Security Service Bill

HL Deb 21 March 1989 vol 505 cc581-648

3.5 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Mackay of Clashfern)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The BARONESS SEROTA in the Chair.]

Clause 1 [The Security Service]:

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 1, line 10, leave out ("or undermine").

The noble and learned Lord said: Perhaps it may be for the convenience of the Committee if I speak also to Amendment No. 2. At Second Reading I readily acknowledged that our country needs a security service to fight against international terrorism and espionage. However, I ventured to stress the need to strike a balance in the Bill between the operational needs of the security service and the need to maintain the values and requirements of our democracy and to safeguard the liberties of the subject. To sacrifice the latter to the former would not only be unacceptable to our democracy but would diminish our security and not strengthen it. I venture to take the view that several of the amendments which my noble friends; and noble Lords from all sides of the Committee will be supporting are directed to achieving that balance.

Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 arise from the provision in Clause 1(2) which describes the function of the security service. It is stated in broad, but I submit imprecise, terms as, the protection of national security", which is nowhere defined either in the Bill or in any other legislation. The particulars which follow those words: The function of the Service shall be the protection of national security", are also in broad and imprecise terms. They describe the actions against which the security service is to give protection. It is to give protection against, actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means". The meaning of, actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by … violent means", is clear. The menance and the mischief are clear. However, what of the adjoining and accompanying words? What does "undermining parliamentary democracy" amount to? Will it mean any defeat for the Government in this Chamber? I am sure not. What does "undermining" intend to contemplate more or less than "overthrow", which I agree is a proper word to include. Then come the words, by political, industrial or violent means". What do the words "political means" contemplate? Do they mean the holding of public meetings, the publicising of political views which may be unattractive to the Government or the organising of political opposition to the Government in various political societies and otherwise? Then we have the words "by industrial means". Against what are those provisions intended to aim? Are they to aim at what perhaps may be lawful strikes but nevertheless strikes which may cause disruption or at the very least inconvenience to the community?

At Second Reading I cited what the European Court of Human Rights said in the case of Leander v. Sweden: Law has to be sufficiently clear in its terms to give ordinary citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to secret and potentially dangerous interference with private life".—[Official Report, 27/2/89; col. 865.] The powers contained in the warrants that the Secretary of State is given authority to issue here are indeed considerable. Further, without the authority of the warrants they could amount to various criminal offences; but the warrants protect them.

The submission we make is that the language of this all-important provision does not come near to achieving the standard of clarity which the European Court pointed out as necessary in the cited case. Moreover, as what follows is so vitally important to the liberties of our democracy, and of the subject, we submit that the words which we seek to leave out by means of the amendment—namely, "undermine" and "political, industrial or"—ought to be left out not only for the purpose of clarification but also, more importantly, because of their potential mischief. I beg to move.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

I should like to support the amendment. Here we are dealing with a matter of subversion. If Members of the Committee will look at Clause 1(2), which defines the functions of the service, they will see that it deals with matters with which we would all agree so far as concerns espionage, terrorism, sabotage and agents. We then come to the last words, which deal with what is known as subversion and to which the noble and learned Lord has already referred.

There is no crime of subversion, so the words which go into the Bill will be the first statutory definition. Therefore they are of the greatest possible importance for the future. As the powers of the service wielded in the Bill at present are without any oversight or any accountability, except to the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister, they are very extensive. They affect individual citizens and are of course wielded in secrecy. Therefore they should be clear and limited.

We all know that since the last war the service has on occasion interpreted its powers so broadly that it has caused quite a degree of legitimate concern. Indeed, we all now know from people who worked in the service, or from politicians, that a number of people, such as Mr. Scanlon, Jack Jones, Judith Hart, Mrs. Harriet Harman of the NCCL, the journalist Duncan Campbell, Professor Allen and also bodies such as CND and even Shelter, have been subject to unjustifiable surveillance at different times.

The origins of the words we find here come from the definition which was laid down by my noble friend Lord Harris when he was a Minister. However, the difference is that although the words come from that definition, which has been used by the service, the crucial words contained in his definition—namely, that the activities must be those which threaten the safety and well-being of the state—have been missed out. Those words do not appear here.

When dealing with the matter the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, said that the subject bore on the defence of the realm as a whole. The noble and learned Lord, when moving the amendment, used the word "undermine", which I suppose means to burrow under, to erode or to weaken. Indeed, many people would say that to support the abolition of this Chamber perhaps undermines democracy. Political and industrial means will of course cover strikes and speeches, and so on: and also almost any activity which may attack the established system at the time. With those words left in it is an entirely subjective judgment by the persons concerned.

When we have had such phrases as "the enemy within" in relation to the miners' strike and the Prime Minister saying that in the GCHQ situation there is an inherent conflict between membership of a union and the defence of national security, the words indicate the problem of such a subjective judgment, although they may only be manners of speech.

In Australia the Security and Intelligence Act was amended to take out "subversion" altogether as it was deemed as being too imprecise a form of words. Mr. Alan Wrigley, the director general of the intelligence service of Australia, specifically warned in one of his reports against the use of that word because its implications are so wide. In Canada, as Members of the Committee may know, a review body has been set up to review the work of the intelligence service. In one of its annual reports it criticised the service for certain targeting policies under the word "subversive", with the result that the counter-subversion branch of the service was disbanded.

The amendment tightens up description of the functions of MI5 and, I suggest, removes a broad grey area the coverage of which has caused a great deal of concern in other English-speaking nations. By removing these words we would be doing exactly the same thing.

3.15 p.m.

Lord Allen of Abbeydale

I am not a lawyer and therefore I venture into the discussion with some diffidence. However, I hope that the Committee will not accept these two amendments. It seems to me that the wording of the Bill expresses what experience has shown to be the areas at risk. Members of the Committee will be aware that it has been the policy of the Government for some years that no one should be employed on work vital to the security of the state who is or has recently been a member of a communist or fascist organisation, or of a subversive group.

There is of course a right of appeal to three advisers by anyone caught by that provision. I have been looking at the terms of reference of those advisers. They describe a subversive group as one which has aims to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by political, industrial or violent means. These words are very similar to the ones contained in the Bill, even though the words "undermine" and "overthrow" are placed in a different order. Moreover, they were agreed with the trade unions concerned with the Civil Service after long discussions. Therefore it seems to me that they should stay in the Bill.

Lord Lloyd of Hampstead

I should like to express my support for the view just expressed by my noble friend Lord Allen of Abbeydale. The movers of the 'amendment appear to wish to confine the restraint to overthrowing by violent means, which obviously refers to ostensible and visible means of action. Of course, that is one way by which parliamentary democracy might be overthrown. But surely there exists a whole area of much more insidious activity with which we have perhaps been familiar not only for many years but for generations.

Two meanings of the criticised word "undermine" are given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary. One is, to wear away the base or foundation of something" — which is the literal meaning. Then there is the rather more extended meaning: to injure by secret or insidious means". One would have thought that it is that area, in addition to the area of violent overthrow, which is the proper province of a security service. I should have thought, with the greatest of respect, that to limit the activities of the security service in the way proposed by the amendment would be to reduce it to virtual impotence in the modern setting. I therefore strongly oppose the amendment.

The Lord Chancellor

It is important to remind ourselves of the wording of Clause 1(2): The function of the Service shall be the protection of national security and, in particular with the phrase to which attention has been devoted in the amendments following as one branch of the particular.

I hope that during our debates the Committee will be reassured that the way the Bill expresses the functions of the service goes only as far as, and no further than, is necessary for the protection of the freedom of us all. The security service cannot act in that area other than for the protection and security of the nation as a whole. That is emphasised by the first part of the subsection which I read a moment ago. It cannot act in response to any narrow party political interest. It cannot act in respect of those who present no threat to the nation, whatever their views and however radical they may be either to the Left or to the Right. I venture to suggest that that is the effect the Committee would wish to see. And that is what the Bill achieves. In that respect there is little difference on any side of the Committee on the basic aim. My principal purpose is to explain how the language of the legislation fulfils the objectives that I have described.

The word "subversion" is not used, and therefore the difficulties to which the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, referred do not arise directly. In relation to counter-subversion the Bill rests on the definition of subversion given to this House on behalf of the then government by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, in 1975. That has been referred to. The noble Lord said: Subversive activities are generally regarded as those which threaten the safety or well-being of the State". The noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, said that that phrase was not included. However, I referred to the opening phrase where the whole matter is related to the protection of national security. The definition of subversion given by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, also referred to activities, which are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means".—[Official Report, 26th February 1975; col. 947.] After nearly 15 years, that definition has stood the test of time under successive governments of different persuasions. It was reaffirmed in 1978 by the then Home Secretary, Mr. Merlyn Rees. He said in the other place on 6th April 1978 that he saw no need to depart from the definition given by the noble Lord. It was endorsed again by a Select Committee in another place in 1985 when it examined the definition in relation to the work of police special branches. We had hoped that the Committee might be reassured that the Government were not attempting to overturn that definition or recast it in some different way. Some Members of the Committee might have been suspicious had we sought to do so. As the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Abbeydale, pointed out, the definition has also been used for the purpose to which he referred after agreement with the relevant trade unions.

The terms of the definition given by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, are reflected fully in the language of the Bill. There are two salient elements. They operate together and as such confine the service to taking an interest in subversive activities only when both elements are satisfied. The person or organisation must have the intention to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy—I emphasise that phrase—by political, industrial or violent means; and, as important, that intention must represent a real threat to the security of the nation as a whole. Both parts of the definition are contained in Clause 1(2) of the Bill.

That definition is therefore a carefully constructed and coherent provision which properly covers the matters on which we need the protection of the security service. I venture to suggest that the Committee would need considerable persuasion that it would be right, or safe, to unravel its constituent parts. But that is what I fear Amendment No. 1 seeks to do. It suggests that the security service should take an interest in those who seek to overthrow our parliamentary democracy, but not those who seek to undermine it. I have to say that I am not convinced that in practice it would be possible to make such a fine distinction. The result would be damaging uncertainty. It could leave the security service either at risk of being expected to act outside its functions, or of interpreting its functions so narrowly that significant threats had to be overlooked. Neither can be desirable.

I do not believe that the Bill should seek to confine the security service's protective role only to those overtly intending to overthrow our democratic system. Those seeking to undermine it can present an equal if not a greater threat. It is the threat one cannot see and may not discover until it is too late which is perhaps the most dangerous threat of all. It is an area where the nation needs particularly the protection and all the skills of the security service if we are not to find one day that the edifice of our parliamentary democracy on which we rely for all our freedoms has been fatally and intentionally eaten away from beneath.

The protection that the security service can offer in that area is carefully defined and carefully constructed to meet the threat; but it must be sufficiently comprehensive and clear to ensure that this country can have the protection that it needs. I do not believe that the unpicking of the definition by attempting to distinguish between overthrowing and undermining our parliamentary democracy would achieve those necessary objectives. I therefore ask the Committee not to agree with Amendment No. 1.

As to Amendment No. 2, I have already pointed out from where the definition comes. Our parliamentary democracy can be as thoroughly undermined by political and industrial as by violent means. Those who wish to see the end of parliamentary democracy in this country can use such means with the firm intention of replacing our democracy by systems, structures and powers of their own making, or imported from other non-parliamentary regimes elsewhere in the world. We must look to and permit the security service to defend us in such matters. If we leave it until the threat has reached the point of a plan for violent overthrow; if we ignore other ways of undermining our parliamentary democracy, it will be too late. The Committee would be ill-advised to support either Amendment No. 1 or Amendment No. 2.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, perhaps I may ask him, in view of the controversy that there has been about the meaning of the words "national security" and arising from what he has just said, whether the Committee may take it that the words "protection of national security" are the equivalent of the words: activities which threaten the safety and well-being of the state".

The Lord Chancellor

I believe that it is fair to say that the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, was referring to subversive activities in the definition that he gave. That is one branch of the type of activity which threatens the safety or well-being of the state. I take the view that the phrase "protection of national security" covers that point. In the way that the subsection is constructed, the latter parts are particularisations of the protection of national security and, of course, help to explain it.

Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, I apologise to the Committee for arriving late but I wish to ask a question after hearing his full speech. The amendment proposes to remove the words "or undermine". I understand that the noble and learned Lord says that that phrase must remain in the Bill. Does he propose to define what is meant by "undermine"? I realise that difficulties are raised if one introduces a large number of amendments into Acts of Parliament which try to define certain matters. However from the answer which the noble and learned Lord read from his brief, I did not quite understand why he was so strongly in favour of removing the words "or undermine" and inserting instead wording that could be understood nowadays in the industrial context.

3.30 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor

First, I am not in favour of removing the words "or undermine"; I am in favour of keeping them. Secondly, I think the words are capable of being understood and applied by ordinary people. The noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, supplemented my understanding of the words "or undermine" by reference to the dictionary. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, will, if necessary, have access to the same dictionary. Acts of Parliament must proceed by using ordinary words; "undermine" is an ordinary word. I believe it would not be for clarity to seek to explain it further. Indeed the attempt at further clarification might just undermine the clarity which exists.

Lord Callaghan of Cardiff

Would a proposal to abolish the House of Lords be regarded as undermining parliamentary democracy or enhancing it?

The Lord Chancellor

That may depend upon one's point of view. I know some who regard removing the House of Lords as an improvement of parliamentary democracy, but that is not a view which I share, and nor perhaps does the noble Lord. I firmly believe that this House is an important part of our parliamentary democracy.

I think that the phrase "parliamentary democracy" in this position refers to the whole identity of parliamentary democracy that is in question—our whole system of government, not just a very particular and important part of it; to overthrow or undermine the system of government that we have by parliamentary democracy.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

I do not wish to undermine the submissions of the noble and learned Lord, but I cannot refrain from expressing a little surprise at his objection to unravelling the parts of the provisions of a clause. I should have thought that his expertise in unravelling parts of statutory provisions was one of his many outstanding qualities.

It is proper that we should look at the detail, while not forgetting the whole purpose of a clause. I venture to submit that where we have dealt precisely with the overthrow of parliamentary democracy by the various means provided for, "undermine" is perhaps an unnecessary addition to the words in the provisions. Nevertheless, that is not a matter about which I should go to the stake, or indeed to a Division Lobby. In the circumstances, I ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 3:

Page 1, line 11, at end insert— ("() The Service shall not investigate any person or group of persons solely on the basis of that person's or group of persons' participation in lawful advocacy, protest or dissent.

The noble Lord said: Perhaps I may paraphrase the words of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in the speech he made a moment ago. They were to the effect that nothing was to be done to interfere with civil liberties unless it was essential from the point of view of national security. That is a negative aspect which it was perfectly proper to make clear to the Committee.

In this amendment I am trying to make something positive quite clear on the face of the Bill in line with that principle, namely, that: The Service shall not investigate any person or group of persons solely on the basis of that person's or group of persons' participation in lawful advocacy, protest or dissent". I seek to make clear that our institutions of democracy remain as they are and as hallowed as they are. Anyone who objects to the Government, the Opposition or whatever institution it may be, is entitled to do so in our land, provided his advocacy is lawful, his protest is lawful and his dissent is lawful. The amendment speaks for itself and I should only ruin its effect by continuing to speak. I beg to move.

The Lord Chancellor

The amendment would move the structure of the Bill away from establishing clearly what the security service is required to do, and instead replace it by injunctions about what the security service is required not to do. I do not believe that that is necessary, nor do I think it helpful.

Of course the security service must not act against lawful advocacy, protest or dissent where they present no threat to the nation's security. But the Bill as drafted does not permit them to do so. I do not believe that the legislation we propose could be any clearer on this point than it is already. If any activity does not represent a threat to those matters which the security service is established to protect under Clause 1 of the Bill, then it can take no lawful interest in those engaged in that activity.

I do not believe that this Bill would be helped by adding what is in effect no more than a declaratory provision. Indeed to do so could be taken to imply that there are other activities or interests which might justify the security service taking action outside its functions. That is not so. Or it could imply that there are areas of activity which can never represent a threat to the security of this nation or can never be exploited by any person in furtherance of such a threat, and that is not so either.

I must tell the Committee frankly that to attempt to negative the possibility of action by the security service by listing types of organisations that it may not hinder creates grave danger. It would put a premium on attempts by those who wish to threaten our safety and democratic system to infiltrate and exploit just such organisations for their own ends. Accordingly I must advise Members of the Committee as strongly as I can not to give effect to the amendment.

Lord Mishcon

I should have made it clear to the Committee when I moved the amendment that on the Marshalled List there are two amendments under Amendment No. 3. They are obviously separate and I deal merely with the first Amendment No. 3. Possibly the Marshalled List could have a manuscript amendment, Amendment No. 3A, against the second amendment. That might help.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for dealing with the speech that I made. However I am not quite sure, if I may say this with the utmost respect, that he did so in a way which should commend itself to the Committee. Nobody seriously suspects that every member of MI5, senior or junior, will look at the Bill and analyse every word in order to see whether what he is doing is correct. I hope that they receive from the Bill, and will receive when it becomes an Act, specific guidance as to where they are entitled to infringe upon civil liberties and where they are not. I hope that this clause, which cannot do a scrap of harm, will make it abundantly clear on the face of the Bill that nobody in your Lordships' Chamber—and I am sure that this is true also of another place—will want to see lawful advocacy, lawful protest or lawful dissent interfered with in the slightest degree by the security service.

Having said that, there is no point, in my view, in my going further at this stage with seeking the opinion of the Committee. I do not in any way discount the importance of this amendment, but there are other very important amendments that the Committee will have to deal with. I, like any other Member of the Committee, have the right to put this amendment forward at a later stage. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington moved, as a manuscript amendment, Amendment No. 3A:

Page 1, line 11, at end insert— () The Service shall not take any action intended to further or hinder the interests of any political party.").

