surely, it is only right that in addition to the market price there should be some incentive. This goes back into the last century. It has been authorised on many occasions. We are trying to write into the Bill only what happens very often in practice, and should certainly happen here. As the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, pointed out, we are not trying to add a further £25,000 to the maximum of £15,000. That will be taken into account, and it will not necessarily be any extra amount over and above that.
On Amendment No.326ZA, this will try to help small businessmen. Goodness knows, they are in enough trouble as it is. If any of them are left after this recession I shall be very surprised. I may be asked what is the definition of a small business. I am desperately trying to think of the report on small businesses of 15 or so years ago. I am informed by the Labour Front Bench that it was the Bolton Report. In that report one finds a definition of small businesses; it is a term applying to businesses having 200 or less employees.
Lord Mottistone: For the distributive trades, the figure was six employees.
Lord Ross of Newport: In any event, there is a definition of small businesses which would apply in this case. It could at least be taken by the Government as a guide. We all feel particularly sorry for small businesses at this particular time; they are facing all sorts of problems, not the least of which are the huge increases in rate demands. I hope that they might also be taken into account. My noble friend Lord Meston was certainly wishing to speak on their behalf.
9.30 p.m.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: I support the amendment in the name of the noble Earl, in particular on the principle, which I do not think we have quite grasped,
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that if you are compulsorily purchased you are not a willing seller, and therefore it alters the books quite a lot.
The other amendment which I support is the one to which I have added my name: the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Cornwallis. At the risk of infuriating the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh (he did the same to me two or three nights ago on farm buildings, so I do not see why I should not do it to him now) and making him rise to his feet, I see no harm in offering slightly over the odds to encourage settlement. Certainly, it works extremely well in France. I believe that Amiens tried to get the fast railway track through the town in order to get compensation. For all I know, the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, will have the railway through Haringey.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: If the noble Lord, Lord Stanley, thinks that I rise infuriated, he has another think coming.
I think that this exchange is marvellous. It encapsulates everything that I expected it to do and all that I anticipated when I spoke on an earlier amendment. What we have is a little difference of opinion between those who—purely altruistically as regards themselves—represent the very greedy and those who represent the very very greedy.
One can go a lot further. Why are there no amendments to suggest that the proper price to be paid should not be the price at the time of the compulsory acquisition but, let us say, the best price that could have been obtained in any of the past 10 years? That would truly be a shift for the benefit of land owners and property holders. If one continues for long enough one might stop any sort of public investment for infrastructure development which involved land at all. No doubt that would be very comfortable for some noble Lords.
As for the reference to Amiens, if the noble Lord examines the history of the case he will find that, like the city of Lille and Arras, the city of Amiens wanted the TGV because of the economic development opportunities rather than the compulsory purchase price that they would receive for the land.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: First of all, I congratulate my noble friend for managing to get the noble Lord opposite to rise to his feet. I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Cornwallis, that much as I share his views on the proposals for the reform of the CAP, it is not a parallel that I feel able to continue to draw with him as we deal with compensation provisions in this Bill.
In bringing forward his amendments the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, argued that compensation payable in all compulsory purchase cases—because that is what it comes to—should include an additional payment over and above the market value of the property itself, in recognition of the fact that the claimant, though I am not sure that the claimant is necessarily an individual, or it may be some other person, is being displaced under compulsion or the threat of it. That brings us up against an important issue to which I am sure we must give careful consideration.

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We have considered at some length in the course of this evening's deliberations the essential principle that a claimant should be left neither better nor worse off than he would have been if the compulsory purchase were not taking place.
Market value compensation and reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses are available to all claimants. However, there is an important addition.
Those who are displaced from their homes are also entitled to further compensation in the form of a home loss payment. This additional entitlement rests on the premise that a special payment over and above the value of the property itself is justified in order to provide some recompense for the personal distress that normally arises when someone is forced to leave his or her own home in these circumstances. The Government remain firmly committed to the principle of the home loss payment, and indeed one of the main purposes of this Bill is to increase the level of such payments and the number of claimants entitled to receive them. We do not retreat from that at all. The law also provides for farm loss and other special payments to help in particular cases and the Bill improves those provisions in a number of ways.
It does not however seem to us that there is the same justification for extending the principle of the supplement above market value to include all cases of public acquisition, regardless of the circumstances. Home loss payments are not made only because the acquisition is taking place under compulsion or the threat of it. Rather, they are intended to reflect, as I indicated, the view that the compensation system needs to give specific recognition to the particular problems faced by those who are deprived of their own homes. It does not seem to us that these problems arise in the same way where non-residential displacements are concerned. It is true that the enforced loss of any type of property will almost always prove to be a painful experience. But I would expect most people to agree that displacement from one's home will generally give rise to an altogether exceptional degree of inconvenience and distress. Hence the distinction which the compensation system makes between the residential and non-residential situations. It is not of course a distinction newly created by this Bill. It has been applied since the home loss payment scheme was first introduced nearly 20 years ago and has been upheld by successive governments since that time. The changes that we propose in the Bill do not involve any departure from the basic concept of the home loss payment.
Amendment No. 312 provides a basis for assessing additional payment. There is a great deal that I could say about the potential cost implications of the proposals. However, I am unable to entertain the basic principles underlying the amendments. We are strongly of the view that the concept of a supplementary payment above the market value cannot, in all conscience, be justified in the case of non-residential acquisitions.
I turn to Amendment No. 326ZA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ross. It provides for a special payment which is broadly comparable to the home
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loss payment in the case of a compulsory acquisition of a small business. I understand the sympathy felt by the noble Lord and other Members of the Committee for small businesses but I see no way of accepting the proposal advanced. I have indicated the basis on which home loss payments are made but the small business is in a different situation. I cannot see that the loss of property in such a case is comparable to the loss of a home.
Businesses can claim for some losses—for instance, staff time spent on the relocation and the loss of goodwill—which are not available to home owners. Even if we were to adopt the principle of a special payment for small businesses we should immediately come up against the problem of definition. How could we frame a provision targeted at the genuine small business which was not open to circumvention and abuse?
It would appear that the amendment attempts to link eligibility for the proposed payment to entitlement for small businesses to the home loss payment. The intention appears to be that the proposed payment will apply only to those living in the business premises. If that is the intention I see no reason in logic or equity why someone who happens to have a small business which is attached to part of his home should receive a payment while another person who has a business in no way attached to his home but which is to be lost should be well treated.
I do not like to dismiss the problems of the small business. However, the home loss payment is an exceptional situation. It is improved upon in the Bill but it should not be extended.
Lord Cornwallis: I beg to withdraw Amendment No. 313.
Amendment to the amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Earl of Lytton: I listened with great care to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate and I shall give his comments serious consideration. There appears to be a credibility gap into which the compensation code currently falls. I shall withdraw Amendment No. 312 with the proviso that I may return to it at a later stage.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
9.45 p.m.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 313A:
After Clause 46, insert the following new clause:
("Compensation for land sales
.—(1) This section shall apply in any case where a local authority, public corporation or other public body may be required pursuant to a statutory provision to dispose of land where the body certifies that it would not, but for the operation of the provision, seek to dispose of the land at the intended date concerned or to the person to whom, or the price at which, it is proposed that it be disposed.
(2) In any case in which subsection (1) above applies, the Secretary of State shall issue a notice stating that—

(a) he is satisfied that the proposed disposal is at a price or on terms which are fully commensurate with the value of the land, calculated on the basis of any existing or proposed use of the land (whichever is the higher) of which the authority notifies him; and

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(b) he is satisfied that no alternative use of the land which the authority or other body has proposed to him is more desirable or conducive to the needs of the area in enabling the body to maintain or improve its services, or on planning or environmental grounds.

(3) No disposal falling within subsection (1) above shall be completed before the issuing of a notice under subsection (2).").
The noble Lord said: There is an issue upon which I hope to have the support of the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, if I have not totally alienated him as a result of my previous remarks. Amendment No. 313A relates to the possibility of a local authority being forced to sell land at a time which may be unsuitable in terms of the market place or alternative uses for the land.
This is a probing amendment. It does not relate to any provision in the Bill but arises from a consultation paper encouraging the use of vacant public land. It was issued by the department last summer and has received a spirited response from those who were consulted. We have not yet received a formal indication of the response nor of the Government's reaction. However, rumours are circulating that somebody somewhere in Marsham Street, whether on the 17th floor or elsewhere, would like to bring into this the provisions proposed in the consultation paper. Those provisions would mean that local authorities which had vacant land could be required to dispose of it to a named buyer or, for example, they could be forced to dispose of all vacant land within a given geographical boundary.
The original thinking behind that is the fact that there is too much vacant public land. There is also too much vacant private land, but the Government do not think of those two facts in the same way. Indeed, there is a lot of vacant land, much of which has been vacant for far too many years. Experience of the docklands and many other parts of London, to take only the places which I know best, is that vacant land continues unused for far too long.
The thinking behind the Government's consultation paper appears to be that somehow that is a failure of property portfolio management rather than what I suspect is much more the case and has been the case for many years—namely, not that there is unwillingness to use the vacant land but that there are either genuine disputes about what the land should be used for or, more often, a serious lack of positive and well financed proposals for the use of the land. In other words, what is wrong is the economies of our inner city areas rather than the property management powers of the public sector.
Indeed, if it were only the property management powers of the public sector which were at fault, why is there so much vacant privately-owned land? It has always been held to be a virtue by house builders, for example, that they should hold a land bank and should have enough vacant land available to them to have a building programme for a number of years ahead. That was in the days when there were house builders and building programmes. Those days may return but probably not under this Government. I suspect that that belief is a fallacy and the reasons for
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private and public vacant land are very much the same: the state of the economy and conflicts as regards the potential uses for land rather than failures of management.
This amendment seeks to protect the community charge payers and those who are behind local authorities. The intention is to make sure that the public assets which they own are not disposed of at the whim of the Secretary of State at anything under the best possible value. Also, they should not be disposed of when suitable alternative uses exist on service, planning or environmental grounds. Therefore, the amendment provides that if the Secretary of State is to make statutory provision to dispose of that land, he shall require the public body to certify that it would not, but for the operation of the provision, seek to dispose of the land at the intended date to the person to whom or at the price at which it is proposed that it be disposed of; and, if it applies, he shall issue a notice saying that he is satisfied that that is the right price and that there is no alternative public use of the land which is more desirable or conducive to the needs of the area. I summarise wildly in order not to impose on the Committee.
The responsibility for proper estate management is quite properly held as being a very important responsibility of local authorities and public bodies. They are quite properly called to task if they fail to dispose of land at the best prices or fail to take account of proper alternative uses. If there is any truth in the rumour that the Secretary of State is to take over those responsibilities, the very least we can ask is that he should take on the responsibility also of determining, for the protection of the public body concerned, that the price is right, or that the alternatives have been properly considered, or both. I beg to move.
Baroness Blotch: I fear that there has been some serious pre-emption of the consultation paper in the amendment. I assume that the noble Lord's amendment—which seems to me to be clearly outside the scope of the Bill—is aimed at the Secretary of State's power under Section 98 of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 to direct the disposal of unused or underused land owned by a relevant public sector body and entered on his register. I am certainly not aware of any other powers to which it might apply.
As such, the amendment is misconceived. Before making a direction the Secretary of State is required to give the owner formal notice of its proposed contents and at least 42 days to make representations about any aspect of it. In taking his decision the main point the Secretary of State normally considers is whether the owner has firm and practical proposals either to bring the land into use or to dispose of it within a reasonable period. The desirability or otherwise from a planning, environmental or other point of view of the particular use the owner has in mind is not relevant to his decision in this context. In practice the representations made have been taken so seriously that only one direction has been made for every three notices issued; and where a direction has been made it has sometimes

