Lords Sitting of 7 February 1989

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Manchester.

Royal Assent
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Mackay of Clashfern): My Lords, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts:
Petroleum Royalties (Relief) and Continental Shelf Act,
Port of Tyne Act,
London Regional Transport Act.

Measles, Mumps and Rubella: Vaccines
2.36 p.m.
Baroness Blatch Baroness Blatch asked Her Majesty's Government:
How much money they are allocating to the regional health authorities in 1989–90 for the purchase of vaccines against measles, mumps and rubella.
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, £7·8 million. The Department of Health informed the regional health authorities of their share of that allocation on 22nd December last year. The allocations were calculated on the basis of each region's share of the number of live births in 1987.
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his reply. Perhaps I may add that the take-up has been significantly successful for this new vaccine. Will he encourage links between the Health Education Council and schools so that a younger age group can be reached in preaching the importance of preventive medicine, which will have an impact on our young people while they are growing up?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, initially the take-up of the vaccine is recommended for children at 15 months and pre-school children. School nurses and community nurses have received information and are aware of the vaccination programme. There was considerable coverage in the media last year.
Baroness Turner of Camden: My Lords, bearing in mind the Government's commitment to free market forces, do they have any plans to negotiate a lower cost per dose of the vaccine, bearing in mind that there is now more than one producer of MMR, the single-shot vaccine in question?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, the noble Baroness is quite right. At the moment there are two producers of the vaccine and I understand that there is the possibility of a third. The negotiations are conducted between the manufacturer and the relative health
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authority, and it is up to the authority to obtain the most competitive price.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, will the noble Earl and his right honourable friends be asking the authorities to negotiate? I understand that a one-shot dose costs £4·50, which seems to be excessively high. Can he say whether the Government are proposing, through the National Health Service, to extend the target area in order to reach a much wider number of children? For example, does the Minister believe that boys should be vaccinated against rubella as well as girls? I understand that they are not. Does he believe that the ethnic groups should also be pressed to vaccinate their children?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, it is in the interests of everybody that the cost of each dose should be as reasonable and as competitive as possible. With reference to the uptake and the particular categories, there are boys as well. As I have just said, when we launched the combined vaccine last autumn we recommended that it should be given to two groups of children—those aged 15 months, as I mentioned, to replace the measles-only vaccine and those aged four to five years before school entry—in a phased catch-up programme in order to give all pre-school children protection in two to three years' time.
Baroness Fisher of Rednal: My Lords, can the noble Earl say whether schoolgirls from the age of 12 years upwards are still included in the rubella vaccine treatment which has been prevalent in schools or whether it has been discontinued under the new scheme? If it has been discontinued, it will have a tragic effect because it concerns the overall health of teenage girls in schools.
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, to the best of my knowledge the scheme is being continued. Obviously in the pre-pregnancy period any way of wiping out measles, mumps and rubella is extremely important.

Armilla Patrol
2.40 p.m.
Baroness Strange Baroness Strange asked Her Majesty's Government:
How many merchant ships the Armilla Patrol had escorted by the time it ceased escorting vessels in November 1988.
The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Lord Trefgarne): My Lords, the number of ships accompanied by the Royal Navy up to 1st November 1988 was 1,026.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: Well done!
Baroness Strange: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his splendid reply. Is he aware that the Royal Navy escorted more than twice as many ships as any other foreign western navy? Is he also aware how grateful the men who sailed in those escorted ships are to the Royal Navy?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for her kind words. I believe I am right in saying that the Royal Navy accompanied more ships than all the other western navies put together.
Lord Irving of Dartford: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that we congratulate the Armilla Patrol and also the men on the three minesweepers for the valuable work that they have done over the past eight years? Can he give the House an assurance that the valuable role that they have been engaged in will continue as long as there is no formal peace agreement between Iran and Iraq?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, as I believe the noble Lord will be aware, following the ceasefire towards the end of last year we have stopped the arrangement whereby merchant vessels are accompanied by Royal Navy vessels. The Royal Navy Armilla Patrol is remaining in the region on independent patrol and will therefore be available to resume its accompaniment role should that prove necessary. As regards the minesweepers, it has been decided that those presently in the region need not be replaced at the beginning of March when rotation was due in the normal course of events, but ships will be earmarked to resume that role should it prove necessary.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, will the House forgive me if I pass my congratulations in the form of a question? How often did the Royal Navy open fire during the course of this operation?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I do not have that information in front of me, but, happily, not very often.
Lord Mellish: My Lords, as it is right that the British flag should be waved at least occasionally, can it be put on record that in escorting the ships the Royal Navy encountered not one incident of antagonism? The Royal Navy did a first class job and provided safety.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. It is indeed the case that no ship accompanied by the Royal Navy was attacked during that time.

Channel Tunnel Railway Route: Proposals
2.44 p.m.
Lord Kennet Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they will ensure that the environmental assessment of the alternative routes proposed for the Channel Tunnel railway line through London and Kent compares all those routes, and that it is available to Parliament before any private or hybrid Bill is introduced.
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, the Government will expect British Rail to take environmental considerations into account in choosing a preferred route corridor and to explain the reasons for its choice.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, does that not assume that this House and indeed the British public will have no opportunity to discuss the relative environmental merits and demerits of the three routes? If British Rail does nothing about it except attach an environmental assessment to the private Bill which it will be promoting in favour of one of them, what opportunity will there be for public and parliamentary discussion of the three options? Will the Government remember the thinness of the ice they are treading on in this matter because of their being in breach of the European directive on environmental assessments?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, perhaps I may take first the second part of the noble Lord's question. The EC directive on environmental assessments does not apply to projects approved by British Rail, but British Rail has made clear that before it introduces a private Bill it will be carrying out a full environmental impact assessment of its chosen route as if the directive did apply. It has appointed independent environmental consultants to advise. On the first part of the noble Lord's question, once British Rail has made known its preferred route there will be ample time for people to write to British Rail if they do not like that route, and naturally the press will cover the story strongly.
Lord Wallace of Coslany: My Lords, is the Minister aware that his reply gives no comfort to the masses of people in Kent who are wholly against this proposal? Is it not the duty of this House and of the other place fully to discuss these proposals before any attempt is made to bring forward a private Bill? The noble Earl must understand the tremendous opposition to this proposal from, among others, Kent County Council and practically all the people of Kent. It is disgraceful.
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I regret that the noble Lord should think this is a disgrace. I understand perfectly well the points that he makes. We all recognise that it is absolutely impossible to build a new line without some impact on the environment. It is therefore important that in developing the proposal the closest attention should be given to minimising and mitigating the environmental impact.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, on the assumption that either a private Bill or a hybrid Bill will be necessary, am I not right in saying that it will have to go through the full parliamentary procedure, including Second Readings in both Houses and proceedings before a Select Committee?
The Earl of Arran: Yes, my Lords. I understand that my noble and learned friend is quite correct.
Lord Jay: My Lords, would it not have been better if the promoters of the project and the Government had investigated the real practical possibilities of running trains at this speed through Kent before and not after they had induced investors to put up very large sums of money for the project?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, the noble Lord may take that view, but it has been decided to go ahead and not to progress in that way.
Lord Mowbray and Stourton: My Lords, if it is not too wide of the Question, is it not envisaged that a route from the northern Midlands and the North of the country will go west of London to the Channel?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I am not quite certain that I understand my noble friend's point, though I am sure that it was meant to be helpful.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, is the Minister aware that in deciding the route the British Railways Board will choose what is most commercially viable and not what is environmentally good for Kent? Can he tell the House whether the Government are prepared to pay to British Rail the additional cost of ensuring that the line takes a sound and environmentally decent route that is acceptable to the residents of Kent?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, in no way will British Rail necessarily take the cheapest route. In deciding on the preferred corridor it will take into account commercial, social, environmental and economic considerations.
Lord Orr-Ewing: My Lords, is it not a fact that Kent County Council, after very careful consideration with all the people it represented, supported the creation of a Channel Tunnel? Further, were they not 100 per cent. behind the Channel Tunnel? Therefore, is it not slightly illogical that everyone should raise their arms in horror that the necessary high-speed railway line should travel through Kent?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, in answer to my noble friend, be that as it may. The railway line from London to the Channel will still have to pass through Kent.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, do the Government accept that it is most important for the success of this venture, not just for the people of the South-East but also for those throughout the North, the Midlands and Scotland, that it should be achieved with the maximum degree of agreement? Therefore, what steps will the Government take to ensure that there is maximum agreement with the people who will be affected by this line development?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I rather hoped that I had just answered that question. When British Rail publishes its preferred route there will be considerable time in which to go into the whole matter. As I said, there will be considerable press comment, and as my noble and learned friend said, there will be a private Bill which will pass through Parliament in the normal manner.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, I asked what steps the Government themselves would take to try to secure maximum agreement through their own contacts with British Rail.
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, the Government will need to be convinced that it is the best route.
Lord Aldington: My Lords, with reference to the question posed by my noble friend behind me which the noble Earl answered, is it not a fact that a large body of opinion in Kent joined with Kent County Council in approving the creation of a new, high-speed rail link? Is he aware that what concerns them is that too little regard appears to be being paid to the environmental impact on the people of Kent of a rail link the main purpose of which is not to serve the people of Kent but to serve other people?
Is it not also a fact that many of those people look to the Government to apply their knowledge and interest to the creation and setting of the new rail link, very much in the same way as they do with a road?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, of course the Government are totally and completely sensitive to the beauties which Kent holds. They are aware of the environmental impact that the rail link will make on Kent. However, as I just said, at the same time they will take into account all considerations.
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, are we not fast approaching the happy state where the cost of compensation to those who will suffer the impact of such a rail line may match or even exceed the cost—certainly in built-up areas—of putting it underground?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, that is a technical question which I cannot answer at present. However, as regards compensation, I can say that people whose property is not required but who are adversely affected by the use of the line will be entitled to compensation for depreciation in the value of their property in accordance with the provisions of the Land Compensation Acts.
Baroness Blatch: My Lords, while it is important to secure a route through Kent, or elsewhere, surely we must not lose sight of the significant importance to the economy of having a link between London and the tunnel and therefore not waste too much time in establishing that link so that we may enjoy its benefits.
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, yes; my noble friend has a point. However, one of the particular points which concerns people at present is the state of uncertainty created by not knowing which route it will be. I think that once that is disclosed, which will be towards th of this month or at the beginning of March, people will feel happier because they will then know where it will be.
Lord Stallard: My Lords, will the noble Earl confirm that we shall not be able to discuss all the alternative routes in this House; that what we will discuss will be British Rail's preferred route and that that will be the only information in front of us?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I think that that question has already been asked and I have done my best to answer it.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, can the noble Earl tell the House whether the presence of the husband of the Prime Minister in one of the lobby groups concerned with the route to the Channel Tunnel was for environmental, commercial, domestic or social reasons?
Noble Lords: Next Question!
Lord Kennet: My Lords, I believe it is the custom that the questioner may round up— —
The Lord Privy Seal (Lord Belstead): My Lords, I think that we have had a good go round the course on this Question. It is now a matter for the House. If the noble Lord is not making headway, then I think that we should proceed to the next Question.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, will the noble Lord permit me——
Noble Lords: Order!

Young Workers: Protection
2.56 p.m.
Lord Graham of Edmonton Lord Graham of Edmonton asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether, as part of their consideration of the future of wages councils, they are planning the establishment of a statutory framework for the protection of young workers.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, Parliament removed the pay of young workers under 21 from the statutory framework of wages council regulation in 1986. The Government have no plans to establish any framework of this kind in future.
Lord Graham of Edmonton: My Lords, will the Minister confirm that young workers are among the most vulnerable sector in the community, that they already suffer from exploitation and that they need protection, especially in respect of their wage rates but also in respect of other matters? If indeed Parliament thought about this as long ago as 1939, when Winston Churchill had something to say about wages councils, what has changed in the intervening 80 years? The attitude of employers to young workers certainly has not.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I am afraid that I profoundly disagree with the noble Lord. A great deal has changed in this century a am surprised that he has not noticed.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: My Lords, does not all past experience show that a statutory framework for the protection of young workers is one of the best methods of securing that they suffer unemployment?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, my noble friend is entirely correct. Indeed, those were the arguments which I deployed in 1986 when your Lordships were considering the legislation, and those arguments commended themselves to the House.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, is the Minister aware that among the many very useful and moral things which the wages councils did, both through members of the councils who were from the employers' side and through those who were from the trade unions, was to seek to prevent and, where it existed, to eradicate the appalling exploitation of young people? The wages councils were well worth their weight in gold for that reason alone. Does the noble Lord therefore not think that the principles of those councils on that score should, in the interests of young folk, be maintained?
Lord Trefgarne: No, my Lords; I am afraid that I do not agree. As my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter just confirmed, the principal effect of the wages councils was to secure a lower level of employment among young people and not a higher one.
Lord Thorneycroft: My Lords, will my noble friend agree that thanks partly to demographic reasons and partly to the admirable policies of Her Majesty's Government there will be a great shortage of young workers in this country; that it will be very difficult to find them; and that they will be in a sellers' market? In those circumstances would it not be very odd indeed to try to clutter the whole matter up with bureaucratic statutory instruments?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble friend. Indeed, that was why we passed the legislation in 1986 and why we have now made new proposals, contained in a consultative document which was issued towards the end of last year. Perhaps I may add that none of that affects health and safety protection for young people because we closely follow the recommendations of the Health and Safety Commission in those matters.
Baroness Turner of Camden: My Lords, does the Minister not agree that the abolition of wages councils, as proposed in the consultation paper to which he has just referred, will leave Britain, alone of the countries of the European Community, without any minimum wage legislation? Does he not further agree that we are the only country in the EC to denounce the 1986 convention to which he has referred?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, that may have something to do with the fact that our unemployment rate is now dropping faster than any other country in the European Community.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester: My Lords, does the Minister not agree that if we abolish all wages councils and all such protection we are encouraging the inefficient use of labour, and that many employers do not want to see such restrictions abolished?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, if I may be forgiven for saying so I do not believe that the right reverend Prelate is right. I believe that the abolition of wages councils would be a good thing; but I must emphasise that the Government have not yet reached a final view on the matter. We have issued what is a

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consultative document only, but we have made our view clear.
Lord Rochester: My Lords, will the Government pay due regard to the views of members of the CBI that wages councils can fulfil a useful role in the sectors in which they operate; and that a sector-by-sector review is to be preferred to wholesale abolition?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I believe that I am right in saying that the CBI is among those who have submitted views following publication of the consultation paper. The consultation period ended only last week. I am not yet in a position to express the Government's view on the outcome of that consultation.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, is the Minister aware that many employers within the CBI and many trade unions are still somewhat apprehensive about the exploitation of young people? When will the Government stop claiming that they are reducing the massive unemployment that they created?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me if I do not follow him down that line, save to say that I profoundly disagree with him. Wages councils are approaching the end of their useful life. That is the view we have expressed in the consultation document. We shall now take into account all the other views that have been expressed.
Lord Graham of Edmonton: My Lords, will the Minister respond to the current situation in retailing whereby the wages of many young workers are £50 or £60 a week? Does the Minister take on board the fact that there are employers, especially in retailing, who will take advantage of the removal of the existing minimum protection?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, a much better way to establish appropriate wage levels, whether for young people or anyone else, is by agreement between the parties concerned and not by imposition from on high by wages councils or any other body.
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton: My Lords, in view of the fact that there are many studies, known of course to the Minister, which support the remarks of the right reverend Prelate about the inefficient use of labour, and as the views of many employers have also been cited, will the Minister see to it that studies which support the view of the consultative papers already published and of the Government—at any rate prospectively—are themselves published? So far the Government have published no evidence for the view they seem to take and which the Minister has put forward.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the Government have expressed their view in the consultation document to which I have referred. Other people have now made their responses to what we have proposed. I dare say that among those responses is one from the noble Lord. They will all be taken into account, and the Government will express their view on them in due course.

Business
Lord Denham: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that the Report stage of the Children Bill will be adjourned at approximately 7.30 p.m. for approximately one hour and that during this adjournment a debate will take place to take note of the report of the European Communities Committee on visual display units.