The noble Lord said: I hope the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor may look upon this amendment with some favour. In moving this amendment I wish to speak to Amendment No. 5, which the Committee will see refers to Clause 2. I shall explain why the two amendments hang together. Clause 2 deals with the duties of the director general. Under Clause 2(2) the director general: shall be responsible for the efficiency of the Service and it shall be his duty to ensure… (b) that the Service does not take any action to further the interests of any political party". I am sure that everyone in the Committee will agree that we want the service to be entirely free from any political bias or influence whatever. I am merely suggesting that the words of Clause 2(2)(b) that I have read out are inadequate to achieve that purpose. The purpose is better achieved by the words of the manuscript amendment, Amendment No. 3A: The Service shall not take any action intended to further or hinder the interests of any political party". As the Bill now stands, the service may well take some action which incidentally may further the interests of a political party. That is what we all wish to avoid, so surely the word "intended" needs to be inserted into the Bill.

Clause 2(2)(b) refers only to action, to further the interests of any political party". An action must be equally obnoxious, surely, if the service does something which is intended to achieve the exact opposite; namely, to, hinder the interests of any political party". On those grounds I wish to move the amendment. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will see the reason for it. I beg to move.

3.45 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor

The noble Lord's explanation of the manuscript amendment, Amendment No. 3A, coupled with his explanation of Amendment No. 5, which seeks to leave out paragraph (b) of Clause 2(2), indicates that there is not a great deal of difference between us in relation to the basic aim. But I venture to submit to the Committee that the way the Government have tackled this is the better way.

I respect and understand the intentions of the manuscript amendment which would prevent the security service hindering the interests of any political party. But I am afraid that would leave a dangerous loophole in our law. The service cannot under this Bill as we have drafted it take any action to damage or hinder the interest of a political party unless to do so falls within its statutory functions. But it must be free to protect the country from threat, from whatever quarter it may come. To provide absolute immunity for political groups would be to create an obvious avenue for exploitation by those who wish to destroy or damage our democratic way of life. Suppose, for example, a political party were to be directly involved in terrorism. It would surely be quite unacceptable for the service's hands to be tied in respect of protecting us from that threat, because it could not hinder the interests of that party. If this amendment were accepted, the message would be clear to those who threaten us: "Form a political party and the security service can take no interest in you. Or perhaps, even better, infiltrate some existing party and the security service can take no interest in you".

We have sought to look at the matter the other way and so avoid that difficulty. I hope therefore that the Committee will not accept this amendment, which would create a most undesirable loophole in the protection which the security service must be able to provide and, by the introduction of a negative declaratory provision, would create unnecessary uncertainty about the scope and intention of this legislation. It would also provide a golden pointer towards a particular institution which could be open to exploitation for this very purpose. I therefore strongly advise the Committee not to accept the amendment. Amendment No. 5 is of course consequential on it.

Lord Mishcon

One of the difficulties which I appreciated right away is that one can find words in an amendment that one puts forward to a Bill which express a perfectly good intention. One then finds that the words are possibly not as precise as one wants in order to express that intention properly in a statutory form.

I put my name to this amendment so I am equally responsible in regard to its precise wording. We want by this amendment to make it perfectly clear that there is to be no political bias, either for or against, in MI5. That is the object of the exercise. It is a worthy object. It was expressed in very good words, but I think they were a little too numerous for the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, and myself to put down as an amendment. They were expressed very well in the Maxwell Fyfe directive. I shall quote from that directive for the purpose of the record. I merely wish to quote one sentence, which states: It is essential that the Security Service shall be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence and nothing shall be done that might lend colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community or with any matter other than the Defence of the Realm as a whole". That puts it beautifully. The noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, and I are very well aware, as the Committee is also, of this directive which was issued in 1952. We could, I suppose, have incorporated the whole of that sentence in this amendment. However, I think that in order properly to express what was in the directive and could be in the Bill we shall have to reflect upon the wording that should be put in the Bill on Report. As I say, we shall follow the wording of the directive in so far as we can, but without being too verbose. I feel the noble Lord would agree with me that on that basis only I should beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 4:

Page 1, line 12, leave out subsection (3).

The noble and learned Lord said: Clause 1(3) of the Bill provides: It shall also be the function of the Service to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands". At the very least we should like guidance or enlightenment about the nature of the activities which the secret service would embark upon to safeguard our economic well-being. What is it that the security service should identify and act against? What are the limits of its interest and involvement? Would organising a run on the pound be within the compass of this provision?

In another place the Home Secretary said that a threat to our oil supplies would be a reasonable example of the circumstances in which Clause 1(3) might be put into operation. What is it contemplated that the duty of the secret service would be if there was such a threat to our oil supplies? A threat to destroy the sources of supply would be a clear matter, but I do not imagine that that is what is contemplated. What is the role of the security service in the economic field and what is the nature of the threat to our economic well-being that is contemplated here as meriting the intervention of the security service? I beg to move.

Lord Boyd-Carpenter

This seems a rather surprising amendment. The noble and learned Lord asks for indications to be given of the action that would be taken in certain circumstances by the security service. I hope very much that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor will not give such indications because they would be a matter of very great interest to various activists outside this country who might well like to know what kind of response their machinations might produce from the security service. Surely the essence of the work of the security service is that those against whom it operates should not have advance warning.

On the general merits, surely it is in the interests of all of us that the British economy should be protected. In the modern world threats may well be made against the economy. The noble and learned Lord quoted the example of oil. That is a very good example. What about people who place bombs on British aircraft at airports all over the world? There are all sorts of threats to our economy which we should hope the security service would safeguard us from. It is quite another thing to ask my noble and learned friend to spell out in detail the actions which the security service might or might not take in certain circumstances.

Surely what concerns the Committee is the simple issue raised by the amendment: do we feel that the British economy—under which and by which we all live—when threatened should have the protection of the security service? I hope very much that my noble and learned friend will not accept the amendment.

The Lord Chancellor

It may be convenient if I remind the Committee about the strict limitations of this function as drawn in the Bill and also of the important purpose it serves. I should make it clear, as I sought to do at Second Reading, that it would not be right to speculate on whether an example of a particular transaction or hypothetical set of circumstances would or would not fall within this function. It is not sensible to identify or appear to identify those who might or might not be subject to security service activities under this function because of the nature and seriousness of the threat they might pose. To put them on notice might be deeply damaging as my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter has said.

I hope, however, that what I do say on the general purpose and effect of this function will persuade the Committee that there is no question of something trivial or peripheral to the nation's well-being providing a proper foundation for action in pursuit of this function. The purpose of this function is to allow the security service to help to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom from hostile foreign actions and adverse developments arising from outside these islands. It is important to emphasise that it is hostile actions and adverse developments arising from outside these islands that are in question. By virtue of its reference to the United Kingdom, the potential threat must be a matter of significance, a threat to the nation: nothing less would suffice.

It is therefore fully consistent with the purpose and role of the security service that this is a protective function and that it is protective of the United Kingdom as a whole. The Committee will know that the term is not new. It is recognised in the European Convention on Human Rights as a proper concern of a public authority. This Bill, however, restricts the involvement of the security service only to safeguarding the United Kingdom against outside threats and in that respect is narrower than the convention iself. It follows closely the analogous provision which this Chamber approved in respect of the Interception of Communications Act 1985. As has already been said, the Committee would not expect me to identify or discuss the ways in which the security service may be able to protect the United Kingdom in respect of this function.

It would be a matter of great concern if the security service was in a position to provide or obtain information relevant to protecting the nation from this form of serious threat but was not able to do so because we had removed this provision from the Bill. That would not be sensible, nor would it be responsible. The security service may properly be able to contribute to our protection in this matter and must be able to do so. It is not difficult to see how foreign threats to our economic well-being can in some circumstances be linked to foreign threats to our national security. They can be two limbs of a concerted and continuing effort and must be identified and assessed as such. In such work, the security service may have an important contribution to make. That is why we need this provision in the Bill. It cannot be in the interests of the nation that the security service should be prevented from protecting us in such a vital matter.

I hope that the Committee will not agree the amendment.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

The guidance that I sought concerned what was supposed to be covered by the power given to the security service by this clause to safeguard our economic well-being. That is the question to which I sought an answer. I should certainly not want any particulars of the kind which the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, indicated it would be against the public interest to disclose. We want to unravel—if I dare use that word again—the purpose of this provision, which stands out somewhat starkly from the otherwise realistic provisions of the Bill. However, I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord can add to what he has said. If not, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 agreed to.

Clause 2 [The Director-General]:

[Amendment No. 5 not moved.]

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington moved Amendment No. 6:

Page I, line 24, leave out paragraph (b) and insert— ("(b) that the Service shall comply with the functions and duties set out in Section (1) above").

The noble Lord said: I should like to move the amendment very briefly. It could not be more simple, perhaps it is totally obvious. Clause 2, as we have seen, sets out the duties of the director general who, shall be responsible for the efficiency of the Service". His duties are set out in Clause 2(2). They are limited duties; namely, that no information is obtained by the service except so far as is necessary for the discharge of its functions and no information disclosed by it except so far as is necessary. There is also the political matter that we have already discussed. Then surely, his duties should be those set out in the amendment; namely, that the Service shall comply with the functions and duties set out in Section (1) above"). If those words are not included, his duties seem to be limited in a way that makes his duties far from what they should be. I cannot put it more simply. I beg to move.

The Lord Chancellor

Clause 2(1) states: The operations of the Service shall continue to be under the control of a Director-General appointed by the Secretary of State". In my view—I hope that this is also the view of the Committee—his responsibility is therefore clear and beyond doubt. He must ensure that there are arrangements to secure that, in obtaining and disclosing information, the service stays within its functions and powers. The noble Lord's amendment puts the case in a slightly different way. If I may say so, I think that the current provisions of the Bill are both fuller and more explicit. There is, I suggest, no need and it serves no purpose to duplicate them with a different formula.

The director general appointed by the Secretary of State has control of the operations of the service. The functions of the service are perfectly plainly defined in Clause 1. In addition to those general duties, subsection (2)—to which no objection has been taken apart from in the amendment discussed earlier—deals with particular aspects of that function. Accordingly, I believe that the matter for which the noble Lord seeks to cater in the amendment is already adequately covered by the present provisions which are plainly stated.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

It is probably unwise for me as a mere lawyer to tangle with the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, when he suggests to the Committee that his words are clearer than mine. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4 p.m.

Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 7:

Page 2, line 9, at end insert— ("() The Prime Minister shall appoint a Security Service Review Committee ("the Committee") consisting of 5 members of Her Majesty's Privy Council (at least one of whom shall be the nominee of the Leader of the Opposition) and one present or former Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. The Committee shall keep under review the exercise by the Service of its duties and functions as set out in section 1 above and shall report annually to Parliament in such manner and on such matters as the Committee deem fit, consistent with a duty to protect the security of the nation. It shall be the duty of every member of the Service and of every official' of the department of the Secretary of State to disclose or give to the Committee such documents or information as the Committee may require for the purpose of enabling the Committee to discharge its functions.").

The noble Lord said: It is my privilege this afternoon to move an amendment to which much respected individuals from all sections of the Chamber have attached their names. Under the terms of the amendment, the Prime Minister is called upon to, appoint a Security Service Review Committee…consisting of 5 members of Her Majesty's Privy Council (at least one of whom shall be the nominee of the Leader of the Opposition) and one present or former Lord of Appeal in Ordinary". The committee shall keep under review the service and its duties and functions. It is to report annually to Parliament, but the safeguard regarding what it reports is clearly set out in the amendment; namely, in such manner and on such matters as the Committee deem fit, consistent with a duty to protect the security of the nation". The last paragraph of the amendment makes perfectly clear the powers of that committee to enable it to obtain the information that it might properly seek.

I wish to divide my address to the Committee into two or possibly three parts. The first part deals with the reasons why some sort of review body is necessary at all; the second part deals with the suitability of the review body; and the third part answers the objection made by the noble and learned Lord with regard to such a suggestion when we dealt with the Bill at Second Reading.

I shall try to be as concise as possible in giving seven reasons why the amendment which, as I have said, is supported by Members from every part of this Chamber, should be approved. I shall set out the seven reasons. The service is undoubtedly vital to the nation. We all agree on that, but we also agree that when we have tried to secure a balance in the Bill between protection of democracy and civic rights we have also tried to ensure that what could be a massive interference in civic rights should have the proper limitations of law and supervision.

At Second Reading, every speaker who followed the noble and learned Lord called for such supervision with the solitary exception of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, who did not mention it in his speech but called for more information to be given to the public. That is the second reason; namely, that there appears to be some form of common consent that there should be a review committee or some supervisory authority.

The third reason is that we are the only English-speaking nation that does not have that authority to supervise and merely relies on the Executive. The fourth reason is one with which I believe the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, might well agree. We all have a high regard for him in his capacity as Minister of State at the Home Office. We know that he is a very busy Minister. It is obvious that the Home Secretary has so many onerous duties placed upon him in various departments and sub-departments at the Home Office that it is impossible to pretend that he can adequately supervise on his own. It is just not humanly possible. That is quite apart from the question of whether the matter should be left to the Executive. Home Secretaries come and go. After a few years' experience, he or she is succeeded by another Home Secretary who has all those onerous duties but does not have that experience. Ultimately, the responsibility is that of the Prime Minister with all the duties that he or she may have to undertake in the interests of the nation.

The fifth reason is the method of accounting. The service spends some £100 million of the nation's money each year. The only supervision by the Treasury on behalf of the nation is that a Minister certifies to the Auditor General the expenditure of the service; there is nothing more by way of supervision.

The sixth reason is that it may be said that one interferes with the necessary secrecy of a security service if there is any sort of supervision outside the Executive. At Second Reading I pointed out that it had been said in another place that three previous directors general of the service have said that they would have no objection at all to an appropriate supervisory authority. If one looks at the evidence from those who are in charge of the service and responsible for it, the argument that secrecy would be impinged if one had a proper supervisory body goes out of the window.

As regards my last reason, perhaps it is appropriate to bring to the attention of the Committee an example—a very contemporary example—of why it is unsatisfactory from a public point of view to say that the only supervision is that of the Home Secretary or the Prime Minister. Perhaps I may be permitted to quote the headline and one paragraph of The Times today. Before doing so I make it abundantly clear that on such an important matter I am certainly not taking anything for granted with regard to the extract that I shall read out. Nor am I making a foolish political point with regard to people who might be involved. Let me say at once that if anyone wishes to translate or transfer the responsibility to a Labour Prime Minister, a Labour Home Secretary, Labour Members of Parliament, or a Labour Cabinet Minister, he is welcome to do so. In my view the principle is the same and the same thing could have happened in any event.

Having said that, let me refer the Committee to the headline in The Times which states, "Speaker attacks security services over Bordes". The paragraph states: The Speaker yesterday intervened in the affair of Miss Pamella Bordes, delivering a thinly veiled and highly embarrassing rebuke to Britain's security services. Mr. Bernard Weatherill, who is ultimately responsible for security at the Palace of Westminster, is understood to be furious that MI5 failed to alert the parliamentary authorities to Miss Bordes's links with high-ranking Libyans before she was given clearance last year to work as a Commons researcher for a Conservative MP. Miss Bordes is reported to have had a relationship with Major Ahmed Gadaff al Daim, who is thought by Britain's spymasters to be behind Libyan arms shipments to the IRA". I shall not read any more of that article. I repeat that I am not in any way inferring facts. One knows that those facts are being investigated. What I am saying is this. Let us take it for granted that it is not just the parliamentary building security that may be affected or the Members of another place. Let us take it for granted that the nation's security is possibly affected. Let us take it for granted that the public want to know that these matters are being properly investigated. Should MI5 have known? Did MI5 pass on the information? Did it do so to a Minister? Did the Minister do anything about it? Is it right that the public in matters of this kind should have to rest on this basis? A fellow Party Member—be he Conservative, Labour or whatever—was involved in this, and possibly a Cabinet Minister. Has it been properly investigated as to when and whether and why and why not? With a supervisory body consisting of Privy Counsellors, and of the composition as proposed in this amendment, the public would know where they stood. The public would have confidence that a committee was looking at this matter bound by their Privy Counsellors.

I move to the next phase of the speech. Is this a suitable body that we have put forward in this amendment? I am frank with Members of the Committee. For what it is worth, I should have preferred that we had a Select Committee of the other place, possibly joined by some Members of this Chamber. I shall not go through that because we have discussed it before. I have tried to say, as have others, that security should not be a risk. After all, there is the Select Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs where secret matters are discussed. I shall not go down that road only because the Government have decided that that is not an appropriate body. I am trying this afternoon, with others who have put their names to this amendment, to get something through which is not already objectionable to the Government.

If the Government say that this is not the appropriate body but that another one is, then I ask them to come forward with something constructive, but not the argument which they put forward before which, if I may say so, is not worthy especially of a noble and learned Lord for whose intellect we all have such great admiration. The answer was this. If the committee knows too much then it will not be able to impart it; and if it knows too little then what is the point of its existence? If that is the Government's response to the weighty arguments that I have tried to put forward, I do not think that the Committee will be extremely moved by such logic or statemanship.

I conclude by quoting if I may the suitability of such a body as is put forward in the amendment. I hope that I am able to do so by quoting the Prime Minister. I am quoting from a speech which she made on 8th July 1982, reported at col. 469 of the Official Report in the other place. It was a debate on the appointment of the committee that looked into the matters that preceded the Falklands War. She was explaining why a Committee of Privy Counsellors was suitable. She said: I wish to deal in turn with the nature of the review, its scope and its composition. As to its nature, the overriding considerations are that it should be independent, that it should command confidence, that its members should have access to all relevant papers and persons and that it should complete its work speedily. Those four considerations taken together led naturally to a Committee of Privy Counsellors. Such a Committee has one great advantage over other forms of inquiry. As it conducts its deliberations in private and its members are all Privy Counsellors, there need be no reservations about providing it with all the relevant evidence—including much that is highly sensitive—subject to safeguards upon its use and publication. A Committee of Privy Counsellors can be authorised to see relevant departmental documents, Cabinet and Cabinet Committee memoranda and minutes, and intelligence assessments and reports, all on Privy Counsellor terms. Many of these documents could not be made available to a tribunal of inquiry, a Select Committee or a Royal Commission". I beg to move.