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incorporated changes in the proposed method or terms or timing of disposal to meet points made by the owner.
Directions normally leave the owner free initially to decide the method of sale and only specify a particular method as a last resort; for example, auction or advertised tender. For cases where there is only one likely purchaser—for example, an adjoining owner—the price is normally required to be no less than the district valuer's valuation.
A direction that specifies the method of disposal carries with it implied consent to waive the best-price requirement of Section 123 of the Local Government Act 1972, as the courts held in the 1987 Manchester case; but we would certainly not normally expect any conflict with that requirement. We are as concerned as anyone that an owner should get a proper price for his land; indeed for that reason we would be hesitant about directing disposal when the general level of the market was depressed in the short term or when problems affecting the price of a particular site—for example, the planning position—were likely to be resolved within a reasonable period. But where an owner uses arguments about best price merely as an excuse for unreasonably hanging on to land, the Secretary of State should remain free to exercise his own judgment in the light of all material considerations without being fettered as to which considerations he must take into account.
The noble Lord may well have in mind some of the proposals in our recent consultation paper Encouraging the Use of Vacant Public Sector Land and the possible effect they might have on the price obtained by owners or on the use of a particular site. Some people seem to have the impression that our proposals were aimed at developing sites which were or could sensibly be used as, for instance, public open space, which was certainly not our intention. I do not think that in the context of this Bill we should embark on a general debate about how to deal with vacant public sector land. On this I would only stress that it is a poor use of public resources that so much public land is still being held without being used. We therefore need to consider further measures to bring such land into use. The consultation paper was part of this consideration.
The Government are looking at a wide range of options for encouraging the use of vacant land. In doing so we shall certainly take full account of the responses received to the consultation paper. I do not think I shall be betraying any great secret if I admit that there have been fairly strong adverse reactions in some quarters to our proposals for named-person directions and for franchises in particular. However, any decision to proceed with these proposals would involve legislation at some future date and your Lordships would have full opportunity to debate them then.
In the circumstances I hope the noble Lord will not press the amendment.
The Earl of Lytton: Before the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, is goaded into deciding which way he will reply, perhaps I may stress that I do not rise in any
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sense out of anger stemming from what was said earlier in the debate. Far from it. I draw to his attention that I was the one who had the cut-off point when the noble Lords, Lord Stanley and Lord Cornwallis, were suggesting that I was not going far enough.
I say straight away that the principle behind getting these matters on a level playing field, which I suspect is what the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, was saying, is something with which I agree. However, that is as far down the road as I would go with him. He is espousing the interests of the most powerful of the organisations involved with compensation; namely, the acquiring authorities. I do not think that that should be forgotten. The fact that they are responsible to committees does not make them any less powerful or capable of using those powers in their own interests.
In particular the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, is trying to achieve a situation which has been a common thread throughout the debates on this Bill. I refer to the expansion of the non-recourse powers available to local authorities whether for planning or compensation. I stress the term "non-recourse" because I stand fairly and squarely against that concept unless there is a compelling reason why that should be the case.
In my understanding of the situation the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, wants everything to be accorded to local authorities. He has been at pains to deny the private claimant. By that I mean the residential and the large claimant supposedly represented by the noble Lord, Lord Stanley of Alderley and my noble friend Lord Cornwallis. The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, is trying to heap a pile of earth in front of the other side's goal while removing the pile in front of his own. I am not sure that that is a fair way of doing things. I had to make that point clear.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I get lost in football metaphors. Even I, who have never played football voluntarily and not at all since the age of 13, know that if I wanted to win a game I would not heap a pile of earth in front of the opposing goal and clear the way to my own. I would do the reverse.
The Earl of Lytton: The simile is a poor one. Noble Lords can tell that I am not an expert on football, but I believe that the noble Lord has the gist of what I was saying.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I have the gist of what the noble Earl is saying. Whenever I hear noble Lords talking about issues of principle I know that considerable sums of money must be involved. I do not mean that personally. The Minister's reply was quite fascinating. It made me very pleased that I had persisted with this amendment. I was pleased with her response that this Bill is not the appropriate place for the amendment. I was also pleased to hear her admit that the response to last year's consultation paper contained a good deal of antagonism and that if anything were to be done it would require future legislation. Can the Minister now be absolutely precise and confirm that future legislation does not mean at a future stage in the proceedings on this Bill?
Baroness Blatch: I can give the noble Lord an absolute assurance.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I am pleased to hear that and that there is no prospect in this Bill of what has been threatened, which is in effect the privatisation of vacant public land. When and if such legislation comes—if the Government are still here to propose it we shall oppose it vigorously. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10 p.m.
Clause 47 [Home loss payments]:
Lord McIntosh of Haringey Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved Amendment No. 314:
Page 54, line 18, at beginning insert:
("(1) In section 29(1) of the Land Compensation Act 1973 (right to a home loss payment where person displaced from dwelling) there shall be added after paragraph (e) the following paragraph—
"(f) the making by a magistrates court of a nuisance order prohibiting use of the dwelling for human habitation pursuant to section 82(3) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990."
and in sub-paragraph (v) after the words "paragraph (e)" there shall be added the words "or (f)".").
The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 315, 316, 317, 326 and 332. In the admirable reply given by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate to a preceding series of amendments, we have clearly distinguished between the very special case of home loss payments and other forms of compensation. We have now reached, the stage of the Bill where we deal with home loss compensation. From these Benches I welcome the increased provision which has been made for home loss payments. Let us not be at all grudging about that.
Baroness Blatch: Is the noble Lord speaking also to Amendments Nos. 321A and 322A in this grouping?
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: No, I did not understand that I was. Amendment No. 321A is in a group with Amendment No. 317. I do not have Amendment No. 322A anywhere.
In welcoming the improved provisions for home loss, we are pointing out through these amendments where the home loss provisions are too heavily weighted towards owner occupiers and not heavily weighted enough towards tenants, particularly certain classes of tenants. After, all we are talking about home loss; we are not talking here about loss of property. The loss of property is dealt with in the compensation on the value of a property.
Home loss payments are the payments for the loss of a home and they are in addition to any payments for the property. So far as we can see there is no good reason why there should be improved payments in home loss terms for people who have been owner occupiers for a shorter period of time, which is what is proposed in the Bill, as compared with those who may have been tenants for a considerable period of time. We take the welcome concessions on home loss
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payments and extend them to a number of groups which in our view are at least as deserving of home loss payments.
Amendment No. 314 deals with those tenants who are shifted permanently from their homes because those homes have become unfit for human habitation. Amendment No. 315 refers to those who are removed permanently from their homes because of repairs and improvement work. The change towards movement for improvement reasons is valid, but repairs, if they are serious enough, can equally require permanent removal. Amendment No. 316 reflects the new forms of tenancy of the 1989 and 1990 Acts and provides that home loss payments should be available to assured tenants as well as to secure tenants.
Amendment No. 317 reflects changes which have taken place in legislation and also changes which have taken place in the practice of the private rented market. It extends home loss payments to contractual licensees as well as to secure tenants. On reflection, we should have added to Amendment No. 317 spouses with rights of occupation under the Matrimonial Homes Act. I regret that we did not think of including such a provision. If we come back to the matter at another stage we shall certainly wish to do so.
Amendment No. 326 in the same group is an attempt to provide a better definition of the phrase, "date of displacement", which is used in the legislation without being defined. I said "a better definition"; I should have said "a definition", because there is not a proper definition. I shall be interested to hear what the Minister thinks "date of displacement" means. We think and hope that our amendment gives a reasonable and workable definition.
Finally, Amendment No. 332 deals with the issue of disturbance payments which are the payments not for home loss but for compensatable interest. It is interesting to see that those Members of the Committee interested in property are no longer in the Chamber. The amendment deals with tenants who do not have what is called—it is an unpleasant word—compensatable interest. It seeks to deal with their actual expenses in removal and forced removal.
The people covered by these amendments are very much more deserving than some of those who have been the subject of previous amendments designed to help landowners and property holders. I suggest to the Committee that the amendments are very much in line with the welcome steps that the Government have taken to improve the home loss amendments. I hope the Government will feel that the extensions which have already been made would in terms of pure social justice be properly extended to the categories of tenants covered in my amendments. I beg to move.
Baroness Blatch: The fundamental purpose of the home loss payment scheme is to provide a monetary solace for the distress and upheaval which people suffer when compelled to leave their home at a time not of their choosing. We are concerned here with situations which involve the permanent loss of a home. Indeed, it is from the permanence of the loss that the personal distress mainly arises. There would

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thus seem to us no case for accepting the principle of Amendment No. 314, which would extend the entitlement to cases where a person is only displaced temporarily from his home by a court order under the Environmental Protection Act 1990 while action is taken to abate a statutory nuisance which is affecting the dwelling.
Similarly, we could not accept Amendment No. 315, which brings in cases where the occupant is displaced in certain circumstances to allow repairs to be made to his home. The legislation already provides for some home loss payments to be made where there is a permanent displacement because of an authority's need to carry out improvements. But one would expect that where repairs—as distinct from improvements—are concerned, there is a strong possibility that the occupant will return to his home once the work has been carried out. The amendment might have the effect of discouraging authorities from carrying out essential repairs because of the potential liability to pay home loss payments.
Amendment No. 316 would establish an entitlement to a home loss payment in circumstances where a housing association tenant with an assured tenancy under the Housing Act 1988 was displaced under the terms of the redevelopment ground in that Act. I have every sympathy with the noble Lord's objective. I am not convinced, however, that it would be best achieved by extending the scope of the home loss payment scheme in the way he suggests. It is of course true that home loss payments continue to be available to those housing association tenants who have secure tenancies under the Housing Act 1985. But we would not be happy about legislating to apply the same principle to those with assured tenancies under the 1988 Act. The assured tenancy regime has been the basis for most new housing association lettings since January 1989. It is the same statutory regime as applies to most new private landlord lettings and our general policy has been to avoid introducing specific statutory provisions for assured tenancies let by housing associations that are not part of the assured tenancy regime as a whole.
It seems to us that the right way forward in this matter is by way of the tenants' guarantee. That is the general framework of guidance which is formulated by the Housing Corporation, with statutory backing, and with which all registered housing associations are expected to comply in managing their properties. The guarantee already makes some provision for compensation and disturbance payments where associations carry out improvement work. But we propose to ask the corporation to look at the issue more broadly with a view to providing, via the guarantee, the safeguard which the noble Lord is seeking.
Amendment No. 317 seeks to introduce three further categories of person who would be entitled to claim home loss payments. The first covers,
"a statutory tenant within the meaning of the Rent Act 1977".
That is unnecessary because, although the Land Compensation Act 1973 refers to tenants under the Rent Act 1968, the Interpretation Act permits us to
1022
apply the home loss payments provisions to re-enactments of the 1968 Act such as the 1977 Act. The second category includes those occupying a dwelling under a contractual licence. Home loss payments are aimed at people who are forced to leave a home to which they have developed a real attachment. There is really no case for making them available to people who merely occupied a dwelling on a short-term basis, as this amendment would require. Such people cannot normally be regarded as having any commitment to their home and might move on at any moment. The existing provisions implicitly but purposely exclude licensees such as lodgers, because of the possibility that such persons could deliberately move from place to place, where they had knowledge that an authority was soon to acquire the property compulsorily, and could claim a home loss payment on each occasion.
The third category of additional claimant would be spouses with rights of occupation under the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983. We are of course concerned here with those who have been deserted by their marriage partner. I certainly do not want to give the impression that the Government are insensitive to the problems faced by such people. However, it is a basic principle of the home loss payment scheme that eligibility for payment depends on having a legal interest in the property.
Under the Matrimonial Homes Act a deserted spouse may retain the right to occupy the marital home but he or she does not acquire a legal interest in the property. A deserted spouse can seek to make arrangements by agreement or through the courts to have a legal interest in the property transferred to him or her as part of a divorce or judicial separation settlement. The fact that such arrangements may not have been made in a particular case would not seem to justify a departure from the principle that eligibility for a home loss payment is dependent upon having a legal interest in the property.
I move now to Amendment No. 326. Under the existing home loss payment provisions, the entitlement to receive a payment occurs on the date on which the claimant is displaced from his home in consequence of any of the circumstances laid down in Section 29(1) of the 1973 Act. The date of displacement is thus the date on which he ceases to occupy his home and, by implication, the date on which the authority takes possession of the property. That seems to be an eminently sensible and uncomplicated arrangement which appears to work perfectly well. There thus seems no reason to make the change proposed by the noble Lord.
I turn finally to Amendment No. 332. This would extend the circumstances under which a disturbance payment can be made under Section 37 of the Land Compensation Act 1973. Section 37 applies to people without a compensatable interest in land (including homes but excluding agricultural land) from which they are displaced by the action of a public authority. The circumstances of displacement are very similar to those which give rise to home loss payments. Disturbance payments therefore particularly apply to

