COMMONS AMENDMENT (Hansard, 8 November 1989)

§ The Lord Chancellor

My Lords, in moving this amendment, I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 237, 239, 313 and 401. This group of amendments is mainly concerned with the effect of care and supervision orders and their interaction with other orders.

Amendment No. 235 moves into Clause 65 many of the provisions to be found at present in Clause 66. Subsections (3) to (7) of Clause 65 are deleted 835 and equivalent provision included in the adoption schedule. The redundant Clause 66 is removed from the Bill by Amendment No. 237.

Most of the orders referred to continue in force until, and cease to have effect when, the child reaches the age of 18, unless the order is brought to an end earlier. The exceptions are Section 7 orders, which expire at age 16 unless the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, in accordance with Clause 8(5) and interim care orders.

Some particular changes are made which perhaps I ought to mention briefly. The new subsection (2J), in excepting interim care orders from the provision that care orders shall continue in force until age 18 unless brought to an end earlier, picks up an earlier oversight. An interim care order will be subject to the specific time limits provided for in Clause 33(4).

The new subsection (20) takes into Clause 65 the bar on further applications in relation to contact with children in care which was previously provided for in Clause 29(10). This is simply a tidying-up provision.

The provisions have been restructured with more specific reference to particular orders as an aid to clarity. In other words we have tried to associate the conditions with the particular orders, to make it easier for the reader to follow. For example, Section 7 orders and orders made under Schedule 1 are referred to specifically.

In addition Amendment No. 235, together with Amendments Nos. 239 and 401, will make changes intended to make a care order incompatible with wardship. New subsection (2B) introduced by Amendment No. 235 provides that, if a ward of court is made subject to a care order, the care order discharges the wardship.

The amendments also deal with the reverse situation. Amendment No. 401 will mean that the issuing of an originating summons will no longer have the automatic effect of making a child a ward if that child is currently under a care order. Amendment No. 239 will prevent the High Court's inherent jurisdiction being used to make a child who is in care a ward of court. That completes the mutual exclusivity of care orders and wardship.

Amendment No. 313 will mean that a supervision order shall cease to apply if a custody order in respect of the same child also ceases to apply as a result of the provisions of Section 25 of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985. This would happen, for example, if a child who was subject to a custody order had been wrongly removed from the United Kingdom and an order to return the child had been made under the terms of The Hague Convention dealing with international child abduction. In these circumstances it would be appropriate for a co-existing supervision order to cease to have effect as well as the custody order. I beg to move.