Viscount Whitelaw

I feel very diffident about intervening in this debate today for two reasons. First, I was abroad at the time of Second Reading. I was abroad on a holiday which I had promised my wife that we would undertake in February after 30 years in government. I had left the Government and therefore I thought it right to go. I apologise to the Committee. I think it is all the worse that I should intervene in this debate.

Secondly, I realise my very limited experience. The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has quite properly pointed it out. Home Secretaries come and go. I came and I went. It was four years; it was some experience but I accept that it was limited. On that limited experience I have the temerity to come to the conclusion that I cannot support the amendment. I accept that it is superficially attractive. I accept that, as it would be, it has been most persuasively moved by the noble Lord. Briefly I shall refer to some of the issues which I do not accept.

I accept at once the importance and value of the Select Committees of this and of another place to Parliament and the nation. That should encourage the belief that a special committee of senior parliamentarians to oversee security and intelligence could be expected to have similar advantages. My contention is that security and intelligence are, by their very nature, a special and a different case and one which is unlikely to be met by a similar process. Nor do I accept that the system for checking telephone interceptions provides a comparable precedent. As the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, knows very well, that system, which he did much to help me in carrying through in this Chamber, is concerned not with the policy itself but with the way in which the Secretary of State fulfils his duty under the Act. That is clear and is something which I believe a judge can properly and legally consider and vet.

However, the amendment is supporting something different: discussions of the details of security and intelligence matters. It must be accepted at once that the amendment does not restrict the proposed committee's remit to matters of the security services' general policies or broad strategy. In fact it goes into the opportunity to consider the details of the security services' actions. Surely it is true that the success of our security services' actions depends on secrecy. That in turn must mean that the system is conducted on a need to know basis whereby secrets are closely guarded. I do not believe that anyone could dispute that.

I know that my next conclusion is disputed; it is disputed by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and no doubt by others. But I maintain that in the final event only the responsible Ministers can be told all such secrets. I do not believe that they can be divulged otherwise. Responsible Ministers alone can be responsible for ensuring that the security services act in line with government policy. There have been occasions when it is suggested that the security services did not do so. I do not accept that, but anyway it is still the responsibility of these Ministers to ensure that they do, and they have that direct responsibility. If it goes wrong, they are responsible to Parliament and to the nation. No one else is. No one else can be, because they are responsible.

The Prime Minister and the Home Secretary of the day are therefore responsible to Parliament and the nation for ensuring that the security services act in line with government policy and are responsible for accepting that they fulfil the duties placed upon them. The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, interestingly produces the Miss Bordes case. I have been abroad so I am not quite clear whether it is "Bordes" or "Borders". It is very interesting in many ways, rather amusing and only serves to point to a quite different solution than the one I would suggest. I should immediately cut down on all the research assistants in another place completely. In fact as a rather old-fashioned figure, I always questioned whether the system ought ever to have grown up in the first place, but there it is. That would be a simple cure.

I do not think that it is unreasonable to think about it in this way. But if I had been the Home Secretary and had read this morning in the newspapers that Mr. Speaker had been saying that MI5 had been lacking in its duty, I should have sent immediately for the director general of MI5 and asked, "What is going on here? Explain to me what you have said and what you have done?" Had I been given a satisfactory answer, I should have been hotfoot to Mr. Speaker to tell him either to shut up if he did not know what he was talking about or that he had a point, that I understood it and that I would deal with it. That surely is what being a responsible Minister is all about. I maintain that that is the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. That is what should happen. And if the Ministers responsible are doing their jobs, that is what will happen.

What is more, if the security services fail in their duty and take action which is outside the realms of government policy, I am afraid that I do not believe that any body of parliamentarians, however eminent, could be in a position to redeem the failure—which it would be—of the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary of the day to carry out their responsibility to the security services and to Parliament. They would have failed in their responsibility, and I do not believe that such a body could redeem that failure if that was what had happened. After all, if the security services were intent—which I do not believe—on concealing their actions, I cannot think it would be likely that they would have any excuse whatsoever for keeping the truth from the responsible Ministers.

However, if this committee wants to report publicly to Parliament—and it would be under all sorts of pressures to make reports; we all know what happens—there would be a feeling in the security services that they might want to withhold some information from parliamentarians without the responsibility of power. I can speak feelingly of this. I am probably one of the most recent people to have had all the responsibility and power, and deliberately (I suppose that is the right word) I renounced them. It was not all that deliberate, because my doctors told me that I had to, and it was not all that deliberately done. But I have renounced that power and responsibility, and having had them for many years —some 14 in all as Cabinet Minister—I find myself with no responsibility. I do not think that that necessarily means that I am a totally irresponsible person as a result, but I have no actual responsibility or power. I am in a very different position. I do not know what is going on. I do not know exactly what is happening. I may have my ideas, as many noble Lords in the House and in the Government will have, but I do not know. It is very different to be a parliamentarian without the responsibility of power than to be one with it. It makes a very great difference to the attitude of parliamentarians.

If the amendment as proposed is passed, we should be requiring a committee of parliamentarians without responsibility or power to report publicly to Parliament. It is said that they would do so only consistent with security and the demands of security. That is right, but everyone knows what happens in a committee when the pressures are on for more public disclosure than there has been—great pressure in the press, in the parties and in Parliament on all sides. Would this body of parliamentarians without power be able to resist that pressure? I should love to think it would, as would many of the people who might serve on it, but it would be a difficult matter for them to do so. I am very dubious if parliamentarians of great station are placed in that difficult position. I find it difficult to believe that in those circumstances they could reconcile their responsibilities to report publicly to Parliament with their obligation to protect national security. They would always be torn in two about it. The committee might be divided about it, and there are grave dangers in that.

Therefore if we were to pass this amendment we would be placing the members of any such committee in an extremely difficult position. We would be expecting senior parliamentarians to be effective watchdogs of the security service. That is what they would be built up as. If they did not come up to scratch, as one might say, if those who want this amendment in another place and here found that they were not doing their job, that the reports were not coming forward, and when they did come forward there was very little in them, they would say "Yes, they have covered it all up before they put the report out". There would be pressure for those great men to be replaced because they had become too good men and too much in the pocket of the government of the day. That is the sort of danger I have seen over a long period of time. It is no good pretending that it does not happen; we all know that it does.

Therefore, I am afraid, I fear, that if they were to report publicly against their better instincts, which they very well might be forced to do, they might well in the process unwittingly damage the work of the security service and indeed individuals involved as well. As I have already said, if they did not so report they would be accused of withholding information from their parliamentary colleagues, and unreasonably doing so.

That is the difficulty. I therefore cannot support this amendment because, as I would not be prepared to accept such an invidious position on such a committee, I certainly would not be prepared to impose on others duties which I could not in all honesty agree to undertake myself.

4.30 p.m.

Lord Callaghan of Cardiff

The noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, made, as usual, a very persuasive speech. It would have been even more persuasive to me if he had not misread the amendment. He referred consistently throughout the whole of his speech to the difficulties and pressure to which a committee of parliamentarians, even of Privy Council status, would be subject. That is not what the amendment says.

What the amendment says is that there shall be a security service review committee consisting of five members of Her Majesty's Privy Council and it is surely possible—and it is certainly in ray mind—that there should be members of that committee who would not be parliamentarians and who might be, for example, a former distinguished ambassador, a former Cabinet Secretary or a former Permanent Secretary of the Home Office. It could be a number of people. Indeed, it might be someone who has never been a parliamentarian or a civil servant but who is appointed to become a Privy Counsellor precisely for the purpose of serving on the committee.

I could have been much more convinced by the address of the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw. Indeed, I hope that noble Lords will dismiss it from their minds, because he has clearly been labouring under a total d0elusion throughout the whole of his speech.

I myself am not in favour, even though my noble friend Lord Mishcon is, of a committee of parliamentarians as such. I therefore hasten to make this very strong point in addressing the Committee. It is not what the amendment says. My noble friend Lord Mishcon said that he had not put it down again, much though he would like to, because of the objections of the Government. Now the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, is misusing this amendment to try to create—I am sure not deliberately—an impression in noble Lords' minds that is simply not contained in the amendment. That must be clear and must be emphasised—

Viscount Whitelaw

I should not like to feel that I have misused my position in any way and I hope the noble Lord does not suggest that. But I have to say quite honestly in reply, yes, but does anyone really imagine that such a committee could be set up and be acceptable to Parliament if it did not have any parliamentarians, or very few? I do not believe that. I quite accept that it could happen. I simply do not believe that is the purpose of what anybody has in mind.

Lord Callaghan of Cardiff

If the noble Viscount will contain himself, he will find I come to that and to many other points. It should be worthy of note by the Committee that this amendment has a most remarkable pedigree. Perhaps it is worthy of notice that in their concern the Government have wheeled on the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, in order to defend their position. I note that the amendment contains the names not only of members of the Labour Party but also of a member of the Conservative Party, a member of the SLD and indeed of an independent Member of this Chamber. In other words, all the major elements in the Committee are represented by the proposers of this amendment.

If we take note, as we should do, of the views of the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, as a most distinguished former Home Secretary, I also take note of the fact that in another place a former Conservative Prime Minister in whose government the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, served—Mr. Heath himself—was in favour of the amendment. So let there be no belief that putting down this amendment is the idea of a few people who have never had experience of these matters, who do not really understand them and who are more concerned with civil liberties than with the protection of the realm or anything of that sort. These arguments have been advanced. It is no good the noble Viscount shaking his head. He did not advance them, but others of his party have done so. It is important that we should understand that.

There is a genuine difference of view about this matter, and speaking for myself, and only for myself, with such experience as I have had, I have no hesitation in supporting the principle of this amendment as it stands. Maybe, as my noble friend Lord Mishcon said, some details could be altered. I do not know about that. If the Government were to show any inclination to accept the principle, which in my belief would strengthen the security service in itself, and would strengthen the confidence of those of us who know a little about these matters, then any attempt to alter the terms of the amendment could obviously be considered very sympathetically.

I do not want to take too much time, but this is the first time I have spoken about these matters since I had some responsibility 10 years ago. Therefore I should like to say something that I hope will be of assistance and at any rate it will get off my chest some of the things I have wanted to say for some time. I want to say two things. First, I welcome this Bill. It is an improvement in putting the security service on a statutory basis. Secondly, I want to thank the security service for the work it does, unknown to a very large extent, in order to protect the realm and the security of us all.

This brings me to the nature of the security service. The noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, said that this amendment has a superficial attraction. I believe it has more than that, and I think I can show to him and to noble Lords that it has a real value if only the Government would accept the idea and the principle. The security service, by its nature, is separate from us all. It is uncommunicative, at least until the time comes when it wishes to brief selected people in order to disinform the public at large, as has not been unknown. It is solitary. It is a body—the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will understand this; I believe they still exist—like a religious sect called the Elder Brethren. The security service reminds me of the Elder Brethren in the sense that they are apart, they know themselves to be apart and they must necessarily remain apart. I do not dispute that.

However, the fact that they are apart, the fact that they set their own agenda to a great extent, the fact that they are certainly immune from the pressures of public opinion to a very large extent, is in some senses a dangerous position to be in. It certainly encourages a factionalism within the service, and that has not been unknown. It certainly means that the service is not subject to the same pressures through the press or public opinion as, for example, other government departments; and, after all, in some sense it is only a government department but one with very special responsibilities.

I ask the Committee to take the contrast with the Department of Transport today, the contrast with the Environment Secretary or the contrast with the Minister of Agriculture, all of whom are subject to the play of public opinion and pressure. All therefore are in a true sense accountable. This is one department which by its very nature is not, and in my view should not be made, accountable in the fullest sense. But that does not mean that we should not ourselves see what other instruments can be built into the machine in order to provide a balance against this lack of accountability, which is inevitable and which certainly exists.

There is a disadvantage in any bureaucracy which is not exposed to public opinion. That is certainly the case as regards the security service because that very immunity from criticism, examination and public opinion leads to an examination of self-criticism by the service itself. I believe that that criticism must and should be supplied in the interests of the service as well as in the interests of the public. I believe that a review committee would help to supply that balancing factor which at the moment is supplied only by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary. However, I do not go all the way with some Members of the Committee who have examined such a committee's functions and I should like to say before I sit down what I believe its function should be. But I should add to that that the director general, who is probably the most important element here, supplies some of that fresh air and breath of the public coming into the service, especially if he has been drawn from outside.

I say to this Committee that let any Home Secretary appoint a director general from outside the service and he will see the degree of hostility which he comes up against. I believe that that is very dangerous and also short-sighted on the part of the security service. I know of an example—and it is known to other Members of the Committee—of one director general who reacted far beyond his responsibilities at a proposal to appoint a director general from outside the service, who it was intended should be brought in precisely for the purpose of acting as a conduit between the service and the public because of a sense that the service had not gone totally in the right direction.

On the other hand, perhaps I may add that I believe that the appointment of the director general who has just retired was an inspired appointment. There could not have been anyone better. He has done a tremendous amount for the security service in the way in which he has acted. It is the director general's job to give a sense of proportion; to give a perspective; to raise the morale; to ensure efficiency and to have the authority, which not all director generals have exercised, to encourage some of his people to restrain and curb some of their enthusiasms when they wish to go off on their own; to know the foibles of his people and to lead them. One needs a very strong person.

The first point I should like to make is that it should not be restricted and the security service should understand very clearly that if the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary believe that someone from outside should be appointed in the interests of the service, there should be no sense of resentment or any feeling of shortcomings on the part of the service. It is essential that the security service should be refreshed from time to time by outside appointments.

In my estimation, most important is the necessity for trust between Ministers and the security service. It does not work well if the Home Secretary and the director general are not on good terms with each other, and if there is even the slightest feeling, on the one hand, that the Home Secretary is not playing a sufficient part or on the other hand, from the Home Secretary's point of view, that the director general is not being fully frank with him. I regard absolute frankness on the part of the director general towards Ministers as being quite essential.

There is no doubt that this present decade has resulted in greater intervention by Ministers in the affairs of the security service, despite the inability—to which my noble friend Lord Mishcon referred—of the Home Secretary to supervise. I do not regard it as impossible to supervise the security service. However, if that is done then it is done at the expense of other work by the Home Secretary. It may be necessary that that should be done, but let no one believe that he can do his job as Home Secretary and, at the same time, supervise the service to the extent which is needed. He can do one or other but, in my view, he cannot do both. However, I must say that the role of the Home Secretary is somewhat lighter than it was some 25 years ago when I occupied that office because at that time he had the responsibility, as the noble Lord will remember, for Northern Ireland which, thank God, has been lifted off his shoulders.

Why has there been this greater intervention by Ministers? I believe that that is as a result of three matters. The first matter is that events have become public, sometimes in a garbled form, which were not publicly known before the 1980s. Secondly, there was the public unmasking of Sir Anthony Blunt—a matter known only to a few people before it became public as a result of a book which was published and questions which were asked in Parliament. Thirdly, there has been the coincidence of a hyperactive, and I almost said bossy, Prime Minister.

Frankly, I do not believe that supervision of the security service should rest on a coincidence of factors of that sort. The degree of accountability and public knowledge should be based on a more structured relationship. After all, as we know, different Prime Ministers conduct their affairs in different ways. For example, some may adopt, as did Mr. Baldwin, a more laid back approach to the problem and may decide to set only the general structure and to let his Ministers get on with it. Undoubtedly other Prime Ministers wish to play a greater interventionist role and no doubt that is also true of Home Secretaries. However, I believe that it is important that we should have a structure which will not depend on the personality or interests of the Home Secretary or Prime Minister. That is why I believe that a review committee with the powers which I intend to describe in a moment will meet that purpose much better than the temporary situation which exists today.

I believe that a review committee could help to strengthen a weakness which I believe exists today, that is, the absence of contact between the Prime Minister and the Opposition on security matters. That becomes especially important when there is a change of administration. In the interests of the nation we need a bipartisan approach in which the Government and the Opposition should play their parts. Of course, the security service itself must play its part. Thank heavens at the moment there is no sign, no matter what may have been the view some years ago, of our security service getting itself into the same position as the Australian security service in relation to the Opposition of the time. Mr. Merlyn Rees, a former Home Secretary with more recent experience than I, has said more than once that he believes that there should be a formal hand-over of security matters from the out-going to the in-coming Prime Minister and also from the out-going to the in-coming Home Secretary. There should be no hesitation in the out-going Prime Minister talking to the in-coming Prime Minister on these issues, and the same applies to Home Secretaries. I also extend that approach to intelligence matters. That can be instituted without a review committee and, indeed, without the need for this Bill, and I recommend that as being an advance which could assist us.

There is the point that if the Leader of the Opposition were asked to nominate someone to such a committee, that could help to create the bipartisan approach which I believe is necessary if all of us who are concerned with the security of our own country—and nearly all of us are—are 1 o be satisfied.

Perhaps I may answer some questions about the way in which I see this committee working. Let us suppose that the Prime Minister has qualms about the proposed appointment by the Leader of the Opposition. Is he to accept it? The answer is: no, of course not. At the level which I assume the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition will conduct their affairs, the person concerned should be freely discussed between them. I trust that the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition would have a sufficient sense of responsibility to talk about a nominee. If that nominee were thought to be unsuitable and evidence was provided as to why that was so, then I believe that such a person would obviously be accepted by the Leader of the Opposition as being unsuitable for nomination and it would be withdrawn.