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those who occupy land or houses under a tenancy but, as with home loss payments, do not apply to those merely occupying property on an informal basis. The noble Lord's amendment seeks to widen or redefine the circumstances in which disturbance payments are payable, in much the same way as his other amendments sought to extend eligibility for home loss payments. For similar reasons to those which I have already stated, I am not persuaded that there is any case for extending the existing provisions in the ways the noble Lord proposes.
I am not sure whether the noble Lord is happy with that explanation, but I hope that he will not press his amendments.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I think that the Minister and I really have the same objective in mind. We are looking for home loss payments to be made where there is a substantial attachment to the home, mainly because somebody has been there for a very long time. In the Government's own amendments and in the changes they have made to the home loss payment scheme for owner-occupiers they have reduced the period of occupation very substantially so that it is now down to one year at the minimum. Therefore so far as owner-occupiers are concerned—I understand it is on a sliding scale—the Government have departed from the principle that the noble Baroness expressed and with which I expressed agreement.
If the noble Baroness looks at the real world she will find that the great majority of cases which fall under my amendments are not exclusively concerned with people who have been in occupation for a long time, but they do include substantial numbers of tenants who have been in occupation for a long time. Whenever one looks at compulsory purchase orders and remembers that they are in a minority, one finds that they tend to be—because it is more convenient to design road schemes and similar schemes where there are on y tenants rather than owner-occupiers—older properties, tenanted properties and properties where people have been in occupation for a considerable time.
I was not convinced that the noble Baroness had an adequate answer to my case for those who are removed permanently from their home because it is unfit for human habitation or else requires very substantial repair rather than improvement. The effect on the tenant, after all, is the same whether it is a case of repair, improvement or redevelopment. I was not convinced that the noble Baroness had dealt with the cases which undoubtedly exist of very long-standing tenants in those categories.
I was not convinced either that she had answered the case which was put for the new classification of assured tenant as well as that of secure tenant. I shall have to read carefully what the Minister said, and think about the Housing Corporation rules before I decide what to do about the amendments. On Amendment No. 326, I am satisfied with the definition given t y the Minister, and I do not wish to pursue that amendment. On disturbance payments, I do not
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believe that the Minister has addressed the issue of the expenses of those who do not otherwise have a compensatable interest.
I have an apology to make to those few Members of the Committee who may have been listening in detail. Because of the layout of Amendment No. 317, I did not realise that I had adequately provided for spouses under the Matrimonial Homes Act. I thought that it would have been a separate sub-paragraph. With those remarks and the thought that there are some aspects of the amendments to which I may wish to return, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 315 to 317 not moved.]
10.15 p.m.
Lord Mottistone Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 317A:
Page 54, line 41, leave out ("10") and insert ("25").
The noble Lord said: I shall speak also to Amendment No. 318 to which my noble friend Lord Coleraine and the noble Lord, Lord Meston, have their names, and Amendments Nos. 326A and 326B which are the Scottish equivalents to the first two amendments. Grouped with them are Amendments Nos. 317B, 318A, 319A, 320, 321A, 321B and 322A. I am advised, as I am sure the Committee will be aware, by the CBI. I am told that the amendments are also supported by the British Road Federation.
As the CBI has shown in its report Trade Routes to the Future, a good road and rail network is vital to this country's economic well being. Without it we shall not be able to manufacture goods on time and deliver them to customers when they need them. Our business people will be sitting in traffic jams while our competitors conclude contracts. The CBI estimates that road congestion alone costs the country £15 billion each year and is becoming worse.
This is not the time to have a full-scale debate on infrastructure and the extent to which the Government might subsidise it; it is, however, an opportunity to see whether the planning system can be used to encourage rather than delay the provision of vital infrastructure. There is no doubt that the planning approval system works too slowly and frustrates developments crucial to the general business community. It is democratic. That is something we all wish to preserve. So the dilemma is how to reduce the automatic tendency of those affected by development to object to it. In a nutshell, it is bureaucracy versus democracy.
Business believes that in broad outline the Government have the right solution. They compensate those affected with more than the market value of their property and offer them a just reward for the loss that they suffer, so that there is a real incentive to settle terms without undermining the whole development project.
The amendments do not in any way negate the principle which the Bill introduces of offering reasonable levels of compensation to create an incentive for home owners not to object to nearby development. However, the Government have not allowed a sufficient premium over market value to

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discourage people from formally opposing development proposals. Nor have the Government appreciated that many properties, especially in rural areas and in the South-East where the Channel Tunnel rail link will be needed, have values in excess of £150,000 and that by stipulating a £15,000 interest in the dwelling as a maximum, the incentive element is substantially eroded.
I do not believe that it is fair, justifiable or necessary to state a maximum. Accordingly, in Amendments Nos. 318 and 326B I ask the Committee to remove it from the Bill.
In France where, as we have heard earlier, the system provides 20 per cent. compensation above the market rate, restrictions are built in so that those being compensated waive their rights to object. I accept that that is not a model which the Government would wish to follow. However, if people are voluntarily to refrain from objecting, the level of compensation should probably be higher than that which is offered in the Bill. In the Bill in my Amendments Nos. 317A and 326A I suggest that the very reasonable and conservative figure of 25 per cent. should replace the 10 per cent.
In conclusion, I should like to congratulate the Government on the innovative provision that allows home loss compensation above current market value. I realise that the rate suggested may have been derived from a study within the Department of the Environment, but I believe that the CBI, with its greater understanding of the real marketplace, would have a better idea of the right figure.
I hope that the Government will accept my argument for 25 per cent. If, for some reason, my noble friend does not see the merit of the argument, I hope that she will have a very good explanation. I beg to move.
Lord Ross of Newport: Before the Minister replies, perhaps I should speak briefly to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Meston. Unfortunately, he cannot be here, and he apologises for his absence.
The noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, has covered the area very comprehensively. His amendment contains the figure of 25 per cent. and that of my noble friend Lord Meston proposes a figure of 20 per cent., but they are both in agreement that there should not be a maximum.
I assume that the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, will speak to his own amendment, to which I have added my name, covering the problems of tenants. I am sure that he will do so much better than I. It seems to be totally wrong that we should restrict the maximum compensation to tenants to £1,500. I admit that initially I put in a figure of double that amount —£3,000—but I have withdrawn that because the figure could be substantially higher. The amendment which the noble Lord will shortly be moving sets out the reasons why we think tenants should be entitled to greater compensation when they have carried out substantial improvements to their properties. In many cases this could well be to a value in excess of £3,000. They are going to come off extremely badly, judging
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by the example which has been quoted to us by a body which is acting for clients whose properties are subject to acquisition. Long leaseholders who have bought their properties are likely to get £100,000, whereas secure tenants are restricted to £1,500. That does not seem to be fair and equitable.
I entirely agree with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, that the Government have moved on the issue and are writing into the Bill the provision of home loss payments—which certainly has not always been adhered to in the past—by authorities and others who are acquiring. That is very much a move in the right direction. However, I hope that the Government will be a little more generous.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: The amendments in my name in this group are Nos. 320, 321A and 321B, and I should like to confine myself basically to those three amendments. Amendment No. 321A has already been spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Ross. Amendment No. 320 takes up the point on which I thought that the Minister and I were in agreement, that the criterion for home loss payments ought to be the length of time which an owner-occupier or a tenant has been in the property and therefore the degree of attachment which might be thought to apply to it. We have applied the same principle to these payments, and we have suggested that rather than having it based on the value—which is a sordid commercial consideration—it should reflect the number of years in occupation. In sheer logic I do not think the Minister, having said what she has, has any way of resisting this extremely modest proposal.
As the noble Lord, Lord Ross, has said, Amendment No. 321A was tabled on behalf of a group of tenants in West London who would suffer considerably if the new home loss payments scheme were to pass unaltered into legislation. Walterton and Elgin Community Homes Limited is a tenants' association in London W9. That association has two tower blocks on its books that contain a few secure tenants and leaseholders who are all members of the same group. The leaseholders have exercised their right to buy, but the secure tenants clearly have not done so.
The local authority has served notices on the secure tenants to seek possession under Ground 10 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985. That is the provision that deals with works. It is negotiating with the leaseholders to buy back their flats. Some of the leaseholders may be able to buy property outside the local authority's stock, and some of them may be able to obtain replacement property from the local authority's stock. However, some tenants have moved voluntarily as a result of the local authority's action, and have been offered home loss payments of £1,500. That is the present maximum. Those tenants will not benefit at all from the provisions of this Bill. However, the leaseholders who would receive £1,500 under the existing legislation could now obtain as much as £10,000. The group of people whom I am discussing believes fair treatment should be extended to tenants and leaseholders. There is no difference between them as regards the degree of attachment to their dwellings.

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They have all spent the same amount of time in them, but only some of them have had the opportunity to exercise the right to buy.
Amendment No. 321B seeks to ensure that payments are regularly increased in line with house prices. I could expand on that point substantially but I shall spare the Committee a detailed explanation. Those amendments are a modest contribution to this block of amendments but I hope that they will find favour with the Government.
10.30 p.m.
Lord Coleraine: I wish to extend the welcome that other Members of the Committee have given to the Government for introducing Clause 47, which is a real improvement to the home loss provisions. My Amendment, No. 318, has already been discussed by my noble friend Lord Mottistone. I do not wish to add anything further to his comments except to say that the principle of a cut-off at £15,000 would, I believe, be a difficult one to impose at the present time when so many houses, especially in the South East, are selling for very much more than £150,000. That is the price that would produce the compensation.
The Committee should also consider what happened to the property market in the first half of 1988 when in many parts of the country house prices increased by 30 per cent. Therefore someone whose compensation was fixed on the value of his property at the beginning of that year found that, by the time he came to buy somewhere else to live, property prices had risen by much more than the 10 per cent. which the home loss supplement is to provide under the terms of this Bill.
I do not necessarily think that one should talk in terms of the 25 per cent. supplement for which the CBI has asked. However, I think that there must be some case for suggesting that the Secretary of State should retain the power not only to alter the maximum and minimum payments, but also to alter the percentages, as there may be times when a 10 per cent. supplement would be inadequate.
A number of points have been made on this matter and I associate myself with the spirit of most of them. I hope that my noble friend will consider that there are aspects of the clause which need to be fairly radically reconsidered.
Whereas the 1973 Act was even-handed as between freeholder and tenant the Bill distinguishes between freeholder and tenant. The cut-off is to be a definition of "owner" contained in the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, which has nothing to do with compensation. In my view that cut-off produces unfairness and anomalies as between freeholders or owners and tenants.
It seems to me to be quixotic to treat a lease with three years and a day to run and no security at the end of the term on more favourable terms than a Rent Act statutory tenancy which may run for many years and which will be of great value to the tenant and would be of great monetary value if the tenant were allowed to sell, which the tenant is not allowed to do. There is also the position of the long residential lessee under
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Part I of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 with less than three years unexpired and a very advantageous ground rent, plus the right at the end of the term of hold-over as a statutory tenant. That tenant has much of value and it is arguable that he or she should not be left with a maximum of no more than £1,500 compensation.
Quite apart from the anomalies there is the question of balance between the owner and the tenant. The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, has suggested that the clause unduly favours the owner. The Committee may know of my feelings on the matter because I have put down a Motion for a balloted short debate to draw attention to the fiscal and other distortions which favour owner-occupation and the affect of those distortions on every aspect of life, including economic and investment decisions. I am inclined to look at the matter from the point of view of the tenant. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, and other noble Lords who have spoken that a maximum of £1,500 is inadequate. It is, after all, the sum which a number of tenants would have received had their properties been compulsorily acquired in 1973.
It may be that the Bill should provide for a flat payment to all persons who are dispossessed and entitled to compensation. That flat payment would be more than £1,500. Other figures have been mentioned. It is inappropriate for me to suggest a figure because resources are involved, but a flat payment of £1,500 is quite inadequate. It should be more, possibly with a right without limit to percentage compensation. That percentage might be less than 10 per cent.
There is another aspect of this matter: the compulsory acquisition of tenanted properties by local authorities and other authorities such as British Rail, which is in our minds tonight in view of the Channel Tunnel proposals. I believe that where a compulsory acquisition is made where there is a tenant occupier in most cases there is an obligation on the acquirer, if it is a local authority, to rehouse the tenant in council housing. As I understand it, there is an obligation on British Rail to see that the occupier is rehoused, which may mean that they have to go to the local authority and persuade them to make council housing available to the person being displaced by British Rail.
If there was some way of getting that person out of council housing and into the private housing market as a tenant, for example under the new provisions introduced by the 1988 Housing Act, that would seem to me to be very advantageous. But it follows from this that if we are talking about several grades of compensation, it might be right to suggest lower compensation for a tenant who is being rehoused by the local authority and higher compensation to persuade other tenants to move into the private sector and find their own rented accommodation, or perhaps in more favourable times to get a mortgage and buy their own houses. I have said enough. I support everything that is in the clause, but I think it has not yet got it right.
Baroness Blatch: The amendments involve changes to our proposed new basis for determining the level of