Children Bill [H.L.]
3.4 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now further considered on Report.
Moved, That the Bill be further considered on Report.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Clause 19 [Provision of accommodation and maintenance by local authority for children whom they are looking after]:
Baroness Faithfull Baroness Faithfull moved Amendment No. 44:
Page 15, line 15, at beginning insert—
("(a) placing him with relatives (subject to any regulations made by the Secretary of State) on such terms as to payment by the authority and otherwise as the authority may determine;").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the social services department feel that as far as possible children should be kept with relatives; and that if they have not been with relatives before they leave care it should be possible to place them with relatives. It should therefore be possible to pay relatives the same type of boarding out allowance as is paid to foster parents. I beg to move.
Lady Kinloss: My Lords, I support the amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, and I said in Committee that the number of children fostered by relatives had declined. That is sad because such children appear to do better and and are better adjusted. One of the elements of the amendment is to enable an allowance to be paid to relatives. That is important when children are living with relatives under voluntary arrangements in circumstances where it may not be appropriate for the relatives to be assessed as foster parents and therefore to receive the foster allowance although they may be in desperate need of money to look after the children. The amendment provides a better solution than sending the children to stay with strangers.
Baroness David: My Lords, as I understand it Amendment No. 45, tabled by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will probably cover the first half of the amendment; we are grateful for that. The other element, which is not covered by his amendment, would enable an allowance to be paid to relatives. That seems important because relatives, if they have support, may be willing to take on nieces, nephews, grandchildren and so forth. It would be much better for those children to be with their relatives. The relatives would be encouraged to take the children if they could have some compensation.
Lord Meston: I support the amendment. It is obviously right that local authorities should be encouraged to look first to the child's wider family. If that is to work, it is also important that foster allowances or something similar should be available to the wider family which is prepared to assist the local authority.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, we discussed this matter in Committee. I undertook then to consider whether we could put emphasis on relatives. That I have sought to do. If I have understood my own amendment correctly—that is an important proviso—it inserts the phrase under the heads (i), (ii) and (iii) into Clause 19 at line 16 and therefore preserves the existing provision about terms as to payment,
"by the authority or otherwise as the authority may determine".
My amendment covers both aspects of Amendment No. 44, which is what was intended. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, will feel that we have dealt with the point more economically in my amendment than in hers and that she will be prepared to withdraw Amendment No. 44 on the promise that I shall move Amendment No. 45 in the hope that it may be accepted.
Baroness Faithfull: My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend. I shall of course withdraw the amendment. We can then debate his amendment. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 45:
Page 15, line 16, leave out ("a family or other suitable person") and insert ("—

(i) a family;

(ii) a relative of his; or

(iii) any other suitable person").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the amendment is intended to cover the point that relatives should be specifically referred to, otherwise leaving the structure of the clause as it was. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Faithfull Baroness Faithfull moved Amendment No. 46:
Page 15, line 31. leave out ("parent") and insert ("carer").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I am very glad that we have with us the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, who is closely associated with the National Foster Care Association and is a foster father of I am not quite sure how many children, but quite a number. It has been put to the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Redesdale, and myself by the National Foster Care Association that in future we should try to call foster parents, foster carers. The reason is that in a number of cases children become confused between their own parents and the foster parents. It ought to be clear to them that the foster parents are not their own parents, although we hope that the foster parents will treat them as their own.
Furthermore, a number of children with foster parents go back to their own parents. One has to recognise that the parents of children who have had to leave them either through force of circumstances
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or for any other reasons have a sense of inadequacy and hopelessness when they feel that their children are looking to others to take their place. It might have been right that this was so. However, the fact remains that it is confusing in the minds of the children and rather sad in the minds of the parents. Therefore the National Foster Care Association asks whether your Lordships would consider calling foster parents foster carers instead in this Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Meston: My Lords, in a sense this is a matter of semantics. I invite your Lordships to accept the argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, that the expression foster carer is less emotive and less confusing. We hope to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, what with his experience he thinks.
Lord Redesdale: My Lords, I have had a wonderful introduction on this occasion. I shall not take the advice which is usually given to people to start off in a very positive way but will start with an apology. I apologise for taking the time of the House on this point because it may be hard for noble Lords to see the difference in the arguments put forward.
The role of fostering has changed very considerably. Most foster parents or foster carers are in short-term situations. I am speaking in a rather different way in that my children are grown up now. We were long-term foster parents and I am arguing against people like that. Therefore my arguments are against the situation which I was in.
We want to have very many more foster carers because that helps the children and the system. There is a much more caring society in a foster care situation. The concept of caring is to look after the children while they are away from their parents, and we hope that they will go back to their parents. The foster carers are not the old-style foster parents that one heard of; they will have to be very much more professional in the future. A point which we were talking about last night is that they must be trained; they need training. This point will come up again.
If carers are to do their job properly they must have a special relationship with the children. I think that being a foster carer or somebody who is caring for the child is a much better concept than the old-style foster parent, who always had the problem, in the terms of the media, of being in the tug of love situation. The child had been with the foster parent for a long time and was dragged away and sent back to the natural parent. Those were the old cases which were so beloved of the tabloid press at one time.
In a situation where one is working with the parents for the children to go back to the parents later, we do not want such a tied down situation. Therefore I am asking your Lordships to consider changing the phrase "foster parent" to "foster carer" because it is a developing concept. It is something which will exist in the future and therefore I am asking the House to consider putting into the legislation something that will help along the concept for the future. I am sorry to have taken your Lordships' time on the matter and I should be grateful if it could be given consideration.
3.15 p.m.
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, is not the important matter frankly not what we call a foster parent in the statute but what the child calls the foster parent? One can hardly imagine a child addressing the person whom he regards as a foster parent as "My dear carer", especially when he writes to him. Do not all these arguments and names alter with circumstances? Will not the circumstances dictate the right title for the child to call the party concerned?
Lord Redesdale: My Lords, perhaps I may respond to that point. I appreciate that in a long-term foster care/foster parent situation children refer to "Daddy" and "Mummy". I am not saying that it should sound like some bureaucratic title. It is more how the foster parent or foster carer is seen from outside. I do not think it is a question of a relationship.
The point is how the parent or the foster parent is considered and whether the child is part of that family—not necessarily a natural part of the family, but he or she certainly enjoys all the benefits and care of the family. That is the difference.
Baroness David: My Lords, I wish to support the amendment. I am sorry to differ from my noble friend on the Front Bench, but I think that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, are making a very important point about the new type of relationship. I hope that this amendment will be accepted.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: My Lords, I wish to add a brief word. It seems to me important that the carer should not be called "parent" because it is frequently his duty to maintain or promote the child's links with his family. It would be very confusing if the carer were known in many cases as "Daddy" or "Mummy" rather than something like "Uncle" or a Christian name.
The new concept of the foster parent has been reflected in the regulations. The 1985 regulations were amended and revised in 1988 and include that consideration. This is an evolving argument which has been incorporated into the modern government regulations. That is the way things are going and it would only be right and appropriate for the Bill to reflect the modern view of fostering that has grown up.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, this is obviously a difficult and important matter, I do not think that my noble friend Lord Redesdale need in any sense apologise for taking up our time with it. This type of placement is central and it is important that we should think it over. However, while we recognise that there is a school of thought in favour of changing the name, it may not be quite wise to do that in the statute, at least not yet.
As the noble Lord, Lord Henderson of Brompton, said, careful consideration has gone into the continuing use of the term in the 1988 Boarding Out (Foster Placement) Regulations, following certain
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representations in favour of "foster carer". Now if in particular circumstances or fostering schemes or placements the parties prefer to make use informally of a different term, there is no reason why they should not do so. The handbook of guidance to the 1988 regulations says as much. The noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, in introducing this matter pointed out that it may depend slightly on the length of the relationship. If a child is to be a long-term resident with a foster carer, it might be more appropriate to refer to the parent as a foster parent.
There is the point, which appeals strongly to me, that the child in the fostering family should be regarded as one with that fostering family from the point of view of developing relationships. I mentioned in Committee my personal experience of seeing a close friend and neighbour fostering children very successfully. Quite disturbed children responded with marvellous speed to the love and affection shown them when they became members of a fairly large family.
The guidance makes it clear that whatever the term may be in the statute, it will be chosen according to the particular circumstances that exist. However, at the moment there is no real evidence that "foster carer" is generally a preferred or widely used term. I know that those who are close to it like it. However, it would be fair to say that it has not yet attained general use, although it may do so. The attachment of the word "foster" to "carer" seems a slightly awkward juxtaposition from the point of view of pure English. But of course the words "foster parent" in a sense have a similar difficulty.
A substitute for foster parent may come into general usage. Then it would be right to reflect it in legislation. In the meantime, I feel that although the matter is worthy of consideration, and no doubt will be further considered as the Bill progresses, we should stick with the present term. It has the merit of conveying the sense of family placement and care to a parental standard; that is, the standard of a good parent. That idea commended itself to some of your Lordships at an earlier stage of the proceedings.
I hope that my noble friend may feel that while I perfectly understand the point which she has expressed that the matter is well worthy of consideration, at this stage at least it would be wise to continue with what we have. If that is her view, she may feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Faithfull: My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for his reply. I have two points to make. First, the word "carer" is coming into being very much more than it ever has before in all social work legislation in connection with the elderly and the handicapped. It is a word that is attaining common usage in a way that it never did before.
Secondly, the noble and learned Lord said that for the moment we would stay with "foster parent" and not use the word "carer". He said that perhaps in years to come we could consider the word "carer". Therefore at this stage at any rate, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Elliot of Harwood Baroness Elliot of Harwood moved Amendment No. 47:
Page 15, line 31, at end insert—
("3A) The Secretary of State shall make regulations under subsection (2)(a) to provide that—

(a) Subject to subsections (3A)(b), (3A)(c) and (3A)(d), a local authority or voluntary organisation shall not place a child with a foster parent unless the foster parent has before or at the time of placement signed an undertaking not to subject the child to corporal punishment.

(b) Subsection (3A)(a) shall not apply to a child placed with a foster parent before this Act was brought into force for the duration of the placement.

(c) Subject to subsection (3A)(d) below references in this Act to giving corporal punishment are references to doing anything for the purposes of punishing the child (whether or not there are also other reasons for doing it) which apart from any justification would constitute a battery.

(d) A person is not to be taken for the purposes of this section as giving corporal punishment by virtue of anything done for reasons that include averting an immediate danger or personal injury to, or an immediate danger to the property of, any person (including the child).").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this amendment is the third attempt that I and my noble friends have made on the Bill to change the ideas of people who believe that corporal punishment is the only way to deal with difficult children. Our previous amendment had much support but was withdrawn when the noble and learned Lord said that it interfered with the common law.
This amendment has no reference to the common law. But as children in foster care are the responsibility of local authorities, the question of beating children who have been placed with foster parents is a separate responsibility connected with local authorities. We all know the arguments for and against corporal punishment. A number of research studies have shown that children who fear physical punishment tend to have less guilt about misbehaviour and less self-discipline. There are also clearly demonstrated links with child abuse. Many of the tragic cases of child abuse started with physical punishment of the child. Many of the abusers of course were themselves beaten as children. Corporal punishment passes on the message that violence solves problems. I think that violence incurs violence. Children model their behaviour on adults and believe that violence solves problems, which it does not. Therefore, it is not surprising that physical punishment tends to encourage aggressive behaviour. One summary of available research in this field concluded:
"Studies of child-rearing practices, assessing the effects of parental punishment, especially the use of physical punishment, yield a consistent outcome. In general the degree of parental punitiveness has been found to be postively related with … delinquency and aggressive…behaviour".
Many children in care, because of their experiences, exhibit disturbed and aggressive behaviour. To allow foster carers to use physical punishment is to risk reinforcing rather than curing that behaviour.
We live in an unacceptably violent society. People talk about the need to subject children to more corporal punishment as a means of disciplining them. But studies show astonishingly high levels of parental physical punishment in this country. The figure is as high as 97 per cent. for four year-olds. Other countries identify the United Kingdom as a land
1444
where children are beaten. Our football hooligans are also the shame of ourselves and of Europe. This amendment is, we hope, one modest way of reducing the intoleraby high level of violence in our society. I beg to move.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: My Lords, it is very hard to follow such a moving speech. I hope that this amendment will command assent both from the heart of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and from his head. He will appreciate that this amendment is logical in that it completes the work of Parliament, which has prohibited corporal punishment in the public education of children. It also completes the work of the Government, who are already committed to banning corporal punishment in community homes.
It would surely be grossly unfair and wrong if children in foster homes were allowed to be beaten when children in community homes—perhaps the brothers of children in foster homes—were not. That is inadmissible and makes this amendment necessary. This amendment concentrates on foster children, in answer to criticisms in Committee. The amendment has also been altered to take account of the technical criticisms of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor.
The amendment continues to exempt existing foster placements, so they will be undisturbed. It also uses the wording of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 to define corporal punishment. I should have preferred the previous amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, and supported by the noble Baroness, to be agreed. If this amendment goes into the Bill, I should have liked the word "carer" to take the place of "parent". However, those arguments have already been rehearsed. I regret that the previous amendment was not pursued because the view of this House would have been invaluable on an unwhipped basis. This is a difficult matter and that would have been very useful. Perhaps that could be done on Third Reading and we could have a totally unwhipped view as to whether "parent" should be retained or "carer" should be substituted. As the noble Baroness has said, the latter word is in use generally by those who deal with children in care.
I believe that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor's objection that the provision of first class foster parents might be diminished if the amendment were passed is totally unfounded. There is no evidence of that happening. We are able to say that with confidence because in those local authority areas where corporal punishment has already been prohibited there has been no evidence of any reluctance on the part of foster parents to come forward, be put on the list and sign a declaration that they will not inflict corporal punishment on children fostered by them.
The amendment has the support of organisations representing all aspects of the child care system, including foster parents.
Finally I should like to support what the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood, said. This is a most serious consideration. There have been a number of cases in which the local authority has had to intervene because of inappropriate use of corporal