Next I answer the question of whether the committee is to be within the so-called walls of secrecy. Certainly it should be. As I see it, it would be a longstop behind the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister. I simply do not accept the view—and here I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw—that the committee can in any way usurp the function of Ministers. Of course it cannot. Ministers are responsible. In cricket, although there is a wicketkeeper there is also a longstop. I believe that the committee would take the form of a longstop behind the wicket-keeper in this respect. It would be an assurance that independent members who are not members of the Executive and who are Privy Counsellors, not necessarily parliamentarians, can add an additional check to what is going on within the security service which is supervised at the moment only by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary. In my view, they would reinforce public interest. It would be an alternative to an impossible degree of public scrutiny.

It is clear that the role of this Committee would be advisory, tendering its conclusions to the Home Secretary and, if it is felt desirable, to the Prime Minister. Ministers would remain in executive control. It would be a body of people who would know what was going on—I will speak about the limits of that in a moment—and could then deliver an informed judgment.

The committee's purpose and role would be to inquire into the targets at which the security service is aiming. It should assess the priorities which the service attaches to them. It should examine the resources allocated to these tasks. It should not consider individual cases; that is not in any way appropriate. These are matters of policy and the strategic direction of the service. These are issues upon which an independent group of Privy Counsellors can have as informed a view, if not more informed, than a busy Prime Minister or Home Secretary. The committee would not advise on whether individual cases are well or badly handled, but it could and should draw general conclusions from the performance of individual tasks.

It is suggested that there will be some overlap with other bodies in the committee carrying out its functions. There would be an overlap but frankly our system of control, such as it is, has grown up in such a grotesque manner that adding one more wheel to the coach is not going to derail it; it is almost derailed at the moment. We have a clumsy set-up with the different roles of a commissioner in respect of phone-tapping; another commissioner in the tribunal under this Bill; the post mortem activities of the security commission and so on. It is all something of a bodge at the moment. However, I believe that the committee, although it would certainly overlap, on balance would be a distinct advantage.

How would the committee work? I think that it should expect a submission from the director general in much the same manner as now, with different details, a Select Committee of this House would expect a submission from other departments because the service is, in some senses, a government department that is exempt from scrutiny. The committee would not normally ask the Home Office to appear, though it should certainly have the authority to do so. Its principal connection would be with the service, through the director general and his senior officers. However, as experience grew over the years—I should want to see how it worked out first—I would not rule out the possibility of it becoming so experienced and so valuable that, from time to time, it could conduct an inquiry or the audit of a section; though I do not think that should be its role at the beginning.

Such a review body would provide a well-informed element, but more than that it would also provide an element of continuity in our study of the security service and its work. It would provide an element of continuity that cannot be supplied in any other way. As the noble Lord said, Home Secretaries change and Prime Ministers change—unfortunately, when I was in office at any rate, as I had no desire for change and felt it was a very bad thing! However, the committee can provide a necessary element of continuity.

There has been disquiet, certainly in my party, about some of the activities of the security service in the past. I believe that much of that disquiet was not well-founded. Some of it, frankly, was fed by members of the security service itself, some by former members of the security service and by their prejudices. I do not think that is true today. I believe that the former director general set the security service on a very good basis and one that I am happy to support. However, there would be an additional element of which the security service would be conscious when undertaking its operations.

As was said by my noble friend Lord Mishcon, there are former members of the security service, including the director general who held the highest office there, who would not only not object to but certainly would support such a review body. In the circumstances, I do not know why the Government and some of their defenders should be so strong in their objections to the proposal. Those former directors general—at any rate, certainly one—who support it do so on the basis that they believe it would strengthen, not weaken, the position of the security service. There is no reason why anyone on this side of the Committee should feel apologetic about it, even though we happen to believe that in the interests of civil liberty it would be an excellent way of doing it.

Canada has a similar system and I have not heard of any particular difficulties, though the Canadian Government intend to review the matter. I apologise again for taking so long—

Lord Denham

No, not at all.

Lord Callaghan of Cardiff

I never expected to hear the Government Chief Whip encourage me. He is my friend for life. I undertake to read all his novels in future.

I feel strongly that the Government have got it wrong. I hope that the Committee, including the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, having considered the arguments will feel that there is more than a superficial attractiveness about this amendment and will ask the other place to think again.

5 p.m.

Lord Thorneycroft

While there are differences which may divide us in this debate—and there are many—I believe that we are united in our desire to see a strong security service. As to the methods, this is a sufficiently complicated matter to warrant good men holding different views about it. There were marked differences between the solution given by the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, and the solution given by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. In another place the Opposition were arguing for a supervisory service, but of an utterly different sort to that proposed either by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, or the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan. Indeed, the solution argued here was much condemned by Mr. Roy Hattersley when speaking in the other place.

The part of the Bill that we are now dealing with relates to the operations of the security service. It is the heart of the Bill; Clauses 1 and 2. Later on we come to other matters—whether warrants are issued rightly; commissioners dealing with whether telephones have been tapped or whether the wrong house has been burgled; tribunals, and so on. There are amendments covering all those suggestions. However, this part of the Bill is far more important and goes to the very root of what the security service is about. The security service is about the kind of war that is being fought today—the secret war. Secrecy is the name of the game.

Yesterday two police officers died on a road in Ireland through a lack of secrecy. Secrecy is the one central point that has to be safeguarded. It is the job of the security service to search and find out where these dangers arise and how this secrecy can possibly be secured. I believe that we have to consider here what it would have been like in the security service if the committee, or one of them, had actually existed; what difference would it have made? Philby would have still have been here; I believe that Maclean would not have been sacked. I knew Guy Burgess very well. When I was a young man he was with the BBC. He was employed to collect young men from both parties in Parliament to do the programme called "A Week in Westminster". He knew everyone very well. Guy Burgess would certainly have still been there and he would probably have been secretary to the committee. He was considered ideal in that particular world.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Anyone who knew Guy Burgess knew that he was a drunk. The first thing that anyone would have done would have been to go to the commitee and say "This is my suspicion and a lot of other people have the same suspicion. Can you find out whether that suspicion is justified or not?" All that could have been done that could not be done in the other place or anywhere else because the answer is always, "No reply to matters of security".

Lord Thorneycroft

The noble Lord is perfectly entitled to hold that view; but I have grave doubts about it. It is very difficult to sack anybody anyway. For a committee of five people, all of whom hold different views and who probably know him in different ways, to come along and say "Sack him. And, by the way, sack Maclean too because he has been found tight on several occasions" would be a most unlikely event. If you wish to have a tough rule and tough government in the security service, have a good Home Secretary; and above all, as someone said, have a good director general.

As I say, these men were there and I do not believe that it would have made much difference. The role that this commitee is asked to play is an enormous one. The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, made it absolutely plain. It has to have not only the strategy or the tactics, but it has to know the detail. The noble Lord said "The Home Secretary is too busy; let us have this committee". The idea of a committee of five Privy Counsellors and a law Lord sitting down and going into the detail of what is happening in MI5 is a startling proposition. For example, Sir Roger Hollis appoints Peter Wright from being a technician to a case officer. Does anyone believe that they would have stopped that? I very much doubt it. Clearly, Peter Wright was off his head, or very nearly. He thought that the Prime Minister was a member of the KGB; moreover, he thought that Sir Roger Hollis was, too. He would have thought that the law Lord was also a member of the KGB. The chance of anyone sacking him at that moment is utterly remote.

The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, went even further. I could hardly believe my ears when he started on this line. The imagination boggles at the proposition of this lady, Pamella Bordes and five Privy Counsellors and a law Lord sitting down and discussing her love life and her suitability as a research officer. I therefore ask the noble Lord to think rather carefully about what I may call the practicalities of this. Running things, particularly the security service, is astonishingly difficult. It is so difficult that s do not feel that I have it in my heart to blame anybody who has failed to run it successfully.

To say "It is too difficult and the chap who runs it gets rather tired so let us put in five Privy Counsellors such as the noble Lords, Lord Callaghan, Lord Mishcon and myself", is impractical. It is not going to work. They must then go on to decide not only how they run an organisation of this kind, but they have to make up their minds about what are the steps with which they can improve the situation. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, when he said that Privy Counsellors may well have a role. I would have no objection to them being widely informed about many matters. It has been done in the past, and I have no doubt that it will be done again. But to appoint Privy Counsellors to discuss what happened in the Falklands war is quite different to appointing Privy Counsellors to run the Falklands war. Here Privy Counsellors are being asked to actually take over the daily supervision.

Noble Lords

No!

Lord Thorneycroft

That is the proposition that has been put forward. It is very difficult to know what else they will do or how else they can discharge their function. It is said that they must be on the inside of the barrier of secrecy and that they must know everything that goes on. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, shakes his head.

Lord Mishcon

The noble Lord is always courteous; and he is usually precise, but not on this occasion. If the noble Lord would kindly look at the title of the suggested committee, it is called a "Review Committee". This amendment sets out very clearly what its duties are. It is to, keep under review the exercise by the Service of its duties and functions". Nobody has ever suggested the daily functioning that he has mentioned. If I may say so, I believe that the noble Lord is spoiling what is a very amusing speech.

Lord Thorneycroft

I had rather hoped that that might be the view; but when the committee was required to investigate research assistants, I began to realise its review was getting a little deeper than a general oversight of the proceedings. It would have to study all these matters. I believe that the noble Lord will agree that, having heard all the secrets that it was worthwhile hearing from the security service, the committee would have to make up its mind how to compile a report and make its own judgment on what it was safe to say. I will not repeat the admirable speech made by my noble friend Lord Whitelaw; but the difficulties that would face a committee under those terms at this moment or at any other, are almost inconceivable.

The temptation—we are seeing it in another place today—to extract the last ounce of political advantage from almost any of these security points is overwhelming in the cut and thrust of party politics today. The moment one starts throwing out these areas for debate very little secrecy will be left. While I share with the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, a deep respect for Privy Counsellors, and would willingly accept systems in which they are consulted (as has been done before and I have no doubt could be done again) that is a different thing from trying to put them in charge of great services, whether as members of a review commission or something else, to investigate and to report on them. I therefore hope that we shall not accept the amendment.

Lord Annan

As one of those whose name is attached to the amendment, I should like to say a few words and in particular to try through a metaphor to convey to the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, the nature of the proposed review committee. Is it not a safety valve which, if a head of steam gets too high, blows a whistle? The object is to restore public confidence in the service. I shall come back to the question of whether confidence needs to be restored, but none of us would doubt that public confidence in the security service is at the essence of its work.

Members of the security service itself would value a body of this kind because public confidence is necessary if they are to do much of the work that falls to them. One of their tasks is positive vetting. Whenever a spy is unmasked, one hears that the system of positive vetting is being reviewed. Positive vetting depends on officers of the security service going to members of the public to ask them for information about someone who is being put forward for a post or for entry to a service. It is essential for the security of the country that the people who are asked these questions give truthful answers. They will not give truthful answers if they believe that the security service is skewed politically or is deeply reactionary. In that case they will prevaricate. That would be a tragedy for the security of the country.

We all know the kind of questions that are asked. I remember being asked about a Member of this House who is now dead. I was asked whether he was a discreet person. I said that he was the most indiscreet men I had ever known. Even though one knows a person and likes him it is essential that one tells the truth in those circumstances. The service itself needs a safeguard of that kind.

We should all wish for the security service to have bipartisan support. The noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, made that point admirably. Why should there be doubt about bipartisan support? The answer to that question must lie in the deplorable activities of that treacherous rascal, Mr. Peter Wright, who, both in his book and subsequently in appearances on television where he contradicted some of the things in his book, revealed a large number of irregularities. One may say that a man so treacherous, so obsessed and so fanatical as Wright rules himself out of court and that everything he has said is of no moment. One cannot say that. There were grave irregularities. The noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, himself said how ludicrous were the examples he gave. Ludicrous or not, they were a grave embarrassment both to the Prime Minister of the country and to members of his party.

Very curious things occurred during that time. I know it will be said that that is all in the past, that we have cleaned the matter up and that everything is fine now. That is always said after a scandal in the security service. It is probably true that it is cleaned up. The trouble is that after things have been cleaned up they often get grimy again. That is another reason why a bipartisan body which is above suspicion and which, as the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said, will act as a review body is needed. No one suggests that this should be an executive body. It would be ludicrous if it tried to be an executive body. I go along all the way with the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw. This body should report to the Home Secretary. He is the man on whom responsibility for security rests. No body dealing with security should bypass the Home Secretary. That would be the worst kind of management. This would then give the feeling that more than one point of view is being considered. That is important because, after all, there are grave differences between Home Secretaries. Lord Kilmuir was a responsible and in many ways a conscientious Home Secretary; but he was a man who, one might say, believed in the status quo. Years later he was succeeded by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead. No one could say that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, believed in the status quo. One has changes of policy under different Home Secretaries. It is right therefore that one should have in this body, people who are responsive to those changes.

So much has been said already that I need not go on with the rest of the points that I intended to make. The noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, said at one point that it is difficult to get people from outside because the intelligence service is a mystery. It is indeed "the mystery in the soul of state". But it is precisely because it is a mystery that people involved in this work sometimes become obsessed. Sometimes their judgment is distorted. No one doubts their patriotic motives in taking certain courses of action, yet they may have fallen completely out of touch with the reality of politics as it is today. For those reasons I have added my name to this amendment.

Lord Boyd-Carpenter

The noble Lord, Lord Annan, and one or two of those who have spoken from the other side of the Committee do not seem to have had fully in mind what is proposed in the amendment. There has been a tendency to play down the role of the proposed committee. I should like to remind the Committee of what the amendment proposes to insert into the Bill: The Committee shall keep under review the exercise by the Service of its duties and functions as set out in section 1 above and shall report annually to Parliament in such manner and on such matters as the Committee deem fit, consistent with a duty to protect the security of the nation. A committee set up under that clause will quite plainly assume a considerable degree of responsibility for the security service.

If the noble Lord, Lord Annan, could contemplate himself as a member of such a committee I know that he would, with his conscientiousness, feel it his duty to use the powers given in the second paragraph of the amendment to obtain very full information about what was being done by the security service and then make a full and conscientious report to Parliament. It is not just—in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan—a longstop; it is a body fully sharing in responsibility for the security service. That is why I find myself in complete opposition to what is proposed in the amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, said—and I agreed with much of what he said—that he welcomed the Bill and the initiative on the part of the Government in bringing forward legislation on this difficult and complex subject. However, it does not perhaps gratefully acknowledge the Government's good action in doing so if one tries to impose into a Bill something which makes a radical change therein; and a change which many of us regard most seriously. If the amendment were carried, I for one would wish that the Government would drop the Bill rather than have this proposal put into the law.

What is to be the position of the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary in respect of responsibility for the service? They will have this body inquiring into the service, given full powers 1:0 obtain every piece of information which the service can give it and then reporting to Parliament. How can a Prime Minister or a Home Secretary feel that he or she has effective responsbility in such circumstances? We are at risk of having a situation where something goes wrong and a Prime Minister or a Home Secretary would have to say, "Yes, it has gone wrong; but I could not help it because I did not have a free hand. My responsibility was intruded upon by another body". In respect of the security service that seems to me to be a particularly dangerous situation. It also involves some people, no doubt of the utmost respectability, but not necessarily of the highest discretion, having power to learn everything that the security service is doing.

A noble Lord

Why not?

Lord Boyd-Carpenter

I shall tell the noble Lord why not. Indeed, I am much obliged to him because I was just about to explain. Exclusive power is so given. In my view there are certain matters affecting the security of the state about which the fewer people who know, the better. Perhaps I may quote an example which should appeal to noble Lords opposite. During the government of the father of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee—I mean the first Earl—a decision was taken to build a British nuclear bomb. That fact was completely and, in my view, wholly justifiably concealed from Parliament and the public because it was thought by those responsible—the then Labour Government—that that was in the interests of the state. Surely that is a good example of the fact that in this unhappy world in which we live, with all the violence and all the strange movements which take place in it, there are certain matters which are best known only to the service and to the responsible Ministers of the Crown.

There is another aspect in this respect which has not yet been mentioned. The security service gains a great deal, as we know, from information obtained from the security services of other friendly countries; for example, the United States and, of course, there are others. Those other sources of information—that is, the security services of those other countries—will not feel increased confidence that the information which they give will be kept in confidence if they know that that information will, by Act of Parliament, have to be given to a distinguished body of people outside the security service and that such a body is quite likely, for what it may think good and sufficient reasons, to disclose at any rate some of it to the public. The effect of that will surely be to dry up the source of information from the security services of other countries. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, wishes to intervene.

Lord Mishcon

I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I shall not return to the history of what the first Earl Attlee did when he was, as Mr. Attlee, Prime Minister. As one knows, that was obviously in a state of war. However, having said that—

Noble Lords

No!

Lord Mishcon

I understand that the country was not in fact in a state of war. Nevertheless, it was quite obviously a decision taken in a situation which is rather outside what we are discussing today. I really wanted to correct the noble Lord, if he will allow me to do so, on this matter. He talked about our allies. Is he aware that the United States of America has in fact the very committee about which we are talking, but that it has to report to Congress? Of course, we do not put that proposal forward in our amendment. The United States has gone much further in that respect.

Lord Boyd-Carpenter

I shall deal with the intervention first. The noble Lord made a wholly inaccurate statement when he said that during the government of Mr. Attlee—as he then was, but he subsequently became Earl Attlee—the country was in a state of war. It was not.

Lord Mishcon

I apologise to the noble Lord.

Lord Boyd-Carpenter

During the six years of that Labour Government, this country was in fact at peace. Therefore that argument is founded on a complete mis-statement.