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home loss payments for those displaced from their homes as a result of compulsory purchase or other statutory action.
As I have indicated to the Committee during earlier debates, the basic purpose of the home loss payment is to provide some compensation for the personal distress and inconvenience people normally suffer when required to move house at a time not of their own choosing. The payment is made on top of market value compensation for the property itself and the reimbursement of incidental expenses which apply in all compulsory purchase cases. The changes we are proposing provide for home loss payments to be made to owner-occupiers on considerably more generous terms than the current flat rate of £1,500. Tenants remain on the flat rate but they in particular should gain from the substantial reduction in the qualifying residence period from five years to one year. They will also benefit from the new provision which enables periods of residence prior to a previous qualifying displacement to be taken into account in determining whether the residence qualification is satisfied.
I hope all noble Lords will accept that, taken together, our proposals represent a significant advance on the existing position in respect of home loss payments. The question is: Have we gone as far as we could have done in these matters? The noble Lords moving these amendments are all suggesting in their different ways that we have not.
I would be the first to admit that the issues we are dealing with here are sensitive and difficult ones. Clearly, there is no simple way of putting a monetary value on personal distress. Whatever approach we adopt can be only a matter of judgment, and in exercising that judgment we have to have regard to what is fair not only to the claimant but also to the taxpayer, or charge payer, who has to underwrite whatever level of payment we fix.
So far as concerns the percentage payment for owner-occupiers, I cannot say that our proposed 10 per cent. is the right figure and that the alternatives suggested are wrong. I can say only that, having thought long and hard about the matter, we concluded that it was reasonable to plump for 10 per cent. The same goes for the specified minimum and maximum amounts. These seem to us to provide appropriate parameters, bearing in mind they are to apply across the country as a whole. To those who feel that the maximum amount is unduly low, I would say that, on the evidence we have concerning the value of properties affected by compulsory purchase, there will be very few cases in which the upper limit actually bites.
A number of the amendments reflect concern that our proposals do not involve sufficiently generous treatment of tenants as compared with owner-occupiers. While it is undoubtedly true that nearly everyone is distressed when they have to move home against their will it does seems to us that the distress will normally be greater for those who have substantially invested in their homes. Therefore, we believe it right that the level of payment for owner-occupiers should in general be higher than for
1030
tenants. But, as I have already said, tenants do stand to gain significantly from the other changes we are proposing.
I turn now to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, Amendment No. 321B, which would require the Secretary of State to review the minimum and maximum amounts annually in relation to movements in house prices and, if they had not held their value, propose increases to Parliament. As I said, we are generally satisfied that the amounts specified in the Bill are the right ones to choose at the present time. However, the Secretary of State will continue to have power to prescribe different amounts by regulation. This is a point that I know will interest my noble friend Lord Coleraine: that is to say, primary legislation is not required for any change to the minimum or maximum.
Lord Coleraine: I thank my noble friend. Does that apply only to the maximum and minimum or does it apply to the percentage?
Baroness Blatch: I believe that it does not apply to percentages but it applies to the maximum and minimum.
Lord Coleraine: The percentage was what I was asking for in my speech. I asked that the Government should consider a power to change the percentage.
Baroness Blatch: Then I fear that I have not pleased my noble friend.
In conclusion, it may be helpful to remind the Committee once again of the main features of the Government's home loss payment proposals. Owner-occupiers, who previously received a flat rate payment of £1,500, will now receive 10 per cent. of the value of their property, subject to a minimum of £1,500 and a maximum of £15,000. The payment for non-owner-occupiers remains at the £1,500 flat rate. But the residence qualification for all claimants is cut from five years to one year. We are also broadening entitlement in various other ways—in particular by removing the bar on a home loss payment in the case of blight notice acquisitions. These new arrangements apply to anyone displaced in qualifying circumstances as from 16th November 1990.
I turn to Amendments Nos. 321A and 322A. These would broadly require the landlord of a secure or assured tenant who is entitled to a home loss payment to reimburse the tenant on his displacement with the value of any improvements which the tenant has made to his home. Such a requirement would fall right outside the concept of the home loss payment and has nothing to do with the value of material objects which may have been added to the home at some stage. There is no obligation on tenants to make improvements to their homes but, where they do, they may be eligible for a grant towards the cost.
I hope that the Committee will accept that what we are concerned with here are essentially issues not of simple fact but of judgment and balance. Overall, we are confident that we have the balance right and that, taken together, our proposals add up to a much better

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deal for all claimants. I hope that Members of the Committee will be prepared to accept this and not see a need to press their amendments.
Lord Mottistone: I heard what my noble friend had to say. She talks quite rightly about the need for home compensation to compensate for personal distress on the part of owners of houses. The burden of my remarks from the point of view of industry is that the compensation also acts as a discouragement to such people formally to oppose the development proposals. That is a rather different argument.
The reason I wanted more money for them was that when people have been in a house for a long time they may feel that they do not want to leave the house and receiving an extra 10 per cent. will not be enough to make them feel that they are sufficiently compensated. They therefore say, "We shall jolly well enter the battle to try to get a public inquiry and slow down the whole thing". So the roads and railways are never built and industry suffers.
My noble friend did not address that argument at all. I shall ask her to think about it in the meantime. I do not at this stage of the game wish to press this amendment but I may well come back at Report stage to repeat that argument, especially so that my noble friend may give me an answer which shows that she understands that point. At this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Ross of Newport Lord Ross of Newport had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 317B:
Page 54, line 41, leave out ("10") and insert ("20").
The noble Lord said: I should like to say in relation to this, amendment that the compensation to tenants is totally out of line. It ought to be reconsidered. I feel that the rest of these measures are probably quite generous but, so far as tenants are concerned, it seems that they are losing out all down the line. We must reconsider that. I shall not move the amendment.
[Amendment No. 317B not moved.]
[Amendments Nos. 318 to 320 not moved.]>
10.45 p.m.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 321:
Page 55, leave out lines 1 to 11 and insert:
("(3) For the purposes of this section and section 32 below the market value of an interest in a dwelling—

(a) in a case where the interest is compulsorily acquired, is the amount assessed for the purposes of the acquisition as the value of the interest; and

(b) in any other case, is the amount which, if the interest were being compulsorily acquired in pursuance of a notice to treat served on the date of displacement, would be assessed for the purposes of the acquisition as the value of the interest,

amount referred to in paragraph (b) above shall be determined by the Lands Tribunal.
(3A) In determining for the purposes of this section and section 32 below the market value of an interest in a dwelling, the dwelling shall be taken to include any garden, yard, outhouses and appurtenances belonging to or usually enjoyed with a at dwelling.").
The noble Baroness said: I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 321, 323, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329 and 330. Amendments Nos. 321 and 323 to 325 make
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what are essentially technical changes to the new provisions on home loss payments contained in Clause 47 which apply to England and Wales.
As Members of the Committee will be aware, we are proposing that the home loss payment for an owner-occupier should be 10 per cent. of the market value of the property, subject to a specified minimum and maximum. Clause 47 as drafted defines "market value" for this purpose but only in relation to cases where property is being compulsorily purchased. However, the entitlement to a home loss payment also applies in certain cases which do not actually involve compulsory acquisition. These include, for instance, displacements arising from clearance orders under housing legislation. It is necessary to provide a basis for determining market value in such cases and our proposal under Amendment No. 321 is that the calculation should be done as if there were a compulsory acquisition in pursuance of a notice to treat served on the date of the displacement concerned.
The remaining amendments in the group deal with the implications of this new provision in relation to the date by which the home loss payment must be made and the right of the claimant to receive an advance payment. Amendments Nos. 327 to 330 make similar changes to Clause 49, which applies to Scotland. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendments Nos. 321A to 322A not moved.]
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 323 and 324:
Page 55, leave out lines 30 to 45 and insert:
("(2) Where a person is entitled to a home loss payment, the payment shall be made on or before the latest of the following dates—

(a) the date of displacement;

(b) the last day of the period of three months beginning with the making of the claim; and

(c) where the amount of the payment is to be determined in accordance with section 30(1) above, the day on which the market value of the interest in question is agreed or finally determined.

(2A) Where the amount of the payment is to be determined in accordance with section 30(1) above—

(a) the acquiring authority may at any time make a payment in advance; and

(b) if, on the later of the dates referred to in subsection (2) (a) and (b) above, the market value of the interest in question has not been agreed or finally determined, the acquiring authority shall make a payment in advance (where they have not already done so).").

Page 56, line 1, leave out from ("agreed") to ("estimate") in line 4 and insert ("to be the market value of the interest in question or, if there is no such agreement, 10 per cent. of the acquiring authority's").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 325:
Page 56, line 8, leave out ("on the completion of the acquisition") and insert ("when the market value of the interest in question is agreed or finally determined.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendment No. 326 not moved.]
Clause 47, as amended, agreed to.
[Amendment No. 326ZA not moved.]
Clause 49 [Home loss payments]:
[Amendments Nos. 326A and 326B not moved.]
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 327 to 330:
Page 58, line 1, leave out subsection (3) and insert:
("(3) For the purposes of this section and section 29 below the market value of an interest in a dwelling—

(a) in a case where the interest is compulsorily acquired, is the amount assessed for the purposes of the acquisition as the value of the interest; and

(b) in any other case, is the amount which, if the interest were being compulsorily acquired in pursuance of a notice to treat served on the date of displacement, would be assessed for the purposes of the acquisition as the value of the interest,

and any dispute as to the amount referred to in paragraph (b) above shall be determined by the Lands Tribunal.
(3A) In determining for the purposes of this section and section 29 below the market value of an interest in a dwelling, the dwelling shall be taken to include any garden, yard, outhouses and appurtenances belonging to or usually enjoyed with that dwelling.").
Page 58, leave out lines 31 to 46 and insert:
("(2) Where a person is entitled to a home loss payment, the payment shall be made on or before the latest of the following dates—

(a) the date of displacement;

(b) the last day of the period of three months beginning with the making of the claim; and

(c) where the amount of the payment is to be determined in accordance with section 28(1) above, the day on which the market value of the interest in question is agreed or finally determined.

(2A) Where the amount of the payment is to be determined in accordance with section 28(1) above—

(a) the acquiring authority may at any time make a payment in advance; and

(b) if, on the later of the dates referred to in subsection (2) (a) and (b) above, the market value of the interest in question has not been agreed or finally determined, the acquiring authority shall make a payment in advance (where they have not already done so).").

Page 59, line 1, leave out from ("agreed") to ("estimate") in line 4 and insert ("to be the market value of the interest in question or, if there is no such agreement, 10 per cent. of the acquiring authority's").
Page 59, line 8, leave out ("on the completion of the acquisition") and insert ("when the market value of the interest in question is agreed or finally determined").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 49, as amended, agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 331:
After Clause 49, insert the following new clause:
Advance payments of compensation and interest
.—(1) In section 48 of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1973 (right to advance payment of compensation) for subsection (5) there is substituted—
"(4A) Where, at any time after an advance payment has been made on the basis of the acquiring authority's estimate of the compensation, it appears to the acquiring authority that their estimate was too low, they shall, if a request in that behalf is made in accordance with subsection (2) above, pay to the claimant the balance of the amount of the advance payment calculated as at that time.
(5) Where the amount, or aggregate amount, of any payment under this section made on the basis of the acquiring authority's estimate of the compensation exceeds the compensation as finally determined or agreed, the excess shall be repaid; and if after any payment under this section has been made to any person it is discovered that he was not entitled to it, the amount of the payment shall be recoverable by the acquiring authority".
(2) After that section there is inserted—
"Right to interest where advance payment made.
48A.—(1) This section applies where the compensation to be paid by the acquiring authority for the compulsory acquisition of any interest in land would (apart from this section) carry interest under paragraph 3(1) of the second Schedule to the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedures) (Scotland) Act 1947 or any bond under section 84 (promoters to be allowed to enter on lands before purchase on giving bond etc.) of the Lands Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845.
(2) If the authority make a payment under section 48(1) above to any person on account of the compensation—

(a) they shall at the same time make a payment to that person of accrued interest, for the period beginning with the date of entry, on the amount by reference to which the payment under section 48(1) above was calculated; and

(b) the difference between the amount of the payment under section 48(1) above and the amount by reference to which it was calculated is an unpaid balance for the purposes of this section.

(3) If the authority make a payment under section 48(4A) above to any person on account of the compensation, they shall at the same time make a payment to him of accrued interest, for the period beginning with the date of entry, on—

(a) the amount by reference to which the payment under section 48(4A) above was calculated; less

(b) the amount by reference to which the preceding payment under section 48(1) or (4A) above was calculated.

(4) Where the authority make a payment under section 48(4A) above on account of the compensation, the difference between—

(a) the amount of the payment; and

(b) the amount by reference to which it was calculated less the amount by reference to which the preceding payment under section 48(1) or (4A) above was calculated,

is an unpaid balance for the purposes of this section.
(5) If, on an anniversary of the date on which the authority made a payment to any person under section 48(1) above on account of the compensation—

(a) the amount of accrued interest on the unpaid balance under subsection (2) above or, as the case may be,

(b) the aggregate amount of the accrued interest on any unpaid balances,

exceeds £1,000, the authority shall make a payment to the claimant of the amount or aggregate amount.
(6) The acquiring authority shall, on paying the compensation, pay the amount of the accrued interest on the unpaid balance under subsection (2) above or, as the case may be, the aggregate amount of the accrued interest on any unpaid balances.
(7) For the purposes of subsections (5) and (6) above, interest accrues on any unpaid balance for the period beginning with—

(a) the making of the payment under section 48(1) or, as the case may he. 48(4A) above; or

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(b) if any payment has already been made in respect of that balance under subsection (5) above, the date of the preceding payment under that subsection.

(8) For the purposes of this section—

(a) interest accrues at the rate prescribed under section 40 of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963 or, in the case of a bond under section 84 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845, at the rate specified in that section; and

(b) the amount by reference to which a payment under section 48(1) or (4A) was calculated is the amount referred to in section 48(3) (a) or (b) for the purposes of that calculation.