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punishment on a foster child. In some instances it has amounted to abuse, as the noble Baroness said, and formal intervention has ensued. That is a state of affairs which none of us would be happy with. The National Foster Care Association has said that that is one of the reasons why it supports the amendment. I should have thought that that, and all the other reasons that have been adduced this afternoon, should be sufficient to persuade the House that the amendment is necessary, if not overdue.
3.30 p.m.
Lord Seebohm: My Lords, I think that there are two sides to the question. As has just been said, under present regulations corporal punishment is to be banned in community homes. It therefore seems quite illogical for the ban not to be extended to foster homes as well. If the regulations were extended, as they may well be, to all children in care they would cover children in foster homes, who would still be in local authority care. Meanwhile, foster parents have not been prohibited from using corporal punishment.
I should hope that, as has already been said by the noble Lord who has just spoken, since Parliament in its wisdom has banned corporal punishment in all state-supported schools and community homes it would complete the job and extend the ban to cover all children in care.
During the Committee stage the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that the child in foster care should be brought up as part of the family. He has repeated that statement today. However that is not what happens in real life. In principle most children are in foster care only until they can be returned to their families. It is very important that the object of their being in foster care should be that they can be returned to their families.
Some of us have read a report by the Dartington Research Project which indicates that 40 per cent. of all children placed in foster care remain there only for about six weeks. Of those who are in foster care for longer, up to two years, 83 per cent. have been in more than one placement. The main object of foster care is not that it should be permanent or a form of second-class adoption: it should last only while family problems are solved.
The noble and learned Lord also said that the supply of foster parents might be diminished. That point has already been dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. That suggestion has not been borne out by research or by those local authorities which have adopted the principle which we are trying to establish with the amendment. I hope that the noble Baroness who has moved the amendment will press it.
Lord Banks: My Lords, I should like to support the amendment. As we have heard, it applies to foster children only. In that connection it is relevant to take note of the fact that the National Foster Care Association supports the amendment.
When corporal punishment was discussed in Committee, as we have heard, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that the 1955 regulations laid down that foster parents must bring up foster children as if they were their own. But that
1446
is considerably modified by the revised 1988 regulations. Foster parents simply undertake to care for the child as a member of the family having regard to local authority requirements. In addition, as has been explained by previous speakers, there does not appear to be any evidence from those areas where there is a ban on the use of corporal punishment by foster parents that such a ban leads to any diminution in the number of foster parents available.
The amendment refers only to new placements. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will feel able to accept it, particularly as it is the Government's policy to abolish corporal punishment in care institutions.
The noble Lord, Lord Henderson of Brompton, raised an important point when he asked whether it was right that children in care should be treated differently as regards corporal punishment from children placed with foster parents. He felt that that would not be right. I also feel that it would not be right.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, I wonder whether we are not going too far. I think that there is too much of a feeling that corporal punishment: is bad and ought to be abolished altogether. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said that one of the arguments in favour of it was that children's behaviour was becoming dreadful.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: My Lords, it was the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot, who talked about violence in society. I did not.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, that is quite right. It was my noble friend Lady Elliot.
When I was brought up in the 1930s there were not the same complaints about bad behaviour as there are today. It may be that there is more publicity today. I was last beaten at the age of 19 as a midshipman for misbehaving. It did not create in me a feeling of antagonism and make me want to behave badly. I think that I have been reasonably well controlled, except perhaps in this Chamber.
It seems to me that one can become obsessed with the thought that corporal punishment—beating—of a child by a parent is wicked. It is wicked if it is done for the wrong reasons but if it is a disciplinary process it can deal with a problem very quickly and easily and solve the problem nicely. I should have thought that a foster parent would need to have that facility just as much as an ordinary parent. It does not matter if there is to be a mini adoption process. Anyone who is in charge of a child should not feel that they cannot beat it as a punishment for doing something wrong. The fourth paragraph of the amendment goes some way in the direction that I should like, but it is not good enough as an excuse for beating a child who misbehaves.
I believe that the noble Lords who are moving the amendment are well meaning but that they are taking the issue too far and too seriously. I hope that your Lordships will feel that there is a place for beating—I shall not call it corporal punishment—in family life. I should have thought that it was silly to legislate in an attempt to cut it out altogether.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: My Lords, every noble Lord who has spoken to the amendment has talked about beating children. I am a mother and I never beat my children. However, I did sometimes—as a great many mothers and fathers do occasionally—cuff my children or give them a smack. It is quite common in the animal world. When a cub has put itself in danger its mother will drag it back and give it a cuff. Quite honestly, it is a reflex action that the human mother has too.
Are we seriously to ask foster parents to sign a written declaration that they will never give a cuff to a child who has perhaps stepped off the pavement into the path of an on-coming car and given them a real fright? It seems to me that we are getting this matter a little out of proportion and creating a difficult situation.
Baroness Macleod of Borve: My Lords, I agree with my noble friend Lord Mottistone and the noble Baroness, Lady Saltoun. They are right. If a local authority in its wisdom gives a precious child into the care of someone who might beat or hurt the child, that is the local authority's fault, but in my view it does not mean that Parliament should lay down as and when any chastisement takes place.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: My Lords, does the noble Baroness agree that she and the previous two speakers have been talking about corporal punishment—beating, cuffing or whatever it may be—within the family and that the amendment is not about the family at all? Those comments are therefore totally irrelevant to the amendment.
Baroness Macleod of Borve: My Lords, I was not talking about the family. I was talking implicitly about children who might be part of a family and who should therefore be treated in the same way as those in a normal family.
Lord Redesdale: My Lords, as possibly the only foster parent or carer in this House, I should like to say that fostering is extremely difficult. I am afraid that I cannot support my noble friend on this amendment.
I hate the thought of the word "beating" which sounds very extreme. It is rather like diets: some things are good for you, but not in excess. A child in a foster situation can perhaps push the parent to the point where it expects a reaction. All children do this. Having had seven children of my own and two foster children, I feel that I have some knowledge of the matter. The child wants to see authority. I do not want carte blanche for beating, but it is unfair that a carer or foster parent can be had for assault because he or she slapped a wrist. It is a question of degree. I cannot therefore support the amendment.
Baroness Phillips: My Lords, I speak as an ex-teacher and as a mother and grandmother. I have never struck a child in my life; it is really not necessary. If you think about it, it is an admission of your own inability to control. I do not wish to pursue that point, but I should be happy to give counselling to some noble Lords.
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Why are we making such heavy weather of this matter? Paragraph (c) of the amendment states quite clearly what corporal punishment is about in this connection. Battery is very clear. Battery takes place when one beats a child to such an extent that it is really suffering. That is rather different from a cuff. Many years ago I can remember my mother saying that one did not cuff a child because it was dangerous to do so and one might do damage to the ear. Her generation had been brought up in a rather different school of thought so I cannot understand why we cannot write this provision into the Act. I should like to see written into Acts of Parliament that parents cannot use corporal punishment against their children. We now see the most appalling examples of torture and cruelty which some parents obviously think is permitted. I fear that the attitude displayed by some Peers suggests that it is permitted.
I do not like the suggestion that we can be compared with animals. There are moments when I think that animals are much more sensitive than we are because they do not attack their own. But there is no doubt that we are uncivilised if we subscribe to any kind of battering of a child or of any other defenceless person.
Lord Seebohm: My Lords, I did not wish to speak again. I just wish to say that to my mind all that we are putting forward is government policy. We are simply extending it to a logical conclusion.
Baroness David: My Lords, my name is on the amendment, but I have been waiting to speak because I expected that someone such as the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, would say, "It didn't do me any harm when I was a child". I find that approach slightly offensive, but I do not want to be nasty to the noble Lord whom I very much like.
We have had time and again this argument, "It didn't do me any harm". We have advanced a little since then. I have certainly cuffed my children, but I have always been very ashamed and sorry that I have done so. I do not think that any of my children now cuff their children and I am glad about that. However, as the regulations now state that there should be no corporal punishment in community homes or residential establishments, it is logical to extend that to foster parents or carers. Why should children who are in care there be treated differently from children in care in the home?
I hope that the noble and learned Lord will give a lead; it is important in creating a climate of opinion. We can do that in this House; I hope that the noble and learned Lord will.
3.45 p.m.
Baroness Faithfull: My Lords, there is one point that has not been made throughout the debate. It is that children in foster homes are vulnerable children. They are not like the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, who has had a wonderful life and could tolerate having had a good old whang and battering. Children in foster homes are vulnerable and often have deep emotional feelings of animosity against life. One does not want to add to that. It is therefore right that we do not have corporal punishment in community

1449
homes and we should not have corporal punishment for vulnerable children in foster homes.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, the regulation-making powers in paragraph 10 of Part II of Schedule 2 will enable us to provide in regulations for a wide range of matters connected with the welfare and upbringing of children placed with foster parents. There are many equally important matters which are, and will continue to be, covered in foster placement regulations which are not specifically named in the regulation-making power. We shall discuss more about the principles of this matter later.
The existing power would enable us to include in regulations such a requirement as my noble friend Lady Elliot has in mind. Before commencement of the Act we shall be reviewing the Boarding Out of Children (Foster Placement) Regulations 1988 and the accompanying handbook of guidance and at that point we shall give careful consideration as to whether further provision should be made on this matter.
In respect of assessing the suitability of people applying to the local authority as foster parents, the handbook at present states:
"The applicant's views on discipline should be explored, including views on the agency's policy on punishment and discipline and on the inappropriateness generally of corporal punishment for children in care. Discussion may be needed on how the agency's requirements might be reconciled with an applicant's differing views in relation to the upbringing of children of the family."
Paragraph 154 of the handbook states that matters of discipline and punishment can he included in written agreements between the local authority and the foster parent. I see great merit in the present approach which is that punishment and discipline generally—that is the whole range of discipline, not just this particular aspect—are matters that can be covered in written agreements between authorities and foster parents. Some noble Lords who have spoken in support of this amendment pointed out that in the case where local authorities have pursued this policy, on the whole it has been successful. There is a great deal to be said for this being pursued by agreement.
With reference to what I said in Committee, some noble Lords were inclined to think that I had in mind only long-term fostering when I said that the children were to be brought up as members of the family. However, the most recent regulations that deal with this matter require the child to be brought up—it is the purpose of a fostering placement—as a member of the family for however long or short a time the child may be in that home. There has to be some form of borderline however one works. This amendment is not attempting to apply this philosophy to the ordinary parent and child. It therefore seems right that the philosophy which should be applied—if one is dealing with an agreement that a child should be brought up as a member of the family—should apply equally to the natural member of the family and to the fostered member of the family.
There is a great merit in proceeding by agreement. As has been said, it has been successful and is becoming more extensive. I believe that this approach allows for flexibility and for a positive attitude with
1450
proper attention to the most suitable framework of upbringing and discipline for each individual child rather than restriction to a blanket prohibition of one form of punishment. There may be forms of punishment other than corporal punishment which are equally inappropriate for children. There are always dangers in focusing on one. There are forms of emotional punishment which could be at least as damaging, if not more so.
It is a question of a borderline. We have made regulations with regard to institutions for child care which prevent institutional corporal punishment. However, with the home and family, there are borderlines to be observed. This amendment provides for a quite remarkable borderline. It provides for placements before the Act takes effect to be covered by one law and placements after the Act takes effect to be covered by another, even if they are placements in the same family. I believe that this is better done by agreement.
However, I wish to assure noble Lords that we shall very carefully consider in the regulations how this should be handled. The concerns that have been expressed here will certainly be taken into account. But I suggest that it may not be wise at this stage, having regard to the principle which has been described—that of bringing up a child as a member of the family, which is what the regulations presently require—as the essence of the relationship. So long as that is the law and so long as the law permits the parent to administer corporal punishment to his or her child it seems to be a contradiction to outlaw this except by agreement. Agreement has certainly proved a very effective way of dealing with the matter so far.
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord sits down, for the guidance of the House will he explain what he means by favouring an agreement entered into between the local authority and the foster parent? Is he envisaging that some local authorities which some of us would describe as progressive would insist on an agreement of that kind whereas a neighbouring authority which did not insist on the agreement would have a situation where a foster parent was permitted to administer corporal punishment? Would that not be the most terrible injustice between various areas in the country?
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I said that some kind of borderline is required. It is possible to say that it is a terrible injustice to make one rule for existing placements and a new rule for new placements. One has to have some form of borderline in this business.
I believe that good practice will produce results. One local authority may well think differently from another. However, it does not appear to me that that constitutes an injustice. After all, a local authority is an elected authority representing the people in its area and is no doubt sensitive to the wishes and atmosphere in the area. It is perhaps demonstrated by what has been said: that this method has been found to be very satisfactory. Where the local authorities have introduced this matter by degrees and by agreement they have been able to do so without any adverse consequences to the supply of appropriate foster parents.
Baroness Elliot of Harwood: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for his reply and to thank those who have spoken in this debate. I still feel that these are anomalies that require thought. The noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, pointed out that in schools and in community centres which are managed by local authorities one cannot beat a child. Why should a local authority which chooses to put a child in a foster home allow that child to be beaten? If it puts him in the community centre he will not be beaten. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said that he will reconsider the matter. There are many anomalies. The situation is not clear. I shall not press the amendment to a Division, though I should have liked to do so.
Noble Lords: No, no!
Baroness Elliot of Harwood: I shall not do so because the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said that he will think about it again. However, I do not think that it is known how many anomalies there are. Do noble Lords want to divide?
Noble Lords: Yes!
Baroness Elliot of Harwood: My Lords, I feel very strongly about this matter. This is the third time that I have tried to make provision for not allowing punishment through local authorities, schools, and so on, in this Bill. If the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is not prepared to accept the amendment, perhaps we should divide.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I may not have made my position as clear as I ought. I said that the matter would be considered in relation to the making of regulations. That is what I said, and I wish to make it quite plain. I was not offering to reconsider the terms of the Bill in order to consider accepting this amendment. I said that it would be considered in relation to the making of regulations. The noble Baroness may therefore feel that she has no undertaking from me to reconsider the terms of the Bill on this aspect.
Baroness Elliot of Harwood: My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for that. I feel very strongly about this matter. I do not know who is advising these people, but it is facts that one wants to consider. Facts condemn this completely. I hope that if the noble and learned Lord reconsiders the matter he will ensure that it is put on the table. I shall not put the amendment to a vote now.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, is it your Lordships' pleasure that this amendment be withdrawn?
Noble Lords: No!
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, the Question is that this amendment be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say "Content".
Noble Lords: Content.
The Lord Chancellor: To the contrary, "Not-Content".
Noble Lords: Not Content.
3.59 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 47) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 109, Not-Contents, 128.

DIVISION NO. 1

CONTENTS

Addington, L.

Listowel, E.

Airedale, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Annan, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Ardwick, L.

Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.

Aylestone, L.

Lockwood, B.

Banks, L.

Lovell-Davis, L.

Birk, B.

McCarthy, L.

Bonham-Carter, L.

McIntosh of Haringey, L.

Boston of Faversham, L.

Mackie of Benshie. L.

Bottomley, L.

McNair, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Mais, L.

Bruce of Donington, L.

Manchester, Bp.

Callaghan of Cardiff, L.

Mason of Barnsley, L.

Campbell of Eskan, L.

Mayhew, L.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Meston, L.

Carter, L.

Milverton, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Mishcon, L.

Cocks of Hartcliffe, L.

Molloy, L.

David, B.

Moyne, L.

Davies of Penrhys, L.

Mulley, L.

Dean of Beswick, L.

Murray of Epping Forest, L.

Dormand of Easington, L.

Nicol, B.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Northfield, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Ogmore, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Oram, L.

Ezra, L.

Peston, L.

Faithfull, B.

Phillips, B.

Falkland, V.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Fitt, L.

Prys-Davies, L.

Foot, L.

Rathcreedan, L.

Gallacher, L.

Reilly, L.

Galpern, L.

Rochester, L.

Gladwyn, L.

Rugby, L.

Glenamara, L.

Sainsbury, L.

Graham of Edmonton, L.

Seear, B.

Grey, E.

Seebohm, L. [Teller.]

Grimond, L.

Sefton of Garston, L.

Hampton, L.

Serota, B.

Harmsworth, L.

Shepherd, L.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Stallard, L.

Henderson of Brompton, L. [Teller.]

Stedman, B.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Hirshfield, L.

Stoddart of Swindon, L.

Hughes, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Hunt, L.

Taylor of Blackburn, L.

Jay, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Jeger, B.

Turner of Camden, B.

John-Mackie, L.

Underhill, L.

Kennet, L.

Vernon, L.

Kilbracken, L.

Wallace of Coslany, L.

Kilmarnock, L.

Whaddon, L.

Kirkhill, L.

White, B.

Kirkwood, L.

Williams of Elvel, L.

Leatherland, L.

Winstanley, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Airey of Abingdon, B.

Bauer, L.

Aldington, L.

Beaverbrook, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Allenby of Megiddo, V.

Beloff, L.

Allerton, L.

Belstead, L.

Arran, E.

Bessborough, E.

1453

Bethell, L.

Joseph, L.

Blake, L.

Keyes, L.

Blatch, B.

Killearn, L.

Blyth, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Bolton, L.

Long, V. [Teller.]

Borthwick, L.

Luke, L.

Boyd-Carpenter, L.

McFadzean, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Brightman, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Margadale, L.

Bruce-Gardyne, L.

Merrivale, L.

Butterworth, L.

Mersey, V.

Caccia, L.

Middleton, L.

Caithness, E.

Monson, L.

Caldecote, V.

Montgomery of Alamein, V.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Mottistone, L.

Carnegy of Lour, B.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Cayzer, L.

Munster, E.

Chelmer, L.

Murton of Lindisfarne, L.

Chelwood, L.

Nelson, E.

Clinton, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Cockfield, L.

Orkney, E.

Colnbrook, L.

Orr-Ewing, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Oxfuird, V.

Cox, B.

Pender, L.

Crawshaw, L.

Peyton of Yeovil, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Platt of Writtle, B.

Dacre of Glanton, L.

Plummer of St. Marylebone, L.

Davidson, V.

De Freyne, L.

Porritt, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Portland, D.

Derwent, L.

Pym, L.

Dundee, E.

Quinton, L.

Effingham, E.

Reay, L.

Ellenborough, L.

Redesdale, L.

Elliott of Morpeth, L.

Renwick, L.

Fanshawe of Richmond, L.

Rodney, L.

Ferrers, E.

Ryder of Warsaw, B.

Fortescue, E.

St. Davids, V.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly.

Gainford, L.

Sanderson of Bowden, L.

Glenarthur, L.

Shaughnessy, L.

Gridley, L.

Shrewsbury, E.

Grimthorpe, L.

Simon of Glaisdale, L.

Haddington, E.

Skelmersdale, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Strange, B.

Strathclyde, L.

Harlech, L.

Sudeley, L.

Harvington, L.

Swansea, L.

Havers, L.

Terrington, L.

Hayter, L.

Teviot, L.

Henley, L.

Thomas of Gwydir, L.

Hesketh, L.

Thomas of Swynnerton, L.

Hives, L.

Trafford, L.

Home of the Hirsel, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Hunter of Newington, L.

Trumpington, B.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Ilchester, E.

Whitelaw, V.

Johnston of Rockport, L.