I turn now to the second point. If the noble Lord wishes me to go into the details of the United States committee I shall do so, but I doubt whether Members of the Committee will appreciate the amount of time which would be involved. Indeed, I shall not do so because it does not deal with the point. Rightly or wrongly—whatever their own system may be—if we were to set up a system under which a body of people outside the security service, and outside the Government, were free to demand every piece of information that our security services had, we must face the fact that a good deal of the information which we receive from the security services of other countries would dry up. It is no use trying to dodge that fact.

We must therefore consider whether the proposal to undermine the responsibility of Ministers—that is, to make them at least share with an outside body responsibility for what is part of the defence mechanism of this country—is justifiable in such circumstances. I can only say this to the Committee. If one studies the history of the war years, and of the years since the war, one would know of what priceless importance our security service has been towards the safety of this country. In a way it is a service which is perpetually in conflict in the protection of the interests of this country. Therefore it must inevitably operate under a cloak of as good security and of as great secrecy as is possible. It would be wild folly for any government deliberately to undermine that degree of security for the service.

It is all very well for those who have spoken in the debate from the other side of the Committee to talk about defence of democracy, and so on. I should like to point out to them that when they were in power—some of them in supreme power—they did nothing at all about the matter. Indeed, it is this Government who have decided to regularise and put the security service under proper statutory control. With the very greatest respect, I suggest that it ill-becomes them now to attack this measure for not going even further and for not going further in a way which would undoubtedly weaken the service.

I very much hope that those on the other side of the Committee will reflect very seriously before they press the matter and before they give discouragement to a government who have not only acted, and are acting, very bravely in the matter but have also maintained the proper sense of proportion in that it is of the essence of a security service—unlike all other services in the government area—that it should remain secure.

5.30 p.m.

The Earl of Halsbury

Not being a Privy Counsellor or a Law Lord and being unlikely to be nominated by the Leader of the Opposition as a member of this suppositious body, I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, how he visualises that I would be acting in the improbable event of my ever being appointed to it. I imagine a filing system the size of the Chamber; and I am asked with my colleagues to put it under review. That means that if I find something they have all to look at the same thing. I have no power to delegate authority to subordinates to look at it for me. Do I try to scrutinise the entire volume of files in MI5 and MI6 once a year, or do I put in my thumb and hope to pick out a plum that is not such a good one—that is one way, if one has the gift for it, of finding out what is screwy about an organisation—and examine possibly 0.1 per cent. of it per annum? Or do I wait until I am briefed by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary or the Home Secretary to look into a particular matter?

It seems to me that the first of my three options is impossible. The second will not lead to any conclusion in the way of a review, and the third does not need an Act of Parliament to empower the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State to expand a committee of Privy Counsellors to look into something in particular, as we did for the Falklands War. What is it that the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has in mind to effect in terms of the amendment?

Lord Allen of Abbeydale

I have been somewhat involved officially in these matters over a considerable period of time. I am still a member of the Security Commission. In fact, I am its longest-serving member. I felt it inappropriate to speak on Second Reading, but I feel that I must venture a brief contribution on the amendment. Incidentally, I have been just a shade surprised that no reference, except a passing reference by the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, has been made to the Security Commission seeing that in the case of Bettany we had a great deal to say about the organisation and management of the security service, and earlier had carried out a review of security procedures throughout the public service. However, it does not fall to me to discuss the role of that body.

I can well understand the reasons for moving the amendment, but I am afraid that I must take the view that in the form that it has been prepared it simply will not do. I find myself in agreement with so much of what the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, says, that I am in an uncomfortable and unusual position in disagreeing with him about adopting the amendment. I confess that I am just a little surprised that in the light of what he said he is prepared to support an amendment in these terms.

Lord Callaghan of Cardiff

I am obliged to the noble Lord for giving way. I said deliberately that I supported the principle of the amendment. Because it is the only one, I shall vote for it. If the Government were to indicate that they accepted the principle of the idea then I repeat, as I said earlier, that I believe there is room for discussion to answer some of the questions, some of which I must say I regard as ninepins put up only to be knocked down, and decide what form the committee should take.

Lord Allen of Abbeydale

I am much obliged to the noble Lord for making his position so clear. On an earlier amendment, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, said that the wording lacked precision. With the greatest possible respect, I believe that that criticism applies to the first paragraph of the amendment. It talks about keeping, under review the exercise by the Service of its duties and functions", but what that means is left extremely vague. Various interpretations have been put on it during the course of the debate. We have heard that it is a long stop or a safety valve. We had a remarkable intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, about its possible remit.

I must confess to having listened carefully to everything that was said, but I am still puzzled to know just what the duties of the body would be. I suppose that it could limit itself to discussing the broad strategies of the security service and the way it allocates its resources. But equally within the terms of the amendment, and in the light of what has been said, it could decide to look in detail at individual cases to see whether they have been handled in accordance with the principles set out in Clause 1 and whether the available resources have been properly expended on those cases. If it did that, it would have to equip itself with a supporting staff although there is nothing in the amendment about giving authority for it to appoint a supporting bureacracy.

Security work may sound glamorous. In the last war it may have had some aspects of glamour about it; but a main characteristic today is the slow and tedious accumulation of small items which have to be laboriously fitted together. Even carrying out a post mortem—I am only too well aware of this—can itself be a time-consuming and painstaking business.

The amendment does not address itself to what I regard as the crucial issue—although the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, rather pooh-poohed it—of whether the committee is to be within the veil of secrecy or not. If it is, I am still puzzled to know what on earth it will say in its annual report to Parliament. It is quite unlike the annual report by the commissioner provided for in Clause 4 on a specific and closely defined topic. On the other hand, if the committee is to be outside the veil of secrecy, how can one possibly justify the obligation on civil and Crown servants in the second paragraph of the amendment? That is a vital issue to which the amendment does not address itself.

Finally, there is the problem, which has been touched upon but which the amendment does not tackle, of reconciling the responsibilities of the committee and those of the Secretary of State. It must be borne in mind that in some of these matters, where there is an overlapping interest between MI5 and the unmentionable MI6, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may also be involved.

It must surely be right that the Secretary of State should, to the best of his ability and with due official support, exercise a general supervision of the service and take a continuing interest in its work. I know that that is what happens. How otherwise could the Secretary of State properly discharge his functions in relation to the interception of communications? How does that fit in with the role suggested for the committee? The amendment says that it is to keep the work of the security service under review and report to Parliament, not to the Secretary of State, as my noble friend Lord Annan suggested; but the amendment remains silent on whether the committee should even discuss its findings with the responsible Minister.

Is it nevertheless the intention, as has been suggested by some speakers, that the committee should, in practice, be mainly advisory? What happens if its conclusions differ from those of the Secretary of State? Is the last word to remain with the Secretary of State? The amendment does not tell us. It would be a recipe for disaster to end up with divided responsibilities.

I wish to comment on the drafting of the amendment. It seems to assume that a Lord of Appeal would not be a Privy Counsellor. However I have said enough to explain why, although I understand the reasons for the proposal, I cannot support the way in which it is proposed.

5.45 p.m.

Lord Campbell of Croy

I am glad to follow the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Abbeydale. Besides being a member of the Security Commission, he is a distinguished former Permanent Secretary at the Home Office. He is therefore familiar with matters affecting supervision of the security service. I am sure that we shall take his views fully into account.

The noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, spoke with the great authority of having had the highest responsibility some years ago for the security service. I agree with that part of his speech which dealt with the ambiguous public face of the security service at present. As the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, mentioned in his opening remarks, I suggested in my speech on Second Reading that consideration might be given to more carefully chosen information about the security service being made public. Such information, which would not give rise to risks in security could be made available in order to enlist the support of the public rather than their suspicion, particularly in their vital tasks in the campaign against terrorism.

However that is a separate subject from the one that we are discussing in the amendment. I venture to offer an opinion for one main reason. I happened to be involved in the invention of the original concept of the Conference of Privy Counsellors. It was called a conference then. In 1954 the first such conference was brought into existence to deal with the situation arising from the sudden appearance in Moscow of Burgess and Maclean who had disappeared three years earlier. I was also made the secretary of that conference in addition to the job I was doing. I therefore drafted the report. At the time I was seconded from the Foreign Office for two years to be private secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet, then Sir Norman Brook, later Lord Normanbrook. Incidentally, I was succeeded in that position in 1956 by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Tanworth, to whom I handed over.

Subsequent conferences of Privy Counsellors have also been established to investigate other situations such as telephone tapping and the Falklands War. I believe that those committees of Privy Counsellors, set up to deal with certain situations, carried out usefully the tasks entrusted to them.

It might be suggested that I have a proprietary interest, having been involved in the creation of the first conference. At the time it was regarded as a novelty. My view is that these conferences are appropriate for particular, difficult security or intelligence situations. But that is quite different from being in permanent existence as a supervisory body such as is now proposed. The Government have in any case decided that in the Bill there shall be considerable supervision through the security service commissioner and a tribunal. That is in addition to the security commission to which the noble Lord, Lord Allen, referred which was not in existence in the days of the first Privy Counsellors' conference.

I return to the first conference because I think it may be of interest to noble Lords to be reminded of it. The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said that I had not referred to the subject at all in my speech on Second Reading. That was because there were a number of other matters I wished to speak about in relation to the Bill. I hope that the noble Lord will not mind me spending a little more time on it now.

I am sure that many noble Lords will remember, particularly if they were in the other place at the time, that in 1954 there was great concern about the appearance of Burgess and Maclean in Moscow. There were demands that there should be an investigation, but no one could think what was the appropriate means. Three or more weeks passed while that went on. An internal inquiry would clearly not be good enough because it would be suspected of producing a whitewash. However, very secret matters had to be investigated. Therefore the notion of a group of Privy Counsellors who had themselves been in positions in government, from both the government of the day and the opposition, was adopted. They had all sworn the Privy Counsellors' oath.

That first conference was called the Privy Counsellors' Conference on Security. It might be of interest to remind noble Lords that it consisted of seven persons including the Lord Chancellor of the day, Lord Kilmuir, formerly Sir David Maxwell Fyfe who was in the Chair. There were: Lord Jowitt, a former Lord Chancellor; Lord Morrison, formerly Herbert Morrison who had been the Foreign Secretary at the time when Burgess and Maclean disappeared; Major Gwilym Lloyd George, later Viscount Tenby, who was then Home Secretary; Mr George Strauss, later Lord Strauss; and Sir Edward Bridges who was already a Privy Counsellor, head of the Civil Service and head of the Treasury. As secretary, I was bound by the Official Secrets Act as a Foreign Office official.

Later conferences have followed the same pattern of membership and operation. The membership of that first conference which I have described clearly had the confidence of all the political parties because there were members from both the government and the opposition who were all Cabinet Ministers and former Cabinet Ministers, together with the head of the Civil Service. Their report would not favour the government nor blame the Labour Government which had been in office three years earlier. It would be accepted as a fair report. Earlier speakers have mentioned Burgess and Maclean. The Committee will realise that I could say a great deal about both of them but I have no intention of doing so today.

The Falklands committee was appointed on the same lines. Sir Patrick Nairne was made a Privy Counsellor and played the equivalent role of Sir Edward Bridges in the first conference. Those groups of Privy Counsellors were not supervisory and they were not supervisory bodies. They were appointed for particular tasks on which they reported. The groups were then dissolved. I presume that the proposers of the amendment are not suggesting that the commissioner or tribunal proposed in the Bill should be abolished. The Privy Counsellors' committee is to be in addition to the new system which the Government are putting forward in the Bill. I am not convinced that this new committee is necessary, nor do I think it wise for it to be operating at the same time as the new system of a commissioner and tribunal. I agree with the main arguments put by my noble friends Lord Whitelaw and Lord Thorneycroft.

The principal problem concerns where the veil of secrecy is to be drawn. It is clear from the second paragraph of the amendment that these persons must be able to see any and all secrets if they are to operate in the way suggested. That is entirely different from the Privy Counsellors' conferences which I have been describing. They consisted of people who had been appointed to undertake specific inquiries. They could see any secret papers or be given secret information which they called for in relation to the subjects with which they were dealing. However, that did not mean that they needed to see everything that was happening all the time over a period of years. That is what must, more or less, be the case here with this amendment. These people would not see everything but they would have to go through an enormous amount of secret material if they are to carry out the job suggested.

The difficulty about where the veil of secrecy is to be drawn and being inside that veil on a permanent basis constitutes one of the main objections to the proposed amendment. I do not support it, for the reasons which my noble friend Lord Whitelaw has given.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

Since my name appears in support of the amendment perhaps I may intervene very shortly. I wish to deal with one or two of the ninepins set up and also what I should not call ninepins—the matters put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Allen.

What everyone seems to have lost sight of—a great deal of thought was given to this before the amendment was drafted—is that this system is already in place in Canada and in Australia. All the points raised so far in this debate are to be found in the Canadian report—the Macdonald Report which Mr Justice Macdonald produced. Finally, the committee in Canada was set up according to the principles of that report.

It would have been possible to have made this amendment three or four pages long and to have dotted all the "i"s and crossed all the "t"s. We could have set out the relationship of the committee with the Security Commission and set out how the members of the committee would be appointed and other matters. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Abbeydale, has said, this is a matter concerning the principle of having such a committee. That committee already exists in other countries and works extremely well. As regards the annual report, no one is suggesting that it should interfere in any way with the final authority of the responsible Minister.

The committee is a review committee which reviews the security service in a very general way under the terms of the amendment. Later, of course, the functions of the committee would have to be drawn up in more detail. The answer surely to the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, and to the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, who said that the Home Secretary was responsible to Parliament for what the security service does, is that that responsibility has been a failure. Everyone has to agree that over the past 20 years there has been, rightly or wrongly, trouble of every sort and kind as regards the relationship of the security service with the public and with Parliament.

My only authority for speaking today or having anything to do with the drafting of the amendment is that as an advocate I have over a long period of time taken part in a large number of cases involving the security service. As a result, I have been privy to quite a considerable amount of information. It was essential that I had that information so that I could carry out my job in a court of law. I became interested in the whole matter of the relationship of the security service with the public and Parliament because it was my duty to cross-examine some officers of the security service about the matters which arose in those cases.

I wish to say on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Dacre of Glanton, whose name is also down to this amendment but who is unfortunately abroad at the moment, that he wishes to support the amendment. On Second Reading the noble Lord spoke about the attitude of officers in the security service. He said that years and years of respecting total secrecy with no form of outlet at all gives rise inevitably to the situation we have witnessed over past decades of leaks and of information being given to journalists. We all know the case of Mr. Chapman Pincher who received information over a long period of time from members of the security service. That fact is known and Mr. Pincher accepts it. He received that information because some people working in the security service felt there were matters which should be known. They became frustrated and gave Mr. Pincher information.

I wish to quote five lines from a memorandum from Mr. John Day, a former senior officer in the security service. He states: All Government organisations are prone to bureaucratic self-interest and without any effective form of external scrutiny the Security Service, free from the normal pressures of open competition, shielded, of necessity, from the scrutiny of Press and Parliament, and protected, by threat of legal action, from any disclosures by members of the Service of significant errors or omissions which have disquieted them, must be particularly prone to this occupational disease". When I first became involved in a case involving the security service, I discovered that the secrecy surrounding that service was totally obsessional. Those of us involved in such cases were not allowed to mention Cheltenham or GCHQ. That was completely and totally unknown to the public, on the face of it. We were not allowed to mention that Cyprus was a listening station. All these matters are not secret in any shape or form. What is secret is the information which comes into those institutions.

However, it took seven hard days of cross-examination at the Old Bailey before the judge said to the Attorney-General, or whoever was representing him, that the case was becoming absolutely ludicrous. He said that we had photographs of Cheltenham and the name of the unit working there. He said that he had in his hand a lot of information. He said to the Attorney-General, "Are you persisting that we cannot mention that GCHQ is at Cheltenham?" In the end, of course, the whole matter came out. Also, three weeks were spent going through published information, still with an obsession for secrecy. In the end, the learned judge said that the case was becoming ludicrous. Later, of course, all this matter came into the public domain.

All I want to say is that the answer to the noble Lords who have spoken with such passion about the responsibility of the Home Secretary is that that approach has not worked. It was hoped that this provision might gain general support because it contains no party politics. It is based on the experience of people who have been involved with the security service. They say that the security service itself wants a committee of this kind, as its reputation has sunk so low. Such a committee would take the heat off the leaks, the books and the articles that are being written as well as investigative journalism. Members of Parliament can feed in questions they wish to ask the committee. Those questions cannot be answered by a Minister in Parliament, but they can be fed into the responsible committee which can ask the relevant questions.

Much has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Abbeydale, about the veil of secrecy. Why is there a problem about secrecy? Everyone who has responsibilities in public life is perfectly able to and does, respect secrecy. An ordinary Queen's Counsel respects secrecy day in and day out. If he gave away what he knew, he would ruin people's lives. Home Secretaries, Defence Secretaries, Attorneys-General, High Court judges, doctors and all kinds of other people respect secrecy. There is no difficulty about respecting secrecy.

All of us who served in the war had secrets of vast importance in our hands when we were very young men and women. We have never divulged those secrets. We witnessed top secret signals. I, as a signals officer, had to decode those signals. But I do not go around divulging those top secret signals. There is no problem or difficulty here. Why on earth should five Privy Counsellors and a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary not be able to go behind this famous veil of secrecy? Young men in nuclear submarines and in ships of the Royal Navy have acutely important secrets, vital secrets, in their hands about the methods of detecting hostile submarines, for example. There are hundreds of people who are already behind the veil of secrecy. To suggest that this proposed committee would not be entitled to go behind the veil of secrecy is not an argument against it.

