Lords Sitting of 11 July 1989

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Sheffield.

Soviet Nuclear Submarine Production
Lord Orr-Ewing Lord Orr-Ewing asked Her Majesty's Government:
What is the latest NATO estimate of the rate of production of Soviet nuclear submarines with and without nuclear missiles and how this compares with each of the years since President Gorbachev came to power in 1985.
The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Lord Trefgarne): My Lords, the Soviet Union completed the construction of five nuclear submarines in 1988, of which three are known to be armed with nuclear missiles. This annual production rate is in line with that for the 1980s as a whole; there has been no reduction in output of nuclear submarines since President Gorbachev came to power in 1985.
Lord Orr-Ewing: My Lords, can my noble friend say whether there is any field of armaments in which the huge preponderance of Soviet strength over NATO strength has been reduced since Gorbachev came to power and started talking words of peace but not putting anything into action in regard to his armament production?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, so far as we can ascertain, the Soviet defence budget has been reduced by not so much as a single rouble since Mr. Gorbachev took power.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, will the noble Lord point out that all submarines to which he referred were presumably ordered by Mr. Gorbachev's predecessors? It would be interesting to know what has happened to the rate of new orders since Mr. Gorbachev took over.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, unfortunately, the Soviet Union does not announce its new orders in the way in which we do. Of course, it is true that the submarines to which I have referred were, for the most part, ordered before Mr. Gorbachev came to power, but it would have been open to him to cancel them.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, would it not have been a little less misleading for that answer to have been made clear to begin with? What is the advantage of making things look worse than they really are?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, surely what matters is the number of submarines that rolled down the slipways during the period in question.
Lord Graham of Edmonton: My Lords, would the Minister care to help the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing, by giving the statistics for the production of NATO forces submarines over the same period? Does the Minister not agree with me that it is more important to look towards verified negotiated reductions of forces and to welcome positive moves, both by President Bush at the NATO summit and by President Gorbachev, rather than entering into arguments about the rate at which Soviet submarines and missiles are being built?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, of course I agree that the objective now must be balanced and verifiable measures of arms control in all the areas where we can secure such agreements. It is perhaps worth noting that, as a result of the SALT agreement, for example, the Soviet Union has been required to decommission two strategic missile-carrying submarines. I understand that it has converted those submarines to another equally offensive role.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: My Lords, can my noble friend explain why the Soviet Union, which is a land mass with very little dependence on sea communications, thinks it requires a navy of this size?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the Soviet Union has long maintained that all its armed forces are there for defensive purposes only. That is impossible to square with the scale of the forces which it has maintained. However, having said that, Mr. Gorbachev has undoubtedly brought a new era into the Soviet Union. Let us hope that things will be different in the future.
Lord Zuckerman: My Lords, has not the Soviet Union allowed a party of Americans, including scientists in the defence field, to inspect a missile cruiser? Each one of its weapons is apparently able to deal with a carrier group. Is this not a question which we might put to the Soviets?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, we are maintaining our pressure on the Soviets to come to the kind of balanced and verifiable agreements to which I have referred. One has to be fair; there is some sign that, unlike their stance in the past, the Soviets are now more ready than they once were to come to such agreements.
Lord Orr-Ewing: My Lords, can my noble friend say what action Her Majesty's Government are taking to put the true facts about the operational capability of the Soviet forces at present in the field before the electorate, not only of this country but of our NATO allies as well? We are in danger of wishful thinking along very much the same lines as in the 1930s, and that led to World War II.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I think perhaps the clearest exposition of the position in this matter is the passage in the Defence White Paper, which I am sure that my noble friend has seen. So far as a wider audience is concerned, we have produced a document called British Defence Policy, which is, if you like, a plain man's guide to the White Paper and which I hope reaches a much wider audience.

Nature Reserves: Management
2.42 p.m.
Lord Hunt Lord Hunt asked Her Majesty's Government:
When they expect to take decisions on the disposal and future management of nationally owned nature reserves which they have asked the Nature Conservancy Council to review.
The Minister of State, Department of the Environment (The Earl of Caithness): My Lords, the report recognises that further work is required on a number of important issues. As part of its current programme of work, the council is looking in detail at those sites which it has already identified as potentially suitable for management by others. This council expects to advise the Government formally of the first results of this assessment shortly.
Lord Hunt: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for that ad interim reply. Because it is an ad interim reply, will he bear in mind the great concern among nature conservation bodies lest the transfer to private ownership of any of the national nature reserves for which the NCC has a statutory responsibility should result in their being damaged or destroyed? Is he aware that the cause of that concern is the fact that during the past three years at least 500 SSSIs on private land have been damaged or destroyed? Will the Minister therefore say whether the Government intend, before proceeding with any private disposals, to bring forward an amendment to Section 35 of the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act? That section places a statutory responsibility on the NCC.
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has asked me a number of questions. The first thing to point out is that the NCC is entirely responsible both for the selection and the declaration of NNRs. I am not quite sure therefore what the noble Lord means by statutory responsibility. The NCC is statutorily responsible for all NNRs. The great preponderance of national nature reserves are already in private hands. There are some 235 in the country, whereas those wholly owned by the NCC amount to only 63. That is about 26 per cent.
Baroness Nicol: My Lords, is it not a fact that throughout the report the two themes to which the NCC continually draws attention are the shortage of funds for looking after those reserves in its ownership and the shortage of expertise for looking after reserves nationally? Can the Government give an assurance that whatever happens in the far distant future there will immediately be enough funds available to the NCC to carry out its duties satisfactorily during this coming year?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, the noble Baroness is, I know, aware, as I hope the House is now aware, that we have increased the funding of the NCC by 150 per cent. in real terms since 1979. That is a substantial increase. Every year we discuss finance with the NCC, but it is up to that body to allocate its programme, having been given the sum of money, as it thinks best.
Baroness Nicol: My Lords, with respect, that answer is slightly misleading. Although there has been an increase since 1979—in a 10-year period one would expect an increase—during the present year there has been a 5 per cent. cut in grant to the NCC. That is not very progressive, given the circumstances.
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, the 150 per cent. increase was in real terms. I am sure that very few of your Lordships would have predicted in 1979 that the NCC would receive such a substantial increase in real terms. However, the amount paid to the NCC continues to go up. Last year it was £38·95 million; this year it is £40·15 million. The job of the NCC is now altering slightly. It has spent many recent years—the noble Baroness knows this full well—renotifying SSSIs. That work is coming to an end; so the programme is shifting.
Lord Craigton: My Lords, is the Minister aware that when he refers to a substantial increase it is niggardly in terms of the money that the NCC needs to carry out the job of conservation for this country?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, I do not know of a single body with which I have been associated that has not said to me that it does not have enough funds. There has been a substantial increase to the NCC. We are very grateful for the work it has done. It has done a very good job. The future for conservation in this country looks extremely bright.
Lord Winstanley: My Lords, does the noble Earl accept that the uncertainty which arises from delay in matters of this kind can be very damaging to sites, as experience has already shown? While we do not wish the wrong decisions to be taken, there comes a time when it is better to have any decision than no decision at all. If final decisions are going to be long delayed, certain interim steps such as those suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Nicol, will have to be taken to protect sites.
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, I am not sure what delay the noble Lord, Lord Winstanley, is concerned about. Further work is needed on the report. In the meantime the NNRs, most of which are SSSIs or likely to be designated as such, are receiving protection. However, they are the very special sites.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that in my opinion hundreds of thousands of landowners carry out many times better work on their own land as regards conservation than the so-called professionals who are paid high sums to do so? Landowners have more practical experience on the whole.
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. Of course we appreciate the very valuable work not only of private owners and those who have NNRs on their land but also of some of the voluntary bodies. That is why, out of about 166,000 hectares, some 120,000 are not in NCC hands. They are very well protected under present arrangements.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, why do the Government keep on pretending that private ownership of NNRs and SSSIs is adequate for their protection? Surely the Government themselves, in their very welcome amendments to the Water Bill, recognised that, as regards the disposal of water company land, an offer for the surplus land to go into public ownership is a valuable protection which cannot be provided in private ownership.
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, I take issue with the noble Lord. We have never said that the private sector cannot do just as good a job as the public sector in this regard. Many of us go to places throughout this lovely country of ours which we thoroughly appreciate and which are in the hands of private owners.
Lord Hunt: My Lords, in the light of these questions will the noble Earl bear in mind that should there be an eventual decision to dispose of any of the 63 nationally owned NNRs—I was talking about the nationally owned NNRs—to private ownership, the nature conservation bodies, which are quite numerous, would be unable to bid for them without additional funds?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, obviously we shall look at that situation if it arises. As the noble Lord knows full well, it is with government approval that the NCC funded the RSPB to buy part of Abernethy Forest.
Baroness David: My Lords, the NCC concludes by saying that it hopes that the report will form the basis for discussions. What discussions do the Government intend to initiate and with what bodies?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, we have had discussions with the NCC. However, it is an NCC paper and it is right that the NCC should have the discussions rather than the Government.

Short Brothers: Subsidies
2.50 p.m.
Lord Bruce-Gardyne Lord Bruce-Gardyne asked Her Majesty's Government:
What progress has been made to date on the negotiation of clearance for the United Kingdom taxpayers subsidies provided to Short Brothers for the purpose of acquisition by the Bombardier Corporation.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office (Lord Lyell): My Lords, formal notification to the European Commission of the Government's proposed package of financial assistance for Short Brothers plc was made on 22nd June this year, and under the terms of the Treaty of Rome the Commission has 30 working days in which to reply.
Lord Bruce-Gardyne: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for that information. Will he bear in mind that there may be a large number of our fellow taxpayers who would be only too delighted if the European Commission were to decide that this very large package of taxpayer support was over the top? If the Commission were in its wisdom to approve the scale of the subsidies, would the Government be able to ensure that they would not find themselves in a similar situation to that in which they recently found themselves over the Wang factory in Scotland, where large sums of taxpayers' money could not be recovered?
Lord Lyell: My Lords, in answer to my noble friend's first supplementary question, he will be aware that, prior to submitting formal notification to the European Commission in cases such as this, officials have informal discussions with officials from the European Commission about how best to present the proposed package of financial assistance. The discussions between the two sets of officials in this case were most helpful. The notification that was submitted drew very heavily on the advice which we received.
So far as concerns my noble friend's second question, of course there can be no copper-bottomed guarantee in any case, but we have a number of assurances from Bombardier, the purchasers of Short Brothers plc. With regard to my noble friend's comment about Wang in Scotland, I do not think that that case is precisely the same as some of the other interesting cases that he and I have discussed over the years.
Lord Prys-Davies: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, for his reply, which I believe to be encouraging. The noble Lord will know that the Official Opposition has been critical in the past of the Government's attitude, behaviour and policy towards Shorts. Is it of some comfort to the noble Lord to know that we are now anxious that the Government should obtain clearance from Brussels for the arrangement that has been negotiated, as that is in the interest not only of the workforce in Shorts but of the people of Northern Ireland.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, it is indeed a great comfort to have such support from the noble Lord. I reiterate that after the formal notification to the European Commission the Commission has 30 days in which to reply, which, according to my calculations, takes us to 4th August. Your Lordships will know that that is the maximum period and we have some hope of receiving news before August.
Lord Bruce-Gardyne: My Lords, perhaps I may ask my noble friend one further question. Is he satisfied that this is a venture in which it is proper and appropriate for employees in the company to be encouraged to take an interest?
Lord Lyell: In general, yes, my Lords.

Engineering Industry: Training
2.54 p.m.
Viscount Hanworth Viscount Hanworth asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether, when the Engineering Industry Training Board is handed over to industry, they will set up a small independent body to monitor and advise those companies whose standards of training fall below an acceptable norm.
The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Lord Young of Graffham): My Lords, no. The Government believe that the independent and voluntary industry training organisations must be responsible for defining and monitoring standards and key skill requirements and for securing the commitment of senior management in the industry.
Viscount Hanworth: My Lords, does the noble Lord realise that at present, even with a certain amount of surveillance, many companies provide quite inadequate training? Does he agree that if there is no outside surveillance there is a reluctance on the part of any industry training board to hold responsible those who are not doing a decent job? Does he also agree that if that board is controlled by large companies its views will not be welcomed by smaller companies? Finally, does he realise that although it is customary to allow some professions to govern their own affairs—and, where codes of ethics are breached, to deal with offenders—that is not always a satisfactory arrangement? Does he agree that training is a very different matter? It is not a matter of ethics; it is a question which affects all the members of that profession. It is a question of ensuring that a decent job is done.
Lord Young of Graffham: My Lords, it is my understanding that the Question is about training and not about ethics. I can tell the noble Lord that one characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s was the inadequacy of training arrangements in British industry. Yet in that same period we had a multiplicity of compulsory training boards. There is no substitute for industry recognising the need to train in its own right. Nothing will change that.
The Earl of Halsbury: My Lords, is it not the case that there ought to be close liaison between the industry training board and the chartered engineers?
Lord Young of Graffham: My Lords, I believe that the voluntary arrangements will result in a closer arrangement between the various statutory and professional bodies and the industries themselves. At the end of the day companies have to realise that it is in their own self-interest to train, with the increased professionalism that that brings. Until they do so no Acts of Parliament and no exhortation by Ministers will change the situation.
Baroness Turner of Camden: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the Engineering Industry Training Board has an excellent reputation for training women in the engineering industry? Is he
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also aware that it currently has a number of excellent projects aimed specifically at increasing the number of women interested in a career in engineering, including women with no previous qualifications? What organisation will undertake that kind of work in future when the EITB no longer exists?
Lord Young of Graffham: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I understand that this very day the Engineering Industry Training Board has written to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Employment suggesting that it transfers to a voluntary basis. I am aware of the many programmes that the board has run, and I have supported them in the past in a previous incarnation. In particular I pay tribute to programmes such as those for women technicians and the like. The board will, of course, have to make arrangements to ensure that those continue.
Viscount Caldecote: My Lords, is my noble friend aware of the situation which prevailed before the establishment of the Engineering Industry Training Board? Enterprising companies spent a great deal of money on training people only to have the skilled staff they had trained poached by other companies which had spent no money on training. Is he satisfied that the new arrangements for transferring the Engineering Industry Training Board to industry will provide a satisfactory supply of trained manpower in the absence of any external monitoring arrangement as suggested in the Question?
Lord Young of Graffham: My Lords, no amount of external monitoring will change the reality that companies have to recognise that they must train for themselves. It is true that in the past many companies poached staff. Undoubtedly at times of skill shortage some may do so today. However, in my travels around industry—and I spend a great deal of time travelling around industry—I have noticed a fundamental change in the attitude of many companies in this country towards training. I think that today we are at long last beginning to make proper provision for the future.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, the noble Lord gave a very disturbing reply to my noble friend when he said that someone will have to make some arrangements. What precisely did he mean? Who will make the arrangements? What arrangements will be made? What part are he and his department playing in this?
Lord Young of Graffham: My Lords, the arrangements will have to be made by the engineering industry on its own account. It is the engineering industry which has been responsible for the Engineering Industry Training Board and which has come to my right honourable friend to suggest that the scheme be put on a voluntary basis. Those up and down the land in the engineering industry know that statutory boards have in the past led to increased bureaucracy and precious little new training. The sooner we recognise the, reality of the situation, the better.
Lord Rochester: My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that one of his successors as chairman of the Manpower Services Commission and also the chairman of the Training Commission as it then was both criticised a number of non-statutory training organisations for not promoting adequate training in their sectors? Should not the Government therefore accept some responsibility for ensuring that training reaches an acceptable standard in all companies, particularly those in the engineering sector?
Lord Young of Graffham: My Lords, I suspect that I am more susceptible to flattery than the next man. I therefore gratefully accept what the noble Lord says about the activities of bodies with which I have been connected in the past. However, we must decide which is the best way to go about the matter—either through statutory boards, which have clearly failed, or voluntary boards, which are working well in many industries. At the end of the day, whether the boards are statutory or voluntary, change depends upon the attitude of those who run industry. It is that attitude which in the long run must change.
Lord Dormand of Easington: My Lords, the Secretary of State has said twice that we must face the reality of this world. Is not part of that reality the inevitability that some employers will not pay a voluntary levy and will poach employees who have been trained by other companies? I realise the problems, but is not some form of statutory levy inevitable and necessary if we are to have a successful industrial training scheme?
Lord Young of Graffham: My Lords, I fear that such a levy did not work in the past. And there is no way in which it will work in the future. There were some 17 statutory bodies when I first arrived at the Manpower Services Commission: one by one they have gone. We now have voluntary schemes. The industries support the voluntary schemes with enthusiasm whereas they supported the statutory schemes with great reluctance. However, as I fear I have already stated, at the end of the day it is a change of attitude by industry—not monitoring by external bodies or a decision to make the scheme compulsory — that is needed. I am now convinced that industry is changing.
Lord Tordoff: My Lords, does the noble Lord accept that my noble friend is not asking for statutory bodies to run these matters? Many of us accept that there was a considerable amount of bureaucracy in the days of the statutory bodies. What is asked for is a small, independent monitoring body. Does the noble Lord accept that, at a time when we are running into skill shortages in this country which put pressure on the economy and which in turn add to inflationary pressures, something along those lines might be seen to be necessary? Should not the Government take some part in this?
Lord Young of Graffham: My Lords, only this very day has the application from the Engineering Industry Training Board been received by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for
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Employment. I have no doubt at all that he will read today's Hansard. If not, I shall draw to his attention what has been said in this House. He may well consider proceeding with the idea, but, whatever the position, at the end of the day it is up to industry up and down the land to put its own house in order.
Lord Dean of Beswick: My Lords, the Secretary of State said that the statutory body that is to be disbanded failed. However, is he aware that when that body functioned under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Scanlon, there were three times as many apprentices in training in the engineering industry as there are now and in industry in general? How can he claim that to be a failure? Is he saying that there is a guarantee that the new body will achieve the figure that was achieved under the chairmanship of my noble friend?
Lord Young of Graffham: No, my Lords. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Scanlon, and to the work that he did at the Engineering Industry Training Board. But it was a different industry then and there were different requirements. It was a time when computer-controlled machines had not appeared and the whole shape of the industry was different. Today, one man does eight men's work in that industry because of the way in which modern technology works. Industry must train for the future and not consider itself hidebound by the past. It is my understanding that the Engineering Industry Training Board has voluntarily asked to be disbanded and to become a voluntary scheme. The Government have not turned it in that direction.

Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Bill
3.4 p.m.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Lyell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The PRINCIPAL DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (BARONESS SEROTA) in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [The Fair Employment Commission]:
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Blease: I rise at this stage to ask the Minister's help in connection with the Bill. I welcome the inclusion in the Bill of Clause 1(2) which contains the phrase "promoting affirmative action". That is an amendment to the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976. In his Second Reading speech, the Minister said that the Bill was a complex and comprehensive piece of legislation; indeed, he went on to say that it was one of the most comprehensive pieces of legislation to be put before the House. I think that he meant that in terms of Northern Ireland. Certainly, the amount of consultation and discussion that has been devoted to the Bill in

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another place explains the fact that it is a complex piece of legislation.
I ask the Minister's help at this stage, first, because the government amendments were not available at an early date and, secondly, because of the speed with which the Bill is being presented to the House and the days allocated for debate. I want to be more positive in what I have to say. I wish to deal with a number of other aspects; however, I should be grateful if the Minister could help us with regard to the procedural arrangements for discussion by explaining various aspects of the Bill. Naturally, we shall deal with matters on which the Government have presented amendments.
As I said, I welcome the proposal for affirmative action. I should be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee whether, among the general duties of the Fair Employment Commission, an obligation is set out in the Bill for the commission to keep its operational arrangements and procedures under review and to suggest to the Secretary of State from time to time reforms that appear wise and necessary. I do not see anywhere in the Bill an obligation and a duty on the commission to keep the operation of the legislation under review.
Lord Lyell: I should say that, if there is any confusion at the outset about the procedural arrangements for dealing with the Bill, the arrangements have been made through the usual channels. I should perhaps preface my remarks by making a slight apology in that there is a commendable amount of speed—but, I hope, not haste—in dealing with each stage of the Bill. I hope that the noble Lord will accept that the matter has been agreed through the usual channels. He will be aware that the tabling of many of the amendments, both by the Government and by his noble friends, was dependent upon negotiations that have taken place between my honourable friend the Minister and the noble Lord's honourable friend. I hope that we have managed to fulfil most of our obligations in this particular respect, ensuring that we put down the amendments as I indicated them at Second Reading.
With regard to the specific point raised by the noble Lord about the commission, the Fair Employment Agency created by Section 1 of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 will be known henceforth as "the commission." Clause 1(2) adds to the duties of the commission that of promoting affirmative action. We shall be discussing that matter in considerable detail at a later stage. It is defined, I think, in Part IV of the Bill. Certainly, if the noble Lord wishes, we shall discuss that matter, but I do not think that we should plunge immediately into a discussion about affirmative action. He has tabled an amendment in his own name.
We believe that the Fair Employment Commission is part and parcel of this programme. It has cross-party support and a great deal of support in Northern Ireland. It is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Blease, himself and all his associates with whom he has been working so illustriously through the years.
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I believe that the duties as set out in Clause 1 provide the Fair Employment Commission with the flexibility to review any of its own actions or activities as it sees fit. The Bill provides the commission with the flexibility that it feels it will need to carry out its duties, including the duties laid down in subsection (2).
Lord Monson: Before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask whether or not he agrees that there are other people to be taken into consideration besides the Government Front Bench and the Opposition Front Bench? Six days is an extraordinarily short time between Committee and Report stages, and three days is a most unusually short time between Report stage and Third Reading of a Bill. I do not understand the urgency of this matter. It is still more than two weeks, indeed almost three weeks, before this Chamber rises for the Summer Recess. Is it not possible to have a little more time between each stage?
Lord Prys-Davies: I should very much like to support the plea that the Government should have another look at the timetable for this important Bill. My noble friend Lord Blease has made a very fair point. The amendments were tabled by the Government on Friday. I was not around on Friday to see them. Many of them are not merely consequential or technical amendments, but are of considerable substance. Many of the provisions of the Bill are technical; nevertheless, they go to the substance of the Bill.
I hope that we shall have adequate time to consider the response of the Minister in the course of today's debate and that the timetable will not be rushed.
Lord Dunleath: I should like to support what the noble Lord has said. I received just 48 hours' notice that the Second Reading had been advanced from Friday to Wednesday. Most unfortunately from my point of view, I was unable to attend that debate. Similarly, the Marshalled List of amendments was not available when I telephoned last week. I obtained it only when I called in this morning.
I honestly believe that this Bill is of too much importance to be rushed through in the way in which it seems to be being hustled at the moment. I entirely support the remarks of both noble Lords who have spoken.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: I too support the last three Peers who have spoken on this point. I have great connections with Northern Ireland. I know that certain action may be for the convenience of the Government and I appreciate that point, but I believe that this Bill is too important to be rushed through.
Viscount Brookeborough: I too would like to express support for that view. Especially from the point of view of someone with as little experience as myself, I believe that it would be much better if noble Lords had more time to prepare for the discussions.
3.15 p.m.
Lord Lyell: At the outset perhaps I may offer to the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, the Latin words mea culpa. I have tried to make special arrangements for him. He has written to me and I know that he wishes to have communications sent to him in Northern Ireland. I have tried to ensure that that is done.
I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Monson, and the thoughts on this matter put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Blease and Lord Prys-Davies, as well as my noble friend Lord Brookeborough, but I had understood that the timetable had been arranged through the usual channels. Certainly a very substantial Marshalled List of amendments was available on Friday morning. The noble Lords, Lord Blease and Lord Monson, may have a point in that respect. There were a number of amendments. Indeed the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, and his noble friends may have a point in that they may have wished to see the Government's reply in respect of commitments that were given in another place.
Noble Lords opposite will be aware that those commitments were given throughout the various stages of the Bill in another place. Many of them were given at Report stage and Third Reading there. There were continual discussions outside this Chamber and the other place as regards the nature of these amendments and how the Government might fulfil the commitments given in another place at various stages of the Bill. I should have thought that two-thirds of the amendments that were available on the first Marshalled List on Friday morning were tabled in response to government commitments at various stages of discussion on the Bill in another place.
If noble Lords feel that there is a problem in this respect, I proffer my apologies; but certainly it was my understanding that all these arrangements had been made through the usual channels. As the noble Lords, Lord Prys-Davies and Lord Blease, and my noble friend Lord Brookeborough will know, the usual channels operate with a great deal of consensus. I conclude by saying that the largest number of amendments on the Marshalled List today, and indeed on the first issue of the Marshalled List, were tabled in response to commitments that we gave in another place.
Lord Blease: I thank the Minister for that explanation. However, I think that in the process of it we have lost the essence of the issue which I raised; namely, the writing into the Bill of the obligation of the Fair Employment Commission to keep its work under review and to suggest to the Secretary of State any necessary reforms. That would normally appear under the general duties imposed on any particular body at the commencement of the Bill. I fail to see it in any part of the Bill, either buried in the general text or elsewhere.
Perhaps I may ask the Minister to take that position away and clarify it for me at some later stage in the proceedings.
Lord Lyell: Perhaps I may try to do that right now. If the noble Lord will look at page 7 of the Bill he will see in Clause 10:
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"It shall be the duty of the Commission to identify and keep under review patterns and trends of employment".
I think that that is the main thrust of what we are discussing today, what we have been discussing before and what I hope we shall be discussing again. That is my first parry today to the noble Lord. If there is anything more in the queries that he has raised, I shall certainly look into the matter. However, if he looks at Clause 10, to which we shall refer at a later stage and which we shall be able to discuss then, he will see that that provides a fair basis for the commission to act. I hope that, with his knowledge, the noble Lord will accept that.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3 [The President]:
Lord Prys-Davies Lord Prys-Davies moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 2, line 22, leave out ("Department") and insert ("Lord Chancellor").
The noble Lord said: Perhaps it will be for the convenience of the Committee if I speak to Amendments Nos. 2, 3 and 4. These amendments would remove the power of appointment of the president of the tribunal—a very powerful office indeed, operating in a sensitive area of policy—from the Department of Economic Development and vest it in the Lord Chancellor.
There are at least two very good reasons for the amendment. First, the office of president of the tribunal is a judicial and senior appointment. It is a senior appointment because there can be no appeal from the tribunal except to the Court of Appeal, and then only on matters of law. Clearly, the president must have an unbiased, questioning approach, good judgment, and an ability to translate this complicated law so that it is fully understood by the lay members of the tribunal. We submit—and I believe that the submission is supported by most of the Peers from Northern Ireland and the political parties—that only the Lord Chancellor's Department has the necessary knowledge of the ability and experience of barristers and solicitors to make the best appointment.
There is another reason for the appointment. It is important that employers and employees, prospective employees, and Catholics and Protestants should have the fullest confidence in the independence of the president. He must not only be independent of the local Department of Economic Development but must be seen to be independent of that department. Indeed, the local department may be seen by some people in Northern Ireland as being partisan. Some people will say that its track record is not all that good. But the president of this tribunal must be seen to be independent, impartial and completely outside the influence of Ministers and civil servants.
Those are the two main reasons for this amendment. However, I should like to add that this appointment would not be without precedent. I understand that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor appoints the president of the industrial tribunals for England and Wales. That is a good

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precedent. He also makes appointments to bodies whose remit is confined to Northern Ireland. Thus, the appointment of the president of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal for Northern Ireland is made by the Lord Chancellor.
Those who were present at Second Reading will recall that I indicated that we would be moving an amendment to this effect. The noble Lord, Lord Lyell, responded sympathetically—indeed, generously. Re-reading his speech at col. 824 of Hansard of 28th June, it seemed to me that the Minister accepted that the argument was valid, but that the department would have to consult with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor before he could respond to such an amendment.
I trust that this afternoon the Minister will be able to come to the Dispatch Box and confirm that it is agreed that this important appointment be made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. I beg to move.
Lord Bonham-Carter: I should like to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. We are talking about the standing and status of the commission. That is highly relevant to the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Blease, before this discussion took place. He spoke about the status of the commission. The commission will have an extremely contentious and difficult role to play. It needs to have all the authority that the legislation can give it. The noble Lord, Lord Lyell, says that its duties are found in Clause 10; that it is to identify and keep under review patterns and trends of employment.
I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Blease, agrees with me that such a commission needs wider authority than that. It needs the authority to say whether its powers and the legislation under which it is working are sufficient for it to do the duties which are imposed on it. By the same token, if the commission is appointed by the Department of Economic Development, for precisely the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, suggested, it looks as though it is an adjunct of a department of government, whereas it should be a free-standing commission responsible to the Government. It should report not to a civil servant but to the Secretary of State, or whoever it may be.
Therefore the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, has put forward and to which I have put my name, with that of the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, and the noble Lord, Lord Blease, is highly relevant and goes to the heart of the whole business. If this commission does not have real authority and standing, it will be unable to do the exceedingly difficult job which it is asked to do. The Department of Economic Development has a specific role concerned with employment. It is meant to encourage opportunities for employment in all directions in the Province, although that role may not always coincide with the role of the commission. The commission may have to do things which, in the short term, do not lead immediately to increased employment. The roles are different. It would be
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wholly wrong if it were seen to be an adjunct of a department and not an organisation appointed by the Government and responsible to the Government.
Viscount Brookeborough: In putting forward Amendments Nos. 1 to 4 we are endeavouring to strengthen the integrity and impartiality of the Fair Employment Tribunal, especially in the eyes of employers and employees in the Province. At present it would seem to me that the powers in Clause 3 to be held by the department leave all the cards in its hand. The department appoints the president. It may accept his resignation, revoke his appointment if it thinks he is unfit, and may nominate another person should he be unavailable. In addition to that, in Clause 42(1) a Northern Ireland department may refuse to give an unqualified person any financial assistance. Subsection (2) refers to,
"financial assistance by way of grant or otherwise".
As Members of the Committee are aware, there are many people in Northern Ireland who have reservations about the impartiality of departments of government there. I do not agree with this feeling of mistrust; nevertheless, it exists. I have great admiration for the way in which various Northern Ireland departments operate in sometimes not very easy circumstances.
In the eyes of the employer, the department appoints and dismisses the very person who may be ultimately responsible for deeming it as unqualified for receiving government aid, which the department administers. I believe that this does nothing to improve the perception of integrity and impartiality of this legislation.
Clause 3(4) states:
"If, in the opinion of the Department the President is unfit to continue in office or is incapable of performing his duties, the Department may revoke his appointment".
I believe that to the layman it means that the interpretation of the word "unfit' is left to the department. It is logical therefore in his mind that, if the department does not like the decisions of the tribunal, the department can sack the president and appoint another who may carry out its own bidding. In addition, the fact that the president will be a barrister or solicitor means that any undue interference by the department will result in the perception of unacceptable interference by government in the judicial system. I therefore ask the Minister to accept that these amendments are desirable.
3.30 p.m.
Lord Dunleath: I entirely concur with what has been said. It is of cardinal importance that this position should not only be completely independent of the department and of the Government, but should be seen to be independent. Having complete confidence in the competence and impartiality of the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack and secure in the knowledge that he bears no allegiance to the Free Presbyterian Church in Ireland, whose permanent Moderator is a friend of mine and sits in two other places, I entirely support and accept that it should be up to the Lord Chancellor to make this appointment.
Lord Lyell: We are particularly grateful for the eloquence with which the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, has put his case both today and at Second Reading. This is not the first time that the suggestion has been made that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, rather than the Department of Economic Development for Northern Ireland, should have the say in this matter.
At the outset at Second Reading, I informed noble Lords that, in consultation with my noble and learned friend, we would consider the points so eloquently put forward this afternoon by both the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, and other noble Lords. I am delighted to be able to inform him, my noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, and the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, that, as a result of consultation, my noble and learned friend has agreed to take the responsibility for making this appointment.
However, there are some drafting complexities in relation to which I shall not detain the Committee this afternoon. I am afraid that we cannot effect all the wished-for changes in the Bill simply by accepting the four amendments on the Marshalled List, though I hope that at the next stage I shall have firm news for Members that my noble and learned friend has taken on board and agreed to the four amendments set out by the noble Lords who have spoken so eloquently. With that in mind, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, will agree to withdraw his amendment because it is in the Government's interest and that of the Committee that we fulfil this obligation.
If my noble friend Lord Brookeborough can wait until Clause 42, I may be able to allay his concerns. I am grateful for his thoughts on the integrity of government departments. My own department, the Department of Agriculture, will note his comments. That excellent newspaper, the Impartial Reporter, will also note the comments of my noble friend. Given that, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, and the Committee will accept that our undertaking to meet the amendment will be fulfilled as soon as possible.
Lord Prys-Davies: I am sure I speak on behalf of all noble Lords who have supported the amendment. We are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, for responding so favourably to the amendment. We are content to rely on his words so that, by the time we come to Report stage, we shall have an amendment, or a series of amendments, which will be acceptable. We rely on the words of the Minister and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 2 to 4 not moved.]
Clause 3 agreed to.
Clause 4 agreed to.
Clause 5 [Tribunal procedure.]:
Lord Blease Lord Blease moved Amendment No. 5:
Page 4, line 11, leave out ("substantial") and insert ("proven").
The noble Lord said: I wish to deal with two matters: the first is the amendment and, on the second, I invite the Minister to explain an aspect of the clause to me. Clause 5 deals with tribunal procedures. The substance of my amendment is concerned with Clause 5(5) (b) (iii) and (iv). I am particularly worried about the word "substantial" and the context in which it is placed. In my view the word "substantial" is too subjective a term to use in legislation. We are dealing here with the giving of evidence either by a complainant or someone who appears before a tribunal and is invited to give evidence. Such people could be deeply concerned about the matters on which they are providing information.
The weighing up of that type of information cannot, I believe, be wrapped up in the word "substantial". We are dealing with the essence of fear: fear in a personal situation or fear for family, friends or fellow workmates. I had thought that the word "proven" might better indentify what I was attempting to convey for insertion into the legislation. But, on reflection, perhaps the word "proven" is equally difficult to interpret, particularly in legislative terms. I shall withdraw the word "proven" and invite the Minister to consult his Northern Ireland ministerial colleagues and the parliamentary draftsmen about the removal of the word "substantial". I believe it will be difficult for tribunal members to adjudicate on these matters. They are expected to give an opinion. The clause provides various grounds upon which the tribunal may hear evidence in private if in the opinion of the tribunal, those grounds are present. That opinion will be conditioned by many aspects of the evidence and also by conditions that pertain in employment factors that occur from time to time.
I suggest to the Minister that this once again puts the onus on the tribunal to give weight to some kinds of information, evidence that cannot be weighted in terms of legislative procedure or in terms of an individual's concept of what he may be suffering. He may be suffering mental anguish. He may be in agony when he gives information against his friends or he may be suffering from fear of what may happen. It is difficult unless one is in that kind of position and knows all its aspects to assess it in any accurate manner. I ask the Minister whether, if I withdraw the amendment, he will take it away to consider rephrasing it or bringing forward an amendment of his own.
Secondly, Clause 5(3) states:
"The tribunal shall give reasons for its decisions."
Can the Minister explain how it is proposed that the tribunal shall give reasons for its decisions? Will they be publicised through Her Majesty's Stationery Office or conveyed directly to the applicant or other interested persons? Will they also be conveyed to the commission? It is not clear in what way it is proposed. It could simply be a written notice sent to the applicant without any reference to the commission which is expected to monitor the events. Also the general public could build up a consensus of how the tribunal is operating. With those remarks I shall withdraw the amendment.
The Principal Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Serota): An amendment must be before the Committee. Is the noble Lord moving his amendment?
Lord Blease: Yes, I beg to move.
Lord Lyell: The noble Lord will see that Clause 5(5) states "Without prejudice" and it will enable the tribunal to sit in private. That is the man thrust of subsection (5). I hope that the Committee will accept the fact that proceedings before the Fair Employment Tribunal will normally take place in public. However, the provision in subsection (5) gives sole discretion to the tribunal—which I am sure the noble Lord will accept contains experts in this area—to decide whether it is appropriate for evidence from any person to be heard in private session. We intend that the discretion will be exercised rarely. That is clear from the constraints which Clause 5(5) places on the tribunal's exercise of that option.
It is similar to existing arrangements for hearings before industrial tribunals in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The question of providing proof of potential for harm is an unnecessary constraint on the working of the tribunal and could itself be difficult and cause damage to business in Northern Ireland.
I am sure that the noble Lord will accept that the provision in subsection (5) is the equivalent to Article 59(7)(c) of the Industrial Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1976, with which he will be familiar, as well as to paragraph 1(5)(c) of Schedule 9 to the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.
The noble Lord raised a query about Clause 5(3) which provides that the tribunal shall give reasons for its decisions. That merely requires reasoned decisions. The registration of proof of determinations, including any publicity, will be covered by the regulations under Clause 5(2)(m).
I shall examine what the noble Lord has said. I hope that I have satisfied him as regards his concern about the words "proven" and "substantial". The whole thrust of subsection (5) relates to circumstances in which the tribunal shall sit in private.
Lord Blease: I thank the noble Lord for the manner in which he has dealt with my amendment. I shall read what he has said with great care. I also thank the Principal Deputy Chairman of Committees for her help. In my enthusiasm to get ahead with the Bill I jumped two hurdles at once. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.45 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 5 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Monson: I should like to ask the Minister one question in relation to Clause 5. He will be aware that in the Bill as originally drafted Clause 5(8)—which is now subsection (9)—provided for a
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maximum fine of £400. That was a scale 3 fine. Obviously it was the maximum which the Government thought fit and proper after due and careful deliberation.
It has been altered upwards not by one but by two stages to a staggering £2,000. That is an increase of five times. That is not all, because an additional fine of £200 per day can be imposed for each day that the requirements are not met. What has pushed the Government into altering their original judgment, which appeared to be sound enough, and raising the maximum penalty by a multiple of no less than five?
Lord Lyell: The noble Lord will be aware that subsection (9) sets out the penalties which apply following a conviction for any of the offences set out in subsection (8). A person found guilty on summary conviction of either offence is liable in the first instance to a fine. That is the maximum fine provided by Article 5 of the Fines and Penalties (Northern Ireland) Order 1984.
In addition, someone who without reasonable excuse fails to comply under Clause 5(8) becomes liable on a second or subsequent conviction to the additional fine for each day on which the failure continues after the preceding conviction. Let us not forget that these are not mere points of order. They are fairly serious offences which have already been through the commission and the tribunal. The level is a maximum but we believe that the scale set out in subsection (9) meets the requirement. We take this aspect seriously and we believe that subsection (9) meets the case in this area.
Lord Monson: I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. Having made up their minds as to what is a right and proper fine, it is unusual for the Government to raise it by a factor of five, but there we are!
Clause 5 agreed to.
Clause 6 agreed to.
Clause 7 [Code of practice for the promotion of equality of opportunity]:
Lord Blease Lord Blease rose to move Amendment No. 6:
Page 5, line 36, after ("to") insert ("advise and").
The noble Lord said: The noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, has an appointment which clashes with the Committee but I understand that he will be available shortly. I have undertaken to—
Viscount Long: I point out to the noble Lord that neither the Minister nor I were informed about the matter with an apology. We should have been informed of this intention beforehand.
Lord Blease: I apologise to the Minister and to the noble Viscount. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, informed the Chief Whip that I had undertaken to move the amendment. However,