(9) Where any payment has been made under section 48(1) above on account of any compensation, the acquiring authority is not required to pay interest under paragraph 3(1) of the second Schedule to the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedures) (Scotland) Act 1947 or any bond under section 84 (promoters to be allowed to enter on lands before purchase on giving bond etc.) of the Lands Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845.
(10) Where the amount, or aggregate amount, of any payment under section 48 above made on the basis of the acquiring authority's estimate of the compensation is greater than the compensation as finally determined or agreed and, accordingly, the interest paid under this section is excessive, the excess shall be repaid.
(11) If after any interest has been paid to any person under this section on any amount it is discovered that he was not entitled to the amount, the interest shall be recoverable by the acquiring authority.
(12) The Secretary of State may by order increase the sum specified in subsection (5) above; and the power to make orders under this subsection shall be exercisable by statutory instrument which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendment No. 332 not moved.]
[Amendment No. 333 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Clause 48 agreed to.
Schedule 8 [Amendments relating to land compensation]:
[Amendment No. 334 not moved.]
The Earl of Lytton The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 335:
Page 104, line 23, at end insert:
(". In section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 (rules for assessing compensation), at the end of rule (4) (disregard of increase in value of land by use contrary to law) there are inserted the words "provided that for the purpose of this rule development which constitutes a breach of planning control as defined in section 171A(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (expressions used in connection with enforcement) shall be deemed not to be contrary to law but, in assessing the compensation, regard shall be had to any likelihood of any enforcement action as defined in subsection (2) of that section being taken and of its success or of any injunction being granted under section 187B of that Act (injunctions restraining breaches of planning control) or of any planning permission being granted or condition discharged in the course of such enforcement action or pursuant to an application under section 63 of that Act (applications in connection with existing buildings and uses) or of any certificate being granted under section 191 of that Act (certificate of lawful use or development).".").
The noble Earl said: This amendment relates to the valuation basis and in particular the assumptions to be made in valuing property to be acquired by compulsion.
The present rules refer to the exclusion of any increase in value due to an activity or use which is contrary to law. That has produced a certain amount of uncertainty and litigation. The amendment is not intended to add value to a property due to some pernicious activity. However, it is intended to cater for the very limited instance in which the use is, in theory, contrary to town and country planning legislation but where the opportunity for enforcement proceedings is long past.
The fundamental concept behind this amendment is that it is reasonable to allow the additional value of a use of the premises which is actually going on and cannot be caused to cease by the powers in town and country planning legislation.
The wording of the amendment may be defective and I am always willing to consider any other views which there may be on this matter. However, I believe that the principle has already been accepted. A Department of the Environment consultation document in 1979 referred to that and indicated that legislation should be forthcoming. I am sorry that I cannot give the Committee the reference for that document.
However, the aim here is to value the property to be acquired on the principle which is well known in rating law known as rebus sic stantibus, which basically means you value the thing as you find it. Therefore, on that basis I commend the amendment to the Committee. I beg to move.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I congratulate the noble Earl on producing an amendment of 16 lines which contains no punctuation other than one comma.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: I understand that this amendment is grouped with Amendments Nos. 336 and 343. It is not clear to me whether or not the noble Earl intends to move those amendments.
The Earl of Lytton: I can confirm to the noble and learned Lord that I do not intend to move those amendments or Amendment No. 337.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: I am grateful to the noble Earl for that indication. As regards Amendment No. 335, I immediately accept that the noble Earl is touching on an issue about which the Government have been anxious. As he rightly says, a consultation paper acknowledged that the value of unlawful development against which enforcement action cannot be taken should properly be considered as part of the market value of the land. It was proposed in that consultation paper that rule (4) in the 1961 Act should be amended accordingly.
The question arises as to why a suitable amending provision has not been included in the Bill. After further consideration we have concluded that such a provision is not after all necessary, given what we are proposing elsewhere in the Bill. As the noble Earl will

1037
appreciate, Clause 10 establishes a new procedure under which a local planning authority can issue a certificate to the effect that a specified use of land is lawful, notwithstanding that planning permission has not been granted. The clause provides, among other things, that a use is lawful if no enforcement action can be taken against it. This new certification procedure should provide a satisfactory framework within which the lawfulness or otherwise of a particular piece of land can be established. It therefore seems to us that, against this background, rule (4) can be left to operate on its current basis without giving rise to the risk of unfairness. In acknowledging the point raised by the noble Earl, and with that explanation, I hope that he will withdraw the amendment.
The Earl of Lytton: I have listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has said. As it appears that the amendment is unnecessary, I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, will be happy that I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 336 to 343 not moved.]
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 344:
Page 105, line 24, leave out ("Subsections (3) to") and insert ("The power to make regulations under this section shall be exercisable by statutory instrument which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(4) Subsections (3), (7) and").
The noble Viscount said: In moving Amendment No. 344 I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 348, 349, 351 to 357, 359 to 362 and 382.
These are all amendments to Schedule 8 and Schedule 9 designed to ensure the effectiveness of the compensations provisions of the Bill. I shall gladly answer questions about them but will mention one in greater detail.
Amendment No. 349 adds a new category of land in respect of which a blight notice may be served. It is already possible under paragraph 16 of Schedule 13 to the 1990 Act to serve such a notice in respect of land on which the Secretary of State proposes a new trunk or special road. Amendment No. 349 extends this entitlement to owners of land which may be required for the improvement or alteration of such a road. This will in particular help people affected by the motorway widening programme. Amendments Nos. 356 and 359 make similar modifications in respect of Scotland.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Stanley of Alderley Lord Stanley of Alderley moved Amendment No. 344A:
Page 105, leave out line 50 and insert:
("(6) Subsections (1) (b), 3(c), (4), (5) and (6) are omitted.
6A.—In sections 35 of the Land Compensation Act 1973, subsections (2), (3), and (6) are omitted.
6B.—In sections 36 of the Land Compensation Act 1973, subsections (1) and (2) are omitted.").
The noble Lord said: I thank the Government for altering Section 34 of the 1973 Act. However, I do not understand it because it leaves doubt, and I shall explain why.
The Bill sees the farm loss payment appearing in a new form, which I welcome, and becoming applicable to freeholders, owner occupiers and indeed tenants. However, there are some technical problems. The new qualifying area of half a hectare needs complete realignment of expectation for this allowance.
I assume that the payment is to be considered as an amount calculated to provide recompense for the farmer, whether freeholder or tenant, displaced from any area of land whether part of a holding or above half a hectare. I also assume from paragraph 6 of Schedule 8 to the Bill that the requirement of moving to a new holding and the rigorous process of qualification outlined apply. But, for example, if three-quarters of a hectare were required from a holding of 10 hectares, it cannot be that in order to qualify for the payment the farmer would have to seek another farm.
I am assuming an awful lot, and I ask my noble friend whether she will allow her advisers to consult with mine to ensure that paragraph 6 of Schedule 8 achieves what the Government want and what I welcome. At the moment I and my advisers do not believe it does. That is my question in regard to Amendment No. 344A.
Regarding Amendment No. 344B, the new conditions under which farm loss payments become payable need a review on the basis of calculation, not least because the Government have moved the goal posts. The acquisition of small parts of the farm makes the detailed and complicated formula contained in Sections 34, 35 and 36 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 unnecessary. These payments could increase in future because of the moving of the goalposts. A fair award would be twice the amount of the annual profit. We are asking for twice the annual profit rather than the existing one year's annual profit because the Government have accepted in the Bill the need to help the small claimants. If the floor is £500 it will have to be up-rated to twice the annual profit otherwise very few will be able to claim because they will not reach £500. I beg to move.
11 p.m.
Baroness Blatch: Two of my noble friend's amendments would change the basis for calculating farm loss payments which are made when farmland is acquired compulsorily. Amendment No. 344A consists of a series of repeals relating to Sections 34 to 36 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 which would affect the way in which the farm loss payment scheme operates. It would seem that these changes are being proposed in order to improve the position of tenant farmers who are displaced from their land because of compulsory purchase. However, I understand that the real problem affecting tenant farmers appears to be the acute shortage of replacement land which is available on suitable terms for them to rent.
We are not aware of a particular problem in respect of the amount of farm loss payments which are made to them. The repeals appear to conflict with the fundamental principle that compensation should leave the claimant in no worse but no better financial position than if he had not been affected by

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compulsory purchase at all. I say to my noble friend that the problem is best addressed by measures to revitalise the rented sector. To this end my right honourable friends the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Secretary of State for Wales have indicated their intention to issue a consultation paper.
Amendment No. 344B would provide for farm loss payments of twice the annual average profits of the land subject to a minimum of £500. It does not specify how the average would be worked out but provides for the Secretary of State to prescribe a different minim um payment. The Land Compensation Act 1973 provides that the farm loss payment shall be equal to one year's net profit from the land concerned. That amount is normally an average of the profit for the three years preceding the farmer's displacement with a deduction for the actual or notional rent that would have been paid on the land. These payments are currently only available to landlords, farmers and tenants with a compensatable interest in the land. In the Bill we are making such payments available to farmers who are tenants for a year or from year to year, where only part of the agricultural unit is taken and where the farmer successfully serves a blight notice or where he chooses to leave his land before required to do so by the acquiring authority.
The purpose of the farm loss payment is to enable farmers who have had to leave their land because of compulsory purchase to take up farming again on replacement land whose farming characteristics may be unfamiliar, and to protect them against a shortfall in profits in the first year of farming the new land. The payment is in addition to market value compensation for the land taken and compensation for disturbance. While it is admittedly an arbitrary calculation, the size of the payment will depend very much on the success that the farmer has made of his business over the period of account.
It will therefore to a great extent reflect the effort he is likely to make in restarting his operations elsewhere. That seems to be a perfectly fair basis on which to calculate the farm loss payment. To double it and to provide a minimum payment as my noble friend suggests, would in our view cushion affected farmers unnecessarily against loss at the taxpayers' expense and would go well beyond the farm loss payment which it is intended to represent.
We have not received any representations about the amount of the payment and therefore see no need to change it. Should my noble friend not be happy with the reply that I have given, I shall arrange for his advisers to speak with my officials in the department. In the meantime, I hope that my noble friend will not press these amendments.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: I think we are at cross purposes here. I am not complaining about the Government's new plans in the Bill. In fact I welcome them very much because, for a change, they help tenants. However, my advisers tell me that what is in the Bill does not make the sense which my noble friend
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thinks it does. I very much welcome her offer to see my advisers so that we can iron out this technical difficulty. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 344B not moved.]
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 345:
Page 106, line 2, leave out paragraph 7.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
The Earl of Lytton The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 346:
Page 106, line 18, at end insert:
("Application to Crown: government aerodromes
. For subsection (1) of section 84 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 (Part I of the Act does not apply to any aerodrome in the occupation of a government department) there is substituted—
"(1) References in Parts I and II of this Act to public works and responsible authorities include references to any works or authority which, apart from any Crown exemption, would be public works or a responsible authority." ").
The noble Earl said: I can deal with this amendment very briefly. It relates to Part I of the Land Compensation Act 1973, which refers to compensation arising from the use of public works. Section 84(1) of the Act makes it clear that Part I does not apply to any aerodrome which is in the occupation of a government department. It is obvious that airfields, particularly those in military use, can cause as much depreciation to values of property through their use as any other type of aviation establishment. This is a probing amendment in order to ascertain what justification the Government can give for the continuation of that exception. I beg to move.
Viscount Astor: It is not difficult to understand the historical reason for the MoD's exemption. It acquires land under a code set out in the Defence Acts of 1842 to 1935 rather than under the normal arrangements for compulsory purchase. Defence works such as airfields are provided and used under prerogative rather than under statutory powers as the provisions of Part I require. To bring MoD airfields under Part I would entail a complex and substantial revision of the way in which these powers operate, which is not a practical proposition at this time. However, I understand that in practice the MoD has for many years complied administratively with the Part I provisions and has met claims in appropriate circumstances. Indeed in some cases it has been prepared to depart from a strict interpretation of Part I to provide a measure of compensation that would otherwise have been denied. In those circumstances, I urge the noble Earl not to press the amendment.
The Earl of Lytton: The Minister has told the Committee something which I certainly did not know before; namely, what is the custom of the Ministry of Defence. I shall certainly consider this with a view to seeing whether the system is working satisfactorily. In the meantime, I think it would be entirely churlish of me to do anything other than withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Earl of Lytton The Earl of Lytton moved Amendment No. 347:
Page 106, line 18, at end insert:
("General vesting declaration: valuation date
. After subsection (3) of section 7 of the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981 (constructive notice to treat) there is inserted—
"(4) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act the valuation date for assessing any compensation payable following the date on which a general vesting declaration was executed in respect of any land specified in that declaration shall be the date of assessment of the compensation or the date on which the acquiring authority in fact took possession of the land whichever is the earlier." ").
The noble Earl said: This amendment addresses a single issue. It deals with the valuation date under general vesting declarations. Under the general rules of compensation the amount is assessed either at the date of taking possession or at the date of actual assessment, whichever is the earlier. In the case of a vesting declaration that does not apply. If the authority does not take possession until some time much later than the vesting date and compensation has not by then been determined, the value of the property may well have increased but the claimant will not be entitled to that increase. It is also true to say that the value could decrease, so the claimant will obviously take a chance on that.
The amendment seeks to insert a new provision in the 1981 Act to apply the ordinary compulsory purchase rule as laid down in Birmingham City Corporation v. West Midlands Baptist (Trust) Association (Inc.) 1970. In cases where general vesting declarations are involved, it seems to me that there is no good reason to alter the general rule of how the date for compensation is assessed. I invite the Minister to comment on why this provision should be retained.
Lord Ross of Newport: I support the amendment in a different context. The Committee is looking at someone who actually owned a farm and sold it off under bank pressure for £26,000. After five years it was worth at least £80,000. It finally changed hands a year or two later for £150,000. I felt pretty miffed. I imagine that anyone who sold some land at the vesting date for £14,000, as in the example given to us, only to find that four years later it was worth over £40,000 would feel aggrieved.
I accept that in normal trading circumstances one would say, "Jolly good luck to you. You were stupid enough to do it in the first place". But in such a case the local authority is acquiring the land in a rapid process and may then decide not to take occupation. In fact, it is dodging the normal compulsory purchase procedures and short-cutting the process. There is something to be said for the fact that such authorities should pay the compensation which is due, which may have decreased. I wanted to ask the noble Lord, Lord Stanley, whether he thought that there were any farmers making a profit these days, but I thought that I had better desist from so doing.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: The law as it stands requires that, where this procedure is used, compensation must be assessed on the basis of the
1042
value of the land as at the date on which it becomes vested in the authority. The noble Earl has argued that this is an unsatisfactory requirement.
It must be appreciated that the essential feature of the general vesting procedure is that the owner loses his legal right to occupy his property in return for a right to compensation on the date of vesting. Accordingly, the vesting date has to be the only logical date at which the property can be valued for compensation purposes. Any alternative approach would simply not make sense in legal terms. To suggest that the valuation date can be defined on the same basis as applies under normal compulsory purchase procedures is to misunderstand the fundamental difference between the two systems.
With the normal compulsory purchase procedure, the claimant retains his legal right to occupy the property until the authority gives him formal notice that it wishes to enter on his land, which may be some considerable time after the compulsory purchase order came into force. Under the vesting procedure he loses his right, as I have said, on the date on which the vesting takes place. Any period of grace after that date during which the claimant continues to occupy the land is strictly a private matter to be arranged between him and the authority, whether by a contract or informal agreement. However, it is quite irrelevant for the purposes of assessing compensation. As the noble Earl will appreciate, if we were to continue on that way a further complication would arise because it does not necessarily follow that the value of the land will always increase. In view of what I have said, I hope that the noble Earl will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
The Earl of Lytton: Although I have some reservations about what the noble and learned Lord has said, I understand that there are difficulties. I hope that I did not misunderstand the procedure, as he suggested, even though it may appear from the amendment that this may be the case. There is an anomaly here, but with regard to the lateness of the hour I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Stanley of Alderley Lord Stanley of Alderley moved Amendment No. 347ZA:
Page 106, line 18, at end insert:
("8A.—(1) For subsection (1) (b) of section 59 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 there is substituted—
"(b) either—