Lord Allen of Abbeydale

I should like to ask the noble Lord whether he is suggesting that, if we had had such a commitee of Privy Counsellors, Prime would not have disclosed GCHQ secrets.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

Of course I am not saying that if we had this committee there would no longer be double agents. The flow of double agents and spies in this country, which is greater than in any other Western democracy, is not an indication of the system having worked very well. I am merely saying that such a committee would help the security services; it would help Parliament; it would restore the reputation of the services, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Annan, said, it would act as a safety valve.

I urge the Committee to look upon this amendment as non-political and a proposal which has been put forward to assist the country, to assist the security services and the marvellous work which the security services do.

6 p.m.

Lord Thurlow

The Committee has covered the main points concerning this important amendment amply and I do not wish to extend the proceedings. However, I ask the Committee not to attach cogency to the argument of analogy to which the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, has referred.

It has been suggested that because Canada and Australia have review bodies of this kind we in this country should follow their example. Like many Members of the Committee, I know those countries well. I have served in no fewer than seven Commonwealth countries. Each of the main Commonwealth countries has very different political and social conditions from the others. I do not attach any weight whatever to the argument that because Canada and Australia have review bodies we should follow their example. I suggest that we should be guided entirely by what the interests and conditions of this country require.

The Lord Chancellor

We have had a very full debate on this important amendment. I have no doubt that, as the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, said, it was put forward after the most careful thought. Therefore we may take this as an example by which to test the principle and to determine whether any such body is possible within the framework of our service.

I should like particularly to express my gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, who, with all his experience, has welcomed this Bill. I take particular comfort from that fact. That is at least an answer to what the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, has just said. This is a new system. The Bill puts the security service on a statutory basis for the first time, with—as I have submitted and as the Committee has so far held—clear terms of reference and a structure of tribunal and commissioner by which to investigate matters. We are proposing a new system. The question of principle is whether an amendment on the lines of this amendment or anything like it would be an improvement on what the Government have proposed in the Bill. The Government's strong submission to the Committee is that it would not.

As I believe the amendment demonstrates very clearly, the result of any such proposal would be to create confusion of responsibilities between the Minister (the Secretary of State, and the Prime Minister) on the one hand and the oversight body. It would result in a considerable increase in the number of those outside the service who have full and unfettered access to all its most sensitive secrets, on which the security of this country and the lives of individual members of the service and others depend. It would create a channel of oversight which can only operate through the medium of publicity. That is a very important matter. The safety valve to which the noble Lord, Lord Annan, referred is a safety valve involving some form of publicity. As a result, it would introduce unavoidable and inexorable pressure to publish information which would be deeply damaging to the security of the country. It would also leave the review committee to form its own judgments on matters which can crucially affect the security of the nation without the democratic responsibility for the exercise of those judgments.

The point on which the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, and my noble friend Lord Whitelaw differed was just that. Parliamentarians, whether or not they are parliamentarians at the time, are parliamentarians in the sense that the amendment requires a report to be made to Parliament. The report is for the purposes of Parliament whether or not the members of the review committee are Members of Parliament. I need hardly say that a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary would be a Member of Parliament as a Member of this Chamber.

I should perhaps deal with some of those points in more detail although noble Lords have covered most of them. Let us look first at the place of the proposed committee under the Bill's provisions. It stands wholly separate and apart from the central structure. Indeed, that separateness is obviously intentional and fundamental to the purpose of the amendment. I recall what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said at Second Reading. He wanted an independent and supervisory body. This amendment is consistent with that. But the result, as we see, is that the committee must be left to form its own judgment on what can or cannot be published in the interests of the security of the nation.

I do not believe that it is reasonable or practicable to ask such a committee to make that judgment in isolation from those in government who must be responsible for the consequences of such disclosures. Indeed, I see from this amendment that the Government have no role at all in the work of the committee or in the receipt or handling of its report. Unlike the Canadian review committee, which reports first to Ministers and then to Parliament, this proposed body reports only to Parliament and does so direct.

I think that the Committee will be in no doubt about the sensitivity of the information which would have to be made available to this proposed committee. It could not be, and perhaps is not intended to be, restricted to some kind of general policy remit. The reference which the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, made in his speech to the headline today shows that. If the review committee were to give any sensible responses to the media inquiries that would be made of it about that particular case it would have to have very much more than a general policy remit.

Instead it is charged with keeping under review the, exercise by the Service of its duties and functions as set out in section 1". There is no doubt that any conscientious committee would be bound by that statutory duty of review to examine the nature and detail of individual operations by the service as well as the detail of its policy, finance and administration. How else could it test the adequacy of the service's performance of its functions except by finding out exactly how, when and where it works in pursuit of those functions?

I need hardly say, human nature being what it is, that if there were any aspects of the service's activities which were more doubtful than others they would be the most difficult to find out. The noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, put that point with characteristic brevity in the question he asked the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. No doubt the answer will be forthcoming in due course.

At Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, suggested that the body of which he was at that time thinking would not probe operational matters. Under these terms of reference, it must do so. I do not believe that any review committee would have a real role if it did not do so. So we must face squarely that one of the effects of this amendment is to give a body, isolated from any responsibilities for the security of this country, full access by right to every detail of the operations of the security service and the full right to publish everything, subject only to it exercising its own judgment on what must be withheld to protect the nation's security.

What, then, does that powerful committee do with all the answers that it receives to its penetrating questions? The committee appears to have no authority for the service of any sort. I make no complaint about that. The Government have consistently maintained that authority goes hand in hand with responsibility, and that is for Ministers alone. But it follows that it either does nothing with the information, becoming a sort of learned repository of detailed information about the work of the security service from which no result emerges, or it must balance its own conception of national security against its statutory duty to report to Parliament—its sole power and purpose.

That puts the committee in an invidious and, I believe, ultimately untenable position. First, as I have said, the committee proposed by the noble Lords would know a lot about the service, but would be trying to weigh the implications of disclosing that knowledge against the need to protect national security without the involvement of Ministers who are ultimately responsible. Secondly, if it were not satisfied with any aspect of the service's work, it would have no formal means other than by public report to give substance to its opinions. Thirdly—perhaps in more human terms—it would eventually be bound to feel driven to justify its own existence by making its views known to Parliament. Perhaps the example given by my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter of the experience of the government of Mr. Attlee could be used to illustrate that point. Let us suppose that a review committee of this sort was in existence, consisting of at least four people with strong conscientious objections to the use of a nuclear bomb. In what sort of situation would the committee find itself, given the situation faced by that government?

Ministers are properly placed to weigh the risks to national security and a disclosure in any particular circumstances. A separate means by which such secrets could be published could be very dangerous and, if I may say so, unfair to those appointed to the proposed committee. That point is in accordance with the view expressed by my noble friend Lord Whitelaw. He said that he would not wish to carry out such an undertaking himself and would not therefore wish to place the responsibility on anyone else.

I do not see and cannot believe that, under the pressures inherent in establishing a free-standing committee of that sort, it would be able fully and fairly to balance the security of the nation with the need to fulfil its functions and duty to report publicly to Parliament.

Finally, let me say a few words about the dangers of confusion. This amendment proposes a body of six, possibly together with some support staff—although the amendment does not mention that—to add to the arrangements for a commissioner and tribunal provided in the Bill. The number of those within the barrier of secrecy grows with each person brought within it, as does the risk of damaging that barrier beyond repair. There are few, either within the security service or elsewhere, who have full access to all the information of the service. The principle of "need to know" is a major safeguard. This amendment must increase the risk.

The amendment is also likely to reduce the degree to which effective responsibility for the security service is able to be exercised. The less clear the avenues of responsibility, the more likely it is that misunderstandings and confusions will arise. Under the amendment, it will in practice become unclear whether the security service is expected to be responsible to Ministers, to the review committee or to both. The fact is that, unless the review committee is to be sidelined and ineffective, it must—to use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, at Second Reading—have a role that is not only independent but also supervisory. It must—to use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, at Second Reading, share responsibility. That would be the result of a committee effectively exercising—

Lord Mayhew

I know that the noble and learned Lord does not wish to be unfair. I made the point perfectly clear: there is no question of equal sharing of responsibility. Even an advisory committee has a degree of responsibility for a final decision.

6.15 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor

That is precisely the point. I do not say "equally"; I say "share" the responsibility. That is my point which I believe the noble Lord accepts is fairly made. There is a degree of sharing, but I do not specify the degree. That would be the result of a committee effectively exercising to the full its powers under this amendment. That is not the way in which we can have a security service protecting the nation under clear authority and control. The noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, said that, although there is a wicket keeper, there is also a long stop, but I do not believe that to have two captains is an effective way to regain the Ashes.

I know that there are a number of noble Lords who look with some longing at the models adopted in other countries for arrangements in respect of their security services. The Government looked long and hard at those arrangements and at our own needs and traditions. I adopt respectfully what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, who has much more experience of the matter than I. We found that in many countries the arrangements were new, about to be reviewed, or both. The noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, said that they work well in Australia and Canada. But my understanding is that the provisions and the operation of the 1984 legislation in Canada are due to be reviewed this year, particularly in relation to the question of whether the report should be directed to Parliament or through the Minister. I understand that, in Australia, there has as yet been no formal meeting of a parliamentary joint committee established in 1986. Nearer home, the Netherlands' legislation and the coming into force of the Danish legislation date only from last year. Systems are many and varied, as one would expect, because each country will want to develop practice and procedures best suited to its concerns.

Certainly by no means all have the kind of review body proposed in this amendment. For example, New Zealand—which is an English-speaking part of the Commonwealth—and France have arrangements more akin to our own. I make no judgment on the validity or merits of arrangements elsewhere. I simply seek the Committee's agreement to this country setting in place the clearest, safest and most workable structure for our own circumstances. I believe that that is what the Bill achieves.

I hope, therefore, that the Committee will agree to resist the voices that have spoken with great authority in support of the amendment. As has been said, good men may differ. I ask the Committee to agree with the view that the amendment should not be given effect. In our submission, it would be wrong to agree to some separate body on the grounds that it might do some good. That would not be the result. It would put confusion at the centre of the system for exercising responsibility for the security service. It would be bound in time to lead to pressure and, in turn, breaches in the nation's security; it would be unfair to those appointed to serve and unfair to the security service and to the Secretary of State. Most of all, I believe, it would do no service to ensuring the proper and responsible protection of the nation's security. I hope therefore that the Committee, will not agree to the amendment.

Lord Mishcon

This Chamber has become pleasantly accustomed to the eloquence of the noble and learned Lord. I cannot measure my eloquence, such as it may be, against his, but I hope at this last moment to be able to give the reasons why it is important that the view of the Committee be taken.

An analogy has been rather amusingly drawn with the game of cricket. Long stop and wicket keeper have been mentioned; then, with a devastating sentence, the noble and learned Lord said that, if we are to win the Ashes, we had better not have two captains of our one team. However, he failed to mention that the game of cricket would be impossible without an umpire. I should like to bring to the attention of noble Lords the analogy of a team fighting another team when a no ball has been bowled and there is no one to say whether it is a no ball.

Having said that, perhaps I may turn to the speeches made by the noble Lords, Lord Thorneycroft, and Lord Boyd-Carpenter. Perhaps I can deal first with the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter. He caught me off guard—he was quite entitled to do so—when he mentioned the case of the Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, as he then was, and the atom bomb. For one moment, I thought in terms of Japan and Hiroshima, that being a time of war. The noble Lord was absolutely right to correct me and point out that the decision was made in peacetime. However, that matter had nothing to do with MI5. It would not have touched MI5 at all. It is to do with the defence department. Quite obviously it would be entirely irrelevant to these considerations.

Lord Boyd-Carpenter

I hope that the noble Lord will understand that I quoted that as an example of the fact that there are certain matters vital to the security of this country which cannot and should not be disclosed outside the machine of government.

Lord Mishcon

I have no doubt that that is right; and I have no doubt that it would be recognised by Privy Counsellors who have taken the Privy Council oath and by the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. Perhaps I may say at once to the noble Lord, Lord Allen, that in the midst of a worthy speech he made one point which was singularly unworthy; namely, that there must be something wrong with the amendment if it did not recognise that a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary was a Privy Counsellor. I immediately say to him that he must have realised that one was talking about five Privy Counsellors and one who happened to be a Privy Counsellor and in addition a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.

Let us get on to the real points that I feel should commend themselves to the Committee. I tried to make the position clear, and in a much more forceful speech with so much experience my noble friend Lord Callaghan made it even more abundantly clear. This is the Committee stage. I was not trying to spell out in this amendment whether there should indeed be a staff, or the precise terms of reference of the committee. I was trying to give a general idea with one purpose, and one purpose only. It was to see that the unsatisfactory state of MI5, now to be known as the security service under this statute, was under the control of and was to report only to members of the Executive and that there was no other supervisory authority of any kind.

I repeat that that is not satisfactory. I shall not repeat the reasons regarding busy Home Secretaries or matters of that kind. We have had those arguments. I shall not bore Members of the Committee with them. I asked the Government this question, as did the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan: if you do not like this method of seeing some supervisory role of an independent kind, suggest another; or are you saying that the whole theory that there should be a supervisory authority is wrong?

It has been argued that this would affect the secrecy and the efficiency of MI5. I do not pretend to be a competent judge of whether it would or would not. I believe that it would not, but I take as my witnesses three directors general of that service who knew much more about the service in detail than anyone sitting in this Chamber this afternoon. The three of them said that they would welcome it. They would welcome it because, if there were such a body, it would make that service not only a healthier service, but it would also give public confidence in it which at times has been sorely lacking.

In his usual amusing and light-hearted way the noble Lord, Lord Thorneycroft, talked in terms of Philby, Maclean and others. I do not think that he would ever want to regard the examples that those people set within MI5 as being a joke or of any credit to this country or to MI5. He asked the rhetorical question: would a supervisory authority of this kind have found out that these men were drunkards and traitors? I do not know. All I know is that those in the Executive who are responsible did not find out for years, during which time this country was being betrayed. Whether a supervisory authority, because of some channel, would find out I do not know. However, it might have stood a chance. The noble Lord was merely quoting an example from our history. It was a bad example and did not show that the Executive supervision was working.

To make a long speech on this occasion would not encourage people to go in the right direction in the Division Lobby. I therefore ask now that the opinion of the Committee be taken.

6.25 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 7) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 99; Not-Contents, 156.

DIVISION NO. 1
CONTENTS
Addington, L.	Jay, L.
Airedale, L.	Jeger, B.
Alport, L.	Jenkins of Hillhead, L.
Annan, L.	Jenkins of Putney, L.
Aylestone, L.	John-Mackie, L.
Birk, B.	Kagan, L.
Blackstone, B.	Kearton, L.
Blease, L.	Kilbracken, L.
Boston of Faversham, L.	Kilmarnock, L.
Bottomley, L.	Leatherland, L.
Briginshaw, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.
Brooks of Tremorfa, L.
Bruce of Donington, L.	Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.
Buckmaster, V.	Longford, E.
Callaghan of Cardiff, L.	Lovell-Davis, L.
Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.	McCarthy, L.
	McIntosh of Haringey, L.
Carter, L.	McNair, L.
Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.	Mais, L.
Cocks of Hartcliffe, L.	Mason of Barnsley, L.
David, B.	Mayhew, L.
Davies of Penrhys, L.	Meston, L.
Dean of Beswick, L.	Milner of Leeds, L.
Dormand of Easington, L.	Mishcon, L.
Elwyn-Jones, L.	Monson, L.
Ennals, L.	Mulley, L.
Ewart-Biggs, B.	Murray of Epping Forest, L.
Falkender, B.	Nicol, B.
Falkland, V.	Peston, L.
Foot, L.	Phillips, B.
Gallacher, L.	Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller.]
Galpern, L.
Glenamara, L.	Prys-Davies, L.
Graham of Edmonton, L.	Rea, L.
Grey, E.	Rochester, L.
Hampton, L.	Ross of Newport, L.
Hanworth, V.	Russell, E.
Harris of Greenwich, L.	Seear, B.
Hooson, L.	Sefton of Garston, L.
Houghton of Sowerby, L.	Serota, B.
Howie of Troon, L.	Shackleton, L.
Hughes, L.	Shannon, E.
Hutchinson of Lullington, L.	Shepherd, L.
Irving of Dartford, L.	Stewart of Fulham, L.
Jacques, L.	Stoddart of Swindon, L.