Young, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
4.8 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, before I call the next amendment, I must point out that if Amendment No. 48 is agreed to I cannot call Amendments Nos. 49 or 50.
[Amendment No. 48 not moved.]
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 49:
Page 15, line 33, leave out ("not") and insert ("only").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment attempts to deal with the matter which was raised in Committee and is the subject also of Amendment No. 48. At Committee stage there was concern that Clause 19(4) was expressed negatively
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instead of positively. We considered then how it might be done. I have now taken the draftsman's help and Amendments Nos. 49 and 50 are the result. I beg to move.
Lord Kilbracken: My Lords, I do not understand why and am sorry that Amendment No. 48 has not been moved because from the purely grammatical point of view it would have been better than Amendments Nos. 49 and 50, as the word "only" should always govern the word or phrase which appears immediately after it. But if it has been withdrawn, this is certainly an improvement.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, surely it is Amendment No. 45 which replaces Amendment No. 48 and that has already been agreed to.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, Amendment No. 49 addresses the problem that Clause 19(4) was expressed negatively. What was wanted in Committee was that it should be addressed in the opposite sense. The word "only", which occurred to some of us when discussing the matter at Committee stage, has been used by the draftsmen in order to turn a negative into a positive. That is what was required and I believe that it is grammatical.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 50:
Page 15, line 37, leave out ("except").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the amendment deals with the same point. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 51:
Page 15, line 39, leave out from ("shall") to end of line 41 and insert ("subject to the provisions of this Part and so far as is reasonably practicable and consistent with his welfare, secure that—

(a) any accommodation is near his home; and

(b) where the authority are also providing accommodation for a sibling of his, they are accommodated together.").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment would insert a new provision into Clause 19(5) to the effect that where a local authority provides accommodation for children who are siblings whom they are looking after it shall, subject to the provisions of Part III, secure that they are, so far as is reasonably practicable and consistent with their welfare, accommodated together.
The amendment is also intended to deal with a matter which was raised in Committee by my noble friend Lady Faithfull and which was supported by a number of your Lordships.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 20 [Advice and assistance for certain children]:
Baroness Faithfull moved Amendment: No. 52:
Page 16, line 22, after ("case,") insert ("assist").
4.15 p.m.
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I should also like to speak to Amendments Nos. 53, 54 and 55. On 17th January the noble Baroness, Lady David, most

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ably moved an amendment concerning the position of young people aged 18 to 21 who had been in the care of local authorities and who, as the law now stands, are discharged from care. She asked that such young people should be advised, assisted and befriended in the manner of a good parent. That amendment appears at col. 135 of Hansard for 17th January 1989.
While supporting her amendment in principle I voted against it because I could not agree with the phrase "in the manner of a good parent". In our mixed ethnic society the concept of a good parent differs among the various groups.
On 31st January 1989, 36 young people who had been in care came to Westminster from different parts of the country in order to meet a number of your Lordships and put forward their points of view. I wish that the Secretaries of State for Social Security and Employment, the Minister for Housing and in particular my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor could have been present to hear what the young people said about their experiences of leaving care and being cast upon the world with no background, no home and few relatives, if any.
I should like to repeat the point which was made by the noble and learned Lord when he spoke against Amendment No. 101 on 17th January. At col. 141 of Hansard he said:
"we are not here to deal with social security legislation in its general provision".
As it now stands, social security legislation is inadequate to enable people with no family background to live on their own while having a low paid job, attending YTS or in further education.
Last week the Secretary of State for Social Security generously received a deputation from voluntary child care organisations in respect of the matter. We await his decision. Does the noble and learned Lord feel able to make representations on the matter to his right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Social Security? Will he consider putting forward a recommendation that young people who have no resources should be able to apply to the social fund without having to repay the money (taking into account Amendment No. 20 which was accepted in your Lordships' House yesterday)?
As far as possible and practicable young people should be helped by social security. They should be befriended in such a way that their social worker helps them to know how to apply for social security should it be necessary. Secondly, the noble and learned Lord dealt with the phrase "in the manner of a good parent", which appears at col. 141 of Hansard for 17th January. While in law I agree with the noble and learned Lord, it must be recognised that young people who have been in care and are discharged at the age of 18 have no family behind them and no resources on which they can call. Emotionally they bear the burden of the experience of abuse, cruelty, neglect and a broken family.
Existing legislation provides for young people leaving care to be advised and befriended on request. It empowers local authorities to offer practical assistance. Some local authorities offer excellent
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support to young people leaving care. However, it must be admitted, as those young people made very clear, that other local authorities abandon young people partly on the ground of lack of resources and partly on the ground that there is an inadequate number of social workers to continue to befriend them.
We believe that the amendments to which I am speaking will clarify and strengthen Clause 20. As the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said in Committee, we are grateful to the Government for taking the step of including Clause 20 in the Bill. However, despite the encouraging speech made by the noble and learned Lord at the last stage, we believe that Clause 20 needs strengthening.
In Amendment No. 52 we propose that the word "assist" be inserted. I am sure that the Treasury is against that but such a provision does not need to be expensive, nor take up a great deal of resources if the Social Security Act is altered, and the social fund used in the way I have suggested.
A proportion of young homeless people in this country are those who have been in care. They are vulnerable. A proportion—and I say "only a proportion"— take to drugs and prostitution. I pay tribute to those people who manage against fearful odds to keep afloat. For the word "assistance" to be written into the Bill will not draw heavily on resources. At the same time, it will be possible for local authorities to help in extraordinary circumstances.
I have already described to noble Lords some situations which I have experienced. For example, I supplied a boy with a guitar and he is now one of the outstanding pop group guitarists in France. The instrument could not have been supplied in a way other than by "assistance". Put at its lowest level, it is not cost-effective for the community not to help young people when they can receive help only in such a way. I underline the fact. I believe that we should enable young people to be helped by the various other services, but there must be a fall-back position. There must be a way in which they can be helped in extraordinary circumstances. If that provision is not written into the Bill we shall be unable to help young people in that way.
In this speech, as reported in Hansard, the noble and learned Lord said that local authorities should help young people on leaving care. The Bill takes the age up to 21 years. Who among us was cast off by our families before or after the age of 21? We had families to fall back on. Many foster parents and children's homes help children, but if they do not have terms of reference under the Bill for help to be given, there is no way in which they can help those children. I beg to move.
Lord Prys-Davies: My Lords, I should like to support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness. Those Members of your Lordships' House who last week in Committee Room 3 met 30 or 40 young people who had left care were immensely moved by the experience which they related to us. I for one see their problems, their disadvantages and their travails in a much clearer way. I now understand

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why they are described as probably the most vulnerable section of that vulnerable age group.
They face severe disadvantages. On leaving care and through no fault of their own they cannot live with a family. Somehow they have to seek to live independently. Yet I believe that they are hopelessly inequipped to set up home independently. Many have to find lodgings or apartments for themselves, and if they find unfurnished apartments, they cannot turn to their parents for help to buy furniture, bedclothing, crockery and cutlery. Their income is too low to enable them to buy those necessities. The social fund office requires any payments made for those essential purposes to be made by way of loan. Plainly those young people face severe difficulties. They do not share in the prosperity and wealth of our country and some feel alienated from society.
However, there is one authority which stands in loco parentis to those young people—the local authority. The care leaver should be able to turn to the local authority for assistance on and after leaving care. It seems to me that the noble Baroness has made out her case for these amendments which in combination will ensure that local authorities can respond with assistance in the circumstances described.
Lady Kinloss: My Lords, as the noble Baroness and the noble Lord have already mentioned, last week we were able to meet some young people who had left care. They were concerned that when a young person leaves care he or she generally faces quite different problems from those who have lived at home with their families.
One point made by the young who have left care is that they mostly have no family to whom to turn for help if they are in difficulties. They cannot go home for help and assistance. That assistance need not be financial but merely somewhere to stay and someone to whom they can talk as they find loneliness one of their problems.
For example, one young man's education was totally disrupted by being in care as he was frequently moved from school to school. On leaving care he asked his local authority for money to help him return to education, which it refused, as it had every right to do. However, being articulate he persuaded the authority to help him to study further and he is now at a college of further education. However, that case is unusual because it worked out well in the end. Many young people are not so lucky and that case demonstrates what assistance can do.
Lord Banks: My Lords, I should like to support this amendment and the amendments associated with it so ably moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull. I understand the distinction made more than once by the noble and learned Lord in the course of our discussions on this aspect of the Bill: regular income should come from social security and exceptional and essential needs should be met by the social services department where they cannot be met by social security. That is an excellent principle in the abstract. However, I believe that we have tried to convey to the Government the peculiar situation in which young people under 25 find themselves today,
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largely as a result of the recent changes in social secutity and the consequent reduction in benefits for that age group.
The Government's policy is to encourage young people particularly 16 and 17 year-olds, riot to leave home. That is understandable but all the evidence shows that youngsters who try to live on their own are in acute difficulty. We have heard about the youngsters who came to the House last week. I was unable to be present but a colleague of mine attended and said that he was appalled by some of the difficulties which they faced. Yet we know that the great majority of those leaving care have to live on their own. They have no alternative and are among the most vulnerable of that age group. We should like to make certain that they will receive assistance and will know that they can receive assistance from the social services department of the local authority if they cannot make ends meet and cannot be expected to make ends meet on the benefits which they receive. Youngsters of 16 and 17 are encouraged to stay with their parents. The local authorities were in the position of parents to those leaving care. Therefore, there is an imperative need for them to cominue to act as good parents towards the young people after they leave care.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: My Lords, I should also like to support this amendment. Unfortunately I was not able to meet the young people who came to the House last week. However, I know that the difficulties of many young people who have been brought up in local authority homes are compounded when they leave by the fact that very often they have had no training in housekeeping and budgeting skills.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: My Lords, I was one of those fortunate enough to meet those young people. Like the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, I was both touched and moved by what they said about their experiences when leaving care. It is incredible that they said most eloquently and vociferously that they were pushed out of care when they were not ready to be on their own. They were not consulted. A number of them said that they would have liked an opportunity to decide for themselves when they were ready to leave care. That is a very important point which has been running through the considerations of this Bill. Some of us have pressed that the child's point of view when leaving care should be taken into account and should have very high, if not paramount, importance.
Children from poor backgrounds are especially vulnerable because that has often meant that they have been in care. The youngsters found all the difficulties which have been enumerated as to lodgings, furniture and managing on a low income which was not enough to live on after paying for all necessities. That happened after they had been to the social fund and exhausted the resources of the social services. However, it is fair to say that some local officers dealing with social services do not really appreciate the discretion that they have and therefore they do not always give to these young people what might be given to them by way of discretion if not of entitlement.

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I should like to say to the noble and learned Lord that it is rather difficult for us to deal with this Bill when the social services Bill is not before us. I am not averse to belt and braces. I should like to see that there are provisions in the social services available for these people as well as provisions in the Children Bill. Of course I recognise there might be some danger in this because some young people might play off the social services against the local authorities; but I believe that danger should be faced and it should be possible to arrange perfectly properly for liaison between the local authorities and the social services.
I should like to put a point especially related to the excellent Part I of Schedule 2, which we discussed in another context last night. Paragraph 6 is headed:
"Provisions to reduce need for care proceedings etc."
It says:
"Every local authority shall take steps designed …
(b) to encourage children within their area not to commit criminal offences".
I think there should be a further subparagraph in paragraph 6 which would deal with provisions to assist children after leaving care. A number of suggestions have been made this afternoon and I would include in that subparagraph (b) additional words, so that it would read:
"(b) to encourage children after leaving care within their area not to commit criminal offences".
I think children in that position are particularly vulnerable because they are not able to go home if there is no home and they are not able to set up home with loans from the social services without finding that their funds are not sufficient to gain them the ordinary daily necessities such as food, lodging rates and so on. That is honestly an encouragement for them to find money elsewhere, which is encouraging them to commit a criminal offence. I believe that is quite wrong. If we are to tackle the business of criminal proceedings which these children get involved in and which may put them into prisons that are already overcrowded, we must have regard to the plight of these children leaving care who do not have enough to live on and who will be sorely tempted—and who would not be, in that position?—to find a little on the side.
Of course I would not condone any kind of criminal activity but there is a sore temptation for children in this position to resort to crime. I believe there should be an obligation in the Bill that in such circumstances children should not be put to that sore temptation. I support this amendment but should like to see a new paragraph in Part I of Schedule 2 relating to the provision to assist children after leaving care.
4.30 p.m.
Baroness Macleod of Borve: My Lords, I wonder whether I might add one or two words. The word "assist" is in the first three lines of Clause 20 and there is a provision for the local authorities to assist both when the children are in their care and when they have left it. However, I should like to underline the fact that these amendments, in addition to the first three lines, are important also for the reasons
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that other speakers have given and especially perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. I think he has realised, as we all have, that this age group can turn so very easily not only to crime but to crime leading on to drugs and other non-social attitudes to life.
It is incumbent on governments to see to it that these young people who have never known a proper home and who have never done anything for themselves—and I have met very many of them—are looked after. Even if they do not need money they should be helped and guided in their future life. This is part of our society which perhaps we, as slightly older people, may not realise is so important in these days. I should like to support anything that will make their future lives more tolerable.
Baroness Phillips: My Lords, it probably is not necessary for me to add to the speeches that have already been made, all supporting these amendments so splendidly. I should just like to follow the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Macleod. I think I am right in saying that if somebody leaves youth custody or prison they are helped when they immediately leave. To me if often seems ironic that people who have committed offences actually get treated far better in society than those who have never done anything other than being left, as these young people have been left, in the position of having to be in care. They are very vulnerable. The necessity to live may make them turn to crime, and this is a very important point to consider.
Baroness David: My Lords, my name is attached to this amendment and it has been spoken to so ably from all sides of the House that I do not think I need add much. However, I should like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, very much for having organised a meeting with these young people last week: it was a great feat of organisation. They were shown round the House, they were brought into the Chamber and so on. We admire the noble Baroness very much for having done that and it was a great help to us. Before meeting those young people I had thought that perhaps the trouble was mostly financial and they were short of money. However, it clearly was not just that: they needed support from somebody in addition.
I am not quite sure whether Amendment No. 57 was moved at the same time. It says:
"The local authority shall take steps to ensure that children and young people are aware of the assistance which may be given to them".
That is very important, I believe, having listened to them last week, and I feel that the young people we saw were on the whole the luckier ones. They had been picked up by various agencies and they were a pretty bright lot. They had been picked up by Barnado's and so on, and one can imagine there are a great many young people who have not been so picked up. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be able to accept this series of amendments.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, perhaps I should mention first, in relation to the last point, that Amendment No. 67 standing in my name has the

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effect of adding to paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 the provision of services under Clause 20.
During the Committee stage we had a very full debate on the provision by local authorities of assistance in cash to young people towards whom they will have aftercare responsibilities under the Bill. Although the Committee did not feel able to accept the relevant amendment on that occasion, I have been considering all the points which were made during that debate and which have been elaborated on today after some of your Lordships had the privilege of meeting some of the young people concerned.
It is important to see what is in Clause 20 at the moment and not to overlook the fact that there is a duty put upon the local authority to provide assistance for the child leaving care: that is at the beginning of the period in question. That is very plainly provided in Clause 20(1). That is the critical time, although difficulties may arise later.
The Government will bring forward amendments at a later stage to provide a power for local authorities to assist young people in connection with education and training, and to assist those seeking employment. On the wider issue as to whether local authorities should be under a duty, or have a power, to assist young people, I am bound to say that we remain of the view that the balance of responsibilities placed on local authorities in Clause 20 for young people who have left care, is about right.
I should like to mention a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson of Brompton. He said that we have not got the Social Security Bill here at the moment and that there is no harm in belts and braces. I believe that when one is dealing with the Social Security Bill one ought to be considering the social security provisions. They apply to everyone who qualifies under the Social Security Bill. We are here dealing with children who are coming out of care. It must be right that proper consideration of social security matters should be in the Social Security Bill. A proper consideration of matters which may particularly affect those coming out of care, and only those, should be in the Children Bill.
With the greatest possible respect, it must be nonsense to put social security measures into the Children Bill and restrict them to particular classes of children, while giving other people who are equally entitled to social security some less good treatment. Therefore the two subjects are distinct and ought to be kept so. I have no doubt that it was for that reason that my noble friend Baroness Faithfull raised these matters with my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Social Security. That is the obvious place to go if a social security matter is in issue. I shall certainly undertake to communicate to my right honourable friend the concerns that have been expressed in this debate about the damage that is done if children coming out of care find themselves without the necessities which they require.
I totally share the feeling of the House that young people leaving care, particularly those who are unable to return to their natural family—or who have no family to return to—may need support from the local authority, at least initially. It depends how well they get on as to how much they need, but the initial
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matter is quite plainly provided for in Clause 20 subsection (1).
Clause 20 is a blanket provision. It applies to all children leaving care in the circumstances described in subsection (2). Some of these young people will be returning to their own families, and in circumstances where those families are fully able to support them. Some will remain with their foster parents, or in other forms of supported accommodation, while others will choose to live, or have to live, independently. I should also like to remind your Lordships that the responsibilities placed on local authorities under Clause 20 cover the period from the child's 16th birthday (if he left care at that age) up to the time he attains the age of 21. In other words, these responsibilities could last for a maximum period of five years, and cover the period from youth to adulthood. During this period the young person could reasonably be expected to attain an increasing degree of self-reliance, both emotionally and financially. The essential point I am making is that the provisions of Clause 20 are designed to cover a wide variety of individual circumstances, and over a relatively long time-span. That is why we believe it is best to give the local authority discretion to decide the circumstances in which assistance might be appropriately offered, rather than impose a duty on them to do so.
In addition to the introduction of a duty to assist a young person who has left care, the amendments propose that the "exceptional circumstances" qualification (Amendment No. 55) should also he removed. Surely, in the light of what I have just said, it would be wholly unreasonable to impose a duty on local authorities, without any qualification whatever, to assist not only young people leaving care when they have just turned 16 but effectively adults up to the age of 21.
I should like to mention a more technical point. The underlying intention of the amendments is to impose a duty on the local authority to assist the young person who has left care, subject to certain conditions. But what does this duty consist of? It is not qualified in any way. It does not say in what circumstances or to what extent the local authority has a duty to assist the young person.
As the amendments stand, therefore, the local authority could, if it wished, say that it had complied with its duty by giving the child a nominal amount. I am sure that that is not what noble Lords intended but that is what has happened. I have looked long and hard at these amendments to see if there is some way in which we could sensibly redraft them to overcome the problems of defining the application and scope of the assistance which local authorities would be under a duty to offer. So far I have been unable to find a suitable formula.
If there is to be an enforceable duty, which is what is essentially proposed, one must have some degree of definition of the scope of that duty so that it can be properly enforced.
I recognise that my inability to accept these amendments will come as a great disappointment to a number of your Lordships. While I understand and appreciate the very good intentions underlying them, I believe that the balance which is struck in the

