Lords Sitting of 13 February 1990

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Liverpool.
The Marquess of Zetland—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

British Technology Group: Privatisation
Lord Birdwood Lord Birdwood asked Her Majesty's Government:
What proposals they have, and what timetable is envisaged, for the privatisation of British Technology Group (BTG).
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, the Government consider that it is more appropriate for the British Technology Group to be in the private sector. This would, however, require primary legislation and the timetable would thus depend upon the parliamentary legislative programme.
Lord Birdwood: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that less than fulsome Answer. Does he concede that the Government are guilty of a considerable ideological fracture in holding back the privatisation of this outstandingly successful organisation because they are in favour of other priorities?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I agree that the BTG is exceptionally successful and has made great strides in its transfer of technology. However, I cannot say more about the legislative programme nor can I pre-empt the gracious Speech.
The Earl of Halsbury: My Lords, can the Minister confirm that the heartland of the British Technology Group is the old National Research Development Corporation, the vision of the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Rievaulx, in 1948, and of which I was managing director from 1949 to 1959?
Noble Lords: Hear, hear!
The Earl of Halsbury: My Lords, does my noble friend also agree that all the money advanced for priming the pump has been repaid to the Treasury with cumulative interest; that the company now operates internationally and needs the status of a private company; and that everyone from the managing director downwards is longing for the day when that can be achieved?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lorus, I confirm that the group is comprised of the National Research Development Corporation and the National Enterprise Board. In 1981 they came together to form the group. I also confirm that the original loans have been repaid to Her Majesty's Government and that the Government are determined to see the company in the private sector.
Lord Taylor of Blackburn: My Lords, my question is completely the opposite. Why should such a successful organisation which has done a great deal of work, be privatised?
A Noble Lord: Loot! Loot!
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, it is considered that its activities are now of a commercial and training nature and that is not appropriate for the public sector.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the Government declared their intention early in April, 1988; they commissioned a report from Coopers & Lybrand on the whole privatisation programme of the BTG; they received the report in July, 1989; and they have done nothing since then? Is it not the case that any company management which has the Sword of Damocles of privatisation hanging over it cannot work properly?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I confirm the noble Lord's figures and dates, although the report was received in July, 1988. In his latest annual report, the chairman of the group, Mr. Barker, stated that extensive advice from the BTG council was communicated to the Government and it was in favour of a transfer providing that certain characteristics of the group could be retained.
Lord Orr-Ewing: My Lords, will my noble friend bear in mind that high technology needs a most flexible and adroit company? Does he agree that although the BTG did well under the leadership of my noble friend Lord Halsbury, its future depends on attracting the right young people who are much better drawn from the private sector —particularly the international private sector —than from a company which in due course grows old and fuddy-duddy if it is in the public sector?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, the British Technology Group licenses the technology internationally and shares the income with the inventor. The group does not have its own research and development facilities but acts as an intermediary or broker between the inventor and the end user of the technology.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, will the noble Viscount reject the assertion by the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing that the management of BTG, which has been in the public sector since the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, was managing director, has become fuddy-duddy? It has been extremely successful and there is no reason why a public sector company cannot recruit proper management at the right price.
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I certainly say that the management has been extremely active and it is a very successful group.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone:My Lords, with due respect to the knowledge of Greek mythology of the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Elvel, is not the promise of ultimate privatisation less like

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the Sword of Damocles and more like a promise of emancipation to a slave?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I agree with my noble and learned friend. I believe that it is a spur to better activity.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, perhaps the noble Viscount would care to explain to his noble and learned friend that the emancipation of slaves was not part of Greek mythology.
The Earl of Halsbury: My Lords, the universities' expectation of dividends from NRDC for 1990 is estimated to be £5 million. Is that the estimation of a group with the Sword of Damocles hanging over its head?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I believe that that shows the effectiveness of the group.

Electricity Privatisation: PR Advisers;
2.45 p.m.
Lord Hatch of Lusby Lord Hatch of Lusby asked Her Majesty's Government:
What is their estimate of the cost of public relations advice by Lowe Bell Communications to the Secretary of State for Energy on the privatisation of the electricity supply industry.
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, the Government and the area boards appointed Lowe Bell Communications in July 1988 to provide marketing advice for the flotation of the distribution companies, as part of the electricity privatisation programme. This role did not include any public relations activities. Since then Lowe Bell Communications has been appointed as special marketing and PR advisers to the Secretary of State. The Government and the electricity supply industry have appointed Dewe Rogerson as joint marketing and PR adviser for the privatisation of the electricity supply industry in England and Wales. Detailed information concerning contracts with individual advisers is commercially confidential.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, frankly, that does not answer my Question. I am asking the Government how much public money is being spent on their public relations exercise as regards the privatisation of electricity. I do not believe that any Member of this House would disagree that the Government certainly need advice on their public relations on privatisation after all the messes they have got themselves into. However, we are entitled to know what the Government are spending on public relations in order to further the policy which the Conservative Party is putting over and what public money is being spent on that public relations exercise.
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I must repeat part of my original Answer. Lowe Bell Communications
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was appointed by the Government and the area boards jointly in July 1988 to provide marketing advice in respect of the distribution flotation. That company was not appointed to give public relations advice under that contract, which was terminated in January 1990.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, that still does not answer my Question. I have a news release from the Department of Energy which states that John Wakeham, Secretary of State for Energy, has appointed Lowe Bell Communications to be special marketing and public relations advisers. I ask how much money the Government are spending on their public relations exercise as regards the privatisation of electricity.
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I expect that the news release which the noble Lord has, is dated January 1990. No money has been spent to date on public relations activity. Detailed information concerning contracts with individual advisers is commercially confidential.
Lord Taylor of Blackburn: My Lords, do we take it that that company is doing the work free and gratis?
Viscount Ullswater: No, my Lords.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, we all understand that the Secretary of State for Energy needs serious public relations advice on privatisation. We take that for granted. However, can the noble Viscount answer my noble friend's Question? How much money is the taxpayer—because this is the taxpayer and not the electricity industry —going to have to pay for public relations advice to be given to Mr. John Wakeham?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, it is not advice to Mr. John Wakeham but advice to the Department of Energy, as the news release makes clear. As regards marketing, which I believe is what the noble Lord is driving at, any expenditure on marketing will be designed to achieve value for money. Previous privatisations have demonstrated that expenditure on marketing generates strong retail demand and secures wide share ownership, including within the company's employees.
Lord Grimond: My Lords, is there any reason the taxpayer cannot be told what is being spent on marketing? There cannot be any secrecy. That is clearly expenditure from public funds and surely the public have a right to know what has been expended.
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, the money involved in marketing will be declared. However, the money so far advanced has come from the Vote to the department.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, this House really cannot understand why the Minister is so diffident about public money being expended apparently for some public good. First, I certainly do not know what is the public good. Surely the

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Government are not trying to persuade the public that they are going to give them a nice gift, as they did regarding the water industry. Everybody knows that the Government are out to ensure that shareholders will make 50 per cent. or 60 per cent. profit. Exactly what, therefore, do the Government intend by the expenditure of this money, and how much is it?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I have already told the House that the marketing of the privatisation is to ensure that the taxpayer gets value for money. A proper marketing campaign maximises proceeds for the taxpayers.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, the noble Viscount must realise that this is a serious matter. Can he tell the House whether there is any precedent at any time for any Secretary of State engaging a firm to give advice in this way?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I understand that this has been done. The amount spent is commercially confidential.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, what is commercially confidential about the amount of money the taxpayer will pay for this?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, the various sides require information and advice and I do not think it is necessarily right to allow these commercially confidential details into the public domain.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, I am afraid the Minister has made a mistake. He says that this organisation has been appointed to the Department of Energy, but that is not what the press release states. It states that it has been appointed as public relations adviser to the Secretary of State —not to the department but to the Secretary of State. This is public money used in order to obtain public relations advice for the Secretary of State. That money comes from the taxpayer. Whether or not money has been spent yet does not make any difference. What money has been contracted to be spent from the taxpayers' pocket in order to give public relations advice to the Secretary of State?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I have answered the question already. The details are commercially confidential. The Secretary of State requires the information while he is preparing the industry for privatisation and I am quite certain that most people feel that he should be properly briefed.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, in that case, if the Public Accounts Committee were to ask him to appear before it, would he then claim commercial confidentiality in revealing what public money has been spent for private advice to him on a public relations matter?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I cannot possibly answer for my right honourable friend to a committee of another place.
Lord Taylor of Blackburn: My Lords, is it true that this firm is also the principal adviser to the Conservative Party?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I do not know.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, I recognise the difficulties of the noble Viscount at this time, but will he convey to his right honourable friend the need for a statement to clarify the position?
Viscount Ullswater: My Lords, I shall certainly draw to the attention of my right honourable friend the exchange of remarks in your Lordships' House.

British Rail Engineering: Privatisation
2.54 p.m.
Lord Dean of Beswick Lord Dean of Beswick asked Her Majesty's Government:
What revenue was raised by the privatisation of British Rail Engineering in April 1989.
Viscount Davidson: My Lords, British Rail's net proceeds were £13·6 million.
Lord Dean of Beswick: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. Is the Minister aware that that was a realistic price in the interests of the taxpayers? Can he confirm that there were substantial lands included in this deal? Can the Minister also give an undertaking that if, on the sale of those lands by the present owners who purchased British Rail Engineering Limited, there are substantial profits the Government will consider implementing a clawback scheme in the interests of taxpayers?
Viscount Davidson: My Lords, yes. The Government approved the sale since they were satisfied that this was in BR's best commercial interests. The price was the best that could be obtained, the market having been fully tested by open tender and genuine competition. My honourable friend Mr. Portillo told another place on 17th January 1989 that the contract of sale contains a clawback provision which ensures that British Rail will benefit from any short-term sale or development of BREL land.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, it is interesting to hear the noble Viscount's reply. However, I have in my files the press notices of January 1989 from British Railways Board and also the Department of Transport. They refer to BRB accepting the consortium as the best bidder for the railway works; but no reference at all is made in either communication to the price. Can the Minister give a definite undertaking that no pledge was given at the time that the price would not be divulged, even though it may be in the accounts of BREL for the past year? Can he say exactly what are the conditions laid down for the clawback to which my noble friend refers?
Viscount Davidson: My Lords, the noble Lord may be interested to hear that i too have too those press cuttings in my file. As I said, the net sale price amounted to £13·6 million. That appears in BR's annual report and accounts for 1988–89. Any queries with regard to figures which appear in the 1989 accounts for the BREL group should be addressed to the group as it is a private company. However, I can tell both noble Lords that there is an element of land and buildings in the sale price. The BR figure of £ 13·6 million was made up as follows: net assets of BREL £·6million; sale of land and buildings for BREL £ 4·6million; sale of land and buildings for BREL £11·1 million. Net of BR costs that came to £13·6million.
The noble Lord asked about the clawback provisions. The sale involved a negotiated clawback provision which ensures that BR will receive a portion of any profit on the sale or development of BR land. The clawback provision applies for a period of seven years after the sale. I will write to the noble Lord giving further details.
Lord Parry: My Lords, is the noble Viscount aware that the cost of a first-class ticket from Haverfordwest to Paddington this morning was in excess of £114 and that the train was late?
Viscount Davidson: My Lords, that is a question as far removed from the Question on the Order Paper as any I have ever known.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, would the noble Viscount care to comment on reports that the land value of assets amounts to £217 million? How will it be ensured, when that land is sold, that the British Railways Board (if it then exists) gets its fair share?
Viscount Davidson: My Lords, that is the purpose of the clawback provision which was agreed at the time of the sale. I can tell the noble Lord that no land has been sold as yet.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, who is to monitor it? That is my question.
Viscount Davidson: My Lords, I shall have to write to the noble Lord.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, has the noble Viscount's attention been drawn to page 21 of the Daily Telegraph of 1st February? It reports that at the time of this somewhat questionable disposal to Trafalgar House the net profits of this company for the year were £7·5 million.
Viscount Davidson: My Lords, I have not read the Daily Telegraph of that particular date, but I can tell the noble Lord that the Office of Fair Trading examined the proposals and looked at any competition implications under the Fair Trading Act 1973. The then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry accepted the advice of the Office of Fair Trading that there were no grounds for reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. The European commission was also notified formally of the terms of the sale and announced its clearance.

Premium Bond
3 p.m.
Lord Ezra Lord Ezra asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether it is their policy to encourage private savings, and if so, whether paying out only 6·5 per cent. on the average value of premium bonds is helping to achieve that objective.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Social Security (Lord Henley): My Lords, it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to encourage personal savings which investors will retain for some time. Longer term savings of this kind help to reduce the level of consumer spending in the economy. Premium bonds can be repaid virtually on demand, and therefore do not contribute to this aim.
Lord Ezra: My Lords,is the noble Lord aware that in July 1988, the average return on premium bonds was reduced from 7·75 per cent. to the present level of 6·5 per cent? The reason for that was the reduction in interest rates. Since then interest rates have very substantially increased. Can the Minister say whether the Government are considering reviewing the position? Is the Minister also aware that people can invest in any building society and receive something like 11 per cent. interest, tax paid, for their money? If the Government are really serious about persuading people to hold their money in the long term, does not the Minister agree that the Government should move somewhat nearer to the market rate?
Lord Henley: My Lords, there is no fixed relationship with other interest rates in the economy. Premium bonds are not the kind of savings to which we attach the highest priority and the interest rate used to set the prize fund reflects that. It is entirely a matter for the individual where he wishes to invest his money.
Lord Winstanley: My Lords, does the noble Lord really believe that a potential return of 6·5 per cent. is fair and reasonable in the light of what has been happening to interest rates? No doubt the noble Lord himself is too sensible to put his own money into premium bonds, but does he not realise that our wives, however prudent they may be, insist on buying them? Does the noble Lord hold out any hope that the potential return on these investments of our wives might be a little better?
Lord Henley: My Lords, I repeat the answer that I have just given. The noble Lord might offer some advice to his wife, but I am sure that she is perfectly capable of making up her own mind. Speaking for myself, I have not the first idea whether my wife has any money in premium bonds. It is a matter entirely for her to decide in the light of the circumstances at the time.
Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that when the late Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Fisher, declared it to be a

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sin, I immediately bought the maximum number of premium bonds?
Lord Henley: My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for those remarks. At the time of the introduction of premium bonds by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1956, the then Shadow Chancellor described them as a squalid raffle.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, in view of the fact that the Government have now privatised the public sector borrowing requirement and transferred it to the private sector, which is now facing very severe liquidity problems, will the noble Lord explain what steps the Government propose to take in order to restore the savings ratio, which is now standing at about 4 per cent., to its former and more desirable level of between 14 and 16 per cent?
Lord Henley: My Lords, I believe that the noble Lord asked more or less the same question of my noble friend Lord Caithness on an earlier occasion when a Question of this kind was put down by the noble Lord, Lord Ezra. I fail to see what this question has to do with the Question on the Order Paper.
Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, surely the noble Lord cannot discard at this time this very popular form of saving because that, in effect, is what he has said. People other than wives like a little gamble. I remember Mr. Macmillan saying that to take a little gamble with the interest did not appear to him to be immoral. At that time the interest was set at a reasonable rate. Does not the Minister agree that for the Government actively to discourage this form of saving must be foolish?
Lord Henley: No, my Lords, I do not accept that. I merely said that the Government do not attach the highest priority to this form of investment.
Baroness Phillips: My Lords, is not the Minister aware that women are much more skilful in handling money than any man? When we have a woman Chancellor of the Exchequer we shall have a proper budget and one that does not have a deficit.
Lord Henley: My Lords, I quite agree with the noble Baroness. I remind her that we have a woman First Lord of the Treasury.
Lord Graham of Edmonton: Do not remind us!
Earl Nelson: My Lords, would my noble friend care to comment on the reasons why the minimum purchase of premium bonds has risen tenfold over the past few months? Does the Minister agree that that measure is surely not one that will encourage saving? Will the Minister also comment on why the minimum period for which a person has to hold premium bonds is still three months, particularly in view of the high interest rates at the present moment?
Lord Henley: My Lords, I am afraid I cannot comment on the second part of my noble friend's question. However, as regards the first part, the cost of processing claims is something of the order of
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£2. Therefore, we deemed it right to increase the minimum amount that can be invested from £10 to £100. I stress that I believe it is still possible to buy premium bonds in units of £10 for children under the age of 16.
3.5 p.m.

Business
Lord Denham: My Lords, at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m. this afternoon, my noble friend Lord Strathclyde will, with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement that is to be made in another place on the Skills Training Agency.
It may be for the convenience of your Lordships to know that the Committee stage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill will be adjourned at about 7.30 p.m. for about one hour and possibly one-and-a-half hours. During this adjournment the Third Reading of the London Local Authorities (No. 2) Bill will be taken.

Standard Life Assurance Company Bill [H.L.]
Read a second time, and referred to the Examiner.
Smith Kline French Laboratories Australia and Menley James Australia Bill [H.L.]
Read a second time, and referred to the Examiner.
North Yorkshire County Council Bill [HI]
Read a second time, and committed to a Select Committee.

Courts and Legal Services Bill [H.L.]
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Mackay of Clashfern): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the amendments for Report stage be marshalled and considered in the following order—

Clauses 1 to 17,

Schedules 1 and 2,

Clauses 18 to 23,

Schedule 3,

Clauses 24 to 27,

Schedule 4,

Clauses 28 to 31,

Schedule 5,

Clauses 32 to 38,

Schedule 6,

Clauses 39 and 40,

Schedule 7,

Clauses 41 to 52,

Schedule 8,

Clauses 53 to 61,

Schedules 9 and 10,

Clauses 62 to 81,

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Schedule 11,

Clauses 82 to 89,

Schedules 12 to 14,

The title. —(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [H.L.]
3.7 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee. —(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair].
Clause 13 [Conditions of licences for treatment]:
Viscount Caldecote Viscount Caldecote moved Amendment No. 81:
Page 6, leave out line 12 and insert ("(2) Information shall be recorded in such form as the Authority may specify in").
The noble Viscount said: This is a small but quite important drafting amendment in the interest of the strict regulation of the licences provided under this Bill. As drafted at present, the authority could specify that it required no information to be given under one or more of the headings in Clause 13(2)(a) to (e). The amendment makes clear that:
"Information shall be recorded in such form as the Authority may specify in directions".
I believe this is what was intended in the draftng of the Bill. It is certainly more precise. I beg to move.
The Lord Chancellor: This amendment would have the effect of making it a condition of all licences that information had to be recorded, in a manner laid down by the authority, on treatment services set out in Clause 13(2): (a) the persons for whom treatment services are provided; (b) the treatment services provided for them; (c) the persons whose gametes are kept or used for the purpose of treatment services provided under licence or whose gametes have been used to create embryos kept or used for treatment services of this kind; (d) any child appearing to "the person responsible" to have been born as a result of licensed treatment; and (e) any mixing of egg and sperm, any taking of any embryo from a woman, and any other acquisition of any embryo.
The amendment would give the authority the power to prescribe the manner in which information was recorded, but it would remove from the authority the discretion to decide what information it wanted recorded. The Government accept that there may be good reasons for specifying the form in which information should be recorded, but would wish to assure themselves that this would not lead to unnecessary bureaucracy or remove flexibility and discretion from the authority.
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Therefore, if my noble friend is prepared to allow me this opportunity, I should like to study this amendment further with a view to bringing forward a government amendment at a later stage in the proceedings to deal with at least some of the matters covered in this amendment.
Viscount Caldecote: I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy Lady Saltoun of Abernethy moved Amendment No. 82:
Page 6, line 24, at end insert —
(", provided that the information specified by the Authority under this subsection is sufficient to identify unequivocally all of the persons mentioned in subsections (2)(a) to (2)(e) above.").
The noble Lady said: Amendments Nos. 82, 83, 87, 134, 136, 145 to 149, 151 and 153 are all ancillary to Amendments Nos. 138 to 141, the purpose of which is to clarify and strengthen Clause 28(3). This clause, the wording of which is taken from the Legitimacy Act 1976, is designed to prevent donor children from succeeding to hereditary dignities such as peerages, baronetcies, and so on, which were generally limited by the monarch who created them to heirs of the body and usually to heirs male of the body. It is unclear whether it would cover the inheritance of coats of arms or property limited to devolve with dignities or titles of honour. In any event, the Legitimacy Act 1976 is an English Act.
The Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 provides in Section 37(1) that;
"Nothing in this Act shall … apply to any title, coat of arms, honour or dignity".
It was clearly thought by the drafters of that Act that the words "title, honour or dignity" would not include coats of arms. That being so, and coats of arms having been specifically included in that Act, not to specify them in this Bill would possibly have the effect of excluding them, particularly in Scotland. At best there could be doubt as to whether they were or were not included until a judicial decision had clarified the position.
Amendments Nos. 138, 139 and 140 in my name and in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, and the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, are designed to remedy the situation in England and Wales by amending Clause 28(3). They have the approval of Garter King of Arms. Amendment No. 141 in my name and in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Jauncey, and the noble Viscount, Lord Oxfuird, is designed to do the same for Scotland by adding a new subsection (4) to the clause, and has the approval of the Lord Lyon King of Arms. Perhaps I may just say how sorry we all are that an accident has prevented the noble Viscount, Lord Oxfuird, being here today and how glad we all are to hear that he and his wife are making a good recovery from their injuries.
Noble Lords: Hear, hear.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: The inheritance of coats of arms is important in any country, but in

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Scotland it has a very special importance because of the clan system. The chief of the clan is the person who is the holder of the plain arms of the name. The whole concept of the clan is that of an extended family all of whom are, theoretically at least, blood relations of the chief. It is this sense of kinship to him which binds the clan together. If the chief is a fraud and not himself of the blood it makes nonsense of the whole clan system.
I do not know how many hundreds of thousands of expatriate Scots there are in the world who at least once and sometimes frequently in their lives visit Scotland in order to meet their cousin, the chief, and discover their roots. A great many do so. Quite apart from that, the clan system is part of the social structure of Scotland and a very important part to the Scots who have historically been divided vertically into clans. I should hate to see this undermined, and many Scots in or out of Scotland would too.
In Scotland we have rather more hereditary offices of state than in England —five as opposed to two. We have the Lord High Constable (the Earl of Erroll); Hereditary Banner Bearer (the Earl of Dundee); Hereditary Bearer of St. Andrew's Flag (the Earl of Lauderdale); Hereditary Master of the Household (the Duke of Argyll) and Hereditary Keeper of the Palace of Holyrood House (the Duke of Hamilton). It is doubtful whether the clause as worded at present would cover the succession to those offices, so that, for example, it could come to pass that the office of Lord High Constable became separated from the Earldom of Erroll. Similarly, in England, the office of Earl Marshal could become separated from the Dukedom of Norfolk. Perhaps the noble Duke himself will have something to say about that. I regret to say that I do not see the noble Earl, Lord Erroll in his place. I hope that this will have made the object of these amendments and the reasonng behind them clear to the Committee.
I turn now to Amendments Nos. 82, 83, 87, 145 to 149, 151 and 153. Neither the amendments I have just explained nor Clause 28(3) as it stands can work unless adequate records are kept of children born as a result of eggs or sperm donation or both. Access to those records is available to persons who may have a genuine need to obtain it. Amendment No. 82 aims to ensure that the records kept on all such births after the Act comes into force are adequate. Amendment No. 87 aims to ensure that all existing records of such births as took place before the Act comes into force are preserved. Amendments No. 145 to 149, 151 and 153 are to ensure that persons with a genuine need to obtain access to the records can obtain them. Amendments Nos. 134 and 136 are paving amendments. I beg to move.
3.15 p.m.
Lord Teviot: It is my great pleasure and privilege to follow the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, whose amendments are mostly in our joint names, and to congratulate her on a most excellent, succinct and lucid speech in which she set out so eloquently our purpose in seeking to amend Clause 28(3), together with our enforcing ancillary amendments. In order to eliminate any confusion we have purposely split
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our amendments into two groupings. The first group contains those amendments based on Clause 28(3) which deal with hereditary titles, honours and coats of arms; and, secondly, those on Clauses 26 and 27 dealing with birth certificates. The issues are separate but closely interlinked and some apply to both points. It is my job to explain the finer points of those enforcing amendments. Without the main amendment they would not stand up on their own. I apologise to the Committee if I am less than brief, but the amendments have to be explained.
Amendment No. 82 seeks to amend Clause 13. As presently worded, Clause 13(2) fails to make clear how much information about the people involved the authority will insist upon having recorded. All it says is that the information to be recorded is such as the authority may specify. This leaves the authority the freedom to specify that only non-identifying information about the donors of sperm, eggs or gametes need be recorded. It should not have that freedom. The amendment is intended to make it quite clear that sufficient identifying particulars of all the participants involved, including the donor, must be maintained as a condition of the licences. The parties must be identified, as the amendment says, unequivocally, so there is not the slightest possibility of confusion; for example, with other persons of the same name.
Amendment No. 83 seeks to amend Clause 13(4). The present wording is not clear. It allows information to be destroyed, or at least removed from any records, after a specified period. On no account must that be allowed to happen, at least in those cases where activities under a licence have led to the birth of a child. The amendment therefore would prevent any information which identifies children and their genetic parents from being destroyed at any time. Indeed, so that there is no doubt that the records are preserved, the amendment goes beyond that and provides that they shall be retained for 115 years from the date of birth of the child. After that date it provides that they shall become public records. I should perhaps explain here that that period of 115 years has nothing to do with the Public Records Act. The Guinness Book of Records tells us what might be the age of the oldest male or female, but I think that 115 is the maximum lifespan.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: Moses lived to be 120!
Lord Teviot: Therefore it seems only fair that at some point in time the organisations acquiring the licences should be relieved of their duty of looking after the records, and that the state should take up the duty in the interests of the community at large; but that that time should be postponed until all children born will have died. The effect of the transfer would enable the records to be open to inspection under the Public Records Act. Remote generations and descendants and interested historians would then have access to any of the information which has been recorded.
I turn now to Amendment No. 87 which introduces a new clause. Clause 13 only applies to

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licences for future activities after the Act has come into operation. However, there are said to be several thousand children already born by the techniques the licensing of which is covered by the Bill. It is vitally important that some effort should be made to record centrally and preserve for posterity details of the genetic parentage of those children, so that at the very least they too, and others born in recent years, will be able to apply for confirmation that they are not about to marry their brother or sister.
In Clause 29(3) and (4) the Government rightly recognise the need to reassure persons who fear that they may be committing incest, but exactly the same fear confronts anyone born as a result of sperm or embryo donation before the Act comes into operation. I appreciate that I may be accused of trying to introduce retrospective legislation. But the amendment has been framed so as to impose the minimum amount of retrospection in its attempt to gather information about at least some of these children. If the Government accept the principle that some records may be created and maintained about such children, but see some alternative means of doing so, I would not wish to insist upon the exact method envisaged by the amendment.
I move on now to the core amendments—namely, Amendments Nos. 138 to 141 —where I have little to add to the remarks of the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun. As I said before, she made her points very clearly. However, I must emphasise that if we are to have hereditary titles then they must go to the right person. Perhaps I may take issue slightly with her where she says that the Scots are divided vertically into clans, whereas the English are divided horizontally into classes.
As regards my pedigree, without making too fine a point, I am probably at least between five-eighths and eleven-sixteenths Scottish. I must say that while I very much enjoy visiting Scotland, I have always lived in England. Moreover, while there is nothing like the clan sentiment in England, there is a very large growing family element in all walks of life all over the country. I shall return later to the increasing role of genealogy when we debate further amendments as regards Clauses 26 and 27.
I should warn Members of the Committee that it will be some while yet before I sit down. I should perhaps now explain further the need for amendments to Clause 29. Amendments Nos. 144 and 145 are self-explanatory and Amendments Nos. 147 and 148 are consequential and need little explanation. However, Amendments Nos. 146, 149, 151 and 153 require further explanation.
Amendment No. 146 seeks to extend the classes of people about whom an applicant can request information under the Act. The amendment first proposes that in all cases the children or more remote descendants of a person who may have been born as a result of sperm, egg or embryo donation will have the right to apply for information. Secondly, where a title or dignity is involved people who are in the line of succession will have that right in respect of persons earlier in the line of succession.
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There are, however, two important qualifications. In the second subsection applicants are prevented from asking for information about their living parents without their parents' consent. In the same way, those applicants who are not next in line of succession to a title may not apply for information about living persons earlier in the line of succession without their consent. The extension of the right to descendants of a person who may have been born as a result of such donation is intended to allow anyone who has, or may have, genes resulting from such donation to be able to inquire about them. That is important for medical reasons and also for those tracing their ancestry. The extension of the right to persons in line of succession to a title or dignity gives them an opportunity to contest the right of succession if they believe that it may not be passing or have passed to the rightful heir.
Amendment No. 151 deals with the information supplied to the next heir when it is a matter of succession to a title. It would seem that there is no need to indentify the genetic parents precisely to the next heir, but merely to say whether the apparent heir would be entitled to succeed to the title.
Amendment No. 153 allows for information to be supplied to two categories of persons other than the applicant. In the first instance (3A) where a title or dignity is involved that person would be the one charged to investigate the succession —a Crown Office official, or Garter, or Lord Lyon King of Arms. That is necessary to enable Clause 28(3) to be enforced, in the event that the person claiming to be the heir refuses to make an application under that clause.
In the second instance (3B), where medical problems are involved, that person would be a qualified doctor attending the applicant or a close relative, who needed the information for the medical care of the applicant or of the close relative. In such cases the person about whom the information is required may be quite unable to make the application. There are many illnesses which have a genetic cause, and there are instances where tissues are required for transplant and only a close genetic relative is able to provide them.
I think, perhaps, that I may have omitted to mention Amendment No. 149. I did have details with me to deal with the matter in regard to the next group of amendments. I must apologise to the Committee for this delay.
Lord Ennals: We cannot hear!
Lord Teviot: I am sorry about that. The situation reminds me of a similar one when Lord Elwyn-Jones said almost the same as has the noble Lord, Lord Ennals. He said that I was inaudible. At that time I was obliged to move my seat. However, I should like to speak to Amendment No. 149, if I can find my information. The order of my paperwork was changed because of the regrouping of the amendments. However, as I do not seem to have the relevant paperwork with me, perhaps I may use the information in connection with the next group of amendments. I think it is still apt in that respect. I see that my noble friend Lord Eden of Winton has

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found the information I need. I am most grateful to him and I apologise again to the Committee for delaying the proceedings.
Amendment No. 149 requires the authority to provide full identifying information about the genetic parent or parents and not the non-identifying information suggested at present. We believe that it is of paramount importance to every individual to be able to develop a proper sense of identity, and knowledge of his genetic parents is a vital factor in that development. One cannot limit the information to be made available to the adult offspring to information about the ethnic origin and genetic health of the donor, not even to a "pen picture" of the donor's social characteristics and family background. Information of that type is quite inadequate to enable the inquiring offspring to develop a sense of personal identity, which is why this is an important amendment. It is more likely to instil deep feeling over the lack of such identity.
It is now widely accepted that an adopted child needs to know that he or she is adopted. The adoption laws correctly give the adopted child the statutory right to discover the identity of its genetic parents. The children whom we are discussing, their children and the more remote descendants should have a statutory right. Such a right is what we propose here. The wording of the amendment limits the disclosure of information to the child itself and its direct descendants. It does not allow the disclosure to the brothers, sisters or other close relatives of the child, except in the sense of making inquiries, because such full disclosure will be made to the child at the age of 18. There is no need for the existing paragraph (b) of Clause 29(3) about the child's intended marriage partner.
I feel that noble Lords have listened to me long enough. The amendments have been explained in great detail and I look forward to the ensuing discussion.
3.30 p.m.
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle: Perhaps I may say a few words about Amendment No. 141 which stands in my name and two other amendments to which my noble friend Lady Saltoun has already referred. The purpose of Amendment No. 141 is simply to bring donor children into line with adopted children and those born out of wedlock in the law of succession in Scotland. The importance of succession to undifferenced coats of arms has already been stressed by my noble and learned friend. I only add to what she said that it is also important —
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: I beg the noble and learned Lord's pardon; I am not "learned".
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle: I have committed a solecism. I understand that I referred to the noble Lady as "learned" but she has demurred. I only add to what she said on undifferenced arms that they are of importance as well to the representors of great lowland families.
The importance of coats of arms to the law of Scotland has been recognised by the Government in
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1964 in the Succession (Scotland) Act in relation to adopted children where adopted children were excluded from succession to coats of arms of their adopted parents. It was recognised again in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1968 in relation to illegitimate children. It was recognised again in the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986 in relation to children born out of wedlock. These Acts all conferred certain rights of succession upon such children in the estates of their adoptive parents or their natural parents; but they excluded titles, dignities, and honours as well as coats of arms.
The new subsection (4)(a) to Clause 28 proposed under Amendment No. 141 simply repeats verbatim the relevant provisions of the 1964 Act and the 1986 Act. It therefore seems to me that the proposed amendment would achieve uniformity. If no amendment is made to Clause 28, then in my view —and here I differ from my noble friend Lady Saltoun —there would not be doubt that the coats of arms might be included; it would be almost certain that they would be excluded. That is because Parliament having on two previous occasions in Scottish legislation seen fit to mention them specifically, the natural assumption would be that if they were omitted altogether they were omitted intentionally.
Logically, in the event of Amendments Nos. 138 and 139 being accepted by the Government or agreed to, it seems probable that the first part of Amendment No. 141, subsection (4)(a), would become unnecessary. The question of coats of arms would be dealt with in Clause 28(3). That would apply not only to Scotland but to England and Wales.
With reference to subsection (4)(b), again this repeats verbatim Section 9(1)(d) of the 1986 Act to which I have already referred. On reflection I am bound to say that I do not think that it achieves a great deal. However, although Clauses 26 to 28 apply only to children "carried" —whatever that may mean —whether born, conceived or implanted after the commencement of the sections, nevertheless Clause 28(1) appears to apply to deeds or instruments which were executed prior to the coming into force of the Act.
Perhaps I may give a simple example. If A, having two sons, chooses to leave certain land or family possessions in trust to B in life rent; and C, and his eldest son unnamed in fee, he having another younger son, and that trust deed was executed prior to the passing of the Act, then a donor child of B would take, in preference to a child of C, albeit the trustor, had he known the situation, might very well have preferred that the natural child of his own blood, the grandchild of his own blood, should take, rather than someone who would probably be a stranger in blood to him.
I therefore ask the Government to consider whether it would be appropriate to introduce some transitional provision here restricting the application of Clause 28(1) to deeds taking effect after the coming into force of the statute. Once again there is precedent for such a provision in the 1964 Succession of Scotland Act, Section 23(4). There is precedent in Section 5(3) of the Legitimation