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having made those comments I do not propose to do so.
[Amendment No. 6 not moved.]
[Amendment No. 7 not moved.]
Clause 7 agreed to.
Clauses 8 and 9 agreed to.
Clause 10 [Survey of employment etc., patterns]:
Lord Monson Lord Monson moved Amendment No. 8:
Page 7, line 20, after ("employment") insert ("and of unemployment").
The noble Lord said: The purpose of my amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, is self evident. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, is equally good; and it is probably better than mine but, unfortunately, he is not here to move his amendment so I must proceed with my own.
For the commission only to review patterns and and trends of employment might result in the emergence of a distorted and misleading picture. First, there is the danger that the public here and in Ulster may be deceived into thinking that Northern Ireland's endemic structural unemployment affects one religious group only, which of course is very far from the case.
Secondly, there is an obvious necessity to establish the truth about official unemployment statistics. For example, in the 1971 census the number of people who claimed to be unemployed on the census forms was 30 per cent. higher than the number actually registered as unemployed. That is too large a difference to be accounted for by statistical error. That suggests the existence of a very large black economy. How large is that black economy, and to what extent is it spread between the different groups in Northern Ireland? If it is larger than generally imagined and confined more to one group than another, might not the true employment patterns be different from those which are generally supposed to be the case?
Are factors such as alcoholism more prevalent among one group than another? If so, that would help to explain to some extent the unemployment patterns. To what extent does family size contribute to unemployment patterns? One academic survey suggests that families with more than five children tend on balance—and there are many individual exceptions—to be under-achievers compared with families of five children or less. To what extent will this Bill increase unemployment among certain religious and political groups? It is bound to do that, as you cannot increase employment prospects among one group without decreasing them among another; that is a mathematical impossibility. All those questions need answering. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: I should like to support Amendment No. 8 and, really for the same reasons, to support Amendment No. 9. In order to promote equality of opportunity of employment, surely the commission should be studying and analysing the up-to-date statistics of unemployment. Without that
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sort of information constantly before the commission, how can it form a view, an assessment, of what is needed and where it is needed?
It can also be said that only by studying unemployment trends can the commission assess whether or not it is achieving results. Indeed, we are constantly reminded that the 1976 Act was a relative failure because it failed to make an impact on the ratio of unemployed between Catholic and Protestant males. Therefore, we on this side of the Committee very much welcome this amendment and hope that the Government can see their way clear to accepting it.
I also agree that, if it is accepted, that will have some resource implications for the commission; but surely that is something which must be met. Therefore, I support the amendment.
Lord Bonham-Carter: I should like to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Monson. As he rightly said, and as I said on Second Reading, there are many different reasons for unemployment, some of which he mentioned. One reason—and only one—is discrimination. It is because we believe that that particular element which causes unemployment can be tackled by means of the law that the Bill is being introduced.
Of course, the effectiveness of this law must be monitored to see whether it is working. As the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, mentioned, one reason that we know that the 1976 Act did not work is because it had no impact on the differential levels of employment between Catholics and Protestants. Therefore, I believe that this amendment is constructive and helpful.
There is only one remark which I thought I heard the noble Lord, Lord Monson, make with which I disagree. I may have misheard him, but I thought he said that it was difficult to increase employment in one group without decreasing it in another. Of course, that is only if you take as fixed the level of unemployment in any given society. If the general level of unemployment goes up, you can increase employment in both groups at the same time. That is highly desirable in the Province, where levels of unemployment in all sections of society are notoriously far too high. Therefore, I am happy to support this amendment.
Lord Blease: Perhaps I may speak to Amendments Nos. 8, 9, 12 and 13. Two amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, are included in that grouping. I believe that we have overcome the earlier misunderstanding concerning my speaking to amendments on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone. As I understand it, when amendments are left they become the property of the Committee, and that resolves the situation. I thank the Deputy Chairman for her help and I am sorry to add to her burdens.
Perhaps I may say that I support what has been said in connection with unemployment. Equally, let us look at Amendment No. 9. Locations of employment and unemployment are very important. I consider that those should also be part of the information tabulated by the commission.
Lord Lyell: I believe that we have overcome the problem. I was rather startled when I did not find my noble friend in his usual place. I understand that he is at another event. Perhaps I may say to the noble Lord, Lord Blease, that as regards an apology, he will do what many of us in Northern Ireland do; that is, look at the good book. Perhaps the noble Lord will look at St. John, chapter 8, verse 7, which I use very frequently. He can disregard the part about the woman taken in adultery, but if he looks at the rest of that chapter he will find that it is particularly relevant to the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, and myself, as I attended two such events last week.
May I address myself briefly to Amendments Nos. 8, 9, 12 and 13, and to the general thrust of the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Monson. I would ask all Members of the Committee who have spoken in this debate to glance at Clause 10 because, as presently drafted, it repeats Section 11 of the 1976 Act, except that the word "commission" is substituted for "agency". The amendments moved on behalf of my noble friend Lord Mottistone and by the noble Lord, Lord Monson, would require the commission to survey patterns and trends of unemployment as well as employment in order to reveal the existence or otherwise of equality of opportunity, as well as to assist the commission in forming an opinion on such equality.
If Members of the Committee glance at paragraphs (a) and (b) of Clause 10 it can be seen that they refer to the existence or absence of equality of opportunity. That is the thrust, the main drive, of this clause and the Bill. I should like to emphasise three aspects. The crucial objective of equality of opportunity is first, to create such an opportunity in employment; secondly, to secure fair participation in employment and, thirdly, to ensure a more representative distribution of jobs between the communities. That very positive objective is what we are discussing in this clause and in the entire Bill.
The aim of the clause and the Bill is not to ensure some equality of disadvantage between both communities. That would be a negative objective and would be inequitable to both communities. It is for that reason that we take the definition of equality of opportunity in Clause 20(1). That repeats what is in Section 3 of the 1976 Act. It concentrates on employment. It does not mention unemployment. The provisions in Clause 10 properly and ideally complement the positive drive and thrust. I think it is appropriate that they should continue to do so.
We must bear in mind that employment and unemployment are not necessarily reverse images of one another. They are separate indices. The dynamics of any labour market mean that an increase in employment does not necessarily reduce unemployment. For example employment might go up as a percentage or in numbers because more jobs become available, but unemployment may well go up in numbers or as a percentage because many young persons or others come on to the job market. That can happen. At the end of the day what matters in Northern Ireland in economic and fair
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employment terms is more jobs for the Province and more representative distribution of increased employment opportunities between both communities.
Given that fundamental objective, which is shared by all members of the Committee, it is appropriate that Clause 1 should require the commission, like the Fair Employment Agency, to keep under review patterns and trends of employment. I hope that the Committee will accept the positive thrust of Clause 10 in particular of Clause 10(a) and (b), and that members of the Committee will see fit to withdraw this series of amendments.
4 p.m.
Lord Bonham-Carter: I find that to be an unsatisfactory answer. It is exactly the answer that the noble Lord's right honourable friend gave in another place. To say that it sounds better that the thrust of the Bill is in favour of employment and not unemployment and that therefore unemployment is not mentioned, is a slightly ludicrous proposition for anyone to put forward.
This is not a Bill about propaganda; it is a Bill which is intended to help deal by practical means with a situation of some importance in Northern Ireland. It may be the case in exceptional circumstances that when employment goes up, unemployment can go up at the same time, but on the whole that is less common—when employment goes up, unemployment tends to go down.
The whole basis of the Bill is argued from the fact that unemployment in the two communities in Northern Ireland is disproportionately high in the Catholic community. That is what we have to watch. That is one of the things that the commission has to watch. That is why this amendment makes sense and assists the commission in doing its job, and assists others in monitoring that the commission is doing its job effectively.
Lord Monson: I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in support of this amendment, in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, for his second intervention. I listened carefully to the Minister. He made the point that unemployment is not a mirror image of employment. Sometimes it is and sometimes it is not. To the extent that it is not, an amendment of this kind is all the more important because one cannot deduce one from the other.
I am not wholly satisfied with the Minister's answer. In some respects I should like to test the opinion of the Committee, but as no other noble Lords' names are down, I am a little hesitant to do so at this stage. It may be that when I beg leave to withdraw the amendment some noble Lords may disagree. If they stay silent, we shall leave it until the next time round, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 not moved.]
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 11:
Page 7, line 28, at end insert—
("(2) It shall also be the duty of the Commission to keep itself informed about proceedings on complaints under Part III of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976.").
The noble Lord said: I should like to speak also to Amendment No. 14. These two amendments are designed to further increase the effectiveness of provisions in the Bill in respect of individual complaints of discrimination under Part III of the 1976 Act, as amended. The purpose of these amendments is straightforward. The main thrust of the Bill is for employers to provide equality of opportunity in employment. Strong emphasis is also laid on dealing with individual complaints of discrimination. This is the complementary thrust that might be of interest to the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, and that he was looking at in a different form. It reflects the philosophy behind the Bill, which has obtained a great deal of support in this Chamber as well as throughout Northern Ireland.
These amendments are intended to cover a situation where a complaint may have been brought before the tribunal which irrespective of the outcome of the case, the evidence given, or the decision of the tribunal indicates that action could be taken by the employer to promote equality of opportunity. Provision has already been made for regulations in Clause 5(b). Clause 5(b) provides for regulations to enable the tribunal to send copies of its decisions and the relevant documentation to the commission so that the latter body can keep itself fully informed about proceedings in discrimination cases. Amendment No. 11 extends that provision and makes it a positive duty of the commission to keep itself informed about such matters.
Amendment No. 14 makes more explicit an obligation which already existed in the Bill. Clause 13(1) empowers the commission in a wide range of circumstances to inform any person of its opinion that equality of opportunity was not being afforded. It allows such a person to give a written undertaking that appropriate action would be taken to redress this situation. Amendment No. 14 now makes it explicit that one of the circumstances in which the commission may so act is that to which we have been referring; that is, where a complaint of discrimination gives rise to the commission forming an opinion that equality of opportunity could be better afforded. The two amendments are very much complementary. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: The noble Lord, Lord Lyell, has rushed us through these amendments. We shall have to study what he has told the Committee.
Amendment No. 11 places a duty on the commission to keep itself informed of tribunal proceedings. As the noble Lord has indicated, that is associated with a weakness in the definition of "indirect discrimination", but I shall not anticipate that argument at this stage. As far as it goes Amendment No. 11 is acceptable. However, I should like to ask the Minister one or two questions.
If the commission is to be given this duty, what correlative rights will the commission enjoy to
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enable it to discharge this duty? If we are imposing a new duty on the commission, then we need to know what rights are invested in the commission so that it can exercise that duty.
For example, will it have the right to receive advance notice of the cases to be heard by the tribunal? Will it have the right to the discovery of documents before the tribunal? Will it have the right to demand the notes of evidence presented to the tribunal? Will it have the right to seek advice from the tribunal? We need to know the answers to those questions. I believe the noble Lord touched on some of the answers, but not all of them.
Then we need to know what this duty means. Does it mean that the commission will be under a duty to ensure that it is represented at every hearing of the tribunal? Will it have the right to be represented if the hearing is in private—in camera? Will this additional duty be accompanied by extra resources to enable the commission to carry out this function that was not anticipated when the Bill was first published?
To the extent that this amendment meets adequately the weakness in the definition of indirect discrimination, then it is an inadequate response. The Minister explained the relationship between Amendments Nos. 11 and 14. The core of Amendment No. 14 is in paragraph (b). Paragraph (a) is virtually already in the Bill, but the other paragraph is new. It is addressing the problem that can arise when an individual case of discrimination is presented to the tribunal. The tribunal finds that it is not discriminatory within the definition contained in Clause 48, but at the same time it is satisfied that the practice or the behaviour of the employer is inconsistent with the requirements of equal oppportunity, and therefore the situation should be looked at and remedied by the employer. That is the situation that Amendment No. 14 is really addressing.
We are glad that the Government acknowledge that there is a difficult area posed by inadequacy in the definition. But we say that the best way of dealing with that problem is to refine the definition of indirect discrimination so that the problem will not arise. Our amendment to Clause 48 we shall come to later on today, and that deals with the problem. If the Government have set their face against refining the definition, then we say that the second best way of dealing with the problem is to amend Clause 49 in order to give the tribunal itself the power to attach a recommendation to its decision; namely, a recommendation that the employer should seek to remedy the practice or the behaviour complained of. I accept that that would be a compromise because it could not be enforced.
We believe that the Government's amendment, relying on a combination of Amendment No. 11 and Amendment No. 14, is the third best way and not the second best. The government solution is to give the commission the power to exercise an opinion, on the basis of the evidence presented to the tribunal that it should invite the employer to give an undertaking under Clause 12. In this situation the commission would be unable to enforce its

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undertaking. In that event it would have no choice but to fall back on the launch of a full-scale inquiry under Clause 11. We say that that is a very poor compromise.
We accept Amendment No. 11 as far as it goes, but we want to know more about the correlative rights invested in the commission. So far as it is intended to address itself to the weakness in the definition, then we say it is inadequate. The best solution would be to redefine indirect discrimination; the second best method would be to invest power in the tribunal to make a recommendation.
4.15 p.m.
Lord Lyell: I look forward to a detailed and erudite discussion on Clause 49. I meant no discourtesy to the Committee in brevity. I shall expand a little more on my opening remarks. I hope the Committee will bear with me concerning the way in which I presented my case, especially at this particular stage of the Bill. I hope that it was not in a de minimis area. I wished to provide the Committee with something to go on. The noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, has replied fairly and I shall attempt to answer most of his questions.
I believe that the noble Lord was a little concerned about the notes of evidence made by the chairman of the tribunal. The commission has no standing to require written notes of evidence made by the chairman of the tribunal. However, I believe the noble Lord will agree that it is not necessary in order to enable the commission to form an opinion, because such an opinion can be based on the reasoned decisions of the tribunal. That may be required in regulations under Clause 5(3) as well as on hearings before the tribunal. I believe that the noble Lord himself, in the light of the other profession that he practises, will recognise that it is inappropriate for the commission as a lay body to call for the notes of the legally qualified chairman of the tribunal. We believe that would inhibit the work of the chairman. In addition, it is against all precedent in this area. We also believe that it would be seen as compromising the significant judicial status as well as the independence of the tribunal for which the Bill provides. I also have in mind the four amendments moved earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies.
The noble Lord will also be aware that Clause 5 provides the enablement for the proposed Fair Employment Tribunal (Rules of Procedure) Regulations (NI) 1989. It contains express enablement for documents that can be sent to any person or body which is so specified. If Members of the Committee were to look at Clause 5(6) that will be seen on page 4 of the Bill. I shall not read it out.
We had in mind providing in the Fair Employment Tribunal (Rules of Procedure) Regulations (NI) 1989 that copies of the following documents would be sent to the commission. First, there would be the originating application; secondly, the notice of appearance by the respondent and, thirdly, the copies of decisions that will of course contain
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reasons. We believe that this series of three documents should be sufficient for any monitoring that the commission shall carry out on any individual cases.
In addition, the commission will be advising on or supporting many of the cases that go to the tribunal and will thus have access to all the documents that come into the possession of the applicant. These documents may take several forms. They may be letters, documents obtained under discovery or witness orders. The applicant will have all the documents which go to the Fair Employment Commission.
The noble Lord also referred to the commission. Under Amendment No. 14 the commission may seek a voluntary undertaking from an employer but it has no power to require an undertaking without first having undertaken an investigation under Clause 11.
Lord Prys-Davies: That is what we say is the defect in the procedure. The commission will not be entitled to ask for an undertaking which it can enforce. If an employer decides not to give an undertaking, the commission will have to launch a full-scale inquiry under Clause 12, assuming that it has the facilities and resources available to undertake that investigation there and then. If the tribunal finds an unsatisfactory state of affairs and puts out a marker about the practices of the employer to which the employer does not respond, a year will be lost before an investigation can be set in train and then completed. That is a weakness in the procedure which the Minister is asking the Committee to accept.
Lord Lyell: I do not think that it is quite the weakness the noble Lord perceives. He occupies himself in a world where legally qualified persons operate. The chairman of the tribunal will certainly be a legally qualified person. The three groups of documents which I set out should be sufficient for the commission—let alone the chairman of the tribunal—to adduce an opinion. I do not necessarily accept the point set out by the noble Lord that there would be a delay. Amendment No. 14, coupled with Amendment No. 11, will strengthen the powers of the commission as well as the powers of discovery and so on of the tribunal. That is why I believe that Amendments Nos. 11 and 14 should be, part of the Bill.
Lord Prys-Davies: Let us assume that the commission receives from the tribunal evidence which persuades the commission to exercise an opinion that it should now ask the employer for an undertaking. The employer refuses to give an undertaking. Where then does one go? What power does the commission have to persuade the employer to change his practices there and then? The commission has no power except to launch a full-scale inquiry which may take 12 months or more to conclude.
Lord Lyell: That is the main purpose of the Bill. In serious cases there should not be an instant reply.

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I do not believe that the commission should have instant access and be able to take instant action. That is why we say that there should be two separate stages. The noble Lord says that an inquiry will take up to a year. We do not necessarily believe that it will take that long. If the commission wishes to ask for an undertaking which is not forthcoming, the machinery will operate as it is set out in the Bill. We believe that that is the best way of operating.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: No Act of Parliament can be 100 per cent. foolproof, no matter how well it is drawn.
Lord Prys-Davies: The weakness flows from the inadequacy of the definition of "indirect discrimination". If the Government were to see their way clear to refining the definition, the problem would not arise. The Minister has referred to the regulations and to the contents of the regulations. Can he say whether the regulations are already in draft form and whether we may have sight of them?
Lord Lyell: I am not aware that the regulations are in draft form but I shall certainly inquire about that. The noble Lord asked about indirect discrimination. We should wait until we come to the relevant definition in the Bill of "indirect discrimination". We think that the definition given in Clause 48 is the same one that is used elsewhere. An employer in Northern Ireland will be aware of his responsibilities in this area, as indeed he will be in the area of undertakings that we are discussing at this moment. We should wait until we come to Clause 48 before we move deeply into indirect discrimination. It is not germane to the delay to which the noble Lord referred at an earlier stage.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 10, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 11 [Investigation of employment etc., practices]:
[Amendments Nos. 12 and 13 not moved.]
Clause 11 agreed to.
Clause 12 agreed to.
Clause 13 [Voluntary undertakings]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No.14:
Page 9, line 16, leave out from ("him") to end of line 18 and insert—

("(a) that, in exercising its functions under this Act, the Commission has formed the opinion that he ought to take action for promoting equality of opportunity, or

(b) that it appears to the Commission from any decision of the Tribunal in proceedings under Part III of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976, or from any evidence given in such proceedings, that he ought to take such action.").

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment earlier. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 13, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 14 agreed to.
Clause 15 [Appeal to Tribunal against directions under section 12 or 13.]:
Lord Bonham-Carter Lord Bonham-Carter moved Amendment No. 15:
Page 10, line 32, leave out ("Tribunal") and insert ("High Court").
The noble Lord said: With this amendment we return to the status of the commission and the tribunal and to their practices. We want to substitute an appeal to the High Court for one to the tribunal because we are most anxious that the commission and the tribunal should have parity of esteem. If one appeals from one body to the other, the body to which one appeals should be superior to the body which appeals. That would give the tribunal an authority and a standing more important than that of the commission. We think that that is undesirable and that is one reason why the amendment has been put forward.
However, there are other reasons why we believe this to be a reasonable amendment. The commission is subject to judicial review. The Commission for Racial Equality, which is in a similar position, has found it an impediment to its work that judicial review can be used to obstruct and delay its activities. If appeals are made direct to the High Court, this would restrict judicial review on the ground that the ultimate appeal would be to the High Court itself and therefore there would be no reason to duplicate its work.
I should like to reassure Members of the Committee that what is proposed here does not seek to infringe in any way upon the right of employers to seek judicial review. It concerns a simplifying procedure, and simplicity in the law is, I think, generally agreed to be desirable. It is also a proposal which has the support of the SACHR in Northern Ireland which recommended this course.
In general, it is more satisfactory that appeals from one tribunal do not go to another tribunal, but go to a court. It is for all those reasons—namely, the standing of the commission; the simplicity of procedure; and the obstructive way in which judicial review can be used—that I commend this amendment to the Committee.
Lord Prys-Davies: The noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, has advanced the arguments for this amendment admirably. I should only like to say in support that it is also based on the recommendation of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights in Northern Ireland which is, of course, the Government's own advisory body in this field. Therefore we are especially anxious, for the reasons which have been well advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, that the Government should look sympathetically at this amendment.
Lord Lyell: I should love to be sympathetic; indeed, I think that the noble Lords, Lord Bonham-Carter, and Lord Prys-Davies, will accept that we are now treading over familiar and very eloquent ground. However, the issue of the appropriate forum to hear appeals from employers against directions of the commission was discussed exhaustively in another place, at considerable length.

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I shall not, therefore, open my remarks this evening by going over much of that ground. The issue was raised, quite rightly, a fortnight ago by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. But, in replying to his comments, and the thoughts put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, I am afraid that I do not think I can add a great deal to what I said on that occasion, or indeed to what has already been said at the other stages of the Bill's proceedings.
It is a fact that the Government remain of the view that the respective roles of the tribunal and of the High Court as set out in the Bill are the right ones. To amplify the matter, the tribunal enforces the directions of the commission by the issue of an order of compliance and it also hears appeals against such directions, while the High Court is involved in the last piece of the enforcement machinery when it may in some circumstances exercise its contempt jurisdiction over an employer's failure to abide by an order of compliance of the tribunal.
The noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, raised the issue of the participation of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights. He is strongly of the view, in common with SACHR, that appeals should go directly to the High Court; that otherwise there will be unnecessary delays in the enforcement procedure; and that the High Court will be involved anyway in applications for judicial review. But, as the noble Lord will be aware, we have begged to differ on that issue thus far in the Bill.
We on this side of the Chamber believe that the blend of judicial expertise and—something most important in what we are discussing—practical industrial experience, which will be found in the Fair Employment Tribunal, makes the tribunal the most obvious and most appropriate body to hear appeals against commission directions. As my honourable friend explained in another place, the kind of questions which the appellate body will be required to determine will involve, for example, such issues as whether the commission's directions were, in the circumstances of the employer, reasonable, appropriate and necessary.
The determination of those issues and the three baskets into which I put them require, first, a knowledge of the detailed provisions of this legislation; secondly, and even more importantly, close practical knowledge of what actually happens in the industrial and commercial world; thirdly, knowledge of what employment practices mean in practical terms on the ground; and fourthly, knowledge of the full implications of the action which the employer is being directed to take by the commission.
I would be the last to suggest that the High Court would not be competent to deal with such issues. However, for the reasons which I have given, I wonder whether it has the right kind of expert and swift knowledge which is so necessary at this stage of the enforcement process. Moreover, unlike the tribunal, it would not have the opportunity to develop a consistency of judgment which we feel sure that the tribunal will do, with beneficial effects for all concerned.
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I must say that the Government are still of the opinion that the tribunal is the most appropriate, most reasonable and most excellent forum to hear appeals against directions of the commission. It is for that reason that I ask Members of the Committee not to accept the amendment now before us.
Lord Prys-Davies: If it is the Government's case that the High Court judge may be too divorced from the world of industry and practice, have they considered whether it would be appropriate for a High Court judge to sit with two assessors when the court is considering an appeal?
Lord Lyell: No. I hope I gave no indication that the High Court, let alone the judge, would be divorced from reality. The main tenet of my argument is that we believe that the tribunal already has the relative and relevant legal knowledge, and we felt that the combinations of that legal knowledge and status, together with the practical experience, would be the proper and the best forum to take these particular actions and that it would be best to proceed in this way. Certainly I would never suggest that the judge would be divorced from reality. It is just that we believe the tribunal is the best and most expeditious forum. Of course, the appeal function can be carried out by the tribunal. The Bill also provides a role for the High Court in the enforcement proceedings at a more appropriate stage, if necessary.
The High Court in Northern Ireland, as I am sure the noble Lords, Lord Prys-Davies, Lord Blease and Lord Bonham-Carter, will be aware, is under increasing pressure. It is for that small additional reason that I do not believe it would be in anyone's interest, especially those concerned in this area of the equality of opportunity and industrial tribunal affairs, to increase the substantial case load in the High Court; or, in doing so, to cause delays which were referred to at an earlier stage by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, in the hearing of appeals against commission directions. We believe that the tribunal will provide a satisfactory and excellent forum for appeals to be heard.
Lord Bonham-Carter: I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, said in defence of the Government's clause. I find it a rather odd argument. I say that because having argued persuasively that the tribunal was admirably equipped to deal with such cases, and indeed rather better equipped due to its industrial expertise than the High Court, he went on to say that he was the last person to suggest that the High Court was not perfectly well equipped to deal with such a case.
Therefore, the first argument is balanced: the High Court is just as well placed, according to his own argument, as the industrial tribunal; but he then falls back on the case that there would be delays. I find that a rather unsatisfactory argument. It does not tackle the first argument I put forward regarding the parity of esteem between the two bodies; namely the tribunal and the commission.

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However, in the light of what he said, and although I regret the position he has taken, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 agreed to.
Clause 16 agreed to.
Clause 17 [Failure to comply with order of Tribunal]:
[Amendment No. 16 not moved.]
Lord Monson Lord Monson moved Amendment No. 17:
Page 13, line 2, leave out ("£30,000") and insert ("£15,000").
The noble Lord said: This is a probing amendment. The £30,000 seems a quite draconian maximum fine for what, to most people, seems only a mildly heinous or possibly even a technical offence. It would hardly be recognised as a crime by most people. I have in mind, for example, a firm advertising a job vacancy in newspapers read by the community at large although the commission wished the company to target a particular group by advertising purely in newspapers read largely, or almost exclusively, by a particular group. Such a high maximum fine for such a trivial flouting of the commission's promptings seems to many people very much like overkill. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: It may be of some comfort to the Minister that once again I come to his support. We cannot support the amendments. We think it is important that the tribunal should have effective enforcement powers. It seems to us that to accept the amendment would weaken the enforcement powers of the tribunal and, to that extent, would undermine the Bill. For those reasons, we cannot go along with the amendment.
Lord Bonham-Carter: I support what the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, has said. I do not regard the offence for which this fine is the suggested punishment as a trivial one. It is very important that when the tribunal gives an order that order should be obeyed. It is very important that people should treat those orders with respect. It therefore seems to me that a fine of up to £30,000—it need not always be £30,000—gives precisely the discretion to judge between the more trivial and the more serious offences.
Lord Lyell: I wish to thank the noble Lord, Lord Monson, for the way in which he presented the amendment. He referred at the outset to what he called draconian penalties. I preface my remarks by saying that this is a maximum figure which we have in mind in Clause 17. I do not see it being used in every case: indeed, we hope that it will never need to be used.
I think that the noble Lord will understand—and it has been clearly taken on board by the noble Lords, Lord Prys-Davies, and Lord Bonham-Carter—that the Bill provides, in the event of non-compliance determined by the tribunal as a whole, that the
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president can then elect either to certify the offender to the High Court or to require the respondent to pay a monetary penalty of up to £30,000. We believe these powers—particularly the president's power to impose a penalty—to be necessary. This gives the enforcement procedure strength, it gives it a great deal of flexibility and it also gives it the benefit of immediacy. The thinking of the Government on this point originally envisaged the courts being used for enforcement purposes. However, on reflection, we became concerned that such a process might be unnecessarily protracted. For a small firm, the penalty of £30,000 would certainly not be reasonable and we do not see this penalty being used in anything but the most extreme circumstances. We believe that it is essential that a penalty for breach of these aspects of the Bill should carry a maximum sufficient to serve as a deterrent.
In the interests of equity and fairness to employers, there is provision in Clause 18(1) for appeal to the Court of Appeal on a point of law against the determination of the tribunal and provision for a separate appeal, subject to the leave of the Court of Appeal, to the Court of Appeal against the amount of the penalty. Members of the Committee will find that in subsection (3).
I make these two points in order to emphasise to the Committee that the Government are aiming for an appropriate balance in this clause as in others. In that spirit, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Monson, to reflect and possibly not to press his amendment.
Lord Monson: I did not expect to get very far with this amendment, nor indeed have I. I am grateful to the Minister for explaining that in his view it is extremely unlikely that a fine of £30,000—whether it be applied to very small firms or not—will be used. To some extent, that is reassuring. I still think that the maximum is on the high side but we shall have to see how things work out in practice. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 17 agreed to.
Clauses 18 and 19 agreed to.
Clause 20 [Meaning of "equality of opportunity"]:
4.45 p.m.
Lord Monson Lord Monson moved Amendment No. 18:
Page 15, line 24, at end insert—
("( ) For the purposes of subsection (2) above, a person is not to be treated as not having the same opportunity as another person has or would have by reason only of failing to be offered employment because he lacks a particular religious belief, affiliation or training, where such factors are of genuine relevance to the duties or context of the job in question and where the employer is a church or religious body).").
The noble Lord said: The problem which this amendment was designed to cope with was discussed, with some considerable vigour, in another place. As the Bill stands, where a job application is concerned, a religious body can express a preference for someone of its own religious persuasion only if the applicants are clergy. This is plainly ridiculous. The Government's answer was that religious bodies should not worry about the religious beliefs of their gardeners. There may be something in this, although

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one can think of at least two religious groups which would be highly offended if their gardeners brought ham sandwiches to eat in their lunch break, another religious group which would be equally offended by the presence of beef sandwiches and two or three more which would not take it at all well if their gardener brought a bottle of beer to drink with his sandwiches at lunch time, irrespective of the filling in those sandwiches.
However, we are not really talking about gardeners, but about much more central and sensitive posts, of a secretarial or managerial nature. As the Bill stands, as I interpret it, a Moslem imam would have to employ as a secretary or PA, if he (or indeed she—there is a thought!) were otherwise the best qualified person for a job, someone who was a passionate supporter of Mr. Salman Rushdie. A member of the Church of Ireland, the Methodists or the mainstream Presbyterians would have to employ fervent supporters of the Free Presbyterian Church, as indeed would a Roman Catholic Archbishop if the individual were the best qualified person for the job. Conversely, the head of the Free Presbyterian Church—who I imagine to be the honourable Member for Antrim, North—would have to employ a passionate supporter of Archbishop Lefebvre if he were the person best qualified for the job. Members of the Committee may consider this an entertaining prospect, but progressive liberal Roman Catholic bishops would also have to employ fervent supporters of Archbishop Lefebvre and that might lead to even more acrimony than in the previous example that I gave.
The problems I have posed are not fanciful ones. There has already been one case in 1984 where a Protestant church group declined to engage for a managerial post a man who happened to have been brought up a Protestant but who had allowed his faith to lapse and had become an atheist. The man who failed to get the job took action against the church under the 1976 Act and won. Any law that forces devout religious believers—whatever their particular religion may be—to employ militant atheists in sensitive positions is an ass of a law indeed. I beg to move.
Lord Blease: The Minister will be aware that out of all the various aspects of the Bill this provision on employment by religious bodies has given rise to more controversy and perhaps more misunderstanding than any other part of the Bill. I think it is important at this stage that we should do something to clear up the Bill's intention in this regard. I shall attempt to give what I consider are the arguments being presented in Northern Ireland, and to express the feeling of unhappiness that exists among many religious bodies in connection with this Bill.
At the outset I should say that I do not carry a brief for any church. I can declare my church membership. I am a member of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. As this argument also involves political parties in connection with employment, I should say that I have been a member of the Labour Party since the start of my early working life. I have
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been involved in employing people in the Labour Party. I have been a member of a parliamentary Labour Party for 11 years. I think I am able to reflect something of the general practices within the Labour Party and, I hope, those of other political parties of whose general workings I am aware.
There seems to be a misunderstanding of the Bill's intentions. In my opinion a big part of this Bill in this respect is based on the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976. Some parts of that Act have been withdrawn; they are listed in the back of the Bill. I wish to quote from the 1976 Act. Looking at the list of exclusions in the Bill, I understand that the part of the Act that I wish to quote still stands in this legislation. I shall quote from Section 37(3) of Part V of the Act which deals with excepted employments. It states:
"Parts III and IV, so far as they relate to discrimination on the ground of religious belief, shall not apply to or in relation to any employment or occupation, other than one mentioned in subsection (1), where the essential nature of the job requires it to be done by a person holding, or not holding, a particular religious belief; nor, so far as they relate to discrimination on the ground of political opinion, shall they apply to or in relation to an employment or occupation where the essential nature of the job requires it to be done by a person holding, Or not holding, a particular political opinion".
The noble Lord who moved this amendment made reference to various church organisations in Northern Ireland. I wish to quote from correspondence I have received concerning this dilemma. I have received correspondence from representatives of the two mainstream churches —that is the Protestant and Catholic Churches—but I shall quote from correspondence I received from the Presbyterian Church. I wish to read it out as I think it presents the argument more succinctly than I can at this stage. It states:
"As political parties expect or require from their employees sympathy and support for the political aims and objectives of the Party so the Churches have a right to require from their employees sympathy and support for their mission and outreach, and that this should be acceptable within the law. The Presbyterian Church feel strongly that this right should be made explicit in the legislation in a way that it has not been made explicit in the 1976 Act. An amending clause to this effect would not weaken the overall authority of the legislation. The Fair Employment legislation in the United States of America exempts the Church's work in mission and outreach, as the Church here understands it.
The Church would also expect in addition that the Minister in submitting the Bill to Parliament would direct attention to Section 37(3) of the 1976 Act, the exemption clause, explaining precisely the special position of the Church in the matter of fair employment. If the Government speak from conviction when they say that the law should not detract from the valuable work being done by Churches and Christian bodies, then there is no good reason why this work should not be protected by legislation.… The aim of the legislation is summed up in the White Paper as published and is as follows:—'Measures to promote fairness must themselves give fair treatment to all who are affected by them, or else they will fail their own test'. The Presbyterian Church hold that the proposed law could be unfair to Churches and Christian bodies.
It would be unfortunate, if not disastrous, if the Fair Employment Commission were obliged by law unilaterally to classify certain aspects of Church employment as secular, and therefore open to all applications on the basis of merit in the secular sense, while for its part the Church was sincerely convinced that such employment required religious commitment and Christian faith. It would be contrary to the whole 'merit principle' if the law forbids the taking into account of religious conviction, experience and training in cases where these are of direct relevance to the job in question".

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I have deliberately put that quotation on record because I understand that the Government are in possession of that note from the Presbyterian Church. However, I am informed that other churches are equally concerned about this matter and support the approach that has been made. I now speak of the Protestant and Catholic faiths collectively. They have stressed the point that they continue to be unhappy about the way in which the proposed legislation will apply to churches and I may add, to party political organisations in Northern Ireland.
I do not wish to table an amendment, but I ask the Minister to consider the matters that have been presented to him in the context of this amendment and the remarks that I have made. It is equally important that exceptions should apply in the realm of political organisations. I cannot for the life of me understand that the legislation would operate so that a member of the Unionist Party—I shall be blunt about this—in Northern Ireland would be obliged to employ a member of the SDLP, or even a member of the Democratic Unionist Party. That applies equally to the other political parties. I am not saying that that applies only to the Unionist Party by any means.
When the Labour Party was functioning in Northern Ireland—my noble friend Lord Fitt will understand the point I am making—it would not have considered employing even a typist who was not aware of the organisational commitments and the political aspirations of the Labour Party. I do not make those remarks specifically as regards this amendment, but I hope that the Minister will take my remarks away and examine them and bring back something that will clear the air in this respect.
Lord Dunleath: The noble Lord, Lord Monson, has raised some pertinent points. The noble Lord, Lord Blease, very nearly said what I was going to say. If one has lived and been brought up in Northern Ireland one must be conscious that one very often looks at matters from a Northern Ireland perspective. I have tried to stand back and look at this matter from the perspective of England, Scotland and Wales. I tried to transpose the situation into that context. The nearest I can come to it is to suggest the following situation.
Suppose there were fair employment legislation in Great Britain but it was based not on religious but on political affiliation. How would the chairman of the Minister's party feel if it were obligatory for him to employ a minimum number of Labour supporters in Conservative Central Office? Similarly, how would the chairman of the party of the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, feel if it were obligatory for him to employ a minimum number of Conservative supporters at Transport House? I do not think either of them would take a very favourable view.
During an interview the personnel manager might think that it would be indelicate to inquire about the political affiliation of the aspiring recruit. He would therefore say to himself, "I shall not ask a direct question; I shall ask about the applicant's background". If he discovered that the applicant's father lived in Cheltenham and was an active
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member of the Church of England, then the applicant would be a Conservative. If, by contrast, the father turned out to be a trade unionist from Tyneside, that would be easy; he would be a Labour supporter. That is the bluntness of the instrument that it is proposed should be used.
I fully appreciate that monitoring is cardinal to the Bill. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Monson, has said, it is only reasonable that just as Conservative Central Office or Transport House would want employees who were broadly sympathetic to their point of view and the objectives of management, the same would be true of the Churches.
For example, the major Roman Catholic charity of international proportions is the St. Vincent de Paul Society. It deals in very large sums of money indeed. Would Her Majesty's Government expect it to employ Protestants, perhaps even members of the Free Presbyterian Church of Ireland? It would hardly be reasonable to expect it to do so. Similarly, would the Protestant Orphan Society, the Church Missionary Society, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel—all Protestant charitable organisations—be expected to employ Roman Catholics who would not be in sympathy with their objectives? I hardly think that that is reasonable.
Therefore, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Monson, and the noble Lord, Lord Blease, have very valid points. I support the amendment.
5 p.m.
Lord Fitt: I feel that I must rise to support what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Blease. I have very vivid recollections of spending hours in Committee in 1975 debating the original Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Bill. It is depressing, after 13 years, to find that many of the elected representatives still oppose this legislation. They do so from a sense of fear. They feel that this legislation will in some way operate to the detriment of their religious supporters.
Although on the face of it this legislation is meant to take account of the great divide between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in Northern Ireland, minor wars are taking place between the different Protestant sects in Northern Ireland. I was a member of Belfast Corporation Education Committee, which at that time was responsible for appointing primary school teachers. I was a Catholic, and it did not appoint Catholic school teachers but only Protestants. There were ecclesiastical representatives on the Committee from the Presbyterians, the Methodists and the Church of Ireland. There was a great deal of canvassing by the Ministers sitting on the education committee to ensure that people of their religion got jobs in preference to members of other religions. I was in the position of being a focus for the canvassing because I did not have any personal or constituency axe to grind.
During the debate that took place prior to the enactment of the original fair employment legislation all the Unionists voiced the same arguments as they have voiced on this Bill. They have voted against this legislation. They do so

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because they feel in some way that their constituents are a little more privileged than the minority Catholic community. Undoubtedly there are firms in Northern Ireland which are situated geographically in either a Republican or Unionist district which find it well nigh impossible to employ people of a different religion. I believe that that is the situation which the Bill is primarily intended to tackle.
I believe that it would be a very foolish man who would believe that, whatever is said in this place and in another place, they can legislate people of different religions in Northern Ireland into employment in an adversarial religion. One has only to look at what will happen in Northern Ireland tomorrow and what will happen on the streets of Belfast tonight, 11th July. To illustrate how rigid religious attitudes are, the Pope may be in Rome but he will be kicked up and down a great many streets in Belfast tomorrow. A great many unpleasant things will be said about the Pope in speeches by so-called responsible elected representatives who should be wiser and should give a lead to some of their more bigoted followers.
What the noble Lord, Lord Blease, has said is quite true. There is concern in Northern Ireland among the Churches which feel that, out of spite, people will take part of this Bill to try to embarrass certain Churches and force them to take on people of a different religion.
As the Minister will know, religion is a very, very sensitive issue in Northern Ireland. He will hear a great deal about that tomorrow. Any suspicions and fears that exist on the part of the representatives of the various churches will have to be taken into account. No attempt should be made to try to impose legislation on the Churches which they would find it very difficult to deal with.
Lord Prys-Davies: Perhaps I can help. We have listened with great attention to the contributions of Members of the Committee to the debate on the amendment. It had been my impression that Section 37 of the Act was working pretty well in Northern Ireland. Can the Minister help the Committee? Does he know how well Section 37 has worked in practice? For example, has there been any application to the commission to review the exemptions under Section 37? Can he explain how Clause 20(2) will assist? It is my understanding that it will reinforce the exemption in Section 37.
The worry must be that the amendment, if it is accepted as drafted, may narrow considerably the coverage of the Bill. Can the Minister give the Committee any indication of the extent to which the amendment, if accepted, would narrow the coverage of the Bill? We want to emphasise that point because the major Churches are heavily involved in ACE schemes. Unless the Minister can reassure us, the worry must be that the extension in the terms of the amendment before the Committee will lead to a major narrowing of the coverage of the Bill.
Lord Lyell: I was about to launch into a diatribe of happiness when the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies,
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brought me down with a cold shower of reality. So far as I am aware, Section 37 is working well so far, but I shall comment later on one particular church—the Free Presbyterian Church—where there was a somewhat awkward incident a number of years ago which I hope has been resolved. I hope that what I say will indicate the great sympathy that the Government have in this area.
All Members who have spoked have drawn attention to the fact that religion is—in my belief, for the better—a great factor in Northern Ireland. One has only to be in the Province on a Sunday to see church attendance and how seriously everyone in Northern Ireland takes their profession of faith. That is something that distinguishes the Province from perhaps even my homeland of Scotland. For better or for worse, religion plays a large part in the life of everyone in Northern Ireland.
Perhaps I may thank the noble Lord, Lord Monson, for the amusing though, I hope, serious way in which he presented his amendment. I enjoyed his allusion to gardeners in sundry establishments, and to their luncheon breaks. I wonder whether he will accept that an imam would be allowed to employ a woman as a secretary, but I shall not delve into that area. As for the honourable Member for Antrim North employing one of Archbishop Lefebvre's more rabid flock, perhaps that might come about. I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Fitt, that miracles occur. Looking at some aspects of today's sports pages, he will be aware of one particular event in my homeland the results of which in October and throughout winter and spring of next year I look forward to. However, perhaps I should not be diverted too far down that particular avenue.
I wish to put on the record one or two points to reply to the serious issue that has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Monson. First, the Government's appreciation of the tremendous efforts made by churchmen and women in Northern Ireland to provide equality of opportunity in work and of their great generosity in that respect is very genuine.
The noble Lord, Lord Fitt, referred to events tonight, and above all tomorrow, in Northern Ireland. He will be aware of the annual disturbances and arguments among participants in tomorrow's marches when it it discovered that the main beneficiaries of the refreshment stalls at those events tend to a large extent to be members of the Catholic Church. I understand that at least 10 per cent. of the bands taking part are members of the Catholic Church—at least, that is my advice—so the situation in Northern Ireland may not appear as the noble Lord, Lord Fitt, always presents it. But the Government and, I believe, everyone greatly respect the efforts made by persons concerned with the Church to meet the proposals in the Bill and the efforts that everyone connected with the Church make to tackle discrimination.
The second point that we wish to emphasise, because we consider it relevant to the arguments that we adduce on this amendment, is that the public lead given by churchmen and women i n Northern Ireland of promoting equality of opportunity is of paramount importance to Northern Ireland. We