Strabolgi, L.	Wallace of Coslany, L.
Taylor of Blackburn, L.	Whaddon, L.
Taylor of Mansfield, L.	Williams of Elvel, L.
Tordoff, L. [Teller.]	Willis, L.
Turner of Camden, B.	Wilson of Rievaulx, L.
Underhill, L.	Winstanley, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Allen of Abbeydale, L.	Holderness, L.
Allerton, L.	Hood, V.
Ampthill, L.	Hooper, B.
Arran, E.	Hylton-Foster, B.
Balfour, E.	Johnston of Rockport, L.
Beaverbrook, L.	Kaberry of Adel, L.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.	Kimball, L.
Beloff, L.	Kinloss, Ly.
Belstead, L.	Kitchener, E.
Bessborough, E.	Lauderdale, E.
Borthwick, L.	Lindsey and Abingdon, E.
Boyd-Carpenter, L.	Lloyd of Hampstead, L.
Brabazon of Tara, L.	Long, V.
Brookeborough, V.	Lucas of Chilworth, L.
Brookes, L.	Lurgan, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.	Lyell, L.
Butterworth, L.	Mackay of Clashfern, L.
Buxton of Alsa, L.	Macleod of Borve, B.
Caccia, L.	Margadale, L.
Caldecote, V.	Marley, L.
Campbell of Croy, L.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.
Carnegy of Lour, B.	Maude of Stratford-upon-Avon, L.
Carnock, L.
Chelmer, L.	Merrivale, L.
Cockfield, L.	Mersey, V.
Colnbrook, L.	Milverton, L.
Constantine of Stanmore, L.	Monk-Bretton, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Mountevans, L.
Cornwallis, L.	Munster, E.
Cottesloe, L.	Murton of Lindisfarne, L.
Craigavon, V.	Nelson, E.
Craigmyle, L.	Norfolk, D.
Craigton, L.	Norrie, L.
Cranbrook, E.	Northesk, E.
Crickhowell, L.	Onslow, E.
Croham, L.	Oppenheim-Barnes, B.
Daventry, V.	Orkney, E.
Davidson, V. [Teller.]	Orr-Ewing, L.
De L'Isle, V.	Oxfuird, V.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Platt of Writtle, B.
Dulverton, L.	Pym, L.
Dundee, E.	Rankeillour, L.
Eccles, V.	Reay, L.
Ellenborough, L.	Rees, L.
Elliot of Harwood, B.	Richardson, L.
Elliott of Morpeth, L.	Rippon of Hexham, L.
Erroll of Hale, L.	Romney, E.
Faithfull, B.	Roskill, L.
Ferrers, E.	Rugby, L.
Feversham, L.	Saint Albans, D.
Fraser of Carmyllie, L.	St. John of Bletso, L.
Fraser of Kilmorack, L.	Saint Oswald, L.
Glenarthur, L.	Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly.
Goold, L.	Sanderson of Bowden, L.
Grantchester, L.	Seebohm, L.
Gray of Contin, L.	Selkirk, E.
Greenhill of Harrow, L.	Sempill, Ly.
Greenway, L.	Sharples, B.
Grimston of Westbury, L.	Shrewsbury, E.
Grimthorpe, L.	Skelmersdale, L.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.	Southborough, L.
	Stanley of Alderley, L.
Halsbury, E.	Stodart of Leaston, L.
Hanson, L.	Strange, B.
Harmar-Nicholls, L.	Strathclyde, L.
Havers, L.	Sudeley, L.
Hayter, L.	Suffield, L.
Henderson of Brompton, L.	Swinton, E.
Henley, L.	Terrington, L.
Hesketh, L.	Teviot, L.
Hives, L.	Teynham, L.

Thomas of Gwydir, L.	Vaux of Harrowden, L.
Thorneycroft, L.	Vinson, L.
Thurlow, L.	Whitelaw, V.
Trafford, L.	Windlesham, L.
Tranmire, L.	Wyatt of Weeford, L.
Trefgarne, L.	Wynford, L.
Trumpington, B.	Young, B.
Ullswater, V.	Young of Graffbam, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

6.35 p.m.

Clause 2 agreed to.

Clause 3 [Warrants]:

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 8:

Page 2, line 11, leave out ("Secretary of State") and insert ("Security Service Commissioner or a Judge of High Court").

The noble and learned Lord said: I propose, with the approval of the Committee, to concentrate on the principle of Amendments Nos. 8, 9and 10 and not to move the additional associated Amendments Nos. 11 to 17. If the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, agrees, that raises the question of principle which arises on these amendments.

The question of principle is that the Bill gives power to the Secretary of State at the moment in Clause 3 to issue warrants. The extent of the power, as one sees from Clause 3(1) is awesome. It states: No entry on or interference with property shall be unlawful if it is authorised by a warrant issued by the Secretary of State under this section". That means no entry on to or interference of any kind in property, so it could amount to a breaking or entering or whatever may be needed to achieve entry. There is no qualification to what may be done in the premises when the entry has been achieved, such as whether eavesdropping contrivances could be left for the purposes of future reference and future use. When so enormous a power as that is given, there ought to be some judicial reference, backing or prior authority associated with it or giving the authority. The Bill already provides for a tribunal. It also provides for a commissioner. The amendment proposes that the Security Service Commissioner—who is a Lord Justice of Appeal—should have the authority to issue the warrant, which is how the amendment stands, or alternatively that the decision to issue the warrant and the issuance of the warrant should emanate not from a purely executive officer, as a purely administrative act, but it should be issued by a judicial authority.

The giving of the power solely and exclusively to the Secretary of State is highly questionable following the European court decision in the case of Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany; whether an administrative decision without judicial authority would meet the court's requirement of independence: in a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole". The granting of such awesome power by issuing these warrants in these circumstances to the Secretary of State, the executive authority, without any judicial reference or judicial power being called in aid, in my submission (and that of those who support the amendment) is wholly unacceptable. I hope that we may have an acceptance in principle from the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, to take away this awesome burden from a member of the Executive and at least to involve the judiciary in some aspect of the matter. I beg to move.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

Might I add my support to this amendment? These words in this clause surely must be the ultimate expression of executive power. It is indeed remarkable that only a small number of people in this Chamber have an interest when here is written into a statute that, No entry on or interference with property shall be unlawful if it is authorised by a warrant issued by a Minister.

I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord about the words "interference with property". Are there any limitations at all on that phrase? Do they include the removal of anything that is found there? Do they cover the property of anyone who is not a person necessarily under investigation? Do they cover the putting in of surveillance devices and things of that sort? In other words, is there any limitation whatever to this power which is handed to the executive without any judicial control whatever?

The other question that I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord is this. The Secretary of State is given this power. If the Secretary of State is unable to exercise the power for one reason or another, apparently the authority can be given to an officer in his department above grade three. If the Minister is abroad, does the phrase "the Secretary of State"include—I think it does—any Secretary of State, whether or not he has any knowledge, particularly of the background of a warrant which he is being asked to issue? In other words, once again, what are the limitations in this clause on the issue by a Secretary of State of a warrant?

In the other place, objection was taken to the idea of some judicial control over the issue of warrants, because it was said that judges would not be available; that judges would not have the background knowledge to enable them to understand quickly why a warrant was wanted. The criterion for the issue of a warrant is built into the statute. There is no problem for the learned judge to bring his mind to bear on the matter, any more than if he is asked for a warrant in many complex and difficult criminal places. Of course the commissioner would be ideally suited to do that, because he would have the background knowledge or would know how very quickly to absorb it. Once again, one has to say on this Bill that in Canada there has been no problem of this kind and Canada has to deal with terrorism, as we all know only too well. I support this amendment. There should be some judicial control of the issue of warrants, and it should not be entirely in the hands of the executive, particularly as this power is so broad and unlimited at the moment.

The Lord Chancellor

First, may I just explain briefly the system for the issue of warrants under Clause 3 as provided in the Bill? We believe that it is safe, efficient and fair. It operates in this way. Where the security service make an application for a warrant, the Secretary of State must satisfy himself on a number of highly significant matters, including that specific action in respect of specific property is necessary in order to obtain information likely to be of substantial value to the service in pursuit of its statutory functions; that the information cannot reasonably be obtained by other means; and that there are arrangements in place to guard against improper disclosure of the information.

In all cases a warrant can only be issued under the personal authority of the Secretary of State. If the Secretary of State was unavailable in a particularly urgent case, a warrant could be signed by a senior official but only on the personal authority of the Secretary of State. As the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, has said, "the Secretary of State" includes other Secretaries of State than the one we might at first think of. But noble Lords would I think be entitled to take it that no Secretary of State would take this kind of responsibility who was not sufficiently briefed about the work of the security service and had responsibilities relating to its work, which would enable him to judge whether the warrant should be granted.

Under our proposals, the Security Service Commissioner is a central safeguard in the operation of the provision. He has a statutory duty to review and report on the Secretary of State's exercise of the warrant powers. Subject to any necessary security omissions on which he would be consulted, his annual report would be laid before Parliament. So he is there, the Security Service Commissioner, a person of judicial quality, to oversee this matter.

Let us now look at what is proposed under these amendments. It is suggested that either the Security Service Commissioner himself or a High Court judge should authorise warrants. We must first examine closely the commissioner's position. He has no specific responsibility for the work of the service or for the protection of the country's security. Under our proposals he is there to keep under independent and objective scrutiny the exercise of the Secretary of State's warrant powers and to adjudicate on specific complaints in respect of property. Under these proposals in the amendment the safeguard of independent review is lost; and indeed the commissioner might well adjudicate in response to complaints about warrants of his own.

As a result, the commissioner's decision would not be made in the knowledge that someone was, in the words of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, looking over his shoulder at how the issues were weighed. And if there is no review function, there is of course nothing in the commissioner's report to the Prime Minister which could touch on the exercise of the warrant power as a whole. That report is of course to be published and laid before Parliament. The loss of the commissioner's powers of review, which is an inevitable consequence of this amendment, seems to me a most significant loss for those who seek reassurance about these matters.

Secondly, an important responsibility is devolved. The Secretary of State is responsible for the work of the security service. It operates under his authority; he must inform himself about its priorities and objectives, and about the whole context of its work. It is therefore wrong in principle to remove from him the responsibility for authorising specific actions under Clause 3. The commissioner is properly in the position to review the Secretary of State's decisions and to hold him responsible. He is not in the position to make that decision himself, and himself to carry the responsibility for that decision, right or wrong. Indeed I think the whole growth of judicial review and the methods that the courts use for that purpose indicates that in an executive decision of this sort the role of the judge is much more analagous to what is proposed for the commissioner here than to grant the warrants at first instance.

The second limb of the proposed amendment suggests that, alternatively, a judge of the High Court should give authority for security service action in respect of property. There are of course other countries who have chosen an approach of this kind within their own system. But in the context of the threats we face in this country, and of the long-established roles of the judiciary and the Executive which we have developed over many years, we believe that the courts should not, and could not, become involved in day-to-day operational decisions of this sort.

As I have said, in our system the responsibility for the work of the service, and indeed for the security of the country, lies with Ministers. Ministers and not the courts must therefore carry the responsibility for authorising particular actions which require an appreciation of the overall objectives and detailed workings of the service, as well as fine judgments on how and whether individual actions contribute to the proper discharge of the service's functions which this Bill places in statute.

There is also the point that not only does the Secretary of State have the power to grant warrants; he has the power to refuse them and the refusal to the security service to take a course of action which they wanted to take might have continuing and very important consequences. Of course, this is not an area in which we believe that the issues are too complex and subtle for the courts. Rather it is a question of ensuring that the difficult judgments on these matters were made consistently and in the light of full and detailed information, not only of the circumstances of a particular application but of a sober assessment of threat, priorities and activities as a whole. That information could not safely be made available to the courts and it is unrealistic to expect an individual judge to absorb all that is relevant in, say, an urgent case where the commissioner was not available. The Secretary of State has the background to make such decisions quickly if necessary; a High Court judge has not.

In any event, it is right that the Secretary of State should take full responsibility for decisions of this nature. A system authorised by a judge would dilute the consistency and control over actions by the security service in respect of property and would further burden the courts to no demonstrable advantage. It would also remove the vital safeguard of a commissioner able to review each and every decision made and to check it meets the statutory requirements, although I am not sure what the amendment proposes in relation to the commissioner's duties in respect of a warrant granted by a judge.

I see that these amendments seek to provide some reassurance about the secrecy of the information which would go to a judge. I remind the Committee that this information deals with matters which cannot be disclosed and which must be kept to the tightest circle possible. It affects the safety, well-being and in some cases the lives of the people of this country. Any widening of the circle, any unnecessary transmission through procedures which, of their nature, cannot always be well rehearsed and completely secure, must increase that risk. Given the other disadvantages I see in this amendment, I do not believe it is a risk Members of the Committee should or need take.

Finally, perhaps I may say a word about the need for speed. Some warrants may be needed urgently. The safety of the country, for example from a terrorist threat, can depend on it. The Bill provides a tightly controlled mechanism for this, with the safeguard that the warrant has been authorised on the personal authority of the Secretary of State, and in the knowledge that all such decisions are open to review and report by the commissioner. The amendments as drafted have no clear mechanism for such urgent actions to be authorised, although I imagine the intention would be to approach any available judge if necessary; and I know that courts have facilities for very urgent applications. I have explained why I do not believe that this would be the right approach, and noted that it would not be subject to review.

I do not believe these amendments would provide any greater safeguards than are clearly in the Bill. Indeed, I think in many ways they are less satisfactory and coherent. They mean that consistency of decision-making is less likely; and they remove, as they must remove, the vital safeguard of a review of the decisions made. Once the commissioner or the judge has decided, no one can say he is wrong. That surely is not desirable or sensible. On these grounds and the others I have mentioned, I hope that the Committee will not agree to these amendments.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

Perhaps I may say that it is disappointing that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has not given any indication of the willingness to associate some judicial reference in relation to this awesome power given to the Secretary of State. I do not know whether it is unprecedented but it is certainly an extraordinary power. It issues warrants on the basis of a provision in an Act of Parliament which states: No entry on or interference with property shall be unlawful if it is authorised by a warrant issued by the Secretary of State". We shall have to return to this at a later stage, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 9 to 16 not moved.]

Clause 3 agreed to.

Clause 4 [The Security Service Commissioner]:

[Amendment No. 17 not moved.]

Lord Annan moved Amendment No. 18:

Page 3, line 17, at end insert ("or such information as any member of the service may see fit to volunteer.").

The noble Lord said: This is merely a probing amendment to ask for clarification. I ask whether an officer in the service can volunteer information if he knows of irregularities; that is, volunteer information to the tribunal or the commissioner. I wondered whether or not he is obliged under this clause. I ask because the words "as he may require" suggest that the commissioner will only receive such information as he asks for. Should not an officer, if necessary, be able to volunteer information to the commissioner whether or not he has been asked to do so? Perhaps the noble and learned Lord will clarify that.

Lord Campbell of Croy

I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Annan, tabled this amendment because it raises a question about which we should like to hear more. Perhaps I may say the same about his Amendment No. 19, to which we are coming, which also raises a matter which is not clear in the Bill.

The Lord Chancellor

It may be for the convenience of the Committee if I explain the functions of the commissioner as provided in the Bill. I believe it will be plain from this that this amendment is not necessary in order to permit him fully to discharge those functions.

The Bill proposes that the commissioner should have clear and well-defined duties. He is there to review the exercise of the Secretary of State's warrant powers; he is there to give any required assistance to the tribunal in the discharge of its functions, as provided in Clause 5(3); he is there to adjudicate on complaints in relation to the complainant's property under Schedule 1(4); and he is there to investigate other matters affecting a complainant or his property referred to him by the tribunal.

It is necessary to ensure that the commissioner is able to get the information and papers he needs properly to discharge these functions. That is the purpose of Clause 4(4). It provides a duty on every member of the service and every official in the department of the Secretary of State to provide whatever material the commissioner requires to discharge these functions.

The duty to meet the commissioner's requirements is therefore properly placed on the officials involved. But of course it is properly for the commissioner to decide what information he needs. That responsibility cannot sensibly be passed to the members of the security service. Nor is it reasonable, I would suggest, to leave members of the service unnecessarily guessing at what the commissioner might need to carry out his work. That is not necessary in order to enable him to fulfil his tasks. The commissioner must have before him the relevant warrants or the relevant complaint, or both, and these will allow him to be very clear what information he requires to carry out his work. The commissioner will therefore be in a good position to follow the trail necessary for his work and to obtain all the necessary information in order to come to an informed view.

Nor do I believe that it is right for the commissioner to be the recipient or information which has nothing to do with his functions as set out in this Bill. But I have to tell the noble Lord that that would be one of the effects of his amendment. It is right that the commissioner's full functions should be described in the statute which creates his office. We believe that the Bill properly establishes the extent of those functions and the right of the commissioner to have access to all the information he needs to fulfil them. He has no need to require or to receive separate information outside those functions.

The other aspect of this matter which I should mention is that matters of concern to individual members of the service outside the commissioner's functions are best dealt with otherwise. It would be unsatisfactory if this Bill were to suggest that matters of concern to individual members of the service outside the commissioner's functions were to be raised with him. If such an avenue were created, members of the service would not be clear whether or when the commissioner was acting in an adjudicatory role or as an adviser and counsellor. Any matters not within the scope of the commissioner's function would be matters to be raised by the member of the service with the staff counsellor. The staff counsellor is fully independent of the security service, has never been a member of it, and can, if necessary, report directly to the Prime Minister.

Members of the security service have through him a clear way in which they can raise uncertainties about their work and have a clear reassurance that they will be treated in confidence and effectively followed up. In so far as the matters are within the commissioner's power, the commissioner must ask and the members of the service have a duty to answer and give the full information. In so far as they are outside the commissioner's function, it is a matter for the individual member of the service to raise, if he wishes, through the staff counsellor.

Lord Annan

I am sorry if I have not followed entirely. Let us suppose that the commissioner is examining a matter and calls for file B/17/4; he asks many questions about that and the officer of the service replies truthfully. However, is it possible for an officer to say, "Commissioner, I think you would be very interested in file B/54/3"? That is rather important if the member of the service feels that not all the facts are being put before the commissioner, not through anybody's fault but through negligence of one sort or another.

7 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor

In practice, with an experienced commissioner, the situation envisaged by the noble Lord is unlikely to arise because a commissioner, in the nature of his remit, is looking to ensure that everything is right. I have no doubt that the commissioner will ask all the people involved questions of sufficient generality to make sure that he has probed all the surrounding circum- stances. He is in control. The point that I seek to make is that the commissioner must have responsibility and be in control of the investigation.

The situation is in a way similar to that of a witness in a court. He is asked to take an oath that he will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth; but he is then required to answer specific questions. An investigator, as distinct from a judge, looking at the whole background would eventually ask questions of sufficent generality to cover these matters. Therefore, I believe that the noble Lord's concern is met in that way.

Lord Annan

Subject to anything that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, may have to say, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Annan moved Amendment No. 19:

Page 3, line 20, at end insert ("whether or not he has received a complaint.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment is more or less on the same lines as the previous amendment. Does the commissioner have to receive a complaint before he examines it? Can he, hearing of something in another field, cause a new inquiry into another matter to be instituted? I beg to move.