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(Scotland) Act 1968. It may be that there are similar provisions in the corresponding English Acts. I invite the Government seriously to consider whether it would be desirable to have some such transitional provision.
Perhaps I may say a brief word on Amendment No. 140 which is designed, as I understand it, to include not only an honour or dignity but property which is destined to descend with it. Once again, although the words are not identical, there is a precedent for this at least in Scotland in Section 23 of the Succession (Scotland) Act which seems to me to achieve a similar provision. Once again, if it is thought appropriate in relation to adopted children, perhaps it might also be thought appropriate to introduce a similar provision in relation to children such as these.
Finally, Amendment No. 146 is clearly needed in order to make Clause 28(3) work, in whatever form it may be. I commend the spirit, so far as it is comprehensible. I very much hope that I never have to construe the precise words of Amendment No. 146.
Lord Kennet: Before the noble and learned Lord comes to reply to the amendment, perhaps he could say a word to help the English. I have in mind particularly Amendment No. 152 further down the Marshalled List. Roughly speaking, it would give the right to any person conceived by IVF to know as much about his or her own identity as the state knows. If the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, could help us, perhaps he would say whether this raft of amendments about Scottish peerages will have any effect on how we should consider Amendment No. 152 if the amendments we are discussing are passed. It would be extremely helpful. I have in mind the following question: is this perhaps the first occasion on which a basic human right has been urged in this House under the guise of an amendment to the law of succession to Scottish peerages, or is it only a small tidying up matter referring to Scottish Peerages?
Lord Prys-Davies: We have had a discussion on an odd mixture of about 16 amendments. There is not always a common theme among those 16 amendments. I am not surprised that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Jauncey, got his papers mixed up at one stage.
I wish to speak to Amendments Nos. 82, 83 and 87. As regards Amendment No. 82, it would be helpful if the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, would indicate in more precise terms the information to be specified in order to identify unequivocally the persons mentioned in the subsections referred to. I note that Amendment No. 143, tabled by the Government, refers to information about an identifiable individual whereas the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, refers to information which is sufficient to identify persons unequivocally. Does anything turn on that distinction?
I had in my innocence assumed that Amendment No. 83 had something to do with the law of succession to hereditary titles. Having listened to the
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noble Lord and the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, I am clearly wrong on that point. However, if that is the case I should have thought that the discussion on Amendment No. 83 would tie up with the discussion on Amendment No. 124 was misconceived as the period of 50 years referred to in the Bill would only be triggered off if the licence-holder did not know whether or not a child had been born as a result of the treatment. If the 50-year period is confined to that situation it appears to me that the Bill is acceptable and that outside those circumstances it would be for the licensing authority to determine for how long records should be held.
There is a factual error in the last line of Amendment No. 87. The reference should be to Section 13 and not to Section 12. However, that is the only help I can give to the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, on that amendment. The general rule, as I have always understood it, is that an Act of Parliament is not retrospective but prospective. Clearly, however, the object of this amendment is to make it retrospective.
I hope that the Committee will not go along with the amendment. It would impose a duty to supply and to disclose information about activities which may have been completed long before this legislation came into force and at a time when there was no duty to supply or disclose such information. The gametes may have been donated on the clear condition that they were given in secret and that that secret must remain a secret for life. Surely that is a fairly substantial right which should not be undermined by Amendment No. 87.
Amendment No. 150 addresses the issue of retrospectiveness. That amendment stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. However, there is a profound difference between Amendment No. 150 and Amendment No. 87. Although both amendments concern retrospectiveness, Amendment No. 150 asks the Committee to confirm that retrospectiveness will not apply. Amendment No. 87, however, tries to ensure that the information is to be disclosed even though it was given before the implementation of the legislation.
3.45 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: A number of issues are raised by these amendments. I should say at the outset that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is right to say that the amendments raise an important matter which goes far beyond any question about titles of honour or anything of that kind. I shall refer to that matter in the course of my remarks.
I shall try to deal with the amendments together to some extent. They seem to me to be founded on three main bases. First of all, they seek both in relation to the succession to titles and in relation to less exalted family circumstances to ensure that there is purity of the blood line and to ensure that there is full information about genetic parentage in relation to children born as a result of the techniques involving the donation of gametes which are to be licensed by the Bill. That is the important question which goes far beyond mere succession to titles.
Secondly, the amendments also seek to amend the provisions in Clauses 13, 29 and 31 of the Bill

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which deal with information which the authority is required to keep about licensed treatments. That information is to be made available to applicants under Clause 29 so that it shall be such as to identify the genetic origins of such a child. That is another aspect of that important generality. That is to be achieved through Amendments Nos. 126 and 129 by requiring that the social parents of the child shall be recorded as such in birth records which are to be maintained by the registrars general. In other words, on inspecting the register one will, according to these amendments, be able to see that the child whose birth is recorded in a particular entry was born as a result of one of the treatments.
Thirdly, the amendments seek to extend the exception already provided for in the Bill in Clause 28(3) which provides that the provisions in the Bill dealing with the status of parents, and children born as a result of infertility treatments regulated by the legislation, should not,
"affect the succession to any dignity or title of honour",
to include succession to a coat of arms. That is the special point which has to some extent motivated these amendments.
The Committee knows well the unflagging interest in genealogy and titles of honour and dignity which the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, and my noble friend Lord Teviot have displayed. It would ill behove someone who is concerned with the administration of justice in England and Wales, and indeed my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland and my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate, who have responsibility for these matters north of the Border, to tangle in this connection with the chief of the Fraser clan. I am reliably informed that the forebears of the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, have a distinguished and warlike history and that one of them, Sir Simon Fraser, filius was put to death in London in September 1306 by King Edward I, the "Hammer of the Scots," and that another met a somewhat similar fate after the Battle of Culloden. Simon, the 11th Lord Lovat, is reported to have declared that there was nothing he placed in balance with his kindred. I am sure he would have been proud of his descendant, the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: I must tell the noble and learned Lord that I am not descended from that person and I do not think that anyone today is descended from him.
The Lord Chancellor: That illustrates the point I am seeking to make. In any event, whatever the history and the lineage aspects of this matter may be, I am sure that all of us appreciated the clarity with which the noble Lady has put this case. I think it would be right to say that this is extremely difficult territory. I am very much aware that there are strong arguments in relation to the welfare of children born as a result of donation. It is felt by some that a child born in these circumstances should be able to discover who his genetic parents were. I know this view is held by many organisations representing social work and adoption and fostering interests who make an analogy with the access to such information in the case of children who are adopted.
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The matter was dealt with in the consultation that the Government instituted in 1986. There was no unanimity on this important matter,. Only 22 per cent. of those responding felt that identifying information should be given to such children and 43 per cent. thought that the donor's name should not be given. Those included the main medical bodies who were concerned lest a provision of that kind would have a deleterious effect on the supply of donors who, in their strong opinion, would be unwilling to come forward because they would not wish 20 or more years later to be confronted with children who had been born as a result of their donation. The balance of 35 per cent. made no comment on the issue. As I said, this is a general issue of considerable importance. The Government have taken the view in the Bill that such identification should not be afforded. Information regarding genetic characteristics might be afforded but not information to identify the individual donor.
The Government have taken steps in the Family Law Reform Act 1987 and the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986 to remove such discriminatory labels as illegitimacy. It would be a pity to replace one label with another. There is a strong argument that marking a child's genetic origins on its birth certificate would be far from conclusive proof as to who the child's genetic father might be. That might well introduce a new kind of label which would not be satisfactory. That is a very important question and is distinct from the question of succession to coats of arms.
So far as concerns coats of arms I should like to assure the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, my noble friend Lord Teviot and my noble and learned friend Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle that the Government take on board the questions that have been raised on that issue. In the light of the amendments that have been proposed and the discussion so far, it is our intention to bring forward amendments at Report stage to include what the noble Lady proposes in her amendments. The aim of the government amendments will be to bring the position regarding succession to coats of arms into line with the practice in illegitimacy and adoption cases in which changes to the normal descent of a coat of arms may be affected by a petition to the Sovereign for royal licence and authority.
I turn now to Amendments Nos. 140 and 141. The first is designed to ensure that property which is intended to devolve with a title of honour is not separated from it. As my noble friend Lady Hooper made clear in her closing speech in the Second Reading debate, that is not the Government's intention. I am therefore pleased to accept the spirit of the amendment in principle. We shall seek to bring forward government amendments at Report to deal with the matter.
I turn now to Amendment No. 141. Two issues are involved. The new subsection (4)(a) which the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, has proposed ensures in relation to Scotland that the general inclusion at Clause 28(3) covering succession to any dignity or title of honour includes coats of arms. The effect is to embrace Scottish chieftainships and certain heritable offices such as those to which the noble

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Lady referred. The amendment which the noble Lady has proposed is identical to that in the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986. I have consulted my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland, who has responsibility for family law in Scotland. I understand that he is happy to accept the principle of that part of the amendment.
I turn now to paragraph (b) of the amendment. It is identical to the provision in Section 9(1)(d) of the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986. I recognise that, as has been explained, the intention is to achieve uniformity in such matters with regard to adopted children, children whose parents are not married to each other, and children who have been born following those infertility treatments to be regulated under the Bill. The Government have given considerable and careful consideration to whether such a provision would be desirable in respect of children born as a result of those treatments. We have concluded that there is a distinction to be drawn between legislation in respect of children who are born as a result of the treatments and those who have been born to parents who are not married to each other or who have been adopted.
Such a distinction has already been made in legislation applying to England and Wales which deals with succession in cases of illegitimacy and in the case of children born following donor insemination. Provisions in Sections 18 and 19 of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 in effect sweep aside the status of illegitimacy for the purpose of the law of succession and in a manner similar to Section 9(1)(d) of the Scottish Act of 1986.
The view taken was that it would have been unfair to apply the new law to wills made under the old system because there would be a risk that as a result of such change they would no longer reflect the testators' intentions regarding legitimacy, for example. However, no such qualification was made regarding children born following donor insemination where in effect a new status was being created. In that case the intention was to give children born to married couples as a result of AID the same succession rights as those enjoyed by children born as a result of natural conception, titles and the like being excepted. The section applied only to children born after the section came into force. To take the approach suggested in Amendment No. 141 would risk creating a situation in which a child born by natural conception stood to inherit from certain wills while his brother, born following donor insemination, did not. That would have raised questions of discrimination against children born by donor insemination, which that Act and this Bill seek to avoid.
I believe that there is an appropriate distinction to be made between children born as a result of infertility treatments, on the one hand, and children who are adopted or born to parents who are not married to each other, on the other.
Baroness Phillips: Before the noble and learned Lord leaves that point, perhaps he can explain why
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anyone would need to have a child by donor insemination if they already had one by natural conception.
The Lord Chancellor: That may depend on the circumstances. For example, earlier in the Committee stage we discussed the situation in which parents knew that there was a possibility of their union resulting in children with a genetic disease. They might have a child who had a genetic disease. They might be afraid to incur the risk of a second child born by natural conception having that same disease. They might therefore prefer, in the light of the information that they could obtain about the embryo that would be produced by the in vitro fertilisation method, to proceed in that way in the belief that they would thereby eliminate the risk of producing a second child with the same defect. That is one example. I hope that I have made it clear. I think that I have not.
Baroness Phillips: The noble and learned Lord has made it clear but he has not convinced me.
The Lord Chancellor: I was not at the moment seeking to convince the noble Baroness; simply to answer her question. This is an important point. That is the reason for the distinction. It is not an oversight. It is based on a real distinction between the situation of a child born to parents who are not married, on the one hand, and the situation in which a child is born as a result of one of the treatments, on the other.
I have sought to deal with the principle of the amendments. So far as they relate to titles of honour and the like I hope to be able to put down amendments accepting them in principle.
On the much more general question which applies far outside that area, the situation is as I have described; namely, that the weight of opinion on consultation was in favour of preserving the anonymity of the donors. I appreciate that that situation might change in the light of circumstances, but I believe that the debate would probably be best conducted in a somewhat wider framework than the framework of amendments which were particularly directed to the question of titles of honour and the like.
As I said, I know that quite a number of organisations concerned with those matters take a different view from that which seemed to prevail on consultation. Noble Lords may think that we should seek to debate the subject on its own account at some stage during proceedings on the Bill.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, would he care to say something about the question of retrospective effect in Amendment No. 87, which is also addressed in Amendment No. 150? This is a worrying question. If this is the right place to raise it, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will answer the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies.
4 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: The question concerns the extent to which the amendments would be

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retrospective in effect. The first step is to decide what one wants to do and whether the kind of distinction that I have drawn between the two types of case is valid. If it is and a will is already in existence and operating, the person who made the will having died, the question concerning a child born as a result of AID after the section comes into force is a perfectly reasonable question to pose and would not involve retrospective legislation. In a sense, it would involve an effect on the construction of the existing deed as from the date of that section coming into force. However, I believe that it would prevent a perhaps improper distinction being drawn between two types of children, a distinction which it is highly likely never entered the head of the original testator in the will in question.
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle: Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, perhaps I may ask him one question in relation to subsection 4(b) of Amendment No. 141 with which he has dealt and about which I hope I made it clear that I was not very wholehearted. My request to the Government to consider a transitional provision for deeds was not primarily intended to affect the succession of donor children to their parents, but rather to affect their ability to take under deeds which were executed at a time when they would not have fallen within the category of persons who could take. In short, A makes a deed for a certain class of persons when he knows that, because of this legislation, the effect will be that persons will be admitted to that class who would have been unable to take at the time the deed was executed. That was the concern which I expressed in general when speaking to Clause 4(1)(b).
The Lord Chancellor: I believe that I have understood the point. In effect, I am saying that, where an existing deed describes the beneficiaries as children of X, then, after the provision comes into force, I think it would be wrong —this is the policy of the Bill so far —to distinguish between those children of X who are born naturally and those children of X who might be born to X as a result of the treatments, on the assumption that the section was then operating. So, in a sense, my noble and learned friend is suggesting that the class of people in the deed as it stands would be, if I may put it this way, the natural children of X. I would extend that provision to include those children who are born as a result of the treatments. We suggest that it would not be right, when the section is in operation, to distinguish between children born naturally to their parents and children born as a result of treatment with those parents as their parents for the purposes of the law under the provisions of this section.
The Earl of Erroll: Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, perhaps I may say that surely it is not the children that create the worry; it is the grandchildren. One may leave to the grandchildren of the natural children. The person who leaves the trust knows nothing about all those grandchildren who are not yet born, but they may be included in the class. I am a trustee of a trust which has experienced that situation and I envisage the provision including many people who were not
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intended by the people who left that property originally. It is the grandchildren, not the children, about whom I am concerned.
The Lord Chancellor: Assuming that I have understood the point, which is a considerable assumption, the distinction sought in subsection 4(b) of Amendment No. 141 is between children who are born naturally, whether grandchildren or not —grandchildren, like children, require to be born —and those children or grandchildren who are born as a result of treatment. The grandchildren may be born either as a result of parents having been born as a consequence of such treatment or as a result of themselves having been born as a result of such treatment.
The Earl of Erroll: The original trust was probably executed long before those grandchildren were born. The original trustee may be dead now, but has left to a class of people which includes grandchildren who are still possibly to be born. He did not know about the Act when he made the trust.
The Lord Chancellor: I quite understand that. The whole point is that, when a person talks about X's children, grandchildren or great-grandchildren, or children in a will which has already taken effect, to any degree, he may, if he thought about this at all, be thinking of children born by natural means. However, the Bill states that, for this purpose, children born by natural means and children born as a result of those treatments should be taken in the same way as children of their parents. That will apply to all degrees of children, grandchildren and the like.
Baroness Elles: Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, will he confirm that, as a consequence of the Government's policy on this matter, a child of a donor will be treated in exactly the same way as a natural child? Is that a guarantee for perpetuity of hereditary peers so that, through selection of gender, they will always be able to have male heirs?
The Lord Chancellor: The provision does not apply to titles of honour which certainly include hereditary peerages. The provision, which deals with the status of children born as a result of those treatments, does not apply to titles of honour.
Lord Kennet: Perhaps I may ask the noble and learned Lord a question about the future handling or discussion of the Bill in the Chamber. He said that he expected that we would come to the general question of the right of access to information at a later stage in the Bill. We now have a rather full Chamber and it would be interesting to know whether I am right in thinking that we shall come to that discussion under Amendment No. 152 which we plan to take today.
The Lord Chancellor: I am at the service of your Lordships as to when we should have that discussion. I must point out that it would perhaps be undesirable to treat it as if it arose only in connection with titles of honour. It is a much more fundamental and

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general question than that, as I think we all agree. It is for noble Lords to determine when we have that debate.
So far I have not seen as much of the briefing about this matter as might yet become available. Therefore I had the feeling that we might perhaps expect to have a fuller debate on this issue at a later stage in the Bill. That is the only reason that prompted me to take that view. So far as I am concerned it is entirely a matter for noble Lords. I have not much to add on that point other than what I have already said as a result of the consultation. I am sure that there are views taken about this matter in this Chamber. The only point of which I want to make sure is that we do not only think that this is a point related simply to titles to honour or Scottish clan chieftainships, important though they are.
The Earl of Lauderdale: I do not wish to prolong this general debate too much but I am a little worried. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor speaks of children "born by this treatment". It is not children "born by this treatment" that worries us; some of us are worried about children who are born by this treatment through AID. That is the distinction that concerns us.
I should like to declare a twofold interest in this matter. First, in 1885 your Lordships' House decided that a forebear of mine who was born out of wedlock in New York in 1775 in fact was legitimate by Scottish law, though not by English law. Happily the Scottish law prevailed. That is why I am here, as a Scot. That is how I come to be both the Chief of the Name and Arms of Maitland and also the Hereditary Bearer of the Scottish National Flag for the Sovereign.
I should like to dot the i's and cross the t's on some points made by the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun. Those of us who happen to be a chief find ourselves not only the head of a very extended family but of a family which consists of all kinds of people all over the world who want to know their origins and their pedigrees. Quite frequently I receive letters on this matter from Australia, the United States, Canada and New Zealand and from all parts of the world. Pedigree research depends now and will in future depend on the exact status of parents of a certain child at a particular time.
I appreciate the fact that when this Bill comes back on Report, my noble and learned friend will have looked at the whole issue. No doubt with his customary perspicacity he will find a way through these difficulties. However, I am very worried lest the business of knowing about a birth by donor is brushed aside. We all know that adopted children want to know their origins. It is only fair and right that such knowledge should extend to all children.
So whatever may happen to hereditary titles and honours in the future —there are some who would abolish them, and abolish me come to that —the desire to know about one's pedigree will survive. It will survive all over the world.
With regard to the related problems touched on by the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun —the question of
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incest at some stage and the possibility of a brother marrying a sister or of cousins marrying one another without knowing their relationship—surely it is not enough to rely on the view expressed by the medical profession that, if the identification of donors were made, donors would not come forward. If anyone in this Chamber believes that, they will believe anything. Donors are easily obtained. We do not need to go into details.
I welcome my noble and learned friend's willingness to look at this whole matter. However, I implore him to take on board the point that children (and grandchildren or great grandchildren) of donor births should be entitled to have access to that information. I have given my reason: namely, that many people all over the world want to know their exact pedigree.
4.15 p.m.
Lord Hylton: We should all be extremely grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, who has very much clarified the issues. As he pointed out, the key distinction lies between those children conceived by artificial insemination through the husband and those children conceived through the aid of a donor. That is the key distinction which applies not only to peerage and other such questions; it also concerns the general population.
I should like to reinforce the noble Earl's remarks about the consultation period. I do not believe that we should allow ourselves to be too influenced by a narrow majority of those responding. It may well have been that the consultation was not sufficiently widely advertised in the first place.
Lord Mowbray and Stourton: I should like to say just a few words. I missed a little of what the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said. He may have been on the same point as the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, and my noble friend Lord Lauderdale. If an adopted child, when it is of a certain age, has the right to know its parentage (who is its father), why in heaven's name should not the child of a donor father to an unknown embryo have the same right? It seems to me to be absolutely wrong—morally and legally wrong —to deny that.
All the matters concerning estates and titles may or may not be important. However the really important thing is that the child should have the same right as an adopted child who has the right to know its real parentage. I believe that that is important. It is no good brushing it aside and trying to pretend that we are creating a new kind of child which does not need to have the same right to know as other children. I shall leave the matter there.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: First, I should like to thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for what he said about Amendments Nos. 138, 139, 140 and 141 and I note that the Government will bring in amendments at Report stage to take care of our concerns. I am most grateful to him. When the time comes, I shall not move those amendments.
I had not thought that as drafted Amendments Nos. 82 and 83 made necessary the identification of

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the donor. Perhaps I was wrong and those amendments were not drafted so as to fulfil my intention. I believed that their object was to make possible identification of donor children so that Clause 28(3) could work. Perhaps I was wrong. I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord could clarify that point.
The Lord Chancellor: It is perhaps entirely easy for me to indicate the full effect of the noble Lady's amendment. However, I think it would be right to take it that Amendments Nos. 82 and 83 would have the effect of requiring the authority to keep information which would unequivocally identify people for whom licensed treatment services are provided and donors of gametes or embryos. Therefore, the result is that a person who donated sperm, for example, would require to be identified.
My noble friends Lord Lauderdale and Lord Mowbray and Stourton and the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, have pointed out that AID children are of particular importance in this connection. I entirely appreciate that point. That is why I linked this matter with the question of whether or not the identity of the donors was to be required. If one has specified the identity of the donors, then something along those lines is possible. This is a matter for your Lordships to consider, but the reason given for not identifying the donors is that which I gave earlier. That is why this question has a very general importance.
Lord Teviot: It might be a good idea to try to bring back some order and sense of purpose as regards the amendments and explain their original intention. I am most grateful to the Committee, but we have gone rather far and wide.
The noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, was asking about identifying information. It is information that one wants the authority to have. That does not mean to say it must be passed on to everybody. I agree that the anonymity of donors is paramount. Perhaps on later amendments we might have further discussion on the matter that my noble friend Lord Lauderdale raised.
The noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, spoke of retrospective legislation on Amendment No. 87. That new clause is to be inserted as bridging a gap. I hope the Committee would agree that it is very important to have the register for it to be private, for the authority not to disclose—to prevent incest taking place. That was the whole point of the clause and the restrospection.
One is grateful to the Government for bringing forward at Report stage amendments concerning coats of arms and also the very important Scottish titles. That is splendid, but they cannot stand absolutely on their own.
My noble and learned friend has been asked to stand up and sit down at least six times, but I hope he will not mind doing so again before I withdraw the amendments. I shall not withdraw the amendments at this stage unless he tells me that the Government will produce back-up amendments to those amendments which deal with hereditary titles
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of honour, and will deal with records in some way or other, so that we can return to the matter. Perhaps my noble and learned friend could enlighten me.
The Lord Chancellor: At present I cannot accept any intention to put any kind of marking on the birth certificate. As regards records to be kept by the authority, that is a matter to be determined in the light of the general responsibilities of the authority. I think my noble friend Lord Teviot is asking that the authority should have records from which it can be determined whether a particular person has in fact been subject to one of these treatments at some time which might be related to the birth of a particular child. That is certainly something that one would want to consider.
However, I want to make it clear that I do not regard myself as committed in any way to bringing back amendments to put any marking of any kind on the ordinary birth certificate.
The Earl of Lauderdale: Is the noble and learned Lord saying that in those cases where a child is born from a donor there should simply be a blank about the name of his father? In that case it would suggest that they should go and ask the authority. If that is what he means it might be acceptable, but if he is saying that there is to be no indication to researchers that a particular birth has a peculiarity —to put it like that for the moment —I do not think that is satisfactory.
The Lord Chancellor: I quite appreciate the difficulties, but the same is true in relation to what occurs in what I might call nature. The precise circumstances in which children are born when couples are married is not the subject of disclosure on birth certificates. When someone applies for a title of honour —and my noble friend has indicated that he has had some experience of that particular test, as it were —there may be more detailed inquiries made into the circumstances of a particular birth than would normally arise in connection with its registration. This is the kind of material that might emerge in that situation. But as far as I am concerned I do not think it would be right to have a particular mark on a birth certificate in this connection, any more than it is right to require people to put particular marks on birth certificates in every other possible situation. That information would have to come in another way than from the ordinary birth certificate.
Lord Ennals: Perhaps I may briefly say that I absolutely agree with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. I should be very concerned if he moved an inch in terms of writing anything on to a birth certificate which would give some indication concerning the actual nature of the birth. The child is born as the child of those parents, and anything which is sought to distinguish that child in any way at all could be very derogatory to the future of the child. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for withstanding any pressure.
Lord Teviot: In all fairness, humble as I am, I should like to bring back order into the proceedings.

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It is very interesting to hear my noble and learned friend's views and those of the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, but those amendments about the birth certificate of the child will be discussed later in the proceedings. We shall be discussing those in their context, when it may be—though I think it is doubtful —that we can persuade the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Ennals. But these amendments are to do with hereditary titles. The Government are to come back with amendments on coats of arms, and it is hoped that there will be back-up amendments on records which we will look at on Report.
We have gone far and wide. I agree that these amendments are what one might call a pudding. The noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, and I have tried to divide them, and I hope that we have explained them to your Lordships properly. We have had an extremely good discussion, and we look forward to coming back later with all kinds of ammunition and other points. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 82.
The Chairman of Committees (Lord Aberdare): This amendment was moved by the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, so it is really up to her to withdraw it if she wishes.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: Under the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 82.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 83 not moved.]
Baroness Blatch: I beg to move that the House do now resume.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

Skills Training Agency
4.30 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Employment (Lord Strathclyde): My Lords, with permission, I should like to repeat the Statement made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State in another place this afternoon about the future of the Skills Training Agency.
"The Skills Training Agency (STA) provides training through a network of 60 skillcentres. It has experienced considerable financial problems over the years. It has broken even only once in the last five years, with a trading loss of about £20 million in 1988–89. This was in spite of an arrangement, up to 1987, under which fixed amounts of training were purchased from the STA by the public sector. This arrangement was criticised by the Public Accounts Committee, and ended in 1987.
"In March of last year my predecessor announced to the House that he had decided, on the basis of a feasibility study, that the STA should
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be offered for sale. Throughout the sale process it has been made plain that the Government's interest is in receiving bids from those who wish to run a training business.
"I have now received advice from Deloitte Corporate Finance on the final offers received. In the light of that advice, I have agreed terms of sale with two bidders. Their offers together cover 47 skillcentres, plus the STA's head office, mobile training service, sales teams and colleges. The main successful bidder is Astra Training Services Limited, a company formed by a management buyout team in the STA head office. I am placing in the Vote Office full details as to which parts of the STA I propose to sell, and to whom, together with the Government's objectives for the sale.
"This is an extremely satisfactory outcome to the sale process. It enables the creation of a viable private sector network of training provision with good coverage of major centres of population in England, Scotland and Wales. Over three-quarters of the skillcentres will be sold on the basis that they will continue to provide training.
"This will also be the first successful management buyout bid in the Civil Service. The management buyout team knows the business, and has detailed plans, backed by professional advice, to develop training both for unemployed and for employed people in a way which responds to the needs of employers. Its plans include investment of over £11 million in the first three years, and opportunities for staff to participate more fully in the business through an employee share ownership scheme.
"The existing five regional offices, and 13 skillcentres, are not included in this sale package. The regional offices do not feature in the management structure envisaged by Astra, and were not part of its bid. The 13 skillcentres are poorly utilised, and at some, no training is currently taking place. I propose to close down the training businesses in these parts of the agency, and wherever possible the staff will be redeployed to other posts. Alternative arrangements will be made to allow trainees to complete training in progress.
"In addition to producing a substantial private sector training network, I expect the course of action I am announcing today to yield a positive return to the taxpayer. The sale of the training business will involve a payment from the Government to Astra of some £11 million. This is a price determined in the sale process after open competitive bids and subsequent negotiation. It reflects the costs of turning around a business which is currently unprofitable and creating training businesses with good prospects of viability.
"The sites of those offices and centres which are not included in the package to which I have referred will be offered for sale. Having obtained professional valuation, I expect the net proceeds from these sales to exceed by a significant margin the payments from the Government to the training business purchasers.

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"My officials will now consult STA staff and their trade union representatives on the implications of my statement for staff, including the measures I have taken to give effect to ministerial undertakings about pension and other arrangements for staff who transfer into the private sector. In due course I shall lay orders before the House to ensure that when the sales are concluded staff who transfer are protected by the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981.
"In conclusion I would like to pay tribute to staff who have continued to work unstintingly for the STA's success through a potentially unsettling period. For them, for the agency's customers, and for the STA contribution to our national training effort, the uncertainty of the recent past is now over and there are sound prospects for the future".
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
Baroness Turner of Camden: My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and for the clarity with which he did so. However, I am sure that he will not be surprised to learn that we on this side of the House find it less than satisfactory. It would appear that the Government are continuing their policy of distancing themselves from training and leaving it to other people. That is what is involved in the concept of employer-led training which we have discussed on innumerable occasions in the House.
The Statement indicates further steps in the privatisation of training about which we on this side of the House have expressed strong doubts. We did so when the last Employment Bill was before your Lordships' House when we said —and I say it again today —that industry training is an important enough matter to be the subject of its own Bill rather than to be tacked on to a Bill at a late stage in debate.
As we in the House already know, we lag far behind our EC neighbours when it comes to training. In Germany, for example, 70 per cent. of engineers have recognised qualifications compared with only 40 per cent. here. We train only one-third of the number of qualified electricians and technicians per head of population that they train in France. Only 15 per cent. of Britain's young people enter higher education compared with 45 per cent. in the United States and 38 per cent. in Japan. As everyone is aware, this country's managers generally have few professional qualifications. Moreover, we are in the process of dismantling or reorganising some of the structures that have worked.
We have discussed the Construction Industry Training Board and its future in the House recently, and its future is still obscure. The Engineering Industry Training Board has been superseded by another body which will be dominated by employers. I have still received no answers to the questions that I have asked about the future of special projects for women in engineering; nor do I know what will be the fate of future applications for money to the European Social Fund. The EITB obtained substantial assistance from that fund towards its special projects; but as I understand it the money is
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available only when there is some direct input of public money into training. The grant and levy system passed muster in that regard.
The Statement does nothing to allay the fears of those who believe that the Government are withdrawing their direct input into training. What is more, we appear to be paying public money to do so. We are selling the skillcentres but we are paying £11 million of taxpayers' money for them to be taken over. The withdrawal of government from responsibility for training has not worked in the past nor do I believe that it will work in the future.
What is to be the fate of the remaining centres? The Minister indicated that some of the centres will be sold. I should like to know more about what will happen to those centres which are being disposed of. Are they to be closed? What, if anything, is to take their place? Although the Minister has, rightly I believe, paid a tribute to the staff of the skillcentres, I should like to know a great deal more from him about what will happen to the highly trained staff in the skillcentres. What is to happen about their pension arrangements? They are being removed from Civil Service employment to the private sector. I should like to know more about that point. What support will there be for special projects when the skillcentres are transferred to the private agencies and pass into private ownership? What will happen about training for the disabled, women, the disadvantaged and ethnic groups? Privatisation is no answer to this country's skill problems and so I cannot welcome the Statement. I regret that the Government are moving further down the path of privatising training instead of making a much greater public investment in that important area.
Baroness Seear: My Lords, I too should like to thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. I believe that I am on record as being as keen as anyone in your Lordships' House to see a much better level of training. However, on this occasion I do not go the whole way with the noble Baroness, Lady Turner. My knowledge of what has gone on in the skillcentres suggests that for one reason or another —it may have been a lack of support and finance; I do not know the reason —they have not been as successful as they should have been. They have been under-utilised and occasionally they have undoubtedly not been up-to-date. I am not therefore surprised that the Government have decided not to continue with that form of training.
Of course I hope that there will be an increase and not a decrease in the overall amount of training after the change takes place. There are a number of questions about the Statement that I should like to put to the Minister. We are told, for example, that there were two bidders. Who was the other bidder? May we know? Were there bids from some of the successful and professional private training organisations? As I understand it, the sale is to the existing staff. As I said, the record of achievement of many of the skillcentres has not been especially outstanding. There may have been other bidders who would have done a better training job. The whole objective should be to obtain the best possible training available.