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have always stressed—I took time out at Second Reading to do so—that the promotion of equality is a collective obligation involving all responsible and farsighted organisations in society. We place the Churches in the vanguard of such organisations. They have extremely valuable and considerable influence in the Province within both communities. It is helpful to the Government when that constructive and positive influence is exercised in the courageous promotion of fair employment and equality of opportunity.
Perhaps I may turn more specifically to the amendment presented by the noble Lord, Lord Monson. First and foremost, there is nothing in the Bill, let alone the 1976 Act, which would require any Church to recruit an employee whose views, opinions or beliefs—religious or otherwise—are such that he would be unable properly to fulfil the duties of the post in question.
The second specific point that I should make at this stage is to remind noble Lords that Section 37 of the 1976 Act, which remains in force, excepts from the anti-discrimination provisions of fair employment legislation those jobs whose essential nature requires them to be done by a person holding—or perhaps not holding—a particular religious belief.
We know that arguments have been advanced for widening and broadening that exception, but the exception is a narrow one—rightly so, I think—and it does not provide any Church with the scope generally to employ only staff who belong to that Church; nor, as I have said, does it force any Church to employ a person whose religious beliefs, or religion, are such that he could not do, or felt that he could not do, a particular job when the essential nature of the job—that is the crux of the argument—requires it to be done by a person of a specific religious belief.
However, the legislation—in this case, Section 37—requires that an individual's beliefs and opinions, in so far as they are related to religion or politics, are not taken into account where they have no bearing on the performance of those duties. Quite where it comes to cutting the grass around the church or cleaning the church, I am not too sure. I have a note here which states that Mammon comes first. I do not necessarily think that members of the Church or the great Church leaders are particularly fussy about where they seek financial advice concerning the considerable sums of money available to the Church. I do not believe that there is any discrimination in seeking advice.
However, posts in any Church organisation which require the undertaking of, for example, evangelising or preaching duties will fall clearly within the scope of the exemption in Section 37. Any Church which employs staff should be clear, when drawing up a job description or considering an appointment, about whether the duties of that particular post are such that the job needs to be performed by someone of a specific religious belief.
In the debate in another place, my honourable friend said:
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"that is the current position; it has operated over the last 13 years; it relates to all churches; it applies the exemption test specifically and precisely to the job in question; and there is nothing in the new legislation which will make it more difficult to apply such a test in future".
I am pleased to let noble Lords know that, in order to give explicit guidance to the Churches in the Province on this matter, specific reference will be made to it when the new code of practice is issued later this year.
Lord Dunleath: Perhaps the Minister will forgive me if I intervene for a moment. Is he aware that the Presbyterian Church has taken legal advice about the matter and has been told that the wording of the new legislation, if taken literally by a court, could lead the Churches into considerable difficulty? I am not sure whether that point has been drawn to his notice.
Lord Lyell: If the noble Lord will be patient, I shall come to that matter in a moment, but I am grateful for his intervention.
I believe that I have so far explained why we are reluctant to widen the test and the exemption beyond the anti-discrimination provisions of the legislation.
The noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, tried to pre-empt my remarks with a particular problem about the Presbyterian Church. Our legal advice has consistently and strongly counselled against widening Section 37 of the 1976 Act. We believe that it would be exceptionally difficult to draft any exemption that would not be open to abuse by others who are less well intentioned than the Presbyterian Church.
However, I think that the key point—and it is the point that concerned the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath—is that the present exemption covers jobs, the essential nature of which is that they must be done by persons of a particular religious affiliation. I think that the onus is on any Church that employs staff to be quite clear about those aspects of its work which are very much involved with preaching and those which are not.
What the legislation requires of Church employers is clear management decisions on this point rather than the ambiguity which probably prevails at present. The fact that there have been so few difficulties with the existing legislation weakens the case for any change. I am not aware of the exact legal difficulties to which the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, referred but I shall certainly take on board the points that he made.
However, in general I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Monson, to consider that Section 37 operates in a fair and reasonable way and that the legislation that we have, especially as set out in Clause 20, should not present any difficulty to the Churches in any particular aspect. I hope that I shall not be tempted to go down the route of the imam or any of those mentioned in the more colourful examples with which I commenced my remarks. I apologise if I diverted from the central issues at the beginning of the debate but I felt that that was perhaps in accord with the tenor of the discussion on the amendment.
Lord Monson: This has been an unusually interesting debate. I turn first to the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. If I interpret him correctly, he suggested that this amendment or something similar to it but perhaps better drafted would drive a large hole through the Bill. I really do not think that that is the case. I doubt whether acceptance of this amendment would affect more than 500 or 600 people in the whole of Northern Ireland.
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Blease, Lord Dunleath and Lord Fitt, for their support and especially to the noble Lords, Lord Blease and Lord Dunleath, for pointing out that political parties may also be caught by this Bill. That is something that I had not appreciated. If that is indeed the case, perhaps I may enlarge on the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, who suggested that should this legislation apply in the United Kingdom the Labour Party would have to employ a substantial number of Conservatives, because they represent about 40 per cent. of the electorate, and the Conservative Party would have to employ probably 40 per cent. of Labour supporters in their central office and elsewhere. However it goes further than that, because in London at any rate both parties would also have to employ a certain number—a small number it is true—of National Front and Socialist Workers' Party supporters. That is possibly something to consider at the next stage of the Bill, if indeed it is the case that political parties in Northern Ireland are obliged to employ people who are totally opposed to their views.
I must say that I am only partially convinced by the Minister's contention that Clause 37 is working perfectly satisfactorily, bearing in mind the 1984 case which I cited in which a former Protestant won an action because he was refused employment by virtue of his atheism; and the Churches are certainly not convinced, as we heard from a number of noble Lords.
It hinges, I think, on the phrase "essential nature", which was repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Lyell. Of course it is perfectly possible for an efficient secretary to type letters and answer telephone calls conscientiously for someone whose religious views she utterly detests. But I suggest that the employer would be extremely uncomfortable in her presence and it would hinder the smooth functioning of the office in question.
As someone who disapproves on principle—and I mentioned it at Second Reading—of social engineering measures such as this Bill, I am tempted to leave the matter as it is because the status quo will help to make a laughing stock of the Bill as a whole. However against that one should perhaps take a more responsible view and try to get this aspect of the Bill right. In either case there is no point in trying to go any further at this stage and so for the time being I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 20 agreed to.
Clauses 21 and 22 agreed to.
Clause 23 [Employers to apply for registration]:
Lord Monson Lord Monson moved Amendment No. 19:
Page 17, line 2, leave out ("ten") and insert ("fifteen").
The noble Lord said: This is a much more low key amendment than the one that I previously moved. It is a probing amendment. Its purpose is to exclude from the scope of the Bill firms employing between 11 and 15 people. I should have liked it to have been more than a probing amendment but I fully realise that, since firms employing more than 10 people are already subject to the restrictions imposed by the 1976 Act, it is almost certainly too late to expect any reversal of policy at this stage.
I should however like to establish one point in particular that arises from the Bill. Let us suppose that in a particular region of Northern Ireland 67 per cent. of the population are Protestant and 33 per cent. are Roman Catholic; in other words the ratio is two to one. Let us also suppose that there are two firms in that region, each employing 12 people. Firm A employs nine Protestants and three Catholics, which is a slight bias in favour of Protestants. On the other hand firm B employs seven Protestants and five Catholics, which is in turn a very slight bias in favour of Catholics. Presumably the Fair Employment Commission will expect firms of that size in this area to employ as an ideal eight Protestants and four Catholics.
I should like to learn from the Minister whether the Fair Employment Commission will expect firm A automatically to replace with a Catholic the first Protestant who leaves the firm and firm B to replace with a Protestant the first Catholic who leaves, so as to retain the ideal ratio of two to one. I beg to move.
Lord Bonham-Carter: One point that the noble Lord has raised with this amendment was also apparent in some of the things he said about the previous amendment. I should be grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, when replying would clarify this point. It is my understanding of this Bill that there is no question whatsoever of quotas in it. Both in what the noble Lord, Lord Monson, said about the previous amendment and in speaking of this one he seemed to be talking in terms of quotas. That is not the thrust of the Bill. I think that it should be made absolutely and abundantly clear at this point that we are not talking about quotas but about judging and appointing people on their merit and on their merit alone, irrespective of their religion. That is my understanding of the Bill. I should be grateful if the Minister would confirm it.
Lord Lyell: At the outset I am happy to confirm exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, said. There is no question of quotas. We shall have to wait until we come to goals, timetables and so on at a later stage.
In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Monson, I must say that in framing the legislation that the Committee has before it today and considering the impact of the registration, monitoring and review obligations of employers, we gave particular regard to the position of the smaller private sector employers. Public sector employers are

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automatically registered under the Bill. The act of registration is required of private sector employers, but we take a progressive approach to that. On commencement employers with 25 or more employees will be required to register. Two years after commencement the threshold will reduce to 10 and what the noble Lord, Lord Monson, is seeking is to lift that threshold to 15.
Above all, I do not think that in Northern Ireland there would be consensus on what constitutes a small employer. What is regarded as a small employer in one region of a country, let alone in Scotland, England and Wales, may not be so regarded in another. That may also apply to various areas in Northern Ireland. It is an important consideration, because in the Province a substantial amount of employment is provided by small private sector employers. Such employment is important, in particular in specific urban and rural localities. Given the unfortunate tendency in the Province for each community to recruit its own, and for some recruitment procedures to be relatively informal and possibly casual, we think that it is all the more important that smaller private sector employers are brought progressively within the ambit of the Bill's registration, monitoring and review procedures.
I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Monson and Lord Bonham-Carter, will accept that all employers—every one of them—are under a duty not to discriminate either directly or indirectly. We think it appropriate that the registration and related duties should be phased in progressively to the private sector. For that reason, we decided to set the registration threshold initially at more than 25 employees and two years after commencement of the Act at more than 10 employees. This seems to be a reasonable and, I hope, a sensible approach. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Monson, will see it, as we do, as a sensible and reasonable approach and will not seek to press his amendment.
Lord Blease: Can I have a commitment from the Minister that he will listen to what I have said and come back at Report stage? He has given me no commitment whatsoever.
Lord Lyell: On which aspect?
Lord Blease: I made some very pointed remarks about the Government having representations made to them by the Churches. The letter indicated that there was still confusion in some areas about the application of the 1976 Act. I would welcome some indication from the noble Lord.
Lord Lyell: I shall certainly take that point on board. I was speaking to the amendment referring to smaller employers. We are not necessarily thinking of the Churches now. I apologise if I missed anything earlier. I shall certainly consider it. I have a note here to consider the point. The answer which I have been giving to the noble Lord, Lord Monson, was on Amendment No. 19. With regard to Amendment No. 18, I shall take that consideration on board.
Lord Monson: Perhaps I may first reply to the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter. He stressed that there are no formal quotas in the Bill. That is true. But "goals and timetables"—the phrase in the Bill—inevitably lead to informal quotas. If a firm is found to employ more of one group and fewer of another than the religious balance pertaining in an area of the Province indicates, the firm will be heavily leant upon, for example, to advertise job vacancies only in those newspapers read largely by members of the unrepresented group, and so on, until such an informal quota is attained. It will take longer but the end result will be the same.
The Minister has had no notice of the way in which I was going to introduce this amendment. I did not expect him to reply to my question about whether a balance will be achieved. However, I still wonder whether the two firms that I mentioned, each of which employs 12 people, would not not be pressurised to achieve a total balance in employment. However, it is a matter on which the noble Lord can write to me, or inform me about at a later stage. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.30 p.m.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 20:
Page 17, line 42, leave out ("35") and insert ("36").
The noble Lord said: For the convenience of the Committee I speak also to Amendments Nos. 21 and 22. These are purely drafting amendments which make it clear that the provisions of Clause 26—to which we shall come in a moment and which deal with the power of the commission to secure further undertakings or to issue further directions in respect of goals and timetables and which were added to the Bill during Report stage in another place—extend to the public sector as well as to the private sector. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 23, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 24 [Rectification of the register]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 21:
Page 18, line 24, leave out ("35") and insert ("36").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 24, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 25 agreed to.
Clause 26 [Certain public authorities to be treated as employers]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 22:
Page 19, line 16, leave out ("35") and insert ("36").
The noble Lord said: I spoke to the amendment earlier. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 26, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 27 [Monitoring returns]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 23:
Page 20, line 5, leave out from ("return") to end of line 19 and insert ("(in this Part of this Act referred to as a "monitoring return") in a form provided by or on behalf of the Department.
(1A) A monitoring return shall contain such information about the employees of the employer as may be prescribed.
(1B) For the purpose of enabling the composition of those applying to fill advertised vacancies for employment in Northern Ireland in any concern of a person who is a public authority for the purposes of this section to be ascertained, the employer shall include in a monitoring return such information as may be prescribed.
(2) For the purpose of enabling the composition of those applying to fill advertised vacancies for employment in Northern Ireland in any other registered concern in which more than 250 employees are employed there to be ascertained, the employer shall include in a monitoring return such information as may be prescribed; and for the purposes of this subsection where, at the beginning of or at any subsequent time in any prescribed period, more than 250 employees are employed there in the concern, that condition is to be treated as satisfied for the whole or, as the case may be, the remainder of that period.").
The noble Lord said: For the convenience of the Committee perhaps I may speak also to Amendments Nos. 52 and 53. The purpose of Amendment No. 23 is quite simple. Basically it is designed to clarify the responsibilities of those employers who are required to monitor the composition of the persons who apply for employment.
The amendment has three effects. First, it clarifies what we mean by an applicant for employment. Secondly, it extends the duty to monitor applicants to avoid evasion. Thirdly, it changes the definition of a monitoring return.
The reason behind the basic requirement to monitor applicants is straightforward, and I shall not detain the Committee on that. Monitoring of workforce composition gives a picture of the situation in the concern at the time when the return is made. However, to obtain an impression of how the employer's practices are impacting on the local community which is what will determine the future shape of his workforce—he must look at the religious composition of those who apply for employment. In order to minimise the burdens on employers, the Government are initially placing this responsibility only on the public sector and on the largest private sector employers.
Given the importance of this provision, the Committee will appreciate the necessity of ensuring that the Bill is clear about what is expected from employers in regard to monitoring applicants. In Clause 27(2) as it stands reference is made only to "those applying for employment" and no attempt is made to define the form or circumstances constituting an application. Since monitoring duties are underpinned by criminal penalties, it is important that both employers and the commission should be clear about what constitutes an application. There is an obvious danger in ambiguity and uncertainty on this important matter.
The new form of wording introduced by Amendment No. 23 makes it clear that an applicant is a person applying to fill an advertised vacancy. By virtue of the later amendments, a fairly wide
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definition will be given as to what constitutes an "advertised" vacancy; and I think that the Committee will appreciate the prudence of adding greater definition and wording to the Bill through this amendment.
However, the overall effect of the amendment, together with Amendments Nos. 52 and 53 which we shall be moving in due course and which I draw to the attention of the Committee, is to make more explicit the very important obligation on employers under this Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: The Minister described this as quite a simple amendment. In fact it is a worrying amendment. It is worrying because it limits the provisions for the monitoring of applications to those situations where the vacancies have been advertised. That is completely unacceptable to these Benches. Of course the monitoring of applications is invaluable in determining whether equality of opportunity is taking place and in assessing whether an employer should be making more efforts to attract applications from the under-represented community. But the amendment restricts the monitoring of applications to those posts which have been advertised.
To the best of my knowledge, there has been no reference anywhere up to now that one would monitor merely the replies to advertised posts. Before I look at the definition of "advertisement" in the 1976 Act, I should mention that so often in Northern Ireland recruitment is by word of mouth. That method is severely criticised in a series of reports.
I should like to ask the Minister whether to advertise a post means also a post which is advertised by word of mouth? If it does not include a post which is advertised by word of mouth, the amendment is unacceptable. We ask the department to consider the amendment again to see either that the definition of "advertisement" is adequate or that the term "advertised" is removed from the amendment.
Lord Bonham-Carter: I agree strongly with the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. I greatly appreciate and applaud the importance which the Government have attached to monitoring in matters of discrimination. If monitoring is so important in Northern Ireland, as I said on Second Reading, I wish to goodness the Government would apply the same rules to race relations legislation in this country.
The point about advertising is crucial. I should like to give the Committee an example of the importance of what the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, was saying. Years ago when I was at the Race Relations Board we found that in the BBC there were no black secretaries. That was in the 1960s. The BBC had no difficulty recruiting secretaries and never advertised appointments. When there was a vacancy the secretaries there were simply asked, "Do you know anyone who would like this job?" The secretaries were all white; so the secretaries continued to be all white. That is why advertising is absolutely crucial. The way one recruits is at the heart of all discriminatory policy.

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If a works or a firm has an unbalanced labour force, the first thing to discover is how it recruits—by advertising, through the hereditary system as used to apply in the motor car industry or by word of mouth.
It is essential that in this clause and elsewhere in the Bill we have a satisfactory answer to the relevant questions put by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies.
Baroness Seear: I should like to add a further comment. One is not concerned only with advertising by word of mouth. Some recruitment, especially where there is unemployment, is done by people dropping in when, from the point of view of the employer, there has not been any question of a job being available. Somebody on the street can come in and ask, "Is there a job?" It could not be said that the job had been advertised in any sense. It is equally important to know what happens to such people. Word of mouth is not the only way in which people get to know of vacancies.
5.45 p.m.
Lord Lyell: The question of advertising seems to have excited the Committee considerably. The Committee will see that there are further amendments—Amendments Nos. 50 and 51, I believe—with which we shall be dealing later. I wonder whether the Committee wishes me to deal with those amendments now. At the outset I can say that the definition of "advertisement" in the sense of advertising for a job is given in Section 57 of the 1976 Act. It includes every form of advertisement whether to the public or not and irrespective of whether it circulates among a small group or in the mass media, be it in newspapers, on the radio, through films or on television. Therefore, it is not a definition which will inhibit the employer in any way, either when he is seeking to attract applicants or when he is monitoring applications where he is required to do so.
The definition will be helpful both to the employer and to the commission in making it clear what constitutes an application for monitoring purposes. The Committee will see this in Section 57. We believe that that is a satisfactory definition which should be in the Bill. I hope that my explanation will assist the noble Lords, Lord Bonham-Carter and Lord Prys-Davies.
If there is any other aspect apart from advertising for a particular vacancy I shall endeavour to answer the questions. However, that is as far as I want to go concerning Amendment No. 23 and advertising.
Lord Prys-Davies: I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter. Does the Minister get the point that because the amendment is confined to advertising in publications it provides an employer with an incentive not to advertise posts? That is what we are getting at.
I have referred to Amendment No. 52. That merely refers to the definition in the 1976 Act. That Act does not include in the definition of "advertisement" the words "advertisement by word of mouth". It is a long definition. It includes advertisements in some
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permanent form, such as a document or a television advertisement so that one can produce evidence of it. Will the Minister consider either amending the amendment so that it will refer specifically to advertisement by word of mouth or else delete the word "advertised" from this amendment and from other amendments to which the Minister will be speaking at a later stage?
Lord Bonham-Carter: That would be an improvement, but it does not cover the point made by my noble friend Lady Seear. The point we are making here is that every person who applies for a job must be monitored. If that is not done one is not covering the field properly. This is a matter of some importance.
Lord Lyell: I apologise to the noble Baroness for not referring to her as I always do. I am so grateful when she takes part in our debates on Northern Ireland matters. She quite rightly raised an important point, but she mentioned somebody advertising by word of mouth. If they did that there would certainly be a record—
Baroness Seear: Those were not my—
Lord Lyell: If I may finish my sentence I shall certainly concede to the noble Baroness. I believe she had in mind people dropping in. There would be some tangible, or as the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, defined it, some permanent record for the commission to work on. In Clause 27 we are seeking each year to prepare for monitoring for the commission. I give way to the noble Baroness.
Baroness Seear: Years ago I was employed in this kind of game. In conditions of unemployment a great many people come to the door and say, "Any chance of a job?" The reason behind their coming may be because of word of mouth, advertisement or anything else. Often they are interviewed and employers keep their application in case there is a job. There is no question of the employer having taken the initiative to advertise or telling the workforce that there is a job. Frequently people come in in that way. One would be interested to know what happens to the application of a Catholic who goes uninvited—and that is my point—to a Protestant firm. I guess that in many cases those cards would be torn up. That is what we want to know.
Lord Prys-Davies: I support the point which has been made by the noble Baroness. Surely the definition must be such that it also catches the individual who takes the initiative to go knocking at a factory door and is offered employment. That also must be monitored.
Lord Lyell: I shall return to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. However, I am trying to take on board the point made by the noble Baroness. I have just received advice which may be of use to her. I stress the fact that people dropping in, looking for a casual vacancy, would make an application in a permanent form. That would be of

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interest to the commission. In monitoring they would ask the employer, "What are you doing about applications coming in?". I cannot see how the employer can be proof against every allegation that someone came in and presented an application which was inadvertently lost. I am sure that if the commission found a deliberate policy such as the noble Baroness has hinted at—that applications had been wilfully destroyed or that there had been malpractice—it would be able to take action in that respect.
We believe that it is necessary to exclude from the duty of monitoring applicants those who have applied in the hope that there is employment but without knowledge of any such vacancy. That goes with the application. An employer can hardly write back to say that he cannot provide employment, but that he must ask the person information about himself or herself and the background, even though there is then no vacancy or any future likelihood of one.
I hope that the point made by the noble Baroness will be covered by Clause 27 and the commission will swiftly discover whether there has been deliberate malpractice by employers in respect of the type of applications to which she referred.
I am sorry that I missed the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. Perhaps he will remind me of it.
Lord Prys-Davies: Do we have the Minister's assurance that he will review the amendment in the light of the contributions which have been made in the debate? Do we have his assurance that he will look at it again?
Lord Lyell: I shall not give an assurance that I shall look at the question of advertising as raised by the noble Lord. We shall deal with that matter in respect of Amendment No. 50. However, I take note of what has been said. I can give no assurances tonight, but I shall take the matter on board. If the noble Lord and the noble Baroness wish to raise it at a later stage we may then be a little further forward. However, I shall give no assurances tonight.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 24:
Page 20, leave out lines 38 to 42 and insert ("in the case of each year at the end of the first four months of the year").
The noble Lord said: The purpose of the amendment is simple and straightforward. The explanation is a little complicated but I shall attempt to be courteous as always to the Committee. It relates to the important issue of monitoring. One of the great advantages of the regular monitoring of returns is that the commission will be able to identify from that information the patterns and trends over time in composition and associated employment practices. But for it to be able to do so authoritatively, the information in respect of an individual concern needs to relate to a consistent and regularly repeated period of time, particularly as regards the monitoring of applicants. The amendment is designed to ensure that this happens.
The amendment has two effects. Its first effect is that returns become due each year on the same date, four months after registration or the anniversary of registration. That replaces a system under Clause 27(7), as drafted, where the first return is due four months after registration and the second return is due one year and two weeks after registration. Subsequent returns would have been due on the anniversary of the latter date.
The new system is thus simpler for employers and commission alike. It has a further useful effect. Those employers required to monitor job applicants will submit information on those applying for employment during certain periods. Under the Bill as drafted, it would take over three years from the date of registration before the commission would receive two returns each containing a full 12 months' data on applicants. By introducing the amendment we will shorten that lead time from over three years to less than two years. That will be a significant benefit to the commission. Employers will also find it easier to adjust to a system which from the outset seeks details of job applicants for a consistent period each year.
I shall give an example of an employer registering. Let us assume that he registers with the Fair Employment Commission on 1st March 1990. He is then required to monitor the composition of his workforce as it stood on 1st March 1990 and to submit his return to the commission before 30th June 1990—that is, before the four-month period has elapsed. This exercise has to be repeated in subsequent years.
We then turn to applications. The registered employer is required in his first year of registration to monitor the applications he receives between 1st March 1990 and 30th April 1990 and, as with his workforce return, to submit the results to the commission by 30th June 1990. Thus, for the first year of monitoring, the commission will receive returns in respect of applicants for a period of two months. In the second year of registration, the employer must submit to the commission, by 30th June 1991, a return in respect of applicants covering the months from 1st May 1990 to 30th April 1991, and this process is repeated in subsequent years.
Without this amendment, the tasks of both the employer and the commission would be considerably more complicated. The acquiring of consistent year on year information especially as regards applicants, would be delayed, and there would be three completely different periods of time in respect of which the commission would receive returns from employers in respect of their applicants.
There is clear advantage in trying to keep monitoring as simple as possible, for both employers and the commission: That is the basic purpose of the amendment. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 27, as amended, agreed to.
6 p.m.
Clause 28 [Regulations as to monitoring]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 25:
Page 21, leave out lines 20 to 24.
The noble Lord said: For the convenience of the Committee I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 34, 67 and 68. I believe that Members will be pleased if I do so. This group of amendments extends the Bill's existing provisions in respect of monitoring applications for employment.
These amendments arise directly from the fact, which I have already emphasised in my earlier comments, that monitoring applications for employment is an extremely important element in determining the extent to which an employer is providing equality of opportunity.
The Bill, as drafted, already contains provisions bearing on this important matter. At Clause 28(2)(c) we had provided that regulations might be made which would oblige any registered employer to keep such records as might be helpful to the commission in its inquiries into the composition of applicants. Amendment No. 25 removes that provision but only to make way for a new and more extensive scheme.
The basic rationale of the new clause is the same as for the provision it replaces. It ensures that, in the case of employers who monitor applicants, the commission will be able to check the validity of the employer's determinations; and in the case of employers who are not required to monitor applicants, the employer will be obliged to retain a data base to which the commission can gain access. When the commission, under Clause 31, is inquiring into an employer's review of practices, it will evidently be helpful if corroborative evidence is available to it. Under the new clause, regulations could, in effect, oblige all registered employers to retain in respect of job applicants all the information which they might use for monitoring, for determining the community background of individuals, and the community affiliation of individuals.
The regulations will specify the length of time for which such information is to be retained, but we may assume that it will be at least three years, so that it can be used in association with an employer's periodic review. It may be noted that these regulations will be made by the Department of Economic Development only after the commission has been consulted.
In addition, the new clause creates offences for failure to retain such information, and in connection with its deliberate falsification. Those offences are largely self-explanatory. I would only point out that the offence of failure to retain the prescribed information is amenable to a reasonable excuse defence which may be familiar to the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. If an accident of some description occurred which destroyed the information, or which made its retention impossible either in whole or in part, the commission would obviously take account of such circumstances in considering whether to bring a prosecution. The scale of the penalties, I might also point out, is consistent with that which applies to offences in other parts of the Bill. I beg to move Amendment No. 25.
Lord Prys-Davies: Amendment No. 25 is connected to Amendment No. 34, as the noble Lord,
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Lord Lyell, pointed out. It is unacceptable for the same reason that Amendment No. 23 is unacceptable; namely, because it refers to advertised vacancies. We very much welcome the emphasis on monitoring, but we fear that by insisting on the vacancies being advertised the Government are chipping away at the principle of monitoring and are therefore undermining the Bill.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Denham: Following consultations through the usual channels, I should like to move that the Committee stage be adjourned and that the House do now resume in order to take the Transport (Scotland) Bill. The Committee stage of this Bill will continue thereafter. I hope that the Committee will agree to these extraordinary measures in view of the present transport difficulties. I beg to move that the House do now resume.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

Transport (Scotland) Bill
6.6 p.m.
The Minister of State, Scottish Office (Lord Sanderson of Bowden): My Lords, I beg to move that the Report be now received.
Moved, That the Report be now received—(Lord Sanderson of Bowden.)
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: My Lords, although there are no amendments tabled at this stage of the Bill, I feel that I must take this opportunity to re-emphasise the very genuine worries expressed by a number of noble Lords in Committee. Your Lordships may remember that the noble Earl, Lord Perth, who is held in high esteem when he speaks in this House, was most uneasy about the possibility of asset stripping. The noble Lord, Lord Tordoff, speaking on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, was even more concerned that the Bill could be a charter for very lucrative asset stripping.
In Committee we discussed three related amendments together. I believe that the Minister satisfied us that, however much of a longstop it may be regarding one company buying into a number of different sections of the bus industry, at least the Monopolies and Mergers Commission exists to give some protection against multiple buying which would destroy the whole concept which the Government believe to be the basis of the Bill; namely, to encourage competition.
I believe that at least machinery exists to help if the bringing together of the bus industry got out of hand. However, I suggest that no such machinery exists to protect the public purse from asset strippers. Our amendments sought to have a longstop provided so that sale of assets—perhaps particularly lucrative city centre based parts of the bus industry in Scotland—would be referred to the Secretary of State to decide whether or not it was in the public interest to sell off the assets.
The Minister did not accept our amendment but, in fairness, he suggested a number of ways in which

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the public purse could be protected. He mentioned four examples which I shall not again go through. I had hoped that he would be in a position, following our debate, to report progress on that extremely important issue. I am aware that Committee and Report stages of this Bill are much closer together than is usual. There is nothing unconstitutional about that, but we are used to having two weekends between Committee and Report stages. Therefore I can understand that perhaps the Minister and his department have not had time to examine what was said as well as they normally would.
However, the Minister made one point which we all felt could help; namely, that the Scottish transport group had appointed property advisers to give some valuation of the property so that, on a bid for it, everybody would be aware of the value of the property involved as against the transport running side of the business. The Minister said that the Secretary of State would also be appointing a property adviser.
The purpose of my intervention is to ask the Minister whether any progress has been made in this field or whether he expects any progress will be made before we reach a further stage of the Bill. I have deliberately raised the matter again because I should like it clearly in the public domain. We are concerned about the possibility of asset stripping so that, should it happen, we will be able to alert the public to it and perhaps, in the nicest possible way, gently remind the Minister of his promises.
Lord Tordoff: My Lords, I should like to add a voice from these Benches in support of the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael. I said at the previous stage that the Minister had gone some way to reassuring us, and the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, has reiterated that point. Nevertheless, this is a serious matter and one upon which I am sure the general public wants some reassurance that public assets are not being stripped off to fill the coffers of the new undertakings, almost regardless of who their property belongs to, whether it is a management/ employee buy-out or an existing transport company.
We are asking whether the Minister can find some words that will underline what he said previously and, if possible, strengthen the safeguards that the Government believe are already built into the Bill.
The Earl of Perth: My Lords, since the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, has mentioned my name, I should like to repeat that it would be very good if the Minister could further reassure us. It might be possible to do so at a later stage. In the meantime, we have his words that the Government are going to take mighty good care that nothing goes wrong in the way of assets being sold to the loss of the public good.
Lord Sanderson of Bowden: My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have taken part in this brief exchange. The noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, expressed concern, as he did at the previous stage and as two other noble Lords have done, about the disposal of properties. The possibiliy of asset stripping was uppermost in your Lordships' minds.
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I have already assured the House in earlier proceedings that we are very much alive to the need to avoid substantial profits being made on re-sales of property after privatisation. Reference was made at the last stage of the Bill to the case of the sale of the Hampshire Bus Company to Stagecoach and the very large profit which was made by Stagecoach when it resold the Southampton bus station. I understand that such problems arose only rarely in the National Bus Company privatisation, but I assure noble Lords that we are well aware that there are no grounds for complacency in this matter. We have learned from the NBC's experience. We shall be examining, with the Scottish Transport Group, the best arrangements for the disposal of all property held by the Scottish Bus Group.
In this connection the Scottish Transport Group's property advisers—Ryden's—is currently examining the properties concerned to establish valuations and to identify those properties where there may be significant development value in an alternative use which would be higher than the value in their current bus operational use. It will also be advising on how particular properties should be dealt with at the time of sale. My right honourable friend, the Secretary of State for Scotland will also be appointing property advisers to advise him on the recommendations made with regard to the proposed treatment of properties by the STG and its advisers. The purpose of this is to ensure that all aspects of property disposals are thoroughly examined.
I cannot anticipate the details or this advice on properties, but there are clearly a number of city centre properties which will require particularly careful consideration because of their potential development value. Properties held by subsidiaries of the Scottish Bus Group which fall into this category include the bus depots on New Street, Edinburgh, and at Motherwell and Greenock. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, would like to hear about St Andrew's Square bus station, Edinburgh, and Buchanan bus station in Glasgow which are owned centrally by the Scottish Transport Group; in the latter case on land held on a long lease from Glasgow District Council. These two sites are clearly likely to have substantial development value and special arrangements will be necessary with regard to their disposal.
I remind the House that there are a number of options, to which I referred at an earlier stage, for dealing with property disposals so as to obtain satisfactory sale proceeds and avoid asset stripping. I will not repeat those options. They are on the record and clearly described. Decisions will be made on the best arrangements for the disposal of properties before companies are offered for sale. Where special treatment is to be given to particular properties which are to be included in the sale of a company, the details will be set out in the documents relating to the offer for sale of the company. All prospective purchasers will thus be bidding for a company on the same basis. Those properties which are to be sold on their own will be the subject of separate offers for sale. Alternatively, it may be appropriate for some properties to be included as part of a portfolio of properties to be sold as such.

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No detailed decisions have yet been made on these matters pending the advice of the STG's and the Secretary of State's property advisers, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, that this will not take place before the passage of the Bill through this Chamber. The general arrangements regarding the disposal of properties will be set out in the statutory disposal programme. The detailed arrangements regarding particular properties will, as I have said, be set out at the time companies are offered for sale. I have explained the arrangements regarding properties. The detailed arrangements will be decided in the light of the disposal programme made after the legislation is enacted.
As a final word of comfort to noble Lords who have taken part in this discussion, no disposals can take place without the consent of the Secretary of State. This will apply to properties, as with other assets, of the bus companies. I take very seriously the points made by all noble Lords who have spoken on this matter. It will be seen from our response that we are very alive to the dangers which can transpire if asset stripping, as it has come to be known, takes place.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: My Lords, I should like to thank the Minister for his reassuring statement. The four points which, for reasons of time, he decided not to reiterate give us as much reassurance as we could expect, given our general disagreement over the Bill.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Report received.

Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Bill
6.18 p.m.
House again in Committee on Clause 28.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 26:
Page 21, line 30, leave out from ("information") to ("for") in line 31 and insert ("to which section 29(1)(a) or (b) of this Act applies to be retained by the employer").
The noble Lord said: I also speak to Amendments Nos. 27 and 28. Amendment No. 26 arises from the provisions made for use of residuary monitoring methods involving a range of information other than that provided by direct or indirect questions.
Under Clause 28, for the purposes of monitoring either the workforce or applicants an employer may make use of a range of information which will be specified in regulations. The nature and extent of that information will be addressed in a later amendment. To understand Amendment No. 26 we need only be aware that a wide range of information will be available for an employer for the purpose of monitoring. The purpose of Amendment No. 26 is to allow regulations which could oblige an employer to retain such information for a prescribed period of time. Under Clause 31 the commission is empowered to inquire into the periodic reviews and practices which will be undertaken by an employer into his most important personnel procedures. That includes monitoring.
Therefore, we believe it is appropriate that the employer should be obliged, if required, to retain all the information on which his review and his monitoring returns are based. This will enable the commission to assess the accuracy of the return and to check the determination reached by the employer as the result of his review. The existing wording of Clause 28(2)(e) was framed when the monitoring provision made by the Bill did not expressly cover use of the residuary method and the information necessary for it. Amendment No. 26 brings the monitoring requirements more fully into line with the new provision and I recommend it to the Committee. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 27:
Page 21, line 39, leave out ("and the form of the returns").
The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment with Amendment No. 26. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: We are uneasy about Amendment No. 27 because it will remove the power of the department to fix by regulation the form in which the monitoring returns should be made. The Minister rushed through Amendments Nos. 25 and 26 and prepared to go on to Amendment No. 27. He may say that this amendment is merely of a technical nature, but it is far more important than that. If the department is not entitled to fix by regulation the form in which the returns are to be made then we on these Benches believe that opens the way for wrecking tactics.
Although the employers will still be required to submit prescribed information they will not have to submit it in a standard form. It is essential for the commission that all the employers, wherever they are in Northern Ireland, should be submitting their returns in a standard form. Otherwise it will be that much more difficult for the commission to compile and interpret the statistics and to decide whether or not we are comparing like with like.
In another area this matter has been the subject of criticism by the Comptroller and Auditor General, who has been pressing the department in certain areas to ensure that the returns are in a standardised form. I refer the Minister to the report. From these Benches we cannot go along with this amendment. We ask the Minister and his department to have a very careful look at it in the light of the report from the Comptroller and Auditor General. I cannot recall precisely the date of the report, but it has been referred to once before in the debate.
Lord Bonham-Carter: It seems to me that this is not a matter of principle but of practice. It is much simpler and more efficient if we follow the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. If a form is universally used it will be more useful and more easily monitored.
Lord Lyell: I ask the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, to look at Amendment No. 23 referred to earlier. He will see that the monitoring return will be taken on a form to be provided by the department. Amendment

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No. 23(1A) gives a broad definition of the form that will be used by the department. The information in that form and included in the return will be prescribed by regulations that we shall see fairly soon once the Bill leaves this Chamber and possibly another place. I have little more to say as regards Amendment No. 27. I shall take on board the points raised by the noble Lord concerning the Comptroller and Auditor General, but I still believe that this amendment meets the needs of monitoring and the form.
Lord Prys-Davies: I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his response. I point out that the significance of this particular amendment is that it leaves out the words "form of the returns".
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 28:
Page 21, line 44, leave out ("in the prescribed form") and insert ("does not contain the prescribed information").
The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment with Amendment No. 26. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: I shall not detain the Committee. The criticism that we have levelled at the previous amendment applies with equal force to this one.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Mottistone Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 29:
Page 22, line 5, leave out paragraph (h).
The noble Lord said: The CBI of Northern Ireland, who advised me on these matters, questioned whether Clause 28(1)(h) should be part of the Bill. It also questioned whether subsection (3)(a)(i) of that clause should be worded as it is. Accordingly, I am speaking to Amendments Nos. 29 and 32, with which are grouped Amendments Nos. 30, 31 and 33 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blease.
The CBI has advised me that the question of classifying employees by schools is getting out of hand. The original idea was to classify people by the religious affiliation implied by their primary schools. Now it seems that every school is to be classified to the dismay of some mixed secondary schools and integrated schools. Surely the whole schools' exercise is unnecessary in view of the other requirements of Clause 28. Accordingly, I suggest that subsection (2)(h) should be left out, and also that my Amendment No. 32 should be agreed to. I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Alport): I have to advise the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to, I shall be unable to call Amendments Nos. 30 and 31.
Lord Blease: I believe that we should stop for a moment and examine what we are attempting to do here. We are dealing with Clause 28 which states,
"The Department shall, by regulations made after consultation with the Commission, make provision for the purposes of section 27 of this Act. The regulations may …".
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A fair amount of this Bill is dependent on regulations being compiled, and also on the issue of a code of practice. I believe that much requires to be cleared up in the text of the Bill, if not by amendment then certainly by a considerable amount of explanation. My amendment deals particularly with the issue of collecting information from schools as regards applications for employment and how schools are listed on a document issued by the Northern Ireland department.
We have been waiting for this legislation for a number of years, and although the Committee will be detained for a certain time we should spend a few minutes contemplating what we are really doing, which might help to clear the air so far as Northern Ireland is concerned.
I shall quote from the Notes on Clauses. The notes on Clause 28 refer to paragraph (h). The notes state:
"Paragraph (h) allows the making of regulations which would require the commission to maintain a list of every school in Northern Ireland for the purposes of monitoring and to publish the list from time to time. The existing list"—
to which the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, referred—
"was published by the department in consultation with the Department of Education for Northern Ireland. The schools' list is intended as a reference document by which employers can discover whether for purposes of monitoring the school attended by an employee is categorised as Protestant or Roman Catholic or is unclassified."
The list sets out categories "P", "RC" and "unclassified".
Because most schools in Northern Ireland are attended mainly by Protestant or Catholic pupils the classification of the school can provide a sufficiently accurate guide to the community to which each employee should be treated as belonging. Since it is envisaged that monitoring exercises may be carried out by reference to different classes of schools—primary, secondary or according to the type of management—the regulations may also allow for the possibility of lists being published in respect of any particular class of school specified by the department.
That list has been sent to employers. It is a subjective list. It has been criticised by many schools and employers as it contains references to Protestant and Roman Catholic schools. They refute the subjective classification that pupils in such schools are either mainly Catholic or mainly Protestant. Some schools have a mixture of religious affiliations. The purpose of my amendments—Amendments Nos. 30, 31 and 33—is to ensure that only a classification which is known to the Department of Education, is listed by the Department of Education and which is scrutinised by auditors and by the Controller and Auditor General and others is used. It is a classification which schools themselves use. If Amendment Nos. 30 and 31 were accepted the Bill would read:
"(h) require the Commission to maintain for general guidance, a list of each school in Northern Ireland specified by the Department of Education—Northern Ireland as controlled, maintained or grant-aided, for the purposes of monitoring and to review and publish the list from time to time".