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present provisions of Clause 20, between the respective powers and duties of local authorities to support young people who have left their care, from 16 through to the age of 21, is about right. In addition, as I have already mentioned, the Government will be bringing forward their own amendments at a later stage to strengthen further the responsibilities of local authorities to support those young people who have left care and are seeking, or undergoing, education and training.
I am grateful that the meeting with young people was arranged and that your Lordships heard directly about these matters. I believe that Clause 20 directly addresses these matters in a new way which, in its practical application, will turn out to be satisfactory. However, it cannot in any sense be said to be a social security amendment. This is a matter that deals with children in care and the consequences for those who leave care during this period up until they are 21.
I hope that, in the light of what I have said, and of my assurance that I shall bring the matters that have been raised here to the attention of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Social Security, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendments.
4.45 p.m.
Baroness David: My Lords, I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord whether as there is a Social Security Bill going through the other place at the moment, and as a lot of the ills that we are trying to rectify come from the last Social Security Act, there is any plan to amend that Act in the present Social Security Bill? That would go some way towards improving the situation at least financially.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, from our viewpoint every Bill is intended to improve the situation. I do not think it would be appropriate for me to enter into the detail of the social security position. I have already said to your Lordships in Committee that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Social Security has undertaken closely to monitor the changes made on the last occasion, particularly in relation to young people. I think that it is right to concentrate in the Children Bill on the special situation of children in care. When your Lordships have an opportunity, as you undoubtedly will, to consider the Social Security Bill, you will be able to apply your minds to that aspect of the matter.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: My Lords, perhaps I may ask the noble and learned Lord one question, because we are all concerned about the fact that these children, after leaving care, will fall between the Children Bill and the Social Security Bill. If, by chance, and as we hope, the social security legislation is amended to help these young people, it might appear that the local authority's duties would be consequentially diminished because of the condition in Clause 20(4)(a). I do not expect the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to answer that now, but I wonder whether he will look at the interaction of the amendments on the two Bills that
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are going through Parliament in order to watch that point.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, the point as regards general levels is a matter for the Social Security Bill. This Bill addresses the special problems arising from coming out of care. That is the aspect that we should be considering now. It is in relation to that matter that these amendments have to be considered.
Baroness Faithfull: My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for trying to help us. There are still some matters on which I need further help. First, the noble and learned Lord has spoken about coming out of care. I presume that he means up to the age of 21 and not just the time when young people leave care at the moment, which is at the age of 18.
Secondly, one has to think of the Social Security Bill and the Children Bill. Under the Children Bill the local authority will have a duty to befriend. The noble and learned Lord explained at the last stage of the Bill exactly what befriending meant. If a local authority is befriending a child and that child needs some kind of financial help, that cannot be obtained under the Social Security Bill. All that these amendments are asking is that in the process of befriending the local authority will be able in a few circumstances—it would not amount to very much—to help the child. For instance, suppose in befriending the local authority finds for a child a job that the child particularly wants. However, the job is a long way from the child's home. The child asks, "Can I have a bicycle in order not to have to pay heavy fares?"
I suggest that social security will never supply a bicycle for a child. That means that a child or young person at the age of 18 of 19 has to spend a good deal of money on fares. Though the social worker is supposed to be befriending him, the social worker cannot help. That is only one instance. Perhaps I may give a second instance. If one befriends a child and helps to find him just one bare room—he certainly would be unable to afford more than one room—and the child says, "I have not got a bed, bedclothes or a chest of drawers," one says "You must go to a jumble sale or to Oxfam and buy those articles".
If the child is on very low pay he cannot go to the jumble sale to buy those items. As the Social Security Bill stands at the moment, the child cannot be helped by the social fund. If the child is helped by the social fund by chance then he has to repay. If the child is on very low pay he cannot repay and therefore he is getting into debt. These amendments are not asking for great resources; they are only asking for fall-backs where it is not possible for the social security to help under the Social Security Act.
It is distressing if a duty is laid on one to befriend a child and in the befriending of that child one sees items that that child needs which are very minimal (they would only be minimal) but one cannot help. In those circumstances what kind of befriending is that? Because this situation cannot involve very much as regards resources, but only a minimal amount, I cannot understand why that cannot be written into the Bill. Perhaps we can redraft these amendments in a way that shows that only in circumstances that

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would not allow social security help would the befriender be able to help the child. Can the noble and learned Lord help me?
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I shall certainly try to do so. When I spoke about children coming out of care I was seeking to use a fairly compendious phrase to describe those who are dealt with at the beginning of Clause 20; that is, those who when they attain the age will be leaving care. Clause 20(1) deals with that and it imposes a duty to assist. It is not specific at that stage because it is the assistance that would be necessary in coming out of care. I am referring to people who have been in care or otherwise as described in Clause 20 when I speak about children coming out of care. The age rises, as my noble friend said, to 21.
Perhaps I may turn to the examples. As my noble friend has explained, there is a duty to befriend. I believe what we have done matches almost exactly the situation that she described. We have given a power to assist. For example, if the social worker felt that the child was going to a job that was very suitable for him, but at some distance, there is power to assist. The clause makes clear that assistance can be given in kind or in cash. Cash may be given in exceptional circumstances. My noble friend has made clear that the kind of assistance about which she speaks would be exceptional and very much a one-off special situation. That is exactly what we have in mind. We have tried to express it as exactly as this kind of language allows.
In the Bill at present there is power for the social worker to buy the child or young person a bicycle if the social worker believes that that is an assistance that it is proper to give in the situation. There is no obligation to give particular assistance. My noble friend will be the first to appreciate that it is difficult to lay down a rule that one has to give assistance in every situation, because there is a good deal of judgment involved. Someone may wish to have a bicycle because he wants a new one, and the job may be just around the corner. He may prefer a bike because at least going to work is downhill. I believe that we have provided to match almost exactly the concerns of my noble friend.
As regards the room, if the young person requires some furniture, again there is power to assist if the social worker believes it appropriate as part of the power to assist which is given in the Bill to the local authority. The real point between us is this. It is very difficult to turn that kind of appropriate, judicious and discretionary help on particular occasions for particular purposes into a general statutory duty to assist. I believe that we have expressed it in a way that matches very closely the two examples that my noble friend has given. I hope that what I have said helps her at least a little.
Baroness Faithfull: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord. The horizon looks slightly brighter than it did before he spoke. I am worried because even now under the Children Bill local authorities are able to befriend and assist, but they do not. Some do and some do not. Therefore, if it is not put more strongly in the Bill many local
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authorities can say "That child cannot have a bicycle". A number of local authorities do say that. A number of them do not even supply a social worker. If we were to withdraw the amendment, could we in some way quantify what the local authority should do? At the moment it is open ended.
5 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, with the leave of the House, this is a difficult question. Somebody must have responsibility for deciding these matters. We felt that they are matters appropriately left to the local authority, which is the elected body in the locality. I am sure that most areas will have people—perhaps not as eloquent as my noble friend—who are able to draw attention to these problems. If the problems are not attended to by the local authority it may be the case that electors in the local authority area will suffer. That is perhaps not the best argument for using these powers properly, but it is nevertheless an argument.
If one gives power in this matter to local authorities it is difficult to see how one can tie up with tremendous detail precisely how that power is exercised. The House will have heard suggestions that I belong to a centralist government. One cannot have it every way. We feel that this authority is best dealt with at local authority level, giving the local authority a power which carries with it a responsibility.
Baroness Faithfull: My Lords, if I may, and if those who have spoken agree, I should like to see the Secretary of State for Social Security to ask whether he can do something through the social fund. If he can I do not say that we shall be home and dry, but at any rate there will be a fall-back position. I should like very much to ponder and read what my noble and learned friend has said, and at this stage to withdraw the amendment; but with the thought of bringing it back at the next stage.
Baroness David: My Lords, my name is also attached to the amendment and I am afraid that I cannot agree with the noble Baroness. We have agencies to deal with young people. We had those young people here the other day. They will be disappointed if this House does not take, or at any rate try to take, some action. The words of the noble and learned Lord today were very much the same as they were last time. He said to me yesterday, "Why shouldn't I give the same answer if it is a good answer?" If all the agencies believe that the position is disastrous at the moment we should try to change things. These are modest amendments, as the noble Baroness said. I should like to press the amendment even if she does not.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, it is for my noble friend to decide what she wishes to do. I shall then put the matter to the House.
Baroness Faithfull: My Lords, I am waiting for my noble and learned friend to put the matter to the House.
5.3 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 52) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 112; Not-Contents, 128.

DIVISION NO. 2

CONTENTS

Addington, L.

Leatherland, L.

Airedale, L.

Listowel, E.

Ardwick, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Aylestone, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Banks, L.

Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Lockwood, B.

Birk, B.

Longford, E.

Blackstone, B.

Lovell-Davis, L.

Bonham-Carter, L.

McCarthy, L.

Boston of Faversham, L.

McIntosh of Haringey, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Mackie of Benshie, L.

Callaghan of Cardiff, L.

McNair, L.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Mais, L.

Carter, L.

Mason of Barnsley, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Mayhew, L.

Cocks of Hartcliffe, L.

Meston, L.

David, B. [Teller.]

Milner of Leeds, L.

Davies of Penrhys, L.

Mulley, L.

Dean of Beswick, L.

Murray of Epping Forest, L.

Dormand of Easington, L.

Nicol, B.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Northfield, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Ogmore, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

O'Neill of the Maine, L.

Ezra, L.

Oram, L.

Faithfull, B.

Peston, L.

Falkland, V.

Phillips, B.

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Foot, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Galpern, L.

Prys-Davies, L.

Gifford, L.

Rathcreedan, L.

Gladwyn, L.

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Glenamara, L.

Rochester, L.

Graham of Edmonton, L.

Sainsbury, L.

Grey, E.

Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly.

Hampton, L.

Seear, B.

Hanworth, V.

Seebohm, L.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Sefton of Garston, L.

Henderson of Brompton, L.

Serota, B.

Hirshfield. L.

Shackleton, L.

Hooson, L.

Shannon, E.

Houghton of Sowerby, L.

Shaughnessy, L.

Hughes, L.

Shepherd, L.

Hunt, L.

Simon of Glaisdale, L.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Stallard, L.

Irvine of Lairg, L.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Jay, L.

Stoddart of Swindon, L.

Jeger, B.

Strabolgi, L.

Jenkins of Hillhead, L.

Taylor of Blackburn, L.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

John-Mackie, L.

Turner of Camden, B.

Kennet, L.

Underhill, L.

Kilbracken, L.

Wallace of Coslany, L.

Kinloss, Ly. [Teller.]

White, B.

Kirkhill, L.

Williams or Elvel, L.

Kirkwood, L.

Winstanley, L.

Lawrence, L.

Winterbottom, L.

NON-CONTENTS

Aldington, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Allenby of Megiddo, V.

Beloff, L.

Allerton, L.

Belstead, L.

Alport, L.

Blake, L.

Ampthill, L.

Blatch, B.

Arran, E.

Bolton, L.

Astor, V.

Borthwick, L.

Atholl, D.

Boyd-Carpenter, L.

Auckland, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Bauer, L.

Brightman, L.

Beaverbrook, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

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Bruce-Gardyne, L.

Margadale, L.

Butterworth, L.

Marley, L.

Caithness, E.

Marshall of Leeds, L.

Caldecote, V.

Merrivale, L.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Mersey, V.

Campbell of Croy, L.

Middleton, L.

Carnegy of Lour, B.

Milverton, L.

Carnock, L.

Montgomery of Alamein, V.

Chelmer, L.

Morris, L.

Chelwood, L.

Mottistone, L.

Clinton, L.

Munster, E.

Cockfield, L.

Murton of Lindisfarne, L.

Colnbrook, L.

Nelson, E.

Constantine of Stanmore, L.

Norrie, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Craigmyle, L.

Orkney, E.

Cross, L.

Orr-Ewing, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Oxfuird, V.

Dacre of Glanton, L.

Pender, L.

Davidson, V. [Teller.]

Pennock, L.

De Freyne, L.

Peyton of Yeovil, L.

De L'Isle, V.

Platt of Writtle, B.

Denham, L.

Plummer of St. Marylebone, L.

Derwent, L.

Dundee, E.

Porritt, L.

Elliott of Morpeth, L.

Portland, D.

Fanshawe of Richmond, L.

Pym, L.

Ferrers, E.

Quinton, L.

Forbes, L.

Reay, L.

Fortescue, E.

Renwick, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Rodney, L.

Glenarthur, L.

Rugby, L.

Grimthorpe, L.

St. Davids, V.

Haddington, E.

St. John of Fawsley, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Sanderson of Bowden, L.

Sempill, Ly.

Harlech, L.

Shrewsbury, E.

Harmar-Nicholls, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Harrowby, E.

Strange, B.

Havers, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Henley, L.

Sudeley, L.

Hesketh, L.

Swansea, L.

Hives, L.

Swinfen, L.

Home of the Hirsel, L.

Teviot, L.

Johnston of Rockport, L.

Teynham, L.

Joseph, L.

Thomas of Gwydir, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Thomas of Swynnerton, L.

Long, V. [Teller.]

Trafford, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Trefgame, L.

Luke, L.

Trumpington, B.

McAlpine of Moffat, L.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

McFadzean, L.

Whitelaw, V.