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Why have we paid £11 million of taxpayers' money? It seems very odd indeed having sold, in what is in fact a management buy-out, to the people who are at present running the organisation —so they will be the same people —because of the non-success of the concerns involved, and the fact that they need to put in £ 11 million over the next three years, to try to bring these centres up to any kind of modern standard of training. Are the Government providing them with all the capital they need to make good the inefficiencies which were there before? It seems an odd way of going about a management buy-out and getting rid of these resources.
Finally, there is another point. At one time —I have not checked whether this is still the case —there was a very successful unit which dealt with the training of trainers. If my memory serves me right, it was at Letchworth. The training of trainers is a matter of the greatest importance because training cannot be done properly except by people who are properly trained to do it; and one of the great weaknesses of modern training in many areas —I fear it will be a continuing weakness with the set-up the Government have supported through the techs —is if training is done by people who are inadequately trained to do it. That was an extremely useful unit. Can the Government tell us what has happened to it? For all I know it may have been closed down earlier, but if it has been we very much need another unit of the highest possible quality to provide the training for trainers which was provided by that Letchworth unit.
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I thank both noble Baronesses for their comments. I was not entirely surprised by the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Turner. I was slightly more surprised by the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, and I very much welcome her support for this change.
The noble Baroness, Lady Turner, after 10 years of privatisation undertaken by this Government appears to be still not convinced that privatisation is sometimes the right course to adopt. The noble Baroness compared some statistics of the United Kingdom's record with our partners in the European Community and in the United States of America in training and education. I think that statistics in themselves are not necessarily enough: one has to look at the quality of the training and education on offer. That is of course exactly why we are going down this path —to galvanise employers to play a full part in training provision. We have done that through the techs, and the principle set up in the techs of employer-led bodies is continuing in this case of privatising the STA. I had hoped that the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, would take some joy from the fact that this is a management buy-out and it is the people who are already involved in the industry who will be taking it on to even better things.
Both noble Baronesses asked whether the Government were paying to get the skillcentres taken off our hands. I think one has to look at that situation against the background of a continuing loss-making position over many years, with taxpayers' money
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being thrown away on an arrangement that was not entirely successful. What is happening now is that we are paying to keep our training going through the £11 million transfer to ensure that the investment by Astra is preserving and improving training. Preserving training must indeed be our first priority, but overall the taxpayer will benefit. The taxpayer will still gain because of the sale of the property of the 13 skillcentres which will close.
The noble Baroness, Lady Turner, asked about the staff. The terms and conditions of the staff are of course protected, as I said in my original Statement, by the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981. The Government Actuary's Department has assessed the pension arrangements proposed by the purchasers and is satisfied that they compare with present Civil Service terms. In the coming weeks there will be a substantial amount of negotiation with STA staff and their unions on these proposals. In particular, they will look at pensions and possible redundancies, and these matters have been set out in the bidder's position papers.
The noble Baroness, Lady Seear, asked who the other bidders were. There were over 100 expressions of interest. There was one other major private sector buyer for a number of the skillcentres, but they wanted only 26 centres, so that bid was considerably less favourable than the deal we have now, which I think is generally to be welcomed. I believe we should encourage the skillcentres to continue the work they have been doing.
Baroness Seear: My Lords, may I intervene? It seems rather odd when the noble Lord says he is getting rid of them because of their inadequacies and he mentions the figure of the loss, and then he says he wants to encourage the same people to go on. That seems very strange.
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I think that one has to look at what happens when companies remain in the public sector and they are restricted by, for example, the Treasury. There are also numerous public sector restrictions and overheads. Those represent some of the reasons the skillcentres have been incapable of being a success while part of the public sector.
Baroness Turner of Camden: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt, but is it not government policy —at least that is the way it seems to me —to run down enterprises that they would then want to privatise? This seems to be a typical example.
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, shame on the noble Baroness for even suggesting that we have been running down the skillcentres in order to privatise them. That must be quite wrong.
Let me turn to the very important question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear: instructor training. Of course this is a very important issue. The instructor training colleges at Letchworth and at Hillington in Scotland are both being sold to Astra. As I have said, the training of trainers is essential to improve the nation's training provision.

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It is an important source of business for the company both in this country and overseas. Therefore, as centres of excellence in the training of trainers they will continue to provide that very valuable contribution.
4.47 p.m.
Viscount Caldecote: My Lords, while accepting that there is obviously a need for change in these organisations, is my noble friend aware of the importance of continuity in training and of the damage that has been done over the past years by so many changes in training schemes? We have had the community programme, the YTS, JTS, ET, and so many schemes. It is very difficult for agencies in this field to keep abreast of them and to work effectively and efficiently. May I ask my noble friend whether he will do everything possible to ensure that there is now a period of stability for training organisations, so as to help with the efficient training which is so very important to our industry?
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I think my noble friend is trying to be helpful there. He is absolutely right in saying that there has been an element of confusion as to how training should be provided by employers and by employer-led bodies through the government network. However, I really feel that we have come to the end of that confusion by setting up the training and enterprise councils, by privatising the Skills Training Agency and by continuing the good work that has been done by employment training and youth training. I sincerely hope that over the next 10 years we will continue to see these programmes grow and prosper.
Baroness Carnegy of Lour: My Lords, would my noble friend agree that my noble friend Lord Caldecote and the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, are not absolutely right when they describe the story of the skill centres as one of stability? It is the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, in my view, who is giving an accurate description. That is not surprising because, unknown to my noble friend on the Front Bench, the noble Baroness has been involved in the work of the Manpower Services Commission for many years and she knows all about the saga of the skill centres.
Through the years it has been quite impossible to get those skill centres to run themselves on an economic and satisfactory basis and also to get them to provide the kind of training required. It has been very difficult for all sorts of reasons: I know some of them, but not all. It is an extremely sensible move. I am glad that those who have been at the head of the skills centres will have such an opportunity. One suspects that if they are the same people they will make the same mistakes as before. One suspected that in the case of the bus system, for example. However, when some of the employees in the nationalised bus system took over the services and eliminated all the problems of being in the public service they flourished. They are doing a marvellous job.
The move is excellent. If it costs £11 million of taxpayers' money in order to establish the centres —and the money will be raised by selling
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some of the old plant —it is not a matter about which noble Lords opposite should be roaring with laughter. It is a sound idea and I wish it well.
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her remarks. They provided some useful information. She was correct in everything she said about the Skills Training Agency. I also hope that it will succeed in the future.
Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran: My Lords, it was a privilege to give way to the noble Baroness from Scotland, particularly in the presence of the Minister and the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack.
First I apologise for not being in my seat when the Minister began the Statement. Secondly, I declare an interest in training because I am the president of the Mobile Radio Users' Association—
Noble Lords: Hear, hear!
Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran: Thank you so much, my Lords. Without qualification the mobile radio users' industry has been one of the most successful advancing industries in this country during the past five or six years—
Baroness Seear: What has that to do with it?
Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran: It has been successful not only in this country but also internationally. I have no idea what the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, is saying from a sedentary position, but if she would like me to give way I will gladly do so for another distinguished lady.
Having regard to what the Minister said today, what assistance can be given to the mobile radio users' industry because there is now a deficiency in the number of skilled employees? For instance, would the Minister be prepared to receive a deputation from our association indicating the importance of training in the industry and the importance of the industry to the economic position of this country?
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, it is certainly interesting to learn that the noble Lord is the president of an organisation as distinguished as the Mobile Radio Users' Association. He has introduced a more general concept of overall training. I am sorry that he missed some of our recent debates on training at which his noble friend Lady Seear was present and on which she is an expert.
I shall try to be helpful to the noble Lord. I am always delighted to receive representations from him. However, I can be most helpful by pointing him in the direction of the training and enterprise councils which have a specific duty to be responsive and flexible to the needs of local indsutry, one of which he represents.
Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister although I did not understand his proposal. Nevertheless, it is a most important industry concerned with training.
Lord Dormand of Easington: My Lords, the House will not be surprised to hear that I found the Minister's Statement quite disastrous. I have raised the subject here on many occasions. He is saying that the principle of privatisation is better than public enterprise. It may be that many of my noble friends believe that in certain circumstances that is the case. However, presumably the Minister cannot and will not accept the fact that people who will run the skills centres will be there primarily to make a profit. There can be no denying that.
It is important to note that the skills centres in particular, and to some extent the TECs, will be run by the same people, as has already been pointed out by my noble friends. Therefore, we wish to know why on earth the skills training centres will be as important as the Minister has said. He cannot get away with this kind of Statement.
The Government have been in power for almost 11 years. I believe that if they place so much importance on training —and, by heavens, it is important —they should have done something about it before now. At present 50 per cent. of the country is not covered by TECs. The Minister knows my view; that by June, the date he has promised, there will still be no TECs in operation and vast areas of the country will have no training of any kind. He should be addressing those problems and not giving the House the kind of information that he has given today.
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, we had a good debate until the noble Lord, Lord Dormand of Easington, rose and decided to dive in—
Lord Ennals: And a good contribution it was!
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, the noble Lord made a dogmatic attack on privatisation and its issues. I do not remember his exact words but he implied that there was something wrong with profit. The past 11 years have shown that profit is most important—
Lord Dormand of Easington: My Lords, I did not say that and the Minister must not misquote me. In principle I believe in the mixed economy and there is nothing wrong with making profit. I said that this is not an appropriate field in which to be making profit.
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, the noble Lord is wrong because skills centres, like anything else, must be in a position to charge the market rate for supplying the services that they provide, whether it is training or whatever. He said that TECs and skills training centres will be run by the same people. That is not necessarily so. There will be a contractual obligation between the skills centres and the training and enterprise councils. The skills centres will be competing with other private sector providers of training so that the TECs can obtain the best possible value for money.
The noble Lord also said that by the summer more than half the country will not be covered by TECs. As I have said to him before, we are two years ahead
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of schedule in the setting up of TECs. Already we have 55 TECs with development funding and we are delighted with the progress that has been made.
Lord Beloff: My Lords, I hope that the Minister will reconsider his dismissal of international comparisons. It has been shown by governmental and private investigation that in the matter of skills we are well behind our chief competitors, particularly our neighbours in Europe.
Why over a long period of time has no advantage been taken of their experience in order to ascertain why they do things better, why they obtain better results and why in consequence our industry suffers? I have a feeling that this country does not take industry and its training seriously. Clearly the Government do not; the Opposition pay lip service to it but have other priorities; clearly this House does not. This House is now relatively empty. Half an hour ago it was full in order to discuss antiquarian trivialities such as coats of arms and Scottish hereditary chieftaincies which matter not at all to the vast earning mass of the British people.
If this House does not take training seriously, if the Government do not take training seriously, if the Opposition do not take training seriously and, in spite of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, if industry does not take training seriously, what is our future?
Lord Graham of Edmonton: A good Labour speech.
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I believe that during the past couple of minutes my noble friend Lord Beloff enjoyed himself. He appears to have a great interest in training but he has not played any part in our recent debates on the subject. I regret that because his views are extremely important and valid.
On the point about making international comparisons, I never said that they were bad. I said that bald statistics were not enough. That was the point I tried to make to the noble Baroness, Lady Turner. Two weeks ago we had a very good debate in this House about training and education when all these issues were brought to the fore. If my noble friend has not read that debate I believe that he should take an opportunity of doing so.
Baroness White: My Lords, can the noble Lord answer the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, about disadvantaged persons and their training? If these outfits are to be profit-making, they will charge. Who will pay the fees or other expenses of those who are disadvantaged?
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, the noble Baroness makes a good point about the provision for disadvantaged people —the disabled, ethnic minorities and, in some instances, women —who need to play a full part in our economy. That is one reason why the Government have chosen training as one of the major priorities in the 1990s.
As I have said, the main provision for training will be through the training and enterprise councils. They will have direct responsibility for the training of all those people whom I mentioned.
Lord Peston: My Lords, perhaps on reflection the noble Lord may wish to withdraw one or two remarks which he made about his noble friend Lord Beloff. I have certainly heard the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, speak on these subjects before, particularly with regard to the question of standards. Perhaps he will hear his noble friend speak on that subject again in the near future.
To return to the Statement, I believe that the noble Lord is doing the best he can with a rather appalling brief. He must not confuse privatisation with the selling off of those properties. The Government could have sold off those properties at any time if they were of no use to them. We are concerned about the sale of a going business. I ask the noble Lord to realise that the word "sell" normally means that you give something to someone else and they give you some money in exchange. The word "sell" is not normally used to mean that you give something to someone and you give them some money as well. That is called giving it away rather than selling.
I ask the noble Lord to reflect on that. Why did not the Government at least retain some sort of equity interest? If they believe that there are benefits in privatisation, they could have benefited and could have recouped something for the taxpayer if the enterprise is a success. However, I can see —and I am not the greatest entrepreneur in the world —that to give it way and then throw £11 million after it is a "give away" deal. I ask the noble Lord to reflect on what he thinks he is up to.
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I apologise to my noble friend Lord Beloff if I implied in any way that he does not have a general interest in the subject. I was merely making the point that, since I have been employment Minister in this House and dealing with the Employment Bill, my noble friend regrettably did not take part in that debate and we all missed him then.
I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Peston, has this matter completely wrong. We are not throwing good money after bad. That is what we were doing, because in 1988–89 the organisation had a trading loss of £20 million and in the current year has a projected loss of £30 million. We are giving £11 million to turn the organisation into a viable, economic and proper concern which will continue to prosper in the future and provide the sort of training which every single noble Lord who has spoken on this issue in this Chamber this afternoon agrees is very important.
Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran: My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Peston, said in his praise of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Beloff. I feel that I should resign my position as president of the Mobile Radio Users' Association and suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, should be appointed because, obviously, he would make better headway than I am able to do in dealing with the difficulties of appointing skilled personnel in that rapidly advancing industry.

The Property Services Agency and Crown Suppliers Bill
Brought from the Commons; read a first time, and to be printed.

Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [H.L.]
5.5 p.m.
House again in Committee on Clause 13.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Baroness Hooper)The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Baroness Hooper): moved Amendment No. 84:
Page 6, line 35, leave out ("1") and insert ("5,").
The noble Baroness said: This is a minor amendment which is required to correct the references to paragraphs in Schedule 3 in this clause. The paragraph in Schedule 3 which deals with consent for the use of a person's gametes is paragraph (5) rather than paragraph (1), and that which deals with consent for the use of any embryo is paragraph (7) and not paragraph (3). I speak also to Amendment No. 85. I beg to move.
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendment No. 85:
Page 6, line 40, leave out ("3") and insert ("7").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Robertson of Oakridge Lord Robertson of Oakridge: moved Amendment No. 86:
Page 6, line 45, at end insert —
("( ) No woman shall be provided with treatment services unless the person responsible is satisfied that the woman does not intend to receive the treatment services with a view to becoming a surrogate mother for the purposes of section 1 of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985.").
The noble Lord said: Surrogacy is of course where a woman carries a child in her womb and after it is born she hands it over to another woman or couple. This amendment seeks to ensure that those providing treatment under the Bill cannot be a party to surrogacy arrangements. Although surrogacy cannot be practised commercially —and this Bill helpfully states in Clause 32 that surrogacy arrangements cannot have the force of law —the practice has taken place and will probably continue to do so.
The Government have already recognised that surrogacy is an undesirable practice. It creates major difficulties if the mother who has carried the baby to full term wishes to retain it. Clause 26 makes it very clear that the woman who carries the baby will always be regarded in law as the mother. Therefore, adoption proceedings have to take place for another woman to be treated as the mother.
As the Bill stands there is a strong implication that medical centres providing treatment under this Bill should not assist surrogacy. This amendment would convert that strong implication into a clear directive. I beg to move.
Baroness Hooper: The Government's policy on surrogacy is contained in the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, to which this amendment

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refers. That Act prohibits the development of commercial surrogacy agencies and advertising of or for surrogacy services, but does not seek to ban private arrangements nor commercial arrangements between commissioning parents and the surrogate mother; that is, where no third party is involved. The Government opposes this amendment because it is considerably more restrictive than the Surrogacy Arrangements Act. It would appear to attempt to prohibit all forms of surrogacy and would, for instance, forbid a woman having placed in her any embryo created from her sister's egg and her sister's husband's sperm with a view to handing over the resulting child to them —an arrangement which we have seen to work.
It is the Government's opinion that the 1985 legislation has achieved its principal objectives of preventing the spread to this country of commercial surrogacy arrangements, particularly from the USA, where I understand such agencies operate in some states. It was no part of the policy of that Act to seek to outlaw altogether this practice, whose origins go back to the Old Testament. Indeed a provision of the kind proposed by this amendment, however much sympathy one might have with its objective, would be unenforceable. For some childless couples, surrogacy is a last resort. Effective guidance is in place to local authority social services departments to ensure that, in appropriate cases, children born as a result of surrogacy arrangements which come to light are made wards of court. In addition, Clause 26 of the Bill makes clear beyond doubt that the carrying mother is to be regarded in law as the child's mother. Clause 32 will ensure that surrogacy contracts are unenforceable in law.
It seems that we have to accept that surrogacy is a practice which it is impractical to prohibit. However, the 1985 Act has proved to be successful in its objective of preventing the exploitation of women who might be used by those wishing to make a profit out of the plight of the childless. The further restrictions that the noble Lord intends in his amendment are therefore in the Government's view both unnecessary and unenforceable. I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Warnock: There is often confusion in discussions on the different kinds of surrogacy which exist. One kind is the result of artificial insemination by a man to a woman who is not his wife but who is to carry the baby on behalf of the couple. The child born of that arrangement is a child genetically connected with the husband but also with the woman. In some sense that has been referred to as the flip side of AID. The child is partly the child of the commissioning couple but partly the child of another woman.
In the United States, however, there is increasingly a use of what may be referred to as IVF surrogacy which is useful to certain couples where the wife of the commissioning couple can produce an egg and the husband sperm. The egg and the sperm of the commissioning couple are united and fertilised and the embryo is then placed in the womb of the
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surrogate mother. In that case the surrogate mother is simply a living incubator and is not in any sense the genetic mother of that child.
Perhaps not enough was made in our report and in the 1985 legislation of that very crucial distinction. If there are those who feel very strongly against AID surrogacy and not so strongly about IVF surrogacy, it would be mistaken as well as unenforceable to try to legislate against surrogacy in the manner proposed by this amendment. My own view, therefore, is that this amendment should not be accepted.
Lord Somers: I differ slightly from my noble friend. The amendment does not outlaw surrogacy as far as I can see. It places a discouragement on it but it does not outlaw it. My noble friend says that the practice is increasing in America. I might point out that many practices of a highly undesirable nature are increasing in America, as they are everywhere else as far as I can make out. It is bad enough surely not to know who your father was, but not to know who your mother was is even worse. I therefore hope that my noble friend will not withdraw his amendment.
Lord Robertson of Oakridge: I thank the noble Lord, Lord Somers, for his encouragement, but I am also grateful for the explanation by the Minister and the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Warnock. In the circumstances I think it is the wish of the Committee that I withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 13, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 14 agreed to.
[Amendment No. 87 not moved.]
Clause 15 [Grant of licence]:
[Amendments Nos. 88 and 89 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
5.15 p.m.
Lord Ennals Lord Ennals moved Amendment No. 90:
Page 7, line 41, leave out ("accompanied by the initial fee").
The noble Lord said: I beg leave to move Amendment No. 90 standing in my name and that of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, and the noble Lord, Lord Henderson of Brompton. The amendment is grouped with Amendments Nos. 92 and 97. These three amendments concern the funding of the statutory licensing authority and although there are only a few Members in the Chamber I believe that these are issues of profound importance.
I and my colleagues who have joined me in moving this amendment believe that it is quite wrong that the statutory licensing authority should raise funds for is own maintenance from the clinics which it licenses. In our view the cost of the licensing authority should be borne in full by the public purse. That is what we seek to bring about.
The Bill as it stands proposes a new method of extracting payment for services from patients. The notification of infectious deseases and at-risk registers are paid for out of central funds and not charged to individual patients. The procedures

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relating to the Abortion Act 1967 require the completion of two certificates and inspection and licensing of private clinics, but none of the expenditure is passed on either to the clinics or to the patients.
Lack of central funding is discriminatory against those who are infertile. Much is done, quite rightly, for the fertile and services include pre-pregnancy counselling, ante-, intra- and post-partum care, neonatal paediatric services, conception, abortion and sterilisation where necessary. Certain contraceptive procedures and sterilisation operations even attract extra payment for medical staff out of central funds.
As was pointed out in the report by my noble friend Lady Warnock and frequently elsewhere, provision for the infertile in the National Health Service is poor due to the underfunding of the service. Failure to provide central funding for the proposed new authority would perpetuate this state of affairs.
Most of the patients affected by this Bill are in any case forced to resort to the private sector for treatment which the NHS fails to provide. Many small clinics, especially NHS and university-based clinics, cannot afford large licence fees and might have to stop work. These are precisely the clinics where services are available at minimal cost and the charges of licence fees would inevitably result in fewer patients being treated and a reduction in the service.
The proposal to finance the statutory licensing authority primarily from fees collected in connection with its licensing activities would probably mean an indirect tax of about £100 for each of the 10,000 patients who seek assisted conception treatment every year. As there are only two NHS-funded IVF centres in this country, the vast majority of patients seeking assisted conception by IVF, GIFT or AID already pay for their entire treatment. That is a heavy burden for most of them. Furthermore, since the take-home baby rate for in vitro fertilisation is only about 10 per cent., that charge could be levied on some poor unfortunate couples on a number of occasions. That will add further to the injustice between services provided for the fertile, (that is, abortion, contraception and sterilisation) and the services provided for those who are childless.
The requirement to have regulation of research and the use of gametes and embryos is one felt by government and society as a whole. The sub-fertile, who will be the ultimate consumer of most of these services, do not necessarily benefit from the statutory work of the statutory licensing authority. Nor are they the sole benefactors of the results of research work, which also requires a licence. Thus, to have to pay for the licensing activities of the statutory licensing authority would be a further injustice and amount, in effect, to a tax on the infertile. The cost of licensing, as I said earlier, should be borne in total by the public purse.
The White Paper of November 1987 said:
"provision will be made for contributing towards the costs of the SLA from public funds, although it will be expected to meet a large proportion of its expenditure from fees connected with its licensing activity".
The then Voluntary Licensing Authority, in its third report made in 1988, responded to that White Paper as follows:
"The VLA considers that it may be impracticable to attempt to meet a large proportion of the expenditure of the SLA from licence fees. From experience, to cover the costs of the SLA, such fees will have to be high, in the order of £5,000 pa. Implications are grave for clinics operating in academic or NHS departments, which might be unable to pass the costs on to patients. It is also unclear who would be expected to pay for project licences. Much research is carried out in University Departments with grant support. The (VL) Authority recommends that 'the running costs of the SLA should come primarily from public funds' ".
I agreed with them then, and I agree with them now.
Further comments on the funding of the proposed SLA were made in the fourth report of 1989, which says:
"We believe that the imposition of a licence fee would deter the expansion of NHS centres of which there are only two".
I can understand that those who do not wish to see these treatments extended and this research facilitated, may want to see some licence because they would look on it as a deterrent. Those who have supported continuation of research and the treatments which result from it would want to see that encouraged. They would want to remove any deterrent factor.
There is perhaps another argument which I have not deployed. I shall use it in conclusion. If the running costs of the authority which this Bill establishes are paid for by the clinics that it is policing, then at least there is a conflict or a potential conflict of interest. At worst a cosy relationship could develop where the authority will seek to please its paymasters rather than Parliament. I believe that there should be no element of paymaster in this provision and that running costs are the responsibility of central funds which should come from the Department of Health and not from a licensing system. That would create not only insecurity, uncertainty and discouragement, but also, as I have said, a relationship between the authority and the clinics which may be very unfortunate. I beg to move.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: I wish to add a very brief observation to what the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, has said. I make two points and the first is in relation to Clause 15(7), which says:
"Different fees may be fixed for different circumstances and fees paid under this section are not repayable".
I very much deplore the fact that there may be fees; but if there are, then it appears that there will be discrimination between beneficiaries of the treatment. I find that strange. Secondly, I ask the noble Baroness who is to reply what precedents there are. I cannot think of any treatment under the National Health Service which demands payment from the client other than for teeth and spectacles. Perhaps there are others, but there cannot be very many. For instance, if treatment for abortion is available free under the National Health Service, then treatment of this nature should also be free. I would very much like to hear what are the precedents for justifying the imposition of fees in this case.
Lord McGregor of Durris: I wish to underline one point which the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, made in moving the amendment. I refer to a quotation which he also used from the third report of the Voluntary Licensing Authority published in 1988. At page 43, paragraph 18, the authority states:
"The VLA considers that it may be impracticable to attempt to meet a large proportion of the expenditure of the SLA from licence fees".
The authority goes on to say that from experience it regards the proposal for licence fees as an impracticable method of finance.
When dealing with this amendment I hope that the noble Baroness will explain on what grounds, unless she is supporting the amendment, the Government believe that the authority, which is the only body that has experience in this field, is mistaken. There is a second point to be made as a footnote to what the noble Lord, Lord Henderson of Brompton, has just said. There appears to be a conflict of principles being introduced by this Bill, as it now stands, were fees to be charged. Inevitably some patients will be charged. Is it not an anomalous situation that patients may be charged when they seek treatment for infertility but when they go to the GP for contraceptive advice, the GP is reimbursed for giving that advice by the Family Practitioners' Committee and not permitted to charge the patient for giving contraceptive advice?
Baroness Hooper: We recognise the concern about fees and in particular concerning the points raised in the course of this brief discussion. Nevertheless, we think it right that applicants for licences should meet not necessarily the whole cost, but a significant part of the cost of the process of licensing. Though references were made to examples of free services, I remind the Committee that fee-paying is an established practice in other fields, if not within the National Health Service. For example, there are planning applications and licences under the Medicines Act.
Perhaps I may distinguish one of the examples quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, who referred to notifications of infectious diseases. The purpose of requiring cases of certain infectious diseases to be notified is for the protection of the health of the public generally. It is not for the benefit of the person whose case is the subject of a notification. In these cases the guiding principle is the general public interest. I realise that unsuccessful applicants may feel aggrieved to have to pay an initial fee or a differentiated fee to no purpose, but the authority will have been put to some work in dealing with their applications. Therefore it is only right that they meet some proportion of the cost.
Also, the initial fees and any additional ones would fall either on the private sector facilities, academic institutions or National Health Service hospitals. I also appreciate the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord McGregor of Durris, that the principle of the payment of fees is new in as much as the interim licensing authority does not charge fees. Its work is supported in relation to this part of its activities by the Medical Research Council and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists.
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However, I believe that there is a different situation when a new statutory authority is set up. I repeat that the Government think it important that those wishing to be licensed should be required to meet a significant proportion of the costs of that system, and indeed of the other costs incurred by the authority. As I have indicated, there are precedents for statutory bodies charging fees for licences, and there is the general principle that people should be made aware of the cost of services they use.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Henderson of Brompton, that Clause 15(7) provides a measure of flexibility to the authority in that different fees can be charged in different circumstances. It will be for the new authority to decide on the level of fees and a fee structure which, under Clause 15(6), will need to be approved by the Secretary of State and the Treasury. This will enable the authority to design the arrangements it finds most appropriate. I do not want to speculate about what the authority's policy in relation to charging fees might be, but clearly there is nothing in the Bill to prevent it deciding to charge different rates of fees for different establishments. The Government will be paying their contribution to this treatment and there is a safeguard against the authority charging exorbitant levels of fees in that they must be set after the Secretary of State and the Treasury have approved them. Amendment No. 97 is consequential on Amendments Nos. 90 and 92 and therefore need not be spoken to individually.
The noble Lord, Lord Ennals, suggested that fees might give rise to a cosy relationship between the authority and the centres which will provide a significant part of the authority's funding. The Bill provides for the proper keeping of accounts by the authority and the proper audit of those accounts. It also provides for the authority to send a report to the Secretary of State annually, as was agreed on the first day of the Committee stage. The statement of accounts, as examined and certified by the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the report will be laid before both Houses of Parliament. We can look to these and to the integrity of the authority and the persons appointed to it to ensure that a cosy relationship between centres and the authority does not develop. I urge the Committee to reject the amendment.
5.30 p.m.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: Before the noble Baroness sits down, perhaps she will answer my specific question about treatments within the National Health Service which are not provided free. The noble Baroness gave me examples from outside the National Health Service, such as planning permissions. I do not see that that has anything to do with what is going on inside. If she can provide me with the precedents for charging within the National Health Service for treatments of this nature I shall be much obliged.
Baroness White: The noble Baroness will surely recognise that there is some difference between family planning and planning land development. It

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is a most incongruous argument, as was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord McGregor of Durris, that those who are concerned with negative family planning should have the arrangements free and those who are trying to secure the birth of a child should have to pay for this great privilege. This is a most astonishing situation in relation to the health service as a whole. The Government are trying to slip into the Bill a provision of payment which is not applicable in other circumstances. The noble Baroness has done the very best with her brief. We all sympathise with her. But I hope that my noble friend who moved the amendment and other noble Lords will at least press for the matter to be reconsidered between now and Report stage.
Lord Prys-Davies: I wonder whether the Government are mindful of the fact that many couples who are desperate to have a child can ill afford to pay the fees. It is recorded that people who are not well-to-do have mortgaged their homes in order to pay for the treatment. The Government should bear in mind that in addition to the burden of infertility people often have to mortgage their homes in order to pay for the treatment.
Baroness Hooper: I should clarify one point. The examples that I quoted in relation to other areas where licence fees are applicable are more similar to this case than the other services within the National Health Service to which noble Lords have referred. In this case we are talking about fees payable not by the individuals who wish to go in for the IVF treatment but by institutions which wish to carry out that course of treatment and have to apply under the Bill to the authority for permission to do so. The exact analogy that I have been asked to give is not appropriate.
Lord Ennals: I must confess to being very disappointed by the Minister's reply. In the course of the debate she has given some able replies. By "able replies" I mean those replies with which I agree. In this case I found myself profoundly dissatisfied; so it was not an able reply.
I should like to refer to four points arising from the debate. The noble Baroness has just implied that, somehow or other, from resources unknown, clinics will be able to pay this licence fee and will not pass it on to patients. I do not believe that for a moment. If the clinics are obliged to pay something over and above what they are now paying for the cost of their work, they will have to find it in some other way. That is what the market-place is about. Who else can they turn to? They cannot apply for a government grant because the Government are to give some unspecified grant to the statutory licensing authority. They will have no alternative but to pass it on to the patients.
This was one of the points that I made when I moved the amendment. My calculation is that it will fall to the tune of about £100 per patient if it is levelled out over 10,000 patients. It may be that in the future the issue will become greater. This will be a blow to families. The thought that the service which we have rightly decided to provide should be
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made available on a means tested basis or be made available only to those who can afford it is deplorable.
Secondly, the research and the resultant treatment has as one of its objectives the reduction of the number of abortions. We hope that that argument will carry some weight with those who have their doubts about what we are debating. As has already been said, abortion is carried out by the National Health Service on a non-fee-paying basis. It would seem strange that that should apply to abortion but should not apply to the treatments which may help to reduce the regrettable number of abortions.
Thirdly, the Committee has witnessed an exchange concerning the planning application. Examples were given from the Medicines Act and reference was made to the fees paid by pharmaceutical companies. Those who pay for licences under the Medicines Act are pharmaceutical companies which are in the business not only for the sake of human welfare —they do great things for human welfare —but for reasons of profit. They are commercial companies. Therefore that is not in any way a valid comparison. I should hate to think that the work being approved by this Committee will be seen as some new form of commercial activity. It is not. We are dealing with human welfare, human research and the relief of hardship. We are dealing with concern among patients about the nature of children born to them.
My fourth point is perhaps the most serious. In her reply the Minister said that different situations arise when a new service is established. That is the slippery slope argument. We argued about that in earlier stages of the debate. I refer to what the Minister said. In an evolving health service —and all right, we are talking about a new service; but there will be other new services provided by the National Health Service —if the Minister is saying that, as new services become available, they will be charged for, then this is a process of privatisation of the National Health Service which her right honourable friend has insisted he has no intention of promoting. It is a dangerous philosophy for those who believe in a National Health Service, as her right honourable friend the Secretary of State says he does, paid for by public funds.
Therefore I should like to put a few questions to the Minister. First, what proportion does she consider the Government will pay of the cost of the licensing authority? Secondly, what sort of proportion of the costs of licence fees do the Government expect will be passed on to clinics? Thirdly, when those factors have been broken down, what sort of cost per patient does she think that will imply? She must have done those calculations, or her advisers must have made such assessments, before deciding to give a negative answer to the amendment.
Baroness Hooper: I recognise the antipathy of the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, to any charges in the National Health Service, even those imposed upon people who can well afford to pay them. Nevertheless, I think that it is important in this