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If Amendment No. 33 were accepted the Bill would read:
"(a) where an applicant—
(i) has stated that he attended a particular primary school, being a school named in a list maintained by virtue of subsection (2)(h) above as a school attended mainly by members of a particular community".
I hope that this will make the record appear reasonable to the people of Northern Ireland who are to examine the list. It will be not an arbitrary list of schools drawn up by civil servants, draftsmen or by others in consultation with the Department of Education. The department has only three categories listed in its returns for educational purposes. That is unfair to parents who attempt to send their children to schools that cater for all and other denominations.
The Government have given considerable support to the setting up of integrated schools. I applaud that, as many noble Lords have done. I applaud them on this occasion for the support that has been given by the department and the Minister. Many schools cater for children of all religious denominations. However, in this respect the Bill is going down a road contrary to the declared object of promoting integration, understanding and harmony in the community. In this clause the Government are erecting a barrier to understanding and they are countering the objective of promoting integration, understanding and the elimination of discrimination in employment. My amendments seek to produce a better understanding of the educational needs of Northern Ireland.
Lord Prys-Davies: We have before us five amendments. Amendments Nos. 29 and 32 stand in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone. Amendments Nos. 30, 31 and 33 stand in the name of my noble friend Lord Blease. I shall deal with them in reverse order.
I have profound respect for my noble friend Lord Blease. He has served the people of Northern Ireland to the very best of his ability over many years. Those of us who are constantly on our feet in Northern Ireland debates always listen to him with great respect. I am pleased to be able to go along entirely with Amendment No. 31. It is a helpful amendment. It provides for the department to review the list of schools. That is perfectly acceptable. Oddly enough, it had not struck the civil servants or our colleagues in another place that there was a need to review the list from time to time. I am pleased to give our support to Amendment No. 31.
Amendment No. 30 seeks to modify the school's method of monitoring. It differs from the Bill in more than one respect. First, it attempts to create a less rigid classification system. The Bill refers to employers looking to the list for general guidance. However, I should have thought that experience since 1976 shows that we need more than general guidance. We need criteria which people will understand and regard as having significance. Therefore, I am uneasy about the opening words of the amendment; namely, "for general guidance". My noble friend's amendment goes on to provide for schools to be identified not by their religious status
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but by the nature of their relationship with the Department of Education. Clearly the categories suggested are to enable an employer to draw an inference because a school is a controlled school, a maintained school or a grant-aided school. However, bearing in mind the difficulties facing employers and the commission, we should have thought that direct guidance should be available to them. I believe that the clause as it stands gives that direct guidance. With the amendment we are in a grey area: this school is maintained; this school is controlled; this school is grant aided. What inference do we draw from that classification?
I believe that the amendment would include integrated schools. I know how my noble friend Lord Blease has been fully in support of such schools. We agree with him. However, perhaps I may suggest to my noble friend that it would be very surprising indeed if the published list did not take account of integrated education. I am sure that it would, because that is a growth area in Nothern Ireland and of particular significance in the context of the Bill.
Therefore, perhaps I may say to my noble friend Lord Blease that the major objection which we would have to Amendment No. 30—and I say this most kindly—is its imprecise use of language. I believe that the present version of the Bill provides a clear form of words and would leave the operation of this clause less open to challenge in the courts. We are in a difficult and sensitive area. We do not want to give people who are ill-disposed towards this legislation the opportunity to challenge the decision of the commission in the courts.
I turn now to the amendment tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone. We are glad to see that the noble Lord is now in his place. Our worry about his proposal is that this single amendment knocks out one of the principal methods of monitoring. If we are knocking out a basic method of monitoring, will that not make monitoring that much more difficult? We must look to the day when employers and the commission are doing their best to put this legislation into practice. We need to give them guidance and feed them guidelines. To knock out this particular guideline would, in my view, weaken the Bill considerably.
6.45 p.m.
Lord Lyell: Perhaps I may start by replying to my noble friend Lord Mottistone and then, while I am still on my feet, I shall include in my remarks replies to some of the relevant arguments raised by the noble Lord, Lord Blease. I mean no discourtesy to either noble Lord, but I think it would be for the pleasure and the benefit of Members of the Committee if I were to reply to this series of amendments in the form of an omnibus reply. I think it will also be for the convenience of the Committee if I do so.
So far as concerns my noble friend Lord Mottistone, I appreciate that there are aspects of monitoring which some people may find distasteful. I appreciate and understand the reluctance of such people to see the place of a person's education used as a "proxy" for perceived religious affiliation.

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However, I must urge the Committee to consider our view which is that these amendments would strike at one of the more successful methods of monitoring currently in use in the Province; namely, the attribution of perceived religious affiliation —not, I carefully draw the distinction, actual religious belief—on the basis of the name and address of the school attended. This method of monitoring is referred to in our Guide to Effective Practice as the indirect method, and it is one of the principal monitoring methods envisaged in the Bill.
First and foremost, we must consider the relative popularity and widespread use of the indirect method in both public and large private sector organisations. Secondly, the fact is that its relative popularity reflects the major advantage of this monitoring method. It is based on objective and factual information which can be checked. It is derived from the name and address of the school attended and involves classification by the employer on the basis of a list drawn up and supplied to him. Moreover, as I emphasised, it records not actual religious belief but perceived religious affiliation. The latter, in Northern Ireland terms, is an indication of community affiliation.
I appreciate, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Blease, the integrated schools' movement and its value. I also appreciate how it is growing. I am sure that we wish it well; indeed, the Government are doing everything they can to encourage, support and stimulate the growth of integrated education. But the noble Lord, Lord Blease, will, above all, I believe, be realistic about this. It will be a long time before the educational system in the Province ceases to be divided, schools for the most part being attended mainly, but not exclusively, by one side of the community or another.
While that situation continues, there is every argument for maintaining the use of the indirect method, which we have before us, as a principal method of monitoring. Monitoring returns will be submitted to the commission. That will be the locus for advice and guidance on all practical matters relating to monitoring. Therefore it is essential that the commission should have the responsibility to maintain the key schools list. Obviously the regulations may require the commission to publish the list from time to time. In doing so, the commission will be able to reflect any changes in the composition and nature of certain schools that may have taken place in the meantime. I hope that my noble friend will accept that the Bill as drafted provides the best method of monitoring in this area.
Amendment No. 31, tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blease, does not necessarily meet the objectives for which he strives. If the commission is to be required to publish the list from time to time, it will be implicit that it is reviewed and altered. In any event, Clause 28(2)(h) is only an enabling power, popular or unpopular as it may be, and certainly the detail can and will be covered by regulation.
Therefore I ask my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Blease, not to press this series of
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amendments. I say that because we believe that the concerns which they have both raised are put at rest and are certainly covered in the Bill as it stands.
Lord Kilbracken: Before my noble friend or the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, speak again, perhaps I may be allowed to voice my objection to the use of the word "community" to which the Minister referred when speaking to the last amendment. The word "community" is contained in Clause 28(3).
The noble Lord said that in Northern Ireland the words "community" and "religion" were practically interchangeable terms. That is simply not the case. The noble Lord has probably visited the Short Strand area of Belfast, as I have. It is a 98 per cent. Catholic and strongly Nationalist area. But, in that community there are Protestants. I do not suppose that they get into double figures, but there are Protestants. I remember that one of them had a fish and chip shop which was very popular; all his customers are Catholics; they go along to the chippie's. That man is most certainly a member of the community in Short Strand. It is the same all over Ireland.
I suggest to the Committee that by using the word "community" in the Bill it is proposed that members of a religious minority living somewhere like Short Strand, or in some small town or village anywhere, are not members of the same community but of a different community. I think that that is deplorable. If the Bill means "religion" then that is what it should say.
Lord Lyell: I meant no disparagement of the friends of the noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, in Short Strand, let alone anywhere else. But we are using a generally accepted term in the context of monitoring the workforce in Northern Ireland. That is the thrust of the Bill which we were discussing at an earlier stage and today—equality of opportunity in employment for everybody in Northern Ireland.
However the noble Lord knows even better than I do that Northern Ireland is a divided society. I hope that we shall not have to define that. The main thrust of the Bill, let alone the monitoring under Clause 28, is designed to see that equality of opportunity is paramount as far as is possible in employment. We mean nothing defamatory or in any way disparaging in the term "community". It is a valid method whereby employers can monitor the composition of their workforce. That is all that the word "community" means.
Lord Kilbracken: I am not suggesting that the Minister is in any way disparaging any people in the community. I am saying that he is calling them different communities. I say that they are members of the same community and should be recognised as being members of the same community. There is no question of disparagement about it. To use the word "community" in that sense is most unfortunate.
Lord Mottistone: I am speaking now to Amendment No. 29. I wish to thank my noble friend for his remarks. Naturally I shall want to read them with great care to see whether his argument satisfies my advisers and myself. I am sorry that I missed the

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earlier amendments; I warned everybody about the situation, including my noble friend the Minister. I am surprised since I wrote to my noble friend about it last week. I am very surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Blease, was not allowed to move my amendments for me; he himself had told the Public Bill Office about it. However, the amendments have gone by default. All I am saying to the Committee is that I may well have to come back to them on Report. I say this very noisily so that perhaps the Government Chief Whip may hear and be prepared to allow a little more time on Report than he might otherwise think necessary because I shall have to make up for lost ground.
I am sorry if my noble friend the Minister has not received my letter, I sent him my briefs for all the amendments in order that he might give me a reasoned reply. If he has not received them, then I hope he will take his advisers to task for not passing them on to him. The situation being what it is, I shall read the debate carefully. At this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Lyell: Before my noble friend withdraws his amendment perhaps I may convey to him my apologies. I received some very kind communications from him but I am not aware that I obtained any information. My noble friend beside me on the Front Bench will confirm, as I understand it, that we did not receive any indication that my noble friend would not be here to move his amendments earlier on.
I shall make inquiries and if I should have received a separate communication, certainly I shall apologise to my noble friend. However when I came into the Chamber I understood that my noble friend would move his amendments. I made a comment about him in his absence and he may care to read it in Hansard. It was of a jocular nature and perhaps we might take it up on another occasion. That was purely out of courtesy. I received one communication from my noble friend for which I am grateful, but I do not recall receiving information from him that he would not be present to move his amendments.
Lord Mottistone: The latter point was in the covering letter.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Blease Lord Blease moved Amendment No. 30:
Page 22, line 5, leave out from ("maintain") to ("for") in line 7 and insert ("for general guidance, a list of each school in Northern Ireland specified by the Department of Education—Northern Ireland as controlled, maintained or grant-aided").
The noble Lord said: Perhaps I may reply shortly to the Minister's remarks concerning the earlier incident when I was reprimanded for moving the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone. I have received an apology from the Government Front Bench stating that I was right and they were wrong. However, that has now gone the way of other matters and will be forgotten about.
I wish to thank the Minister for the manner in which he replied to these three amendments and particularly my noble friend on the Front Bench for
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his remarks. I always listen to his points of view with interest and great respect. I still maintain that the list is very arbitrary and that the evidence is that teachers were offended, parents were offended and employers were offended by the list and the way in which it was presented.
The Minister has indicated that the list will contain some qualification that it is set out in terms of perceived religion, if it should be widely publicised, not only to the employers, in a hole and corner method, but also to the schools concerned which have been identified on the list and the teachers concerned who are looking after the children. I shall read what the Minister has said and with those remarks I beg leave to withdraw the amendment in my name.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 31 to 33 not moved.]
Clause 28, as amended, agreed to.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 34:
After Clause 28, insert the following new clause:
("Monitoring applicants
.—(1) The Department may, by regulations made after consultation with the Commission, provide that the employer shall, for the purpose of enabling the composition of those applying to fill advertised vacancies for employment in any registered concern in Northern Ireland to be ascertained (whether or not section 27 (1B) or (2) of this Act has effect in respect of their applications), seek to obtain such information about them as may be prescribed.
(2) The regulations may—

(a) require information to which section 29(1)(a) of this Act applies to be retained by the employer for such period as may be prescribed,

(b) provide that a person who—

(i) without reasonable excuse fails to comply with such a requirement, or

(ii) knowingly gives any false information to another who is seeking to obtain information in pursuance of the regulations, or

(iii) knowingly includes any false information in any records kept in pursuance of the regulations,

is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, and

(c) make different provision for different cases.").

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment earlier. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 29 [Confidentiality of monitoring information]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 35:
Page 22, line 36, leave out from beginning to end of line 43 and insert ("This.section applies—

(a) to information about a person employed or applying for employment in a concern which might be used if any of the methods prescribed by regulations under section 28 of this Act for determining the community to which a person is to be treated as belonging for the purposes of monitoring were applied,

(b) to information as to the community to which a person employed or applying for employment in a concern is to be treated as belonging for those purposes, and

(c) to any other information from which that community might be deduced.

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(1A) If a person discloses any information which—

(a) he holds or has held in his capacity as an employee in a concern or as the employer, and

(b) is information to which this section applies or has applied").

The noble Lord said: It might be convenient to the Committee if I speak to Amendments Nos. 35 and 37 together. These two amendments in no way weaken the provisions of the Bill governing the confidentiality of information which might be used for monitoring purposes. That is a particularly important point in the context of monitoring and I wish to emphasise it at the outset.
The disclosure of any information from which the perceived religious affiliation of an identifiable individual might be determined remains an offence. But the introduction into the Bill at Report stage in another place of the provision permitting in certain circumstances the use of the residuary method of monitoring needed a recasting of the clause before us, Clause 29.
Perhaps we may briefly remind ourselves that Clause 28 allows an employer who has attempted unsuccessfully to establish the religious affiliation of an employee or an applicant by means of one of the principal methods—in other words, the schools question or the direct question—to turn to the residuary method, the method whereby he may use other information known to him about the employee or applicant to determine from which community he comes.
Such information might be, if we take one example, a home address, knowledge by indirect methods of the church attended, identity of referees or even knowledge of membership of a particular sports or social club. Members of the Committee will be aware that such information within Northern Ireland can often be used to determine pretty accurately a person's background in the community. Such information may be and in some cases is likely to be common knowledge. The fact that an employee or applicant is a prominent member of a particular church, plays a particular form of sport or engages in a particular form of social activity may well be common knowledge and not confidential. If that is so, it is important to provide a defence for anyone charged with the disclosure of such information.
Amendment No. 35 provides a defence for anyone, whether employer or employee, charged with the offence of disclosure of information from which may be deduced the community to which a person is treated as belonging for the purpose of monitoring, on the grounds that he possessed that information otherwise than in his capacity as employer or employee. In other words, it is a defence to show that such information was derived other than through the monitoring process.
I hope the Committee will find this a sensible and reasonable amendment, given the nature of the information that could be used in the residuary method of monitoring. I beg to move.
7 p.m.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Lockwood): I must remind the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 36.
Lord Mottistone: I did not hear my noble friend speak to Amendment No. 36, though I find it grouped with Amendments Nos. 35 and 37. Will he be taking that point up later?
Lord Lyell: I said I was speaking to Amendments Nos. 35 and 37. I should not wish to speak to Amendment No. 36 without having heard my noble friend move it. I think the matter would be in the hands of the Committee. I suspect the Committee would wish to hear exactly what my noble friend has to say.
Lord Mottistone: As my amendment cannot be called if the amendment of my noble friend is agreed to, I think it is only right that it should be in this group. I expected to hear something about it.
I am advised that the FEA, which currently precedes the commission, generally tells employers with whom it becomes involved that one can tell a person's religion by his or her names and by his or her address. I therefore suggest that the existing Clause 29(1)(b) is too tightly drawn. With Amendment No. 36, I seek to remove from that clause the words:
"or information held by the employer from which that fact may be deduced".
I believe it is going too far to include that sentence. Clause 29(1) is to be replaced by the provision in Amendment No. 35, but I am sorry to see that the part I want to see removed reappears as paragraph (c) of the proposed new subsection (1). So, clearly, my noble friend did not take the point in the notes I gave him on this subject. I should be most grateful if he will explain why he thinks that his proposed paragraph (c) should continue to be in the Bill.
Lord Kilbracken: I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, with the very greatest respect, that it really is not the case that it is possible to tell somebody's religion either by their name or by their address. Of course, in general terms Catholics do tend to have Irish or Celtic names, but that is very far from being a rule. One finds the most ardent Catholics, the most ardent Nationalists, with names like Nixon or Young or Walker, simply because at some stage their grandfather or their grandmother married a Catholic. They may have been brought up as Catholics but they still have completely English names. That is the position so far as the names are concerned.
Regarding the address, there are ghettos in Northern Ireland and it is most regrettable that that should be so. But in all the towns and cities living in a particular street is no indication whatsoever of one's religious faith.
Lord Mottistone: I agree with what the noble Lord says, having been many times to Northern Ireland myself. However, the FEA is always bossing

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employers. If the noble Lord had been present on Second Reading he would have heard that the main burden of the grumble of the CBI in Northern Ireland in relation to this Bill, which it otherwise supports, is that its members are treated as second-rate employers compared with the public sector employers when they would like to be treated as partners. The FEA appears to say that one can tell a person's religion by his name. This provision is a protest against that kind of bossiness, rather than against the facts of life.
Lord Blease: I shall speak to Amendment No. 37, with particular reference to Clause 29 which concerns the confidentiality of monitoring information. I should be grateful if the Minister will assure me that the Bill imposes some duty upon employers as regards the confidentiality of this monitoring information. My view is that there is a lack of responsibility on employers to maintain a register of all the persons employed by them, and as regards dealing with the information compiled and its transmission. The situation is left open to the excuse that the liability for someone obtaining employment through some under-the-counter or backdoor method should be on the employer. Only certain members of the staff or personnel involved should have access to the records and to the correspondence that is required by this part of the Bill. I hope the Minister will consider the views I am expressing. I hope he can help me by indicating how this matter will be regulated as regards the law and the courts, and as regards the obligations to employees in particular instances.
Lord Lyell: I shall first try to answer the point of my noble friend Lord Mottistone. I was grateful for the communication he sent to me but, as he will have heard, I expected him to present his own amendment as it is in his name. He has made his case, but I think his amendment would certainly weaken what we see as the important confidentiality provisions in the Bill relating to the information from which the classification of individuals for monitoring purposes is derived.
In his comments at an earlier stage of the Bill, my noble friend stated that private sector employers should not feel they were being singled out. If my noble friend looks at the Second Reading debate on the Bill, he will find that both public and private sector employers are treated on an equal footing in all parts of the Bill, including monitoring.
In taking account of the confidentiality provisions, especially of Clause 29, we think the amendment of my noble friend would not be consistent with the provisions in our amendment on Clause 29, and, specifically, the substitution of new paragraph (c) into subsection (1). That was what my noble friend was particularly concerned with.
The introduction of what we call the residuary method—I think that is a lot more refined than what my noble friend has suggested—requires a recasting of Clause 29. The residuary method can be used as a fall-back option when the principal methods have failed to provide the necessary information. It can involve, but does not have to, the use of such
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information as home address, knowledge of the church attended, the identity of referees, or even knowledge of membership of a particular sports or social club.
We accept that that may well be common knowledge. So it is important, while maintaining the confidentiality of monitoring returns, to provide a defence for an employer who reveals that overt information. That defence is provided in our own amendment to Clause 29, and it is based on the grounds that, far from bossing anyone around, the employer came into possession of that information otherwise than in his capacity as employer. In other words, it will be a defence to show that such information was derived other than through the monitoring process; but if the information is obtained in confidence, then it is treated as confidential.
The provision of this defence is an important safeguard for employers. We believe that it is necessary, equitable and sensible. The divulging of such information in certain circumstances could conceivably place certain individuals at risk. The possibility of such information being divulged could compromise the effectiveness of the monitoring exercise.
I emphasise that voluntary monitoring is already under way throughout both the public and private sectors in Northern Ireland. At an earlier stage I referred to over 450 separate organisations. I imagine that the majority are within the organisation which has advised my noble friend. They are conducting voluntary monitoring without, it seems, any problems that cannot already be resolved swiftly and effectively.
Our success in stimulating voluntary monitoring in anticipation of the statutory obligation introduced by the Bill is due in no small measure to the emphasis placed on confidentiality in the Guide to Effective Practice, and the respect which employers have shown for that confidentiality in relation to the information that they have obtained.
I understood the noble Lord, Lord Blease, to be concerned about confidentiality and how the information would be treated. I think that he will see, particularly in relation to Amendments Nos. 35 and 37, that we treat the question of confidentiality between employer and employee particularly seriously. The amendments provide what we believe is a valuable defence to employers if an employee believes that the employer has obtained information as a result of a breach of confidence.
I hope that my noble friend will accept that paragraph (c) of Amendment No. 35 is necessary because information from which a person's community can be deduced may not be known at the workplace although it is common knowledge elsewhere. The defence provided by Amendment No. 37 will not remove an employer's obligation to silence if the fact is raised by others.
I hope that that explanation has been of some help to my noble friend. I stress once again that we have no intention of bullying. In this aspect the private sector is treated as a very valuable partner with the public sector.
Lord Mottistone: I thank my noble friend for his comments.
I shall read them with care.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendment No. 36 not moved.]
7.15 p.m.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 37:
Page 23, line 8, leave out from beginning to end of line 12 and insert ("It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that he also obtained the information otherwise than in his capacity as an employee in the concern or the employer.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 29, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 30 [Periodic reviews by employers]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 38:
Page 23, line 36, leave out from ("made") to end of line 41 and insert ("towards fair participation by members of the community concerned—

(a) in employment in the concern in Northern Ireland or among those whose employment in the concern there begins after the determination, or

(b) among applicants to fill advertised vacancies for employment in the concern there.").

The noble Lord said: It may be for the convenience of the Committee if in moving Amendment No. 38 I speak also to Amendment No. 48. These two amendments are purely drafting amendments. They ensure consistency of expression in Clauses 30 and 35 with the definition of affirmative action which is given in the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: The noble Lord, Lord Lyell, has introduced two major amendments and has described them as merely drafting amendments. They are far more important than drafting amendments. Amendment No. 38, I regret to say, is another example of the Government chipping away at and eroding the existing provision in the Bill relating to the purpose of periodic reviews by employers to determine what progress has been made towards providing equality of opportunity. Far from being just a technical amendment, the amendment has worrying implications for the scope of affirmative action and of the reviews.
The amendment is unacceptable for two reasons. We have already come across this form of wording earlier in Committee. The first reason is the restriction of the review to advertised vacancies. That is to be found in paragraph (b). We have rehearsed the argument and I do not intend to take up the time of the Committee in repeating it. However, it is equally valid and applies with equal force to this amendment.
The second objection is that Clause 30(3)(b) is weakened by the substitution of the words "fair participation" for the word "composition". The composition of a workforce is something that can be measured and progress towards equality of opportunity can be measured in terms of the correspondence between the religious composition of the workforce and that of the available pool of labour. Fair participation—the term that is now
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being introduced—is a much more nebulous term. The term "fair", unless I have missed it, is left undefined in the Bill. So the concept of fair participation has no meaning in the Bill. It has no meaning except that given to it by a tribunal or a court. As a result, it has not been possible to say what any section of the Bill containing the concept means.
From our point of view this is an unsatisfactory position. We should be grateful if the Minister would have another look at the amendment in the light of the criticism which we have aimed at it.
Lord Lyell: I shall certainly take on board the points made by the noble Lord. However, I have nothing more to say this evening.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Prys-Davies Lord Prys-Davies moved Amendment No. 39:
Page 24, line 5, after ("promotion") insert ("or redundancy").
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that redundancy policies too are considered in terms of equality of opportunity. Redundancy policy can affect the structure of a firm's workforce just as much as its:'ecruitment or promotion policy. The point is particularly applicable if the employer uses affirmative action programmes in order to rectify imbalances in the workforce but is subsequently forced to make employees redundant and bases his redundancy policy on the principle of "last in, first out": his attempt over the preceding years at securing equality of opportunity may be eroded and in some cases negated.
We mentioned that problem in the Second Reading debate and the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, told the House that the Government were considering an amendment in the area of redundancy to avoid any erosion of gains towards fair participation through redundancy practices. I therefore very much hope that the Government have now given the matter further consideration and that this amendment, or an amendment along these lines, will be acceptable to them.
Lord Hylton: As I understand it, when redundancies occur, trade unions in most parts of the world—certainly in England—have generally adopted the principle of "first in, last out". We know that over the last 20 years there have been a sad number of redundancies in Northern Ireland. I should like to know whether that principle has been applied until now and whether in future the Irish trade unions operating in Northern. Ireland will abandon it in favour of conducting redundancies in such a way as to balance the composition of the workforce.
Lord Lyell: Perhaps I may deal briefly with the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord. Hylton, in a moment. When I was first instructed, I had good news for noble Lords, in that I was able to accept the amendment in principle. Unfortunately, I cannot do so tonight, but we propose to table an amendment at a later stage—at the next stage, I hope—for your

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Lordships' consideration. That amendment will address the issue of redundancy.
It may help the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, if I briefly explain that in so doing we shall follow through the reasons underlying our amendment to Clause 52 which we shall consider later. We propose to afford protection against direct and indirect discrimination where a redundancy practice is followed by an employer, first, in pursuance of affirmative action, secondly, in accordance with agreed procedure—that will be of relevance to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton—and, thirdly, where the practice does not involve the application of any condition or requirement framed by reference to religious belief or political opinion.
If those three criteria are met—namely, a redundancy scheme as part of affirmative action, a scheme that is concluded on the basis of an agreed procedure and a scheme that does not involve the application of any condition or requirement framed by reference to religious belief or political opinion—the scheme is protected from both direct and indirect discrimination, even if the proportion of employees of one community is smaller than that of another.
The purpose of our amendment will be to ensure that the progress made towards fair participation is not compromised by redundancy schemes which, for example, might result in those most recently recruited being selected first for redundancy. That is the reverse of the position that concerned the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, which I would call the "last in, first out" position. We believe that our amendment will give employers the flexibility to agree other redundancy arragements with their trade unions in order to safeguard progress which has been hard won towards fairer participation in employment by an under-represented group.
That is all that I wish to say on the subject this evening. I hope that it will be of some help to your Lordships. I am sorry that I could not accept the amendment tonight, but we shall certainly produce our own amendment at, I hope, the next stage.
Lord Prys-Davies: The Minister has been very helpful and we look forward with keen anticipation to the amendment to be tabled by the Government before we arrive at the next stage of the proceedings. I therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 30, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 31 [Enquiries by the Commission]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 40:
Page 24, line 7, at beginning insert ("The Commission may from time to time require the employer to give the Commission such information held by the employer, being information to which section 29(1)(a) or (b) of this Act applies, as the Commission may specify; but an employer who has been required on any date to give any information under this subsection shall not be required to do so again before the expiry of the period of six months beginning with that date.
(1A)").
The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 41 and 47.
These amendments have the effect of extending the powers of the commission to require the disclosure of information by the employer. The existing power hinged on the employer's having submitted a monitoring return, and extended only to information supplementing that given in the return. We have released the commission from both those constraints. In that way the amendment provides that the commission can obtain from the employer any of the information that he might use for monitoring. For example, where under the new clause inserted by Amendment No. 34 which we discussed earlier an employer who is not required to monitor applicants holds information on job applicants, the commission will be able to gain access to that database, which will be particularly important.
The second effect of Amendment No. 40 is that the commission can exercise its powers whether or not a monitoring return has been submitted under Clause 27. That is to avoid an employer who has neglected to submit a return attempting to avoid disclosing information to the commission on the legalistic point that, under the Bill as drafted, its powers came into play only following the submission of a monitoring return.
However, the commission's powers of inquiry are not totally unrestricted because, in common with its rights of inquiry conveyed by other provisions in the Bill—for example, in Clause 31(6), which noble Lords will find at the bottom of the page, and in Clause 34(5)—we have restricted it to six monthly intervals. While it is right for the commission to have extensive powers to inquire into an employer's discharging of his obligations, it seems fair to provide that the employer is not needlessly inconvenienced thereby. If the commission thinks that further action is required, powers for full investigation under Clause 11 will still be available. We believe that the amendments enhance the commission's powers in that respect. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: We are extremely worried about the last line of Amendment No. 40. The amendment restricts the right of the commission to apply for information for a second time within six months of its original application. That part of the amendment therefore restricts the ability of the employment commission to require employers to supply information. We believe that that is another example of the Government attempting to restrict the role of the commission and as such is unacceptable.
Under the Bill as drafted, after a monitoring return has been received, the Government may require the employer to produce further information. For example, the commission could ask the employer for a breakdown of the composition of the workforce by grade. The commission could then go back and seek further details, perhaps to verify or clarify the information in the original return.
Once the initial request has been made, this amendment will prevent the commission from asking for supplementary information for a further six months. We all know of cases in which the respondent produces information but the plaintiff or the claimant has to go back for further and better

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particulars of that information. This amendment would prevent the commission from going back a second time until six months had elapsed.
The Minister says, "Well, this is not all that restrictive because the commission can resort to its powers under Clause 11". What a suggestion! Why should the commission have to launch a full-scale investigation because it cannot apply to the respondent for further and better particulars? Surely that is nonsensical.
It appears to me that this amendment deliberately introduces, or could be seen deliberately to be introducing, a delaying mechanism. All the employer needs to do is to give a vague, uncertain answer and the commission cannot go back and request further and better particulars. If we are concerned that this Bill should become effective law, surely what is required is that the commission should be given every opportunity to arrive at the truth with the minimum of delay. This amendment, if acceptable to the Committee and later on to the House, will make it impossible for the commission to get at the truth within a period of six months. I very much hope that the Government will have another look at this amendment.
7.30 p.m.
Lord Lyell: I shall reply instantly. Wimbledon has finished but perhaps I may give what I could call an instant volley reply to the noble Lord. I commend the noble Lord for his forbearance and patience, and my concluding remarks will consist of little more than two sentences.
While it is right for the commission to have extensive powers to inquire into an employer's discharge of his obligations, it seems fair to provide that the employer is not needlessly inconvenienced thereby.
Finally, if the commission for any reason considers that further action is required, then it has powers of full investigation under Clause 11. There is no question of any rogue employer weakening the powers contained in Clause 31. If the noble Lord's fears were to be realised and such cases became numerous, then the commission certainly has the powers given under Clause 11. I hope that it would use them and I think that the noble Lord believes that they would use them.
Lord Bonham-Carter: The noble Lord has not really answered the point, which is that if one asks for information and receives it then often that information leads to a need for further information. That is the first point.
The second point is that there is unnecessary delay if one has to wait for six months, and employers may use the device of giving inadequate information in order to obtain a delay.
Thirdly, the way round this difficulty which the noble Lord suggests is a full investigation; but that is a draconian measure which should not be necessary since all one needs to do is to ask for further information.
Lord Lyell: In reply to the noble Lord I think that he, partly at least, makes my case. He is a little worried that the power under Clause 11 is draconian. I do not think that it is necessarily draconian. It is there, it will be used and it will bite.
In the event, the noble Lord said that there may be an employer who was deliberately seeking to annoy or delude the commission. I believe that the amendment to Clause 31, backed up by the powers in Clause 11—draconian or not, they are there to be used—will be sufficient safeguard to satisfy the noble Lord and above all to protect the commission against recalcitrant employers.
Lord Prys-Davies: With the greatest respect I must say that the Minister has not met the edge of the criticism made by the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter. Surely it is a waste of resources and undermines the legislation if the commission cannot go back with a request for further and better particulars. It is as simple as that. We do not know whether an employer is embarking upon delaying tactics. All we know is that the commission cannot come back for six months for further and better particulars.
We believe that that is totally unsatisfactory. We ask the Government to have another look at this amendment.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 41:
Page 24, line 9, leave out ("information") to end of line 13 and insert ("as to the manner in which the return was prepared as it may specify,").
The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment earlier. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 42:
Page 24, line 33, leave out from ("and") to end of line 34 and insert ("assuming the action is taken, as to tae progress towards fair participation in employment in the concern, by reference to any period or periods, that can reasonably be expected to be made by members of that community.").
The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 43, 45 and 46. I think that the Committee will be pleased. This group of four amendments is intended to deal with a technical difficulty which we have identified in Clause 31.
As presently drafted, Clause 31 obliges an employer to disclose to the commission, on request, the findings of his periodic review of employment practices, and the decisions he makes in the light of those findings. The commission must, where a review reveals that fair participation is not being afforded, make recommendations as to the sort of affirmative action that the employer should consider taking, whether or not goals and timetables are appropriate, and if so the goals and timetables he might reasonably be expected to set.
Alternatively, the employer may, of his own volition, decide on a course of affirmative action and on the setting of goals and timetables and inform the commission of his plans. In that event, the

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commission is empowered to make further enquiries about progress. But under the existing provisions if an employer decides to take affirmative action only after it has been recommended by the commission following the completion of his review, the commission is not able to use its powers of further enquiry under subsections (5) and (6) of this Clause, which are only available when an employer has made his own decisions and determinations.
The amendments that we propose are designed to remedy this anomaly by widening and broadening the commission's powers so that it may ask an employer who has taken affirmative action and set goals and timetables following a recommendation of the commission rather than entirely off his own bat, for further information about the progress that his efforts are making.
The amendments remove this anomaly by providing for a slight but useful expansion of the commission's powers. These provisions are not burdensome. They make good sense. In that spirit I commend them to the Committee. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 43:
Page 24, line 35, leave out ("under this section").
The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment earlier. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Mottistone Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 44:
Page 24, line 44, at end insert—
("( ) The Commission shall treat the disclosure by the employer as confidential until the six month expiry date has been reached or until, if earlier, the employer decides to make the disclosure public.").
The noble Lord said: This clause is an important one. Employers should be given every chance to respond to the commission and to provide the information that it clearly needs and is seeking. My amendment is designed to give employers encouragement to provide that information.
There is nothing within Clause 31 as presently drafted to state that the information when provided should be treated as confidential. Amendment No. 44 therefore proposes a new subsection to the effect that:
"The commission shall treat the disclosure by the employer as confidental until the six month expiry date has been reached or until, if earlier, the employer decides to make the disclosure public."
I should have thought it a very reasonable amendment and also rather important because, under the circumstances in Northern Ireland, every encouragement that can be given to the employers on such matters is important and this confidentiality would be such an encouragement. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: I have listened with great care to what the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, has said. However, I fear that we cannot agree to this amendment. The noble Lord has explained very clearly that, if the amendment is agreed to, it would prevent the commission from disclosing the decision of an employer to take affirmative action until a
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period of six months has elapsed or unless the employer authorises him so to do. Notwithstanding the honeyed words of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, we have a fear that it would shackle the enforcement powers of the commission and thus tend to limit its effectiveness.
Lord Lyell: I am slightly puzzled by the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Mottistone. He has moved it in his usual honeyed tones but the substance causes me some puzzlement. I am not entirely clear. I appreciate that an employer who has informed the commission of his intention to affirmative action or actions might not want the full glare of publicity focused on his efforts as they evolve. However, I wonder whether the amendment proposed by my noble friend will achieve this. Nor am I certain whether it is a desirable objective.
As the amendment stands, it applies the confidentiality rule only to a disclosure made by an employer to the commission in respect of the type of affirmative action that he proposes to take under subsection (5) of the clause. It does not apply to a similar disclosure made under subsection (6) of the clause, which relates to goals and timetables. We think that the effect of the amendment would be to prevent the commission from disclosing the actual action which the employer had decided to take, but not from disclosing the goals that he was aiming to achieve or the timescale within which he was hoping to achieve them. My noble friend would certainly have wanted to catch those two elements in his amendment. That is why it appears a little inconsistent. For that reason, my noble friend's amendment is unlikely to work with regard to the aspect to which he has drawn the Committee's attention.
Lord Mottistone: I appreciate that the amendment may not be perfect and may be placed in a wrong part of Clause 31. I shall therefore read with care what my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, have said. I shall probably come back at Report stage with a tidier amendment, which may be more acceptable to noble Lords. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendments Nos. 45 and 46:
Page 24, line 45, leave out from ("Commission") to ("the") in line 46 and insert ("a determination as to the progress towards fair participation in employment in the concern, by reference to any period, that can reasonably be expected to be made by members of a particular community").
Page 24, line 49, leave out from ("progress") to ("has") in line 1 on page 25.
The noble Lord said: I spoke to these amendments earlier. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 47:
Page 25, line 12, after ("subsections") insert ("(1)").
The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment when I dealt with Amendment No. 40. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 31, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 32 to 34 agreed to.
Clause 35 [Notices about goals and timetables]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 48:
Page 27, line 46, leave out from ("made") to end of line 4 on page 28 and insert ("towards fair participation by members of the community concerned—

(a) in employment, or any class of employment, in the concern in Northern Ireland, or

(b) among applicants to fill advertised vacancies for such employment or any class of such employment.").