The Lord Chancellor

The statutory duty upon the commissioner is to make an annual report on the discharge of his functions and the power to report at other times to the Prime Minister is not tied to the receipt of individual complaints. Indeed, one of the commissioner's principal functions, set out in Clause 4, is to keep the Secretary of State's warrant powers under review. He has the intitiative—this refers back to the previous amendment—to keep the Secretary of State's warrant powers under review. Therefore, there is no need for a complaint about a warrant for him to see whether an investigation is justified. Certainly one sees from the report of the commissioner under the Interception of Communications Act that that is the way such matters are handled.

There is another aspect to his work in relation to the tribunal where complaints may arise; but for the main part of his work on the review of warrants he has the initiative and his duty is to review the exercise of the warrant powers.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

This appears to be the only time we shall be dealing with this part of Clause 4. Arising from what the noble and learned Lord just said, when the commissioner keeps under review the exercise of the Secretary of State's powers in regard to warrants, does that mean that he is entitled to ascertain whether, under Clause 3(2)(a) the warrant really was necessary or whether, under Clause 3(2)(a)(i) the information was likely to be of substantial value? Will he be in a position to be able to say to the Secretary of State, "Well, that warrant that you issued was, in my opinion, unnecessary and, if it was necessary, was certainly not in regard to information of substantial value"? The commissioner seems to have an ex post facto duty; or is he only going to see that the warrant is properly issued and that the Secretary of State has put his mind to the matter and acted in an honest, reasonable and sensible way? His duty in relation to warrants is not exactly clear to me.

Lord Campbell of Croy

I shall be interested to hear the reply to the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington. In the meantime, I simply want to say that the answer given by my noble and learned friend to the matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Annan, gives the interpretation of the Bill that I had hoped for. I am sure that is the way in which we all hope the commissioner will be able to operate.

The Lord Chancellor

There are two aspects. First, in relation to the commissioner's general duty the Bill states in Clause 4(3): In addition to his functions under the subsequent provisions of this Act, the Commissioner shall keep under review the exercise by the Secretary of State of his powers under section 3 above". Therefore, he has a full power to look at and review all that the Secretary of State does under Clause 3; that is, the full matters that the Secretary of State deals with. The commissioner is entitled to see everything that the Secretary of State has received in the way of documents, and so on, in order to reach his conclusion and to report to the Prime Minister on the discharge of these functions of review.

In addition, he is dealing with complaints and the noble Lord—or perhaps it was the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew—and myself went into that on Second Reading. The situation is that the commissioner considers the matter from the point of view of judicial review, as in Schedule 1, paragraph 4, which provides that, if he finds that such a warrant has been issued he shall, applying the principles applied by a court on an application for judicial review, determine whether the Secretary of State was acting properly in issuing or renewing the warrant". That is the way he operates for a complaint. The review enables him to say anything he likes that occurs to him on the exercise of the Secretary of State's powers.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

I do not want to be difficult; but is the answer therefore yes to my question in relation to the powers under Clause 3?

The Lord Chancellor

I do not have the exact question in my mind. But I think that the answer is yes he is entitled to look at any aspect of the matter and report upon it.

Lord Trafford

Can my noble and learned friend answer one question that might seem a little odd at first sight? What action is the commissioner supposed to take if, in the course of carrying out his duties under Clause 4, he comes across some other irregularity other than that relating to a warrant that it is his immediate duty to investigate? It is not clear to me from the clause—perhaps I have overlooked the matter—what action he would then take.

Without going over everything that has been said this afternoon, let us make the assumption that he is investigating a complaint or reviewing a warrant and comes across a series of events that lead him to believe that there is a more significant irregularity in the service. What is his function and duty then? Does he wait to make his annual report or does he take specific action?

The Lord Chancellor

The commissioner's duty is to keep under review the exercise of the Secretary of State's warrant power and to deal with complaints so far as they relate to the exercise of the warrant power. The commissioner has a duty to make an annual report to the Prime Minister on the discharge of his functions and may at any time report on any matter relating to that duty. If in the couse of his investigations he comes across a matter which relates to the discharge of his function to examine warrants he has the power to report the matter to the Prime Minister without waiting for the annual report. He can do so immediately because he has the power to report at any time.

Lord Trafford

I hope I am not being obtuse if I press my noble and learned friend on this matter. I was not referring to where the commissioner comes across an irregularity in a warrant, which is part of his duty and on which he may report to the Prime Minister at any time. What is the position if, in the course of his duty, he comes across something that is not part of his duty to review the activities of the Secretary of State?

What happens if by chance—and this must occur many times within the security service—he stumbles on a series of events that lead him to believe that there is something wrong in the security service but which does not relate specifically to an action of the Secretary of State which it is his duty to review? What action does he then take? Surely he is not confined to reporting to the Prime Minister only on matters relating to warrants or a review of the actions of the Secretary of State. If he has reason to believe that something else has gone seriously amiss, I am asking what his action would then be.

The Lord Chancellor

It is important to be clear. The commissioner's responsibility is in relation to the exercise of the warrant power. He has not got a roving commission; it is the warrant power that he has to deal with. If, in the exercise of that power and the discharge of these functions, he comes across some material that he believes should be reported on, he will certainly be entitled to do so. I wish to make it clear that it would need to arise out of the discharge of his functions. It might well not be something relating immediately to the warrant. As my noble friend suggested, it may be something that transpired out of the examination. It may be related to it but not actually an exercise of the warrant power. It would certainly be within the powers given to him under this Bill to report that matter to the Prime Minister.

Lord Annan

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his clarification. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 20:

Page 3, line 20, at end insert— ("(The annual report as mentioned in (5) above shall include the following matters—

1. (a) the number of warrants issued under section 3 of this Act;
2. (b) the number of complaints referred to the Tribunal under section 5 of this Act; and
3. (c) the number of persons who have been refused employment or continued employment or any office of capacity specified by him as a result of information disclosed by the Service.").

The noble and learned Lord said: Clause 4(5) of the Bill provides: The Commissioner shall make an annual report on the discharge of his functions to the Prime Minister and may at any time report to him on any matter relating to his discharge of those functions". This amendment proposes that the annual report shall include the following matters:

1. (a) the number of warrants issued under section 3 of this Act;
2. (b) the number of complaints referred to the Tribunal under section 5 of this Act; and
3. (c) the number of persons who have been refused employment or continued employment or any office of capacity specified by him as a result of information disclosed by the Service.").

In our submission, these are matters that Parliament should know about in order to see the extent to which these powers are being exercised and for information as to the function of this important machinery generally. I believe that once the machinery is set up there will be concern in Parliament. Therefore I feel that it is proper that this information should be included in the annual report. I beg to move.

Lord Monson

From the point of view of the liberties of the people of this country, I believe that this is a most important and valuable amendment, as indeed is the following Amendment, No. 21. I hope that they will both be agreed to either as they stand, or, should there be any technical defect, in principle.

The Lord Chancellor

The commissioner established under this Bill will be a person of standing, independence and considerable judgment. He will have the right to know all the facts relevant to his functions. He is surely best placed to decide on what he should include in his annual report. I hope that the Committee will therefore agree that these are matters which are best left to I he commissioner's judgment.

There is no bar in the Bill to what the commissioner includes in his report on the exercise of his duties, including some of those matters set out in Amendment No. 20. But it would be very odd for the statute to demand that this be done. Nor would it prevent such material being included in the annual report to the Prime Minister but quite properly being omitted from the published report. This amendment would not therefore have any substantial effect. Nor, I would submit, should it do so since a decision about what should be published must be made in the light of the circumstances at the time. It cannot be right to decide now on such matters in the abstract or to set them in the unyielding concrete of primary legislation.

For example, it is obvious that the number of warrants issued might give a very good indication to some persons who are seeking to undermine national security about the extent to which their activities have been detected.. I do not say that that will necessarily be so, but it might well be. Therefore, I believe it is right to leave the contents of the report to the judgment of the commissioner. After all, we are giving him a very important function. I believe it is correct that he should have the right to judge what to put in his report. No doubt he will seek to make the report as useful to Parliament as the circumstances allow.

7.15 p.m.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

I wonder if I can urge the noble and learned Lord to look at this matter again. One of the reasons for tabling this amendment was to ensure that this report did not just become anodyne and worthless. Already we have been able to look at reports by the commissioner under the Interception of Communications Act. They do not seem to give any information at all which can be of any interest to anybody.

For the noble and learned Lord to say that you cannot give information as to how many warrants are issued during the year because somebody might then guess that they were being surveyed is a little far-fetched. We find that in Canada the Security Intelligence Review Committee issues an annual report that contains a number of chapters as regards its work.

Complaints are set out quite often without reference to the names of the persons who have made the complaints. They are set out and it is explained how they are dealt with so that the public has some account of the work that its watchdog is doing concerning the security service. The public becomes educated about the matter. It is yet another example of this obsessional desire to keep everything totally secret.

The Government have been pushed—we know they have been reluctant—to include this commissioner in the Bill simply because the European Court has made it absolutely essential to do so. There are other cases coming up which will be lost without a doubt if this measure is not included in the Bill. But if it has been included, should not the public be given sufficient information to have some idea of what this watchdog is really doing?

Lord Monson

I suggest to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that it can only be harmful to reveal the number of warrants issued if the external threat to this country came from one single and unified source, which is obviously not the case.

The Lord Chancellor

I am not able to say precisely what the case is about that. The point is that the commissioner is perfectly free to make as elaborate a report as he wishes. I am sure that the commissioner appointed under the Act would wish to do his job as fully as possible. If one looks at the Interception of Communications Act reports, numbers of this kind are given. It does not seem to have been sufficient to satisfy the noble Lord. As far as I am concerned the judgment is left entirely to the commissioner and the more information he puts into his report the better. As regards Parliament, there is a judgment to be made concerning the security implications of the report; concerning the commissioner there is no restriction whatever on what he puts in his report. One would expect a commissioner appointed to do this work to give as full a report of what he is doing as the circumstances allow. It is one of the justifications for his existence in that capacity.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

I hope that the noble and learned Lord will look again at this matter. The importance that Parliament and the public should know what use is being made of this extraordinary power is so great that I believe it is proper that it should be stated to be his duty to disclose it. Disclosure cannot damage a potential danger to the security of the country. On the contrary, the fact that these warrants are being issued would point out an effective deterrent operating effectively. So far from any damage being caused to public security by the disclosure of the number of warrants issued, it would, I should have thought, be beneficial all round. I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord will look at this again before we come to the next stage of the Bill.

Lord Mayhew

If the figures for interceptions are published, as they are, I should have thought that they would be the most sensitive of all the forms of information that we are considering. The point made by the noble and learned Lord against paragraph (a)—the number of warrants—scarcely applies to paragraphs (b) and (c). Yet he ruled out the whole proposal on the basis of a not tremendously persuasive argument about security. At no time, either in another place or in this Chamber, have the Government given way on any amendment. Of all the amendments which face the Government, this one might be conceded with the least discomfort to Ministers. I urgently ask that this be thought about again before the next stage.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

I see the discouraging sedentary position occupied by the noble and learned Lord. We shall undoubtedly return to this point at the next stage of the Bill. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 4 agreed to.

Clause 5 [Investigation of complaints]:

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington moved Amendment No. 21:

Page 3, line 35, after ("Service") insert ("and the Special Branch of any police force which enters into an arrangement to assist the Service in the proper discharge of its duties and functions.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment relates to Clause 5 which deals with the investigation of complaints. Subsection (1) states: There shall be a Tribunal for the purpose of investigating complaints about the Service". The amendment seeks to add that the investigation should also cover complaints about the Special Branch. If complaints about the activities of the service are to be covered, it is our suggestion that the system should embrace the activities of the Special Branch as well.

All provincial constabularies now have their own Special Branch units which are responsible to the chief constable. They are linked to New Scotland Yard's unit, which is the main unit and does such remarkable work in regard to terrorism. It holds a central computer with many thousands of files which in general cover subversion. As I understand it, it is the definition of subversion of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, under which it operates. The officers of Special Branch have been described as the foot-soldiers of MI5. The security service has no power of arrest. To carry out arrests and interrogations of suspects and for many other aspects of its work it uses the services of Special Branch. Its task, in its own phraseology, is the preservation of the Queen's peace. It deals with threats to public order and provides personal protection to persons who are at risk. Highly sensitive information is gathered and kept on the computer. There are stringent rules about access to it and about who sees it and on what basis. None of this is under statutory control.

If the activities of the Special Branch are at the behest of the security service, surely all persons affected by those activities should be able to avail themselves of the same channel of complaint as persons who are directly affected by the activities of the security service. If there is not this power it will be the easiest thing in the world to circumvent the arrangements made under the Bill by seeing to it that it is the Special Branch which does something in relation to the individual about which the individual might have reason to complain. I beg to move.

Lord Trafford

One could circumvent the proposal very easily merely by using the ordinary police force, which is not designated Special Branch. Secondly, are not complaints against the police subject to a different procedure?

The Lord Chancellor

I shall try to answer the questions raised on the amendment. If the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, does not think that I have the answers right, he will no doubt give his own in due course.

It is sensible and right that the police should be able to work closely with the security service where the service's functions and the responsibilities of the police coincide. The Committee will well understand that there must be close co-operation between the security service and the police in order, for example, to counter threats of terrorism. I am sure the Committee would endorse the need for close co-operation in such matters and agree that the relationship between the security service and the police to counter such threats should be harmonious and effective.

Such co-operation is no secret. The relationship between the security service and the police was made explicit in the Home Office guidelines on the work of a Special Branch, published in December 1984. Those guidelines provide that a specific function of a Special Branch is to assist the security service in carrying out its tasks. As the guidelines make clear, and I quote, a large part of this effort is devoted to the study and investigation of terrorism, including the activities of international terrorists and terrorist organisations". But—and this is the important point—where the police undertake work which is relevant to the functions and objectives of the security service, they do so on the basis of their own powers and responsibilities. This is highly relevant to the mechanism for complaint and remedy. Police officers and Special Branch officers have no special powers in respect of the security service. They act under their own legislation and each police force operates under the authority of its own chief constable.

The right course for anyone who wishes to complain about the actions of a member of the police—whether the police are acting for the security service or not—is through the well-established means to do so; that is, to the chief constable of the police force concerned or to the Police Complaints Authority. So the proper course in that event is through the police complaints mechanism. As my noble friend Lord Trafford pointed out, if that were not the case it would be necessary to extend the amendment to cover the police generally. I am sure the noble Lord appreciates that it is an easier method of complaint to go through the police complaints system than to use the suggested mechanism.

I hope the Committee will agree from what I have said that it is desirable, and indeed a safeguard in itself, to keep police powers, responsibilities and the mechanism for complaints separate from the statutory basis for the work of the security service which we are considering today.

Lord Mishcon

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, and following from the point that he has made, will it be a direction to the security service—because the poor complainant will not know this—that where the security service has not been involved in the matters of which the complainant complains, the security service will inform the complainant that the Special Branch was involved and that his complaint should go there? The ordinary citizen will not know who has carried out an action, and I do not suppose that the Special Branch will leave a visiting card.

7.30 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor

The answer to that question is that I do not think members of the Special Branch would do so deliberately—at least, not very often. A person who feels that he has been wrongly treated by an authority would, I suppose, be wise to complain to the body which he feels has mistreated him. I believe that there would be no possible difficulty about an individual complaining to the police. Further, if he had any suspicion that the security service were involved, I do not think he would have any difficulty in complaining to the service.

Lord Mishcon

The noble and learned Lord is most kind, but he has not answered the question I put to him. There is a complaints procedure set up under the provisions of the Bill which is for the benefit of the member of the public who has a complaint to make. My question was that since such a person will most likely not know whether it was the security service or the Special Branch that carried out the act about which he wishes to complain, will there be a clear direction, where it was not the security service which was involved but in fact the Special Branch, that the citizen will be informed so that he may make his complaint to the proper quarter?

The Lord Chancellor

It was because I found the question difficult that I did not answer it rather than any unwillingness to do so. The point is that the person making the complaint must be complaining about something. Further, the "something" must be some form of interference with his property. It may be that the interference with his property was carried out by a burglar and he may therefore think it wise to complain to the police about it. However, it may well be that on investigating the matter it turns out that it was not a burglar after all. The subject matter of the complaint will determine what the complainant thinks he should do in those circumstances. I certainly think that anyone who felt that he was involved in any way with the security service, and who wanted to complain, would be wise to complain not only to the police, who may be involved, but also to the security service.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

I think the point my noble friend Lord Mishcon was trying to make was that the member of the public might be well advised to do many things. But that person will not have gone to bed with a copy of the Security Service Bill and read it from cover to cover. All he will know is that someone has been interfering with his property. If that person suspects that there is some interference with his property and that someone has been putting in bugging machines, he would want to make his complaint under the provisions of the Bill if he knew that he could do so. Indeed, there would be all sorts of implications in such a suspicion.

Under paragraph 7(2)(b) of Schedule 1 it will be open to the tribunal, when complaints are made, to find, that it is appropriate for there to be an investigation into whether the Service has in any other respect acted unreasonably", and so on. However, if that person were to say to old copper Jones down at the local nick, "Someone has been putting bugging machines in my office", he would get a pretty sharp answer and might be told that he would do better to complain about something else.

Therefore it seems to me, with the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, that there is room here for getting round the investigation, which would arise under the provisions of the Bill, by having this overlap of complaints to the police on the one hand and to the security service on the other. In those circumstances, and having regard to the lateness of the hour, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment. However, I should add that I think it will be necessary to return to the matter at a later stage of the Bill's proceedings.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The Earl of Arran

I think this might be a convenient moment to break for dinner. I suggest that we do not return to further consideration of the Bill until 8.35 p.m. I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.