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context to stress again a point I previously made: fees will be charged to the centres which are providing the service and will be charged at the time of application. As centres are likely to see a number of patients during the existence of a particular licence, and if indeed they are going to pass on the costs of the licence fee to the patients, it will be shared and spread among a great many people.
As regards any possible calculations at this stage in connection with the actual costs involved, it is my understanding that it is anticipated that the applicants for a licence will be expected to pay something in the region of two-thirds of the cost of the licensing authority. Moreover, as I said previously, the Government will be paying their share in more general costs, as well as in relation to work carried out in regard to the applications.
Lord Ennals: Can the Minister give us any figures in that respect?
Baroness Hooper: No, I am afraid that I am not in a position to give the noble Lord detailed figures at this point.
Lord Ennals: I think that the Minister needs time to bring forward the answers to my questions. I do not think that the Committee can be expected to take a decision on the matter when she is not prepared to say what sort of sum of money the Government are expecting to pay to the licensing authority; what sum of money the clinics are expected to pay as regards a licence; or how this is likely to fall upon patients. I hope, therefore, that between now and the Report stage the Minister will make those inquiries so that we may have a debate with adequate information to enable us to take a decision on the matter.
My view has in no way changed as a result of the Minister's answer. However, I do not propose to divide the Committee at this stage of the proceedings. But I hope that she will think seriously about the matter because it is my intention to return to the issue when we reach the Report stage. Accordingly, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 91 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
[Amendment No. 92 not moved.]
5.45 p.m.
The Duke of Norfolk The Duke of Norfolk moved Amendment No. 93:
Page 7, line 45, after ("individual") insert ("who is a medical practitioner registered under the Medical Act 1983").
The noble Duke said: The Bill requires that when a licence is applied for there must be a "person responsible" for the activities to be carried out under that licence. Such a person may or may not be the applicant. We can assume that in many cases he or she would not in fact be the applicant. I consider that this amendment is necessary to ensure that the "person responsible" genuinely is responsible for the said activities.
As it stands, it could happen that this person was merely an administrator of a particular private clinic, a member of a pharmaceutical company or some other non-medically qualified person. Some clinics might find it convenient to operate in that way. If that were to happen, responsibility would be a fiction and would exist only on paper.
By requiring such a person to be a medical practitioner, registered under the Medical Act 1983, we would ensure that the person responsible would genuinely be responsible. I beg to move.
Lord Walton of Detchant: As a registered medical practitioner under the Act just referred to, and having had the privilege for seven years of presiding over the council which confers such registration, I naturally have some sympathy with the amendment proposed by the noble Duke. However, I think that is is important for the Committee to recall that licences under the Act, provided and conferred by the proposed licensing authority, will deal not just with treatment but also with storage and research.
For that reason it would be inappropriate in my view that the licences should be held only by registered medical practitioners because there are many distinguished scientists, Fellows of the Royal Society among them, who are concerned with the research which will fall within the ambit of this legislation. In my opinion the amendment would be entirely reasonable, or appropriate, if the following words were added:
"A practitioner registered under the Medical Act 1983, or a suitably qualified scientist".
It is very important to recognise that many scientists will be engaged in such research.
There is one other possibility which I think it is only right that the Committee should consider on Report. It concerns licences for treatment as set out under Schedule 2, which we have already considered. In my view it would be perfectly appropriate that that provision should require the designated supervisor to be a registered medical practitioner.
I am afraid that I must oppose the amendment as it stands, but trust that I have offered the noble Duke some suggestions which might perhaps, with modification, make what is proposed more acceptable.
Lord Renton: In order to decide the matter we need to consider what the licences are for. If noble Lords will look at Clause 11(1) (a) it will be seen, among other things, that the legislation is,
"authorising activities in the course of providing treatment services".
That seems to indicate the work of a medical practitioner. Moreover, that view is fortified if we refer to paragraph 1 of Schedule 2, to which, incidentally, we are referred in Clause 11. There we find various examples of the work which is to be carried out under the licences, including,
"(d) practices designed to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to be placed in a woman or to determine whether embryos are suitable for that purpose,
(e) placing any embryo in a woman,

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(f) testing the fertility of any human sperm by the penetration of the egg of another species of animal, but only where any resulting embryo is immediately destroyed, and,
(g) such other practices as may be specified"—
and, we do not know what they will be—
"in, or determined in accordance with, regulations".
Therefore, for an important part of this work under licence, it seems that the skill of a medical practitioner and the responsibility which he exercises will be required. That surely indicates that the amendment should be accepted.
Viscount Craigavon: I had not intended to speak on this amendment, but perhaps this will assist the noble Lord, Lord Renton. I understood that the question of licences was not simply black or white—that a person is either given a licence or fails to be given a licence. I thought a person was licensed for a particular activity. When the noble Lord refers to treatment, I suggest that not all people applying for licences will do so for the purposes of treatment. They might be given licences for other reasons. So a diversity of people with different requirements might apply for licences.
Baroness Phillips: As the discussion progresses, my dislike for the Bill becomes more and more intense. I could almost have tolerated it if it concerned fertilisation, but it seems that the Bill starts with a total disregard for the dignity of human life.
Lord Ennals: No, it does not.
Baroness Phillips: Perhaps my noble friends will wait a minute. They have had their turn. There is the comment in paragraph 1(1) (f) of Schedule 2:
"testing the fertility of any human sperm by the penetration of the egg of another species of animal, but only where any resulting embryo is immediately destroyed".
That is rather left in the hands of the person who will carry it out. Surely research in relation to human life should be carried out under a general practitioner. We all know that scientists are sometimes carried away by their enthusiasm for their experiments. It seems strange to me that anyone should object to this. At some stage we must bring in the medical profession if the legislation is to hold any validity at all.
Lord Swann: I am troubled because I do not think that noble Lords have picked up what the noble Lord, Lord Walton, said. Undoubtedly there are facets of the matter which require a qualified medical practitioner. But there are rather few medical practitioners who would be happy with, for instance, testing the fertility of human sperm and the storage and keeping of embryos. A number of such activities need highly skilled scientific treatment.
It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Walton, was absolutely right in saying, "Yes, of course it needs medically qualified practitioners but it is also necessary that before the medical practitioner can carry out his medical work some of the background activities should be carried out by skilled scientists". I feel strongly that that should be part of an amendment.
The Earl of Halsbury: I support the argument of my noble friends Lord Walton and Lord Swann. Much of the activity will be group activities by firms and similar organisations, as they are called in hospitals. The act of fertilisation might well be under the control of biochemist or a biologist. Different parts of the procedure are conducted by different people. I understand that a person has to have a hypodermic inoculation with a luteinising hormone in order to induce superovulation. That might well be done by a medical technician who gives other types of injections.
The Bill leaves the situation quite open. It only insists that one person must take overall responsibility for seeing that the other persons are qualified. Why should not the biochemist engaged in fertilisation assure herself that the ovum will be extracted by a gynaecologist or whoever it may be? She should be in charge of the project as a whole. I think that the Bill should be allowed to stand as it is.
Lord Prys-Davies: The noble Lord, Lord Walton, gave helpful guidance to the Committee; namely, that one should draw a distinction between a licence for treatment and a licence to undertake research. If the amendment had been in place, if this had been the law of the land, would Robert. Edwards of Cambridge and Anne McLaren of the MRC have been able to make the contribution they made?
Lord Somers: Perhaps I may say one word before the noble and learned Lord replies. One point has been overlooked by some noble Lords: whether the work is to be research or treatment. The preliminary operation must be carried out on the human body. Surely that is a case where a qualified medical practitioner is essential.
Lord Winstanley: I should like to make this point. The body which has responsibility for the overall control of the conduct of registered medical practitioners is the General Medical Council, of which the noble Lord, Lord Walton, was such a distinguished president. The GMC would continue to be responsible for the conduct of such practitioners, ethical or otherwise.
On the other hand, the body responsible for the conduct of the work that comes under this Bill is to be the licensing authority. That authority will have to supervise with great care the conduct of each and every person working in that field. It will do so. The GMC will only be responsible for the conduct of registered medical practitioners. That is worthy of consideration.
The Lord Chancellor: The policy of the Bill is that licences will be granted either to individuals who will themselves control the premises where the activity to be licensed is to be carried on or to another person or body which manages the premises on which the activity is to be carried on. But —and this is the important point —each licence application must designate an individual under whose supervision the activities authorised by the licence will be carried on. So there must be a single person responsible for supervision of all the activities authorised by a

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particular licence. This person is described as "the person responsible" in Clause 16. The effect of the amendment would be that a licence could be granted only if the individual designated by the licence as the person responsible was a medical practitioner registered under the Medical Act 1983.
I appreciate that where research is to be done in respect of the human body, as the noble Lord, Lord Somers, has pointed out, it would be entirely appropriate that a properly qualified doctor would be in charge and responsible for it. But, as has already been pointed out, the Bill in its present form provides for the licensing of treatments, of storage and of research. It by no means follows, as the noble Lords, Lord Walton, Lord Swann and others have already pointed out, that a person who would be qualified to give treatment would be qualified properly to supervise research. These are quite different matters. Again, the specialities that one might need in order properly to arrange for storage might involve other qualifications.
How does the Bill deal with that? It takes the view that the supervisor should be a person appropriate to supervise. It provides that the activities regulated by the Bill should be carried on under the supervision of a person who is responsible —that is the requirement —and who is suitable in character, qualifications and experience. That is why paragraph (c) of Clause 15(2) requires the licence committee, before it may grant a licence, to be satisfied that the individual designated by the licence as the person responsible is suitable in character, qualifications and experience and that he or she will discharge the detailed duties of supervision set out in Clause 16.
In my submission that is precisely what the noble Lord, Lord Walton, suggested. I think it meets what my noble friend the Duke of Norfolk desired in moving the amendment. He wished that where the necessary qualification is a medical one the supervisor should be medically qualified. I take it that he agrees that where the proper requirement or qualification necessary is scientific, the person should have the appropriate scientific qualifications. More than one of these activities might be carried on and we need to be sure that the appropriate qualifications for all activities carried on are held by the person responsible.
I suggest to the Committee that what the noble Lord, Lord Walton, has proposed is already covered in the Bill, leaving it to the licensing authority to decide, in relation to any particular licence, what are the necessary qualifications. As I said, that may be quite a difficult matter of judgment. It would not surprise me, for example, if the authority thought that in licensing certain types of treatment the fact of merely being a medical practitioner might not be sufficient. The authority may require some other specialist qualification, such as a qualification granted by one of the Royal colleges or something of that kind. I do not believe the Committee will improve this matter by seeking to be too specific. The principle of this amendment is already covered appropriately in the provisions of Clause 15, to which I have drawn attention.
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I hope that my noble friend may feel that we have catered adequately for his concern, and if so that he may feel able to withdraw his amendment. I should say to the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, that the various matters to which she has referred emphasise how important it is for people involved in this kind of activity to have appropriate qualifications.
6 p.m.
The Duke of Norfolk: In view of what the noble and learned Lord and other speakers have said I am consoled. I pointed out that we did not wish to have a licence granted to someone who is purely, let us say, the director of a pharmaceutical company. We do not want that. However, if the people who will carry out this kind of activity will have appropriate qualifications, we shall be content with that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 94 to 96 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
[Amendment No. 97 not moved.]
Clauses 15 and 16 agreed to.
Clause 17 [Revocation and variation of licence]:
[Amendments Nos. 98 and 99 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendment No. 100:
Page 9, line 15, leave out ("is not discharging") and insert ("has failed to discharge").
The noble Baroness said: This amendment alters the wording of Clause 17(1)(c) to make the reasons given in that clause for revoking a licence clearer and more clearly demonstrated, should the licence holder wish to appeal to the full authority against the licensing committee's decision. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendment No. 101:
Page 9, line 17, leave out ("any directions") and insert ("directions given in connection with any licence").
The noble Baroness said: This amendment is also designed to make it clear that the grounds for revoking a licence because the person responsible has failed to comply with directions given to him by the authority can include failure to comply with directions given to him in connection with a different licence. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendments Nos. 102 to 109 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Clause 17, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 18 [Procedure for refusal, variation or revocation of licence]:
[Amendments Nos. 110 to 116 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Clause 18 agreed to.
Clause 19 [Appeal to Authority against determinations of licence committee]:
[Amendment No. 117 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Clause 19 agreed to.
Clause 20 [Appeals to High Court or Court of Session]:
[Amendment No. 118 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Clause 20 agreed to.
Clause 21 [Temporary suspension of licence]:
[Amendments Nos. 119 to 121 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Clause 21 agreed to.
Clause 22 [Directions: general]:
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendment No. 122:
Page 12, leave out line 7 and insert —
("(3) Anything clone by a person in pursuance of directions is to").
The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 122 I wish to speak also to Amendment No. 123. These are drafting amendments designed to make clear the intention of Clause 22(3); that is, that anything done in pursuance of conditions set out in directions is, for the purpose of the Act, to be treated as if done in pursuance of a licence. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendment No. 123:
Page 12, line 8, leave out ("authorised to do so by virtue") and insert ("done in pursuance").
On Question, amendment agreed to
Clause 22, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 23 [Directions as to particular meetings]:
Viscount Craigavon Viscount Craigavon moved Amendment No. 124:
Page 12, line 28, at end insert —
("(1A) Directions may authorise that records maintained in pursuance of a licence may be transferred by the person responsible to the Authority for safe keeping after the expiry of ten years since their creation or of such longer period and with such conditions as may be specified by the Authority.").
The noble Viscount said: This is a probing amendment, to attempt to clarify the position of the records which are mentioned in the Bill. I think I can guarantee that this amendment will not raise the blood pressure of the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips.
In the Bill the records are described in Clause 13(2). Those are the records which will have to be kept by the licence holder. They are fairly detailed records. It appears under Clause 29(1) that the central authority also has to hold most of those records, although not the most detailed records which are mentioned in Clause 13(2)(e). This amendment might seem to be rather weak as I have used the word "may". However, the intention is to give the approval of Parliament to a specific minimum number of years as regards keeping records.
Clause 23(2) states that:
"Directions may authorise any person…".
As I said, I wish to clarify the matter of keeping records. My intention is to ensure that no unduly onerous or impractical conditions are laid upon licence holders and clinics. Attention is drawn to this possible problem by the mention in Clause 23(1) of a period of 50 years. That subsection requires certain records to be kept for 50 years. A possible solution is suggested by the wording in Clause 23(5)(a). The word "may" occurs again here. In the event of a licence being discontinued directions may:
"require anything kept or information held in pursuance of the old licence to be transferred to the Authority or any other person".
That suggests a possible procedure for successfully relieving licence holders of the need to keep records for long periods after those records have effectively become dormant. The provision may ensure safer conditions for the preservation of records against fire, flood or some computer mishap. Obviously, some clinics may prefer to hold on to all their past records, but for those for whom this would be an onerous requirement over a long period the stipulation of a minimum period of 10 years seems to be reasonable. After that period, under this amendment, detailed records could be transferred to the authority. It also happens, by coincidence, that the period of 10 years is the period stipulated in Clause 14(2) as the maximum period for storing gametes.
I mentioned the period of 50 years appearing in Clause 23(1). That relates only to records where it appears that no child resulted from treatment.That period of 50 years is not unreasonable if it is intended to cover a case where directly after the treatment, the outcome of which is unknown, a woman may disappear without trace, for example to Australia. It may be reasonable and useful for her or her child to know that records are being kept for 50 years. However, what is not quite so reasonable or even useful is for there to be a requirement that the individual clinic should have to keep those records. It would be much more sensible not only for those seeking information about past treatment to be able to find it centrally through the register, but also, for the reasons I have given, to allow clinics, if they wish, to be able to transfer their records after the period of 10 years to the central authority.
As I said at the beginning, the wording of this amendment may seem to be rather weak and at the end of the day it still leaves the final decision to the authority, but what it achieves in the same spirit as other parts of the clause is to tell the authority that Parliament has considered this matter and that it thinks 10 years is a reasonable minimum period of time in this context. I beg to move.
Baroness Hooper: We believe that the amendment is unnecessary since the information to which the noble Viscount referred is already held by the authority. The noble Viscount himself pointed out that the provisions of Clause 13(2) and Clause 14(1) require, as a condition of all licences, that all necessary information is recorded. In addition, under Clause 29, that information must be provided to the authority. Since the authority will already

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hold the information it requires the effect of the amendment would be to place an unnecessary burden upon the authority if it were to receive in addition the physical records kept in pursuance of a licence. Clause 13(4) specifies that there is no limit to the length of time that may be specified for keeping the information held by the authority.
For those reasons the Government oppose the amendment. I trust that the noble Viscount will feel able to withdraw it.
Viscount Craigavon: I do not want to take up the time of the Committee further. The Minister's explanation is useful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave withdrawn.
Baroness Elles Baroness Elles moved Amendment No. 125:
Page 12, line 35, at end insert—
("Provided that —

(a) any person receiving gametes or embryos from outside the United Kingdom shall be required to obtain with the gametes or embryos such information and consent as would have been required if the gametes or embryos had been obtained in the United Kingdom under a licence from the Authority, and

(b) any person exporting gametes or embryos shall satisfy the Authority that the gametes or embryos shall be held under the same terms, conditions and restrictions (including restrictions on use and conditions for destruction) as would have applied thereto under this Act but for such exportation.").

The noble Baroness said: The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, cannot be present this evening for family reasons. He sends his apologies to the Committee. He joins me in supporting all the amendments in both our names. Regrettably I have not been able to discuss with the noble Lord the arguments that he would have deployed before the Committee. Therefore, I retain sole responsibility for the arguments that I put forward in support of this amendment and other amendments in our joint names.
Amendment No. 125 concerns an important aspect of the storage, keeping and other treatment of gametes and embryos which have not yet been covered by this Bill; namely, the possibility of their being exported to other countries where different legislation or no legislation applies. It also concerns the importing of embryos and gametes from other countries. We should like to see the same legislation applied to gametes and embryos coming into the country as covers those already in the country.
As Members of the Committee who are concerned with farming will know, there are already very strict health certification and licensing regulations concerning the export and import of, for example semen of bulls and embryos of cattle and other animals. We suggest that some form of corresponding regulations should apply to human gametes and embryos.
Regrettably, it is not impossible that in the future there may be the question of the sale of and trade in embryos and gametes. That may be carried out perfectly respectably and honourably with those countries undertaking embryo research but which
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do not have sufficient embryos. In this country there may not be sufficient embryos and there may be a demand for more. If that should happen I believe that such transfer of embryos from one country to another should be very carefully regulated, as in the case of animals. In that case gametes and embryos when first imported to this country go to an artificial insemination centre where they are recorded and tested before being sent to individual farms.
I hope that with that short explanation the Government will give their opinion and see fit either to accept the amendment or, if they cannot accept it in this form, to consider the implications behind the amendment. I beg to move.
The Earl of Onslow: Am I alone in thinking "yuk" at the idea of trade in gametes and embryos? It is repellent and I am not sure that it should be allowed at all under any regulations.
6.15 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: The amendment is concerned with the export and import of gametes or embryos. Trade is rather a different matter and I believe that the noble Earl's graphically expressed attitude to that will be widely shared.
On this particular matter the situation is that the Bill as drafted provides in Clause 23(2):
"Directions may authorise any person to whom a licence applies to receive gametes or embryos from outside the United Kingdom or to send gametes or embryos outside the United Kingdom in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the directions".
The intention is that that will be very closely controlled by the authority. The subsection continues:
"directions made by virtue of this subsection may provide for sections 12 to 14 of this Act to have effect with such modifications as may be specified in the directions".
The necessary framework exists. It is therefore a matter that we have addressed.
The subsection as drafted recognises two difficulties. First, there need to be strict controls so that the United Kingdom legislation which is the subject of the Bill cannot be circumvented by imports from abroad. Secondly, it makes no sense to attempt to legislate on what happens in foreign countries.
It is not anticipated that such movements of gametes and embryos will be at all commonplace, but it is important that we are able to deal with any that take place properly and reasonably. That is why the Bill proposes to enable the authority to give directions which will make it possible to attach particular condtiions to such movements. The precise conditions to be attached will depend to a great extent on the subject matter.
The clause as presently drafted provides for the authority to be able to impose by directions the very conditions which the amendment proposes. However, it is the Government's view that by seeking to incorporate those conditions into the body of the legislation the amendment would impose inflexibility and create considerable practical difficulties. The authority will recognise that not all the standards imposed by proposed licence

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conditions set out in the Bill will apply when gametes or embryos are exported for use in another country. It will also recognise and take full account of the possibility that high standards may not have applied in the countries from which it is proposed to import gametes or embryos. In either case it is hardly possible to lay down in United Kingdom legislation what shall happen in another sovereign jurisdiction.
We therefore consider that it makes more sense for the authority to treat such cases on their merits and impose on the import on the one hand or the export on the other the conditions that seem appropriate, taking into account the situation in the particular country at the time, the purpose for which the import or export is sought and any other factors which seem relevant.
Perhaps I may add in relation to what the noble Baroness has proposed that the authority would not only need to have the information required in this country, where there would be a supervised regime, but it would need to have effective methods of ensuring that the information it received was correct. Therefore the controls that would be required on import and export would have to be very closely geared to the circumstances. We are therefore catering for the very concerns that my noble friend has expressed but in a way that gives the authority very full discretion as to the precise method by which that result would be achieved.
I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment in the light of that explanation.
Baroness Phillips: Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, in relation to the remark of the noble Earl can he confirm that gametes and embryos would not be exported or imported for gain but that that is merely a phrase and the exchange would be between medical authorities?
The Lord Chancellor: The words "import" and "export" are used with what I believe is the correct meaning; namely, carried out of the country or carried in. Import means carried in and export means carried out. If those gametes or embryos are to be carried into the country, it is essential that proper protection is afforded because that could be an extremely delicate and dangerous matter, as I am sure all noble Lords appreciate. Similarly, for us to allow embryos to go out would offend most people unless we were satisfied that they would be used in the same way as noble Lords have in mind might be allowed here. However, the precise terms in which that provision should be expressed would relate closely to the situation. For example, it might be appropriate that a person should continue to be responsible for the embryo until an operation was carried out. A much more specific provision would be required than would be appropriate in the case of an ordinary licence which, in a licensed institution, was to run for some time in this country.
Baroness Elles: I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for his explanation. Perhaps he will be kind enough to consider this point. My amendment refers to
"any person receiving gametes or embryos".
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Clause 23(2) states:
"Directions may authorise any person to whom a licence applies".
Would the phrase
"any person to whom a licence applies"
also cover employees working within the framework under a person to whom a licence has been given and —the point raised by my noble and learned friend —an individual woman residing outside the United Kingdom who wished to take embryos with her to continue the treatment? That point is perhaps not completely covered by Clause 23(2), although I accept my noble and learned friend's general explanation. Rather than take up the time of the Committee, perhaps he would be willing to agree to consider that point. I should then withdraw my amendment.
The Lord Chancellor: Before my noble friend sits down, it may be worth giving what I think is the answer; namely, that no person shall keep or use an embryo except in pursuance of a licence. That is the basic doctrine for this country. The only way in which a person could, therefore, lawfully either import or export an embryo or gamete would be under licence. That covers the point but, naturally, I shall be happy to consider it further.
Baroness Elles: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 23 agreed to.
Clause 24 agreed to.
Clause 25 [Procedure for approval of code]:
[Amendment No. 125A had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy Lady Saltoun of Abernethy moved Amendment No. 125ZA:
Page 14, line 4, leave out subsection (4) and insert —
("(4) If the Secretary of State does not approve a draft, he shall give reasons to the Authority.
(4A) If the Secretary of State approves a draft, he shall lay it before Parliament; and if either House of Parliament passes a resolution requiring the draft to be amended the Secretary of State shall withdraw the draft and shall prepare a draft in substitution for the one which is withdrawn.
(4B) No resolution shall be passed by either House of Parliament under subsection (4A) above in respect of a draft after the expiration of the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which a copy of the draft was laid before that House; but for the purposes of this subsection no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.
(4C) If, on the expiry of the period of 40 days mentioned in subsection (4B) above, no resolution requiring amendment of the code has been passed by either House of Parliament, the draft shall not come into force until it has been approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.
(4D) Where the Secretary of State withdraws a draft under subsection (4A) above, he shall lay an amended draft before Parliament and the amended draft shall not come into force until it has been approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.").
The noble Lady said: The object of the amendment is to ensure that the draft code of practice which the

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licensing authority will issue to the licensees can be amended as well as approved not only by the Secretary of State, but by both Houses of Parliament.
Although I was naturally sorry that the Committee did not agree with me over the question of the provision of AID to unmarried women, reports in the press that I intend to raise the matter again on Report are quite unfounded. Apart from anything else, it is against the rules of the House to do so. I took great comfort from the words of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor at cols. 800 and 801 of Hansard of 6th February, about the emphasis that the code of practice would put on the welfare situation of any child to be born as a result of the treatments. I hope that I shall have the opportunity of reading the code when it has been drafted, and I have great confidence that it will be satisfactory.
However, governments and Secretaries of State change. Perhaps noble Lords will consider that in a matter of such importance —and it is a matter of great importance as it will give directions on the conduct of licensees in many other areas besides the welfare of children —Parliament should have a chance to amend, as well as approve, the code, both when it is first drafted and later on, should changes be made to it in the future. There is a precedent for that practice in Section 118 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
Perhaps I may also suggest that whoever drafts the code should have his attention drawn to the recommendations of R. Snowden and G. Mitchell of the Institute of Population Studies at Exeter University, in Chapter 9 of their book Artificial Reproduction, a Social Investigation. They emphasise the importance of counselling and the greatest care as to the suitability of prospective parents as parents. I beg to move.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: I support the amendment, which ensures that the spirit of the amendment which the noble Lady moved and lost shall nonetheless receive due consideration when the regulations or code are drafted. It is an important point on which the Committee was narrowly divided. It is a matter which noble Lords may well think is best left to the code rather than to primary legislation. The status of the code is made clear in Clause 24(4). It is advisory and it does not constitute secondary legislation. The Committee is therefore in no way inhibited in praying against secondary legislation and the provisions of subsection 4(c) of the amendment in that regard are apt. I support the amendment.
Lord Ennals: Without saying a word for or against the amendment, as the noble Lady who moved it referred to the Mental Health Act, and as the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, who raised the issue a few weeks ago, knows, perhaps we may put on record the fact that it took from 1983 to 1990 to produce a satisfactory code of practice which was then debated and approved by both Houses. I hope that it will not take seven years for the operation to be completed. It should be said —and I hope that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will confirm
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this —that there will be some encouragement that the process will be completed rather more speedily. Noble Lords on all sides of the Chamber, whichever position they take, want to see effective codes of practice. The sooner that they can be presented in a way that we can understand and debate them, the better.
The Lord Chancellor: First, I entirely agree that the code should be produced as rapidly as possible consistent with the subject matter with which it deals. Secondly, when I replied to the earlier amendment of the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, to which she referred, I had in mind the possibility that statutory guidance —not just in the code, but a statutory provision dealing with the matter that she raised on the lines that I suggested —might go into primary legislation and control the code to some extent in that way. I am still considering whether I can bring forward such a proposal on Report, having regard to what happened to her amendment.
Clause 25 deals with the procedure which we have set out for the approval of the code. The Secretary of State would require to approve the draft. If he did not approve it, he must deal with the matter by requiring a further draft. The consultation must be wide, as subsection (3) requires. Subsection (4) is also important. It states:
"If the Secretary of State approves a draft, he shall lay it before Parliament and, if he does not approve it, he shall give reasons to the Authority."
Subsection (5) states:
"A draft approved by the Secretary of State shall come into force in accordance with directions."
The idea is that Parliament should see the code, but that the code should come into force immediately. If Parliament did not care for the code, that point could be drawn to the attention of the Secretary of State responsible to Parliament and the result would be reconsideration of the code.
As the Committee knows, the purpose of the code will be to give guidance to licence holders and persons who apply for licences from the authority on matters such as counselling arrangements, to which the noble Lady referred, and which are extremely important in this area, procedures for obtaining consent, and qualifications and experience of staff—such as the matters that we dealt with earlier in answer to the amendment of my noble friend the Duke of Norfolk. The code will be drawn up by the authority and will have the benefit of the authority's own expertise and that of any persons or groups whom they may wish to consult. I have already mentioned the detailed specialist experience that the authority will have across a number of different fields. I believe that it will be more than qualified to draw up a code of practice to be followed by licence holders and applicants for licences.
A code of practice is not intended to be unchanging. It is expected to reflect the wisdom of the day concerning those issues that it covers. As the Committee is aware, the field of human fertilisation and embryology is still relatively new and we can expect further advances to be made. It would be unwise if we required each new draft of the code not only to be approved by the Secretary of State who

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is accountable to Parliament but also to be laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament before it could come into force. One would then have the difficulty of being able to take action by means of the code to deal with some new development which might well require practice directions to be given in respect of it.
In effect, we should be requiring the code to go through an elaborate two-stage process of approval before it could be brought into effect or any change at all could be made in it. I cannot believe that the affirmative resolution procedure, which is normally reserved for regulations which make significant alterations in the effect of principal legislation, is appropriate for a code of practice which does not carry the status of a statutory instrument.
I believe that this procedure takes as a model that set out in Section 118 of the Mental Health Act 1983. That provision required the Secretary of State to draw up a code of practice and lay it before Parliament on the same basis as these amendments propose for the code of practice to be prepared by the Human Fertilisation and Embroyology Authority. There are important differences between the Mental Health Act code and the one provided for in Clause 25. First, the Mental Health Act code is to be prepared by the Secretary of State and his department rather than a statutory body which, as I indicated in earlier debates about the role and functions of the new authority, is intended to be independent in its day-to-day operations of government.
Secondly, the Mental Health Act code deals with matters such as professional guidance and the admission to hospital of patients suffering from mental disorders and professional guidance about medical treatments which may be appropriate for such patients. Those matters include serious issues affecting that vulnerable group of patients, such as the detention under the powers provided in the mental health legislation. I do not therefore think that there is a direct analogy between the requirements in the Mental Health Act code and the matters to be dealt with in this new code with which we are now dealing.
Clearly in that situation Parliament felt it right to impose very careful safeguards in a code being prepared by central government themselves which, among other things, dealt with restricting the liberty of patients who, in the nature of their illnesses, were not in a position to defend themselves. The position with the code of practice in this Bill is altogether different. I believe that it would not be right to look to that as an appropriate model. As I said earlier, we shall look carefully at the issues raised in our debates in Committee to see whether some statutory directions in relation to the code are appropriate. I mentioned one in particular.
The code will not set out regulations but will give guidance which licence holders will be expected to follow. That guidance can be expected to change with advances in the field. Surely it would be inappropriate to make too cumbersome a procedure necessary to make an effective change in the code.
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I hope that the noble Lady will feel that we give effect to her concerns but that the way in which that is done in the basis of this legislation is appropriate for this particular code.
6.30 p.m.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord for that very helpful explanation and for his remarks about the possibility of guidance on certain matters in secondary legislation. On that account I shall withdraw this amendment. But before I do so perhaps the noble and learned Lord could possibly arrange that when the draft code has been prepared a copy of it is placed in the Library.
The Lord Chancellor: I see no difficulty in that. The authority will be consulting quite widely on the code and I should expect it to be very easy for noble Lords to have sight of it at that stage.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: I thank the noble and learned Lord for what he has just said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 125A had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
[Amendment No.125B not moved.]
Clause 25 agreed to.
Clause 26 [Meaning of "mother"]:
Lord Teviot Lord Teviot moved Amendment No. 126:
Page 14, line 15, at end insert—
("(3) Where a woman is to be treated as the mother of a child by virtue of subsection (1) above, the prescribed particulars concerning the birth of the child required by the law governing the registration of births shall include an indication that the woman registered as the mother is so registered by virtue of this subsection..")
The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 129, 133, 135, 137 and 144. In previous discussions I mentioned that certain matters were applicable to all these amendments but my general introduction to this group of amendments is based on my genealogical interests. The noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, will be discussing primarily the very important consequences to the family.
At the outset perhaps I may say how much I have appreciated the interest shown by the British agencies for adoption and fostering. Genealogy may still convey to many people an image of some body of people once called the upper classes who can trace their descent from ancestors who came over with William the Conqueror. However, even if that image was ever a fair one it has ceased to be so over the past 25 years. Since the 1960s the study of genealogy and family history has grown dramatically among people of all social origins who are interested in understanding the life and surroundings of their recent ancestors, many of whom would be termed as of humble status.
It has been estimated that in England alone 70,000 people are currently interested in tracing their