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment in connection with Amendment No. 38. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: I shall not detain the Committee, but I must place on record that the objections that we have raised to the government amendments to Clause 30 apply with the same force to this amendment.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
7.45 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 35, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Mottistone: I have put down my objection to Clause 35. It seems to the employers in Northern Ireland that
Clause 35, although it is worded in the way that it is, is the legalisation of quotas by another name—quotas being preconceived ideas of how many people of a particular type should be employed, regardless of their qualifications or their past record of doing their job well in the area in which employers need to employ them.
For private industry, and for public manufacturing industry also, it is very important that people should employ only those who can do the job best so far as possible within the area of the factory, or whatever it is. This is a fundamental point. It seems to the employers of Northern Ireland that this clause will box them into a corner to employ people who are not necessarily the best for the job.
Perhaps I may ask my noble friend a question. How is an employer to meet any goals and timetables without making any decisions on the basis of religion? How does he avoid being open to a misdemeanour when he does not achieve any goals and timetables? Perhaps my noble friend can elaborate. Perhaps he will also explain how this clause is not meant to refer to quotas and, if so, how he squares that with the misgivings of the employers in Northern Ireland; and how he answers the question that I have just put.
Lord Dunleath: Further to what the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, has said, have Her Majesty's Government taken into account the number of small companies—I venture to suggest such as my own, employing some 32 people—where labour turnover is extremely low? The noble Lord would probably recognise from his experience in the Department of Agriculture in Northern Ireland that in small companies of this kind, where there is a really good relationship between management and labour, the turnover of labour is small. Therefore, opportunities to meet goals and timetables are very limited. Many
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years may pass before there arise vacancies which can be filled by persons of another religious persuasion. Indeed, when such a vacancy occurs the Bill emphasises that it should be on merit. I entirely support that. Have Her Majesty's Government taken full account of the difficulty of small companies which have a settled labour force meeting goals and timetables, as mentioned in the Bill?
Lord Monson: Further to what my noble friend Lord Dunleath has said, I wonder whether the noble Lord can explain precisely what the term "on merit" means. Does it mean purely academic qualifications? Does it mean length of service with another company? Or does it include those intangible qualities that most employers everywhere in the world look for in employees which may have nothing to do with academic qualifications and have everything to do with their good nature, their ability to get on with other people and so on and so forth?
Lord Hylton: I am inclined to think that my noble friend Lord Dunleath has a good point about small companies with a very low turnover of labour. Surely, the answer is that the goals and timetables that may be set have to be long-term and cannot be expected to come about quickly or take effect rapidly.
I ask the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, whether he would not agree that it is better to have some goals and timetables set out rather than to find ourselves in a situation where, for example, the MacBride principles which have been so hotly debated in the States, are beginning to be applied in Northern Ireland? That might be a worse state of affairs.
Lord Lyell: I start by thanking my noble friend for the way in which he has set forth his objections to Clause 35. Perhaps the best I can do for him and for the noble Lords, Lord Dunleath, Lord Hylton and Lord Monson, is to try to answer their questions. Most of the points that they are worried about should come out when I explain why we believe that we need to retain Clause 35.
Clause 35 is an essential part of the provisions made by the Bill as a whole. We all believe that its removal would considerably diminish the effectiveness of what we are trying to achieve. Secondly, we do not believe that its removal is warranted in any way.
Let us be quite clear what we mean by goals and timetables. I stress to my noble friend that they are not quotas. Goals and timetables are simply targets or benchmarks which are established by the commission and against which progress can be measured. They respresent a degree of change which good faith efforts might reasonably be expected to bring about.
The fears expressed by my noble friend on quotas are entirely different. Quotas, as he will be aware, are a fixed number of proportion of jobs which the employer is obliged to allocate to a particular group. As such the only way these quotas can be met is by reverse discrimination. The Government have totally rejected such an approach in the past. I welcome the opportunity I have tonight of doing so

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again. We shall not countenance any measures which involve reverse discrimination. We would not include it in the Bill and we would not include any provisions for goals and timetables if we thought that they would have that effect.
We believe that the clause is important because it provides the mechanism whereby the commission may, if it thinks it is appropriate, serve on an employer a notice about the progress it thinks might be made towards the achievement of fair participation in employment by members of the under-represented community. Such progress and the time within which it may be achieved are not absolutes. It is recognised that there will be circumstances which may contribute to these goals and timetables not being fulfilled. That is why the clause contains no penal provision for failure to meet a goal.
I repeat to my noble friend, as well as to other members of the Committee who have spoken, that goals are not quotas and employers will have no reason to regard them as such. But what a notice about goals and timetables will achieve is to give an employer something to focus on when he is taking affirmative action. It is difficult to envisage how a programme of affirmative action could be drawn up if it did not contain some reference to an ultimate objective. In this respect the clause provides flexibility.
The commission is empowered to make inquiries from time to time about progress. That will be helpful both to the employer and to the commission. If an affirmative action is not achieving its objectives, it obviously is in everyone's interest that the reasons for the failure should be brought to light as soon as possible. That is why the clause makes provision for penalisation in respect of inquiries by the commission into progress. It is essential that the implementation of goals should be accurately monitored.
These goals and timetables are not an end in themselves. They are an integral aspect of affirmative action and it is affirmative action which is one of the fundamental provisions of the legislation. If we take away goals and timetables that affirmative action becomes less effective. It is as simple as that. We do not think that there is any good reason for removing Clause 35. As I have explained, there are very good reasons for retaining it.
The noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, asked about merit. That will be on the basis of ability and aptitude. Goals and timetables will be related and tailored to the circumstances of each individual company, let alone the small companies with which I would be familiar in my duties dealing with the Department of Agriculture and referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath. They are a measure of expectation; that and that alone.
For the reasons that I have outlined, the Bill needs Clause 35. I hope that my noble friend Lord Mottistone will accept my arguments for its continued inclusion in the Bill.
Lord Mottistone: I am most grateful to my noble friend for his explanation. I shall read it with care and see what might happen at a later stage.
On Question, Clause 35, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 36 [Power to secure further undertakings or issue further directions]:
On Question, Whether Clause 36 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Mottistone: I am advised that in the past the FEA has happily and frequently changed the goalposts. It has often recommended action to one employer but not to another in similar circumstances. In cases where things looked in order overall, it probed until it found something wrong. I suggest that that is not the way to gain the co-operation of employers. It is feared that Clause 36 is very much a cover-all clause giving the commission more or less unlimited power to call for any other information or action that it thinks fit. For example, could the Fair Employment Commission call for an employer to conduct training for non-employees? It would seem that within the terms of Clause 36 it could. It would be nice to be reassured about that.
If that is so, probably there is a necessity for something within the clause to restrict it within the bounds of what is practicable and real. Perhaps at another stage we shall go on to that. If my noble friend can reassure me, that would be helpful.
I should not be satisfied—I do not think any noble Lord would—to hear that of course the commission would not do anything. In real life that does not always prove to be the case with official bodies, I am afraid. With the very best intentions, if they are not restrained by the legislation in any way they can exceed and have exceeded in many other areas—nothing to do with Northern Ireland—the bounds of what people, when they passed a Bill, may have thought reasonable and at a later stage think is all right. There is a need for tightening up Clause 36; I should be grateful to hear what my noble friend has to say.
Lord Lyell: I am fascinated to hear my noble friend say that he wants the clause tightened up. His amendment seeks to eliminate it. I find that curious. I wonder where my noble friend feels that he is seeing what I can only regard as bogies in Clause 36. I do not see anything in the clause, let alone in subsection (2), which would give rise to what my noble friend believes. I believe that Clause 36 stands or falls with Clause 35.
I was fascinated by what my noble friend said. Already we have found that 450 private sector organisations, many of which must be members of the CBI in Northern Ireland, do not find that Clause 36 will present them with any major problems. They are happy with, trust and get on with the Fair Employment Agency which will soon become the Fair Employment Commission.
The reason for Clause 36 is clear. It will strengthen the provisions of the Bill for goals and timetables, and will complement the procedures which we have

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set out in Clauses 30 and 31 concerning the employers' period reviews of practice and the commission's inquiry into them.
I repeat what I said earlier. Failure to meet goals is not an offence. Any such provision would turn them into quotas. Again, I stress that the keynote in the clause is flexibility. The failure which is discovered may well be due to some change in circumstances over which the employer has no control. For example, anticipated vacancies in the workforce may not have occurred or a planned expansion may not have been realised. The failure may be due to some default on the part of the employer. He may have recruited persons by means of advertisements which reached only one section of the community, or he may have used unnecessary job criteria which the under-represented section of the community found difficult to meet. Whatever the reason for the failure, Clause 35 provides the means whereby it may be discovered and Clause 36 provides the means of remedying it. For that reason, we believe that Clause 36 is an essential adjunct to Clause 35 and a useful additional weapon in the armoury of the commission. We strongly support its inclusion in the Bill.
Lord Mottistone: I am grateful to my noble friend for that explanation. I shall take advice at a later stage.
Clause 36 agreed to.
Clauses 37 to 43 agreed to.
8 p.m.
Clause 44 [Additional powers of Commission to obtain information]:
Lord Mottistone Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 49:
Page 34, line 38, leave out from ("scale") to end of line 42.
The noble Lord said: It appears that Clause 44 (4)(b) is excessively powerful by way of further punishment, and one wonders whether it is necessary. I should be grateful if my noble friend could explain why he must be so punitive when trying to obtain the co-operation of others in regard to help. I beg to move.
Lord Monson: Before the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, arrived this afternoon I expressed concern about a similar provision in Clause 5. I echo his worries about this provision in Clause 44.
Lord Lyell: As the noble Lord, Lord Monson, said, I stressed that the scale of penalties in the earlier amendment was necessary. The maximum scale I set out in the Bill is relevant and needed as a deterrent. Some penalties may appear to be draconian but they are intended to catch repeated offenders and infractions.
If the commission's powers are to be effective, they must be backed up with sanctions. So the clause provides that if the information requested by the commission is not provided by the specified time, the person from whom it was requested is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of up to £2,000. That
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may be seen as a small price to pay for withholding information from the commission, particularly if the employer felt that its disclosure was likely perhaps to deny him public sector contracts. In order to cover this contingency the Bill provides that if a person is convicted of the offence of failing to provide the information requested, and after his conviction persists in failing to provide it, he is liable on a second or subsequent conviction to a daily fine of up to £200 for each day on which his failure continues.
We believe that the scale is necessary.
We do not believe that this is an unreasonable provision. The penalties provided in this clause are appropriate to the offences created. The provisions are precisely the same as those relating to the provision of information to the commission about the manner of monitoring or the conduct of the periodic review, let alone the goals and timetables.
My reply is the same as that which I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Monson, and to my noble friend Lord Mottistone in absentia, at an earlier stage. We do not see the penalties as being regular, but we see them as a necessary deterrent against repeated offences and continual infractions.
Lord Mottistone: I thank my noble friend for that explanation which I shall read with care. I shall decide what to do at a later stage. I beg leave to wihdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 44 agreed to.
Clause 45 agreed to.
Clause 46 [Interpretation of Part II]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 50:
Page 35, line 41, at end insert—
(" 'advertised' shall be construed in accordance with the definition of "advertisement" in section 57 of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976").
The noble Lord said: I should also like to speak to Amendment No. 51. They are consequential to Amendments Nos. 23 and 34 which we discussed earlier. They introduced the concept of a job applicant being a person who applies to fill an advertised vacancy in employment. It is necessary, therefore, to be clear about what constitutes an advertised vacancy, and the purpose of these amendments is to attract the definition of "advertisement" which already exists in the 1976 Act.
The definition of "advertisement", which is given in Section 57 of the 1976 Act, is wide-ranging. It includes every form of advertisement, whether the advertisement is to the public or not, and whether it circulates among a small group, or in the mass media of newspapers, radio, films and television. It is, therefore, not a definition which will inhibit the employer in any way, either when he is seeking to attract applicants or when he is monitoring applications where he is required to so do. Indeed, the definition will be helpful to both the employer and the commission in making it clear what constitutes an application for monitoring purposes. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: We have listened to the noble Lord, Lord Lye11, repeating an argument that we have already heard. If our arguments in respect of Amendments Nos. 23, 34 and 38 leave those amendments untouched, clearly the definition of "advertised" is not sufficiently compehensive. I wish to emphasise and repeat that point. The Government intend to give protection to advertisements by way of mouth so that they are monitored. If the action of a person calling at a factory on his own initiative and obtaining employment—as outlined by the noble Baroness earlier—is not monitored, then the definition is inadequate.
However wide-ranging—and those were the words used by the noble Lord, Lord Lyell—the definition may be, it is not sufficiently comprehensive. Therefore, we should be grateful if the department would have a careful look at this definition if it intends that Amendments Nos. 23, 34 and 48 should remain untouched by Parliament.
Lord Lyell: I shall take on board the points raised by the noble Lord, as I did at an earlier stage.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 46, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 47 [Index to Part II]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendments Nos. 51, 52 and 53:
Page 38, line 1, at end insert—
("Advertised Section 46(1)").
Page 38, line 18, column 2, leave out ("27(3)") and insert ("27(1)").
Page 38, line 24, column 2, leave out ("Section") and insert ("Sections 26(3) and").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 47, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 48 [Meaning of "discrimination"]:
Lord Prys-Davies Lord Prys-Davies moved Amendment No. 54:
Page 38, line 40, after ("condition") insert (", policy or practice").
The noble Lord said: When we discussed Amendment No. 14 I had in mind both Amendment No. 54 and Amendment No. 57. It may be for the convenience of the Committee if I now speak to both. These two amendments comprise an alternative approach to the problem which the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, identified when he moved Amendment No. 14.
The purpose of Amendment No. 54 is to tighten the provisions dealing with indirect discrimination so that the definition will accommodate the problems thrown up by developments in case law in anti-discrimination legislation. At present, as the Minister explained, a complainant can prove indirect discrimination only if he can establish that the barrier which has prevented him from securing the post amounts to a "requirement or condition". That is the critical phrase.
One could refer to the case of Mear or the case of Pereira, which are two well known and authoritative
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cases where the Court of Appeal held that the complainant must establish that the offending provision constitutes an absolute bar to the complainant's employment. Anything less is not indirect discrimination. For example, that means that an employer can, without being in breach of the Act, decide to exercise a preference in favour of people who are not resident in West Belfast. As long as that preference is not an absolute ban, it will be legal under the provisions of this Bill.
In the result, a tribunal decision may well uphold as lawful in an individual case something which patently does not meet the equality of opportunity standards of most reasonable people. Therefore, if we extend the definition so that it comprises not only "requirement or condition" but also "policy or practice", that will solve the problem identified by the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, when he addressed Amendment No. 14.
If that amendment is not acceptable to the Committee, we should fall back on Amendment No. 57. This amendment would allow the tribunal, if it finds evidence of failure to provide equality of opportunity but not, because of the current restrictive interpretation of the words "requirement or condition", of indirect discrimination as defined by the Bill, to make a recommendation that the respondent should refrain from an action where it—the tribunal—was satisfied that justice could only be done by making such an order. Clearly we would not be concerned with Amendment No. 57 if the Government were to redefine indirect discrimination to include "policy or practice". I beg to move.
8.15 p.m.
Lord Bonham-Carter: I very much agree with the sentiments expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies. However, I am concerned about one aspect of this definition of indirect discrimination to which I referred on Second Reading.
The fact is that indirect discrimination, which some people find a quite difficult concept or notion, is arising in a large number of different types of legislation. It first emerged in race relations and sex discrimination legislation. It now emerges in analogous employment discrimination legislation in Northern Ireland and is also emerging in the consideration of European directives on equal treatment for men and women as regards pensions and other benefits.
The problem is that the definitions of indirect discrimination differ in each of the different laws. I believe that it is the same in the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Sex Discrimination Act, but here we have a slightly different definition which the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, would like to make even more different. In the case of the European Community, the definition of indirect discrimination is once again different. The definition reads:
"For the purposes of the principles of equality …indirect discrimination exists where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice disproportionately disadvantages the members of one sex … and is not objectively justified by any necessary reason or condition unrelated to the sex of the person concerned".

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I believe that the Government should think rather carefully about what they want to do on this notion and concept. It would be a great advantage to ordinary men and women if indirect discrimination always meant the same thing. If it is going to mean something different in each piece of legislation, I think we shall be very confused and it may be rather unfair. I should like to draw that to the attention of the Minister and I shall be interested in his comments.
Lord Lyell: Members of the Committee will not be totally surprised that I cannot agree with everything which has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, this evening, let alone on this amendment.
As we see it, this amendment is designed to widen the existing definition of indirect discrimination. This is an issue on which the Government and certain Members of the Committee opposite hold different views and which was discussed in a comprehensive and lucid way in another place. The position taken in another place has not changed.
I should like to re-emphasise the views of the Government on this issue. I appreciate that I cannot say to Members opposite that the Government propose to repeat the current definition of indirect discrimination in sex and race legislation. I understand the disappointment of the noble Lord at the interpretation that the courts have chosen to place on the phrase "requirement or condition". That interpretation is a matter for the courts.
I should like to reiterate the basic points made during discussion in another place. In our view the current definition is fair, balanced, reasonable and does not bias the system too heavily one way or another. We think it right that a complainant should have to show that he was excluded from employment by the condition and nothing more.
I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, wishes to see a broader definition introduced into the legislation to redress what he might consider to be the trend of the relatively recent Appeal Court decisions in the cases of Mear and Pereira. I do not share his view of this matter or that of his colleagues.
I should like to emphasise one of the central policy thrusts of the Bill. The problem lies not so much with the technicalities of the definition of indirect discrimination but much more with the unintentional and structural descrimination that occurs through slack and lax employment practices. That is why many provisions in the Bill are essentially practice centred; for example, compulsory monitoring and review, the provision for follow-up inquiries by the commission and the provision for the new commission to draw up a code of practice. These and associated provisions such as those dealing with goals and timetables, let alone affirmative action, will serve as the effective cutting edge in any struggle against discrimination. They will promote the best employment equality practice. For that reason I ask the Committee not to follow the line taken by the noble Lord, let alone that in another place, and not to accept the amendment.
Lord Prys-Davies: I should like to thank the noble Lord for his defence of the Government's position. He seems to suggest that it will be for the court to sort out the difficulties. I should mention that in the Mear case the court stated that this was a case which required Parliament to act. Here is an opportunity for Parliament to act.
I note the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter. He was good enough to alert us at Second Reading to the fact that he saw merits in a common definition, and that is the position of the Government.
In this Bill we are addressing ourselves to a situation specific to Northern Ireland in the light of the experience which has been gained since 1976. I point out to the Minister that there have been many occasions in this Chamber when the Government have been content to introduce legislation which differs considerably from Great Britain legislation. I need only to refer to the erosion of the right of silence in the courts. I believe that the position taken by the noble Lord is consistent with what he has been saying over the years. However, I think that it comes ill from the Government to reject the amendment on the grounds that here we are differing from the UK legislation. If it is for the convenience of the Government to differ, they will differ; if it is not for the convenience of the Government, then they will not differ.
We will consider our position and decide whether we shall come back to this issue at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Monson Lord Monson moved Amendment No. 55:
Page 39, line 11, at end insert—
("(2A) For the purpose of subsection (2) above, a person is not to be treated as discriminating against another person by reason only of refusing employment to job applicants who have

(a) been convicted of charges involving terrorism:

(b) openly supported terrorism, or

(c) openly supported a country or countries with which the United Kingdom was at the time at war or otherwise engaged in hostilities.").

The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 55 and 56 have been grouped together. However they cover different matters and therefore I shall speak to them separately. It would be quite possible for a Member of the Committee to support Amendment No. 55 and disagree with Amendment No. 56, or the other way round. I do not think that the wording of Amendment No. 55 requires much explanation.
The Government, broadly supported by the Opposition, not so long ago introduced what is now the Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act because they rightly felt that it was wholly unreasonable to expect elected councillors to sit round the same table as supporters of terrorism, who were defined in the Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act as people who publicly expressed support for or approval of a proscribed organisation or acts of terrorism.
Is it not equally unreasonable to expect people to work side by side at a factory bench, on a building site or in an office with people who openly support

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terrorism or, even worse, people who have taken part in terrorist acts which have resulted in the death or maiming of friends or members of their family?
Paragraph (c) of this amendment covers a different point. It is obvious that nobody would have considered it reasonable that employees in England, Scotland or Wales should have been obliged to work side by side with somebody who, for example, in the early 1940s openly supported Hitler or the German armies. The days when extreme Irish Republicans also supported the Germans and Hitler have passed, but we should remember that supporters of Sinn Fein openly and enthusiastically supported General Galtieri at the time of Argentina's invasion of the Falklands and rejoiced in the deaths of British servicemen.
It would have been quite intolerable to require by law that normal patriotic people in Northern Ireland should work alongside such individuals. If they had been prepared to do so of their own accord, fair enough; but they should not have been obliged to do so in the past and should not be obliged to do so in the future. I beg to move.
Viscount Brookeborough: I feel that I should support the noble Lord, Lord Monson, in this amendment or at least ask my noble friend the Minister to look at something similar. I shall not waste time by going into the details of the matter. They are obvious in the context of terrorism as it exists in Northern Ireland. I therefore support the noble Lord in thought and maybe in hope for the future.
Lord Mottistone: I should also like to support this amendment in principle, although I suspect that it could be worded differently.
Lord Hylton: I am sorry to say that I differ from the noble Lord, Lord Monson. I know a number of persons who have been convicted of charges involving terrorism. Some of them are remorseful and regret their involvement because it turned out badly for them; others go much further than that and are repentant and have had a total change of attitude and outlook. On moral grounds they are convinced that what they did earlier was wrong.
It would be most unfair to discriminate again against people in the category I have just mentioned. As regards paragraphs (b) and (c), this seems to be very much a question of opinion. I do not see how these things can always be clearly proved. On those grounds I think that the amendment goes too far.
8.30 p.m.
Lord Lyell: The noble Lord. Lord Monson, has moved Amendment No. 55 in an excellent manner and very clearly. I believe Members of the Committee will accept that we would have every sympathy with an employer who refused to offer employment to an applicant who had been convicted of an offence connected with terrorism in Northern Ireland, was known to be an active member of a paramilitary organisation or was known actively to support terrorism in other ways. I share that sympathy. I am pleased to be able to tell the noble
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Lord, Lord Monson, that Section 57(3) of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 which is a section unaffected by this Bill, already provides that,
"a person's political opinion does not include an opinion which consists of or includes approval or acceptance of the use of violence for political ends connected with Northern Irish affairs (including the use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear)".
That is a direct quotation from Section 57(3) of the Act that is unaffected by the Bill.
The interpretation of this section would be a matter for the Fair Employment Tribunal if, in an individual case of alleged discrimination, a respondent used Section 57(3) as his defence. But I hope the noble Lord will see that at least two-thirds of his amendment is unnecessary. As regards paragraph (c) of the amendment, I believe it provides extremely difficult problems of definition. The noble Lord has alluded to one particular case as to what "otherwise engaged in hostilities" might mean or if we were at war on the occasion referred to by the noble Lord. I am not clear what the amendment might mean.
If an employer felt that to employ an applicant who actively supported a hostile power was likely to jeopardise national security, public safety or public order—and I stress here public order—the employer would be protected by the provisions of Section 42 of the 1976 Act which provides that acts done for any of these purposes may not be challenged under fair employment legislation.
I hope that that is sufficient to explain to the noble Lord, Lord Monson, that the existing provisions in the 1976 Act provide the kind of safeguards that he is seeking. What I have said also refers to the remarks of my noble friend Lord Brookeborough. As regards paragraph (c) of the amendment I hope I have explained the difficulties concerning definition. I hope that the noble Lord will accept my explanations and will not pursue his amendment.
Lord Monson: I am most grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, and the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, for their support of the principles of this amendment. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Hylton for the first part of what he said. I understand what he is getting at as regards the question of repentance: perhaps one might look again at a later stage at a redrafted amendment in the light of what he said. However, I cannot agree with the second part of what my noble friend said. The difficulties of definition and subjectivity about which he spoke apply equally well to the Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act. If he criticises this amendment then presumably he is equally critical of that Act.
I am somewhat reassured by what the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, said, but I do not believe it goes the entire way to meet my fears. As regards the wording of the amendment, the reason for including the word "hostilities" is that we were not actually at war with Argentina. We were most certainly engaged in hostilities and it may be that in a technical sense hostilities have not been officially ended. I am not quite sure on that point. I wish to study the matter

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again in the light of what has been said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment for the time being.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Monson Lord Monson moved Amendment No. 56:
Page 39, line 11, at end insert—
("(2B) For the purpose of subsection (2) above, a person is not to be treated as discriminating against another person by reason only of giving preference in employment to job applicants who—

(a) have served for at least five years with the armed forces or the police, where such previous employment is relevant to the job in question, or

(b) are the close relations of existing employees with at least ten years' service.").

The noble Lord said: The wording of this amendment is also self-explanatory. It divides into two parts. There are many occupations where former service, ideally long service, in the armed forces is considered highly desirable, if not strictly essential. You only have to look around the Palace of Westminster to see what I mean. In a rather different sphere, the Corps of Commissionaires is, as I understand it, also recruited entirely from ex-servicemen, while former police officers are particularly sought after by security firms and private detective agencies.
It has been suggested that these sensible and long-hallowed preferences should be outlawed in Northern Ireland because members of one community are less likely to have served either in the police or the armed services. That is a nonsensical suggestion. I emphasise that the amendment deliberately does not specify a particular police force: former membership of a force in England, Scotland or Wales or indeed of the Southern Irish Garda would be just as acceptable as former membership of the RUC.
The second part of the amendment is also self-explanatory. For one family to have worked for another for generation after generation is considered by most normal people throughout the free world to be a commendable and admirable tradition. But we are told that Northern Ireland must be an exception to this rule.
At Second Reading I instanced the case of a Smith family. (The fact that the surnames that I used tend to be common surnames of English, Scottish or Welsh origin has no political significance.) I instanced the case of the Smith family who worked for the Jones family for many generations. Under the Bill it is quite likely that the younger Smith may be told that he cannot follow in the footsteps of his father, grandfather and great grandfather because young Robinson, who happens to come from a different religious community, has fractionally better 'O' levels than he has and therefore must be given the job, whatever the employer's preference.
Elsewhere in western Europe an employer would be able to take account of what might be called the intangible assets of a job applicant. He would not be bound to employ people purely on the basis of their slightly superior academic qualifications. The Conservatives claim to be the party of the family and the party of tradition. While this amendment
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may go slightly against the grain of abstract social engineering, it upholds the value of both the family and of tradition. Therefore I hope that the Government will accept the amendment, at least in principle. I beg to move.
Lord Lyell: I shall look first at paragraph (a) of the amendment that the noble Lord is attempting to introduce. There may well be job vacancies in Northern Ireland where experience of service in the security forces may be relevant. If the nature of the job is such that it cannot be done satisfactorily without that experience—in other words it is a requirement that is wholly justifiable for the job irrespective of the religious belief or political opinion of the applicant—then the employer is already on safe ground.
But there can be no doubt that an employer who persistently—I believe this to be the point at issue—demonstrated a preference for employing former members of the security forces would run the risk of a charge of indirect discrimination against the Roman Catholic community in Northern Ireland. As Members of the Committee familiar with Northern Ireland will know, the proportion of Catholic members of the security forces, is sadly low in relation to the overall numbers of Catholics in the community as a whole. The noble Viscount will know why, sadly, that is true. For that reason, and for the other reason I adduced, we think it is inconsistent with the spirit of the Bill, endeavouring to promote equality of opportunity for all, to include in it a provision which is clearly discriminatory in effect.
There could be great difficulty in determining in what circumstances security force experience was "relevant to the job". It is the role of the tribunal to determine when discrimination has taken place and of the commission to promote equality of opportunity and to advise employers to adopt employment practices consistent with it and to avoid those which are not. However sincerely the noble Lord has put forward his views, the amendment is wholly inconsistent with the promotion of equality of opportunity. For that reason I cannot advise the Committee to accept the amendment.
Lord Monson: The Minister has cenfirmed my worst fears. Of course there are few jobs in the world where former membership of the security forces is absolutely vital for the effective carrying out of the job. However, there are a great many jobs where former membership of the security forces is extremely useful and desirable, if not essential. It is obvious from what has been said that what applies everywhere else in Western Europe and in most of the world cannot be applied uniquely in Northern Ireland because of the overkill aspects of the Bill. So many aspects of the Bill represent overkill.
The same applies to the question of sticking with the family tradition of working for a firm. The Left in Britain believes in social engineering. I respect its sincerity. I do not agree with it myself—I have totally opposed it—but that is its practice. Conservatives normally purport to oppose social engineering and favour family values and traditions. Yet in this Bill they are going totally against the grain of their own

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traditions. It is late in the evening and I am sure that noble Lords are dying to get something to eat. For that reason I shall not pursue the matter further tonight but I may come back with a slightly revised version of the amendment at a later stage. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 48 agreed to.
Clause 49 [Complaints of unlawful discrimination]:
Lord Prys-Davies Lord Prys-Davies had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 57:
Page 40, line 41, at end insert (", and
(d) a recommendation that the respondent take such action for promoting equality of opportunity as appears to the Tribunal to be reasonable and appropriate in all the circumstances.").
The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment in connection with an earlier amendment.
[Amendment No. 57 not moved.]
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 58:
Page 41, line 7, after ("may") insert ("(subject to the limit in subsection (4))").
The noble Lord said: Perhaps I may speak also to Amendment No. 59. The amendments are designed to remove any doubt that might exist about the amount of compensation which the tribunal may award to an individual complainant. Subsection (5) of the new Section 26 of the 1976 Act which is inserted by Clause 49 of the Bill allows the tribunal in certain circumstances to award a successful complainant increased compensation if, for example, the respondent has failed to pay an earlier award of compensation or has failed to take other action ordered by the tribunal to alleviate the complainant's difficulties. The amendment makes explicit what is already implicit in the clause—that in such circumstances the total amount of compensation awarded may not exceed the maximum of £30,000 provided in subsection (4) of Section 26 as inserted by Clause 49.
Amendment No. 59 is a declaratory provision which is included for the avoidance of doubt and for consistency with the Industrial Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1976. I beg to move.
8.45 p.m.
Lord Prys-Davies: The Minister told the Committee that the effect of Clause 49 is to make it abundantly clear that the upper limit of compensation is £30,000. That is worrying. It is a movement away from the present position. At the moment the tribunal can make an award of up to £30,000 in compensation. The tribunal can also recommend that an employer takes further action to redress the situation. If he ignores that recommendation the tribunal can then make a further award over and above the original £30,000 to compensate for the employer's failure to act upon the tribunal's recommendation. This amendment ensures that the absolute maximum will be £30.000,
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irrespective of whether the employer follows the recommendation of the tribunal. This is another example of the Government eroding their original provisions and therefore chipping away at the effectiveness of the Bill. For those reasons, we cannot accept the amendment and we ask the Government to reconsider their position.
Lord Lyell: I shall take on board what the noble Lord has said. But even he would agree that the sum mentioned is certainly reasonable in such cases. It is a fairly large sum. It is not chipping away at anything. However, I shall consider what he has said.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 59:
Page 41, line 51, at end insert—
("(12) It is hereby declared that the limit imposed by subsection (4) applies to the amount which the Tribunal would, apart from that subsection, otherwise award in respect of the subject matter of the complaint after taking into account any payment made by the respondent to the complainant in respect of that matter and any reduction in the amount of the award required by any enactment or rule of law.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Mottistone Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 60:
Page 43, leave out line 27.
The noble Lord said: I should like to speak also to Amendment No. 61. These amendments seek to reduce the powers of the commission in two respects. On page 43 of the Bill circumstances are set out in which the commission can obtain advice and assistance. Subsection (2) rounds itself off with a save-all, comprehensive sentence:
"or by reason of any other special consideration".
Subsection (3) ends with the words:
"any other form of assistance which the Commission may consider appropriate".
The sad point that I have determined both from the briefs I had at Second Reading and from talking as I have done to the CBI in Northern Ireland is that, for whatever reason, its trust in the FEA, the agency which currently exists, is minimal. It has found the agency to be oppressive and not respectful of private industry and what it tries to do. It advised me at Second Reading to inquire of my noble friend the Minister whether the new commission would be more professional in its approach. These two amendments are inspired by a doubt that the FEC can be trusted to have the more or less unlimited powers in any areas, especially in this part of the Bill. I find this distressing.
It would be helpful if my noble friend—perhaps not now, because I have not warned him that this is the way my thinking would go; and as I have studied all the amendments—could let me know what changes are being made as regards the personnel who will form the commission as opposed to those who formed the agency in the past. For example, is he in a position yet to tell the Committee who he has in mind for the commission? It would be helpful to know that because one may be able then to say to the CBI, "Well, this is a new bunch of chaps and they will probably be people who will not treat you in the cavalier fashion which the FEA did in the past".
Therefore the point of this amendment is basically to reduce the powers but also, in passing, to invite my noble friend to clarify the position with regard to the personnel of the commission. I beg to move.
Lord Monson: I fully support Amendment No. 60, to which I have added my name. Moreover, I think that there is also quite a lot to be said in favour of Amendment No. 61. The purpose of Amendment No. 60 is to put a very modest brake on the powers of the commission. The commission already has very wide-ranging powers granted to it by specific provisions under the Bill. Therefore to allow it still further powers—powers which would be very much resented on the mainland, let us not forget, were they to be applied here in respect of religion, race, sex, age, politics or anything else—under the vague category of "any other special consideration", is tantamount to giving the commission carte blanche to do virtually anything. For that reason I fully support the proposal put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone.
Lord Prys-Davies: I am rather saddened by the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, for whom I have every respect. I am especially saddened because I am sure that he does voice the view of a powerful section of opinion in Northern Ireland. I believe that all the amendments which have been moved by the noble Lord would weaken the effectiveness of the commission and therefore the effectiveness of the measure. If that represents and reflects the views of industry in Northern Ireland, then I am indeed saddened.
These amendments confine the range of potential complainants to whom the commission can offer assistance to present their case before the tribunal. The point should be made that the commission is not bound to offer assistance under Section 29(2). The potential complainant has no statutory right to receive assistance. We have been saying consistently since Second Reading that the commission will be a responsible body. I believe that we can rely upon the commission to exercise its discretion under the legislation responsibly.
I feel that the circumstances spelt out in subsection (2)(a) and (b) are most certainly adequate. That is my view. But, of course, in the school of experience one has learnt that one can never be certain that one has foreseen all the situations which may arise; neither can one be certain that all the situations in which it would be proper for the commission to give assistance have been foreseen.
Paragraph (c), which this amendment would remove, provides a fallback. It seems to me, on a practical level, that it would be very prudent to retain this sentence. For those reasons we urge the Government to stand by their position.
Lord Mottistone: I must point out that my amendments will not take away paragraph (c); they in fact take away one phrase at the end of subsection (2) and paragraph (e) of subsection (3).
Lord Bonham-Carter: I share the feelings of the noble Lord, Lord Pry-Davies, about the cumulative effect of the amendments which have been proposed in the course of this evening by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone—even more so because they are, as he told the Committee, the opinions of the CBI in Northern Ireland. It is really rather depressing that a body of such importance should have such a negative view towards a measure which I think most of us in this Chamber feel is of the utmost importance in the light of history.
The effect of the accumulative amendments proposed by the noble Lord would be to emasculate the Bill almost totally. That can be their only purpose. As to the particular amendments which have just been proposed, it is my view that prospective complainants do need assistance. Further, it is my experience, having dealt with complainants, that what they really should have is legal aid. I think that the proposals in the Bill which give permission to render assistance to such people is highly necessary and therefore should be supported.
Lord Mottistone: I hasten to add in response to the noble Lords, Lord Prys-Davies and Lord Bonham-Carter, that they have got the wrong message in this regard. If they would be kind enough to refer back to what I said on Second Reading, they will understand that the CBI in Northern Ireland is right behind the Bill and has been so from the beginning. However, in so doing, the CBI is saying that it has not found it easy to trust the FEA.
The other point that I should like to make is that all the amendments which I have tabled are probing amendments; they are not emasculating amendments. Moreover, they seek to obtain information from the Government. The most important information that we require is confirmation that the FEC will be a more trustworthy body than was its predecessor.
Lord Prys-Davies: I appreciate what the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, says and indeed what he has said. However, I am still saddened that there is this lack of trust on the part of industry as regards the commission. It seems to me that the cumulative effect of these amendments, although they are only exploratory, at least creates the impression that the commission does not have the support of industry to the extent that I should like to see it enjoy such support.
In reply to the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, I must say that it is not paragraph (c) in Section 29; it is the third ground given in that section although it is not labelled (c).
Lord Lyell: It is on occasions like this that I am delighted to say that I hesitate to intervene. I have a small note here and it seems that the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, was almost making the case of the Government in his defence of some of the Bill's provisions. It is perhaps an occasion for humour during our lengthy proceedings.
I have quite a long reply for my noble friend, but I think that he would be grateful if I were to shorten it somewhat. I worry about the problem which has

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been raised by my noble friend. He seems to think that the Fair Employment Agency has been, and the new Fair Employment Commission will be, oppressive. He seems to believe that, in this field of professional personnel management, the Fair Employment Agency, as it stands at present, is oppressive and not professional.
I stressed to my noble friend at an earlier stage of the Bill's proceedings that my door is open. However, with some hesitation, I suggest that his complaints are not necessarily relevant to the two amendments which he has put forward this evening. I shall nevertheless take on board the points he raised, although I have heard them before. As regards the composition of the commission, which is what concerns him and, no doubt, his friends in Northern Ireland, I should say, first, that arrangements are still in hand. Therefore it would be injudicious of me to give too many details at present.
Secondly, the commission will draw very largely upon the experience of the Fair Employment Agency. The staff and resources of the commission will be considerably increased and the post of chief executive has been advertised. I have no doubt that we shall receive many professional applications for it
I shall take on board the points raised by my noble friend. I hope that in his usual robust way he is being fair because I do not think that the Fair Employment Agency, let alone the commission, would ever seek to be oppressive, let alone unprofessional. If my noble friend feels that he has a point perhaps we might be in touch later, but not as a result of the fascinations of Section 29, as amended by Clause 49.
Lord Mottistone: I thank my noble friend for his remarks. I quite understand that at this stage he cannot go as far as I should have liked. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 61 not moved.]
9 p.m.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendments Nos. 62 to 64:
Page 43, line 45, after ("apply") insert ("(a)").
Page 43, line 47, after ("section") insert ("or
(b) in relation to any act done before the commencement of this section in respect of which a complaint under section 24 of that Act could have been, but was not, made before that time or in relation to any such complaint made in respect of it.").
Page 43, line 48, leave out ("such a complaint") and insert ("any such complaint or act").
The noble Lord said: I am sure that the Committee will be pleased if I speak to Amendments Nos. 62 to 64 together and move them en bloc, if the noble Lord the Deputy Chairman agrees.
This group of transitional amendments is designed to deal with the unlikely but not impossible situation of an individual complainant making a complaint under the existing Part III of the 1976 Act after the commencement of the new Bill. Clause 49(2) already provides that a complaint made to the Fair
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Employment Agency and not disposed of before commencement of the new Act—that is, the Bill before us—is to be dealt with under the old Part III of the 1976 Act by the new commission.
The amendment provides that a complaint which could have been made before commencement of the new Act but which was not—that is to say, a complaint where the time limit for making a complaint runs beyond commencement—will similarly be dealt with by the commission's applying Part III of the 1976 Act. With that, I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman (Lord Ampthill): The noble Lord has spoken to and wishes to move Amendments Nos. 62 to 64 en bloc.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 49, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 50 and 51 agreed to.
Clause 52 [Provision of training]:
Lord Prys-Davies Lord Prys-Davies moved Amendment No. 65:
Page 44, leave out from beginning of line 26 to end of line 3 on page 45 and insert—
(" "Measures to encourage training from under-represented community.
37A. Nothing in Parts III or IV shall render unlawful any act done by—

(a) an employer,

(b) an employment agency,

(c) a vocational organisation, or

(d) a person providing services mentioned in section 22(1) in or in connection with affording members of the Roman Catholic, or members of the Protestant, community in Northern Ireland access to facilities for training which is not intentionally confined to members of the Roman Catholic or Protestant community as the case may be and which would help to fit them for employment, or for employment in a particular capacity or occupation. Where the act is done in pursuance of affirmative action (within the meaning of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989)."").