(i) subsection (1) of section 26 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 does not apply to the notice by virtue of subsection (2) of that section and case B of Schedule 3 to the said Act; or

(ii) the Agricultural Land Tribunal have consented to the operation of the notice and stated in the reasons for their decision that they are satisfied as to the matter mentioned in section 27(3) (f) of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 (land required for non-agricultural use not falling within Case B of Schedule 3)."

(2) After subsection (7) of section 59 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 there is inserted:—
"(7A) (a) Where a tenant is served a notice to quit in pursuance of Case B of Schedule 3 to the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 by a landlord who is not in possession of compulsory purchase powers and who is

1043
not in receipt of a notice to treat having been served by an authority with such powers the tenant shall be entitled to elect that subsection (2) of this section applies as if a notice to treat had been served; and
(b) for the purposes of this subsection the landlord shall be deemed to be a person with compulsory purchase powers.".").
The noble Lord said: I believe that I should declare an interest at this stage in so far as I have been a tenant farmer since 1954. I have also been an owner-occupier and a landlord. As the Committee will know, my heart lies with the tenant. The amendment addresses the very unfair position of the tenant farmer who is being evicted by his landlord because the latter has obtained planning consent.
A tenant who is dispossessed of his holding by a landlord without compulsory purchase powers—the landlord himself not having been compulsorily purchased, as in the case I am citing, whereby he has managed to obtain planning permission —is placed in a much more disadvantageous position than the tenant dispossessed under compulsory purchase powers. The maximum compensation available here is five to six years' rent. This is wholly inadequate and will rarely be enough in order for a tenant farmer to purchase another holding. Much more importantly, most holdings are let with a dwellinghouse and the tenant farmer is faced with the additional problem of finding a home for himself and his family. It should not be to the detriment of the tenant that the status of the landlord determines the amount of compensation payable to his tenant. As I say, in this case a landlord has been fortunate enough to get planning permission.
The hardship caused to the tenant dispossessed under the agricultural holdings legislation is exactly the same as the hardship caused to the tenant dispossessed under compulsory purchase legislation. Both should be compensated equally. I will give your Lordships a perfect example. Take the case of two neighbouring tenants: one is compulsorily acquired and is being evicted, and the other is being evicted because his landlord has managed to get planning permission on his farm. They are not equally entitled to the same compensation, and I believe that in fairness they should be. I beg to move.
11.15 p.m.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: Having opposed the whole slew of amendments about compensation, I think t he case put by the noble Lord, Lord Stanley, is very sound. I cannot see why it is that two tenants -one evicted because of compulsory purchase and the other because of planning permission - should in the one case get a valuation of tenancy compensation and in the other get only compensation equal to a multiple of the rent, which could not be as much. I hope that the Government will feel that there is a case which ought to be put right here without affecting the public purse.
Baroness Blatch: To extend the scope of the land compensation system in this way would be quite inappropriate. I recognise that there is anxiety about the level of compensation provided for in the 1986 Act, but clearly no formula will satisfy everyone. I
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understand that the main problem for those losing land is the difficulty of finding new land to rent. Anything which would discourage landowners from letting will exacerbate the problem. The first priority must be to find ways of encouraging landlords to let their land and to this end my right honourable friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food has indicated his intention to issue a consultation paper. I know this answer will be disappointing to my noble friend, but I hope he will not press this amendment.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, always amazes me, particularly —if I may flatter him—on his knowledge of agricultural compensation: he filled in the part that I did not detail, and I am most grateful for his support. I do not think my noble friend answered the argument correctly. In this case somebody is being dispossessed of his home. I am not particularly worried about his finding another farm: that is his bad luck. There should be equal compensation for the loss of the home; but that is not the case. It is quite clear, as the noble Lord says.
It is almost 11.30 p.m. At any other time I would be strongly tempted to press this amendment. I shall not do so tonight, even though it would only lengthen proceedings for a short time. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment but I may well come back to it at a later stage.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Nicol Baroness Nicol moved Amendment No. 347A:
Page 107, line 2, after ("management") insert ("and that neither the purchase nor the proposed measure of preservation or improved management would prejudice any existing freedom of access to the land enjoyed by the public").
The noble Baroness said: This amendment, with Amendment No. 347B, is a perfectly straightforward amendment. Their purpose is to protect existing public access on common land which is acquired under Schedule 8, paragraph 13. In our debate on common land, somewhat earlier—a long time ago, in fact—we drew attention to the loss of access rights on land which was in public ownership and is now privatised—gas, water, electricity, etc. Therefore access to common land becomes even more precious. Although the amendment refers to common land which is purchased for nature conservation purposes, despite the arguments to the contrary, nature conservation and access are not necessarily incompatible.
The amendments simply seek to ensure that where an access right existed—not an extension of it—that right is continued unless there are good reasons for not doing so. When I began to study the background to this matter, I became rather worried about the provisions of paragraph 13 of Schedule 8 when set in context with the original Act, the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. Land acquired under the new provision, if found to be unsuitable for the purpose for which the local authority acquired it—presumably it then ceases to be common land—could be sold on for development or whatever. I should like to be reassured by the Minister that that is not possible.
We should remember that land bought under the new provision is not replaced. That is an important point. Until now, common land taken for any reason

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has to be replaced by equivalent land somewhere else. We are now dispensing with that provision. There could therefore be a net loss of common land. I beg to move.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie: The amendments relate to paragraph 13 of Schedule 8, which modifies the current legal position regarding the need for special parliamentary procedure in cases where there is a proposed compulsory acquisition of—or a proposed new right over land forming part of—an open space or common. As the noble Baroness said, the relevant statute here is the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. That Act already provides that special parliamentary procedure is not necessary where the Secretary of State certifies that he is satisfied as to certain specified criteria. The purpose of paragraph 13 is to extend those criteria so as to exclude the need for special parliamentary procedure where the Secretary of State certifies that he is satisfied that the purpose of the compulsory acquisition of the land, or new right, is to secure preservation of the land, or improve its management, as—and I emphasise this—open space or common land.
The effect of the amendments would be to provide that, in exercising that new power, the Secretary of State must also satisfy himself that the proposals concerned would not prejudice any existing freedom of public access to the land. While it may not have been intended, such a requirement would seem to us unduly restrictive.
"Open space" under the 1981 Act means any land laid out as a public garden or used for public recreation. "Common" includes any town or village green. In both cases there is an automatic entitlement—whether by statute or custom—for the public to use the land. Since the purpose of compulsory acquisition would be to secure preservation or improved management of the land as open space or common land, basic rights of access would be unaffected. It is true that a preservation or management scheme might involve some changes as to how the right of access to open space or common land might be exercised. Where that was likely to occur it could be a material consideration in the Secretary of State's decision as to whether or not compulsory acquisition should be authorised. We should not, however, consider it necessary or desirable that that aspect should be a material factor in determining whether or not the Secretary of State can issue a certificate obviating the need for special parliamentary procedure.
As the noble Baroness will appreciate, compulsory purchase powers can, in principle, be applied to any land, including common land, but all compulsory purchase orders must be confirmed by the appropriate Minister. The requirement for open space land to go for special parliamentary procedure arises in addition to the normal confirmation procedure where there is no equally convenient land to replace the open space lost. The Bill's provisions remove only the additional requirement, but in the limited circumstances that I have described.
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If the noble Baroness reads that elaborate explanation she will see that her fears, although I appreciate them, are ill-founded.
Baroness Nicol: I am grateful for that very full reply. I need to clear up one or two small issues that are relevant to it, and I should like to consider what the noble and learned Lord has said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No.347B not moved.]
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 348 to 354.
Page 107, line 13, leave out ("Town and Country Planning Act 1990") and insert ("principal Act").
Page 107, line 17, at end insert:
("14A. In Schedule 13 to that Act (blighted land) after paragraph 16 there is inserted—
"16A. Land to be included in a trunk road or special road as proposed to be improved or altered by the Secretary of State if he has given written notice of his proposal, together with maps or plans sufficient to identify the land in question, to the local planning authority".").
Page 107, line 19, at end insert:
("Land Compensation Act 1961 (c. 33.)
14B.—(1) In section 14(1) of the Land Compensation Act 1961 after "shall" there is inserted "(subject to subsection (3A) of this section)".
(2) In section 14(3) of that Act, for the words from "but" to the end there is substituted—
"(3A) In determining—

(a) for the purpose referred to in subsection (1) of this section whether planning permission for any development could in any particular circumstances reasonably have been expected to be granted in respect of any land; or

(b) whether any of the assumptions mentioned in section 16 of this Act (but not section 15) are applicable to the relevant land or any part thereof,

regard shall be had to any contrary opinion expressed in relation to that land in any certificate issued under Part III of this Act."
14C. In section 17 of that Act—

(a) for the words from the beginning of subsection (2) to "acquire it" there is substituted "If the authority proposing to acquire the interest", and

(b) subsection (8) is omitted.

14D. In section 19(1) of that Act for "in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1) of section 17 of this Act" there is substituted "by an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers".
14E. Section 22(3) of that Act is omitted.").
Page 107, line 26, leave out ("for the diocese in which the land is situated") and insert ("in which the land is vested").
Page 107, line 29, leave out sub-paragraph (2).
Page 107, line 33, leave out paragraphs 16 and 17 and insert—
("16. In section 13 of the Land Compensation Act 1973—
(a) in subsection (1) for "to the Church Commissioners to" there is substituted—

"(a) in the case of land which is not diocesan glebe land, to the Church Commissioners; and

(b) in the case of diocesan glebe land, to the Diocesan Board of Finance in which the land is vested,

and (in either case) shall", and
(b) at the end of subsection (2) there is added "or being diocesan glebe land; and "Diocesan Board of Finance" and "diocesan glebe land" have the same meaning as in the Endowments and Glebe Measure 1976".
16A. In section 26 of that Act—

(a) in subsection (2) for "of the kind mentioned in section 22(2) above" there is substituted "a qualifying interest", and

(b) in subsection (5) for "and (2)" there is substituted "(2) and (2A)".

17. In section 52 of that Act—

(a) in subsection (9) after "the amount of the advance payment" there is inserted "together with any amount paid under section 52A", and

(b) in subsection (10) the words following "unpaid" are omitted.

Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (c. 65.)
17A. After section 141(5) of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 there is inserted—
"(5A) No compensation is payable, by virtue of an order under this section, under Part IV of the Land Compensation Act 1961".").
Page 107, line 42, leave out paragraphs 19 to 21 and insert:
("19. At the end of section 12(3) of, and paragraph 3(3) of Schedule I to, the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 there is added "or being diocesan glebe land within the meaning of the Endowments and Glebe Measure 1976".
20. Section 20 of, and paragraph 7 of Schedule 3 to, that Act are repealed.
The principal Act
21. I a section 151(4) (d) of the principal Act for "or 16" there is substituted "16 or 16A".
22. In section 231 of that Act the words from "for a purpose" to "is situated" are omitted.
23.—(1) In section 318 of that Act, in subsection (3) for the words from "be" (in paragraph (a)) to "shall" (in paragraph (b)) there is substituted—
"in the case of land which is not diocesan glebe land, be paid to the Church Commissioners; and
(b) shall, in the case of diocesan glebe land, be paid to the Diocesan Board of Finance in which the land is vested,
and shall (in either case)."
(2) In subsection (4) (b) of that section for "(3) (b)" there is substituted "(3)".
(3) At the end of section 318(6) of that Act there is added "or being diocesan glebe land; and "Diocesan Board of Finance" and "diocesan glebe land" have the same meaning as in the Endowments and Glebe Measure 1976".
24. In Schedule I to that Act, in paragraph 20(4) for "paragraph 16" there is substituted "paragraphs 16 and 16A".
Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 (c. 9.)
25.—(1) In section 86(3) of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 for the words from "be" (in paragraph (a)) to "shall" (in paragraph (b)) there is substituted—
"in the case of land which is not diocesan glebe land, be paid to the Church Commissioners; and
(b) shall, in the case of diocesan glebe land, be paid to the Diocesan Board of Finance in which the land is vested,
and shall (in either case)."
(2) At the end of section 86(4) of that Act there is added "or being diocesan glebe land; and "Diocesan Board of Finance" and "diocesan glebe land" have the same meaning as in the Endowments and Glebe Measure 1976".
Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 (c. 10.)
26.—(1) In section 34(3) of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 for the words from "be" (in paragraph (a)) to "shall" (in paragraph (b)) there is substituted—
"in the case of land which is not diocesan glebe land, be paid to the Church Commissioners; and
(b) shall, in the case of diocesan glebe land, be paid to the Diocesan Board of Finance in which the land is vested,
and shall (in either case)."
(2) At the end of section 34(4) of that Act there is added "or being diocesan glebe land; and "Diocesan Board of Finance" and "diocesan glebe land" have the same meaning as in the Endowments and Glebe Measure 1976".").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No. 354A:
After Schedule 8, insert the following new schedule:
("Compensation where permission for additional development granted after acquisition—Scotland
1. After section 30 of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963 there is inserted—
"PART VCOMPENSATION WHERE PERMISSION FOR ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANTED AFTER ACQUISITION Compensation where planning decision made after acquisition.
31.—(1) Where—

(a) any interest in land is compulsorily acquired or is sold to an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers and, before the end of the period of ten years beginning with the date of completion, a planning decision is made granting permission for the carrying out of additional development of any of the land; and

(b) the principal amount of the compensation which was payable in respect of the compulsory acquisition or, in the case of a sale by agreement, the amount of the purchase price, was less than the amount specified in subsection (2) of this section,

then, subject to the following provisions of this section, the person to whom the compensation or purchase price was payable shall be entitled, on a claim duly made by him, to compensation from the acquiring authority of an amount equal to the difference.
(2) The amount referred to in subsection (1) (b) of this section is the principal amount of the compensation which would have been payable in respect of a compulsory acquisition of the interest by the acquiring authority, in pursuance of a notice to treat served on the relevant date if—

(a) the planning decision mentioned in subsection (1) (a) of this section had been made before that date; and

(b) the permission granted by it had been in force on that date.

(3) No compensation shall be payable by virtue of this section in respect of a planning decision in so far as it relates to land acquired by the acquiring authority, whether compulsorily or by agreement—

(a) under section 142 or 143 of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (acquisitions by urban development corporations and by roads authorities in connection with urban development areas);

(b) under the New Towns (Scotland) Act 1968 (acquisitions by development corporations and by roads authorities in connection with new town areas); or

(c) where the compulsory purchase order included a direction under section 107 of the Town and

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Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972 (minimum compensation in case of listed building deliberately left derelict).

(4) If—

(a) in accordance with the preceding provisions of this section the person referred to in subsection (1) of this section would be entitled to compensation under this section; but

(b) before the planning decision in question that person has died, or any other act or event has occurred whereby the right to compensation under this section, if vested in him immediately before that act or event, would thereupon have vested in some other person,

the right to compensation under this section shall be treated as having devolved as if that right had been vested in him immediately before his death or immediately before that act or event, as the case may be, and the compensation shall be payable to the persons claiming under him accordingly.
(5) Compensation under this section shall carry interest at the rate prescribed under section 40 of this Act from the date of the planning decision in question until payment.
(6) The provisions of Part II of this Act (so far as applicable) shall apply (subject to the following provisions) in relation to the assessment of compensation under this section as they apply in relation to the assessment of compensation in respect of the compulsory acquisition of an interest in land.
Provisions as to claims under section 31.
32.—(1) For the purpose of facilitating the making of claims for compensation under section 31 of this Act—

(a) the person entitled to receive the compensationor purchase price in respect of such an acquisition or sale as is mentioned in section 31(1) (a) of this Act; or

(b) any person claiming under him as being a person who, if compensation under that section became payable, would be entitled to it by virtue of subsection (4) of that section,

may give to the acquiring authority an address for service under this section.
(2) Where, at any time—

(a) after a person has given an acquiring authority an address for service under this section; and

(b) before the end of the period mentioned in paragraph (a) of section 31(1) of this Act,

such a planning decision is made as is mentioned in that paragraph, the acquiring authority shall, subject to subsection (3) of this section, give notice of the decision in the prescribed form to that person at that address.
(3) If—

(a) an address for service has been given by such a person as is mentioned in subsection (1) (b) of this section; and

(b) the acquiring authority have reasonable grounds for believing that the person mentioned in subsection (1) (a) of this section is dead or that any other act or event has occurred as mentioned in section 31(4) (b) of this Act,

the acquiring authority need not give a notice to the person mentioned in subsection (1) (a).
(4) A claim for compensation under section 31 of this Act in respect of a planning decision shall not have effect if made more than six months after the following date, that is to say—

(a) if the claim is made by a person who has not given the acquiring authority an address for service under this section, the date of the decision;

1050

(b) if the claim is made by a person who has given the acquiring authority such an address, the date on which notice of the decision is given to him in accordance with subsection (2) of this section;

but, where there is an appeal against the planning decision, the reference in paragraph (a) of this subsection to the date of the planning decision shall be read as a reference to the date of the decision on the appeal.
(5) The references in subsection (4) of this section to an appeal against a planning decision include an appeal made by virtue of section 34 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972.
(6) Where—

(a) a person has given to an acquiring authority an address for service under this section; and

(b) that authority, before the end of the period mentioned in section 31(1) (a) of this Act, cease to be entitled to an interest in the whole or part of the land comprised in the acquisition or sale, without remaining or becoming entitled to the dominium utile, or a tenancy, of that land or that part of it, as the case may be,

they shall notify the planning authority; and after that it shall be the duty of the planning authority to give notice to the acquiring authority of any planning decision of which the acquiring authority are required to give notice under subsection (2) of this section.
(7) Notice under subsection (6) of this section of a planning decision—

(a) in the case of a decision made by the planning authority, shall be given within seven days after the making of the decision; and

(b) in any other case, shall be given within seven days after the making of the decision has been notified to the planning authority.

Extension to planning permission where no planning decision made.
33.—(1) The provisions of sections 31 and 32(1) of this Act shall have effect in relation to any planning permission falling within column 1 of the following table for any development as if a planning decision granting that permission had been made on the date shown in column 2.
When development is initiated
Permission granted by the adoption or approval of a simplified planning zone scheme
When the scheme is approved or adopted
Permission granted by an order designating an enterprise zone
When the designation takes effect
Permission deemed to be granted by a direction under section 37 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972
When the direction is given
Permission deemed to be granted by a planning authority
The occurrence of the event in consequence of which the permission is deemed to be granted
(2) Where the provisions of section 31 of this Act have effect as applied by subsection (1) of this section in relation to any planning permission falling within column 1 of that table for any development, then if—

(a) before the date shown in column 2, a person who (under section 32(1) of this Act as so applied) is entitled to give an address for service under that section has given such an address to the acquiring authority; and

(b) the development is proposed to be carried out by the acquiring authority or, if it is proposed to be carried out by a person other than the acquiring authority, notice of that proposal is given to the acquiring authority by the person proposing to carry out the development,

it shall, subject to subsection (3) of this section, be the duty of the acquiring authority to give notice of that proposal in the prescribed form to the person mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection at the address given by him to the authority.
(3) An acquiring authority shall not be required by virtue of subsection (2) of this section to give notice of proposed development to the person mentioned in section 32(1) (a) of this Act if—

(a) an address for service has been given to them by such a person as is mentioned in section 32(1) (b) of this Act; and

(b) they have reasonable grounds for believing that the former person is dead or that any other act or event has occurred as mentioned in section 31(4) (b) of this Act.

(4) A claim for compensation under section 31 of this Act in respect of a planning permission falling within column 1 of that table shall not have effect if made more than six months after the following date, that is to say—

(a) if the claim is made by a person to whom notice has been given under subsection (2) of this section, the date on which the notice was given;

(b) in any other case, the date shown in column 2.

Extension to Crown development.
34.—(1) Where—

(a) any interest in land is compulsorily acquired or is sold to an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers, and before the end of the period of ten years beginning with the date of completion there is initiated any additional development of any of the land which was comprised in the acquisition or sale; and

(b) by reason of any such circumstances as are mentioned in subsection (2) of this section the development in question is development for which planning permission is not required,

the provisions of sections 31 and 32(1) of this Act shall apply as if a planning decision granting permission for that development had been made at the time when the additional development is so initiated.
(2) The circumstances referred to in subsection (1) of this section are either or both of the following—

(a) that the development is initiated by or on behalf of the Crown;

(b) that there is a Crown interest in the land and the development is initiated in right of that interest.

(3) Where—

(a) the provisions of section 31 of this Act have effect as applied by subsection (1) of this section in relation to the initiation of any development; and

(b) before the development is initiated a person who (under section 32(1) of this Act as so applied) is entitled to give an address for service under that section has given such an address to the acquiring authority,

it shall, subject to subsections (4) and (5) of this section, be the duty of the acquiring authority to give notice in the prescribed form of the initiation of the development to the person mentioned in paragraph (b) of this subsection at the address given by him to the authority.
(4) Where—

(a) by virtue of subsection (3) of this section, it is the duty of a government department to give notice of development initiated by or on behalf of that department; and

(b) the Minister in charge of the department certifies that for reasons of national security it is necessary that the nature of the development should not be disclosed, except to the extent specified in the certificate,

the department shall give notice of development, but shall not be required to give any particulars of the nature of the development except to the extent specified in the certificate.
(5) An acquiring authority shall not be required by virtue of subsection (3) of this section to give notice of proposed development to the person mentioned in section 32(1) (a) of this Act if—

(a) an address for service has been given to them by such a person as is mentioned in section 32(1) (b) of this Act; and

(b) they have reasonable grounds for believing that the former person is dead or that any other act or event has occurred as mentioned in section 31(4) (b) of this Act.

(6) A claim for compensation under section 31 of this Act in respect of the initiation of any development shall not have effect if made more than six months after the following date, that is to say—

(a) if the claim is made by a person to whom notice has been given under subsection (3) of this section, the date on which the notice was given;

(b) in any other case, the time the development is initiated.

(7) In this section "Crown interest" means an interest belonging to Her Majesty in right of the Crown, or belonging to a government department or held in trust for Her Majesty for the purposes of a government department.
Application of Part V to certain cases.
35. The preceding provisions of this Part of this Act shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Third Schedule to this Act.
Regulations for purposes of Part V.
36.—(1) The Secretary of State may by statutory instrument make regulations for prescribing the form of any notice required by this Part of this Act to be given in the prescribed form.
(2) Any statutory instrument containing such regulations shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
Interpretation of Part IV.
37.—(1) In this Part of this Act—
"additional development", in relation to an acquisition or sale of an interest in land, means any development of the land other than the following, that is to say—

(a) where the acquiring authority are a local authority, and acquired the interest for the purposes of any of their functions, development for the purposes of the functions for which they acquired it;

(b) where the acquiring authority are not a local authority, development for the purposes of the project in connection with which they acquired the interest;

(c) development for which planning permission was in force on the relevant date;

(d) in the case of compulsory acquisition, development for which it was assumed (in accordance with the provisions of sections 22 to 24 of this Act) for the purpose of assessing compensation that planning permission would be granted; and

(e) in the case of a sale by agreement, development for which, if the interest (instead of being sold by agreement) had been compulsorily acquired by the acquiring authority in pursuance of a notice to treat served on the relevant date, it would have been so assumed;

"date of completion", in relation to an acquisition or sale of an interest in land, means the date on which the acquisition or sale is completed by the vesting of that interest in the acquiring authority;
"local authority" means a regional, islands or district council;
"prescribed" means prescribed by regulations under this Part of this Act;
"the relevant date", in relation to a compulsory acquisition of an interest in land, means the date of service of the notice to treat and, in relation to a sale of such an interest by agreement, means the date of the making of the contract in pursuance of which the sale was effected.
(2) In this Part of this Act any reference to the granting of permission for the carrying out of development of any land is a reference to the granting of permission (including where applicable outline permission) for that development—

(a) either unconditionally or subject to conditions; and

(b) either in respect of that land taken by itself or in respect of an area including that land."