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ancestry and belonging to a family history society. More than 2,000 visitors a day use the records of the General Register Office and many are family historians. Drover's Dictionary of Psychology, 1953 edition, defines genealogy as:
"the investigation of the genetics of the ancestral descent of an individual".
One can therefore continue to say that the importance of genealogy in medical research, expecially research into the inheritance of genetic defects, grows every year as more and more illnesses, from colour blindness to fatal conditions, are found to be of an inherited nature.
Genealogists are very concerned that the Family Law Reform Act 1987 should have thrown into doubt the birth certificate and thus the genetic record of every child registered in England and Wales. As it stands this Bill does nothing to correct that matter. It is unfortunate that the Bill now drafted had to include this matter as it was discussed specifically by the Warnock Committee. For various reasons I personally declined to come into the discussion until we had this Bill before us.
The present Bill allows for the birth of a child following AID or as a result of any one of many modern techniques to be registered as if that child were a normal legitimate child. That is so not only where the legal father is not the genetic father or the legal mother is not the genetic mother but also where neither the legal father nor the legal mother is the genetic parent of the child. It is the view of genealogists and others that the birth certificate of such a child should indicate in some way the fact that it is not the genetic child of its legal parents. It should be done in a discreet manner. The amendment suggests that it would only be meaningful to informed people. However, we might mention that there is nothing discreet about the birth certificate of an illegitimate or adopted child. The facts are there for everyone to see. We believe that the facts should be indicated in those cases as well.
I visited a gynaecological clinic and spoke to an eminent professor who has been quoted and whose name I shall not mention. I put this point to him, and his feelings were that there should be no secrecy.
If we do not do anything to mark the certificates we are in effect abandoning any real claim that our birth certificates and birth registers show genetic relationships. In the past it was always an offence knowingly and wilfully to give wrong information to a registrar. It is one thing for an individual to give false information and to risk prosecution but quite another for a government to create a legal fiction. We believe that every adult has the fundamental right to information about his or her genetic parents. We also believe that this right is more important than the desires of genetic parents to keep the information secret.
As a genealogist one tends to see this problem from the point of view of the child. It is a point of view which has often been overlooked. One can obtain the consent of all the people concerned but one canot obtain the consent of the person ultimately the most concerned: that is, the resultant child. The
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desire for confidentiality and privacy by the parents is a natural one, but as the Warnock Report says in paragraph 4.12, in deceiving family and friends one also deceives the child. We have to be cautious about situations in which the whole of family life is built on deceit; whether it is a deceit about which any two people know or the other relatives know, the child is unaware of it.
My noble friend Lady Saltoun will go much further into that area. As a genealogist one is struck by the number of people interested in tracing the origins of their parenthood, not of their more remote descent. It is adopted children who want to find their real genetic parents, illegitimate children who want to trace their fathers, or mothers of children given up for adoption who want to trace those children. Children are often in great distress and will go to enormous lengths to trace the real truth about their origins, however unsavory the facts may be and however well disguised they have been in the past.
Those who enter into the kind of arrangement included in this Bill will no doubt do so after much painful discussion and lengthy counselling. In that process their eyes must be open to the long-term consequences of what they are doing and to the rights of the child they are creating. The donor must also realise the effect of what he is doing and realise that in later years he may be confronted with the children for whom he is genetically responsible. He should realise that he must be able with a clear conscience to explain these things to his own wife and children.
Here I shall depart from my brief because in general discussions there has been talk about donors being medical students. I have been told that they are not of an age to be generally suitable. We hope that the authority will look into this area most carefully. One believes that the best donors would be those in the mid to late thirties or early forties who have had their own family and who wish to provide others. It is a very serious matter. I believe there have already been consequences of donors wondering whether there are children of theirs around, and those donors have been in a rather upset condition.
Above all, however, problematic this may be, the children must be brought up in the knowledge that the circumstances and facts of their birth must be recorded for future generations, and the certificate must be marked in some way. The whole situation of births is clarified in the amendments we are proposing.
With regard to Clause 26, from the genetic and genealogical points of view we come to the crux of the amendments in Amendment No. 126. This amendment provides for marking of the birth certificate to identify the status of the mother. Until the advent of embryo transplantation any woman giving birth to a child was that child's genetic mother. The identity of the genetic mother, unlike the genetic father, was never in doubt and the birth certificate, except in cases of gross fraud, was a true record of the child's genetic mother. Adopted children's birth certificates on re-registration after adoption always made it clear that the child was adopted and not the genetic child.
Now an embryo deriving from an egg donated by one woman can be implanted in the womb of another woman, and a woman giving birth to a child is no longer necessarily the genetic mother of that child. This amendment seeks to mark the birth certificate of a child born as a result of such transplantation to show that he or she is not or may not be the genetic child of the woman described on the certificate as his or her mother. If the Bill is not amended, the accuracy of any birth certificate as a true record of a person's genetic mother will be suspect. As the genetic record of maternal descent the registration of birth will have been destroyed. Destruction of the record is an awesome responsibility.
I should also make it clear at once that the amendment is not intended to affect the legal status of the woman described on the certificate as mother. It retains her position for all purposes except those of Clause 28(3) and for other purposes which may be introduced if other amendments to this Bill are carried. It is right and proper that the woman who has become a mother by virtue of Clause 26 should be just as much a mother as one who, by adopting a child as with an adoption, lets the fact be mentioned on the certificate.
The amendment requires that the birth certificate of the child be annotated, as I have mentioned, in the most discreet manner. Against the mother's name on the certificate would appear the simple note that she was the mother by virtue of Clause 26(3) of the Bill. Such a notation would indicate to an informed person that the mother on the birth certificate was not the mother of the child. If the child does not wish it to be generally known, he or she can use the short form of the birth certificate which omits details of parentage altogether. That was a most satisfactory procedure brought in just after the last war.
I come now to the next and last amendment in the group which deals with the father—Amendment No. 129 to Clause 27 which follows the previous one in marking on the child's birth certificate the true status of the father. Instances in which the mother has her status by virtue of Clause 26 will always lead to the husband having status by virtue of Clause 27. The only exception is where the embryo is derived from the sperm of the legal mother's husband but the egg is that of another woman. However, the reverse is not true. Artificial insemination as mentioned in subsection (1) of Clause 27 affects the status of the father and not that of the mother.
What I have said about the previous amendments applies here. Every child has an undeniable right to know the truth about its genetic parents. The information about the father does not allow the brothers, sisters or other close relatives of the child to make inquiries. Because of such full information which is available to the child at the age of 18, there is no need for the existence of subsection (b) about the child's intended marriage partner.
I hope I have explained these amendments clearly and succinctly. In regard to what was discussed on previous amendments, if Members of the Committee had feelings that they should not move an inch, I hope they will listen to this argument. I beg to move.
6.45 p.m.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: I entirely support all that the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, has said about the marking of birth certificates of the donor children from the point of view of their descendants who may wish to trace their ancestry. The need to know one's roots is a very fundamental one, and it is a question of a person's sense of identity, a lack of which could even lead to mental instability.
Long ago, before the age of the train and the steamship, most people spent their whole lives in the same part of the country and they as well as their neighbours knew exactly who they were. Then there was the family bible in which all births, deaths and marriages were recorded. Nowadays it is probably rare to spend one's whole life in the same district. There are Britons scattered over the whole world, and Scots especially, who come over here desperate to discover from where their forebears who emigrated came and how they fit into the family. If there is no differentiating mark on the birth certificates of donor children in future they will never in their researches know that any person is not a donor child; and neither will any donor child ever know for certain that he or she is not a donor child unless he happens to have asked his parents in their lifetime or they have told him that he was or was not.
I do not think it necessary that the short birth certificate should be marked, but the long one and the entry in the register should record the fact that the child was born by donation. To put nothing in the register or on the birth certificate may or may not be telling a lie with regard to the identity of the legal father, but it can only be described as being exceedingly economical with the truth about the actual parentage of the child.
There is another reason why it is essential for the birth certificate to be marked, and for that reason it is necessary that the words "by donation" appear on the certificate. It is important to put all possible pressure on the parents of the donor child to tell him that he is a donor child so that he does not accidentally discover the fact later. There have been cases where donor children have discovered that fact and it has been a traumatic experience for them as it has been for adopted children. It is not something that should be risked, and attempts at secrecy will carry that risk. The parents may quarrel over the child and let the secret out, or someone may tell a third party in confidence and that confidence may be broken. It is now accepted that adopted children should be told that they are adopted while they are still young, so that they can grow up with the knowledge. The same should surely apply to donor children. It is more difficult to tell a young child, but there are ways of doing it, and it has been done.
If the birth certificate is marked, the parents will be under greater pressure to tell the child than if it is not. Snowden and Mitchell of the Institute of Population Studies at the University of Exeter in their book Artificial Reproduction, A Social Investigation which I mentioned earlier, maintained that where children are told when they are young they accept the fact happily. They stress the great importance of counselling.
Lord Robertson of Oakridge: My Amendment No. 137 is grouped with the amendments that we are discussing, and so it might be for the convenience of the Committee if I were to speak to it now. In doing so, I am conscious that some fairly heavy 16-inch shells have been winging my way from the Government Front Bench as we have gone along this afternoon. The aim of the amendment is to ensure that by including the words "by donation" on the birth certificate children created through gamete donation would know the nature of their conception. That will enable them, if they so wish, to invoke the provisions of Clause 29 to discover at the appropriate time further information about their genetic parentage.
In line with the Family Law Reform Act 1987, the Bill would make it legally permissible to put inaccurate information on the birth certificate. The birth certificate would then show that there was nothing out of the ordinary in the birth and what led up to it, when in fact that was not the case. Although Clause 29 contains provisions to enable children to find out information about their parents, a child cannot seek such information unless it knows the method of its creation. Since we have no guarantee that the parents will tell their children —indeed, there may be some pressure not to tell them —the only way to ensure that the children know is to indicate on the birth certificate that there is something to find out. I suggest that the words "by donation" would do that. The children will then be able to seek further information and avoid all the unwitting problems of incest or potential hereditary disease.
I should think that in our time most of us have been asked by our doctor whether a particular disease had appeared in previous generations of our family. Perhaps I may emphasise that the provisions contained in Clause 29 are all very well, but they are not worth putting on paper if children do not know that there is a question to be asked.
When this place discussed the Family Law Reform Bill 1987, it was rightly pointed out that AID clinics encourage partners to maintain normal sexual relations while receiving treatment. It is therefore possible for children to be created naturally while AID treatment is being received. That problem would be avoided if the partners submitting to AID treatment agreed to a blood test for the child. That could be a condition of treatment. It would be sad if confidence in public records were undermined by Parliament ordaining that inaccurate information could legally be put on such records. Furthermore, it is wrong to put difficulties in the way of children to prevent them obtaining information about their creation which, by any standard, they are entitled to have.
The Earl of Lauderdale: We alluded to this subject earlier this afternoon. My noble and learned friend pointed out that existing birth certificates sometimes give information which is not historically accurate. Parents may conceal the fact that the father was someone else. That is sometimes innocently done. It might happen that a father does not know that
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he is not the father of the child. I remember a conversation with a Member of this place some years ago in which it was said that "We never know".
According to my noble and learned friend's earlier intervention, it is suggested that there should be no indication that such a procedure has been gone through. While one respects the need for privacy, something that we all agree is important, that need must be reconciled with the integrity of the records. If the records are going to be inaccurate that will be serious. It is difficult to believe that Parliament and my noble and learned friend would want anything to be done which would lead to official records being inaccurate. I beg my noble and learned friend to look at the matter sympathetically. It may not be necessary to have some indication on the birth certificate. The point could be covered in some other way. We must ensure that the integrity of the record is respected as well as the privacy of those concerned.
Lord Renton: The main principle should surely be, although there may be exceptions, that every birth certificate should contain the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. There are circumstances in which the truth with regard to the father's name is not always ascertainable. That is an exception into which we need not go. Another exception is made by Clause 26(1). For reasons which have already been given, I find it unsatisfacotry that we should create an exception in such wide terms as that subsection does.
I favour something along the lines of Amendments Nos. 126 and 129, which go together, or Amendment No. 137 which is an alternative as I see it. It would not be sensible to have all three amendments written into the Bill. They are consequential. I prefer Amendments Nos. 126 and 129 because Amendment No. 137 merely includes the words "by donation". I do not believe that that is specific enough in relation to the supposed mother or the supposed father.
I hope that my noble friends on the Front Bench will realise that this matter is important. It of course affects descent by blood and various things of which some families are proud. It is surely also important for medical reasons. There are times when the doctor needs to know whether an inherited characteristic has been transmitted. It may be essential to treatment to know. I greatly look forward to hearing what my noble and learned friend will say because this is a matter which the Bill does not yet have right. It is something which, with the Committee's help, can somehow be rectified.
7 p.m.
Lord Ennals: It had not been my intention to rise before the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor because it is my earnest hope that he will discourage the acceptance of the amendments to the same extent as his noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham did when dealing with similar amendments to the Family Law Reform Bill 1987. However, I have been a little disturbed by the trend of the debate so far and I wanted it to be known that there are at least some who are very strongly opposed to the amendments put forward and the concepts

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behind the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, and the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun. As I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, proceeding with his arguments, the more he proceeded the more I became opposed to the case he was seeking to make. For his sake I was glad he did not proceed further; otherwise I might have leapt to my feet rather than try, as I am trying now, to be as reasonable as I can.
I believe that the direction in which these amendments take us is unfortunate and undesirable. The most important fact is that the child who will result from an embryo implant comes from the mother's womb and in that sense is the product of the mother. There are of course all sorts of questions as to whose sperm it was which fertilised the embryo and created the child. Those are all questions that arise, along with others, in the records that exist at the moment. The noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, was reminding us of the situation, although perhaps he did not do it as specifically as the noble Baroness did when she was replying to an earlier amendment. I think she said that on the registration forms one in 20 of the fathers listed were not the fathers of the children appearing on the birth registration form.
I want to know why we should do all this. I believe that we are storing up, not for ourselves but for the children who result from the birth, a degree of trouble. A mother gives birth to a child, and that child has a life from that moment. I think that we are creating problems if we, as it were, encourage this rather macabre research into whose sperm it was.
The Earl of Lauderdale: Surely the medical argument is important. We have all been examined by a doctor at some time or other and the question has been asked: "Is there any madness in your family?" I have been asked that question many times. There is plenty now! Medical treatment may require knowledge of antecedents and if those antecedents are not known or are wrongly stated the treatment can be wrong as well. So from he child's point of view or that of the grandchild, surely the medical case is a very important one.
Lord Ennals: When we come to legislate we always have to balance one argument against another and of course the medical argument is one of them. I believe that the social argument against doing this is very much more powerful. It is not for us as legislators to tell parents what they should tell their children. I believe it is for parents to decide what they should tell their children. In many cases at a certain stage a mother may say to the child, "I want you to know the circumstances and how it was that mummy and daddy just were not able to produce you without a little bit of help from elsewhere". The parents might feel they wanted to tell the child that but I do not think they would ever want to add, "And Mr. So-and-So was the man from whom we managed to get the little bit of sperm that did the trick".
I do not believe that that is the right way for parents to behave; or perhaps what I really mean is that I do not think this is the right way for us as
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legislators to behave. It is most important that parents should have the responsibility for their children, with all the counselling and the social work backing that we can provide; but for us as legislators to decide to write on a child's birth certificate the words "by donation" to distinguish them from every other child is wrong. We do not now write the word "illegitimate" on a birth certificate concerning a child who is not born within marriage.
I see the noble Lord wishes to interrupt but may I just finish this and then I will sit down. I hope we shall not go down this line. I think that for elderly legislators to tell parents how they should look after the social problems involved with their children is not right.
Lord Teviot: The noble Lord talks about "illegitimate". The word is not used, but in the long birth certificate at the moment if the child is illegitimate a line is drawn straight across the space in column five referring to "father".
Baroness Macleod of Borve: I feel very strongly about this. Unfortunately the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, seems to be on the wrong foot. He gives great credit to the mother—and of course it is the mothers who give birth to the children —but he does not seem to think that the fathers matter at all. But very often they matter to the children as much as the mothers.
What is paramount is that children must be told the truth and they must be seen to know the truth if they want to. It is not likely that a child will want to see its birth certificate before perhaps the age of 14 or 15, and it would be able to do that at the age of 18, as is the case with children who are adopted. On that birth certificate the truth should be stated, the space should not be left blank. As the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, said, it can lead to terrible psychological problems if at the age of 18 or so you discover that nobody knows who your father is or where you came from. I believe the truth must be put on the birth certificate and must be told to the child as and when the child wants to know.
Lord Swinfen: I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, would take into consideration the case of a disease such as Huntington's chorea. Would it not be of the most considerable assistance and relief to the child to know that that particular disease, which he knows to be a horrible one, will not have been transmitted to him or her because it was all done by donation? The child would be able to prove to the family that he or she was not a carrier.
Lord Ennals: If I may just respond to that point immediately and then sit down, these are matters for decision by parents. That is the argument I am putting forward. I am not saying that children should never know, but I do not think it is for legislators to decide what children should know in these very intimate matters.
Viscount Craigavon: May I briefly follow up the line taken by the noble Earl and quote exactly what the noble Baroness, Lady Hooper, said at Second

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Reading (at col. 1112) on 7th December 1989. The noble Lord, Lord Ennals, referred to this. She said:
"But perhaps we should remember in this context that the clinical geneticists tell us that about one in 20 of the population today have a father other than the one named in the birth certificate".
At that point the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, interrupted her and said he thought that was a myth. I should be interested to know whether he has had any further thoughts about that. It is a very interesting statistic. The noble Lord gave an impression of all these people interested in genealogy burrowing away in the records. I am not sure how they would take into account the fact that that might be the case. I find when discussing this very interesting statistic with others that women are very much more prepared to believe it than men. Perhaps we should not forget the words Oscar Wilde put into the mouth of one of his characters:
"You should study the Peerage, Gerald … It is the best thing in fiction the English have ever done".
Lord Redesdale: When the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, was saying that it was for the parents to decide, I think he meant it with the best possible heart. However, having had some knowledge of foster children and adoption, these children desperately need to know who their parents were down the line. I do not see why children born in this way should not have the same right of finding out. They need to know, and it will cause problems. I totally agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Macleod said. I can assure the noble Lord that when the children come to the point of wanting to know, they desperately want to know.
Lord Ennals: Will the noble Lord recognise that there is a difference between adopted children and those born from their mother's womb? He shakes his head, but of course there is. The adopted child arrives in the family at a certain age, having been born elsewhere. Some have recollections of their early life. In this case we have children who were born from the womb of the person they know to be their mother and with a known father. These are not comparable situations.
Lord Redesdale: Although the mothers have given birth naturally without knowing the identity of the fathers, the children still desperately need to know.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: There is one other instance in which a person badly needs to know at least whose son or daughter he or she is not. It is in applying for life insurance. One is then asked what one's mother and father died of. Therefore, it is just as well to know who one's father was not.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: I briefly endorse the distinction which should be made between adoption and what is provided for in this legislation. They are not on all fours. The kindly laws of legitimacy should continue to be followed. They provide for the presumption of legitimacy of any child born to the wife of a marriage. That is a kindly and wise law of long standing and it should be preserved. By analogy, this Bill should follow that line.
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Secondly, the legitimacy of any child by a subsequent marriage of his or her parents is provided for by the law. Again, that is a kindly provision. We should continue to honour it when considering this legislation and not label children on their birth certificates with marks which could prove to be extremely distressing.
The Duke of Norfolk: I am certain that in such matters we should be guided by the truth. It is wrong to pretend by failing to tell the children. The truth will out; truth has the mastery.
7.15 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: The White Paper which we published in November 1987 made it clear that in the Government's view all adults over 18 should have a legal right to find out whether they were born as a result of sperm, egg or embryo donation and that those who were should be given right of access to certain non-identifying information about the donor or donors of the genetic material; for example, about their medical or genetic history. This is reflected in Clause 29. The point about medical records is dealt with absolutely. I can do no better than remind the Committee of the reason which the Government had when indicating that this was their policy in paragraph 83 of the White Paper:
"While the Government has much sympathy with the view that children born following donation should be able to seek out their genetic parents if they wish to, it also recognises the differences between adoption and donation. Its present view is that all adults over the age of 18 should have legal right to find out whether they were born following gamete or embryo donation: and that those who were should have a right of access to certain non-identifying information about the donor to be prescribed in regulations."
There is a balance to be struck here between the interests of children born through donation and others who may have an interest in tracing the genetic origins of such children and the importance of confidentiality of personal information. It is clear that many people believe that it is in the interests of children born following donation that they should be able to learn of that fact and, indeed, some think, also the identity of their genetic parents. If it were made a requirement that birth certificates should include the words "by donation" then, perhaps, it would be easier for children to trace their genetic origin. I realise that the Warnock Committee considered that it should be made possible, if the social parents so wanted, that birth certificates could indicate whether a birth has been by donation. However there was little support for the proposal for an optional "by donation" annotation of the birth register in the response to Warnock. That is not proposed in these amendments.
Certainly, it would alert a donation child looking at birth records to ask the authority for the information that he or she is entitled to under Clause 29. But it would also reveal to anyone seeing the certificate that the person had, or might have been, born following AID or IVF and that his or her parents had undergone treatment. This, I think, could be regarded as an invasion of the personal privacy of both the children concerned and their parents, as well as, possibly, a breach of confidence

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concerning the parents' personal medical information.
While I understand the argument made by the supporters of the amendment that it is important that the birth records contain truthful information about the actual circumstances of the birth, I believe that too much can be made of the argument. As I indicated in the earlier debate, in many cases where infertility treatment is not involved, the information about a child's father on the birth record may not reflect the true genetic position. That can arise for a number of reasons; for example, the mother may not know who the child's father is because she was having sexual intercourse with another man as well as her husband at the relevant time. After all, the birth register is a record and not a legal statement about the reality of who the child's father is. The noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, said that a doctor may ask what one's father died of. There is a chance that if one proceeds on the basis of what is shown on the birth certificate one may not give the correct answer. That is one of the problems.
In that connection, the noble Viscount, Lord Craigavon, mentioned the figure of 5 per cent. I have had an opportunity to look at that matter more closely. It is misleading to believe that at present the information on a birth certificate necessarily contains the full facts about the birth of a child. Members of the Committee will remember the surprise which greeted the reply made by my noble friend Lady Hooper on Second Reading. She indicated that clinical geneticists tell us that about one in 20 of today's population has a father other than the one named on the birth certificate. "Wrong paternity", if I may describe it as such, is an important matter to such medical specialists because, for reasons that have been outlined, they must take account of it in their clinical practice.
I am not aware of any published research reports from which one can derive with certainty an estimate of the prevalence of this state of affairs. But, in an article published in Nature on 26th October 1989, mention was made of a figure of 10 per cent. I have discussed the question with Professor Marcus Pembery, Professor of Paediatric Genetics at the Institute of Child Health in London. From his experience, he believes that 10 per cent. may be a somewhat high estimate. In his view, research studies where wrong paternity is an incidental finding, and clinical experience of clinical geneticists up and down the country each of whom has a service covering a wide geographical area, point to a prevalence of at least 5 per cent.
The importance of the matter is stressed in at least one text book and it takes up the point that I made in relation to the comment of the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun. An article written by Peter Harper, appearing on page 7 of Practical Genetic Counselling, 3rd edition, published in 1988, states:
"Illegitimacy must be borne in mind, especially in a puzzling situation. A family doctor or nurse may well, particularly in a small community, be able to clarify this possibility. Illegitimacy is not of course the problem, but mistaken paternity. New and definitive tests of paternity based on DNA will help to resolve those problems more easily, but may equally produce new difficulties by the more frequent detection of unsuspected non-paternity".
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A person investigating the incidence of a genetic disease may have genetic DNA records of more than one generation. It is possible for those who are skilled in the science to tell in some instances whether the genetic quality of a child is compatible with the parents. The result is that sometimes, quite incidentally and not as part of any deliberate study, that is apparent. Of course, if the treatment or diagnosis is based on the birth certificate, as is obvious, mistakes can be made. The science of genealogy, in so far as it rests on birth certificates, is not on completely secure foundations. Nevertheless, it is still an important subject.
The birth certificate as such is not necessarily a correct record of the situation. Of course, the birth certificate has always to be understood in the light of the existing law. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson of Brompton, referred to the kindly presumption of paternity, which exists, and has existed for many years, in respect of a child born in wedlock.
The important thing is to decide how this matter should be taken forward. I want to point out that Clause 29 provides for the policy which I indicated a moment ago. Clause 29(2) states:
"A person who has attained the age of eighteen … may by notice to the Authority require the Authority to comply with a request under subsection (3) below, and the Authority shall do so"—
that is, shall give information about whether or not the parents of the child had those treatments—
"if the information contained in the register shows that the applicant was, or may have been, born in consequence of treatment services".
I need not remind the Committee that there may not be certainty in this matter depending on what else was happening at the same time as the treatment. Paragraph (b) states —and this is very important:
"the applicant has been given a suitable opportunity to receive proper counselling about the implications of compliance with the request".
As has been pointed out, that may be a matter of crucial effect on the person asking for the information.
In this legislation we have a perfectly clear way in which a person who may think that he or she was born as a result of one of these treatments can require the authority, which shall have kept the necessary records, to indicate whether or not the parents who are shown on the certificate were involved in treatment of that kind. Therefore, the child can find out through records to which he has access. On the other hand, those records are not open to everyone and the public cannot find out that information. That matter of privacy is respected because the right to receive the information is fairly limited in terms of Clause 29, but the person himself can find that out.
The information given in Clause 29 does not go the full distance which some would like. It goes the distance which is required to indicate "by donation". That can be found out from those records. However, the identity of the genetic father is not indicated. The reason for that is, as I explained earlier, that this policy depends upon the view that the particular identity of the genetic father in an AID case requires to be protected for reasons of continued supply. That

1319
is a matter of general experience which this policy recognises. So far as the information is important for medical or genetic studies, all the information necessary is available in the records. Of course, the precise detail of the record will be settled by the authority.
In my submission to the Committee, the main aims sought by this amendment and the related amendment are achieved in a way which is more consistent with the privacy of the family arrangements and family life than the amendments themselves. They go as far as is reasonable in that respect. Of course, a genealogist would not be able to search the record, but a genealogist with the authority of an applicant —that is, with the authority of a child who wanted to know —would be able to obtain this information on the basis that the child was a qualified applicant who had been counselled before the information was sought.
I suggest to the Committee that most of the concerns —indeed, I hope, all the concerns —expressed are adequately catered for in an appropriate way by the provisions which we have made. In the light of that explanation, I hope that my noble friend Lord Teviot will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
The Earl of Lauderdale: I am not quite sure how a child, or indeed an adult if he has reached the age of 21, would know that he could apply to the authority or have any reason to do so if his mother had not told him that there was a donation.
The Lord Chancellor: If he was concerned about that, all he needs to do is to apply to the authority and that authority will tell him whether or not there are grounds for his fears. If a person is happy with his roots and does not wish to know anything more about them, then he can leave the matter as it is. However, if he wishes to find out, provided that he satisfies the condition of having been counselled, he need only apply to the authority which will be able to tell him whether or not his parents had been in receipt of treatment covered by the Bill at the appropriate time, although it cannot tell him exactly how he was born.
Lord Swinfen: Before my noble and learned friend sits down, does not everyone who writes to the authority have to receive counselling before an answer is given? Could that not mean a lot of counselling?
The Lord Chancellor: If Members of the Committee take the view, as I do, that it is an important matter to know what the likely effects will be, then I believe that that counselling is very well placed. I do not imagine that there will be a huge desire to resort to these applications. It may be that more people will have recourse to this process than may at first sight appear, although the total number affected by these procedures is likely to be rather small. Even so, the need for counselling is so important that it is right to make it a condition that a person should be counselled before he receives an answer to the query.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: Perhaps I may say, if only for my own satisfaction, how deeply I agree with what my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said. The world was not made for genealogists but was made for people. If you muck about with a birth certificate, you are labelling a child as a second class person.
The only legitimate point made by the supporters of the amendment has been the question of the potential desire of a child to know his origins. That point is met, as far as humanly possible, by Clause 29. I do not agree with them but I have always understood those who find that these practices are so inherently immoral that they should not be allowed at all. If anybody has studied the well known story of Oedipus, which I have seen re-enacted in real life more than once in some rather modified form, they will appreciate the catastrophic effects of labelling a child. They will also appreciate the high desirability of the long tradition of English law that there is a presumption of paternity in respect of a child who is born of a marriage and brought up as a child of the marriage. That is something which is based on humanity and not on the anfractuosities of the professional genealogist.
Lord Robertson of Oakridge: I listened to what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said with great interest. One point worries me. He said that if anyone was concerned about their origins they could apply under Clause 29. Putting "by donation" on the birth certificate is a pointer that someone should be concerned. There may be a less clumsy way of dealing with this problem than putting those words on a birth certificate, but if we do not have some pointer in view then the only solution is for everyone, when they reach the age of 18 —man or woman —to write to the authority and say, "Have you got anything for me?"
7.30 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: That is a solution for those who want to find out the information. The problem about putting anything on the birth certificate is, first, that it is public to everyone, whatever their interest or connection with the family. Secondly, if the Committee believe in counselling before this information is disclosed —which I hope and believe most Members of the Committee may do —if such information is put on the birth certificate the child may discover it completely by accident when he tries to get a copy of his birth certificate. He will not have any opportunity to have counselling; he will suddenly discover it. I believe this has happened in other circumstances, but this is a difficult problem. One of the disadvantages of putting this information on the birth certificate is that there cannot be an enforceable requirement for counselling before the information is disclosed.
Lord Teviot: This debate has been long and wide-ranging, but perhaps I may pick up one or two points. Coming back to my noble friend Lord Lauderdale, integrity of records and accuracy are paramount. Also, I am glad my noble friend Lord Renton preferred my Amendments Nos. 126 and

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129 to Amendment No. 137. I will pick up the last point of my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham. Not only the professional genealogist but also very much the British adoption, fostering and other family organisations feel the same as we do. This is not just something which will suit us.
The noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, spoke about the family consequences. My noble friend Lord Redesdale, with his great practical experience, whom I was delighted to hear, says that fathers need to know. All right, there is Clause 29, but that is not the easiest way round. As regards discovering that your birth certificate contains the words "by donation", it is important that the child should be told. I have seen people arrive at a general registry office for the first time and find their names not in the birth registers but in the adoption registers. That is horrifying. These things happen. It is important for everyone to know.
In view of the support one has had for these amendments, despite all that is going on, I believe that the Committee must decide. The truth should be paramount and I therefore press this amendment.
7.33 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 126) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 35; Not-Contents, 97.

DIVISION NO. 1

CONTENTS

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Mersey, V.

Ashbourne, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Carnock, L.

Norfolk, D.

Craigmyle, L.

Oxford and Asquith, E.

Falmouth, V.

Peel, E.

Fortescue, E.

Phillips, B.

Halsbury, E.

Reading, M.

Harvington, L.

Redesdale, L.

Hemphill, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Hylton, L.

Salisbury, M.

Iddesleigh, E.

Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly. [Teller.]

Jakobovits, L.

Kinloss, Ly.

Savile, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Strabolgi, L.

Liverpool, E.

Sudeley, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Swinfen, L.

Masham of Ilton, B.

Swinton, E.

Melville, V.

Teviot, L. [Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS

Addington, L.

Carnegy of Lour, B.

Airedale, L.

Colwyn, L.

Allenby of Megiddo, V.

Craigavon, V.

Alport, L.

Crathorne, L.

Ampthill, L.

Darcy (de Knayth), B.

Attlee, E.

Davidson, V. [Teller.]

Belstead, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Blease, L.

Donaldson of Lymington, L.

Boardman, L.

Downshire, M.

Borthwick, L.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Bridge of Harwich, L.

Elliott of Morpeth, L.

Brightman, L.

Ennals, L.

Broadbridge, L.

Ferrers, E.

Brookes, L.

Fraser of Carmyllie, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Galpern, L.

Butterworth, L.

Gardner of Parkes, B.

Caithness, E.

Graham of Edmonton, L.

Caldecote, V.

Hacking, L.

1322

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Molloy, L.

Monk Bretton, L.

Harmar-Nicholls, L.

Mountevans, L.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Munster, E.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Nicol, B.

Henderson of Brompton, L.

Northfield, L.

Henley, L.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Hives, L.

Onslow, E.

Home of the Hirsel, L.

Orkney, E.

Hooper, B.

Orr-Ewing, L.

Houghton of Sowerby, L.

Parry, L.

Howie of Troon, L.

Prys-Davies, L.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Johnston of Rockport, L.

Rea, L.

Joseph, L.

Reay, L.

Kaberry of Adel, L.

Renton, L.

Kilbracken, L.

Robson of Kiddington, B.

Kirkhill, L.

Seear, B.

Lawrence, L.

Seebohm, L.

Liverpool, Bp.

Shackleton, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B

Stockton, E.

Stoddart of Swindon, L.

Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.

Thomas of Gwydir, L.

Lockwood, B.

Tordoff, L.

Lothian, M.

Tranmire, L.

Lyell, L.

Turner of Camden, B.

McGregor of Durris, L.

Underhill, L.

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Warnock, B.

Marshall of Goring, L.

White, B.

Mason of Barnsley, L.

Winchilsea and Nottingham, E

Merrivale, L.

Mills, V.