The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 65 is an attempt to address the problem which Clause 52 of the Bill addresses and which the new Clause under Amendment No. 66, tabled by the Government, is intended to address. Clause 52 itself is complicated and technical and so is our Amendment No. 65, though possibly it is less complicated. Certainly the new clause tabled under Amendment No. 66 by the Government is extremely complicated.
It is crucial that the Government get Clause 52 right. The aim of that clause is to protect employers who are setting up affirmative action programmes under Clause 56 from a successful challenge that the affirmative action programme itself constitutes a violation of the prohibition against direct or indirect discrimination. If we cannot give that guarantee to the employer, employers will be extremely reluctant to set up schemes of affirmative action.
Obviously the Government have experienced great difficulty in drafting the clause because they have returned with a new version. I might mention that I received a letter yesterday from the chair of the Equal Opportunities Commission for Northern Ireland, expressing its concern about the Government's new clause and the Government's

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amendment to Schedule 2. I understand that those concerns have been conveyed to the Government.
It is vitally important that we get this clause right and certainly I shall not be pressing our amendment to Division. We are simply anxious to hear the Government's views on our amendment. However, if we do not get things right, the employers will simply not be prepared to run the risk of a prosecution by setting up training schemes in pursuance of affirmative action programmes because they fear that they will be challenged and will be found to be in breach of the law.
The difficulty is that our Amendment No. 65 meets or overcomes the weaknesses in the Government's amendment. In a sense, I apologise for referring constantly to the Government's amendment but it is only in the light of the perceived weaknesses in that amendment that one can see that there is a powerful case even for the Government's amended draft to be redrawn.
If we examine Clause 37A, a scheme which is for the benefit of a class which is framed by reference to a religious belief or a political opinion will be unlawful. So if the scheme is intended to be for the benefit of a religious group, that would be direct discrimination.
The following clause is more helpful because, if a scheme operates in a particular area such as the Falls Road, or in Shorts, for example, access to facilities by persons of a particular religious belief may be excluded or restricted. So that is a helpful clause. But in fact the scheme may have the effect of benefiting a religious group. But subsection (2) of the Government's amended draft only allows protection to the employer if his scheme satisfies paragraphs (a) and (b). What will happen in practice is that the person who wishes to challenge the lawfulness of the scheme will argue that the de facto scheme is having the effect of benefiting members of a religious group. Accordingly, if that is the effect, it will be argued that the intention is to benefit a religious group, and that will be in breach of the proposed subsection (I)(a). That argument would be reinforced by the fact that the employer has undertaken the scheme itself in order to ensure fair participation by members of one or other of the two communities. Therefore one can argue that that in itself shows an intention to benefit a religious group, which is not allowed by the proposed subsection (1)(b).
We claim that the Government have worked hard at these amendments but that they are still defective and will not provide the protection that is required. A person who claims that a scheme is unlawful will almost certainly succeed. The essence of our amendment is that we acknowledge that schemes which are specifically religious, in other words, which would have the effect of benefiting a religious group provided they are not intended to be confined exclusively to that religious group, will be lawful.
This is a complicated and technical argument. I have probably not done justice to the argument, but I should be pleased to hear the Government's response, if not today, between now and the next stage. I beg to move.
Lord Hylton: I am glad this amendment has been tabled because it gives me an opportunity to raise a point which may be unnecessary. However, I cannot be sure of that and I shall be glad if the Minister can tell me whether or not it is unnecessary. I need to declare an interest because I am currently the president of the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders, which is perhaps better known as NIACRO. The association, in parallel with various other voluntary bodies, provides training for released prisoners, ex-offenders and young persons at risk of offending.
Given the location of the workshops where the training takes place and given the supply at any moment of people within these categories, it may well be that the intake of a given workshop is unbalanced in one direction or the other. I hope the Minister can confirm that the Bill will not make present practices unlawful.
Lord Dunleath: I am on rather difficult ground here because, quite frankly, I do not know what I am talking about. Nonetheless I was much relieved to hear two things from the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies; first, that he too acknowledged that this was a complicated matter and, secondly, that he had had contact with the Equal Opportunities Commission.
It seems to me that there are some difficult legal implications regarding the new Section 37A. I wonder whether Her Majesty's Government have thought them through. I fully acknowledge that I have not thought them through as I received my brief only this afternoon, and anyway I. am no lawyer. However, it seems there are some possibilities for conflict, for contradiction and for inconsistency.
In selecting persons for training two possible criteria can be used: one is gender and the other religion. It seems possible for some women to be disadvantaged through being targeted by both criteria, thus bringing about an imbalance. Length of service is another criteria for women. I am not sure that the broken service of certain women due to maternity leave or domestic matters has been taken fully into account. That is an anomaly which, if it exists, ought to be addressed.
I understand, arising from that situation, that claims of unlawful discrimination could be made under the sex discrimination legislation. It could also possibly contravene the EC equal treatment directive.
The noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, will understand the issue. I am afraid that I am not fully briefed on it. All I ask of the Minister is that he takes those possible difficulties into consideration. I am sure that if he were to ask his staff to get in touch with the Equal Opportunities Commission the commission would let him have copies of the briefing papers which I received today. Perhaps he would be prepared to give them careful consideration because I think that they contain material which may not have been taken fully into consideration in the preparation of these clauses of the Bill.
9.15 p.m.
Baroness Seear: I should like to ask the Minister two questions on this issue. The first is whether, in regard to training, this Bill is on all fours with the Sex Discrimination Act for the UK. Under that Act it is perfectly legitimate to provide training for a member of a sex which is substantially under-represented in a particular job. That is not regarded as discrimination. People will not automatically get a job as a result of the training, but the argument is that the training brings them up to a level starting place to enable them to compete for the job. Is that the intention in this legislation? If it is the intention there is no problem about providing training for the under-represented group. That group can quite openly be provided with training and that is not regarded as discriminatory.
The noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, raised another point. I have forgotten what he said. Perhaps he could repeat his point.
Lord Prys-Davies: The point that I made was that under paragraph (b) siting a training centre in a certain area, say the Falls Road area, will benefit a certain community. It could therefore be argued by those who are hostile to the legislation that, because it favours that community, it is in breach of paragraph (a), which prohibits benefiting a class of beneficiaries framed by reference to religious affiliation.
Baroness Seear: I thank the noble Lord. If the point that I made about the Sex Discrimination Act is correct that problem does not arise. One is allowed to discriminate quite openly in training matters. It is when it comes to giving a job as a result of the training that the issue of discrimination arises.
Under our legislation—I do not know whether it is the same in this case or not, and perhaps the Minister could make that clear—it is not illegally discriminatory to remove a discrimination. It is discriminatory to discriminate in favour of a group, but it is not discriminatory to help a group which is discriminated against. I hope that Members of the Committee follow what I am saying.
Lord Lyell: Just‡
Baroness Seear: It is late at night, but there is an important difference. Removing an existing discrimination is not the same as discriminating in favour of a group of people. One is removing a discrimination which operates against a particular group. That is not discriminatory under our legislation.
Lord Prys-Davies: Perhaps I may respond. As I understand it, an affirmative action scheme designed to increase the proportion of females securing promotion could also, in the circumstances of Northern Ireland, lead to a rise in the number of Catholics securing promotion. As the clause stands, in our submission that would be unlawful because it would be discriminatory. That is why we say that we have to work hard on this clause to get it right.
Lord Lyell: Again I hesitate to intervene in a lively debate between the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Seear. I think that I just understood the second point raised by the noble Baroness. I may have some help for her, if not in relation to this particular amendment but certainly in relation to my own amendment which follows this one.
Perhaps I may begin by stressing two particular points. The first is that both the Government and the Opposition have agreed, following helpful discussions in another place, that Clause 52 should be amended in order to do two things. First, it should make it clear and explicit on the face of the Bill that affirmative action training is protected from both direct and indirect discrimination. Secondly, it should remove explicit reference to the criteria of age, unemployment or length of service which, if used as the basis of selection for such training, could in certain circumstances give rise to legal challenge under both UK and European Commission sex discrimination legislation.
The second point is that the Government have tabled their own amendment, to which I shall refer in a few moments, to deliver those two objectives. A third point follows from the first two; namely, that what is, as I understand it, basically at issue between ourselves and noble Lords opposite on this matter is not a difference of opinion about policy but rather a difference of view of how that objective can best be achieved.
The principal effect of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, would be that affirmative action training to remedy under-representation would not be regarded as either directly or indirectly discriminatory, provided that the employer could prove that it was not intentionally confined to members of either the Catholic or the Protestant communities. So, bearing in mind that it is illegal to select for training on the basis of religion, if it transpired that an affirmative action training course, in which the participants were not selected on the basis of religion, turned out to be composed exclusively of either all Catholics or all Protestants, a charge of direct or indirect discrimination could not be sustained against the employer concerned, if he could prove that he did not intend to operate a course exclusively recruited from either Catholics or Protestants. Here, the test at issue is one of intention.
The Government considered that aspect deeply. We took legal advice at all levels and hold to the view that no test based on intention will be satisfactory. Indeed, we believe that a test based on intention is the wrong test, for three reasons. First, in the case of an employer who takes affirmative action, it is possible to infer an intention to treat members of the majority community less favourably. Which community was the majority would depend on the circumstances of the case and—although I hesitate to say it—on the geography of Northern Ireland. It could be either one or other of the two main communities in Northern Ireland.
Secondly, that inferred intention, coupled with the less favourable treatment, may amount to direct

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discrimination. Thirdly, it follows that it would be possible to infer an intention—we are now getting into somewhat marshy ground with which I am sure the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, will be familiar—to isolate members of the majority community from the fact that training is part of affirmative action. But such an intention should not preclude the training from benefiting from the exception provided. That legal circularity creates rather than solves a problem. For that reason, we have adopted in our amendment the objective test which does not present the difficulties of proof for the complainant and the respondent which are an integral part of the subjective intention test.
In effect, we believe that, for the reasons that I have tried to set out, our amendment will provide a clearer, cleaner and more objective test than that of intention proposed in this amendment. I believe that I have been rather destructive. I have produced no reasons for not accepting the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, but have not set out our own amendment. If the Committee will bear with me, I shall do so as briefly and as soon as possible. However, I can assure the noble Lord that there is not much between us. We believe that our amendment, which I shall move and explain as soon as possible, is the best, cleanest and clearest method of achieving that objective.
I see that the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, would like to make a quick point.
Lord Bonham-Carter: Perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to ask one question. I find the argument fascinating in its complexity and in its obscurity. However, I cannot fully understand why the Government do not use the same formula as that used in the race relations and the sex discrimination legislation. This is a deliberate act because when this matter was raised in another place the answer was that it was not considered appropriate. The word "appropriate" covers a multitude of sins and I do not understand why it is not appropriate.
Lord Lyell: With the utmost politeness perhaps I may counsel patience to the noble Lord. I have only given one side—the dark side—of the argument and explained why I think that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, does not meet the case; I have not yet expounded our case. I shall do so briefly and quickly in due course.
In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, who raised one query, it is highly unlikely that the NIACRO (the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders—I hope I have it right) training schemes will fall foul of the legislation. Although they may be attended by young people from only one religious group, they are not intended to exclude members of the other community. Such schemes would be protected from any charges of indirect discrimination. Certainly the schemes are not selected on the basis of religion and therefore there is no discrimination.
I hope that that explanation will be of some help to the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, and that the noble
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Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, will agree that our amendment will meet the objectives that he seeks.
Lord Prys-Davies: I shall be very brief indeed. I think that the significance of the argument this evening is that it shows that there is immense uncertainty about the validity of the Government's amendment. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, that we seek common aims. However, we do not think that the Government's amendment will attain the desired result.
One has to be frank about this. We believe that the best approach is to draw a distinction between schemes which are religious exclusive and therefore unlawful and schemes which are religious specific—in other words, one targets a community and, provided that it is not intended to exclude all other members of the other community from benefiting from the scheme, that would be lawful. I believe that it is far better to face up to that dilemma rather than seek a roundabout way of achieving the desired end and fail to do so. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 66:
Page 44. line 26, leave out from beginning to end of line 11 on page 45 and insert—
(" 'Provision of training in pursuance of affirmative action.
37A.—(1) This section applies where, in pursuance of affirmative action, persons are afforded access to facilities for training which would help to fit them for employment, for employment in a particular capacity or for a particular employment or occupation, but—

(a) the facilities are provided only at a particular place in Northern Ireland or the training is confined to persons of a particular class, not being a class framed by reference to religious belief or political opinion, and

(b) by providing the facilities only there or by so confining the training, access to the facilities by persons of a particular religious belief or political opinion is excluded or restricted.

(2) For the purpose of determining whether any act done in, or in connection with, affording those facilities is by virtue of section 16(2) unlawful under any provision of Parts III and IV. the fact that, by providing the facilities only there or by so confining the training, their access to the facilities is thereby excluded or restricted is to be disregarded.' ").
The noble Lord said: My putative remarks commence with telling the Committee that this is a most significant government amendment, relating as it does to the crucial area of affirmative action training. That is the gist of my earlier remarks. The new clause which we propose in this amendment replaces the existing Clause 52. Certainly I want to pay tribute to the discussions we have had earlier this evening as well as those in another place. We are dealing with training measures and, in the terminology current in fair employment, we usually refer to that as "outreach" training. These training measures are essential weapons in the armoury of affirmative action. We believe that providing access to training for an under-represented group is one of the classic ways in which competitive disadvantages, such as the lack of particular skills, abilities or aptitudes, which are all familiar to noble Lords, can be overcome.
We certainly think that such training is important not only to individuals who may be at a disadvantage

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and to the under-represented group; we believe that it is also important to both employers and the new Fair Employment Commission. In view of the overall importance of affirmative action training, it is not in the least surprising that at earlier stages of the Bill as well as today there should have been considerable discussion about how best to provide for it. It is true to say that the discussions have produced many valid points.
However, in bringing forward our amendment, as against that of the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, the Government sought to address two special difficulties associated with the old clause and one central priority. The first difficulty was the need to provide protection for employers taking affirmative action training from both direct and indirect discrimination. While there was considerable room for debate and discussion about how far the existing clause provided such protection, the Government accepted the general proposition that the greater the degree of clarity in this area the better.
The second difficulty that we felt we had to overcome was that the criteria for selection suggested in the existing clause as a basis for constituting a training group—I referred to them a little earlier in the previous amendment: age, unemployment or length of service—could in certain circumstances have left employers open to charges of indirect sex discrimination under both United Kingdom and European Community legislation.
The new clause proposed in this amendment is designed to address these difficulties. It is also designed to address the central policy objective in the Bill; namely, that while affirmative action training is to be protected against both direct and indirect discrimination, it is not to permit religion specific or religion exclusive training. In other words, in selecting a group of people for training, an employer should not be permitted to select on the basis of religious belief or affiliation. That policy imperative is central to fair employment; indeed to depart from it would allow individuals to be turned away from, or refused entry to, training opportunities simply because of their religion.
There is unemployment and disadvantage in both communities in Northern Ireland. Jobs and training—which are what we are discussing this evening—are needed by both Catholics and Protestants. That emphasises the sound reasons why we hold fast to this central policy objective of selection for both employment and training irrespective of religious belief or indeed political opinion.
This new clause is a considerable improvement on existing Clause 52. We believe that it is more objective. We think that it will be clearer, will avoid the potential difficulties associated with the existing clause and will prove easier for both employers and the commission to operate. I commend the clause to the Committee. I beg to move.
9.30 p.m.
Lord Mottistone: Can my noble friend tell me how this training under the altered Clause 52 will be paid for? Will it be paid for by the Government or will there be a hidden charge on industry?
Lord Lyell: It will be existing training either by government and possibly also by private sector employers. That would be a matter for discussion. I had probably better not give my noble friend detailed answers this evening. So far as I am aware most of this training would be from the public sector but I am sure that there would be participation from the private sector.
We are still considering this aspect. Perhaps I shall be able to give my noble friend some detailed answers. I doubt that it will be before the next stage in the proceedings on the Bill. However, I shall take his points on board and reply to him either in the Chamber or by letter as soon as possible.
Lord Prys-Davies: I shall not detain the Committee except to emphasise once again that this is a core provision. It is probably the most important provision in the entire Bill. For the reasons that I have given, we believe that the Government's amendment is flawed. I have a feeling that after studying the words of the Minister we shall still have to return to this clause at a later stage.
Lord Bonham-Carter: I believe that the Government are making matters unnecessarily difficult for themselves. The idea behind the training schemes is to bring people who are under-qualified up to a level at which they can compete. The classic example in the race relations field is that of Asians who cannot speak English. It was clear that until they spoke English they could not compete on equal terms for a job. It was totally Asian-directed, therefore, and Asian-specific, but it was not regarded as discriminatory because discrimination in training did not apply. Where the discrimination applied was in the allocation of jobs. Once that Asian boy applied for a job in competition with a white boy then it had to be on the merit of the person in question.
I cannot believe that it is necessary in training to eschew religious training. If, as the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, said, a training scheme in the Falls Road is de facto religious specific because no one from the other community will go to be trained in the Falls Road, is that or is that not allowable under the Government's amendment? I simply do not know. It would seem to me that it probably is not. Therefore I should have thought that, if the formula that has been established in the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Acts which allows race-specific and sex-specific training is followed, that would enable the Government to overcome the difficulty with which we have been struggling for this past half hour.
Baroness Seear: I should like briefly to add to what my noble friend Lord Bonham-Carter has said. On a number of occasions I have taken part in women-only management training programmes for companies where there has been a dearth of women in management so that, to redress the balance, women-only courses have been put on. That is totally illegal. In an organisation in Northern Ireland which has no supervisors of a given faith, such as no Catholic supervisors. It would, by analogy with the English situation, be perfectly proper to put on

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religious specific Catholic only supervisory training programmes. This is the exact analogy with what has been done for women —religious specific supervisory training programmes for Catholics because they are under-represented. What is wrong with that?
Lord Hylton: I am reading Amendment No. 66, incorporating new Clause 37A(1)(a). The words are:
"the facilities are provided only at a particular place in Northern Ireland".
I should have thought that that covered the example recently given of a training scheme in the Falls Road. Then we go on to read:
"or the training is confined to persons of a particular class".
I should have thought that covered my earlier example of NACRO's ex-offender training.
Lord Lyell: The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, has made a valid point. I shall attempt to take on board the points that have been raised by the experts—the noble Baroness, who is expert in sex discrimination, and the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, who draws attention to some aspects of race discrimination. I wish them to remember that we are talking about Northern Ireland, where there is a third and more insidious form of discrimination. There is much to be learned which is being learned as a result of both sex and race discrimination measures in Great Britain.
The main thrust of what I and the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, have been trying to put across—I hope that I have it right and that we are on common ground—is that we are looking for a method whereby affirmative action and specific training will leave the employer unable to discriminate on grounds of sex, race or, certainly, religion. Where the employer is seeking affirmative action under the Bill, he should not be found guilty of discrimination under other aspects which have been raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, and by the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter. That is the main thrust of Amendments Nos. 65 and 66. I hope that we have improved Clause 37 by our Amendment No. 66. It is for that reason that I ask the Committee to accept the amendment.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 52, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 53 and 54 agreed to.
Clause 55 [Regulations and orders]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendments Nos. 67 and 68:
Page 45, line 37, leave out ("or 28") and insert ("28 or (Monitoring applicants)").
Page, 45, line 41, leave out ("or 28") and insert ("28 or (Monitoring applicants)").
The noble Lord said: I spoke to these amendments when speaking to Amendment No. 25. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 55, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 56 [Meaning of "affirmative. Action]:
Lord Monson Lord Monson moved Amendment No. 69:
Page 46. line 8, leave out from ("of") to ("in") in line 9 and insert ("all religious denominations and none").
The noble Lord said: The effect of the amendment would be to alter Clause 56(1) so that it read:
"In this Act 'affirmative action' means action designed to secure fair participation in employment by members of all religious denominations and none in Northern Ireland by means including".
Clause 20 declares that:
"'equality of opportunity' means equality of opportunity between persons of different religious beliefs".
How strange and contradictory, therefore, is the fact that Clause 56 specifies that affirmative action should apply only to members of the Protestant or Roman Catholic communities. It thereby discriminates against Quakers, members of the Orthodox Church, Jews, Moslems, Hindus, Buddhists, agnostics and atheists. I am interested to note that Amendment No. 70, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blease, approaches the same problem in a slightly different way.
One suspects that the truth is that the clause is not aimed at religious affiliation but at political affiliation. Few people in Northern Ireland care whether English, Welsh, Italian or German people working in Northern Ireland are Protestants or Catholics. Either way they constitute no threat to anyone. Similarly, there is no discrimination by Protestants against Roman Catholic members of the UDR or RUC, although they may be discriminated against by a few members of their own community.
It must be emphasised that a large part of the problem that we are addressing in the Bill is due not to deliberate discrimination but to other factors. I should guess that such discrimination as exists is 70 per cent. political, 20 per cent. cultural and only 10 per cent. purely religious. It would be more honest if the Bill spelt that out. I beg to move.
Lord Hylton: This amendment and Amendment No. 70, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blease, raise an important principle. I should like to see the Government accepting either one or the other. If they cannot do so they should produce their own improved version at the next stage.
Lord Lyell: I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Monson, will accept that the effect of his amendment would be to compromise the main political objective behind affirmative action in Northern Ireland. That objective is to encourage a more proportionate distribution of jobs and employment opportunities between the two main communal religious or political groupings in the Province.
That is why monitoring and affirmative action relate to both the Protestant and Roman Catholic communities. Everybody in the Province, regardless of their religious beliefs, is covered by the anti-discrimination and equality of opportunity provisions of the Bill. However, I believe that in this context the key issue in fair employment is the more proportional distribution of jobs between both major communities. I am afraid that in Northern Ireland

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and in Northern Irish terms that means the Protestant and Roman Catholic communities. For that reason, I believe that Clause 56, as drafted, meets the needs and the main thrust of the Bill, which I believe we are all agreed is particularly necessary in Northern Ireland. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Monson, will accept that we do not believe that his amendment is particularly helpful in that regard.
Lord Monson: I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hylton for his support. What the Minister said confirms my supposition that the essential thrust of Clause 56 is political and not religious. In a way it is curious that Amendment No. 70 is not grouped with this one. There were some misgroupings earlier, when amendments were grouped together which should not have been, and now these two have not been grouped together when they should have been. However, it may well be that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Blease, is superior to mine in various other respects and I look forward with interest to what he has to say. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
9.45 p.m.
Lord Blease Lord Blease moved Amendment No 70:
Page 46, line 13, at end insert—
("(1A) Affirmative action under subsection (1) above shall not be to the exclusion or discrimination of members of the Northern Ireland community who are not professed or classified for the purposes of this Act as members of the Protestant or of the Roman Catholic community.").
The noble Lord said: Before I speak to this amendment perhaps I may say that I admire the stamina of the Minister. He has now sat for seven and a quarter hours, sometimes for lengthy periods alone, which shows the confidence which his parliamentary colleagues have in him to deal with this Bill. My flagging concentration compels me to be brief in what I have to say, although I must do justice to the arguments which I believe this matter deserves.
The purpose of Amendment No. 70 is to attempt to write into the legislation a reference to members of the Northern Ireland community other than Protestant and Catholic members. I could put forward arguments and reasons why I believe that is justified. There is a tendency in this Bill to present Northern Ireland as consisting of only two communities: the Protestant and Catholic communities. I believe that that is false and completely misleading and does a disservice to the situation in Northern Ireland.
The problem in Northern Ireland is looked upon and seen throughout the world as a religious problem. I believe that it is the absence of religion which is to blame, and that is not by any means just a throw-away line. I believe that the values placed on religious persuasion mean that reconciliation and working together is something to strive for. The problems in Northern Ireland are confused. There are political and social divisions and issues in the Northern Ireland community as there are similarly
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in other communities. What rather compounds the problem in Northern Ireland is the blatant politically-motivated terrorism. That is what we must tackle. I am afraid that, while I fully support this Bill, it slants completely away from that desired objective of promoting reconciliation and understanding.
The citizens of Northern Ireland are not throwing Bibles and rosary beads at each other. They are not trying to crash each other's skulls, and they are not standing on corners debating theology and the Westminster "Confession of Faith". In Northern Ireland there are a number of communities which could be categorised along the lines set out in this Bill. There is the working class community, the professional community, the upper class community, the disabled community, the deprived community, the unemployed community, and the homeless community among many others, including the farming community of which the Minister will be aware.
I am glad to say that there are many Catholics, Protestants and others—the peace loving community—who carry out much voluntary and caring work with a sense of justice and fairness. I do not want to labour the point. The Bill tends to higher the sectarian walls by creating misconceptions and more misunderstandings. There is almost a strengthening of the myths about religious differences. Therefore, although I fully support the Bill, I should like to see some adjustment to that concept.
Lord Prys-Davies: I have listened with great sympathy to my noble friend Lord Blease who has, by his own example, sought to work in partnership with members of both communities in Northern Ireland. This amendment intends to ensure that non-Protestants and non-Catholics are not damaged by the affirmative action programmes.
With great respect to my noble friend, I believe that the amendment is misconceived. First, it is contrary to the whole thrust and philosophy of the Bill, which is designed to deal with inequality between Catholics and Protestants. Indeed, it is to provide a basis for a legal attack on the existence of discrimination and of inequality of opportunity. Secondly, we believe that it is unnecessary, to the extent that neither the government nor the opposition amendments make provision for religious exclusive affirmative action of the kind we have been talking about with regard to Clause 52.
It would be of assurance to my noble friend Lord Blease if the Government could get the affirmative action under way. All the people of Northern Ireland would stand to gain from that. If it takes place effectively the benefits will accrue to the entire population of Northern Ireland.
Lord Lyell: I should like to thank the noble Lord Lord Blease, for his opening compliments. He should know that my duties in Northern Ireland take me around the Province. I assure him that the night is young. If the noble Lord has attended any agricultural dinners, as I have, he will know that the Minister never speaks before one o'clock in the

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morning, and that is only the first speech. I shall not follow that example this evening.
The effect of the amendment would be to compromise what I referred to earlier in replying to the noble Lord, Lord Monson; that is, the main political objective in Northern Ireland behind the affirmative action in the Bill. The objective is to encourage at all times a more proportionate distribution of jobs and employment opportunities between the two main communal religions or political groupings in the Province. That is the problem which we are trying to address in the Bill. It is for that reason that both monitoring and affirmative action relate to the two main communities. Everybody in the Province is covered by the anti-discrimination and equality of opportunity provisions in the Bill.
In the political context the key issue in fair employment is a more proportional distribution of jobs between both communities. I think that the noble Lord will accept that that means Protestant and Roman Catholic communities. That position certainly applies as regards monitoring obligations placed upon employers, followed through with the important area of affirmative action measures.
At the heart of the Bill the fundamental problem that we are addressing is the distribution of jobs and employment opportunities between members of the two main communities. It is important that the monitoring and affirmative action provisions of the Bill in particular relate specifically to the Protestant and Roman Catholic communities. To attempt to give them a wider and more diffused focus would make life exceptionally difficult for employers and would draw attention, resources and effort away from the main issue.
Let us not forget that it is the commission that is going to be given the duty to work for the elimination of discrimination and to promote equality. We believe that the Bill provides comprehensive coverage in the area of discrimination and equality of opportunity.
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It is for that reason that we ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment because we believe that the Bill, especially as it is drawn in Clause 56, covers affirmative action as it should be covered in Northern Ireland.
Lord Hylton: I expect we have all heard the stories of atheists living in Belfast who have been immediately classified as either Protestant or Catholic. There was even the story of a GP in Derry who became so fed up with the carry-on of the two main religious communities that he became a Baha'i. I cannot vouch for the authenticity of that story but it is indicative of the background.
I believe that the merit of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Blease, is that it is framed in negative terms. It states,
"shall not be to the exclusion or discrimination".
I believe that is a strong point in its favour. It would be a terrible pity if this Bill succeeds in its main objective of ending employment discrimination between the two main religious and political groupings only to allow or encourage discrimination against others. I hope that we have not heard the final word from the Government on this point.
Lord Blease: I thank particularly my noble friend on the Front Bench for his remarks and the points he made. I am not convinced that he has got the real meaning of my intent in tabling the amendment. I believe that the Minister has dealt with it in a manner which is not helpful to the general need of the Northern Ireland community. There are areas where training, employment and reinvestment are all required. If people are to be treated purely in terms of Catholic or Protestant blocs then we are in for more trouble than we have ever envisaged. I propose to return to this matter at another time. In the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 56 agreed to.
10 p.m.
Lord Prys-Davies Lord Prys-Davies moved Amendment No. 71:
After Clause 56, insert the following new clause:
("Repeal of certain provisions of Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976.
Subsections (2) and (3) of section 42 of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 (certificate that act done for the purpose of safeguarding national security, or of protecting public safety or public order to be conclusive evidence of that fact) shall cease to have effect.").
The noble Lord said: The effect of this amendment is to allow judicial review of the national security notice issued by the Secretary of State. Members of the Commitee will know that the effect of the national security notice under Section 42 is to prevent an investigation by the commission into the merits of a case of alleged discrimination on the ground of national security. That is an issue to which we drew attention during the Second Reading debate.
We pointed out that there is no provision in the 1976 Act or anywhere in this Bill for any form of judicial review to prevent the abuse of the certificate procedure. There is in fact an anomaly between this Bill and the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order since a national certificate issued under that order is subject to judicial review. Moreover, there is an anomaly within the Bill itself. Part II of the Bill deals with contractor compliance. A contractor who is deemed by the Secretary of State to be an unqualified person to hold a contract on the grounds of national security can apply for judicial review.
We also believe that in this respect the Bill may be in conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights, which requires the individual citizen to have a right of redress against the arbitrary use of power. We say that individuals should not be denied access to employment on the pretext of national security. Of course we fully accept that the Secretary of State must have the power to issue a Section 42 certificate, but at the very least an individual who believes that he has been discriminated against unlawfully by the issue of the certificate should have the right to call for a judicial review. We do not say that he should have the right to have the reasons for the decision. We are asking that he should be entitled to the right of judicial review of the decision. By removing subsections (2) and (3) of Section 42 that would be possible.
At Second Reading the Minister assured the House that the department was considering how this procedure could be improved. I hope that by tonight he is in a position to accept the amendment. I beg to move.
Viscount Brookeborough: In putting my name to this amendment I show support for it to the extent that yet again we are trying to improve the public's perception of the impartiality of this legislation. It is not that we would doubt the job that the Secretary of State is carrying out, his willingness to provide certificates or anything else. From time to time the Secretary of State may change, and indeed after an election the government may change. It must not be
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seen by the public of Northern Ireland to be a Conservative or Labour decision to grant or not grant a certificate. We should like to improve the impartiality of the legislation and to improve what the public think of it. In that sense it follows along the lines of Amendments Nos. 1 to 4 which were moved earlier this afternoon.
Lord Lyell: The noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, raised this point at an earlier stage. During the Second Reading debate I explained that we believe that the issue of a certificate under Section 42 of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 is an inseparable part of the national security safeguard which that section provides and which all noble Lords, especially the noble Viscount, will agree is absolutely necessary. To permit wider scrutiny of the reasons for the issue of such certificates would be to jeopardise the sensitive information on the strength of which such certificates are issued and in so doing to do potential harm not only to the efforts of the security forces in Northern Ireland to gather valuable intelligence about terrorist organisations but quite possibly to the safety of individual people.
Applications for Section 42 certificates are not treated lightly. They are subject to the most detailed scrutiny. They are considered personally by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State. I know that he makes his decision only after the closest and most thorough deliberation. Certificates are not issued in haphazard ways. It is significant that, since the passing of the 1976 Act, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has issued Section 42 certificates on 17 occasions. To dismantle the certification process would undermine the entire and vitally important purpose of the safeguard for national security. To do this would not only be irresponsible but could be dangerous.
We take on board the strength of feeling which this matter has aroused as well as the genuine concern that has been expressed about the way in which the certificate procedure is operated. The whole process is, by definition, concerned with sensitive information and its analysis and assessment and the whole procedure itself is confidential. I realise that this is one of the reasons why the issue of Section 42 certificates is regarded with considerable suspicion. I hope that it is not a cloak to cover up lack of discrimination or even something which can be used by unscrupulous employers. That is not the case; but, certainly genuinely held anxieties do exist.
Members of the Committee may be aware that we have examined for many months how we might introduce an independent element into the procedure. We have not yet been successful in discovering how we can achieve that aim. However, we are looking at the administration process which we undertake. It is important that that process should be as straightforward and efficient as possible, and that when papers are submitted to the Secretary of State for his consideration, the advice and information they contain should be clear and wholly accurate. I must stress that everything

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possible will be done to eliminate the possibility of injustice in the issue of these particular certificates under Section 42.
I do not think that what I have said will satisfy the noble Lords who have moved this amendment, but I am afraid that it demonstrates the determination of the Government to see that the Section 42 system operates fairly. I ask noble Lords who have spoken to this amendment to accept that explanation in the spirit in which it is offered. I ask them to withdraw the proposed new clause, which would seriously damage the national security safeguard which the section provides.
I am sorry that I cannot go further than that tonight, but 17 certificates issued in 13 years is perhaps 17 too many. It must show Members of the Committee that this is not something which is carried out lightly, or without any thought. From my own knowledge of such matters, I know that these papers are read very thoroughly by all authorities, right up to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, and very searching questions are raised upon them. Further, the certificates are not granted without full and, I believe, justifiable reasons.
Lord Prys-Davies: I am sure we accept that the certificate is only issued after the most careful consideration. Our amendment is not based on any evidence that that is not so. But, concern arises on the part of individuals who believe that they have been discriminated against. It is their case that the certificate should be open to scrutiny by an independent third party. We suggested judicial review because that is the procedure which applies in the case of certificates issued under the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976.
It seems to me that if a certificate issued under the sex discrimination order can be the subject of judicial review without threatening national security, then a certificate issued under the 1976 Act should also be capable of review.
The Minister has moved some way to meet us in this respect. However, does he anticipate that at the next stage of the Bill the Government will be tabling an amendment which will introduce an independent element into the Section 42 procedure?
Lord Lyell: I am most grateful for the reply given by the noble Lord. As we speak tonight and knowing, as I putatively put it, the scheduled commencement of the Report stage of the Bill in this Chamber, I think that it is extremely doubtful that we shall have an amendment by that time. However, I shall make a careful note of what the noble Lord said and will be in touch with him before the next stage, I hope as early as tomorrow. But I really cannot give the guarantee he requested at this time. I hope that I shall have further news before the completion of the consideration of the Bill in this Chamber; but, certainly not by the next stage of the proceedings on the Bill.
Lord Prys-Davies: Again, relying upon the Minister's words, and with the leave of my colleagues whose names were tabled in support of this amendment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 57 and 58 agreed to.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Minor and consequential amendments]:
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 72:
Page 51, line 38, at end insert—
("23A. In paragraph 6(1) of Schedule I to that Act for "Schedule 5" there is substituted "Schedule I to the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989".").
The noble Lord said: This is a drafting amendment, because the existing reference in paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 1 to the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 to Schedule 5 to that Act is, I have to tell the Committee, in error. It is in error since Schedule 5 to the 1976 Act has been replaced by Schedule 1 to this Bill. That provides the necessity for the drafting amendment which I propose. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 73:
Page 52, line 6, at end insert—
("The Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 (S.I. 1976/1042 (N.I.15))
27A. At the end of Article 49 of the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 there be added—
"(4) Any act which by virtue of this Article or Article 48 could not be unlawful under Parts III to V (or, in the case of an act falling within paragraph (3), under Article 15) is not by virtue of 16(2)(b) of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 (indirect discrimination on the grounds of religious belief or political opinion) unlawful under any provision of Parts III and IV of that Act."").
The noble Lord said: I think that this is where Lyell's luck tends to hold since, with Amendments Nos. 65 and 66, it was the turn of the noble Lords, Lord Prys-Davies and Lord Bonham-Carter. However, at this stage my amendment has been called by the noble Lord the Lord Chairman before the competing amendment—if I may call it that—of the noble Lords, Lord Prys-Davies and Lord Bonham-Carter.
The amendment honours a commitment made in another place to provide protection against indirect religious discrimination for what we call the "positive action" or gender specific training permissible under Articles 48 and 49 of the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976. Both the Opposition—that is noble Lords cpposite—and the Equal Opportunities Commission raised concerns about this matter. We are pleased to be able to try to meet their representations.
The positive action or gender specific training permissible under Articles 48 and 49 is a useful tool in the promotion of sex equality. Obviously the Government would not wish to see its progressive

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use potentially inhibited by the new provisions in the Fair Employment Bill before us this evening. As the Committee will appreciate, one of the most significant new features of the Bill is the outlawing of indirect religious discrimination. Direct discrimination is illegal under the 1976 Act.
Given the new prohibition on indirect religious discrimination in Clause 48, new Section 16(2)(b) of the 1976 Act, concern was expressed to us that employers who genuinely seek to implement gender specific training under Articles 48 and 49 of the Sex Discrimination Order 1976 could quite inadvertently find themselves guilty of indirect religious discrimination.
There are of course three tests that have to be satisfied before indirect discrimination can be proved. First, adverse impact; secondly, unjustifiability; and thirdly, detriment. While it may be difficult in practical terms for an individual to satisfy all three tests in alleging indirect religious discrimination, as a result of gender specific training programmes—especially when an employer should be able to show that such a programme is justifiable, irrespective of religious belief or political opinion—we hope that we can provide the protection which is requested by the Equal Opportunities Commission and Members of the Committee opposite. Indeed, we are satisfied that such protection is necessary because the indirect discrimination element is a new feature of our fair employment legislation, above all the Bill before us this evening.
I hope that that explanation will bring about the approval of the amendment which stands in my name before the Committee. I beg to move.
Lord Bonham-Carter: I do not wish to detain the Committee long on this penultimate amendment in such a long day. The objects at which both amendments are directed are the same. It is simply my contention that the amendment in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, is better than the one tabled by the Government. This is for a simple reason. As I understand it and read it, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, covers only indirect discrimination. The point of the amendment which I and the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, have tabled is that it covers both direct and indirect discrimination. It is for that reason that I prefer our amendment to that of the Government.
10.15 p.m.
Lord Prys-Davies: I very much wish to support what the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, has told the Committee. Our amendment, in our view, is far superior to the Government's amendment because it addresses both direct and indirect discrimination. I mentioned earlier in the day that I had received a letter from the chair of the Northern Ireland Equal Opportunities Commission. I was told by the chair that the commission itself was hesitant about endorsing the terms of the Government's amendment because it fails to address both aspects
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of discrimination under Section 16 of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 but is confined solely to indirect discrimination. As it is confined to indirect discrimination, there will be scope for legal challenges to gender specific training unless this amendment is more widely drafted so as to cover both direct and indirect discrimination.
Lord Lyell: I shall reply to the very delicate way in which the noble Lords, Lord Bonham-Carter and Lord Prys-Davies, placed their amendment in competition to mine. I think both of them would accept that in my opening remarks I pointed out that the 1976 Act already makes direct religious discrimination illegal. We have ensured that that is covered in our amendment. I hope that will also cover the query that was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter.
For many reasons, I shall not go into a lengthy explanation tonight. We believe that our amendment should be satisfactory and will meet the queries that have been raised by the Equal Opportunities Commission in Northern Ireland.
Lord Bonham-Carter: If the Minister can give me and the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, an assurance that direct discrimination is covered, I shall be happy not to move my amendment.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendment No. 74 not moved.]
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell moved Amendment No. 75:
Page 52, line 10, at end insert—
("28A. In Article 32(3) of that Order at the end there is added—
"(c) a dismissal which is an act of discrimination (within the meaning of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976) which is unlawful by virtue of Part III of that Act."").
The noble Lord said: The Committee will be pleased to know that this is a technical amendment to the Industrial Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1976. It covers a complex but relatively minor issue. It is suggested that I explain the provision briefly. If the Committee wishes me to do so I shall, but it may wish to leave this as a technical amendment to the Industrial Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1976.
The main purpose of the amendment is that it provides that compensation payable under the order in a case of alleged unfair dismissal on the grounds of religion is the same as that payable in a case of unfair dismissal on the grounds of sex. That might be of some relevance to the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Seear. We hope that the amendment will bring the Bill into line with the provisions of the 1976 order. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining schedule agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with amendments.

Licensing Amendment (Scotland) Bill
10.20 p.m.
Lord Stallard: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
This is a very short Bill. It consists of only two clauses. It is designed to tighten controls on the sale of alcohol to under-age persons from supermarkets and other premises covered by an off-sale licence in Scotland. It might be useful, even at this late hour, if I briefly outline the background and the reasons why it was felt necessary to introduce the Bill.
In October 1986 the Scottish Home and Health Department issued a consultative document seeking views on possible amendments to the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976. Apart from a reference to "children's certificates" for public houses, no views were sought or expected in regard to under-age drinking. At that time there was discussion about the public house being made into a family environment and about children's facilities. At that stage the department did not ask for and did not expect to receive comments on under-age drinking.
However, it soon became clear that that was the issue of most concern throughout Scotland. About 70 community councils in Scotland and many thousands of members of the public wrote to the department expressing the view that there was a need for more stringent control of the sale of alcohol from off-licences to help combat the problems of under-age drinking.
At about the same time the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys carried out a survey of adolescent drinking. About 2,000 adolescents in Scotland aged between 13 and 17 were surveyed and the report was published in December 1986. The report's findings indicated that among 14 year-olds in Scotland 32 per cent. of boys and 28 per cent. of girls who drank said tint if they purchased drink for themselves they usually purchased it at off-licences. Twenty-one per cent. and 28 per cent. respectively said that they usually bought drink from shops or supermarkets. In other words, out of each 100 surveyed 32 boys said that they drank and 21 got their liquor from supermarkets or other off-licences. For girls the figures were 28 and 18.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, perhaps I may ask the noble Lord this question. The statistics that he quoted relate to shops and supermarkets. In the Bill are shops included or just supermarkets?
Lord Stallard: My Lords, both. The report also provided evidence that most adolescents in Scotland who buy alcohol appear to buy it unchecked and most of them from supermarkets. I cannot go into the details at this time of night; I wish that I could.
A working party on young people and alcohol was chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Masham. She apologises for not being present; she would have liked to have spoken on her report but she had to be elsewhere. The report was published in 1987 and made recommendations in relation to under-age drinking. It noted that off-licences were cited as a major source of supply for teenagers and, in
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particular, the self-service section of licensed supermarkets. The group recommended that the law should stipulate that all sales of alcoholic liquor should be made by, or at least effectively supervised by, persons aged 18 or over.
In November 1988 the Daily Record, a well-known Scottish newspaper, began a campaign for action to be taken against what it called "teeny tipplers". That campaign aroused countrywide support from the Scottish public. There was a tremendous amount of support for it. District councils took up the issue and joined in a campaign to persuade the Government to take positive steps to curtail drinking in public places as a crime prevention measure.
I ought to mention here in order to save time later that drinking in public places is the subject of consultation with CoSLA and the police about the possible introduction of by-laws. As far as I am aware, the Government are awaiting CoSLA's proposals as to where experimental by-laws might be introduced. That dealt satisfactorily for the time being—until we see the government proposals—with that aspect of the problem.
A great many examples were given of the social problems caused by under-age drinking and its attendant features, particularly in Committee in the other place. I should like to mention many more examples than is possible. However, to show the concern that was felt by Members of Parliament, I shall mention one example that stood out to me. It was mentioned by Dr. Reid who is the Member of Parliament for Motherwell, North. At col. 19 of the proceedings of the Commons Second Scottish Standing Committee on 10th May he said that a public meeting called to discuss the issue had been attended by 450 parents. It is a rare event nowadays, with all the other distractions, for a public meeting to be attended by 450 people. That fact alone shows the concern of those parents who attended a meeting organised by local councilors—
Lord Henley: My Lords, I think it is probably incorrect that the noble Lord should quote from proceedings in another place. It would probably be better if he paraphrased what was said.
Lord Stallard: My Lords, I accept what the noble Lord says. I am in fact paraphrasing rather than quoting exactly.
As I said, Dr. Reid said that the meeting was attended by 450 people. That shows the importance attached to the subject and the concern felt by parents and expressed to their councillors in that part of Lanarkshire about what were becoming no-go areas between the hours of five and six o'clock at night—even, later at night, for grown men. Those people were not killjoys. They wanted to make sure that the balance of leisure activities was contained within a legal framework. The one does not preclude the other. That is only a brief illustration. There are many others that I could give about the concern felt by those people.
We are only too familiar with the relationship between crime and alcohol abuse. There have been scores of reports, documents and committees on the

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matter. I shall not list them all. But according to one recent survey almost 66 per cent. of inmates in a Scottish young offenders' institution in 1980 said that they had committed their offences while under the influence of alcohol. A frightening thought about that statistic is that if that was the situation in 1980, how much worse is it now, given the increase in drinking generally, in under-age drinking in particular, and in all kinds of crime? It certainly frightens most people when they think deeply about it. There are many more statistics that I could quote to illustrate the extent of the problem in Scotland. I hope that I have said enough for the moment to establish the extent of the concern.
Against that background, in December 1988 Mr. Jimmy Hood, Member of Parliament for Clydesdale, introduced a Bill to deal with under-age drinking in public places. While sympathising with that Bill, the Government pointed out a number of flaws. Mr. Hood was persuaded to rethink his proposals. Because of the time limitation on Private Members' Bills—all parliamentarians understand that restriction—it was not possible to have wide consultation. However, consultation did take place with a number of people. The Government intimated support and the Bill now before us was introduced.
The Bill provides that, in any off-sales premises, sales of alcohol may be made only by or under the supervision of an adult person. It also provides that in any licensed premises with three or more till or sale points—call them what one will—the intending purchaser will require authorisation of the sale at a separate wrapping and pricing point manned by adults before proceeding to the check-out.
The first provision—that the sale of alcohol must be made or supervised by a person over 18—should not cause supermarkets or anybody else too much of a problem. Indeed, many of them already operate a similar procedure. I am impressed when I read about some of the practices that are in existence in some of these supermarkets. It was pointed out during the Committee proceedings in another place that this procedure itself is open to abuse by collusion between an under-age purchaser and a co-operative friend employed on check-out duties. That is not apparently unknown or even uncommon in some parts of Scotland. So the imposition of an additional check at the authorisation point makes such collusion that much more difficult. It does not totally abolish it, but it makes it more difficult.
Critics have said that the necessity to have the purchase authorised would cause great inconvenience and annoyance to consumers.
10.30 p.m.
Lord Jenkin of Roding: My Lords, I should be extremely grateful if the noble Lord would give way. He has touched on one of the points which cause me and I know some others a certain amount of anxiety. He said that the additional authorisation point would make it more difficult for adults to buy alcohol on behalf of juveniles. Could he explain why that should be so, compared with the position of a juvenile who wants alcohol and persuades an adult to go into the shop and buy it for him? It will be the
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adult who gets the authorisation, and then when he goes out of the shop he will hand over the product to the juvenile. I think that the noble Lord owes it to the House to explain why the authorisation point will make that process any different at all except to add an extra stage.
Lord Stallard: My Lords, first of all I did not mention that point at this stage. I said that the procedure that exists now is open to abuse by collusion between an under-age purchaser and a friendly operator at the check-out. It is not the same point as that mentioned by the noble Lord, but it is the point that I am making. It makes it more difficult for that kind of collusion to take place if the under-age person has to be checked. He has not now to be checked but if he has to be checked in the future there will be less likelihood of that kind of collusion. And of course there will be the force of law with its penalties and so on to back that up. So it must be more difficult. Probably it will deter most under-age drinkers who have been getting away with this practice because of a friend. They will find that the friend will now lose his job and all sorts of complications will arise. That is the point that I was making. We may well come to the other point later on, but at this stage to save time I am bound to say that the fact that the adult has to be checked—and indeed the whole operation has to be checked—puts some kind of responsibility on those who do not have it now. There is the force of the law behind it and they know that it is there. Young people will be less inclined even to try some of the practices that they have attempted up to now. So I believe that there would also be some kind of restraint on those practices.
I was saying that the critics have said that the necessity to have the purchase authorised would cause great inconvenience and annoyance to consumers. I go on to say that I can understand that because I am one of those people who use supermarkets quite frequently. I could say too frequently because I do not like the chore of shopping, but I have to do it.
But why should it be more inconvenient or disruptive than the other special counters? We all know and use the special counters for cheeses, bacon, fresh meat or fish and a whole range of other items including, invariably, tobacco. All those commodities are dealt with at separate counters. One has to queue up and have one's purchases authorised. One has to ask for, say, 1¼ lb. of cheese, which is priced at £1·69 or so; a piece of paper then has a stamp put on it and it is clipped to the purchase, which must be taken through the check-out point. One has been authorised to purchase it at that separate counter. That happens now and I have never heard anybody complain about that course. In fact people like it. They like the choice. Most people at heart do not really like supermarkets and hanker after the old times when one could pick and choose and be served by an assistant. That was an aside; nonetheless people still like to choose from a selection of cheese, bacon or whatever. They like to be able to say, "I'll have half a pound off that piece".