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Wise, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Young, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
5.12 p.m.
[Amendments Nos. 53 to 55 not moved.]
Baroness David Baroness David moved Amendment No. 55A:
Page 16, line 34, at end insert—
("( ) Assistance given under this section to a person who, when he reaches the age of 21 is undertaking a course of educational training which extends beyond that date, may be given until the end of the course.").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in a way this is consequential to the amendments which we have been discussing, but it addresses a particular problem. There are some young people who have left care and who have had some assistance up to the age of 21. They have started on a course of education which perhaps lasts for two or three years. They may not have finished that course when they reach the age of 21 and therefore they need a little extra assistance so that they can finish their course. That assistance

1469
may only be required for a few months, but it may be very necessary. I hope therefore that the noble and learned Lord will at least look kindly at this small amendment which will certainly not be costly because it will not affect all that many people. I beg to move.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, when I was seeking to answer the groups of amendments with which we have just been dealing, I said that we hoped to bring forward future amendments to make specific provision for local authorities to assist young people in connection with their education and training.
Section 27 of the Child Care Act 1980 contains a provision allowing local authorities, where they are making contributions in respect of a person receiving education and training at the age of 21, to continue making contributions until the course is completed. At present, I see no reason why that should not be reflected in the amendments to be brought forward. I hope therefore that the noble Baroness will feel able to await such amendments.
Baroness David: My Lords, with that reassurance I must say that I am very happy about the matter. Of course I shall study carefully the amendments when they are brought forward, but I am nevertheless reassured. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 56:
Page 16, line 35, leave out ("and (8)") and insert ("(8) and (8A)").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I spoke to this amendment when I spoke to Amendment No. 20. Accordingly, I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Baroness Faithfull Baroness Faithfull moved Amendment No. 57:
Page 17, line 4, at end insert—
("(10) The local authority shall take steps to ensure that children and young people are aware of the assistance which may be given to them by the local authority under the terms of this section.").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this is a small but very important amendment. It provides that young people should be informed of the services which the local authority has to offer when they leave care. I think that I may have made a mistake because I believe that they ought to be told more than just what the local authority has to offer; I think that they should specifically be told what the housing department has to offer and how they can put their names on the housing list. It is important that they should know what the social services department has to offer and indeed who is their social worker. However, I know that the noble Lady, Lady Kinloss, will speak on other matters.
As I said, I think that perhaps the wording ought to have been a little wider so that young people should know, for instance, what the Citizens' Advice Bureau is, what the medical services are, what social security is and how they should, for example, open a bank account. I say that because a young man aged 24 came to see me saying that he had won the football pools but that I had never taught him how to open a bank account. Therefore, perhaps the amendment ought to have been wider but, in any case, I should
1470
like to move it so as to ensure that young people are informed of what is available to them within the local authority. I beg to move.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, I should like to support the amendment in principle. It seems to me that there is a little loophole in the Bill in this respect. I think that it is a provision which could be extremely helpful.
In the Isle of Wight we have a great difficulty with people in their early twenties and late teens who are outside the net of official care of one kind or another. We have an organisation called The Isle of Wight Youth Trust which we are trying to develop in order to deal with such people who may be in their mid-twenties. Therefore the principle contained in the amendment is something which needs very careful thought. Even if my noble and learned friend cannot respond positively at this moment, he may like to give the matter some thought for the future.
Lord Prys-Davies: My Lords, in Committee a similar amendment was moved to which the noble and learned Lord was sympathetic. Indeed, he promised to look further into the matter. It appears to me that possibly the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is responding by way of Amendment No. 67 which is tabled in his name and which we shall discuss later.
I should like to make the point that we are being told by the voluntary bodies that many young people leave care without any idea of what services are available to them or, indeed, of their entitlement under the various laws and regulations. That fact was confirmed by some of the young people whom we saw in the committee room last week. I well recall one of the young men saying to us, "I have been thrown out of care". I believe that that phrase captures his very raw experience. Therefore, it seems essential that the local authorities which have been standing in loco parentis to such young people should be under a duty to make the information available to them when they leave care.
Of course the problem of how to inform young people who have already left care and who are living in the community is much more difficult. However, it has been suggested by one of the voluntary organisations that the notification should, or could, be linked to the notice under subsection (8), Clause 20, and that the local authority on receiving a notice under that subsection should be responsible for notifying the young person of the assistance and advice which is available. I draw attention to that particular suggestion as it strikes me as being a constructive one. Therefore, there are two specific occasions when information can be made available; namely, when young people leave care, and when a notice is being served under subsection (8). Finally, I should very much like to express my support for the amendment.
Lady Kinloss: My Lords, I should like to support the noble Baroness, Lady Faithful!, as regards this amendment. It is most important that young people should know how to go about getting their rights and that they should know what assistance they can have.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, I support the amendment in principle. However, I wonder whether the word "ensure" does not impose too high a duty upon the services.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, before dealing with this amendment I should like to say that Clause 20 addresses the problem that the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, mentioned—that of children leaving care. Clause 20(1) places a duty on an authority to advise, address and befriend him with a view to promoting his welfare when he ceases to be looked after by it. That is a general duty of a character that should take account of the matters to which the noble Lord referred. Where it applies, subsection (8) should also have that effect if there is a need for advice and befriending. "Befriending" is a big word which encompasses all the sorts of things that a good friend would tell another on parting about matters that could affect him. Social security and all the other matters that were mentioned will be covered by that provision.
Amendment No. 57 is virtually identical to Amendment No. 107, to which the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, referred and which he moved in Committee. As I said in addressing that amendment, where a child has been looked after by a local authority, it will be part of the process of preparing a child for independent living to inform him. What is evident however is that such counselling might not be available to children or young persons who are leaving accommodation which has been provided by a person or persons other than a local authority. Clearly, we would not wish to see such young people at a disadvantage, and this amendment seeks to remedy that. However, I feel that the government Amendment No. 67 to paragraph 1 of Schedule 2, which I hope to move later, would be a more appropriate means of doing this.
Paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 2 would require each local authority to publicise the services which are provided under Clauses 15 to 17, and, importantly, to take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that those who might benefit from the services receive the information relevant to them. Our amendment will extend that duty to aftercare services under Clause 20. The advantage is that the local authority's duty to publicise its services will be set out in a single provision. That is a practical point.
I believe that with this new duty we can ensure that all children who qualify for advice and assistance under Clause 20 will receive the information that was being sought by the noble Lord and to which I believe they are entitled.
Our amendment will also achieve one other thing, and this follows from Amendment No. 126, moved in Committee by my noble friend Lord Mottistone. That amendment sought to require local authorities to publish such information about services provided in their area by persons other than themselves as they consider appropriate—services provided by voluntary organisations, for example. As your Lordships will know, many services for children and families are provided in the private and voluntary sector, especially in respect of day-care and under-fives provision. Those complement the services of
1472
local authorities and represent an important part of the support that is available to families in the community. The amendment additionally requires local authorities, when publishing details of their own services under Clauses 15 to 17 and Clause 20, to present a fuller picture of the services that are available in their area generally.
I hope that our amendment meets the concerns of my noble friend and those who have supported her and that she will feel able to withdraw the amendment in favour of the government version.
Baroness Faithfull: My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for that reply. I realise that Amendment No. 167 covers the whole point, as he said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 22 [Review of cases and inquiries into representations]:
Lord Simon of Glaisdale Lord Simon of Glaisdale moved Amendment No. 58:
Page 18, line 18, leave out subsection (2).
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, there has been general agreement that this is a valuable Bill. It faces important social problems which, today especially, have been debated knowledgeably and in moving terms. After examination, your Lordships have generally agreed that the Bill is well structured. It is agreed that the draftsmanship is generally satisfactory in the sense that it uses language which an ordinary, literate member of the public affected by the Bill can understand.
The amendment removes a blemish on the Bill in that it deletes superfluous verbiage. It has been linked with Amendments Nos. 73, 74, 95, 116 and 127. They raise a similar, although not identical, problem. It will save confusion and, I hope, commend itself to your Lordships if I confine myself to Amendment No. 58.
I raised the matter in Committee in the debate on clause stand part. My noble and learned friend who sits on the Woolsack did not at that time deal with what I was drawing attention to. I have no complaint about that, because I had an opportunity to raise a similar point on Schedule 5 upon which he was able to give a full and informed answer. Although I shall be addressing myself exclusively to Clause 22, I shall refer to the arguments of my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack.
If your Lordships will be good enough to look at Clause 22 you will see that it deals with review of the cases of children taken into care. It is in permissive terms. It provides that:
"The Secretary of State may"—
I emphasise the word "may",
"make regulations requiring the case of each child who is being looked after by a local authority to be reviewed"—
I emphasise the next phrase,
"in accordance with the provisions of the regulations".
In other words, that says everything that needs to be said. Nevertheless, subsection (2) goes on to say:
"The regulations may, in particular, make provision as to the manner in which each case is to be reviewed

1473
and so forth. Anyone of common sense, in which I include lawyers, reading subsection (2) would say, "Of course the Secretary of State may make those particular regulations because he has already been given power to do so in subsection (1)". Such a person would go on to say, "It goes without saying". If it goes without saying, as it does, it should not be in an Act of Parliament.
The background to the amendment is an intervention in Committee by my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham in which he approved the policy of an amendment but questioned the necessity of writing in every good intention that may be expressed, regardless of the consideration that any sensible Minister would do what was required. He significantly cited the state of our statute book today—annually some 3,000 pages, he said—compared with the statute book in 1911, a busy year of a reforming government, which took up 450 pages. In other words, the statute book has swollen in the intervening years by no fewer than six times.
However, one can bring the matter more up to date. After years of complaint about the prolixity, the complexity and lack of clarity in the statute book, the Renton Committee was finally set up with powers of reference to review those matters. It reported in 1975. In 1976 the statute book ran to three massive volumes. In 1986—notwithstanding Renton—it had expanded to six equally massive volumes. It had doubled, in spite of Renton. It had doubled, curiously enough, although there were fewer public and general Acts. That suggests (does it not?) that we are far too prolix, far too prone to verbiage in the legislation that we enact.
My noble and learned friend, in defending this kind of provision, accepted that it might not be strictly necessary. The holder of the Great Seal always speaks "strictly", which means that it was not necessary. It is only fair to say that he went on (I must. get out my magnifying glass, if your Lordships will allow me):
"However, knowing the particular desire of the Members of the Committee"—
by which I take my noble and learned friend to have meant the Members of both Houses of Parliament—
"to have a idea of what the Secretary of State had in mind for regulation and in order to keep the headings in question, we have put them in".
In other words, subsection (2) is unnecessary but has been put in so that Members of both Houses may know what the Secretary of State has in mind by way of regulation.
I hope that my noble and learned friend will not take this amiss, but the first point to be made is that the subsection does no such thing. What it does is to say what he might make by way of regulation. But in the same breath the subsection says what he might not do, because this is a purely permissive power.
Secondly, a permissive power to make regulations for the local authority in reviews in accordance with the provisions of the regulations having been given, I ask my noble and learned friend specifically what is really added by subsection (2)(a):
"The regulations may, in particular, make provision—
(a) as to the manner in which each case is to he reviewed".
1474
What does that tell any Member of Parliament, however acute he may be? The answer is, precisely nothing. Your Lordships will see that subsection (2) alone runs to three-quarters of a page. All the provisions that have been grouped with it, taken together, run to some three or four pages. With six massive volumes of statutes, surely we are bound to do what we can to prune the legislation of unnecessary verbiage.
There is one final point to be made. If the only object is to apprise Parliament of what the Secretary of State intends to do, he can tell Members in the other place himself and it will be reported much less expensively in Hansard. My noble and learned friend on the Woolsack can be safely trusted to repeat that accurately to your Lordships. I beg to move.
5.30 p.m.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, Clause 22 deals with what is potentially a very important matter; namely, provision for review of cases and inquiries into representations by a local authority. However, there is a desperate need to flesh the bones of the provisions in this clause, which are at the moment extremely skeletal, if I may continue the metaphor.
The provision in subsection (2) is that the Secretary of State having been given the power to make regulations, we then anxiously look to see what the regulations will contain. But answer comes there, if not none, very little. The subsection says:
"The regulations may, in particular, make provision—
(a) as to the manner in which each case is to be reviewed".
There is no clue as to who is to do the review, what the nature of the review is to be, or when it is to be done. It is left completely open and there is no clue as to the manner of the review. In so far as it is sought to give the impression of completion of the responsibility of the duties of a local authority, it leaves the situation almost completely bare. There is no clue as to the manner in which each case is to be reviewed.
When we come to subsection (2)(b), the regulations may make provision:
"(b) as to the considerations to which the local authority are to have regard in reviewing each case".
Again, there is no clue there as to what the considerations should be. There is no suggestion of a code of practice as to the manner or the nature of the considerations. Parliament is left on this important matter in a complete state of not knowing what is involved, what exactly is undertaken or where we go from here.
If I were to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, "When is Parliament going to see the regulations?", I have little doubt that he would not be able to give an immediately encouraging answer. I should certainly not expect it to be, "Oh, they are all ready; we are just eager to wait for the moment to show them to Parliament". I am sure that is not the case and the noble and learned Lord would not mislead us in making that suggestion.
I say with respect that with all his great ability the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor cannot point to any moment in time when reality will he given to what is undertaken; namely, that there shall be a review of cases arising from the manner in which

1475
a child's fate and affairs are being looked after by a local authority. That will not do. Such a matter should not be left in this wholly uncertain and unknown field. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord can give us any indication when, in what circumstances and in what manner these undertakings will be carried out.
This is a sad example of the mischief of putting into a Bill a broad provision of regulations without undergoing the political and intellectual process of giving a clue beforehand as to what the regulations will contain. Clause 22(2)(a) and (b) are practically useless. The House cannot feel satisfied—I certainly do not—with the way in which the matter is left. Perhaps, however, the noble and learned Lord may be able to give us some comfort in answering these complaints.
Lord Meston: My Lords, strictly speaking, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, is right. Even if all the details were not set out in Clause 22(2), regulations could still be made which covered all the subjects dealt with in Clause 22(2) without those regulations being vulnerable to attack as having been made ultra vires.
Nevertheless, there is still some point in having something like Clause 22(2) in that it gives guidance to the draftsman of the regulations. It also enables the Government to meet the complaint that we often utter that a Bill such as this provides a regulatory power without giving any clue as to the substance of the regulations to follow.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, says that Clause 22(2) is useless. In a sense, I go as far as to agree with the noble and learned Lord. However, I feel it is better than nothing. At least having something like Clause 22(2) enables us to try and improve on the directions given to the draftsman of the regulations and enables the regulations to concentrate on further details—the kind of details to which the noble and learned Lord has just referred.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, I agree that it is better to have something rather than nothing, even if it is contrary to the recommendations of the Renton Report and contrary to the strict tenets of pure draftsmanship. It is just better to have something rather than nothing.
However, the problem was identified clearly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones. The problem exists when there is an enabling clause like this without a draft of the regulations. It is essentially that practice, for which my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor is in no way responsible, which has become a general practice. That puts us all in difficulty. Now that we are in that difficulty, we must make the best of it. Therefore, although I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, is right, as he always is, I suggest that it is proper on this occasion to oppose his amendment in order to ensure we have something.
5.45 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, is right to say
1476
that this subsection strictly speaking, may not add anything to what is in Clause 22(1). I venture to suggest that there are some branches of this provision which may not be covered unless expressly mentioned, particularly the provision relating to monitoring.
I am sure my noble and learned friend Lord Simon of Glaisdale has had experience, and much more than I, of arguments about whether or not regulations are within the powers contained in an Act of Parliament. I believe that it is a wise policy, when such arguments are possible, to do what one can to meet them in advance in relation to the headings which one expects to put in regulations.
I believe also that provisions indicating the headings that may be covered under the regulations have a purpose in informing the Committee, as it was when we discussed this before your Lordships' House, and of course another place when the legislation eventually gets there, of what the Secretary of State has in mind.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, would like even more information. He would like me to propose an amendment to add even more detail to Clause 22(2). I believe that what we have to do at this stage is to try to lay down—in so far as we regard them as important—particular headings. This is a new kind of review in this kind of provision. It is a very important element of what is being proposed. I think it is right that we take this level of care over it.
My noble friend Lord Mottistone is, I believe, about to move another addition to this provision, if I am not mistaken. I have no doubt that he would regard it as somewhat frustrating if he did not obtain some consideration for that heading on its merits. My noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, say that it is difficult to consider this matter when we do not have the regulations. I certainly do not anticipate that we shall have them for some time yet. In a sense, having draft regulations may distract one from the provisions in the Bill itself, because regulations made under such a power as this may be changed.
I believe also that, in pursuance of the argument put yesterday by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, about the Secretary of State having very general power, Parliament has come to look at the vires or the powers of regulations quite closely. It is, as a practical matter at least, an advantage to have headings of this kind in the enabling legislation.
I subscribe very much to the view that the statute book should be as short as is reasonably possible. However, when one is actually faced with particular proposals, I fear one wants to go for what seems to be reasonably safe rather than the shorter formulation. I fear that I could not advise your Lordships, in spite of the eloquence of my noble and learned friend in moving this amendment and the very cogent argument with which he supported it, to give effect to the amendment. I believe that to do so would not be in accordance with the practice of Parliament as it has developed.
Lord Simon of Glaisdale: My Lords, if I withdraw this amendment, being confident, as I hope my noble