Winstanley, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
7.40 p.m.
Clause 26 agreed to.
Baroness Blatch: This may be a convenient moment to resume the House. In moving that the House be now resumed, I suggest that we reconvene the Committee stage on this Bill not before 8.45 p.m. I beg to move that the House do now resume.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

London Local Authorities (No. 2) Bill [H.L.]
7.41 p.m.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
I understand from the speakers whose names appear on the speakers' list today that the controversial element in this Bill is Clause 4. I understand that almost every speaker will be speaking to this clause, so I shall restrict my remarks to that. As your Lordships know, the Second Reading of this Bill was on 15th February 1989, so that is almost a year ago. The controversial element is about the licensing of private hire vehicles and the effect that this might have on the London black cabs.
The taxis, or black cabs as we know them, are famous throughout the world. They are controlled by the Home Office in London. But there is no control whatsoever over private hire vehicles. The public always call them minicabs no matter what we call them technically. This Bill seeks to provide

1323
control over minicabs or private hire vehicles. Under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 all vehicles must be licensed for hire. London was excluded and nothing was implemented in the London area.
I think we all recognise the unique role of the London taxi. This Bill proposes no changes whatsoever for the black cab. But it is clearly in the public interest to have some control over private hire vehicles. As a magistrate, I often hear cases where minicabs are involved in accidents. They have no insurance; the vehicles are unsafe and sometimes the driver has no driving licence. All too often he has a criminal conviction and is frequently driving as a minicab driver in order to earn money to pay off a court fine in connection with criminal activities.
Disabled people have advantage taken of them by unscrupulous drivers who overcharge them. I have heard that comment made in this House. RADAR originally had a degree of concern about the supposed threat to the black cab, but on the whole it is now thought that it would be to its advantage to have the minicabs licensed. There would be then more reliable drivers and they would also be identifiable.
There seems to be no pricing system at all. There is a dangerous criminal element such as was shown in a television programme last Friday. It was shown that there were drivers with no legitimate standard at all who posed as drivers in order to drive off women. Rape cases were reported on television. The black cab representatives who have discussed the matter with me are concerned that controls would be ineffective, unenforceable or not enforced.
That may be true, but in my view any control, however inadequate or poorly enforced, can be no worse than the present system of no control. It is estimated that there are about 40,000 private hire vehicles operating in London. Clearly, there is a need for them because if that need did not exist they would not be in business. The new licensing burden will be quite an added responsibility for local authorities, but it is necessary.
Women in particular are a section of the community quite dependent on private hire vehicles to enable them to go out at night. It should be possible for them to go out safely at night in such vehicles. The "London Programme" shown on television last Friday, to which I have already referred, was instructive and disturbing. It made the case for control more vividly than I can tonight. There were serious and alarming interviews with women who had been raped. There was another interview which I found lighter because I thought that the man, the subject of the interview, was probably not as bad as he made out. However, the interview showed how bad the situation can be.
The man concerned was a cowboy operator who had what appeared to be a car radio, in order, he said, to make people feel more confident. His radio was not connected. He explained that he spoke into it occasionally to make people feel that he was part of a bigger organisation. If a passenger remarked on the lack of a reply, the driver said that he must be out of radio range.
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I was impressed by a number of points made by the black cab representatives and I consider it important that local authorities should bear these in mind when they are considering matters of licensing. First, if meters are allowed in private hire vehicles there must be a maximum rate at which they can be set. It would be very wrong to have a meter charging six times as much as a black cab, a meter which appeared to be perfectly legitimate and yet it was really exploiting the unwary passenger.
I understand that at the moment this Bill will not give powers to implement such control over the meter. That may be a further stage to come. It may be that at this stage the local authorities would not allow meters because of the lack of control over them. That is an interesting point to be considered.
The second point is that vehicles must be subject to regular testing to standards above those for private vehicles. I am informed that the average minicab in London covers about 50,000 miles a year compared to a family car which travels about 15,000 miles a year. Thirdly, there must be no possibility of confusion between the hackney carriage driver and the private hire vehicle driver. Neither should the vehicles be the same; nor should there be any possibility of confusion.
The fourth point is that some thought must be given to the fitness of the driver. I do not know what restrictions apply to black cab drivers, but I believe that anyone driving other people should be subject to regular medical and eye tests. The hire car drivers fulfil a need in London. There would not be 40,000 of these vehicles in use if there was no need for them. How often have noble Lords or friends been told by a black cab driver that he does not go south of the river. I have been checking this out with everyone whom I have met in the past week. I have received that answer from pretty well everyone. Another answer is that the driver is on his way home and can only take a passenger if he is going in that direction.
For some reason all black cab drivers seem to live either in North or East London. The 1847 Act obliges a black cab to take a fare anywhere up to six miles from Charing Cross. That was as far as a horse could comfortably travel; that is where the six miles came from. Under the law a taxi should carry a bale of hay for the horse. That is not done any more, and neither are you taken unquestioningly the six miles in any direction from Charing Cross.
But the most difficult thing to value is The Knowledge —that is the official name —by which London cabbies have an intimate awareness of London, a knowledge of its streets and of the quickest and best ways to get to any destination. The black cab and its driver are unsurpassed anywhere in the world. They must remain clearly identifiable as most people prefer to use a black cab to any private hire vehicle, particularly if the passenger wishes to be sure of reaching the destination and if it is a difficult one.
I have heard from taxi drivers that they face the threat of extinction. I do not accept this. I spent some time last week with a representative of the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association and on the following day I spent a similar amount of time with

1325
a minicab proprietor. When I put this point to him he gave me an interesting reply. He said:
"A lot of my drivers have been able to get the "knowledge" while they have been driving for me and they have gone on to become black cab drivers. I have never had a black cab driver wanting to come back to work for me. It must be better to be a taxi driver".
It must, my Lords. We wish to maintain and increase the number of black cabs and to see that they are not subject to unfair competition. But they are now subject to unfair competition. This Bill will help to control the situation and will be of benefit to the public. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read a third time. —(Baroness Gardner of Parkes.)
7.52 p.m.
The Earl of Winchilsea and Nottingham: My Lords, I am most encouraged by some of the remarks and sentiments expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes. However, I have serious doubts and reservations concerning Clause 4 of the Bill. The promoters wish to use its proposals regarding the licensing of private hire vehicles to implement the adoption of Part II of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 in London in line with the rest of England and Wales. But they fail to appreciate that, as concerns the licensing of private hire vehicles and hackney carriages, London is unique and cannot be lumped together with the provinces.
When the 1976 Act became law, Part II did not apply to London. In my opinion, nothing has changed since then to justify the changes which are now proposed. Indeed, I should like to quote a reply of the noble Viscount, Lord Davidson, to a Question tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, on 7th June 1989. He said:
"My Lords, I assure the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, that the statement by my honourable friend the Minister for Public Transport says that it is too early to propose new legislation, so no new legislation is proposed. As regards the London Local Authorities (No. 2) Bill, although technically neutral on private Bills, the department's Ministers have indicated that they do not welcome the proposals because the Bill would make each borough an independent licensing authority. Different approaches to licensing would cause confusion as so many journeys cross borough boundaries. I am told that the Bill is in some difficulty. As I have already indicated, although the Government are either benevolently or malevolently neutral on private Bills, on this occasion it is malevolently neutral". —[Official Report, 7/6/89; col. 852.]
The central proposal contained in Clause 4 affecting the licensing of private hire vehicles is that every participating London borough, at present consisting of 31 out of 32, should issue licences to applicants. The borough of Greenwich has refused to participate, so already the confusion starts. Why do these proposals pose direct and real threats to the licensed hackney carriages of London? They do so for the following reasons. First, there would be no enforceable controls exercised over the operations of minicabs in London after the introduction of Clause 4. Each participating borough council would be required to introduce controls and standards. In other words, it would be legislation on the hoof.
Secondly, even if tight and proper controls are in place before these proposals become law, who will
1326
enforce them? Will they be enforceable? Who is to police it all? Is it to be the Department of Transport and the Metropolitan Police, which already exercise strict controls over the licensed black taxis through the Public Carriage Office? Surely not, my Lords. The police already have their hands more than full with their many onerous duties and could not take on 35,000 minicab operators as well. If not the police, who then will do so? Will the London boroughs employ an army of enforcers to see that the yet to be initiated laws which it is hoped will control and limit the illegal activities of minicabs are enforced? Let us make no mistake about it: it will take an army.
In this context I should like to acquaint the House with an operation mounted in Birmingham in August 1989. Tired of massive illegal private hire operations in which hundreds of them were openly plying the streets for hire, Birmingham's principal consumer protection officer, in conjunction with Birmingham city police, mounted a round-up operation of some of these illegal and lethal cowboys. I was a part of that operation and spent most of one night in a police car observing what was going on. What I saw horrified me: ramshackle, broken-down vehicles offering themselves for hire almost invariably licensed from somewhere else —another authority — which invalidated their licence and their insurance. Most of the drivers when questioned by the police offered the excuse that they had been booked by telephone, but in no case could anyone be found who had made the booking. They were clearly cowboys.
My point is that those cowboys were under the controls of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 and that clearly the Act was not working as it was intended. And why? The reason was that to enforce it required an army of enforcers. The two nights in August in Birmingham required 36 people and six policemen to mount the operation. If one multiplies that figure by the total number of London boroughs, adds in the differences in population between Birmingham and London and takes into account the differences in size between the two cities, one has a rough idea of the gigantic problems that would face the enforcers, even if they were to exist.
I come to my third point. If minicab operators were to be given badges, plates and taxi meters, the public, be they Londoners, other citizens of this country or visitors from overseas, would assume that these vehicles were licensed taxis and were available for hire. Fourthly, visitors to London who telephone for a taxi, or who ask their hotel for a taxi, would assume that the driver of the vehicle that arrived would have a working knowledge of London. That is not so. The only two requirements asked for by the Bill for private hire licence applicants is that they hold a clean, current driving licence and have one year's driving experience.
My fifth point is that the Bill would allow minicabs to install taxi meters. No restrictions would apply to the rate, which could be set at anything the operator wanted or thought he could get away with. In other words, giving him a licence would legalise customer rip-off. Do we really want this? This legislation

1327
changes nothing. Already more than 35,000 minicabs are running around London, a good many of them operating within the law. But a large number do not operate within the law, and they will not change their ways because of these proposals, which merely give legality to unscrupulous hotel staff and minicab operators.
My sixth point is that local authorities would not be given access to the criminal records of licence applicants. Therefore it would be easy for an applicant to fail to declare any previous convictions for serious crimes. My seventh point is that the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 demands that both hackney carriages and private hire vehicles are maintained to the same high standards. That is wishful thinking, as I observed in Birmingham. How will this be achieved in London, and who will see to it? We are back again to that mythical army.
I come now to my eighth point. The method of licensing taxis in London was recently revised, allowing more applicants for licensing in the suburbs. Currently more than 900 drivers are passing through the knowledge test for London's suburbs in addition to those already operating with their yellow badges. Those 900 drivers will start to come on stream in April.
I move on now to point nine. Since 1985 the Metropolitan Police authorities have issued 3,964 new Hackney carriage licences in central London. Moreover, recent proposals submitted by the Association of Taxi Proprietors are designed to increase that number.
I turn now to point 10, and noble Lords will be relieved to know that I have nearly reached the end of my speech. The considerable investment made by the manufacturers of the black taxi, Carbodies of Coventry, in the wheelchair facility for disabled people would also be threatened by the legislation if minicabs were to be given licences. At present, all taxis coming off the assembly line in Coventry are required by law to provide that valuable facility. Who in their right economic minds will pay up to £20,000 for a new black taxi from Coventry when they can carry on their business operating from a second-hand car which they can buy from any local garage for a fraction of that price?
In conclusion, I should like to quote from a letter written by the Minister for Public Transport, Mr. Michael Portillo, to the Secretary of State for Transport, Mr. Cecil Parkinson. It is dated July 17th 1989. It reads:
"Government Ministers in the House of Lords, where the Bill"—
that is, the Bill which we are now discussing —
"currently rests, have expressed firmly severe doubts about the proposal's effectiveness and practicability. The Bill's promoters are currently considering how best to take matters forward given the problems encountered with a number of its proposals. My view is clear: while I am not opposed in principle to some form of regulatory system for London's minicabs I have yet to see a good case for introducing one now. Moreover I do not like the Boroughs' proposal for 32 licensing areas; it is over-complicated and will be a burden on businesses".
1328
I apologise to the House for the length of my speech tonight, but at stake is simply the finest licensed taxi service of anywhere in the world, bar none. It enjoys a hard-won reputation for its standards of excellence. The black, or whatever colour, London taxi cab is symbolic of this country. It is a symbol that is known, admired and respected the world over. In my opinion the proposed legislation would destroy that reputation at a stroke for the many reasons I have mentioned, and no doubt there will be further reasons put forward by other noble Lords.
I believe that the licensed taxi drivers are right to defend their trade. I for one stand by them and, in so doing, I ask the promoters of this Bill to withdraw Clause 4 for reconsideration by all interested and concerned parties.
I am not opposed to a licensed second-tier taxi service for London, nor are the licensed taxi drivers. However, what they and I are opposed to is that the second tier is licensed without the strict controls and regulations that govern the first tier.
8.3 p.m.
Earl Attlee: My Lords, I start by saying that I am implacably opposed to Clause 4 and the adoption of Schedule 2 to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976. The noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, said, if I heard her correctly, that the average family car travels about 15,000 miles a year. I suggest to her that she has got the figure wrong and that the figure is about half that. The noble Earl who has just spoken has given the House facts and figures. I shall not bore your Lordships by repeating them. However, I shall recount just one or two true stories about black cabs.
A few weeks ago a letter written by an American tourist appeared in the Daily Mail. He explained how he had hailed a black cab and asked to be driven to his hotel. He subsequently arrived there, paid the black cab driver and went into the hotel. The taxi drove off and was ultimately flagged down by another person. However, on opening the door the driver saw a wallet sitting on the floor. He turned down the fare, drove back to the hotel and handed in the wallet. The tourist concluded his letter by asking, "Is there any other capital city in the world which has such honest cab drivers as those in London?".
On August 1st the year before last my wife and I were being driven towards the Royal Horseguards Hotel in a black cab. I think that what I have to say will embarrass my wife as she happens to be listening to me tonight. We had just got married. We were sitting in the back of the cab and, as newlyweds tend to be, we were fairly happy. When we arrived at our destination one of us said —I claim that I said it; but my wife claims that she did —to the cab driver that we were sorry, but that we had just got married. Whichever one of us it was asked how much the fare would be. The cab driver said, "It's all right, it's my wedding present to you". I ask noble Lords would a cab driver anywhere else in the world do that?
On another day I picked up a cab at Waterloo, although I normally travel by Underground. We

1329
went on our journey but instead of turning left the driver turned to the right and we went over the wrong bridge. The cab driver turned to me and said, "Sorry, guv', I went over the wrong bridge". I said "Yes, I know". He then said, "Don't worry, sir, I'll put it right". Eventually we arrived at your Lordships' House and he reduced the fare by 1.50. I said, "No way", and I paid him the full amount. I knew he was wrong and he knew he was wrong; but it was a genuine mistake.
I have a very good friend. As a young man he had to be taken to the dental hospital in Leicester Square. His mother hailed a cab and the cab driver asked, "Where to?" She asked, "Do you know the dental hospital in Leicester Square? He said, "Yes, why?" She thought to herself: "Oh, my God! I've got one of those". She explained that she had to take her son there for treatment. He said, "What's wrong with him?" She said, "Well, he's got an abcess on an impacted wisdom tooth". After that the taxi driver took them to the hospital.
When they left the hospital two hours later she heard a loud whistle —the kind of whistle I have never been able to do, though I only wish I could. It was the same cab driver. He said, "Here lady, how's the nipper now? Is he all right?" She explained that he was. He said, "I thought I'd better wait for you". At that point he pulled out a key ring with a little compass upon it and handed it to the boy. When we talk about big-heartedness, such an example is beautiful.
Ever since I realised that this matter was to be debated each time I have got into a black cab —or whatever colour it may be —I have asked the driver, "Have you ever heard of any black cab driver molesting, assaulting or doing anything to a woman passenger?" Each driver has said, "No, never". If you read the reports in newspapers you will see that it is in fact licensed or unlicensed minicab drivers, some of whom are just out of prison, who commit such offences.
I love my wife and I adore my mother-in-law. I would hate them to hire anything except a black cab in the capital city. I do not trust minicabs. Indeed, some of the vehicles are falling to pieces. Moreover, if they have an MOT certificate I cannot think why. I think that the situation is terrible.
There is much that is wrong with the Bill we are discussing. The length of time it takes to acquire The Knowledge has already been mentioned. Moreover, if you have a yellow badge you can pick up a passenger from central London and take him outside your area, but you are not allowed to pick up a return fare. That is most unfair. If we pass this particular clause we shall destroy the position of the black cabs in London.
Our cab service in London is the envy of the world. Let us forget about capital cities; there is no large city in the world which has such honest and logical people as our black cab drivers. If we allow that situation to change all of us in this House, our children and grandchildren will regret it for evermore.
Lord Carnock: My Lords, in addressing your Lordships for the first time I have the task of giving some explanation of the decision of the committee of which I had the honour to be chairman regarding private hire vehicles. I had in mind to deal with this under three headings. The first relates to the need for the proposed legislation, the second to certain problems with the existing legislation and the third to the statement made on behalf of the government department.
As regards the first, it may be helpful to remind your Lordships that there are in London about 15,000 black cabs licensed by the Hackney Carriage Office and about 20,000 drivers so licensed. The number of private hire vehicles concerning which we heard evidence was 40,000, as stated by my noble friend Lady Gardner of Parkes. Of the 40,000, many work part-time, whereas the black cab drivers generally work full-time.
There was evidence that in certain areas of the private hire trade throughout the country cowboy operators were at work and criminal elements were attracted. Apart from offences under the Road Traffic Act and illegal plying for hire, drugs, prostitution, indecent offences with children and burglaries were all mentioned. There was evidence that some of the vehicles were dirty or unroadworthy and on occasions that there were physically violent clashes with the regular taxi trade.
In a recent police strike in Birmingham —which must be the same as the one about which we have already heard —on a Friday night no fewer than 286 alleged offences were uncovered. This was a one-off operation. We had evidence that enforcement was a persistent problem with the legislation.
Regulations under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 were in force in the majority of areas throughout the country, including all the great conurbations other than London. The only petitioner against the proposals was the Transport and General Workers' Union representing the three London taxi drivers' associations, the proprietors and the large licensed taxi radio circuits.
The union's main concern was to avoid the establishment of another regulatory system. It hoped to increase the number of black cabs regulated through the Hackney Carriage Office. This would mean that applicants for licences would have to pass the daunting knowledge of London test. Although a system of less exacting tests has been devised for certain peripheral areas, it appeared unlikely that there would be a sufficient increase in black cabs to meet the demand for hire vehicles. In any case the basic cost of a black cab according to the evidence that we heard is about £16,000. They are fine vehicles, many of which have special facilities for the disabled. In these circumstances the committee had little difficulty in deciding that the need for some regulation in the field of private hire was established.
In relation to the second matter, the history of the present legislation may usefully be recalled. The Hindley Committee first recommended that there

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should be some regulation in the field of private hire as long ago as 1939; but with the disturbances of the war and its aftermath, nothing was done until the Maxwell Stamp Committee in 1970 recommended the licensing of minicabs. No action followed until the matter was picked up in local legislation by the Plymouth City Council Bill in 1975. The private hire provisions were subsequently lifted out of this Bill and inserted by amendment into the 1976 Act. Of course they only have effect if adopted by a local authority and within its area. The Act does not extend to London.
The geography of Plymouth, which is near my home, is such as not to present trans-boundary problems of significance, so it is not perhaps surprising that these problems have caused difficulty in other areas; and certainly they could be formidable in the case of the 31 London boroughs.
Perhaps I should explain that where there is control under the present legislation, a private hire vehicle can operate from a district where there are no, or only light, regulations and obtain custom in a neighbouring area which is stringently regulated but without complying with the regulations in force in that area.
This problem has been addressed by two amendments which were agreed prior to the hearing before the committee and which are now in the Bill. One of them provides for the Secretary of State to be consulted prior to the adoption of the private hire provisions by any borough, thus in practice enabling the department to exercise by persuasion, but only by persuasion, a co-ordinating role; and the other of which provides for the registration of a vehicle or driver in one borough to be effective in the other boroughs.
As regards the third and final matter, it will be remembered that at Second Reading on 15th February, 1989 my noble friend the Minister informed the House that the Government believed that there should be comprehensive legislation which would take the whole country into account. But subsequently the Government had second thoughts and on 11th May 1989 the Minister responsible in another place stated that the Government did not intend to change the present arrangements concerning the black cab or the knowledge of London test; nor did they intend to alter the distinction between the taxi and hire car trades. The reasons for this change of mind were not developed before the committee but the matter appeared to turn upon the desire of the Government to promote business opportunities by limiting restrictions upon entry into the trade.
The members of your Lordships' committee were not aware that the Government had changed their mind in this way until they were so informed by the departmental spokesman at the hearing on 13th October 1989. In reply to questions the departmental spokesman confirmed that the department would be ready to have consultations with each borough desiring to adopt a scheme in order to secure so far as possible a uniform system.
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In these circumstances the committee decided that the provisions relating to private hire, as amended, should proceed. In giving that decision I was asked to say that the committee had had regard to the fact that the Government had no plans for the introduction of general legislation for the regulation of private hire vehicles. I hope that this explanation will be of assistance to your Lordships.
8.18 p.m.
Baroness Macleod of Borve: My Lords, it is my very pleasant duty as the next speaker to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Carnock, on his excellent and well informed speech this evening. We have been friends for quite some time and since he is the Chief of the Clan Nicolson and we have been discussing clans a great deal this afternoon, this is for him an opportune day on which to have made his maiden speech. We hope that he will continue to give us his wisdom and knowledge in this sphere as well as others in the future. However, I do not think I can go all the way down the road that the noble Lord has traversed. From previous experience I favour enormously the system of black cab licensed drivers that we have in London. I understand that there are 19,000 licensed black cab drivers in London and that we are likely to have another 960.
As has been said so eloquently by the noble Earl, Lord Winchilsea, in an excellent speech, our black taxi cab drivers are second to none in the world. They are trained, trusted and their cabs are clean. I believe that the families of the drivers are visited by representatives from Scotland Yard and references are taken up before licences are issued. After that drivers must undergo a long training.
I worry sometimes about the foreign visitors to our country. They are very welcome. Before they come they are told to take a black cab. Black cabs have a distinctive appearance. Those visitors are told that if they take a black cab they will receive good service and they will know within £1 or £2 what they will have to pay at the end of their journey. However, that does not happen, and will not happen, as regards unlicensed minicabs. Even if they are licensed I do not think that foreign visitors will be able to distinguish minicabs or trust their drivers. Standards will vary from borough to borough. There are 32 boroughs in London and they will each have different standards. Fares will probably be different in different boroughs, and the boroughs themselves will decide who to license and what companies to license. I cannot envisage any cohesion about the whole plan.
I know that this is a Private Member's Bill. It was moved so eloquently by my noble friend, but Clause 4 seems to me to be the wrong way of seeking to provide more hire cars within London. I am sure that a better way will be found of licensing ordinary cars. This is not the way to do it. I have rung round the country to one or two cities but I have yet to find a better system than that provided by the licensed black cabs that we have in London now. This Bill has started in this House and will therefore proceed to another place. I hope that due consideration will be given there to the weighty words that noble Lords have spoken tonight. I know

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several people who are much too frightened to ask a minicab driver to pick them up. I hope therefore that something will come of the discussions we have had tonight.
8.23 p.m.
Lord Renton: My Lords, for years I have admired the patience and the stamina of my noble friend Lord Carnock. I have often seen him sitting where he is sitting now late at night, paying close attention to all our proceedings. I often wondered why he did not intervene in our debates on the Floor of the House. The reason was, of course, that he also did a lot of work on committees. We have now had the real advantage and pleasure of hearing him make his maiden speech on this Bill.
The committee of which he was chairman considered this Bill at great length and with great care and reached the conclusions that we have heard. I must say that I agree with those conclusions. I entirely share the admiration that has been expressed of London taxi cabs. Indeed, some 30 years ago it was part of my Home Office responsibilities to keep an eye on the way in which the commissioner licensed them. Occasionally interested parties would come to me and ask for more taxi cabs. Sometimes the taxi cab people themselves would have a point. I think they provide a wonderful service and have done so all my lifetime, which is a long time. However, I cannot agree with the assumption that if we licensed minicabs in London that would lead to any kind of deterioration in the quality of service given by the taxis, or that it would adversely affect their financial interests. Indeed, I take the opposite view.
I shall concede one thing. The administration of those parts of the 1976 Act which are referred to in the Bill has been very uneven throughout those parts of England and Wales where they apply. In some places the legislation has worked beneficially. I happen to live in a county which, I am happy to say, is still called Huntingdonshire because that is the name of the district council. In my county the minicabs are licensed. They play fair and the taxi operators get on well with them. Our system is an excellent way of allowing the public to have two kinds of cab service. The public can have cabs, like the London cabs, of a high standard and which ply for hire the whole time. The public also have access to minicabs which often work part-time but which have to be registered.
The fact that in London there would also be an uneven performance does not worry me at all, because I think that to the extent that it works in some boroughs it would be worth doing and would not adversely affect the interests of the taxi cabs. I think it is in the public interest that minicabs should be licensed. There are the wrongdoers among minicab operators but I think there would be fewer wrongdoers if they all had to be licensed. Then it would be possible for authorities to keep a closer eye on them. Therefore I support Clause 4 of this Bill.
8.27 p.m.
Lord Teviot: My Lords, I support this Bill to a certain extent, but to license 40,000 minicab drivers
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would be rather a cumbersome process. I must congratulate my noble friend Lord Carnock on his most excellent speech. My noble friend Lord Renton remembers him sitting here for a long time, but I also remember the father of the noble Lord, Lord Carnock, sitting next to where the noble Earl, Lord Winchilsea, is now sitting. While licensing 40,000 minicab drivers might become rather a bureaucratic affair, nevertheless something has to be done.
There was a proposal to license minicab proprietors. It was proposed that minicab proprietors should be put on the same footing as a licensee of a public house or a licensee of a betting shop, whereby the barmaid or barman or counter clerk is not held responsible for the premises but the landlord and the betting shop manager are. Therefore the scheme that is proposed would mean that owners of minicab firms would be responsible for a higher standard of character on the part of their drivers. Perhaps owners would not have the same privileges as the Public Carriage Office has with regard to the police register. That matter may have to be considered. However, if one message has come over from this debate so far it is that people must be driven in a safe way.
Another salient point concerns vehicles. I believe my noble friend Lady Gardner of Parkes mentioned that the normal mileage for an ordinary private car was 15,000 miles a year whereas for the average minicab in London it was about 50,000 miles a year. Therefore minicab vehicles would have to be tested.
I do not believe that the point has been made this evening, but the charge has often been levelled that many of the 40,000 drivers are people who draw dole or they may work part time. We do not want any social security fraud. That matter must be looked at most carefully.
Either the Bill should go forward —and I do not believe that it is quite right at the moment —or the Government must bring forward legislation very soon. It is a great pity that that Green Paper came out when it did.
8.30 p.m.
Lord Mountevans: My Lords, I rise to support the noble Earl, Lord Winchilsea and Nottingham, as I believe all speakers have, in urging the promoters of the Bill to withdraw Clause 4.
At the outset I should declare an interest. I am adviser to the British Tourist Authority. The British Tourist Authority has a statutory duty under the Development of Tourism Act to advise the Government on matters relating to tourism. As the noble Earl reminded us, when the possibility of the liberalisation of the London plying for hire regime was considered by the department in 1988 the authority made a submission through the usual channels against any change and very much in favour of the black cab. We have talked a great deal about black cab drivers; perhaps we should have talked about drivers of black cabs.
The authority gave 12 reasons for preserving the status quo. I shall not quote all of them; I shall quote only four because I am in a sense the cheeseboard

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in the dinner break business, and I know that the House has other matters to deal with.
A major point in the British Tourist Authority's argument was the Knowledge, the cross-border knowledge —the requirement to achieve a qualification. After all, the noble Baroness had to achieve a qualification before she could practise as a dentist. She had to prove her competence to practise. The authority was in favour of the licensing of cabs under the present system by the department not least because the department had access to criminal records which, as has been said previously this evening, the London boroughs do not necessarily have.
In speaking of the department, I am surprised that no noble Lord has mentioned the work that the department has sponsored in that context in relation to the Suzy Lamplugh Trust.
A third argument related to the safety and appropriateness of the vehicle for the job in hand as reflected in the present inspection system. A fourth argument was cross-border fares. In the same way as the licensing system, the Knowledge and the quality of the vehicle were guarantees of the quality of the service provided; so is the present review system.
My noble friend Lord Underhill knows that I should also declare an interest on behalf of British Rail. Although it has no duty to do so, British Rail seeks to make sure that when it delivers passengers to a London terminus it hands them over to a black cab driver. Noble Lords will be aware of notices at termini and at airports, "Beware of the cowboy operator. Use only a black cab".
Lastly I should like to pray in aid somebody in whom I do not have an interest but I read his book with great interest. Some noble Lords will recall that Bernard Levin recently wrote and published a book about his experiences in New York. A different kind of Londoner it would be hard to imagine. He is a very committed Londoner in many respects. His columns in The Times remind us that he is also a human being with the interests of the world at heart. He pointed out in one of the excerpts from his book published in a newspaper that he had taken a yellow cab in New York. In New York there is licensing by the boroughs rather than by a collective authority. One takes a yellow cab in Newark into New York. As many of your Lordships will know, New York is a grid iron city. If one is in 42nd Street one ought to know where 47th Street is. Bernard Levin said that two experiences of yellow cabs in New York, particularly those licensed outside Manhattan, made him pray, and he felt that one of the things that would really improve New York was a good black cab system. I support the noble Earl.
8.35 p.m.
The Chairman of Committees (Lord Aberdare): My Lords, I have listened with interest to the debate which has centered so far on Clause 4 of the Bill. It would not be appropriate for me to express a view on the merits of the clause but I should underline the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carnock, in
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an admirable maiden speech that the arguments for and against the clause were considered very carefully by the Select Committee, and it decided unanimously that the clause should proceed. I hope that the House will give due weight to that fact.
I hope that those noble Lords who were critical of the clause do not intend to oppose the Third Reading. The Bill still has to go to another place. There it will be quite possible to petition against the clause if so desired. That was the wise advice given to the House by the noble Baroness, Lady Macleod of Borve, and I commend it to your Lordships. There is no amendment before us to delete Clause 4. If the Third Reading were to be refused, a number of other clauses which are unopposed would fall by the wayside.
Perhaps I may take the opportunity of thanking members of the Select Committee, under the able chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Carnock, for giving up so much of their time to consideration of the Bill. The House is well served by those of your Lordships who agree to sit on Private Bill Committees. At the beginning of what is likely to be another very busy Session for such committees I should like to express my gratitude to all noble Lords who serve on them.
The main reason why I wish to intervene in the debate is to make a general observation about the Bill's passage through your Lordships' House. Leaving aside the formal clauses, the Bill was introduced in November 1988 with six parts containing 55 clauses. This evening it will leave the House for another place with just one part containing five clauses. Two whole parts, together containing 31 clauses, and two further important clauses were withdrawn by the promoters before the Select Committee sat. A further part with 12 clauses was disallowed by the Select Committee. Finally, four clauses were either disallowed by the Unopposed Bill Committee or withdrawn with that committee's leave. That amounts to 50 clauses out of an original 55.
I am bound to say that when quite so many provisions fall by the wayside, whether in the face of opposition or at the instance of the promoters themselves, one is bound to question whether sufficient consideration was given to the provisions before they were included in a Bill introduced into Parliament. So far as concerns Private Bills, both this Session and last have been exceptionally busy ones and I know that promoters will appreciate that a Bill of this kind inevitably provokes a great deal of work on the part of the House. In addition of course there are those outside Parliament —organisations of one sort or another as well as individuals —who have to spend time, and in some cases money, considering the implications of the powers sought in the Bill and, if necessary, preparing petitions against it for deposit in Parliament.
I hope that the promoters of the Bill will bear those points in mind. I have no doubt that we shall see further London local authority Bills—indeed another has been introduced in the current Session —but I hope that on future occasions

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provisions are included only after careful consideration and, where appropriate, due consultation with interested parties.
8.40 p.m.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, we have had an interesting debate which has raised several interesting points. I want first to make it clear that we on this side of the House shall not oppose the Third Reading. It is not our policy to do so, but I shall have some comments to make in that regard before I close.
I should like to thank the noble Earl, Lord Winchilsea, for introducing the criticism of the Bill in such an excellent speech. I want to avoid covering the ground that he has covered. We are also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carnock, as chairman of the committee, for explaining why the committee has taken certain decisions. That is helpful to the House. Having had them explained, I believe that the committee did its best, but it is not what is desirable.
It was noticeable that everyone, including the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, paid tribute to the London taxi trade, as happened on Second Reading. Everyone is fully complimentary of the work of the London taxi trade. I do not intend to knock the private hire trade and minicabs. I frequently use a minicab when I have an early appointment in the House or elsewhere to travel from my home in Essex or when I carry luggage to a London terminal station. I should make it clear that I do not charge the Treasury for that. I do not knock the minicab trade in general, but we should bear in mind certain points as a result of changes in the Bill. I agree that changes have been made. Some have been made because of what was said on Second Reading. I am certain that it was realised that the proposal for helicopter licences was nonsense. That point was made at length by a number of speakers on Second Reading.
On Second Reading I referred to the review conducted by the Government into the taxi and private hire industry. Noble Lords heard reference today to the statement by Mr. Portillo on 11th May 1989 when he referred to that review and made it clear that, so far as concerns London, there would be no change in the knowledge or in the present requirements and that he did not propose to change the position of taxi cabs and the minicab trade. However, it is generally agreed that the licensing provisions in the 1976 Act have not worked well throughout the country. Reference was made to the position in the city of Birmingham. I shall not repeat those comments save to say that Birmingham has had some unpleasant experiences with regard to illegal operations.
The Bill has been amended by removing Clause 49 and inserting Clause 4. I must make it clear that Clause 4 gives London boroughs the option of whether to license minicab vehicles, drivers and operators in their area. They may choose whether to do so. As distinct from the control over licensed taxi cabs by the Public Carriage Office, to which a number of noble Lords paid compliment on the way in which it exercises that control, a borough which decides to take up the option to license hire cars
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need not go through certain checks. I must emphasise the points that have been made. The borough need not check about criminal records. It need not set fares. It need not stipulate that there must be meters, but if a vehicle has a meter the fares must be declared, not controlled. The meters must operate properly. Different standards might therefore apply in each of the 32 London boroughs.
It is said that there will be consultation to encourage the boroughs to have civilised standards, but that is not what the Bill states. The Bill will enable each London borough to set separate standards if it should so desire. A borough has the option as to whether it wants to license. There will be no compulsion. If it decides to license minicabs, there will be no compulsion as to the standards set. If a borough takes up the option to license private hire cars or minicabs, such vehicles will be free to operate in all London boroughs.
Reference has been made to the Knowledge. I understand that it is now possible for knowledge of only the area of the licensing borough to be required. That need take only three to four months' work on the part of the applicant. Before a driver is licensed by the Public Carriage Office, he or she must acquire knowledge of the whole of London, which may take up to two years to complete.
Unless the Bill is amended, London may have a three-tier trade. The taxi cabs —the black cabs —would be licensed as at present through the Public Carriage Office. The private hire cars —minicabs —would work on different and less stringent conditions as applied by the 32 London boroughs. There would then be a third tier acting illegally, as has happened in the city of Birmingham. We are therefore likely to have inferior conditions for licensing of such vehicles which would be free to ply for hire using radio circuits, if so desired.
It is said that, before a borough decides to take up the option to license minicabs, there must be consultation with the Secretary of State. I note what the noble Baroness said; namely, that all the Secretary of State can do is to exercise persuasion as to the conditions which a London borough may decide to apply. The Secretary of State cannot compel all 32 London boroughs to have the same conditions. That is farcical if the vehicles are liable to travel in any part of London.
I also remind noble Lords that the Minister said that, if there are to be any changes, they should be comprehensive and apply to the country as a whole. In the light of the criticisms of the operation of the 1976 Act in various parts of the country, that would appear to be the correct policy.
With regard to the consultation which the Secretary of State will have before any London borough opts to have licences and minicabs, there is no reference as to whether there will be any consultation with the London Taxi Board, which represents taxi proprietors, private owners and taxi drivers. I remind noble Lords that I made it clear on Second Reading that the taxi section of the Transport and General Workers' Union and the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association were not consulted about the Bill. The taxi section of the TGWU only learnt about the Bill by chance. If there is to be consultation by