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So in my view there is no substance in the criticism that it will cause great disruption. What causes a great deal of disruption and complaint is that when customers reach the check-out there is a long queue. But six or seven checkouts are not manned for long periods of the week. Nobody is there. They complain about such queueing; and I think that they are quite justified.
I therefore could not see any basis for the criticism, especially in the context of the Scottish scene where we know the tremendous amount of support that already exists among the shopping public for the Bill and for the measures that are attached to these new procedures. I believe that the critics are wrong, and will be proved to be wrong.
There has also been some predictable opposition from trade interests. It was inevitable. They feel aggrieved. They say that there was no wide consultation and that this is an additional burden which will bring them no benefit but will increase their costs. People think hard when they hear of that objection. I have studied the Official Report of the proceedings in another place. There was no serious attempt to argue these points at any stage in those proceedings, although trade interests were represented throughout. It was generally accepted that the potential benefits that would accrue from the attempt to control the problem far outweigh any inconvenience. These interests were prepared to put up with any inconvenience and the small cost in relation to their turnover on alcohol. It seemed to have been accepted, however reluctantly.
The question of consultation has always been a problem, in particular on Private Members' Bills. One cannot produce a Green Paper, with a consultative period during the procedure on Private Members' Bills. It has never been possible. There has always been a difficulty on consultation. But the position is well understood, not only by us but by all those consultants who operate in the field—the PR firms and the researchers. It is a big industry. I have not seen these people lacking in this respect. Usually they are able to ensure that their interests are well stated and represented at all stages of a Bill.
I can honestly say that I have had no correspondence from anyone or any organisation, big or small. I have had nothing except one telephone call from Gateway asking for a meeting. I met representatives yesterday. We discussed the Bill. Although we did not reach complete agreement, at the end of the meeting I promised to take away some of the points that they raised and consider them between now and the next stage. That is the only approach that has been made to me by anyone. I am therefore inclined to consider that consultation did not worry these people too much.
My noble friend Lord Graham kindly showed me a letter that he had received from the Scottish Consumer Council. Probably some other Members have received this letter also. In it the council raised the question about lack of debate. On 6th July it stated:
"Moreover, there has been little or no debate about the details of the proposal. The Scottish Consumer Council only became aware of it two weeks ago".
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Two weeks from 6th July takes us well into the third week of June. This Bill was presented to Parliament on 26th April. It had its Second Reading in the other place on 28th April. That is 10 weeks ago. It went through its Committee stages on 10th May. That is eight weeks ago. Here is a consultative organisation—a consumer council—which states in another letter that I have read that it is constantly on the look-out for issues that affect its members and consumers and that it never lets an opportunity go by without commenting. It heard about the Bill only two weeks ago; that is about eight or nine weeks after it was introduced in the Commons. It complains about lack of debate. I do not think that there is any substance in that complaint. In fact there is a question mark about the whole organisation, to my mind. If I were connected with it I should want to know why it had not heard about the Bill and why it had not carried out its function as a lobbying or a research organisation.
I am sorry that I cannot deal with any more correspondence because of the time, but as I have said, apart from Gateway, no other organisation has made any approaches to me. I imagine that the others have concentrated on selected Members of your Lordships' House. I understand that and am not complaining. I have not been selected; that is all; but it says something about the publicity industry generally.
However, although the trade has some reservations, most have now been accepted, as I have said, with some reluctance. The Bill has merit in its attempt to control teenage drinking and the trade is prepared to give the proposals a fair wind. The Bill had all-party support in another place; it has massive public support in Scotland. It had a great deal of positive newspaper and other media support, and it also has Government support.
I again refer to the Committee proceedings and the words of the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, Lord James Douglas-Hamilton. I am being careful in referring to his name so that I am not out of order, and the noble Lord, Lord Henley, will not be too vexed. The Under-Secretary of State gave it his wholehearted support. He even said that there were two simple points in support of the Bill. He welcomed it as a crime prevention measure. He regarded the Bill as a significant part of an overall package of measures, because there is a package of measures. I have mentioned another one, that the Government are in consultation about bye-laws. The Government have also announced their intention to bring in some licensing legislation in the next Session of Parliament. These things are all going on. There are constant discussions about the crime wave and so on. The Bill, according to the Under-Secretary of State at the Scottish Office and the Government, is a very useful addition and,
"a significant part of the overall package."
In the view of the Scottish Horne and Health Department,
"the Bill is a useful measure in that context".
The Minister ended by giving the Government's unreserved support for the Bill and he congratulated the honourable Member for Clydesdale on it. He commended Clause 1 and hoped that it and the

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whole Bill succeeded. I do not think I can add to those sentiments in a way that satisfies me. That will do me. I look forward to a useful and constructive debate. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read a second time.—(Lord Stallard.)
10.43 p.m.
Lord Lucas of Chilworth: My Lords, I think I probably speak for your Lordships' House when I say that I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, for his explanation of the Bill. I do not have any quarrel with what he had to say and what the Bill attempts to do in terms of curtailing the purchase of alcohol or drink by under-age people. I do not have any complaint about any measure that goes some way towards stemming alcohol abuse. Indeed, the noble Lord will recall our very long debates in March 1988 during the passage of the English licensing Act. There is concern. What there has to be is a balance of concern and practicality. I will come to that in a moment.
It may be thought outside your Lordships' House somewhat impertinent of me to object or to become involved in a Bill the content of which is essentially a Scottish matter. But I submit to your Lordships that it is not only of concern in Scotland because of the 14,000 alcohol drink outlets in Scotland, but that just over 1,000 are affected by the proposals contained in the Bill. Those affected are mainly English multiples. It seems manifestly unfair that out of some 14,000 outlets fewer than 10 per cent. should be singled out for a piece of legislation.
I am advised by Messrs. Hill Brown, the specialist solicitors in Glasgow dealing essentially with licensing matters, that there is no great body of objection to supermarket applications. That is what we are dealing with in the Bill: supermarket sales premises with more than three sales points. Only in June this year a big national multiple was granted a licence, oddly enough, in the Clydesdale district court, without any comment, question or condition. Indeed, it was in the constituency of the honourable Member for Clydesdale who is promoting the Bill. That appears to be most odd because I understand that in Scotland the licensing boards are made up of locally-elected district councillors. Yet the application was granted without comment, question or condition.
The noble Lord, Lord Stallard, referred to consideration in another place; just 100 minutes in the second Standing Committee. It was unfair of him to say that the Bill had its Second Reading in April. The Second Reading went through on the nod, as did every other stage other than the second Standing Committee. I must ask rhetorically: is it good enough to put forward a Bill which has not been accorded the opportunity of being discussed fully in another place? Is it fair that the honourable Member in another place should say, as he did, that there is no great objection and only the retailers are objecting?
Sadly, he said that before the Scottish Consumer Council issued its report and before its views were known. Those views are now known and the council
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opposes Clause 1(3). It sets out its arguments fully and cogently in a widely distributed document. I shall not quote from it, but perhaps other noble Lords might. It is a very good document.
The Bill before us this evening assumes that supermarket wine and spirit sales are a primary source of liquor bought or consumed by those under age. The noble Lord draws in support a number of statistics which have been produced by the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys. I do not quarrel with them. However, I draw your Lordships' attention to the only independent report on drink of which I know. It was published in 1985 by Exeter University. It identified the home, and not the supermarket, as being the primary source for the acquisition of drink. If I remember correctly, the tables put the supermarket fairly low down. Pubs, clubs and discos account for the largest number of under-age people acquiring drink.
Let us look at some aspects of the Bill in relation to the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976. Already the sale of alcohol in on-licensed premises with a bar must be by a person over the age of 18. The proposed legislation appears to ignore the separate off-sales department in a pub or hotel. Those off-sales may not be designated as special areas and that is in terms of Section 119 of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976. Whether or not designated, the Bill does not attempt to bridge the apparent gap created by those off-sale parts of pubs and hotels where the sale of liquor does not take place over the bar. It appears that the off-sales are not covered by the Bill and that such sales would not require any authorisation whatever. Therefore, there is a gap between these proposals and the existing law.
Another apparent omission in the proposed legislation is the wholesale purchase. A licence is not required to sell alcohol in wholesale quantities and, as no reference is made to wholesale quantities in the Bill, presumably such sales would continue to be unauthorised on non-licensed premises.
The new Bill introduces a step prior to the sale of alcohol in a supermarket or another place with more than three—and I quote the noble Lord—"till points or call them what you will". I shall return to that in a few moments. Again, so far as I can see, that does not affect the absolute offence and responsibility contained in Section 68 of the Scottish Act of 1976, which is not to sell liquor to a person under 18 years. Therefore, even if a sale is authorised, the authorised liquor could then be passed, as my noble friend Lord Jenkin of Roding attempted to say earlier, to a person under 18 years old and then it would presumably be the responsibility of the check-out operator or the person at the sales point, till or "call it what you will" point; I do not know. We must look at that if we reach a later stage.
Since the new Section 97B(1)(a)(i) uses the term "authorised", one assumes that there has to be a separate authorisation point or counter and I suppose that has to be manned by an authorising officer. Again, there is no link between this point and Section 68 of the Scottish Act to which I have already referred. I said that that Act already provides for the sale of liquor in licensed premises to or by persons under the age of 18 years to be an absolute

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offence. Perhaps, in parenthesis, I may ask the question raised by my noble friend: should there be collusion between the would-be purchaser, because he is only the would-be purchaser at that stage, and the authorising officer or even later between the authorising officer and the sale point, cash point or "call it what you will" point, who is, or is anybody, guilty of aiding and abetting the wilful buying or attempt to buy alcohol? There is nothing in the Bill about that and the noble Lord opposite said nothing as regards that matter.
Everybody is reasonably happy about Clause 1(2). That refers to shops with more than three check-outs, till points, sale points or "call it what you will" points, which is fairly clear. The noble Lord opposite laughs but those are his words and not mine. That merely indicates that there is no definition in the Bill of what is meant by a "sale point". One is assuming a number of matters. I merely ask why the language in that clause, which we welcome, is different from Section 18 of the 1988 English Act.
Perhaps I may turn to the question of the sale point and ask what it actually is. Is that a cash register or at the check-out queue? Is it operative whether it is manned or not manned? Is it operative if it is a till that is plugged in or not plugged in? Must it be working or can it be out of commission? All those questions will have to be answered sooner or later because there is a gap in the proposed legislation.
Referring to Clause 1(3) again, when does a criminal offence take place? Is it when the product is selected from the shelf? Is it when the would-be buyer joins the queue at the check-out or till, or is it when the sale is made by the passing of cash? Is there a defence for a customer who inadvertently finds himself in that position and is charged with wilfully attempting to buy the product? The Bill does not say anything about that matter and I cannot trace anything about it. It seems to be manifestly unfair. Who decides when this criminal offence takes place? How will he or she decide? When will he or she decide? Whose responsibility is it—the licence holder, his employee, duly authorised, or his agent? Do they have any discretion? What are they supposed to do—make a civil arrest or call for the police? It really is a nonsense.
In the Second Scottish Standing Committee proceedings, these questions were asked: who has the duty to report the offence? Is there a defence for a licence holder who fails to report an alleged offence? Nobody in the Standing Committee—and I have read the whole 100 minutes of the proceedings—gave an answer to that. We need an answer.
I turn to a matter which has concerned this House on innumerable occasions—low alcohol products. The Bill unwittingly makes it more difficult to purchase de-alcoholised or low alcohol wines and beers because of the definition of alcoholic liquor. I shall not go into that matter now but may do so at a later stage. It strikes me that in our great endeavours—and the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, in 1988 gave encouragement to the wider distribution and sale of low alcohol and non-alcohol beverages—we shall block that.
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There are only a thousand outlets or so in Scotland which will be so disbarred. The double queues argument to which the noble Lord opposite referred is a specious argument. If he looks across the whole range of technology that is being introduced into retail store operations, he will know that double queues are fast disappearing with the introduction of the bar scanning system for loose products as well as pre-packaged products. That is apparent, and as stores are up-dated and modernised the compulsory double queue is disappearing. One can opt in a store to buy a pre-packed item. The double queue argument is specious.
The problem of the illegal sale and purchase of alcohol by minors is a matter of concern to society, parents, licence holders, authorities and Parliament. However, I suggest that the need for adequate controls must not be allowed to cloud common sense. Clause 1(3) falls into this trap. It will establish a procedure patently fraught with difficulties, which will be ambiguous and burdensome to those who will have to operate it. I have tried to illustrate some examples. Sadly, it will have an insignificant effect on the problem. The Scottish Consumer Council described the Bill as a "guddle"—and that it is. I seriously urge the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, and—dare I say it?—my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate to think again about Clause 1(3).
11 p.m.
Lord Cocks of Hartcliffe: My Lords, I shall be extremely brief because my noble friend Lord Stallard has admirably outlined the purpose of the Bill in moving the Second Reading. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, was a little unfair on the other place because the Private Members' Bill procedure there is very sophisticated. The fact that a Bill receives a Second Reading on the nod means that there is not one out of the 650 Members of Parliament who wishes to raise an objection. A Bill can only receive a Second Reading, on the nod if there is no objection at all. One Member shouting "Object!" is sufficient to block its further progress.
The fact that the Bill has been through the other place with Second and Third Readings on the nod should not inhibit us from discussing it on its merits. On the other hand, I agree that it is a more onerous responsibility on this House in terms of its revising and scrutinising function. My noble friend said that he was prepared to listen to suggestions for improving the Bill.
In terms of licensing laws Scotland has been ahead of England for some time. Indeed it would be a very unwise Englishman who did not concede that Scotland is ahead of England in many other ways as well. The Scottish licensing laws were liberalised in the mid-1970s and it is only recently that England has caught up. I hope that at a later stage it will be possible to consider, as the merits of the Bill become clearer, whether it can be extended to England through a fairly straightforward amendment.
I know that my noble friend will be receptive to suggestions for improvement as the Bill proceeds. I wish to congratulate him on taking on the promotion of the Bill in this House. I hope that it has a successful

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passage and that it is improved in such a way that it gains support in all parts of the House as it did in the other place.
11.3 p.m.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, when I first heard of this Bill I greeted it with enthusiasm because I recognise that teenage drinking is a major social evil in Scotland. Anything that is designed to curtail or limit alcohol consumption among teenagers is to be welcomed. Since the Bill reached this House I have received representations from the Retail Consortium, a large supermarket chain in Scotland and one or two other bodies in the retail distribution business.
I was not seriously affected by those representations. I was mindful of the experience of this House and of the pressure of the brewers in the last week or two. Therefore, I tended to say "All right, they are rather special interests who are pleading their case". But when I received a representation from the Scottish Consumer Council, a body for which I have the highest regard, I began to examine in greater detail the full implications of the Bill.
It is not enough to say that we are dealing with a major social evil. The question that this House has to answer is whether this major social evil will be seriously affected by the provisions of the Bill. It is easy for the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, to say that there is massive support in Scotland for the Bill. Of course there is massive support in Scotland for anything that will limit teenage drinking, particularly when that support is whipped up by the most popular Robert Maxwell tabloid in Scotland which has adopted this as its cause. And which MP can resist the pressure of the Daily Record in Scotland?
In this House, however, we have a rather different task. We have to examine seriously whether the Bill will cure a social problem about which we are all concerned. I feel just as deeply about the problem of teenage drinking as the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, and Members of this House and of another place. I very much regret the terms of an interview given by Mr. Hood, the sponsor of the Bill, to the Glasgow Herald today in which he castigated the Scottish Consumer Council. He said:
"It appears that the hurried response of the Scottish Consumer Council in supporting big business interests indicates that the interest of the large supermarket chain is more important to the Scottish Consumer Council than the interests of thousands of young Scottish kids who are victims of alcohol abuse".
That is a distortion of the situation. The Scottish Consumer Council has played a prominent and admirable part in examining consumer legislation in Scotland in a detached and objective manner and is certainly not the product of the big business interests in Scotland. That is a complete distortion of its role. I hope that Mr. Hood will think again when giving interviews of that kind.
What does the Scottish Consumer Council say about the Bill? It has already been said that the legislation would affect only the larger shops and supermarkets with three or more points of sale. There is no evidence that the sale of alcohol to
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minors is a significant problem in the larger supermarkets. As has been stressed, the teenage drinker can acquire alcohol at the disco or at some of the less reputable distributors. Between now and the next stage of the Bill I invite any Member of the House to go into any of the large supermarkets and test for himself whether he can get through the check-out with an under-age person buying alcohol. I have made that test myself; I find that control at the large and reputable supermarkets is taken seriously. I believe that the Bill attacks the wrong target. It attacks the large supermarket and ignores the small and less reputable distributors in the trade. To that extent the Bill is faulty.
Perhaps the Minister will confirm at a later stage tonight that the Government intend in the next Session to bring in new legislation affecting licensing in Scotland. It would be more appropriate to introduce this kind of measure within that new, legislation and perhaps devise something more effective in tackling this social problem. Anyone who visits large supermarkets—I used to be, but am no longer, in the supermarket business—will find that few minors line up at the check-out to buy merchandise. The Bill attacks the wrong target.
For those reasons I hope that our friends who wish to tackle this social evil will look again at the Bill and examine how far the real problem is being dealt with in the legislation now before us.
11.10 p.m.
Baroness Young: My Lords, I should begin by declaring an interest as I speak as a non-executive director of Marks and Spencer. However, at this late hour I shall be brief in what I have to say. I agree with the points which have been made by my noble friend Lord Lucas and by the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe.
I should like to make just three points. The first and most important is that no one could quarrel with the purpose of the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Stallard. In my life I have had a great deal to do with education, and I am well aware of the fact that today many teachers are extremely concerned about under-age drinking, and about children who have been able to obtain alcoholic drinks during the lunch hour and who come back to school unfit to take part in lessons. I am also aware of the concern of the parents and the public. Therefore, no one could quarrel with any measure which is designed to try to address that particular social difficulty which we face today.
My second point is that I unconditionally support the provisions in the Bill which seek to ensure that the sale of alcohol on off-sales premises should only be made by adults or under adult supervision. As I understand it, that would bring the law in Scotland into line with that which now operates in England and Wales. I think that it is a very useful measure and one which deserves support.
My third point—and here I very much agree with what has been said by other noble Lords—is that I am most unhappy about Clause 1(3). I have been greatly impressed by the evidence which has been produced by the Scottish Consumers' Association.

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At this late stage there is not the time, nor would it be appropriate, to go through in detail the many points which the association has made. However, I shall touch upon three of them.
First, the legislation affects only larger supermarkets, and supermarkets with three or more points of sale. That is a very small proportion of all the stores which sell alcohol. In fact, there is no evidence to support the contention that it is in the larger supermarkets that alcohol is sold to minors, or that it is a problem. Indeed, it is quite the contrary.
The Scottish Consumers' Association has published most valuable statistical information showing that this is not the case. As the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, quite rightly made clear, this particular subsection is aimed at the wrong stores; it is the small shop where this situation is much more likely to take place.
Secondly, the legislation is quite impractical in relation to a large supermarket and really would not work. Thirdly, it would cause great inconvenience to customers because they would have to queue twice. Further, as the Scottish Consumers' Association makes quite clear, queueing is one of the things which customers most dislike and supermarkets make tremendous efforts to try to make their check-outs more efficient.
We would find ourselves faced with the absurd position where someone who was perfectly entitled to buy alcohol would be risking a very heavy fine through not having gone to an authorised point, and then going through the check-out point, and therefore is caught by the provisions of this Bill—whereas the young person who is most unlikely to be in a supermarket would not be affected.
Therefore I very much hope that the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, will take a long hard look at this subsection as the Bill proceeds through its many stages. I think he said that he had not had the opportunity to talk to the retailers, but I hope that he will discuss with them these very real concerns. I am sure that they would be prepared to meet him and explain to him the real problems which they face and that this section of the Bill will not help on the one issue which the noble Lord wishes to address.
Perhaps I may conclude by putting a very important point. It would be a great pity if it were thought that somehow those who were against Clause 1(3) represented a group which had no interest at all in trying to deal with the problem of under-age drinking. Indeed, my experience shows that a great deal of trouble is taken rigidly to enforce the law as it stands in England and Wales and to ensure by training that everybody is well aware of the law; to ensure by notices that customers have the law brought to their attention and that there is a supervisor to whom they can appeal if there is any doubt about the age of a person purchasing alcohol. But also there is every possible interest not only in complying with the law but in complying with the spirit of the law. No one wants to see this very great social evil of under-age drinking helped in any way.
There is a great sense of responsibility. I can speak on behalf of Marks and Spencer, but that view would be shared by all the supermarkets affected by this.
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It would be a great pity if it were thought that the case was otherwise. With those remarks, I hope very much that the noble Lord will look at this section again.
Lord Macaulay of Bragar: My Lords, before the noble Baroness sits down, perhaps I may ask her to point out where in the Bill it is made a necessity on the part of the supermarket to have a separate authorisation point where a queue would form.
Baroness Young: My Lords, as I understand it that is how this part of the Bill would have to work in order to achieve its objective.
Lord Macaulay of Bragar: My Lords, if I may say so, that is perhaps the imagination of the large stores at work. If the noble Baroness cares to look at Section 97B(2)(b), the only requirement is that the authorisation has to be made other than at a point of sale. The point of sale is obviously the check-out. Therefore there is no need to have any special expenditure in order to build 15,000 authorisation points.
Baroness Young: My Lords, at this late stage I do not wish to become involved in something which is clearly a point for the Committee Stage. In order to fulfil this section of the Bill it would be necessary to have some other point in order to make the situation quite clear. I do not think it would be right to take up the time of the House on Second Reading with considering precisely how that takes place. I am concerned only about the practicalities. I am quite certain that the noble Lord would not wish something to reach the statute book which would bring the law into disrepute because it was unworkable and would not deal wich the problem which both of us would like to see dealt with in an effective manner.
11.18 p.m.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: My Lords, first I must apologise to the noble Lord for not being here at the beginning of his opening speech. I am afraid that it was largely due to the disorganisation of business which happened today.
Perhaps I may start by supporting what the noble Baroness, Lady Young, has been saying. As I understood it from reading the Committee stage of the Bill in another place, the promoter envisaged that Clause 1(3) would work through authorisation points. I think that was made quite clear.
I agree with and wish to support everything that all the speakers before me—the noble Lords, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, Lord Cocks and Lord Taylor of Gryfe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Young—have said. In addition I wish to point out that some youngsters get round the very stringent efforts made by the supermarkets to prevent them buying alcohol by getting an older friend to take the alcohol through the till. In the same way, if we have authorisation points, as I think the promoter of the Bill envisages, there will be nothing to prevent a 17 year-old getting an 18 year-old friend to get his bottle authorised and then having it back and paying for it at the till. The

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onus will no longer be on the girl at the till to question his right to be buying it.
For these reasons and those given by previous speakers, subsection (3) will not have the beneficial effect that the sponsors of the Bill believe and hope that it will. I am afraid it will have an effect which I do not think they have seriously thought through. Certainly no one mentioned it in Committee in another place. I read the whole of the Committee stage carefully last night to check. I also checked the matter with my lawyer in Scotland this morning. The Bill creates a new criminal offence—that of wilfully buying or attempting to buy alcoholic liquor without the sale having been authorised.
Let us take the case of a busy person, perhaps a bachelor or a working wife, who is in a hurry, as busy people are, with many other things on his or her mind. It could be one of your Lordships or one of your Lordships' wives. He or she goes round the supermarket, picks up a bottle or two of wine or whisky, sensibly putting them at the bottom of the trolley lest the weight should damage other goods such as cakes and soft fruit, and then joins the queue for the till. At the bottom of the trolley, hey presto, there is the bottle. As I understand the matter, looking at the Bill, that shopper is guilty of a criminal offence and liable if convicted to a fine at level three on the Richter scale of fines which I understand these days is £400. Thereafter, he or she has a criminal record with all that that entails. That can affect a person's credit rating and possibly the chance to acquire a mortgage, a firearms certificate and other things.
The honourable gentleman who sponsored this Bill in another place stated in Committee on 10th May at col. 10 of the Official Report of another place that the Scottish public support the Bill and that that is proved by the response to the Daily Record campaign. There are a vast number of Scots who do not read the Daily Record. The first inkling my husband and my lawyer had of what was afoot was upon reading page two of the Press and Journal yesterday morning. The first inkling a great many other people had was when they read The Scotsman and the Glasgow Herald today.
When the general Scottish public—I do not honestly believe that they have any idea of what is afoot—discover what is in store (or perhaps I should say what is in supermarket) for them they will be up in arms, and justifiably so. Apart from anything else they will be furious that a draconian and ill-thought out law which will have almost no effect on the evil which it is intended to cure should be foisted on them and not on England and Wales where the level of under-age drinking is far worse than it is in Scotland. And who will get the blame? The Government, of course, for no one will remember that this was not a government Bill. They will only remember that it was passed in the time of the present Government; and the government of the day will get the blame, as they always do—for the weather and every other evil which befalls.
I believe that if any action needs to be taken with respect to supermarkets the way to achieve what the promoters of the Bill want is to insist that all
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supermarkets sell alcohol only in a shop within a shop, with a separate till, as do William Low and Presto in Scotland and Waitrose in England. That has the added advantage that if you only want to buy a bottle of whisky and are in a hurry you do not have to spend ages queueing at the general till behind people with trolleys piled high with household goods.
11.25 p.m.
Lord Jenkin of Roding: My Lords, I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, when he said in moving the Bill, and giving a very full explanation of its contents, that a Bill which had had comparatively little debate in another place deserves very thorough scrutiny in this House. I was a little shocked when he told the House that the Bill had its unopposed Second Reading—no doubt on Friday—two days after it had been published.
I believe that part of the opposition that the Bill has run into has stemmed from the fact that it is permissible for a Bill to be published and debated in such a short space of time. The noble Lord gave the dates; I did not write them down but I think that they were two days apart. Part of the trouble is due to the fact that the Bill had its Second Reading in another place when virtually no one had had a chance to read it. I doubt whether more than a tiny handful, apart from the promoters of the Bill, were aware of what was in it when it had its unopposed Second Reading. I think that in those circumstances we have a duty to look at the Bill very carefully, and no doubt we shall wish to do so in Committee.
Perhaps I may point out to my noble and learned friend and my other noble friends on the Front Bench that the Second Reading of the Bill in this House started after ten o'clock in the evening. It is now half past eleven. The television cameras are already covered up. We are in danger (are we not?) of repeating the problems which the Bill ran into in another place, where it had less than a couple of hours' debate in a Standing Committee, by this House giving it a Second Reading at this time. I understand the difficulties of the business managers, but we are entitled to ask when we come to the Committee stage of the Bill would should be invited to discuss it at a more reasonable time of the day and that we should be under no constraints of time in order to do justice to the Bill.
I do not wish to repeat what other noble Lords have said about the Bill. I start from the fact that last autumn I was asked by the Economic and Social Research Council to chair a one-day seminar on the problems of under-age drinking. The seminar was set up in order to publicise some of the research work that had been done at a number of university centres with grants funded by the ESRC.
Reading the reports that had been published prior to that seminar, I was astonished to discover how prevalent under-age drinking has now become, and how overwhelmingly the drinking habit is acquired in the young people's own families.
It has now become acceptable in the family context for 13, 14 and 15 year-olds, by perhaps starting with half a glass of wine, to become more regular drinkers. There is a major social problem there. I do not need

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to be persuaded of the need to try to make it more difficult for under-age people to acquire their own drink, whether or not drinking in the context of the family and with the supervision of parents.
I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe, my noble friend Lady Young and others who have made the same point that, in Clause 1(3), the Bill hits the wrong target. It does so for two reasons. First, the overwhelming evidence is that the young do not shop in large supermarkets. I am told by the Retail Consortium that fewer than 1 per cent. of the customers of large supermarkets for all products—not just for drink—are under the age of 18.
One will therefore see every purchaser of drink of whatever age, when trying to buy it at a supermarket with three or more check-out points, being subjected to the new procedure of queueing twice: first, to be authorised at somewhere other than the point of sale—the noble Lord, Lord Macaulay of Bragar, read out the clause that requires the authorisation point to be other than at the point of sale—and, secondly, at the check-out. I find it impossible to believe that, in order to attempt to check the tiny number of teenagers who buy alcohol at the larger supermarkets, it can be right to impose that substantial additional burden on the vast majority of supermarket customers who will have to go through that double procedure.
The second reason why the procedure will not work is that it immediately removes from the point of sale and from the check-out girl—that was the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe—the obligation not to sell drink to those under the age of 18.
I have been impressed by the evidence of the very clear and firm procedures for their check-out staff from many of the major supermarket chains. If there is any suggestion that an under-age person is presenting himself at the till with alcohol, the managers must always be called. If one attempts to off-load that responsibility on to someone else at some prior stage, one removes the obligation from where it primarily rests; namely, on the person who effects the sale at the check-out point.
Clause 1(3) entirely misses the target. My noble friend Lady Young made the point that, according to the evidence, it is at the smaller, perhaps less reputable shops and supermarkets with fewer than three tills that there are positive policies of being prepared to sell to under-age drinkers. They are the people exempted from the Bill, so one must ask: what is to be done about it?
We all support Clause 1(2). It makes the selling of alcohol through a sales assistant under the age of 18 an offence. Surely that provision should be carried into law. I hope that no one in the House will dissent from that. However, try as I might, I cannot see how Clause 1(3) can be rendered sensible as an additional safeguard. It hits the wrong target in a way that imposes enormous inconvenience on the vast majority of supermarket customers. I believe that it will be ineffective. As the Scottish Consumers Council recognises, by removing the obligation from
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the salesgirl at the point of sale, it may make it easier for teenagers to obtain drink.
I therefore wish to suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, his noble friends and perhaps the promoter of the Bill in another place that the right answer is more drastic reform. It may well be necessary, in fact, to await the results of the review which the Scottish Office has been undertaking into the licensing laws under the 1976 Act; to enact the Bill with Clauses 1(1) and 1(2); to drop Clause 1(3); and to recognise that it must be part of the Government's review to examine this and other possible alternatives and come forward with their proposals in the next session. Otherwise, it seems to me that there is a serious risk at this stage of the parliamentary year—we are virtually half way through July and it is thought that the House will recess at the end of July, and then have a modest and, I fear, rather overcrowded overspill in October—that even Clause 1(2) will not make the statute book when everybody would like it to do so.
So my suggestion is that the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, and his noble friends and honourable friends in another place might like between now and the Committee stage to ponder whether half a loaf is not better than no loaf at all. There is no doubt whatever that the comments of the Scottish Consumer Council on Clause 1(3) have a devastating force, not least coming from that source. Those comments very strongly reinforce the fears which have been widely expressed by the retail trade in Scotland. So I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, will feel able to accept that he and his colleagues should ponder this question very carefully before the Committee stage.
11.36 p.m.
Baroness Carnegy of Lour: My Lords, as one who has had a lifelong involvement in the youth work scene in Scotland and who is still currently involved in that scene, I do not need convincing of the alarming trends in young people's drinking that we are experiencing. I think that I would give a little more credit than many speakers have to the promoter of the Bill in another place and to the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, for the publicity which the Bill has brought to these problems, at any rate in part of Scotland. I think that the Daily Record campaign, too, has been beneficial in that respect.
The problem is not in question; it is the contents of the Bill itself, which have not had proper publicity, that we should be seriously considering this evening. I agree with my noble friend Lord Jenkin that subsection (2) of Clause 1 is wholly welcome. It is important to tighten up the supervision of employees under 18 whose job is to sell alcoholic drink, wherever they are selling it. If a boy or girl under 18 wants to sneak in and buy a bottle of wine or can of lager, it is natural to pick a shop where there is a 16 or 17 year-old sales assistant, whether or not he or she is a friend, who might find a sale difficult to resist.
That part of the Bill is supported by the Scottish Consumers Council and by the large supermarket chains which have written to me. I believe that everybody wants young shop assistants who are

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selling drink to have the backing of more experienced authorisation of the sale which will become mandatory under the Bill. That is wholly good.
Like other noble Lords who have spoken, it is when we come to the next part of the Bill—subsection (3) of Clause 1—that I have doubts. As has been said, this part of the Bill is aimed not at small shops or small or larger supermarkets which sell drink at a totally separate counter. It is aimed at large supermarkets with three or more check-outs in which one selects for oneself a bottle of wine or sherry and, as the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, has graphically described, takes it in the trolley along with one's other purchases and pays for everything together. What the Bill imposes on those of us who shop in those large supermarkets has been clearly explained several times in this debate, and of course I shall not go over it again. However, perhaps I may say to the noble Lord, Lord Macaulay, that everyone who wants to buy a bottle of sherry or wine, however old, infirm or rushed he or she may be, will have to go to a separate authorisation point—separate from the check-out. If there is more than one person there it will become a queue. That is where the queue occurs. It will be a queue that is not voluntary, as it is if one goes to buy fish or cheese, but one which you will have to join because it is a legal requirement. Shoppers may also find, as the supermarket chains have told us, that the procedure is not only lengthy and a little risky but that it puts up prices in the supermarket.
People in Scotland are so worried about under-aged drinking that if the scheme in the Bill were likely to have a significant impact on the problem they might be prepared to put up with the extra nuisance and expense and having to remember to do the right things in order to buy their bottle of sherry. The supermarkets might well accept the extra work and costs. But will the scheme have an impact? Will it work?
Noble Lords have already pointed to the evidence that large supermarkets are the least likely place for young people to go. Those of us who shop in supermarkets know from our observations that one sees very few young people in them. Any noble Lords who are involved in Scottish licensing courts or who read the reports in the press will know that when large supermarkets apply for licences there is almost never an objection from the general public. I think the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe, made that point. The objections come in plenty when smaller shops apply, especially those small corner shops at the foot of high-rise flats or adjacent to housing schemes. That is what one would expect. It is the small shops where under-18s buy drinks, because it is more difficult for such shops to organise themselves to supervise every sale properly. The great bulk of offences are the result of sales, innocent or otherwise, in small shops.
Therefore the Bill is targeting the kind of shop where young people are least likely to try to buy drink. That being the case, is it right to ask every single customer of those shops to queue up an extra time so that a special person can look him in the face to see whether he might be under 18 years and,
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if not, to authorise the bottles by a system of labels or stamps that can easily be dodged or abused? If anyone has any doubt about the matter, we should explore it at Committee stage. Is it right also to expect assistants at check-outs to be vigilant about their legal responsibilities in asking themselves whether customers are under 18 years when the bottles are assumed already to have been checked at a special authorisation point?
The Scottish Consumer Council is worried about this part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Stallard, and the promoter of the Bill in another place are clearly displeased. It has been suggested that the council is in the pockets of the supermarkets. I am not in anyone's pocket. I am simply a regular shopper. As a shopper I agree with the consumer council. I am sorry that it did not spot the detailed implications of the Bill earlier, but nor did I, and nor, I suspect, since nobody objected at Second Reading, did Members of another place. At the Committee stage, they discussed the problem of teenage drinking, not the details of the Bill. I was interested to hear that the clerk of at least one of Strathclyde region's licensing courts spotted the implications of the Bill only the other day.
I am sorry that up to now the Government have apparently supported the Bill. But the purpose of the House of Lords is to tell the other place and the Government when a Bill seems unlikely to work. I hope that that is what we shall do. I hope that we shall give the Bill a Second Reading because its first part is extremely good.
I hope at Committee to put down amendments and to support amendments by other noble Lords to alter or delete the part of the Bill which seems flawed. Should the Bill fail altogether I intend to press the Government, when they complete their review and bring forward legislation on the licensing laws in Scotland, to ensure that the problem of teenage drinking is confronted by them.
11.45 p.m.
The Viscount of Falkland: My Lords, I feel somewhat diffident in talking about a Scottish Bill, because although I am a Scottish Peer I am resident in England. However, I have a great deal of admiration for the way in which in Scotland, in the field of alcohol abuse, there is perhaps even more support for detoxification treatment than there is in England, particularly for young people. In this country I am a trustee of a foundation which runs two treatment centres for alcohol and drug addicts. It is one of the most alarming and saddening things to see the ever lower age of those who are admitted for treatment. As other noble Lords have said, I am absolutely behind the motivation for this Bill, somehow to attack the enormous evil in our society of the growth of under-age drinking and the misery that that causes.
Nevertheless, one of the points which several noble Lords have brought up is the fact that this Private Member's Bill should be introduced at this time. We are most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, for introducing it this evening. I apologise for being several seconds late for his opening speech. I find it curious that the Bill is with us at this time, because