2. After Schedule 2 to that Act there is inserted—
"THIRD SCHEDULE APPLICATION OF PART V TO CERTAIN CASES Disturbance, severance and injurious affection
1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Schedule, any reference in section 31 of this Act to the principal amount of any compensation shall be construed as including any sum attributable to disturbance, severance or injurious affection.
2. If the person entitled to the compensation under section 31 of this Act—

(a) was, at the time of the compulsory acquisition or sale mentioned in subsection (1) of that section, entitled to an interest in other land contiguous or adjacent to the land acquired or purchased; but

(b) is, at the time of the planning decision in question, no longer entitled to that interest, either in respect of the whole or in respect of part of that land;

any reference in section 31 of this Act to the principal amount of any compensation or the amount of the purchase price shall be construed as excluding so much of the compensation or purchase price as was or would have been attributable to severance or injurious affection of that land or, as the case may be, of that part.
Increase in value of contiguous or adjacent land
3. In determining for the purposes of section 31 of this Act the difference between the principal amount of the compensation specified in subsection (2) of that section and the principal amount of the compensation or the amount of the purchase price mentioned in subsection (1) of that section, in a case where—

(a) the compensation or the purchase price was or would have been reduced (whether by virtue of section 14 of this Act or otherwise) by reason of an increase in the value of an interest in contiguous or adjacent land; but

(b) at the time of the planning decision the person entitled to the compensation under section 23 of this Act is not entitled to the interest or is entitled to it only as respects part of the contiguous or adjacent land,

the amount specified in section 31(2) and the principal amount or purchase price mentioned in section 31(1) shall be calculated as if the circumstances by reason of which it was or would have been so reduced had not existed or, as the case may be, as if the interest in the contiguous or adjacent land had subsisted only in that part of the land.
Land held subject to heritable security
4. Subject to the provisions of this Schedule relating to settled land, where, in a case falling within section 31(1) of this Act, the interest in land which was acquired or sold was subject to a heritable security, any reference
1054
(however expressed) in section 31 or section 32 of this Act to the person entitled to the compensation or purchase price shall be construed as a reference to the person who, subject to the heritable security, was entitled to that interest, and not as a reference to the heritable creditor.
5. For the purposes of the application of section 31 of this Act, and of the provisions of this Schedule other than this paragraph, to a case falling within the preceding paragraph, any reference to the principal amount of the compensation which was or would have been payable in respect of any compulsory acquisition shall be construed as a reference to the principal amount of the compensation which would have been payable if the interest in question had not been subject to a heritable security.
6. No compensation shall be payable by virtue of section 31 of this Act in respect of a compulsory acquisition or sale by agreement where the interest acquired or sold was the interest of a heritable creditor (as distinct from an interest subject to a heritable security).
Land held in trust
7.—(1) Where, in a case falling within section 31(1) of this Act, the interest in land which was acquired or sold was subject to a trust, and accordingly the compensation or purchase price was payable to the trustees of that trust, any reference (however expressed) in section 31 or section 32 of this Act to the person entitled to the compensation or purchase price shall be construed as a reference to the trustees for the time being of the trust.
(2) Where sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph applies, section 31(4) of this Act shall not apply.
(3) Any compensation paid to the trustees of the trust by virtue of section 31 of this Act in respect of a compulsory acquisition or sale by agreement shall be applicable by the trustees as if it were proceeds of the sale of the interest acquired or sold.
(4) In this paragraph "trust" has the same meaning as in the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921.
Interpretation
8. References in this Schedule to sections 31 and 32 of this Act include references to those sections as applied by section 33 or 34 of this Act, and references to the time of any planning decision shall be construed accordingly." ").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 52 agreed to.
Schedule 9 [Amendments relating to Land Compensation in Scotland]:
Lord Fraser of Carmyllie Lord Fraser of Carmyllie moved Amendment No.355:
Page 109, line 7, at end insert:
("5A.—(1) In section 22(1) of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963 after "shall" there is inserted "(subject to subsection (3A) of this section)".
(2) In section 22(3) of that Act, for the words from "but" to the end there is substituted—
"(3A) In determining—

(a) for the purpose referred to in subsection (1) of this section whether planning permission for any development could in any particular circumstances reasonably have been expected to be granted in respect of any land; or

(b) whether any of the assumptions mentioned in section 24 of this Act (but not section 23) are applicable to the relevant land or any part thereof,

regard shall be had to any contrary opinion expressed in relation to that land in any certificate issued under Part IV of this Act."
5B. In section 25 of that Act—

(a) for the words from the beginning of subsection (2) to "acquire it" there is substituted "If the authority proposing to acquire the interest", and

(b) subsection (8) is omitted.

5C. In section 27(1) of that Act for "in the circumstances mentioned in section 25(1) of this Act" there is substituted "by an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers".
5D. Section 30(3) of that Act is omitted."). On Question, amendment agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361 and 362:
Page 109, line 8, at end insert:
("5E. In section 181 of the 1972 Act (scope of blight provisions), after paragraph (h) of subsection (1) there is inserted—
"(hh) land to be included in a trunk road or special road as proposed to be improved or altered by the Secretary of State if he has given written notice of his proposal, together with maps or plans sufficient to identify the land in question, to the planning authority;".").
Page 110, line 1, leave out ("Subsections (3) to") and insert ("The power to make regulations under this section shall be exercisable by statutory instrument which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(4) Subsections (3), (6) and").
Page 110, line 31, leave out paragraph 10.
Page 111, line 2, at end insert:
("The 1972 Act
11A. In subsection (2) (d) of section 183 (objection to blight notice) of the 1972 Act, for "or (h)" there is substituted "(h) or (hh)"").
Page 111, line 4, leave out ("(2)").
Page 111, line 5, after ("1973") insert ("(a) in subsection (2)").
Page 111, line 6, at end insert ("and
(b) in subsection (5), for "and (2)" there is substituted "(2) and (2A)".
13. In section 48 (right to advance payment of compensation) of that Act—

(a) in subsection (8), after "the amount of the advance payment" there is inserted "together with any amount paid under section 48A", and

(b) in subsection (9) (b), the words following "unpaid" are omitted.

Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 (c. 65.)
14. After section 141(5) of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 there is inserted—
"(5B) No compensation is payable, by virtue of an order under this section, under Part V of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963".").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 53 [Interest on compensation]:
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No.363:
Page 61, line 35, leave out subsection (2) and insert:
("(2) If it appears to any person that he may become liable to pay to another—

(a) compensation under any provision mentioned in Schedule 10 to this Act, or

(b) interest under subsection (1) above, under any provision mentioned in Part II of Schedule 10 to this Act or under any bond under section 85 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 or Schedule 3 to the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965,

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he may, if the other person requests him in writing to do so, make one or more payments on account of such compensation or interest.
(2A) If after a payment has been made by any person under subsection (2) above—

(a) it is agreed or determined that he is not liable to pay the compensation or interest, or

(b) by reason of any agreement or determination, any payment under that subsection is shown to have been excessive,

the payment or, as the case may be, excess shall be recoverable by that person.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendments Nos. 364 and 364A not moved.]
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendment No. 365:
Page 62, line 3, leave out ("Regulations or").
Clause 53, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 10 [Compensation Provisions referred to in section 53]:
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 366 to 368:
Page 115, line 25, at end insert:
("Section 23 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 (permission for additional development granted after acquisition).").
Page 116, line 2, at end insert:
Section 31 (compensation where planning decision made after acquisition) of the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963.").
Page 116, line 9, at end insert ("Section (time limit on validity of notice to treat) of this Act").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 54 agreed to.
Clause 55 [Short title, commencement, etc.]:
[Amendment No. 368A not moved.]
Clause 55 agreed to.
Schedule 11 [Repeals]:
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendments Nos. 369 and 370:
Page 116, leave out lines 15 and 16.
Page 116, leave out line 30.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Viscount Astor Viscount Astor moved Amendment No. 371:

Page 117, line 8, column 3, at end insert:

("In section 74(2) "section 71 of this Act and".").

The noble Viscount said: I beg to move Amendment No. 371, and also to speak to Amendments Nos. 372, 373, 375 to 378, and 384 to 394. These amendments are all consequential on the provisions of the Bill as it is amended in Committee.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch moved Amendments Nos. 372 to 394:
Page 117, leave out line 15.

Page 117, line 40, column 3, at end insert:

("Section 286(1) (b).").

Page 118, line 3, leave out ("2").
Page 118, leave out lines 10 and 11 and insert:

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("2, in sub-paragraph (1) (c) "and subsection (5) of section 196" and in sub-paragraph (8) "or 290".").

Page 118, line 25, at end insert:

("1990 c. 9.

Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990

In section 9(5) "on indictment". Section 55(6). In section 88(6) "or the presence of minerals in it".

In section 90(6) (b) "and 42(6)".

In section 92(2) (b) "and 42(6)".").

Page 118, line 26, leave out ("25(2) (c)") and insert ("25(1) (c)").

Page 118, line 27, at end insert:

("1990 c. 11.

Planning (Consequential Provisions) Act 1990.

In Schedule 3, paragraph 10.").

Page 118, line 32, at end insert:

("1965 c. 36.

Gas Act 1965.

In Schedule 3, paragraph 3.").

Page 119, line 23, leave out ("47") and insert ("49").

Page 119, line 35, at beginning insert:

("1961 c. 33.

Land Compensation Act 1961.

Section 17(8). Section 22(3).").

Page 119, line 36, column 3, at end insert:

("In section 52(10), the words following "unpaid".").

Page 120, line 6, column 3, at end insert:

("Section 23(4) (a) and (b).

Section 25(8).

Section 30(3).

1965 c.36.

The Gas Act 1965.

In Schedule 3, paragraph 3.").

Page 120, line 7, column 3, at beginning insert:

("Section 5(3) (a) and (b).").

Page 120, line 8, column 3, at end insert:

("Section 48(9).").

Page 120, line 9, column 3, at beginning insert:

("Section 19(5).

In section 28(1), the words "Subject to the provisions of section 26(2) to (5) of this Act,".

Section 35.

Section 36.

In section 41A(6) and (7), the words "consisting of the winning and working of minerals".").

Page 120, line 9, column 3, at end insert:

("In section 58(2) (a), "35, 36,".").

Page 120, column 3, leave out lines 11 to 14 and insert:

("Section 84(11).

In section 85, in subsection (5), the words "or for varying the terms of the notice in favour of the appellant; and subsection (11).").

Page 120, line 18, column 3, at end insert:

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("In section 88(2), the words "(as defined in section 84(2) of this Act)".

Section 91(3) and (5).

In section 93, subsection (1) (k) and, in subsection (5), the words "or for varying the terms of the notice in favour of the appellant".").

Page 120, line 21, column 3, at end insert:

("Section 98(3).").

Page 120, line 25, at end insert:

("In section 106, the words from "other than" to the end.").

Page 120, line 26, at end insert:

("(except section 145).

In section 155(5), the words from "and subsection (5)" to the end.

In section 155(6), the words "and in section 156 of this Act".

Section 156.

Section 157(1).

In section 157(3), the words from "(a)" to "(b)" and, in the proviso, the words "paragraph (a) or".

Section 157(4).").

Page 120, line 28, at end insert:

("In section 167A(11), the words "or bodies of persons".

Section 169(3).

In section 201(5), the definition of "lawful access".

Section 231(3) (c).

Section 234.

1048312029543

Page 120, line 29, at end insert:

("In Part I of Schedule 19, "section 158 except subsection (5)".

1982 c. 16.

Civil Aviation Act 1982.

In section 53(1) (a), the word "158".

1986 c. 31.

Airports Act 1986.

In section 61(1) (a), the word "158".").

On Question, amendments agreed to.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I wish to express my thanks to my noble friends Lady Nicol, Lady Hollis and Lady David who have suffered three late nights on this Bill. I express my thanks to the Minister, to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate and to all on the Government Front Bench for their courtesy. I thank those few but doughty Members of the Back Benches who have put up with what has sometimes been a dialogue des sourds as the sound has not reached too far back into the Chamber. This is a totally different Bill to that which came to the Chamber and I protested about that at the beginning. We shall have to consider it afresh on Report in two weeks' time.
Baroness Blateh: It is only the lateness of the hour that prevents me from reciprocating at length. I thank

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the noble Lord for his comments and thank all who have been concerned in our proceedings, including the staff.
[Amendment No.395 not moved.]
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Schedule 11, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with amendments.
House adjourned at twenty-seven minutes before midnight.