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the Secretary of State with any London borough which decides to take up the option of licensing, I hope that there will also be consultation with the London taxi trade.
In conclusion —I do not wish to cover the ground that has been covered so well by others who have criticised the Bill —as I have already said, by convention we do not vote against the Third Reading. The Bill will now go to the Commons, which I hope will take serious note not only of what was said in the Select Committee but what has been said in tonight's debate. The remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, the Chairman of Committees, were extremely helpful. We do not want a repeat of the situation in which a Bill which we discuss on Second Reading and which then goes to a Select Committee is mutilated, although it must be said that the Bill needed to be mutilated. That is not the way to carry on our business.
In view of the criticism that exists I wonder whether even at this stage the promoters of the Bill might not consider withdrawing this section either during the Commons stages or before then. There are, as the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, said, other sections of the Bill that we should hate to see deleted. As it is at present, I believe that an attempt has been made to improve the situation, but I do not believe that it will work in the interests of the London cab trade.
8.50 p.m.
Lord Reay: My Lords, it may be helpful if I give the House an indication of the Government's views on the Bill, which was so ably brought to the House for Third Reading this evening by my noble friend Lady Gardner of Parkes, and in particular on Clause 4. But before doing so I cannot resist the opportunity, as one clan chief to another, to congratulate my noble friend Lord Carnock on his unusual achievement in making a maiden speech as chairman of a Private Bill Committee reporting to this House and doing so in such an appropriate, sagacious and distinguished manner.
In general, the Government have no objection to the principle of London local authorities, as they are empowered to do by statute, seeking in promoting this Bill additional general powers for the London area. With one exception —namely, Clause 6 —all the provisions in the Bill to which government departments objected have been either withdrawn or disallowed by committees of your Lordships' House. On Clause 6, the Department of the Environment, while having no objection to the purpose of the clause, considers that the powers are too widely drawn. Negotiations are continuing with the promoters to provide a more tightly drawn provision. I hope that this issue can be resolved in due course.
At Second Reading my noble friend Lord Arran expressed the Government's view on what is now Clause 4, which provides for the introduction of licensing for London minicabs. He explained, first, that the Government were reviewing the need for comprehensive legislation on taxis and private hire
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cars on a nationwide basis; and secondly, that the provision as drafted seemed impractical.
Your Lordships may recall the Department of Transport's fundamental review of all taxi and private hire vehicle licensing which was completed in May of last year. During the course of the review reactions were obtained from the public, licensing authorities and those within the trades on the absence of minicab licensing in London, as well as on other aspects of licensing. Following the review, the Government announced that they had no present plans to legislate to change the position in London. I have to say that so far the case for licensing in London remains in our view uproven. Allegations of malpractice in the London minicab trade are often made, but are rarely supported by hard evidence which might justify new legislation.
Your Lordships may recall that my honourable friend the Minister of State for Public Transport recently announced in another place that the Government were providing funding to the Suzy Lamplugh Trust —as I believe was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Mountevans —which is conducting research into passenger experiences with the minicab trade. They will also look at the question of whether licensing of minicabs would be likely to have any impact on safety. The results of this research should be available in about 12 months' time, and should provide a useful contribution to the debate on the need for licensing.
The most frequent complaint made during the review was a lack of police record checks on drivers of taxis outside London and of private hire vehicles everywhere. Let me stress that this issue is not addressed by the licensing provisions of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 and therefore powers to make such checks would not be provided by Clause 4 of this Bill. The whole question of police record checks on drivers is a separate issue currently being examined by the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Office.
The Government were also concerned that simply extending the private hire licensing provisions of the 1976 Act would create 31 separate licensing authorities, with consequent scope for cross-border hiring confusion such as sometimes exists outside the capital. However, I have to say that the amendment since tabled by the Bill's promoters making vehicle, driver and operator licences issued by one London council valid in any other participating borough should ease much of the cross-border problem. We are still concerned that the public may be confused not only about whether their council practises licensing at all but also about the level of stringency applied by their council compared, for example, with the neighbouring council. This could lead to confusion when ordering minicabs about the licensing regime under which they operate. It is also possible that licence applicants might migrate to particular boroughs where the most minimal standards required by the clause are applied but then concentrate operations in more restrictive boroughs. No doubt that problem could be overcome by the boroughs agreeing common licensing conditions but

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I think it is only right to point out that there are still potential practical difficulties with this provision.
London is served by a taxi trade which, largely because of its unique purpose-built vehicles, has long been famous worldwide. Standards are set by the Public Carriage Office and drivers must pass through rigorous testing, in particular of their knowledge of London. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, told some charming stories illustrating the standards of service and the esprit de corps, if I may use a French phrase to describe such a British institution, which may be found among taxi drivers. However, I take the same view as my noble friend Lord Renton. I do not think that the introduction of Clause 4 would undermine these benefits as much as some of the taxi trade seems to fear. Nor do I think that it would put taxis out of business. In areas where both taxis and private hire vehicles are licensed (that is to say, approximately 90 per cent. of district councils), taxis do not appear to have suffered. Where information is available, the number of licensed taxis increased by 37 per cent. between 1985 and 1989. Organisations representing the taxi trade have had an opportunity to present their case to a Select Committee of your Lordships' House and, if they or others remain dissatisfied with the provisions of the Bill, there will be a further opportunity for them to petition against the Bill in another place, as the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees has just pointed out to us.
In conclusion, while the Government acknowledge that the amendment to Clause 4 tabled in Committee has improved the practicability of the Bill, we nevertheless remain unconvinced of the need for licensing in London and therefore are neutral on this clause. As I have already stated, subject to the successful resolution of the negotiations on Clause 6, the Government are content with the rest of the Bill.
8.57 p.m.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, I thank those Members who have taken part in the debate on this Third Reading. However, I feel that every speech we have heard has made it more apparent that there is now no control whatever over minicabs and that some control is necessary. As I listened to people putting one case, I felt that they made exactly the opposite case.
The noble Earl, Lord Winchilsea, said that the problem was that people with criminal records might fail to declare them on their applications for licences. That is true, because it would have to be on a self-declaration basis. As has been said, the police would not provide criminal records. But in the event of an accident and someone being brought to court, it would then certainly come out should he have a criminal record. If he had made a wrong or false declaration on his application, it would be taken much more seriously.
As I said, we continually have cases in court of people who not only have criminal records but have no insurance whatever for car or passenger. A very important point to make, which I think was not clearly made in the noble Earl's speech, is that this
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provision would not allow minicabs to ply for hire in the streets. There would still have to be the same arrangement as now; namely, that a contract would be made between the hirer and the provider of the service. There would be no right to ply for hire. That is being done illegally and no doubt people will continue to act illegally but there is no suggestion of legalising that practice.
Like other speakers I very much enjoyed the remarks of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. I accept what he said about average family car mileage being perhaps 7,500. I was given the figure by one of the car services. From my own experience I would not know about car mileage. However, the important point was the vast difference between the 50,000 miles travelled by a minicab in a year and the very much smaller mileage done by a private car.
I know that it is not traditional for all speakers to compliment a noble Lord on his maiden speech, but, under the very exceptional circumstances of his being chairman of the committee and his making such a marvellous summary of its proceedings, I must add my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Carnock. He pointed out that there are 50,000 black cabs and 40,000 minicabs in London. The noble Baroness, Lady Macleod, mentioned that there are 19,000 drivers of the black cabs. I have not yet put those figures together.
The noble Baroness, Lady Macleod, said —and I think it is most important —that she would be much too frightened to ask a minicab to pick her up. That is a very real problem facing people now. They are frightened to ask for a minicab because they have no way of knowing whether it will be safe and its driver honest and reliable. The provision in the Bill to supervise and license such minicabs must be an advantage.
The noble Lord, Lord Renton, supported me, so I will not reply to any point that he made. The noble Lord, Lord Teviot, said he thought it was the proprietors who should be licensed. That is a very interesting idea which may have a lot to commend it but, like the views of the taxi drivers, it has come forward rather late.
I would emphasise that the Bill was deposited in November 1988. It was advertised correctly in all the papers and there was the opportunity to petition against it. Its Second Reading was a year ago in February 1989. The noble Lord, Lord Underhill, spoke on behalf of the Transport and General Workers' Union, and yet tonight he said it was just by chance that they heard about it. Was it just by chance a year ago or was it just by chance a week ago? How is it that I have heard nothing from anyone in a year, and then last week I was asked to meet taxi drivers and minicab drivers, and even today motorbike couriers, who are concerned that somehow this may affect them.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, I referred to the Second Reading debate. It was only then that, by chance, the Transport and General Workers' Union heard about the Bill. Of course, this time they have fully informed noble Lords of the position.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that clarification, and in the interim in this year they have presented their case to the committee on the Bill. This is what I cannot understand: if these people had so many points why were they not presented to the committee?
The noble Lord, Lord Mountevans, said that as a dentist I had had to qualify before I could practise. That is absolutely true, and he made a comparison with the cab drivers. But in dentistry we now have dental hygienists, dental ancillaries and all sorts of other people as well. We no longer have a profession exclusive to dentists.
Lord Mountevans: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. Of course we have dental hygienists and others, but they are not allowed to practise nationwide as dentists.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, this is exactly my point about minicabs. We are not suggesting that they should have the right to ply for hire or look or act like black cabs. They would be an ancillary service in the way that dental hygienists are.
The noble Lord, Lord Mountevans, also mentioned how British Rail liked one to take a black cab from the station. Of course we all like to do that, but how long have we waited in queues at stations? That demonstrates how short of black cabs we are. If there were no minicabs we could not cope at all, because there are 40,000 minicabs at the moment.
The Chairman of Committees, the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, said that this Bill had been very much reduced; he said they had disallowed 12 clauses. I do not know exactly what that means and whether "disallowed" means that they just threw them out.
The Chairman of Committees: Yes, my Lords.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, so on those 12 clauses I cannot claim responsibility in any way on behalf of the promoters for withdrawing them. It looks as though they were disallowed and rejected out of hand. But I appreciate the point made that others were withdrawn. The difficulty with this kind of Bill is that it represents a group of London boroughs each of which has its own specific problem, and it has been put together under the auspices of just one promoting authority acting on behalf of all the other London boroughs. I will pass his message on. I think it is important not to waste the time of the House.
The noble Lord, Lord Underhill, mentioned that he frequently uses minicabs. I thought it very unfortunate that in his final sentence he said that he spoke "in the interests of the London cab trade". That was a shame because I thought he was speaking in the interests of the public. I believe that this Bill is in the public's interests and that there should be some proper licensing system. I believe that the whole question of enforcement is a legitimate one. Only when the enforcement is in practice will we see how well it works or does not work, but I believe that any degree of control must be better than the
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present situation of no control. I ask the House to give this Bill a Third Reading.
On Question, Bill read a third time, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill
9.5 p.m.
House again in Committee.
Clause 27 [Meaning of "father"]:
Baroness Elles Baroness Elles moved Amendment No. 127:
Page 14, line 21, leave out ("unless it is shown that he did not consent") and insert ("if he consented in writing").
The noble Baroness said: The purpose of this amendment is clear. First, I think there should be clarification in the Bill that the husband must consent to the procedure as outlined in Clause 27(1) if he is to be considered the father of the child, as it is stated in Clause 27(3). Secondly, there must be evidence of the consent of the husband. In my view, and that of my noble friend Lord Grantchester, that evidence must be in writing. Thirdly, I must ask: how is it possible for somebody to show non-consent to a particular action?
As one can imagine, the husband may not even know that the treatment has taken place and that his wife has undergone AID. The wording of the provision does not reflect what we should like to see in the Bill. If the father is to be treated as the father of the child —when I refer to the "father" I mean the husband of the woman who has undergone the treatment —it must be clear beyond any shadow of a doubt that he has given his consent. I shall not go through all the arguments that could be adduced in support of the amendment. Its meaning and intention are clear. I hope that my noble and learned friend will consider it and that, if he does not like the wording, he will consider the input that it is intended to make in the clause.
Lord Ashbourne: I am in favour of the amendment. It is another case of removing an ambiguity. I am always in favour of removing ambiguity from legislation, and on that basis I support the amendment.
Baroness Warnock: The committee that considered the point spent a great deal of time on whether to ask for consent in writing. In the end it seemed that if consent in writing were required, especially in the case of artificial insemination, that might cause a great deal of hardship and a certain amount of confusion. The committee received a considerable body of evidence on the subject and the evidence that finally weighed with us was that there were a number of women for whom not having a child was a ground for divorce. Most of those women were Asian. Many women from that community wrote to us. In that community it is presumed that infertility is the woman's problem. It is not recognised that there is such a thing as male infertility, and so those women have to seek artificial insemination with the knowledge of their husbands.

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It was not that we approved of that practice, but it happens on a considerable scale because the penalty for not doing so is divorce and destitution for those women. That is one class of case that weighed with us when we decided that it was better to present the case in this rather negative way.
There could be some husbands who do not, and put into writing that they do not, want their wives to have artificial insemination. That would be evidence that the husband had not consented. It seemed to us that it would be proper to ensure that in the normal case the husband of the pregnant woman would be deemed to be the father and would take the responsibility of being the father of the resulting child. That was why in our report we recommended something similar to Clause 27. I hope that the amendment is not accepted.
Lord Kennet: I understand the reasoning behind the Bill as drafted, but will the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor tell us of any precedents there may be in English or British law for Parliament to direct a court to find that someone has done something unless he can prove that he has not?
Lord Prys-Davies: Initially I found the amendment attractive, but I ran into difficulties because I believe that there is a precedent for the clause in Section 27 of the Family Law Reform Act 1987, which deals with artificial insemination. For the sake of consistency therefore I would follow the wording of the Bill.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: Snowden and Mitchell came down heavily on the side of requiring written consent from the father. I mention that fact although it is at variance with what the noble Baroness, Lady Warnock, said, but I believe that it is important.
The Lord Chancellor: As the Committee has heard, the Bill, as drafted, provides in Clause 27(2):
"If, at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of her insemination, the woman was a party to a marriage, the other party to the marriage shall be treated as the father of the child unless it is shown that he did not consent"
to the treatment. That provision continues and extends the rebuttable presumption under Section 27 of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 in respect of children born as a result of artificial insemination by donor. That provision was of course accepted by Parliament in 1987 and, so far as I am aware, has not been thought to be problematical or ambigious. The clause as drafted extends the existing law relating to AID to the other techniques.
In the great majority of cases the issue of consent will be clear. It is already the usual practice of gynaecologists to withhold AID treatment unless the partner gives written consent. We can expect that practice to continue and, if it wishes to do so, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority could include such a requirement for all treatments in its code of practice, which will be subject to parliamentary approval.
There may, however, on rare occasions be some doubt about whether consent has been given, perhaps, for example, where AID is carried out at
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home: it is after all a fairly simple procedure. Where such doubt does arise, Section 27 of the 1987 Act and the clause as drafted guards against hardship to the child by, in effect, creating a presumption that the husband of a married woman has consented to the treatment and is therefore in law the child's father, with the corresponding responsibility for his upbringing and maintenance. In the Government's view, if there is any doubt about consent it should be determined in the child's favour rather than the husband's. This approach is in line with the common law which provides a presumption that the child born to a married woman is that of her husband. I would not wish to see the protection that those presumptions together provide for a child eroded or weakened.
So perhaps the answer to the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is, first of all, that Section 27 of the 1987 Act provides a precedent. However, perhaps more fundamental is the attitude that the common law takes to a child born in wedlock: unless the husband in effect establishes that the child is not his, it is presumed to be the child of the husband.
As to requiring the consent to be in writing, again we can expect that to be the general practice and again it could be dealt with in the code of practice. It would be perfectly reasonable for the doctor, the person in charge of the treatment, to require the consent to be in writing and it could well be dealt with in that way in the code of practice so as to avoid any doubt. However, to insist upon it as a matter of law, as this amendment would, would mean that, in the absence of writing, even where there was clear evidence that the husband had consented, he would not be treated as the father. In practice and law the child would be fatherless, with no rights of support against anyone other than his mother where there was an AID situation. That in the Government's view would not be right.
To summarise, as the Law Commission pointed out (page 175 of its Report on Illegitmacy, Law Com. No.118)
"it would be hard on a child whose paternity and status had been settled for some years if, in the course of his parents' marriage breaking down, his legal paternity depended on proof of consent to an operation years before or upon proof of a particular document".
That approach was endorsed by the Warnock Committee in paragraph 4.24 of its report, as the noble Baroness, Lady Warnock, has said. These are always somewhat difficult questions but I believe the balance is in favour of staying with the existing law. Therefore I would urge your Lordships that we should stay with the Bill as drafted.
9.15 p.m.
Baroness Elles: I thank my noble and learned friend for that explanation. I am afraid it goes back to the argument we had earlier today on the identity of the child and the child wanting to know who its true father is. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Warnock, who has in fact come out with one of the reasons why this is not going to be possible. There may sadly be a group of Asian women who may carry on living with their husbands but may have AID; the husband may be living in a world

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of deception and deceit and may not know that he is not the father of the child thus produced. If that is the kind of Bill that the Committee wishes to produce, well and good. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 128 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
[Amendment No. 129 not moved.]
[Amendment No. 130 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Baroness Elles Baroness Elles moved Amendment No. 131
Page 14, line 33, leave out ("not")
The noble Baroness said: With the leave of the Committee, I would wish to take with this Amendment No. 132; they are dependent one upon the other. We have just discussed Clause 27(2) where the husband, not having given his consent but certainly not having refused it, would be deemed to be the father. However, in the case where the father does not give his consent, who would be the father of the child? Clause 27(4) states that where the sperm of a man who has given his consent to be used as a donor is used, he nevertheless is not to be treated as the father of the child. My amendment would remove the word "not". Where the husband had definitely refused to give his consent, the donor would be treated as the father of the child. Clearly, it seems to me that the direction in which this Bill is going would deny the child knowledge of its genetic father in any circumstances.
I should be grateful if my noble and learned friend could explain the purposes of subsections (6) and (7) and tell the Committee whether that is the fact. Clause 27(2) is what one might call a blind because, although the husband may not give his consent, at the end of the day the child will remain that of the marriage in law. I should be grateful for an explanation. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: I too have difficulty in understanding Clause 27. Will the husband who has given consent for his sperm to be used in the assisted fathering of his own child by his wife be treated by the Bill as the father of the child? The clause appears to provide two different answers to that question. By virtue of Clause 27(2) he will be treated as the father. However, as was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Elles, by virtue of Clause 27(4)(a) he will not be treated as the father.
If those two subsections are in conflict there is an inconsistency. Subsection (4)(a) should be amended so that it does not cover the situation where the man who has given his consent is the husband.
I would ask my noble and learned friend to expatiate upon this aspect —that subsections (6) and (7) are there precisely for cases where the father has refused to give his consent, but under common law presumably the child would still be treated as the child of the husband and wife in marriage.
Again, I am in difficulty about the way in which subsection (6) will affect the position, unless the key
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to resolving the conflict between Clause 27(2) and Clause 27(4)(a) lies in subsection (6). Subsection (6) will overreach subsection (2) and we may obtain the result that he is the father of the child. I should be grateful for guidance from the noble and learned Lord.
The Lord Chancellor: In amending subsection (4) of Clause 27 the amendment has two quite separate effects. First, as regards paragraph (a) of subsection (4), the clause as at present drafted ensures that a man who provides sperm through the statutory scheme for use by others is not to be treated as the father of any resulting child. In the Government's view it would be unfair to sperm donors if as the result of a public-spirited act aimed at helping infertile men and women they were to make them selves liable for the maintenance and upbringing of the child. Not only would such a result be unfair to donors but it would not in any way reflect the social reality and would carry the very grave risk of seriously reducing the number of donors and hence the supply of sperm.
The Government recognise that as drafted subsection (4) could have the result of producing a child who has no father where subsection (2) of the clause does not supply a substitute. The matter is one of balance but the Government consider that the scales come down clearly in favour of subsection (4) as presently drafted.
There is another objection to the amendment as it would affect paragraph (a) of subsection (4). It is not clear how this amendment would affect married couples who use AID. If the amended subsection (4) were to be construed as overriding subsections (2) and (3), it would mean that the sperm donor and not husband of a married woman would be treated as the child's father where AID was used. Presumably, that is not the intention of the amendment but the clause would need further amendment to make that clear were it to be carried into the Bill. I am not sure what my noble friend wishes to do about that matter.
I now turn to the second effect of the amendment; namely, that on paragraph (b) of subsection (4). As drafted, it provides that where the sperm of a man, or an embryo created with his sperm, is used after his death he is not to be treated as the child's father. This does not apply only to donations. It also applies to cases where a man's sperm is stored and after the man's death is used to treat his wife, or where an embryo is created in vitro using the gametes of a man and is implanted after his death.
The effect of the amendment would be that the man would be the child's legal father even if the sperm or the embryo were used after his death. It does not appear to me that that is a very desirable result. As the Warnock Committee pointed out, it is essential that there should be some finality for those administering the estates of deceased persons. Posthumous fertilisation could cause real problems of inheritance and succession. The Government agree strongly with those views and accordingly could not support this amendment.
The second amendment, which would leave out subsections (6) and (7), may be viewed as being

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consequential to the amendment designed to make sperm donors the fathers. But it would be quite wrong to underestimate the importance of those subsections.
In England and Wales and Northern Ireland there is a presumption at common law that a child born to a married woman is the legitimate child of that woman and her husband. In Scotland in the same circumstances there is a presumption of paternity. The presumptions can be displaced in a number of ways; for example, by showing that the husband and wife had not had sexual intercourse at the appropriate time or by showing that the husband and the child are not genetically related, such as by the techniques to which I referred earlier.
Where the common law or statutory provisions such as the adoption legislation provide a satisfactory answer to the question "Who is the father?", it is unnecessary for the clause to provide an answer. Indeed, it would be undesirable for it to do so, for that would place the children concerned in a special category. As the clause will give priority to the common law presumption, no purpose will be served by anyone showing that that presumption does not apply in the case of a Clause 27(2) child unless it can also be shown that the husband did not consent. Thus most Clause 27(2) children will be treated as the children of their "parents" in the same way as genetic children.
Subsections (6) and (7) are included in the Bill to ensure that the earlier provisions of the clause which determine who is to be the father of a child do not upset or cast doubt on common law or statutory arrangements which already in some cases provide a clear answer. I believe that I have shown that the amendment would cause a considerable degree of uncertainty and, therefore, I suggest that the Committee should not agree to it. Subsection (6) rules. One only needs to go beyond that if subsection (6) or the corresponding Scottish provision does not provide an answer.
Baroness Elles: I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for that reply. If I understood him correctly, subsection (6) fills in the gap where the husband has not given his consent under Clause 27(2), so that the child has a parent in law. Is that correct?
The Lord Chancellor: The subsection provides that presumption. Of course the presumption may be a rebuttal. Therefore, it is possible that the answer is not finally provided under the clause.
Baroness Elles: I was concerned that the child would be left without a father at all. I wanted clarification as to the legal position if under subsection (4) the donor is not to be treated as the father and under Clause 27(2) the father has not given his consent. I believe that my noble and learned friend has given that clarification.
The Lord Chancellor: Perhaps I may just clarify what I believe to be the correct position. If what I might call the social father —the woman's husband —has not given consent and can show that
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he is not the father of the child because he was absent for a long time or something like that, in that situation the child will not have a legal father because the donor's identity is not revealed. In I hat situation the child will have no father at law.
Baroness Elles: I am still fairly grateful to my noble and learned friend because this is clearly a difficult area. I should be grateful if he could look at the matter to clarify the position which he has just mentioned where a child may be left without a father at all. We cannot have that in the interests of the child. I do not believe that subsections (2), (4) and (6) are completely adequate. Of course I shall withdraw the amendment, but I should be grateful if my noble and learned friend could look at this matter in view of the situations which could arise.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 132 not moved.]
Clause 27 agreed to.
9.30 p.m.
Clause 28 [Effect of sections 26 and 27]:
[Amendments Nos. 133 to 141 not moved.]
[Amendment No. 142 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Clause 28 agreed to.
Clause 29 [The Authority's register of information]:
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendment No. 143:
Page 15, line 22, leave out from ("register") to end of line 25 and insert ("which shall contain any information obtained by the Authority which falls within subsection (1A) below.
(1A) Information falls within this subsection if it relates to —

(a) the provision of treatment services for any identifiable individual, or

(b) the keeping or use of the gametes of any identifiable individual or of an embryo taken from any identifiable woman,

or if it shows that any identifiable individual was, or may have been, born in consequence of treatment services.").
The noble Baroness said: In moving Amendment No. 143 I speak also to Amendments Nos. 153A through to 153K.
Amendment No. 143 sets out clearly the information which the authority will be required to keep which it obtains from the licence holders. This information will be protected from disclosure by Clause 31. It is highly sensitive information, as we have already discussed, and I am sure it is right that we should do all we can to protect it from disclosure. The effect of the amendment is to provide that the authority must keep a register of the sort of information described in the new subsection (1A) outlined in the amendment; that is, in relation to the provision of treatment services for any identifiable individual; or the keeping or use of the gametes of any identifiable individual or of an embryo taken from any identifiable woman; or which shows that an identifiable individual was born following treatment services.
The register will contain the information necessary to enable the authority to answer questions which

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may be put to it in terms of the later provisions of Clause 29 and Clause 30. In other words, questions will be asked of it by people wishing to ascertain if they were born as a result of one of the techniques to be licensed by the authority or by the registrar general to settle cases of disputed paternity.
The main purposes of Amendments Nos. 153A to 153K is to make the meaning of Clause 31 clearer and to provide for different exceptions to the general rule in Clause 31 which prohibits disclosure of confidential information which is obtained by members or employees of the authority. The purpose of the amendments is to provide for different exceptions from the general prohibitions depending on whether the information in question is contained in the register kept by the authority under Clause 29 or is other information obtained in confidence.
I trust that that information is adequate for the Committee and I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Cocks of Hartcliffe): Amendment No. 144 is pre-empted by the acceptance of Amendment No. 143.
[Amendment No. 144 not moved.]
[Amendments Nos. 145 to 149 not moved.]
Lord Henderson of Brompton Lord Henderson of Brompton moved Amendment No. 150:
Page 15, line 42, after ("information") insert ("save that such information entered in the register before the date of implementation of this Act as would specifically identify the person concerned shall not be given").
The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 150 has to a certain extent been discussed when a large number of amendments were discussed with Amendment No. 82. The one I refer to in particular is Amendment No. 87.
This amendment is an attempt to deal with the concern that up until now sperm donations have been made on the understanding that the donor's identity will not be made known. When we were discussing Amendment No. 87 among others, I believe that somehow we got into the context of property. I am not concerned about property, but about the possible retrospective character of this legislation. We have heard from our earlier discussions that there was acceptance of the argument that the donor's identity should be made known. I do not need to rehearse the argument. It is much contested by those who think like myself and by, for instance, the National Association for the Childless.
I do not consider it acceptable that the conditions on which the donation has been made until now, or even as it is made now, should be betrayed by retrospective legislation, which seems to be the purport of these provisions. I am asking whether the provisions of Clause 29(3)(a) are retrospective or not. They seem to be so, but they may not be. I am heartened by some of the amendments which are to be moved in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hooper. I am referring to the block of amendments,
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Nos. 153A to 153K. I refer in particular to Amendments Nos. 153D and 153E.
All this makes for some complication, but we seem to be making some progress. It may be that the problem that worries me and some of my friends about retrospective legislation does not arise since Clause 29(1) refers to,
"recorded for the purposes of that licence in pursuance of … this Act".
In that case confidential information obtained prior to implementation of the Act ought not to be affected. I am puzzled, and it is because of this puzzlement that I am moving this amendment. I would like to know whether or not there is retrospective legislation which would invalidate an immunity which until now has been regarded as sacrosanct. I beg to move.
The Lord Chancellor: As I understand it this amendment would prevent the authority from making information available to an applicant which would identify his or her genetic parents derived from information relating to the period before the legislation came into force. I do not think the amendment is necessary because, as the Bill is at present drafted, Clause 29 does not empower the authority to make such identifying information available to children born as a result of the techniques to be licensed under the Bill. Unless the Bill is subsequently amended to alter the policy that no identifying information is to be made available to children born as a result of donation, there is no need to specify that as this amendment does. The Bill does not allow that in any event.
In any case, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Henderson of Brompton, that to make a retrospective provision about identifying information when that information was not made available to the clinic or centre on that basis would not be a measure lightly to be entered into. As the noble Lord said, the donors have given their gametes on the basis that the information will not be made available. It would need a very strong measure indeed to overrule that retrospectively. I do not see any basis in the Bill for suggesting that that might happen.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: I am very much reassured by what the noble and learned Lord has said. It is just that kind of statement that I was eliciting. I am very grateful to him and I shall look carefully at what the noble and learned Lord has said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 151 not moved.]
Lord Robertson of Oakridge Lord Robertson of Oakridge moved Amendment No. 152:
Page 15, line 46, at end insert —
("; or
(c) if the applicant so requires at the time of making his request, specifying by name any person who would or might, but for the said sections 26 to 28, be a parent of the applicant.").
The noble Lord said: This amendment would remove the anonymity of donors. It would allow

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children created through the donation of gametes to discover if they so wished and after they had reached the age of 18 the identity of their genetic parents. Following the previous debate, I hope that the amendment will not prove retrospective. If the amendment is agreed to, children created through AID will be placed on a par with adopted children who can ask for a copy of their original birth certificate once they reach the age of 18.
I do not think it is necessary for me to go over the arguments in favour or against allowing children to know the identity of their genetic parents. I believe it to be to their advantage to have that information. Much has been made of the position of donors. What has not been said is that disclosure would make them face up to the consequences of their action. This must be for the public good. In any case, the interests of the children concerned are infinitely more important than those of the donor. I beg to move.
Lord Ashbourne: I rise to support the amendment. The Committee has to decide whether it will put first the interests of the child or the interests of the sperm donor. I entirely agree with my noble friend that we should put first the interests of the child. Therefore I am in favour of giving a child who has reached the age of 18 access to the truth if he seeks it.
I should be grateful for help on one point. As I understand it, there has been legislation in Sweden to remove anonymity. I know that the Government were studying what has happened in other countries. Is there any information from Sweden concerning this issue which could help the Committee?
Lord Kennet: Before dinner we discussed an amendment which sought to put a "D" on birth certificates to show that the registered father was not the true biological father. The Committee rightly thought that that should not be pursued because it amounted to publishing the information and broadcasting it to the world. It would be thrust on the attention of the owner of the birth certificate. This amendment takes us into quite different territory. We are considering what is the correct response for the state to give to an adult who is asking for information which the state has.
Both noble Lords who have so far spoken in the debate have referred to the two parties concerned, the donor and the child generated by that donation. There is a third party in the deal envisaged by the amendment; that is, the state. We have to consider what effect the provision in the clause as drafted would have on relations between the individual and the state. The state possesses knowledge of the identity of the father, or even, in rarer circumstances, of the mother, of a citizen. The citizen goes to a representative of the state to ask whether there is any danger of incest if he marries. The representative of the state looks up the catalogue and says that there is no danger of incest. The citizen then asks, "You have the facts; who was my father?" The state says, "I have the facts and I know; but I refuse to tell you". That means that the state is in possession of information about the very identity of some of its citizens which it will not divulge.
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It seems to me that the clause as drafted takes us over a rather important threshold. If a threshold can have ramifications, as I would say this one has, then I would say that such ramifications go far wider than the Bill. If a precedent is set for the state refusing to divulge the identity of people to those people, for what would that precedent not serve? There can be no greater, more intimate or more ontological information about anyone than their identity. If that can be withheld, desite their pleas, surely any lesser information could henceforth be justifiably withheld.
I daresay that this is not the time for the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, to press the matter, but I hope that the subject will be further aired and that we may have an opportunity to return to it at a later stage of the procedings on the Bill.
9.45 p.m.
The Marquess of Reading: I should like to speak in favour of the amendment standing in my name. I should especially like to say how concerned I am about the fact that the Bill appears to discriminate against the children. I understand the dangers outlined by the noble and learned Lord on placing the words "by donation" on the birth certificate. However, if the child is either suspicious or his parents advise him that he is a product of AID or of IVF, or if the child at the age of 18 wishes to know the identity, after counselling, I cannot understand why he should not be able to identify the donor. Perhaps we are in danger of discriminating against the child in favour of the donor.
The Earl of Lauderdale: I should like to support the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. He touched upon a completely new aspect; namely, the state having information about a person's identity and refusing to disclose it. It may seem a strange comparison, but in recent months we have witnessed extraordinary changes on the face of Europe, not least the revolution in Romania. This is a terribly dangerous power to leave in the hands of the state.
Of course, it is much too late to press the matter to a Division, so I can only hope that my noble and learned friend will look again at the matter, especially from the viewpoint of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. In my view he made a serious and significant point which requires a thorough answer.
Baroness Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe: I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord whether he will clarify a matter which has puzzled me throughout all the discussions we have had about the disclosure of the identity of the donor. Most noble Lords who moved or spoke to the amendments have expressed their worry about doctors inquiring into the genetic properties of the donor because of the possibility of genetic disease. But, so far as I know —I may be quite wrong about this —there is no dossier about the genetic properties of the donor. Is that information in fact kept filed?
So far as I can see, if they knew the identity of the donor, people would not be any the wiser about what is to me the most important aspect of the matter;