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I understood that the Government have been taking a close look at the working in Scotland of the 1976 Act. I was expecting in the very near future some new innovative action to bring that Act up to date. I should have thought that Clause 1(2), which all noble Lords have welcomed and which I welcome, would have been part of that legislation, with suggestions for other better thought out methods of sale or purchase of alcohol by under-aged people in whatever outlets they choose.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Taylor of Gryfe and with the noble Baroness Lady Young. I have an interest in where young people buy their drink and, in my observations from supermarkets in England, Wales and Scotland, it seems that the training and the steps that the large supermarkets have undertaken to make sure that young people do not get past the check-out, have been extremely responsible and effective. I have a particular knowledge of Marks and Spencer, with which the noble Baroness has a connection. There one can see the training that has gone into recognising people who are under age.
It would appear that young people are deterred from going into the large supermarkets because of the difficulty of purchasing drink there. They are more likely to have been funnelled into the smaller outlets. To that extent I agree absolutely that the Bill, although well intentioned, is aimed at the wrong target. The whole drinking scene has changed in this country over the past five years. There are various contributory factors to the growth of under-age drinking and the extent of under-age drink abuse. One must mention the decrease in family support for young people and the example set by parents in some areas of society.
When I had a daughter at school I was most shocked on one occasion. One of her friends, aged 11, returned from a half-term break with a bottle of vodka concealed in her case. It was undiscovered by the teachers. She shared it with another girl aged 11 in her dormitory, who was taken out of the school in a coma. The school did not know how to cope with the situation. Of course the girl received medical treatment. The two girls were rusticated for a week, which seemed to be extremely inadequate. Some kind of rustication should have taken place in respect of the parents. It appears that private-sector schools have inadequate ways of dealing with and advising young people when such sad events occur.
I was particularly interested in the remarks made by the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun. I entirely agree with her. I should much prefer to see shops within shops, because that is a more effective way of dealing with the matter. One can use well-trained personnel, and all the aspects of a shop within a shop achieve all that the Bill intends but in a better targeted way.
I am not a reader of the Daily Record as is my noble friend Lord Taylor. I understood from the tone of his remarks that the paper does not have a good reputation with him. However, one should welcome the organs of the press taking the line that they take about under-age drinking. In this country some of the papers do so admirably. Some papers which we criticise for the quality of their journalism in other aspects take a responsible stance in this area
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and we should welcome that. After all, it is the culture of British drinking which must be partly responsible for the sad concentration among young people.
As yet no one has mentioned drinks advertising targeted towards young people. That area deserves much closer attention. There is too much advertising and people are getting round the standards. Advertising drinks for young people, whether on T-shirts, through subliminal advertising in cinemas or whatever, is extremely damaging to our efforts to counteract the trend.
Nowadays young people have more mobility. They travel around the place and can avoid the law more easily. I have noticed that in Scotland there has been an enormous increase in drinking among young women. I do not know why that should be so. Perhaps it is more frequently reported, but it is extremely worrying. We are all now well educated about drink. I am glad to see that the Brewers' Society has published informative and interesting pamphlets which inform people about the amount of alcohol they can drink. Young women are extremely vulnerable. In the treatment centres with which I am connected the young women are the saddest patients who are admitted. Often at the age of 16 or 17 they have reached a stage of advanced addiction.
Assuming that the Bill becomes law and subsection (3) is effective, who will police it? I cannot visualise many supermarkets taking somebody who had offended to a policeman, whether they had not gone to the right authorisation point or whether they had tried to pass alcohol to an under-age person or whatever. I wonder whether the supermarkets will not merely attempt to deter, to give warnings and to let the offender go in the hope that he will not return. He probably would not return, which would mean an even greater concentration on the smaller outlets. It is on that point with which I particularly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Young.
That one should have to queue twice does not seem to me to make much sense. That is a cumbersome way of dealing with the problem, and I hope that the noble Lord and the promoters of this Bill can think of a less clumsy way of coping with that matter.
Having said that, I am sure that there are alternative or additional ways in which the Government and school institutions can raise the tempo of the fight against under-age drinking. After all, that end has been achieved as regards smoking. I know that young people are more resistant in regard to the campaign against smoking. However, a change of culture seems to me necessary rather than taking a particular measure against supermarkets. The reputable, larger supermarkets seem to be the target of this Bill in Clause 1 (3). That seems to me inappropriate. I have seen a number of supermarkets throughout the country, and I am satisfied that they look after that area extremely well. I hope that that will be taken on board I hope that this Bill does not reach the statute book because if it does, I believe that we may come to regret it.
11.57 p.m.
Lord Macaulay of Bragar: My Lords, initially I put on record my congratulations to my noble friend Lord Stallard for introducing this Bill. Up to this point, we have had an interesting and valuable debate on what is behind the Bill and how it would be operated if it became law.
It has become clear in the course of this debate that the Bill is heading for a Committee stage. If that is so, then I have reason to believe that the future of the Bill will be seriously jeopardised, and the likelihood is that it will not pass into law in any shape or form. That is a matter of serious concern to the people of Scotland who are interested in reducing the access by young people to alcohol, whether from a small shop or supermarket.
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, mentioned that Clause 1(3) would only apply to 1,000 out of 14,000 outlets. I noted that he did not define what he meant by an outlet. Is that 14,000 small shops or a mixture of small shops and supermarkets because, if regarded as a single outlet, a supermarket may be the equivalent of 10 small shops. Accordingly, perhaps I may say that the noble Lord, on the face of it, was not comparing like with like. No more is it helpful to take the research of Exeter University and apply that to what is happening in Scotland. We have our own particular problems in Scotland and it is to those problems that this Bill has been addressed.
There has been much said by Members of your Lordships' House about separate authorisation points. Indeed, that seems to be the centre point of arguments against the practicality of the Bill being brought into operation. For myself, I appreciate that in another place it was said and envisaged that there may be a separate authorisation point, but the Bill does not require that. The proposed new Clause 97B(2)(b) requires that the sale should be approved. It reads:
"Subject to subsection (3) below, the sale of alcoholic liquor is authorised for the purposes of this section if a person appointed for that purpose by the licence-holder, his employee or agent"—
in other words, there are three categories of people who can authorize—
"being reasonably satisfied that the person seeking authorisation is aged 18 or over, approves the sale";
and paragraph (b) states:
"does so"—
that means "approves the sale"—
"other than at a point of sale."
There could be a system in a supermarket where no separate point is required to be built. Members of staff over 18 years of age can be the approved agents of the owners of the supermarket for approving the sale on the floor. To envisage one way of dealing with it, a person could go to an identifiable member of the staff and ask for the approval to be put on the particular—
Lord Jenkin of Roding: My Lords, will the noble Lord give way? Is he seriously suggesting that rather than having—as the Bill appears to provide—some designated point where they can queue and be authorised, customers have to go chasing round the shop to find somebody who is over the age of 18
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and say that they are authorised purchasers? If so, he is digging a very large hole for his noble friend's Bill.
Lord Macaulay of Bragar: My Lords, the noble Lord is stretching my suggestion beyond the area that I am envisaging. It is easy in large shops to identify members of staff. Emphasis has been placed on the expense and the building up of a queue by those with the supermarket's interests at heart, but they are exaggerating the problem. They are creating a problem that does not need to exist in the operation of this Bill. Nowhere in the Bill does it say that there has to be a separate authorisation point. All that has to be done is for the sale to be approved before it reaches the point of sale. There is no reason why members of staff should not do that. It is for the supermarkets to put their own house in order. If they wish to build a separate authorisation point and create queues—
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: My Lords, will the noble Lord give way? How is the purchase going to be authorised before it reaches the point of sale?
Lord Macaulay of Bragar: My Lords, there are various ways in which it can be authorised. For example, a suggestion was made that a piece of sticky paper could be attached or a rubber stamp used to mark the bottle. In that event the person has an approved sale within the store. I do not want to get bogged down in the technicalities of this matter. It is for the stores to work that out if the Bill becomes law.
Baroness Carnegy of Lour: My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord will give way. I do not think that he should get away with that. Where is the customer going to find the sticky label? How is the customer to know where to find it if it is not going to be at the authorisation point? The noble Lord cannot get away with that.
Lord Macaulay of Bragar: My Lords, the sticky label is only one suggestion that has been made. Members of staff would have access to it. All one has to do is identify the member of staff and ask for him or her to approve the sale, and it is done either by a sticky label or a stamp. That does not seem to be an insuperable difficulty.
The Bill has received all-party support in another place. I respectfully suggest the Bill should receive the same support in your Lordships' House. It has been criticised for leaving out small shops in so far as the authorisation procedure is concerned; but it catches the small shops in Clause 1, which has not been subjected to any criticism, in that the person selling alcoholic liquor will need to have persons over 18 years of age supervising the sale. It goes without saying that to have an authorisation point in a small shop, perhaps run by one man and his son or daughter, would be ludicrous because the customer is under immediate supervision in any event.
This Bill is the result of a long campaign run by the Daily Record newspaper and perhaps the Glasgow

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Evening Times. The noble Lord, Lord Taylor, suggested that that was not a well-thought-of newspaper. I do not carry any brief for the Daily Record, though I must declare an interest in that I worked for it many years ago. I understand that it has a circulation of 650,000. If one assumes an average family of four we are talking of about 2 million people behind this campaign—at least nominally. The people of Scotland are looking carefully to see how this matter is dealt with in your Lordships' House. If the Bill falls in your Lordships' House, that will be noted.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, I do not comment on the quality of a tabloid like the Daily Record. But does the noble Lord believe that such a newspaper will present the arguments produced in this House concerning the detail of the Bill rather than mounting a campaign against teenage drinking in general? Everyone supports the campaign, but what we are discussing is the detail of a Bill and examining it in an objective and less emotional manner than it is presented in the Daily Record.
Lord Macaulay of Bragar: My Lords, I accept the noble Lord's view on the matter. I am saying that the Daily Record has sparked off the interest which has resulted in the presentation of the Bill. Of course one does not expect a tabloid to go into the minutiae of it. I suggest to your Lordships that the second part of the Bill is aimed at the supermarket because it is there that the devious purchaser can best hope to get away with the purchase of alcohol, in contrast to the small shop, where he may very well be known to the shopkeeper.
In any event, I believe that there is a miguided approach to the subject by some of your Lordships. No one is pretending that the Bill is going to cure anything or that it will make a significant impact. All that it is setting out to do is to tackle part of this very serious problem that we have in Scotland.
Much has been said about the small shops. Not so long ago we had a problem with shops selling glue kits to young people. It took a great deal of work on the part of the legal authorities finally to prosecute people who were selling them. The High Court in Scotland created a new crime to enable people who were doing so to be prosecuted. As regards older people getting liquor for younger people, there are persons, for example, who are stupid enough to buy a bottle of whisky and give it to a 14 year-old child. They might very well find themselves in the same situation as the people selling glue kits to youngsters of that age. But that is another matter which is not immediately before the House.
I speak with the experience of over 25 years in the civil and criminal courts of Scotland. Drink is almost invariably the common factor in crime and spans all ages and classes. When it brings ruin to a young life, and sometimes brings death, and when violent crimes are created, it is a major blot on society. Anything that can be done to lessen the access of young people to alcohol at an early age should be welcomed by your Lordships' House. As the noble Viscount, Lord Falkland, has indicated,
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consumption at an early age is habit-forming and to some extent it is apeing adult behaviour.
Society accepts alcohol as a legitimate social pastime and in moderation it may do good. In excess it does evil and mischief to society. We have a duty to ensure that it does not get into young hands at the stage when young people are physically and mentally unable to cope. As we all know, it is hard enough for adults to cope with alcohol. As the noble Viscount indicated, putting it into its social context, we are living in an age when young people are bombarded by the media with the delights of drinking. It is socially acceptable. Just as advertising for the services ignores the fact that by joining them you might get killed, so advertising for alcohol ignores the pitfalls of its use and abuse.
In sport we have the ridiculous picture of major clubs and tournaments being sponsored by brewers, with their logos being carried on the club jersey. Children are found on the streets of Scotland, and no doubt on the streets of other towns, and in play parks as walking and running adverts for alcohol and wearing their favourite team's jersey, which usually has to be the latest edition that they pressurise their parents to buy. The psychological pressures to experiment and to try drink build up, perhaps subconsciously, but they are there through advertising and adult example.
To some people the supermarket is a boon for shopping but to others it is a menace. I regard it as a striking example of what Robert Burns called man's inhumanity to man. It is a place that I take great care to avoid if possible. Whatever view is taken on supermarkets, they cultivate the art of enticement and the commercial seduction of the shopper. Everything on the shelves must be made attractive to the shopper to encourage his or her willingness to buy.
Drink has insidiously crept into the main shopping areas and has therefore become a ma in selling item. It is not surprising that young people want to buy and try. Others who have tried drink may want more and will go to great lengths to get it. The supermarket perhaps represents the best chance of not being spotted, particularly on a busy day when a young check-out assistant who puts the bar code through the machine does not have the time or the interest to check. That is why authorisation,It another part of the shop is important.
We all know that young people are maturing earlier these days and that it is not always easy to gauge the person's age. That is why it is important to have adult supervision to ensure that young people do not have access to alcohol as and when they wish. That is why the prior check is needed.
The reaction of the larger shops is, to say the least, rather over the top. Phrases such as "enormous disruption and annoyance to customers" and "imposition on and inconvenience to customers" are being used. They exaggerate the problem facing supermarkets, which undoubtedly use alcohol as an enticement to get a person onto the premises. Only two days ago I heard of a shop—this story is anecdotal—where one has to go through the licensed part to reach the main shopping area. If that is

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happening, there must be proper control over young people going into supermarkets.
The Bill would make the supermarket a no-go area for the devious purchaser of alcohol. One wonders why alcohol has crept onto the shelves. I agree with noble Lords who suggested that perhaps the best plan for supermarkets would be to operate under the terms of new Section 97B and have the shop within a shop. The facility is there if they want to use it. If they want to have alcohol on sale in the main part of the shop, they must accept the restrictions that go with that.
I cannot see any sensible adult in Scotland objecting to the minor inconvenience of having a bottle or a purchase stamped prior to going to the check-out if it assisted even a little towards the lessening of this problem. It happens already in supermarkets. I cannot understand what all the fuss is about. Before purchasing goods in a supermarket people are directed to authorisation points for cheques and credit cards. The public does not complain about that. People queue up quite willingly.
Alcohol is a poison. It is high time it was recognised that selling alcohol is a privilege which should be exercised with great care. I have no doubt that supermarkets do their best to do that but mistakes will be make. Alcohol poisons the mind. It poisons the judgment, it can lead to untold misery and it can have disastrous effects on health, particularly among young people. If society is to license the sale of poison, it should be properly controlled. We go to great lengths to control drugs, from cannabis upwards. I cannot see why people should object to reasonable steps being taken through this Bill to control the sale of alcohol to young people.
The Bill may be criticised for its wording, and all kinds of imaginary prosecutions can be envisaged. But I remind the noble Baroness who referred to the inadvertent purchase that the word "wilfully" appears as an essential part of that type of behaviour. We like to think that a little common sense is applied to prosecutions. We can all imagine situations that may be initially embarrassing. One hopes that the application of common sense would ensure that there would be no prosecution in appropriate cases. Accordingly, I support the Bill.
12.15 a.m.
The Lord Advocate (Lord Fraser of Carmyllie): My Lords, the Government's stated objective is to seek means of closing off avenues through which alcohol is supplied to young people who are under age. The noble Lord who introduced the measure is absolutely right in saying that there is very widespread concern in Scotland regarding under-age drinking. Indeed, as he suggested, that may be best evidenced by the "tiny tipplers" campaign run by the Daily Record, whether or not that newspaper finds favour with all noble Lords.
However, that is not the only source from which one can ascertain that there is concern. For example, when the Government sought representations on the various aspects of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976,
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without request being made over 70 community councils and individuals responded on this very issue. Therefore, I say to noble Lords that it would be wrong to under-estimate the degree of concern which exists about the general problem. I accept, however, the noble Lord's point that we have a particular provision here with which we must deal.
The Government had hoped that this Bill would be a significant step towards the achievement of the goal of cutting off the avenues. By tightening controls on the sale of alcohol and thus restricting its availability to young people it is hoped that it will be more difficult for them to acquire it and that such measures will serve to reduce the anti-social behaviour and, I regret to say, crime which is often associated with under-age drinking. That, in itself, imposes a substantial burden upon law enforcement, health and social work agencies.
As this interesting debate has developed this evening, many statistics have been bandied about and, not for the first time, one's conclusion depends upon which statistics one looks to. Perhaps I may try to strike a balance by saying that if one looks to the OPCS report of 1986—which has already been referred to—Table 217 shows that as regards 14 year-olds 21 per cent. of boys and 18 per cent. of girls who said that they bought alcohol usually did so through shops and supermarkets. However, for reasons which I do not understand, if one then looks at the column in respect of 17 year-olds, the relevant figure for boys has dropped to 12 per cent. and that for girls has dropped to 4 per cent.
However, before I suffer any intervention on that aspect, I readily accept that the OPCS report deals only with a classification of shops and supermarkets. Moreover, there is no attempt in the report to subdivide the types of shops or supermarkets and certainly not to subdivide them to deal with a supermarket which has three or more sales points.
In another place the Government supported the Bill in principle and in detail, as your Lordships have heard. But, in the welter of criticism which there has been in regard to Clause 1(3) in the course of this evening's contributions, I have noted that there has not been a single word of criticism of the measure contained in Clause 1(2)—that is, the new Section 97A.
I am grateful to my noble friends Lady Young, Lady Carnegy of Lour and Lord Jenkin for being emphatic and unequivocal in their welcome for that particular provision of the Bill. It would be most unfortunate if the message went from this House that what is a very welcome and sensible measure in England and Wales is not to be extended to Scotland.
Of course, any legislation which we introduce cannot be foolproof. However, we can, and do, encourage and educate. We seek to point young people towards a healthy lifestyle. But that message will only carry conviction if we who have responsibility for legislation have done all that we can to constrain those who want to drink and if we can constrain them and set their opportunities within a tight legislative control.
At the same time, however, we must seek to ensure that the controls which we impose are sensible and

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no more than is required to achieve the ends at which we aim. I had hoped that before this debate began your Lordships would immediately accept that what is contained in the Bill does not step beyond that. I agree with my noble friend Lord Lucas that there has to be a balance between proper concern and practicality. The question is only this. Where does that balance lie? I should have hoped that what is on the face of the Bill at the moment might have met with noble Lords' approval. But I acknowledge that a substantial volume of letters has been received from traders and traders' organisations who are worried about the possible impact of the controls.
However, the measures proposed are, it is believed, no more than is necessary to achieve a real and effective barrier to the purchase of alcohol products by under-age customers. I cannot disguise that many remain unhappy since they feel that the voluntary controls that are already in place are sufficient. I pay tribute to those supermarket chains and organisations which have, without the compulsion of a legislative requirement, already put in place certain voluntary controls.
I know that a number of such organisations are concerned that the authorisation requirement imposed by the new Clause 97B would involve additional cost and inconvenience to customers. We are given to understand that the requirement for a separate area for authorisation of sales would result in an average non-recurring cost to stores of about £13,000 to £14,000 and that the additional staff costs might amount to something like £25,000 per annum for the average supermarket caught by this provision. While these amounts are not negligible, neither are they excessive when measured against the average store's turnover in alcohol products of around £1 million annually.
I have indicated that I recognise that the restrictions of the nature proposed are not welcome in some quarters, but I hope that those who have put forward their objections to what we support will recognise that we are trying to achieve a measure of proper social responsibility. The Scottish Consumer Council, at a late stage—and I make no criticism of that—have entered this debate. I think it was my noble friend Lord Jenkin who described it as an intervention of devastating force. Perhaps I may make it clear that I certainly would not accuse the Scottish Consumer Council of being in anyone's pocket. Indeed, there are occasions when I wish it was. For that reason, I am not surprised that the representations that it has made have impressed a number of your Lordships.
I do not wish to engage at this time in any detailed analysis of what the council had to say. But I share the view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Macaulay, about the observation it makes with regard to the "forgetful grandad" who buys his can of McEwan's and fails to get it properly authorised. The suggestion is that, simply by arriving at the point of sale he commits an offence. I shall go away and look at the drafting again, but on the face of it I do not see that he has committed an offence there. It would be a wilful attempt to purchase without the authorisation that would be an offence.
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The provisions proposed are no more than a socially responsible government would support and I believe they would have at most a limited impact on the average store's turnover.
As regards the contributions from the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun, and the noble Viscount, Lord Falkland, as I understood them, both were more inclined to support the concept of a shop within a shop as concerns alcohol products. That might be a way forward. However, if the figures I have mentioned with regard to the cost of what is proposed in the Bill are considered to be great, I have little doubt that those who run supermarkets would find that to adopt instead the shop within a shop concept would cost significantly more.
The noble Lord, Lord Cocks of Hartcliffe, made a good point. It is unfair to criticise the promoter of the Bill in the House of Commons for his failure to have a Second Reading debate. I commend him for his political skill in managing to get it through the House of Commons without a single voice expressing objection. I do not think that therein lies a valid ground for criticism, and there was only a short debate in the Scottish second Standing Committee. Nevertheless, I trust that at any further stage in this House we shall treat this Bill in the constructive manner that it properly deserves.
The noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe, thought he saw a way through our difficulties by reminding the House that there appeared already to be an indication from the Government that there would be some future opportunity for the matter to be more sensibly considered. He is certainly correct to the extent that the Secretary of State for Scotland in a parliamentary Answer has indicated that there are a number of provisions within the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976 which he would like to amend. In the time honoured phrase, he will introduce them when an appropriate legislative opportunity presents itself. The noble Lord will appreciate that he will get nothing more from me on the date of that.
I conclude by saying that although there might be, at some future date, a further amendment of the 1976 Act, it would be wrong of this House to fail to treat this Bill with the greatest care and concern. That care and concern has been shown in all the contributions that have been made this evening. I only urge that at any further stage the same careful scrutiny be given to it.
12.26 a.m.
Lord Stallard: My Lords, we have had an exceedingly interesting debate, albeit a bit truncated. I do not suppose noble Lords would expect me at this time of night to be able to reply to all the points that have been raised in the course of this debate, without at least studying the report of the proceedings in the Official Report tomorrow. I intend to do that.
I hope I shall be able to be in touch with the normal channels to see whether some arrangements can be arrived at that might smooth out the further progress of this Bill. To me it is imperative that it gets onto the statute book as soon as possible. We

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owe it to the people concerned to do everything we can to facilitate its progress. I shall do my part, and I hope I can rely on others to do theirs.
There is not a great deal between us on this matter. I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate. He expressed the matter a great deal better than I could ever hope to do, but he has said all that really needed to be said about the general approach to this matter. We all agree on the need for more education, better legislation and other matters, but we cannot do all that in a Private Member's Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, in the only real point one has to make, laid great stress on the timetable in another place and the timetable in your Lordships' House today. But that is nothing that can be laid at the foot of the promoter or on the Opposition in another place. If he is criticising the Government's management teams in both Houses, I cannot reply to that or get involved in it. However, there was a clear and quite unambiguous criticism of the way the matter has been handled by the Government so far. I am only too pleased that the Government have supported the Bill and maintained their support in your Lordships' House tonight. I look forward to the constructive discussions we shall have on the next stages of the Bill. I end by asking the House to give this Bill a Second Reading. My Lords, I beg to move.
On Question, Bill read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Limitation (Northern Ireland) Order 1989
12.30 a.m.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 11th May be approved.
The noble Lord said: The purpose of the order is to bring together in one place, without any change in the law, the enactments relating to the limitation of time. The Statute of Limitations (Northern Ireland) Act 1958, the principal legislation, has been amended on a number of occasions, notably in 1976, 1982 and 1987.
I should add that the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills has considered the draft order and reported that it is satisfied that it is purely a consolidation measure. I commend the order to your Lordships. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 11th May be approved.—(Lord Lyell.)
Lord Prys-Davies: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for introducing the order. He has had a long innings today but is still batting powerfully.
As the noble Lord said, this order is a consolidation measure. No doubt there are good reasons why the limitation should be three years, or six years or nine years, but I shall not ask him to explain why that should be so. I am sure that this order will prove very helpful to the practitioner in Northern Ireland and we welcome it.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Solicitors (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order 1989
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 22nd June be approved.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the order before your Lordships makes various amendments to the Solicitors (Northern Ireland) Order 1976, the legislation governing the education, training, conduct and discipline of solicitors in Northern Ireland.
The solicitors order gives the Law Society of Northern Ireland extensive powers of control over the solicitors' profession in Northern Ireland. But in the years since the enactment of the solicitors order the Law Society has found that the powers granted by that order are in some cases insufficient to enable it to regulate the solicitors' profession in the best interest of the public and solicitors in Northern Ireland generally. The Government concur with the Law Society's view and accept that a number of amendments of the solicitors order are necesssary in order to enable the Law Society to exercise proper and more effective control over the conduct of solicitors in cases where that is necessary.
The order also deals with some other matters. It increases the role of the Lay Observer for Northern Ireland, who monitors complaints against solicitors, and it introduces lay participation for the first time into the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal and into the committee of the Law Society which handles complaints. These measures are important to ensure public confidence in the impartiality of complaints and disciplinary procedures in relation to solicitors.
Having outlined the purpose of the order, I turn to its main provisions. Articles 5 and 6 increase the Law Society's control over the issuing of solicitors' practising certificates. Article 5 adds to the circumstances in which a solicitor might be refused a practising certificate. Article 6 adds to the Law Society's powers to impose terms and conditions on practising certificates. Terms and conditions may be imposed which extend also to subsequent practising certificates issued to a solicitor so as to require the solicitor to take steps to become more efficient in his practice. A practising certificate may be suspended where the Law Society exercises its statutory powers of intervention under the solicitor's order.
Article 9 clarifies the Law Society's powers of control over the education and training of those seeking admission as solicitors and for the first time allows the Law Society to control the continuing education and training of qualified solicitors. Article 10 allows the Law Society to provide in regulations for the running of solicitors' practices as bodies corporate.
Article 16 enables the Law Society to impose sanctions in the interest of the client where a solicitor has provided inadequate professional services. This may take the form of a refund of costs to the client or a rectification, at the expense of the solicitor, of any error or deficiency. To facilitate the investigation of complaints, the Law Society will have express power to require a solicitor to produce files and documents in his possession.
Article 17 increases the role of the lay observer by giving him express power to examine any written allegation from a member of the public about the Law Society's treatment of complaints and provisions made for the publication reports. The lay observer will also be able to refer certain matters to the solicitors' disciplinary tribunal with a view to the imposition of sanctions for inadequate professional services.
Article 18 reconstitutes the present disciplinary committee as the solicitors' disciplinary tribunal, so emphasising that it is a statutory tribunal, independent of the Law Society. It will have lay members appointed to it for the first time and, in addition to its present powers, will have new powers to impose sanctions for inadequate professional services and to exclude a solicitor from legal work or to reduce or cancel his costs in respect of such work.
The order contains provisions intended for the better regulation of the solicitors' profession in Northern Ireland in the interests of the public, and, indeed, in the interests of solicitors in Northern Ireland generally. The legislation was brought forward in close consultation with the Northern Ireland Law Society and has been generally welcomed by the General Consumer Council for Northern Ireland. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 22nd June be approved.—(Lord Lyell.)
Lord Prys-Davies: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, for introducing so clearly the provisions of the order. I am pleased to learn from the Northern Ireland Law Society that it was the society itself which took the initiative that led to the new order. The Northern Ireland Law Society welcomes the order and wants to lose no time in getting it duly sealed and delivered. I shall therefore not delay its passage for more than a minute or two.
The order touches on about 26 topics, but, out of that variety, I believe that the most important articles for the solicitor and his client are Articles 14 to 20 which deal with the investigation of complaints against solicitors and disciplinary proceedings. I am assured by the Law Society that they are acceptable to the society and its members, but it is equally important that they should bring comfort to the clients. I say that without striking a sceptical note. I believe that the Minister has already confirmed that the department consulted consumer interests in Northern Ireland in the course of preparing the order. That is reassuring.
There is just one point that I must make before resuming my seat. I should like to pay tribute to the 1,200 solicitors and their staff in the Province who practise their profession. They too play a significant role in difficult times to maintain law and order. We recall with sadness that a member of the Northern Ireland Law Society who was a courageous advocate paid the ultimate penalty not so many months ago. Having paid that tribute, I simply reiterate that we welcome the order.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, perhaps I may add my tribute to the solicitors and all who work for them. We recognise all the good work that they do in very difficult conditions, as indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Appropriation (No. 3) (Northern Ireland) Order 1989
12.38 a.m.
Lord Lyell Lord Lyell rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 29th June be approved.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, as is normal with orders of this nature, the order is being made under paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the Northern Ireland Act 1974. It authorises additional expenditure of £294 million by the Department of Economic Development for purposes connected with the privatisation of Short Brothers plc. Noble Lords may wish to refer to paragraph 3 of page 5 of the Northern Ireland summer supplementary estimate 1989–90 which is available in the Printed Paper Office. That supplementary estimate explains that increased expenditure of £294 million is partly offset by the receipt of £30 million from the sale of the company's shares.
Your Lordships will appreciate that, unlike the main estimates for Northern Ireland which were approved by the House on 26th June this year, the draft order before us this evening deals only with expenditure in connection with Short Brothers plc. Noble Lords who were present at the debate on 26th June may recall that I explained that the disposal of Shorts would require substantial further amounts of government funding over and above the £5·3 million for Shorts which is already included in the main estimates for the current year 1989–90.
Your Lordships may also recall that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State announced on 7th June this year the details of the financial package agreed with the Canadian company Bombardier for the sale of Shorts. The £294 million being sought this evening relates to the second part of that package, the first part being the £390 million loan made earlier this year, which was included in the Northern Ireland spring supplementary estimates for 1988–89.
Of the £294 million that is before us this evening, £275 million will be used to recapitalise the company, to repay remaining borrowings and to meet anticipated losses on existing contracts. We intend that at least £60 million of this sum—that is the £275 million net—will be in the form of an interest free loan. That loan will be subject to full or partial payment if Bombardier fails to abide by the detailed and specific performance-related requirements of the loan agreement. Also, in order to encourage investment in research and development, the loan agreement will provide for progressive cancellation of the loan if certain specific targets relating to research and development and capital expenditure are met.
The remaining £19 million that we are seeking will be used first of all to provide financial assistance for the capital investment and training programmes to be undertaken during this financial year by Shorts under its new ownership, and, secondly, to meet the fees of the Government's professional advisers.
The Government also intend to provide grant aid of £91 million toward Shorts future capital expenditure and training programmes, totalling some £216 million in the period 1990 to 1993. This last sum is not covered by the order that is before us this evening and the approval of your Lordships' House will be sought for this in due course.
Your Lordships will appreciate that at the point of sale it will be necessary to assess the losses incurred by Shorts since 31st March 1989. That figure will be added to the cost of sale. The funding requirement to meet these losses will be met in the first instance by an advance from the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Fund, and this will be repaid in due course through a supplementary estimate which will be brought before your Lordships probably in the autumn of this year.
I want to conclude by saying that Shorts now faces one of the most exciting and challenging periods in its history. The proposed expenditure before us this evening will ensure that it is returned to the private sector with a capital base that will enable it to face the future with confidence. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 29th June be approved.—(Lord Lyell.)
Lord Graham of Edmonton: My Lords, we on this side of the House certainly appreciate, understand and approve what the Minister has brought before us today. Both my noble friend Lord Prys-Davies and I have been present on previous occasions when the whole anxious future for Shorts—which concerns the future of the people not just of Belfast but of all Northern Ireland—was the subject of great concern on the part of the Minister and his ministerial colleagues. I think he understands that we also share his anxiety.
In effect, we have been presented with the authorisation for tapping some of the moneys which he advised would be required when the financial package came before the House. Certainly we are minded to say that this is proper and is needed.
Can the Minister help me on one point? I think that he mentioned £91 million for training. Can he tell us whether it is the normal training which would be conducted by a large organisation such as Shorts in respect of its engineers or draughtsmen undertaking basic training programmes or is there anything special about the training facility that would be made available? If the Minister is unable to answer that I shall understand.
In the schedule there is a matter to which he did not refer: the development of tourism. Would the Minister care to say something about that? As well as referring substantially to aircraft and shipbuilding industries, there are other matters in the schedule that I should have liked to have taken up had there been time. Can the Minister tell me what is involved in the phrase "the development of tourism"?
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I congratulate the two noble Lords on their stamina. They have sat throughout the heat of debate.
I do not know what is referred to in "the development of tourism", the gross provision and the net provision, and the appropriations in aid of precisely £1,000. Normally these sums shown as £1,000 tend to be in the schedules and in the appropriation orders to show that there has been a contra entry in the payments. It looks as though there has been a very small appropriation in aid. Quite rightly, the noble Lord has pointed out that the net provision is only £1,000, down from £6.106 million to £6.105 million.
I shall obtain an answer and write to him on why that sum on tourism appears in an order which I presented to your Lordships as being exclusively dealing with Shorts.
The £91 million about which the noble Lord asked is the sum which we shall be spending on training. However, I pointed out that this would be over the next three years, between 1990 and 1993. This is how we shall envisage the funds being spent. But we think that it will be necessary, and it would be normal in financial restructuring of this type over the next three years. Indeed, the sum that I have over the next three years for training with regard to government support is nearer £12 million. I shall obtain the precise answer for which the noble Lord is searching.
My stamina may be failing slightly this evening. I shall certainly find out and write to him. However, I am grateful for the attention that he has paid. I shall draw his perspicacity to the attention of the chairman of Northern Ireland Tourist Board, who I know will be grateful for the attention paid by your Lordships at this late hour. I think that it would be the wish of your Lordships that I commend the order.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Sheffield Development Corporation (Vesting of Land) (British Railways Board) Order 1989
12.48 a.m.
The Earl of Arran The Earl of Arran rose to move, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee].
The noble Earl said: My Lods, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name. With the leave of the House, your Lordships may find it convenient if I speak at the same time to the 10 other orders also in my name on the Order Paper.
The 11 orders that we are considering this evening vest around 207 hectares of publicly owned land in six urban development corporations. The House may find it helpful if I briefly explain some of the background to these orders.
As your Lordships will know, urban development corporations are established under the provisions of Part XV1 of the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 to secure the regeneration of their designated areas. To achieve this they have a wide

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range of powers, including the powers to acquire, manage and dispose of land and property. With land in their control they are able to assemble sites for redevelopment, reclaim derelict and polluted land and service sites to make them attractive to investors.
One of the ways by which land can be obtained is by vesting orders, such as those we are considering tonight, made under Section 141 of the 1980 Act. This section empowers my right honourable friend the Secretary of State to vest in urban development corporations land owned by local authorities, statutory undertakers and other public bodies.
Your Lordships may find it helpful if I outline briefly the problems of the six UDCs involved in these orders, and describe the provisions of the orders. The Black Country Development Corporation's area was once dominated by metal-based manufacturing industry. As this has declined it has left an abandoned and neglected landscape: The two orders before your Lordships' House tonight vest in that corporation 87 hectares of land owned by the boroughs of Sandwell, Walsall and Wolverhampton, the Severn Trent Water Authority, the British Waterways Board and the West Midlands Residuary Body.
The Leeds Development Corporation is one of the third generation UDCs. Its area is relatively small, comprising two parts of inner city Leeds. An area south of the city centre contains a mix of industrial and commercial uses and a number of derelict, disused and vacant sites. The second area is in the Kirkstall Valley and is dominated by the vacant site of a former power station. The vesting orders will transfer 13·2 hectares of land to the development corporation. This land is currently owned by Leeds City Countil, the British Waterways Board, the West Yorkshire Residuary Body and British Rail.
Your Lordships will probably be familiar with the work of London Docklands. This corporation was set the job of securing the regeneration of the rundown and derelict docks of East London, both north and south of the Thames. The corporation has been a spectacular success. So far it has attracted over £6 billion of private sector investment to its area. The vesting orders will transfer to the corporation 2–4 hectares of land currently in the ownership of the Port of London, Thames Water and the London Borough of Newham.
The Merseyside orders include 50 hectares of land presently owned by the City of Liverpool, the borough of Wirral, the Merseyside Residuary Body, British Rail, the Merseyside Passenger Transport Executive and Merseyside Transport Limited. Nearly all this land is in the newly extended area of the development corporation. This is an area primarily of industrial and commercial land, much of it now in need of regeneration.
The Sheffield Development Corporation covers some 900 hectares in the lower Don Valley to the north east of the city centre. The decline of the steel industry struck the area badly, leaving large areas of derelict and unused land and an unattractive
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environment. The one vesting order will transfer 2·62 hectares of British Rail land to the corporation.
The Tyne and Wear Development Corporation consists of two areas along the banks of the rivers Tyne and Wear. Your Lordships will be familiar with the problems the North-East has faced. The traditional heavy industries have contracted, leaving behind a legacy of high levels of unemployment and industrial dereliction. Following last year's vesting orders, these two orders vest some 52 hectares of land in the corporation from the City of Newcastle, the boroughs of North Tyneside, South Tyneside and Sunderland, the Port of Tyne Authority and British Rail.
In conclusion urban development corporations are proving to be effective tools for tackling the problems of decay and dereliction in the hearts of some of our major cities. They are showing that vitality can be brought back to these areas, and that environments can be created where people will once again want to live and work. The orders before the House this evening will, if approved, greatly assist the UDCs in this task. If this House agrees, the orders will be debated in another place next week. I commend each of the orders to the House. I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved—[24th Report from the Joint Committee.]—(The Earl of Arran.)
Lord Graham of Edmonton: My Lords, the House will be grateful to the Minister for the care he took in doing justice to the orders. I know that earlier in the evening he would have genuinely enjoyed a debate on the matters before us. However, because of the circumscription on our time tonight, he and I will have to forgo some of that. Nevertheless, we have responsibilities.
The noble Earl will accept that the basis of all the vestings is agreement between the various bodies concerned. We have come a long way since the concept of the urban development corporation was first introduced in the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. I served on the Bill in another place and I know that the creation of the London Docklands Development Corporation and the Merseyside Development Corporation caused a great deal of concern. That was primarily because they were undemocratic in the eyes of the Labour Party. They are still as undemocratic, but I should like to acknowledge the reality of their achievements and the manner in which they have carried them out.
I should not go as far as the Minister in saying that in respect of London it has been a spectacular success. It may have been so for many who have invested large sums of money and received back even larger sums quickly. Certainly there is a great deal to the credit of the London Docklands Development Corporation and I shall not cavil at that.
Can the Minister help in respect of the Merseyside Development Corporation? The explanatory note states that:
"In some instances where the present ownership of the land to be vested is a matter of dispute between two or mere of the bodies mentioned in the Schedule to this Order or where the bodies own

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different interests in the land, the description of the land is, to that extent, duplicated in the Schedule".
I am under the impression that the concept of having the right by legislation to vest land owned by one public body in another is not in dispute. Can the Minister help the House and colleagues in another place by explaining the basis upon which a dispute occurs? I shall understand if he is unable to do so.
I listened carefully to the Minister. He said that, when one looks at the size of the pieces of land affected, it is clear that they are pocket handkerchiefs which for one reason or another have been neglected or gone by default. I can see the good sense of vesting that land in the urban development corporations so that they can make better use of that small area together with others around it.
We on this side of the House recognise the important part that is being played by the development corporation idea and their creation around the country. They are a useful economic tool in the hands of an enterprising authority. However, the Minister must also take on board that those put on the board undemocratically can do their job only if they have a good relationship with the local authorities in whose areas they are seeking to work. The orders demonstrate that almost universally that goodwill is present. I am quite certain that it also exists as regards Merseyside. However, perhaps the Minister could answer the point I raised.
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Graham of Edmonton, for his comments. I should like to join with the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, in congratulating him not only on his stamina but also on his versatility, having just dealt with the Northern Ireland orders.
With the noble Lord, Lord Graham of Edmonton, I should like to take the opportunity of thanking the local authorities, the statutory undertakers and other public bodies for their constructive attitude to all these orders. Once they are approved in another place—and we hope that that will take place next week—the land will be transferred to the corporations. That will greatly assist them in their task of bringing new life to run-down inner city areas.
As regards the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Graham of Edmonton, concerning Merseyside, it was discovered that the Merseyside Residuary Body, as successor to the former county council, had interests in land otherwise used by Liverpool City Council and the Borough of Wirral. Those disputes derived from poor record keeping and confusion in the transfer. I hope that the answer assists the noble Lord, Lord Graham of Edmonton, and I hope that he is satisfied with it.
Lord Graham of Edmonton: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I say that I understand what the Minister said; namely, that it is not a dispute in that there is an argument as to who owns the land or what should happen to it, but rather confusion caused by the creation of succeeding authorities over the land. I hope that that is a fair interpretation of what the Minister said, and on that basis I do not ask him to rise to his feet again.
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, if it is in order, I should like to move the first Motion together with the remaining 10 en bloc.
Lord Morris: My Lords, I must object to that. Unless there has been a government Motion to move these orders en bloc they must be moved severally and not jointly.
Lord Denham: My Lords, I believe that my noble friend is at fault there. With the permission of the House, it is possible to move a number of Motions en bloc. No, I apologise to my noble friend: I was misleading the House. The Motions have to be moved separately.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Merseyside Development Corporation (Vesting of Land) (Transport Land) Order 1989
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee].—(The Earl of Arran.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Merseyside Development Corporation (Vesting of Land) (General) Order 1989
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee].—(The Earl of Arran.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Tyne and Wear Development Corporation (Vesting of Land) (Various Local Authorities) Order 1989
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee].—(The Earl of Arran.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Tyne and Wear Corporation (Vesting of Land) (Port of Tyne Authority and British Railways Board) Order 1989
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee].—(The Earl of Arran.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Leeds Development Corporation (Vesting of Land) (British Railways Board) Order 1989
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee].—(The Earl of Arran.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Leeds Development Corporation (Vesting of Land) (General) Order 1989
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee].—(The Earl of Arran.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Black Country Development Corporation (Vesting of Land) (General) Order 1989
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee].—(The Earl of Arran.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Black Country Development Corporation (Vesting of Land) (Borough of Walsall) Order 1989
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee]—(The Earl of Arran.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

London Docklands Development Corporation (Vesting of Land) (Thames Water Authority) Order 1989
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee].—(The Earl of Arran.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

London Docklands Development Corporation (Vesting of Land) (Port of London Authority and London Borough of Newham) Order 1989
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 14th June be approved [24th Report from the Joint Committee].—(The Earl of Arran.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Associated British Ports (Hull) Bill
Reported from the Unopposed Bill Committee without amendment.
House adjourned at five minutes past one o'clock.