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and learned friend on the Woolsack is, of the respect in which I hold him, it will not be because I accept the cogency of the argument which the noble and learned Lord has just addressed to your Lordships. In particular, he said that there are some powers under subsection (2) which would not be covered by subsection (1). However, that is not possible as a matter of construction because subsection (2) purports to set out the particularity of the generality of subsection (1).
The second point is that nothing I said yesterday in denunciation of a "Henry VIII clause" gives any justification for this idle verbiage. Thirdly, I noticed that my noble and learned friend did not answer the question that was echoed by my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones as to what subsection (2)(a) means and what it adds to the final phrase:
"in accordance with the provisions of the regulations"
in subsection (1).
If I do not press the amendment to a Division, the main reason is that I noted the result of the two earlier Divisions. The second reason is that both the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, said that something was better than nothing. I personally regard subsection (2) as nothing, as mere abstraction or mere verbiage, as I put it. The third reason is that I like to think that by nagging at these matters without Divisions, particularly without being defeated in a Division, one obtains some result in the form of improved draftsmanship.
For many years the noble Lord, Lord Renton, girded at the absurdity of the phrase,
"with the consent of the Treasury".
I did my best to second him. We came very close to satisfaction on one occasion when I raised the irrelevance and lack of necessity of that phrase in a statute because the internal machinery of government takes perfect care of consultation with the Treasury on any matter which might amount to a charge on public funds.
On that occasion the Minister in charge accepted that that was so in his experience. I was encouraged by that to set down an amendment at Report stage, but by that time his arm must have been twisted out of its socket because it was clear that the Treasury felt more comfortable with the phrase in the statute, quite unnecessary though it was, and the draftsman had got used to it.
The last occasion on which we raised the matter was during the passage of the Legal Aid Bill, which was conducted with great agility by my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack. Regulations had to he made with the concurrence or with the consent of, or after consultation with, the Treasury. There are abundant examples in this Bill of regulations which may involve a charge on the Treasury. Yet the draftsman has quite happily forborne from using that phrase. The only reference to the consent of the Treasury is in another context in Clause 63.
It is therefore buoyant with the hope that that kind of access of common sense may even extend to not inserting subsections in a permissive form which particularise a generality which is also permissive that
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I ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Mottistone Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 59:
Page 18, line 37, at end insert—
("( ) requiring the authority to advise the child of his right of application to the court to discharge or vary an order made under Part IV of this Act.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have pleasure in proposing, as my noble and learned friend pointed out, a further addition to subsection (2), to which I hope the noble and learned Lord, Lord' Simon of Glaisdale, will not object too much. In passing, I may say that I do not agree with the noble and learned Lord. I think that it is a very good thing. We grumble when we have regulations because we do not know what will be in them. Yet when we are given an idea we grumble about having the provisions in the Bill. That does not seem to me to be logical. Perhaps it would be better still if we did not have any regulations, but think of the problems. We should be sitting all night, every night, in order to cope with the much wider general legislation.
My amendment deals with the fact that Clause 34(1) and (2) provides that the child has a right to apply to the court to vary or discharge an order but there is no provision to ensure that the child is told about that right. On a general level the child should always be given as much information as possible to help him retain some control over circumstances which may be alien and confusing.
The review process requires that the local authority should consider the continuing necessity for an order. A reminder to a child of his or her rights would be valuable in helping the child to consider and focus on what course of action he or she wants to take. There appears to be little point in giving a child rights if the child is unaware that those rights exist. I moved a somewhat similar amendment at Committee stage. Unfortunately it was bracketed with other amendments and was not properly debated. However, my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said (at col. 168 of Hansard for 17th January) that he would
"certainly consider whether anything needs to be done about that",
referring to my earlier amendment on those lines.
In the light of that debate we have modified the amendment slightly to include specific reference to Part IV. Otherwise it is much the same. I hope that my noble and learned friend has had an opportunity to give it the consideration that he promised. I hope that his reaction is favourable, that he thinks that I am talking sense and will agree to the amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Simon of Glaisdale: My Lords, I have no objection to the amendment so long as the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, is not misled into thinking that it will have any influence at all on the Secretary of State. The whole of subsection (1) and subsection (2), in contradistinction to the ensuing subsections, is purely permissive. If the Secretary of State wants to do what the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, wants him to do he can do so under subsection (1).

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However, I can offer this encouragement to the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone. If my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack opposes the amendment, that will indicate to the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, that this is not one of the regulations which the Secretary of State has in mind. I should not like to prognosticate what satisfaction that will give to the noble Lord, but I would wish him better.
6 p.m.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, I do not wish to depress the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, further, but I am afraid that this is a somewhat futile exercise in view of the other provisions of Clause 22.
Lady Kinloss: My Lords, I should like to add in support of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, that the Government have already agreed to amend the Bill so that young people are informed of their rights on leaving care. This amendment seeks to ensure that young people are informed of their right to a court order in order to leave care. I hope that as the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, has shown care and thought in putting down Amendment No. 67, he will be equally thoughtful in accepting this amendment.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, as my noble friend has explained, the purpose of this amendment is to provide that the regulations which may be made under Clause 22 in respect of local authority reviews may include a requirement that the authority advise the child whose case is being reviewed of his right to apply to the court for discharge or variation of an order made under Part IV of the Bill.
As has been said, this measure was part of a list taken together in Committee. There was not very much opportunity to consider it separately. At present the list includes in paragraph (e) provisions that may be made in the regulations,
"requiring the authority to consider, in the case of a child who is the subject of a care order, whether an application should be made to discharge the order".
Paragraph (d) requires the authority to seek the views of those specified including, where appropriate, the child, on any matter to be considered. Paragraph (h) requires the authority to notify the result of the review and any decision taken. Again, where appropriate, those notified would include the child.
As this amendment was grouped with others in Committee, it was discussed only briefly and I offered to consider it for this stage. Having now done so, the conclusion that I have reached is that an amendment of this kind may have merit in relation to the older child, as indeed may a provision requiring advice to the child on various other matters such as contact and the availability of the representations procedure.
Although we have not been able to discuss this fully with the draftsman for the reasons that I gave yesterday, we shall try to do so before Third Reading. So the position is that I have not been able fully to consider how this might be done but I have reached the stage of believing that it may well constitute an advantage if we can do it with a reasonable degree of
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economy of language. I hope that the noble Lord may feel able in the light of that assurance, to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, I am indeed grateful to my noble and learned friend. I hope that the chief draftsman improves quickly and that we can hope for appropriate wording to appear in the Bill before it leaves this House. With those encouraging words, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, before I call Amendment No. 60, perhaps I should say that it appears to be an alternative to Amendment No. 61.
Lord Prys-Davies Lord Prys-Davies moved Amendment No. 60:
Page 19, line 9, leave out ("for considering any representations") and insert ("to consider any complaint or other representation").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should like to speak in support of the amendment that my noble friend Lady David and myself have tabled. I should also like to speak, with the leave of the House, to manuscript amendments which—I apologise for this—we submitted late in the day. The manuscript amendments are Amendments Nos. 62A to 62E. The effect of each amendment is to introduce the words "or complaints" in lines 24, 27, 30, 33 and 42 respectively on page 19.
In Committee, we urged that the word "complaint" should be included in Clause 22(3). Your Lordships will recall that the amendment attracted considerable support. I am particularly grateful that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has considered the matter further and has tabled Amendment No. 61. Nevertheless, I should like to bring to the attention of the House the fact that the 10 organisations that have briefed us on this issue are all agreed that it is essential—that is the word they use—that "complaint" should be used in the Bill and in any procedures to be established under the Bill.
Children and young people understand the word whereas the word "representation" on its own has little or no meaning to many young people. The word "complaint" is preferred to the word "representation" for another reason. A complainant is not simply expressing a view or making a comment. He expects that his complaint will be listened to and in the event of it being upheld that it will lead to a decision and to action.
I should mention that there is considerable precedent for the term "complaints procedure". It is used in the Residential Care Homes Regulations 1984, in the Hospital Complaints Procedure Act 1985 and again in the Education Reform Act 1988. Moreover, the use of the term "complaints procedure" is strongly supported by eight major studies or reports that have been published in the United Kingdom since 1980. So the amendment is in line with respectable precedent. I should like to think that it has helped to pave the way for Amendment No. 61 which has been tabled by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor.
I should just like to say a few words about the amendments that have been tabled late in the day. If

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there were a similar amendment to Amendment No. 61, with the effect of including the word "complaint" wherever the word "representation" appears on page 19 of the Bill, it is felt that proper recognition would then have been given in the Bill to the importance of using the term, "complaints procedure". I do not propose to press the manuscript amendments upon the House, but it would be appreciated if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor could consider in due course whether they meet with his approval. I beg to move.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: Perhaps I may express gratitude to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for the open-minded way in which he has approached this question of providing expressly for "complaints" to be dealt with in the terms of the Bill. The noble and learned Lord has done that in Amendment No. 61 and we are grateful to him.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I do not believe that any further explanation is required apart from saying that I think the effect of Amendment No. 61 is to give "representation" wherever it occurs thereafter the same meaning. I shall however check with the draftsman to be certain. That is my understanding of what we did. This precludes in no way the format for the procedures when the procedures are set out. It may well be that some greater prominence might be given to "complaint" in that situation than is done here. However, I think the basic point that I have explained still arises. We want to make it clear that the review procedures are intended to deal not only with complaints but with every aspect of matters. I believe that the amendment does that. I think therefore that I ought to invite noble Lords to deal with Amendment No. 60 and then we can possibly go on to Amendment No. 61.
Lord Prys-Davies: My Lords, I am very pleased to withdraw Amendment No. 60 and to rely upon the Amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. I thank him for responding so favourably to the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 61:
Page 19, line 10, after ("representations") insert ("(including any complaint)").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I have already explained this amendment. I am grateful to the noble Lords who raised this matter with us. I believe that we may have made a practical improvement in this situation. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Mottistone Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 62:
Page 19, line 15, at end insert—
("(e) any person who has had contact with the child").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment follows from Amendment No. 114 at Committee. It considerably widens the number of people who can make representations on behalf of a child. As the Bill stands, family members such as brothers, sisters or grandparents cannot make representations on behalf of a child. Local authority staff are also precluded.
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That is surprising when one considers that testaments from staff have in the past been instrumental in disclosing abuses in residential homes. As the Bill stands, very young children, children with communication difficulties and children who have been abandoned are cut off from people who could complain on their behalves.
At Committee stage, my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor felt that there were difficulties in assessing who should be able to make complaints. I suggest that contact with the child is an appropriate test. It seems reasonable that persons in contact with the child should be able to voice their concerns. No one is likely to abuse this system. Making a complaint is a serious matter. With a little encouragement my noble and learned friend said at col. 191 on 17th January in Hansard that he would give further consideration to this point.
In conclusion, I received a letter this morning from a lady from Macclesfield in Cheshire. She said that she was a guardian ad litem. I was most encouraged. Until I read the earlier part of this Bill I had never heard of them. To have had a letter from one was a great privilege. She supported strongly the amendment that we discussed yesterday. Unfortunately the letter arrived only today. I shall hope to pursue the matter later. She was also in favour of the forerunner of this amendment at Committee stage. She wonders whether I have heard of the legislation of Quebec state—she thinks it was in 1978—which set up an office of child protection. Any adult can take a complaint to the director; in fact they have a duty to do so. It provides for any adult to do so, not just those specified in this part of the Bill that we are considering.
The general principle of widening the provision to include close relations seems to have much support from obviously very worthy people. I beg to move.
Lord Simon of Glaisdale: My Lords, I do not know whether this would be a convenient opportunity to ask a question that I asked in Committee. What is the meaning of "other person connected with him"? The reference is page 79, Schedule 2, at line 20.
The relevance that I beg for the question is the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, to extend the circle of people who are concerned in the review. If is is not convenient to the noble and learned Lord to answer now, I shall be perfectly content to wait and to have the question answered by letter or in any other way that is convenient to him.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, I support the amendment. It exposes an unintentional gap in the proposed administration. I also welcome Amendment No. 61, having spoken on the question of complaints procedures on previous occasions. Surely representations should be heard from any person who has had contact with the child.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, perhaps I may first address myself to the question that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, asked me about paragraph 13 of Schedule 2 which appears on page 79. I am speaking from memory but I think that I attempted to answer that question somewhat later

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in the proceedings than when he first asked it. However, I may be wrong about that. My understanding of "connected with him" in that context is that it is a phrase that has been used in this type of legislation in the past and that it means related in any degree. I believe that I am right in saying that it was in legislation before; I may be wrong about that. However, that is the context of and the connotation that we give to the phrase in this clause.
On this amendment, I refer to the very useful discussion that we had about its predecessor in Committee. I undertook to consider whether we could find a way of opening up access to procedure a little to provide for problems of the kind that have been addressed. I said that there could be difficulties in doing so and we are finding that there are. As a result we are still considering the matter.
One of the problems is to avoid opening up access to the procedure too much. As I said in Committee, it must be a reasonably selective procedure so that the time of the authority is not continually taken up with having to look into complaints instead of looking after the child. That is always a risk. On coming into public life for the first time one may be surprised at the number of people who are prepared to take up other people's time in investigating matters which require much time to investigate and sometimes have been investigated rather frequently in the past. When I first came to office I tried to interview some of these people. I soon found that if I did it too often I would not have much opportunity for everything else. We must also watch that the procedure is not made capable of abuse by persons who have no legal interest in the child and who may only cause trouble between the authority and the parents.
I thought that my noble friend's original amendment was perhaps a little wide. However, his present amendment goes wider. The very slightest contact at any time in the past—perhaps a single meeting—would be sufficient. I recognise that there is a problem here. I would certainly expect to go so far as allowing representations from an independent visitor, for example, appointed in accordance with paragraph 15 of Schedule 2. I shall certainly consider what can be done in relation to staff and people who have responsibility for children in such a situation.
I am told that I was wrong when I said earlier that the phrase "connected" was used in previous legislation. I was relying upon my recollection. I shall have an opportunity to check it later. I understand that it is a new phrase. The purpose of it is to include any person who can claim connection with the child.
I hope that in the light of that explanation my noble friend may feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, I hope that my noble and learned freind will forgive me. Did I correctly gain the impression that he is still studying the matter with a view to bringing something into the Bill if he can at some stage to take care of the point that I am trying to make?
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, yes.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, with that understanding I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Manuscript Amendments Nos. 62A to 62E not moved.]
Clause 24 [Recoupment of cost of providing services etc.]:
6.15 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 63:
Page 20, line 27, at end insert—
("(2A) No person shall be liable to pay any charge under subsection (1) at any time when he is in receipt of income support or family credit under the Social Security Act 1986.").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I spoke earlier to this amendment with Amendment No. 20. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Mottistone Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 64:
After Clause 25, insert the following new clause:
("Designation of responsible officer.
For the purpose of facilitating the discharge of their duties, the local authority shall—