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that is, whether he might pass on genetic disease. Can the noble and learned Lord clarify the position for me?
Lord Ennals: When the noble and learned Lord replies, will he comment on what effect this provision might have on donors? Would it not be a considerable deterrent to a potential donor coming forward if there was the danger that at some stage he might be accosted and accused of the responsibility of parenthood?
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: I am a little worried about the whole question of incest. Young people today start living together from the age of 16 and may well already have had at least one child by the age of 18. That is the age by which it is suggested that the applicant could discover something about his or her genetic descent. It could then turn out that two young people who had been living together from the age of 16 and who had already had at least one child were half-brother and half-sister. What does one do then? I wonder how much this matters. The Pharoahs got by quite nicely marrying their brothers and their sisters.
Perhaps I may tell Members of the Committee a brief story. Centuries ago in Peru a family lived in a remote district—mother, father and two children. The parents died when the two children —a boy and a girl —were very young. With no guidance, the inevitable happened and children resulted. The bishop travelling through that district visited the house and discovered what had happened. He scratched his head and wondered what to do. Then he decided that the only possible course was to marry them.
I wonder whether we are making too much of a fuss, provided there is some limitation on the number of children a donor is allowed to father. Perhaps for the sake of these wretched young people we had better leave the matter of inadvertent incest alone.
The Lord Chancellor: Perhaps I may take up the last point that the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, made. In considering the terms of licences the authority may decide that it is wise to limit the number of donations by an individual for the reasons given. No doubt other precautions could be taken with regard to that and to the way in which sperm from a particular donor is used.
The amendment would extend the right of a person aged 18 or over to information about his genetic parents to include the right to know their names. As I explained earlier, the idea we have had so far is that genetic information about the parents should be available for the purpose of medical treatment and other such purposes. However, non-identifying information would be given to an applicant.
This amendment goes further and includes the right of the child to know the name of the donor. The first point is that with egg embryo or sperm donations the donor may not even be aware that a child has resulted from his or her donation. The
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Warnock Committee examined the matter and concluded that children should have access only to non-identifying information about the donor.
Some Members of the Committee have asked whether we support the child or the donor. Unless there is a donor in this situation there will be no child. In a sense, unless one gives such protection as the donor needs in order to become a donor, the interests of the child will not arise at all.
My noble friend Lord Ashbourne mentioned Sweden, about which there is some information in the report by Jennifer Gunning to which I referred a week ago. I think that it is quite informative and I shall read an extract from the section dealing with Sweden, on page 39:
"In 1985 the Swedish Government passed a law on artificial insemination following the publication of a Report by a Government Committee set up in 1981 to look at issues related to assisted reproduction. This law restricted donor insemination to married couples, or those in a long-standing relationship. Treatment requires written consent from the husband or cohabitant who will be regarded as the legal father of the child. The most radical aspect of this law is the section relating to information about the donor which specifies that the child should have the right to obtain identifying information about the donor".
That is as my noble friend suggested.
The report continues:
"It had been the tradition in the past for non-identifying information only to be held.
The net effect of this change in the law was, firstly, to reduce and change the type of donors available—older married rather than younger single men offered themselves as donors—and, secondly, a reduction in the demand for donor insemination.
In fact, many Swedish couples seeking donor insemination are seeking treatment in other countries where donor anonymity is still guaranteed".
The practical effect of that measure appears to have been to reduce the availability of donors. That is the primary reason why the Warnock Committee does not support it.
I believe I have dealt with the matter of genetic diseases. The matter of genetic information will be relevant to that question. As I said in answer to earlier amendments, that information is much more reliable than particular information about the donor if there was any chance of that latter information being inaccurate. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and my noble friend Lord Lauderdale emphasised the point about the state having information which it withholds. Strictly speaking, in the system set up here, it is not an organ of the state but an authority which is independent of the executive government which will hold the information about donors and children born as a result of the techniques regulated by the Bill and people who have received one or more of the treatments.
Children born by donation will of course as a result of Clause 29(3) and (4) have access to non-identifying information about the donor. That is to be prescribed by regulations for the reason I have stated; namely, that information relevant to their medical situation might be important. However, the reason that the information is not provided is the one that I have given; namely, that the consideration of this matter by the Warnock Committee concluded that if there are to be donors in any substantial number anonymity is a necessary

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condition. The Government have no reason to differ from that conclusion. The experience in Sweden appears to lend considerable support to that view. As I said at the outset, this is not a question of children against donors. However, unless there are donors and anonymity for donors the chances are that this treatment of AID is unlikely to be available.
Baroness Seear: Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, I should mention that he referred to the matter of protecting the donor. Earlier he referred to protecting donors from any claims of responsibility as regards paternity and from any financial obligations towards the child. That is one thing, but if there is no such obligation and all the child obtains is the knowledge that a certain person was the donor but that the donor has no obligation whatsoever towards him, does that make any difference in the view of the noble and learned Lord?
The Lord Chancellor: I am not sure that I mentioned responsibility particularly. I understand that it is the identification of the donor that is likely to discourage him from coming forward. One can see that the fewer consequences identification has for the donor, the less identification is likely to pose a disincentive. On the other hand, I suppose that once one's identity is known one's security against any other form of responsibility is apt to be diminished. Therefore in practical terms the result may be the same. The noble Baroness makes, as usual, an important point. However, I believe that, on balance, the Warnock Committee was right to hold that identification in itself is sufficient to make it unlikely that donors would come forward.
Lord Kennet: I hope that the Committee will bear with me for a moment. I do not want to lean on the point, for obvious reasons. However, I have seen reports—the validity of which I have not tested —that the Swedish experience was indeed as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor indicated, but that following the reduction in the number of donors immediately after the change in the law the number of donors coming forward has picked up. I have also seen it reported that there has been a similar experience in France. There was an immediate drop in the number of donors but it has since picked up again. I do not want to lean on the point because I do not have chapter and verse to quote which might seem to contradict the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor's source. Perhaps there will be an opportunity on another occasion to go into the matter more fully.
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The noble and learned Lord pointed out that it would not be the state as such which would be concealing the knowledge of his identity from the citizen but rather the licensing authority. I do not believe that ordinary citizens will make much distinction in their minds and in their feelings between the state as such and a statutory authority set up by Parliament to have dominion over the matter. Their feelings will be the same in either case. It will be the res publica, the corporate body which everybody regards as "Them", "It", 'Big Brother", the state, which will be the subject of fear and hatred and the cause of pain when that knowledge is denied.
10 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: I do not wish to press the point about the distinction between the authority and the state, but the authority will be an independent body set up for that purpose.
So far as concerns the information that I gave about Sweden, when I first referred to the matter I mentioned when the report was compiled. I think that I am right in saying that the work was done last summer. The report is as up to date as that. I do not have in front of me the information about France. The report is available to all Members of the Committee, and no doubt some further study of it can be undertaken.
Lord Robertson of Oakridge: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his comments on the amendment. I am also grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in support of the amendment. I should like to comment on something that the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, said about limiting the number of times a donor could donate. That was the subject of Amendment No. 30, which did not find favour with the Committee. However, it would have helped with the problem.
Although the amendment has received a great deal of support I do not believe that this is the time to divide the Committee. However, I should like to be free to come back to the matter at Report stage. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 153 not moved.]
Clause 29, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 30 agreed to.
Clause 31 [Restrictions on disclosure of information]:
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendments Nos. 153A to 153K:
Page 16, line 30, leave out from ("employee") to end of line 31.
Page 16, line 35, after first ("any") insert ("other").
Page 16, leave out line 38 and insert —
("(3) Subsection (1) above does not apply to any disclosure of information mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above").
Page 16, line 42, at end insert—
("(bb) so that no individual to whom the information relates can be identified,").
Page 16, line 45, at end insert—
("(3A) Subsection (1) above does not apply to any disclosure of information mentioned in subsection (2)(b) above —

(a) made to a person as a member or employee of the Authority,

(b) made with the consent of the person or persons whose confidence would otherwise be protected, or

(c) which has been lawfully made available to the public before the disclosure is made.").

Page 17, line 1, at end insert ("and no person to whom directions have been given").
Page 17, line 2, leave out ("mentioned in subsection (5) below") and insert ("falling within section 29(1A) of this Act").
Page 17, line 3, leave out from ("person") to end of line 10 and insert—
("(5) Subsection (4) above does not apply to any disclosure of information made").
Page 17, line 11, leave out ("or").
Page 17, line 12, leave out ("another") and insert ("a").
The noble Baroness said: With the leave of the Committee, I should like to move Amendments Nos. 153A to 153K en bloc. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Lord Teviot Lord Teviot moved Amendment No. 154:
Page 17, line 13, at end insert—
("(d) to a person for whom services are provided in pursuance of the licence but only in so far as such disclosure is permitted under regulations").
The noble Lord said: The amendment is moved on behalf of the British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering. Its purpose is to enable the parents of a child born as a result of treatment services to give information to that child at appropriate stages of his or her development about his or her genetic parents if they were donors or gametes. The provisions as to confidentiality in Clause 31 as it stands are so rigidly drawn that it appears that the parents will not have access to that information.
Under the Adoption Agencies Regulations 1983 similar provision is made to that contained in Clause 31 of the Bill regarding confidentiality of adoption records. Nevertheless, an adoption agency is permitted to make disclosure of confidential case records as necessary for the purposes of carrying out its function. One of them specifically is to give to adoptive parents information about the child's personal history and background, partly in order, as the Department of Health, and then Social Services, circular on regulations (LAC) 84/3 makes clear, to enable them to pass the information on to the child.
Under the Bill, it is left to the authority to direct that information should be obtained about donors
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and to the Secretary of State by regulations to direct that certain information be disclosed to the child concerned on application. But the prohibitions on other disclosure contained in Clause 31 make it possible for the responsible authority to disclose any information about the donor or donors to the persons receiving treatment. While it is believed right that the Secretary of State should be able to insist that the identity of the donors is not disclosed at this stage, it is believed that it should be essential for the emotional well-being of the child as he or she grows up for the parents to be able to provide some information about the characteristics of its biological parent.
This is purely a probing amendment. I am interested to hear the comments of the Committee and particularly those of the noble and learned Lord. I beg to move.
The Lord Chancellor: I had judged the intention of Amendment No. 154 to be the same as that of the group with which we dealt earlier which had the aim of making identifying information available in respect of children born as a result of techniques to be licensed under the Bill. In that case the amendment would have the effect of making information defined in regulations available to those receiving services. I do not think, for the reasons that I have given in relation to other amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Teviot, and the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, that it would be appropriate for us to agree to that extension of the policy in the White Paper and to make such information more widely available. Even with the safeguard which the amendment provides of regulations which would specify which categories of information would be available, I think it would be unfortunate if the confidentiality of data held by licence centres and by the authority about these sensitive treatments were to be breached.
Amendment No. 154A, the government amendment to Clause 31, seeks to provide for situations which are not covered in the current drafting of the Bill. It inserts paragraph (cc), which allows non-identifying information to be supplied, and paragraph (ccc) which makes provision for the case of a person to whom directions have been given who will need to be able to disclose permitted information to other persons. The inserted subsection (6) now provides that information may be released to the individual to whom it relates —for example, a donor or persons who are being treated —but that does not extend to any information showing that an identifiable individual was or may have been born in consequence of treatment services.
Given that the government amendment to Clause 31 will allow disclosure of non-identifying information to those receiving services, I hope that my noble friend Lord Teviot will feel that my comments have dealt with the substance of this amendment.
Lord Teviot: I shall certainly not press the amendment, but it was not in the group; it was a totally separate matter. I checked the grouping list.

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I note that there was a government amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Hopper. I shall read carefully what has been said and hope that it will satisfy the points that have been made. If necessary, I shall return with another probing amendment on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendment No. 154A:
Page 17, line 13, at end insert—
("(cc) so that no individual to whom the information relates can be identified, or
(ccc) in pursuance of directions given by virtue of section 23(3) or (4) of this Act.
(6) This section does not apply to the disclosure to any individual of information which —

(a) falls within section 29(1A) of this Act by virtue of paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection, and

(b) relates only to that individual or, in the case of an individual treated together with another, only to that individual and that other.").

The noble Baroness said: Amendment No. 154A inserts paragraph (cc) which allows non-identifying information to be supplied and paragraph (ccc) which allows disclosure by persons to whom directions have been given who will need to be able to disclose permitted information to other persons.
The inserted subsection (6) now provides that information may be released to the individual to whom it relates —for example, a donor or persons who are being treated —but that does not extend to any information showing that an identifiable individual was or may have been born in consequence of treatment services. That sort of information would therefore be disclosable only in accordance with Clause 31(6). I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 31, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 32 and 33 agreed to.
Viscount Caldecote Viscount Caldecote moved Amendment No. 155:
After Clause 33 insert the following new clause —
("Inspection of premises
. —(1) The Authority shall ensure that every licensed premise is inspected at least annually.
(2) The Authority shall appoint to its staff competent inspectors in such numbers and with such qualifications as the Authority considers necessary to enforce the conditions of the licences granted to the premises and any other relevant provisions of this Act.").
The noble Viscount said: During the course of these discussions in Committee several Members have stressed the importance of strict regulation and enforcement for the licences and other provisions of this Bill. Indeed, I think that was an understanding of many noble Lords who voted for research; namely, if there were to be research, the conditions under which it was carried out would be very strictly enforced.
There seem to be two serious omissions in the Bill. First, there is no reference to the frequency of inspection of licensed premises. I understand that the Interim Licensing Authority believes that premises should be inspected at least annually. That deals with the first part of the amendment.
Secondly, there is no obligation on the authority as the Bill is drafted at present to appoint a sufficient number of properly qualified inspectors to inspect licensed premises and generally to enforce the provisions of the Bill. That is in striking contrast to the Food Safety Bill wherein in Clause 27 every food authority is required to appoint public analysts with proper qualifications approved by the Minister.
submit that in this Bill it is at least equally important to put an obligation on the authority set up under the Bill to appoint an adequate number of properly qualified inspectors to enable the authority to carry out its regulatory and enforcement responsibilities. It is true that in paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 (on page 24 of the Bill) there is a provision for the authority to:
"appoint such employees as it thinks fit".
But surely that is not sufficiently precise. I submit that it is of great importance to clarify and strengthen the duties of the authority as proposed in this amendment. I beg to move.
Lord McGregor of Durris: As the noble Viscount said, many noble Lords voted for the continuance of research on the footing that the strict control established by the Voluntary Licensing Authority would be continued by the new statutory authority. As the noble Earl said, it is self-evident that if the new authority is to do its job effectively and fulfil the expectations of Members of this Chamber, it must at least establish annual inspections and do so on the basis of a fully qualified inspectorate. It is only on that basis that public confidence in the regulation of research of this nature can be fully established. I very much hope that the noble Baroness will be able to accept the noble Viscount's amendment.
The Earl of Halsbury: I strongly support this amendment. One cannot experiment on an animal without having a licence from the Home Office. It is difficult to imagine that one can experiment on a human embryo without being inspected, even if one has a licence. If one is experimenting on animals the Home Office inspector can descend at random and one does not know when he will come. I believe that the amendment of the noble Viscount is very welcome.
Lord Ennals: The noble Viscount has very well made his case, and I entirely support it. If the words are not entirely appropriate, the noble and learned Lord will say so, but I hope that the principle will be accepted.
Lord Harvington: I entirely support everything that has been said. I cannot resist the thrill of finding myself on the same side as Lord McGregor for once.
10.15 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: As we come towards the end of the Committee stage, it is very pleasant to feel an air of unanimity enveloping the Committee.
The Government take the view that efficient control of the licensing system is necessary. Whether it is quite wise to specify that every licensed premise,

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irrespective of the type of licensed premise, should be inspected at least once a year may be open to doubt. It ought to be for the authority to decide that. But I certainly understand the spirit of the amendment. It is clear that the confidence that the authority has in a particular area may have an effect on its decisions about inspection.
As has already been said, the unexpected inspection is obviously the most powerful weapon in the hands of an authority, and it may well be that more frequent than once a year inspections would be perfectly common. However, in view of the general response which has been given to this amendment, I think it would be right for me to consider the matter further.
Viscount Caldecote: I did not quite catch what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said. Was it that he would accept this amendment or that an amendment would be brought forward at Report stage?
The Lord Chancellor: I said that if my noble friends were agreeable I should like to consider the matter further.
Viscount Caldecote: For the second time tonight, I should like to thank my noble and learned friend sincerely for his acceptance of the amendments I put forward. In view of his undertaking, I am very happy to withdraw this amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 34 and 35 agreed to.
Clause 36 [Offences]:
Baroness Elles Baroness Elles moved Amendment No. 156:
Page 19, line 25, at end insert ("or
(c) exceeds any authorisation contained in a licence or fails or omits to observe or perform any condition contained in a licence granted to him or his employer").
The noble Baroness said: This Bill, in Clause 36, provides for certain sanctions in certain circumstances against persons who contravene provisions laid down in the Bill. Some acts are totally forbidden, as in Clause 3(2), or they may be prohibited unless a licence is granted. A licence may authorise certain acts within strict parameters, such as those set out in Clauses 12, 13 and 14 of the Bill, but there appears to be no provision to deal with the necessary safeguards which are needed against any excess of any authorisation allowed, or failure to observe any of the provisions which are required under the Bill, not only as far as concerns the person to whom the licence is granted, but also in face of employees who might exceed authorisation or fail to act in accordance with instructions laid down.
It is perfectly possible to imagine all sorts of situations where that could happen. I do not want to start being controversial or polemical, but one could imagine an extension of the 14 days; one could imagine an embryo being kept on with a hamster after the time laid down. There are all sorts of examples of which one could think which could
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happen, although I am not saying that they would happen. Nevertheless, there should be provision in the Bill for any excess of any authorisation. This amendment seeks to remedy that gap in the Bill. I beg to move.
The Lord Chancellor: The amendment would provide that a person who exceeds any authorisation contained in a licence, or who fails or omits to observe or perform any condition contained in a licence granted to him or his employer, is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine or both.
The offence contained in Clause 36(1), and the corresponding penalties to which my noble friend referred, are provided in the Bill for the most severe offence with which the Bill deals and that offence is restricted to any person who:

(a) places in a woman an embryo or gametes which are not human,

(b) mixes human gametes with the gametes of any other species, except in accordance with a licence, or

(c) does anything which by virtue of Clause 3(3), such as placing any human embryo in any other animal species, may not be licensed under the Act.

The Government regards those matters as very serious, but while I can appreciate the spirit in which the amendment is moved, I do not believe that the activities with which it deals fall into quite the same category as those to which Clause 36(1) applies. The Government believe that appropriate sanctions for the activities the amendment describes are provided for elsewhere in the Bill. A person who exceeds any authorisation contained in a licence by bringing about the creation of, keeping, or using an embryo without being licensed to do so, or by storing any gametes or using donated gametes in the course of providing treatment services except in accordance with a licence would be guilty of an offence under Clause 36(2) and liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both. Clause 17 enables a licence committee to revoke a licence if it is satisfied that the person responsible is not discharging the duty under Clause 16 which provides that it shall be the duty of the person responsible to secure that the conditions of the licence are complied with.
For that reason I feel that the amendment puts the activities with which it deals, which are not already contained in Clause 36(1), into a more serious category than they should be put. We believe that offences under Clause 36(1) should be those which carry the severest penalties and that the other matters, which could amount to criminal offence, should be dealt with rather less severely.
It is important to focus on the severe matters and deal with them rather than provide for too vague an offence in Clause 36(1). That is why we have distinguished between the two levels of offences. I believe that adequate sanctions for the activities described in the amendment are provided for in the Bill elsewhere than in Clause 36(1).
Baroness Elks: I thank my noble and learned friend for that explanation. I understand his argument that Clause 36(1) is kept for severe offences; nevertheless, there could presumably be a severe offence where there is an excess of authorisation or where an employee or licensed person fails to act. However, in view of what my noble and learned friend has said and the lateness of the hour, I might come back to the point after considering carefully his reply. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendment No. 157:
Page 19, line 29, at end insert ("otherwise than by doing something which, by virtue of section 3(3) of this Act, cannot be authorised by a licence").
The noble Baroness said: I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 158 to 163. Amendment No. 157 provides for the severer penalties in Clause 36(1) to apply where people not only create, keep or use an embryo without a licence when one is required, but also do something that a licence cannot authorise under Clause 3(3).
The words suggested to be deleted by Amendment No. 158 are unnecessary. As currently drafted, Clause 36(2)(c) makes it an offence to fail to comply with any directions given by the authority. Amendment No. 159 therefore seeks to replace the excessively broad provision and would instead make it an offence to fail to comply with directions issued under Clause 23(5)(a). Amendments Nos. 160 and 161 are intended to extend the defence contained in Clause 36(9) to circumstances in which a person is not working under the immediate direction of the persons responsible under a licence. Amendment No. 162 is required merely to remove the word "of," so that it is clear that the directions refer to the directions in No. 161.
Amendment No. 163 is designed to extend the defence of due diligence to a person to whom directions have been given by the authority. With that explanation, I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendments Nos. 158 to 163:
Page 19, line 31, leave out ("or regulations made by virtue of subsection (2) of that section").
Page 19, line 33, at end insert ("given by virtue of section 23(5)(a) of this Act").
Page 20, line 28, after ("time") insert—

("(i)").

Page 20, line 29, after ("licence") insert—

("(ii) a person designated by virtue of section 16(2)(b) of this Act as a person to whom a licence applied, or

(iii) a person to whom directions had been given by virtue of section 23(7) of this Act,").

Page 20, line 30, leave out ("of").
Page 20, line 34, after ("applied") insert ("or to whom directions had been given").
The noble Baroness said: With the leave of the Committee, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 158 to 163 en bloc.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 36, as amended, agreed to.
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendment No. 164:
After Clause 36, insert the following new clause—
("Consent to prosecution
. No proceedings for an offence under this Act shall be instituted—

(a) in England and Wales, except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and

(b) in Northern Ireland, except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Nothern Ireland.").

The noble Baroness said: The effect of this amendment is that no proceedings can be brought under the Act in England, Wales or Northern Ireland without the consent of the relevant Director of Public Prosecutions. Scotland is not included because under Scottish law there is no provision for bringing private prosecutions except in highly restricted circumstances. The amendment is designed to ensure that only well-founded cases are brought before the courts so that they are not burdened with frivolous prosecutions. I beg to move.
The Duke of Norfolk: The effect of this clause would be to prevent prosecutions under the Bill when enacted without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. It would make private prosecutions brought by ordinary members of the public impossible. This appears to me to be a serious erosion of the effectiveness of the Bill. The right of ordinary citizens to bring a case in law is of the greatest importance. This is indeed an issue which concerns many ordinary members of the public, as was indicated by the Gallup Poll which I mentioned on a previous occasion and which I fear was misunderstood by my noble friend Lord Craigavon. Outright majorities opposed the use of the human embryo for experiments to develop contraceptives or abortifacients.
On the first question of research into genetics and chromosomal abnormalities, 32 per cent. were opposed to research. The 58 per cent. who were in favour of research were then asked whether they would support it if the aim was to discard affected embryos. Twenty-nine per cent. of those people, which is 17 per cent. of the total, then opposed research. Thirty-two per cent. plus 17 per cent. equals 49 per cent. opposing research, with only 32 per cent. still supporting it, if the aim was to discard affected embryos; and 20 per cent. did not know.
These figures are always complicated, and I apologise to my noble friend if I failed to explain it earlier so that it could be understood. I have put the figures in the Library. I hope that your Lordships will take time to look at them because there are a number of other interesting results from the poll. I am making the point that this is a matter which the public are very concerned about. I think it would be wrong to make it impossible for us to act through the courts to see that the law is enforced. For this reason, I would oppose the amendment.
Lord Harvington: I must support my noble friend the Duke of Norfolk in opposing the amendment. We have a strange situation in British law where many Acts remain on the statute book which no one would wish to see enforced. For instance, a taxi driver who does not carry a bale of hay in his boot is breaking the law but no one would expect to see

1367
him feeding the hay to the horse which was towing him back to his garage. That is a matter of which we should take note.
Such a system has its dangers. The present Director of Public Prosecutions might decide that it is not in the public interest to prosecute in respect of a certain matter when many people would like to see the law enforced. Such events now take place.
I apologise for introducing a new topic at this late hour but it is by way of example only. The Abortion Act provides a good example in practice. Most abortions are carried out on the grounds of the risk to the mental health of the mother. However, in its report on unplanned pregnancy published in 1972 the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists stated:
"It is no such danger of injury to the majority of these cases as the indication is purely social".
That must mean that many illegal abortions are taking place but there are no prosecutions. How do we know that there will be prosecutions in this case? If the Director takes such a course in other cases, why not in this case? It is not a situation which anyone envisaged in 1967. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Ennals, did not, nor David Steel and the noble Lord, Lord Houghton.
A similar comment can be made about the time limit. Today many late abortions are those of children capable of being born alive, yet there are no prosecutions. I do not believe that we can have any confidence in the DPP to ensure that laws of this kind will be enforced. We must be most wary of preventing all other avenues of enforcement.
10.30 p.m.
Lord Brightman: I must comment on the last observation made by the noble Lord. I do not have the statistics to hand but I assure him that extremely few abortions take place —in fact, none —of a child capable of being born alive, save exceptionally where the child is an encephalic or for some other reason it is impossible for it to survive.
I believe that it would be quite wrong in this highly sensitive area to permit private prosecutions. I wholly support the amendment.
Lord Robertson of Oakridge: The right is not available in Scotland, but it is the basic right of the individual in England to take out private prosecutions, except where it is specifically declared to be the opposite. I can understand that in cases where national security is at stake there is a reason for limiting private prosecutions. However, merely because there may be frivolous prosecutions is no reason at all. I am sure that the courts have ways and means of dealing with frivolous prosecutions. I believe that Parliament should look closely each time this right of the individual is whittled away.
Lord Dean of Beswick: I have listened with great care to the previous speakers. I was not aware that the amendment concerned abortions. Those Members of the Committee who listened to the "The Today Programme" on the radio this morning will have heard medical people from Romania talking about
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what was happening there under President Ceaucescu. Abortions were banned and those which took place were completely illegal. The maiming and crippling of young women, some with young families, was appalling. That situation would exist here if private prosecutions were introduced. The flood gates would be opened.
With my limited knowledge of the Bill I did not believe that abortion was relevant to the amendment. However, anyone who wants to talk in terms of turning back the clock on abortion would do well to listen to the tape of those interviews with medical people from Romania. They have sent a desperate appeal for medical equipment to allow the doctors in Romania to start performing abortions. I believe that Members of the Committee should consider that when they propose turning back the clock. It seems odd that a Communist and dictatorial country like Romania could behave in such a manner. One would expect such a country to be more liberal but it is a closed shop as regards abortion. Abortion is not available at any time for any reason. I hope that the Committee will reject this amendment.
Lord Kennet: Perhaps I can bring the Committee back to the subject of the Bill and to the territory within which it will apply. No doubt frivolous prosecutions are a great danger in many spheres. For that reason we are all fairly accustomed to the institution of DPP only crimes. That is a special class of crimes which are considered so sensitive to somebody that the citizen must be deprived of his normal right of taking out a private prosecution. That right must in those cases be confined in the hands of the DPP.
No doubt there is readily available a list of offences which are DPP only. I believe that the judgment of the Committee on this fundamental amendment —which has come rather late in the day —would be better if the noble Baroness could tell us what the list is. Prosecutions in this field will be sent to stand beside other DPP only offences. I would not feel capable of making a rational decision without knowing the list of those offences beside which this will stand. I am now repeating myself for a reason that I believe the noble Baroness will understand.
Viscount Caldecote: I ask my noble friend what action is open to members of the public if they sincerely believe that the DPP is not prosecuting when he should be. Does that come within the duties of the ombudsman or is there some other recourse open to them?
Baroness Elles: I should like to add my voice to those who oppose this amendment, which has nothing to do with abortions or Romania but is to do with this country and the people who may feel that they have been ill treated or have had an offence committed against them through some action by the authority. Those of us who have had direct dealings with the electorate know of cases where women in particular have been totally frustrated and do not feel that they have been treated justly. I believe that putting the DPP between an individual and the courts is depriving that individual of a right to justice

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in this country. Therefore, I join those who oppose the amendment.
Viscount Craigavon: Before the Minister replies, I was mentioned by name by the noble Duke and perhaps I may just reply to what he said. It is relevant to the amendment in that he referred to public support for his point of view.
I stand by the statistics which I produced before. As the noble Duke said, a copy of this information is available in the Library. I referred to a final question in a series of questions which was put in a Gallup Poll on behalf of SPUC. The question asked whether human embryos should be used at all in experiments. Having first mentioned various purposes for which human embryos might be used, there was a general question. Thirty-seven per cent. said that embryos should not be allowed in experiments and 36 per cent. said that they should be allowed. There was a large number of "Don't knows" —27 per cent.
That corresponds closely with the MORI survey which appeared in the House magazine on 4th December and which also found a figure of 38 per cent. in favour of a total ban on live human cells. There were 11 per cent. "Don't knows", leaving a figure of 51 per cent. in favour of research up to 14 days and after 14 days.
The point I was making and to which the noble Duke has just referred —this is relevant to the amendment —is that the public gave a verdict also in his survey on the matter of research into genetics and chromosomal diseases. Only 32 per cent. said embryo research should not be allowed in that case but 58 per cent. said it should be allowed. What seemed to happen is that having obtained an unfavourable result the survey then recast the question in a much narrower form and tried to obtain, by a very loaded question, a different result. Those figures are available in the Library for inspection.
Baroness Hooper: I am aware of the statistics quoted by my noble friend the Duke of Norfolk which he has so kindly placed in the Library, but I should like to make absolutely clear that this amendment does not make private prosecutions impossible, as my noble friend suggested. It simply requires the consent of the DPP before such a private prosecution can be brought.
In answer to my noble friend Lord Caldecote, who asked what recourse was available if the DPP refuses consent, my understanding is that the DPP operates under the superintendence of the Attorney-General who, in turn, is answerable to Parliament. As I said in presenting the amendment, it is designed to ensure that only well-founded cases are brought before the courts and is in no way intended to infringe an individual's right to attempt to bring a public prosecution.
While I cannot answer the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, by giving him a list of offences covered by the DPP, I can tell him that there is an identical provision in Clause 4(2) of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. That is all I can say to answer the points raised.
Lord Kennet: Knowing one other Act in which this provision exists seems to me to be an insufficient basis on which to ask the Committee to decide on this matter. As the noble Baroness said, she is sure there is a list. Might it not be advisable to withdraw the amendment for the moment and introduce it at a later stage when that list is before us? We shall then see in full the company which we are sending this Bill to join and see what status the Government intend the Bill to have.
Baroness Hooper: I do not feel it is necessary at this stage to withdraw the amendment, but I will inform the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, of the additional cases, which I am not able to do spontaneously at the moment.
Lord Kennet: That will be too late.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees: The Question is, That this amendment be agreed to. As many of that opinion will say "content"?
Noble Lords: Content.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees: To the contrary, "not content"?
Noble Lords: Not content.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees: I think the "contents" have it.
Lord Kennet: Not content.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees: I think the "contents" have it.
Lord Kennet: Not content.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees: The "contents" have it.
Amendment agreed to.
Clause 37 [Regulations]:
[Amendment No. 164A had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
Baroness Hooper Baroness Hooper moved Amendment No. 165:
Page 20, line 44, leave out ("3(3)(b)") and insert ("3(3)").
The noble Baroness said: This is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 37, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 38 to 41 agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with amendments.

British Railways Bill
Brought from the Commons; read a first time, and referred to the Examiners.
House adjourned at thirteen minutes before eleven o'clock.