(a) designate an officer of the authority, or

(b) facilitate the designation of an officer of another agency, who shall be responsible for safeguards and promoting the welfare of any child accommodated by them.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a new way of presenting a matter which came to the fore in various ways during the Committee stage. I am suggesting that we should have a new clause to deal with this particular subject. It seeks to ensure that there is a named key worker for every child in the care of the local authority. Parents and children frequently complain about lack of information, not knowing where to complain or where to ask for advice. A named officer could ensure that any plans or targets for the child would be met and could co-ordinate the multi-discipline network on behalf of the child.
A child is likely to feel more secure if he is able to develop a relationship with one person. Local authorities have high staff turnovers and at times are unable to attract staff. However, regulations could deal with such matters as sickness, extended holiday periods or a member of staff leaving. The amendment would establish the principle that children would be far less likely to drift if they were the responsibility of a named officer from a local authority or a local voluntary group. I beg to move.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, I support the amendment. I spoke to a similar amendment at Committee stage and I do not intend to repeat anything that I then said. The reasons are still valid. In essence one needs a key worker, a named officer, perhaps to stop the child slipping through the net of care and welfare. I should have thought that this was an obvious improvement in accordance with the intendment of the Bill and in no way in conflict with it.
Lady Kinloss: My Lords, I should like to support the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, in all that he has said, and to emphasise in particular the principle that a child is far less likely to drift if he is the responsibility of a named officer of the authority or a local voluntary group.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, this amendment, as my noble friend has said, is like one that we discussed in Committee. The theme of a responsible officer started there and is expanded in the amendment to deal with all children accommodated by a local authority. It would also give that officer responsibilities to safeguard and promote the child's welfare.
As I explained in Committee, cases of all children who are looked after by local authorities will be subject to regular reviews, and the review will entail a check on the development of, and the long term proposals for, each child. I also said that I would expect regulations to provide for the implementation of decisions made under such reviews to be entrusted to a named officer. That is what we shall expect to see emerging from Clause 22. The child's welfare will therefore be protected by a detailed and professional assessment of his needs and the child should thereafter be protected from the risk of drift by the personal attention and constant review of the named officer. That officer will, on behalf of the local authority, be under a duty to safeguard and promote the child's welfare, as envisaged under Clause 18(3). Therefore I do not believe that there is anything between my noble friends, the noble Lady or myself on this matter. However, we believe that the situation requires regulations, partly for the reasons which my noble friend explained. One has to make detailed provisions about the transfer of the named officer from one named person to another in the event of staff leaving. In a sense that is the time when something is apt to go wrong. It is necessary that the regulations should cover that.
This amendment also refers to facilitating the designation of an officer of another agency. Clearly many children are looked after by a local authority, but they are actually accommodated in voluntary homes or other such accommodation. In those circumstances, it may be appropriate for the relevant officer of a voluntary organisation, or of another authority, to have special responsibility on an agency basis. I should certainly not wish to prevent this, but as it is the local authority which has the welfare responsibility in respect of such a child, that authority will have the discretion to act appropriately in each case, but should itself always remain accountable, ideally through its own designated officer.
I spoke a moment ago about the responsibility which this amendment would place upon the individual officer. The responsibility would be equal to the local authority's welfare duty in respect of the child under Clause 18(3). Although the officer would acquire this duty only to facilitate the discharge of local authority functions, this could nevertheless lead to unwelcome conflicts between an authority and its employee. It is right that the local authority should be required to promote and safeguard the welfare of
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each child whom it looks after; but individual officers should not have that duty. The officer should act as an agent of the authority in carrying out its policy in the discharge of its functions.
As I have explained, I have certain reservations about this amendment as it stands, and also that the principle of the amendment, with which I substantially agree, will be provided for under regulations concerning reviews. I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment. As I have said, I substantially agree with the principle of the amendment. However, I believe, as my noble friend said, that regulations are required to deal with the matter and it is better that it should be dealt with there in its entirety.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, may I ask my noble and learned friend one question? If this is to be dealt with by regulations, we know that the regulations may or may not so provide. I understand that my noble and learned friend anticipates that they will. But if he accepts the principle, as he does, why should not the governing principle of designation be put in the primary legislation leaving the regulations to sort out any machinery? Perhaps I am being slow on this aspect. What is the objection to the amendment in its present form if the principle is acceptable?
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I said that I substantially accepted the principle; but I indicated one or two reservations about the precise scope of the duty placed on the designated officer. Moreover, I expressed a doubt also about the wisdom of designating an officer of the other agency rather than of the authority when the child is being looked after by another agency on behalf of the authority. This is a matter which requires regulation. Therefore I feel it is best dealt with in its entirety in regulations. If one is dealing with the whole subject, it is better to do it in one place.
Reference to regulations would be necessary because the officer of the authority would be required to pass it down from the person who held it on transfer to another person. That is the difficulty about doing it on the face of the Bill.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for our general agreement on the principle of that amendment. However, in view of the fact that he said it would be more suitable in regulations, would it perhaps be appropriate to have yet another part of subsection (2) which embraced the gist of my amendment within it?
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I am willing to consider that. One has to be slightly careful because the subsection is fairly long already. However, if my noble friend would be kind enough to leave that with me, I shall consider it with my advisers.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, I thank my noble friend very much. If he can carry it that much further, I shall be even happier. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 65 not moved.]
6.30 p.m.
Lord Prys-Davies Lord Prys-Davies moved Amendment No. 66:
Page 76, line 14, at end insert—
("( ) Every local authority shall take reasonable steps to make provision of services to meet the identified needs of children within their area.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 66 if it is convenient to the House, I should also like to speak to Amendment No. 68. The purpose of both amendments is to strengthen the provisions of Schedule 2, paragraph 1. Schedule 2, paragraph 1, requires that,
"Every local authority shall take reasonable steps to identify the extent to which there are children in need within their area".
It appears that thereafter there is a full stop. The voluntary bodies working in the area consider that that is inadequate. Having identified the extent of the need, it is argued, the paragraph should go on to provide that local authorities shall take reasonable steps to meet it.
I appreciate that it may be said in reply that the duty to meet the identified need is now covered by Clause 15(1) of the Bill. Nevertheless, it would be helpful if the specific duty was spelt out in paragraph 1 of Part I of the schedule. That would at least ensure that when the reader comes to paragraph 1, Part he knows of the requirement of Clause 15(1).
Amendment No. 68 deals with another area of concern. On many occasions during the course of the discussions on the Bill we have seen that local authorities are given wide discretion as to how to carry out their duties in respect of children in need. The result is that the Section 1 budget of the Child Care Act 1980—that is, the budget for the preventive and rehabilitation service—varies immensely from authority to authority without apparent justification. For example, we have been told that one study has shown that the expenditure under the Section 1 budget varies from £2,000 in one authority to £1 million in another. It is suggested that that wide, unpredictable variation points to the need for regulations to be made to establish standards—presumably minimum standards—for the provision of services to meet needs.
The question may well be asked: what difference will regulations make? I am advised that the existence of such standards will encourage authorities to take a comprehensive look at what has been done and to consider what changes are required in order to improve the services. Otherwise, there is a danger that we shall continue to have more of the same, whereas what we possible want is less of the same. I beg to move.
Baroness Faithfull: My Lords, is it likely that regulations will define the phrase "provision of services"?
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I believe that it is wise to deal with the amendments in order, though they are closely connected as the noble Lord has explained. Amendment No. 66 would place a duty on local authorities to take reasonable steps to make provision for services to meet the identified needs of children in their area. If this amendment is intended to relate to children in need as defined, the
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amendment is unnecessary because the Bill already provides for this in Clause 15. It states that it shall be the general duty of every local authority to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within its area who are in need by provision of a range and level of services appropriate to the need of children in need in its area. That general duty under Clause 15 applies to all children in need in the area.
Under paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 the local authority is under a duty to identify the extent to which there are children in need in its area. It is not necessary to provide specifically for the local authority to take reasonable steps, as local authorities are under the general law required to act on a reasonable basis. Clause 15(1) is preferable in that it specifies that an appropriate range and level of services must be provided in order to fulfill the general duty to further children's welfare. I do not think, therefore, that there is any need to say more than what is already in Clause 15(1).
The issue comes back to the relationship between Clause 15(1) and the schedule, which is the overriding general duty. The powers and duties in the schedule are intended to fill that out and give facilities for it. I hope noble Lords will agree that the proposed amendment does not add anything to what is already there. If the amendment relates to the needs of all children, which in fact is how the first subsection of the amendment is drafted, I cannot agree to even the sentiment behind it because it goes far too wide, covering any need of any child. The local authority must provide services for the children in need, as they appear from an examination of its area.
The second linked amendment, No. 68, would require the Secretary of State to make regulations to establish reasonable standards for the provision of services to meet the needs identified for children in the local authority area. This would result in the Secretary of State regulating local authorities about matters which should properly be left to the local authority to determine.
I said earlier that one must have a philosophy about the matter. Some peope believe that central government know it all, while others believe that local authorities know it all. We believe that this situation is one for local authorities to determine. Local authorities are accountable to their local electorate and are responsible for making their own decisions according to their priorities and the particular needs and circumstances of their area.
The mere fact that the level of provision is different in money terms does not necessarily show that it is not appropriate for the area. I do not believe that it will be appropriate for the Secretary of State to take powers to control so closely the provision of local services which, in any event, need to reflect local needs. Accordingly, I believe that the balance of power in the matter is right and that the local authority is given the general duty. It is then for it to meet the needs identified by an examination of its area as required by Clause 15(1).
In the light of that explanation, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Prys-Davies: My Lords, I had anticipated the noble and learned Lord's response to Amendment

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No. 66. We have lived with the Bill for seven or eight days and are now familiar with its structure.
It may well be that in practice social workers and solicitors who come across Part I of Schedule 2 for the first time will not appreciate that it must be read in conjunction with Clause 15(1). However, I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord is reluctant to move away from the basic structure of the Bill. I accept the guidance which has been given and beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 66.
As regards Amendment No. 68, there is a belief that the centre ought to be giving guidance if the existing pattern appears to be unsatisfactory and local authorities are not moving to amend it. Earlier I pointed out that there is a danger that the authorities will merely provide more of the same, whereas one ought to be having less of the same. Those with whom we have discussed the amendment must consider the response given by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and the delicate relationship between the centre and the local authorities. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 67:
Page 76, line 16, leave out from ("information") to ("and") in line 17 insert ("—

(i) about services provided by them under sections 15 to 17 and 20; and

(ii) where they consider it appropriate, about the provision by others (including, in particular, voluntary organisations) of services which the authority have power to provide under those sections;").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I referred to this amendment in speaking earlier to Amendment No. 57. This will extend the local authority's duty to publish information about services provided to include services under Clause 20 (aftercare) and to meet a point raised by my noble friend Lord Mottistone, where appropriate, those which are provided in their area by other persons. I beg to move.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, I should like to thank my noble and learned friend for this amendment. That meets amendments which I tabled at an earlier stage.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[Amendments Nos. 68 and 69 not moved.]
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 70:
Page 76, line 36, leave out ("neglect or physical or sexual abuse") and insert ("ill-treatment or neglect.").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, in speaking to this amendment, I also speak to Amendment No. 129. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 provides for the duty of the local authority to take steps to:
"prevent children within their area suffering neglect or physical or sexual abuse".
This is an important preventive duty and it is right that we should draft carefully. In Committee we discussed the possibility of extending this provision to make explicit the notion that abuse might not be physical. That was a helpful debate. As a result, these amendments are proposed by the Government. They
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recast the duty at paragraph 4 to refer to "ill-treatment or neglect" and provide for "ill-treatment" to have the same meaning as in Clause 26(8)—that it includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical.
This is not precisely what had been proposed by your Lordships, but I think that it covers the point. "Emotional abuse" is difficult to define. However, I think that it is undoubtedly embraced by "ill-treatment" which is defined to include the non-physical. I hope that this will meet with the approval of, amongst others, the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, whose own inspirational suggestion was not dissimilar, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones will remember. We should not turn paragraph 4 into a detailed catalogue of suffering, but I believe this scheme ensures that the duty is sufficient to ensure that no child who is suffering will be excluded. I beg to move.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, in the unavoidable absence of my noble friend Lord Mishcon (who I believe will be returning to the joust before very long) I accept the amendment which I understand owes its fons et origo to my noble friend.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
6.45 p.m.
Lord Campbell of Alloway Lord Campbell of Alloway moved Amendment No. 71:
Page 77, line 16, after ("proceedings") insert—
("(v) proceedings taken under section 21 of the Act:").
The noble Lord said: The object of this amendment is to impose a mandatory duty to require the local authority to diminish the use of secure accommodation. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 requires that:
"Every local authority shall take steps designed—
(a) to reduce the need to bring"
and this amendment adds proceedings instituted under Clause 21 relating to secure accommodation.
There is a real need for this amendment. A recent study by Timms and Harris, DHSS September 1988, concluded that 98 per cent. of applications for secure accommodation orders were approved, that there is evidence of rubber stamping and that the use of secure accommodation has not been restricted to cases where the child or the public have been exposed to serious risks.
I referred to this problem in my Second Reading speech and on Amendment No. 52. I know that my noble and learned friend and his advisers are actively engaged in seeking to come to grips and in devising an acceptable solution to this very complex problem, which is far more complex than I realised. Noble Lords on all sides of your Lordships' House will be grateful to my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor.
However, in any event, this amendment is supportable and supported. It is supported by a Voice for the Child in Care, the Children's Society, the Children's Legal Centre, Independent Representation for Children in Need and the British

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Association of Social Workers. Perhaps I may read from their letter:
"At present, secure accommodation is open to wide abuses enabling children in care to be 'locked up' in circumstances in which they have committed no criminal offence or for incidents in which it would not be possible to restrict the liberty of a child not in care. Some children in care who abscond can find themselves placed in secure units while those who persistently 'run away' from home, adoptive parents or boarding schools can receive no such consideration."
I shall not cite them in full, but perhaps I may give two citations to my noble and learned friend when the House rises which they gave me from Cawson on secure accommodation which point to the urgency of this problem.
In those circumstances, irrespective of the very intensive efforts which my noble and learned friend makes to deal with the major aspect of the problem, I beg to move this amendment on its own merits in any event.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, I rise to indicate my support for this amendment.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: My Lords, I too should like to support this amendment. Research seems to have established the need for action, and the widespread support it commands among children's organisations also gives importance to this amendment. Even if Amendment No. 52 put down in Committee was not acceptable to the Government, it seems to me that this amendment could only make a positive contribution to the welfare of children in this sphere.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I see no difficulty in accepting the principle underlying this amendment. It is clearly right that local authorities should be expected to take whatever steps are possible to reduce the need to place children in secure accommodation and to seek the authority of the court to keep them there.
However, I believe there is another aspect of this matter to which I should like to draw attention. Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 requires the local authority to take steps to reduce the need to bring certain proceedings—these are listed in the sub-paragraph.
This amendment seeks to put Clause 21 of this Bill into that. However, there is a matter which I should mention on that. Children may of course be placed in secure accommodation for short periods, currently for up to 72 hours, without an application being made to the court. Therefore, to meet the principle of my noble friend's amendment, I believe a more general provision would be desirable, something on the lines of the existing subparagraph (b), which required local authorities to take steps to reduce the need to restrict the liberty of children. I shall certainly consider the point further in the light of the debate we have had and bring forward a Government amendment to give effect to the principles underlying the points which have been made at a later stage, possibly going slightly wider for the reason given in dealing with the matter. I hope that my noble friend will feel that we have fully taken his point on board.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend. I am more than content and thank him for taking the principle on board. Again, the problem is rather more complicated than I had appreciated. I am sure that the Government will produce the right amendment to meet the principle. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Prys-Davies Lord Prys-Davies moved Amendment No. 72:
Page 78, leave out lines 7 and 8 and insert ("unless, in their opinion, to do so is not in the interests of the child's welfare.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should like, in speaking to this amendment, to speak also to Amendment No. 75. At Committee stage we tabled an amendment to transfer paragraph 9 of Part I of the schedule into Clause 15 but we accepted the guidance given by the noble and learned Lord that the paragraph should remain in the schedule. However, it is strongly felt that legislation should encourage a more positive attitude towards rehabilitation, and we submit that that would be the effect of Amendments Nos. 72 and 75.
Amendment No. 72 amends the wording of paragraph 9 and Amendment No. 75 amends that of paragraph 13. We are advised that it is a principle of good social work practice that it is in the interest of the majority of children who are looked after by a local authority that they should remain in contact with their families and eventually return home. Nevertheless, we understand that not enough is being done to maintain contact and to promote the return of children to their families.
My attention has been drawn to a report called Social Work Decisions in Child Care, published by HM Stationery Office. I believe it is the work of Dr. Jane Rowe, a very respected researcher. In one study she found that in only 10 per cent. of cases was rehabilitation actively pursued. In another 25 per cent. the child's return home was hoped for, yet nothing practical was done to achieve that desired objective. Dr. Rowe concluded that once children came into care social work contact with natural parents dwindled rapidly and did not feature even in cases where the child's return home was considered to be desirable.
Given this depressing background, it is important for children in care and for their parents that advantage should be taken of this important legislation to express as a duty in positive form that the authorities have to give higher priority to rehabilitation, or at least to give it the priority it deserves. These two amendments seek to do that. We trust they will be acceptable to the House. I beg to move.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, with permission, I shall deal with Amendments Nos. 72 and 75 together. The intention, as has been explained, is the same. It is to strengthen the duties of local authorities to promote links between children and their families. Naturally, I am very sympathetic to this objective, and indeed Clause 15(1) imposes on local authorities a general duty to provide services to promote the upbringing of children in need by their families so far

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as that is consistent with their duty to safeguard and promote the children's interests. That is a very general duty and it applies at all times, not just before there is a question of care. So the general thrust is towards the family at all times. That is an important aspect of Clause 15(1).
However, I respond to the proposed amendments with an element of caution because the Bill should not impose duties on local authorities which are unnecessarily onerous. To do so would dilute the provision of services where they are most needed. The first amendment seems to us to go too far. It relates to paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 which applies to any child in the authority's area who is in need and living apart from his family whether or not he is being looked after by the local authority. The duty to take reasonable steps to enable such a child to live with his family or to promote contact between him and his family applies "if in the authority's opinion" it is necessary to do so in order to safeguard or promote the child's welfare.
The amendment would make the duty applicable unless, in the authority's opinion, to take such steps would not be,
"in the interests of the child's welfare".
In other words, the authority is required to act unless it would not be in the child's interests. That would be a presumption that action should be taken.
Paragraph 9 was deliberately framed in the opposite way. A local authority should only have to take steps where it is necessary to do so to safeguard or promote the child's welfare. To turn this formula around would greatly increase the burdens of local authorities. This would only be at the expense of other services for children and families; and for this reason I believe that when one remembers the overall duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child, the duty in paragraph 9 is correctly framed in that respect.
The second amendment, however, is of more limited scope in that it applies only to children who are being looked after by local authorities. A similar amendment was moved in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady David, in somewhat stronger terms. As I explained then, the Government would not wish to lose certain features of paragraph 13(1), namely that the duty with regard to contact should be "to endeavour to promote contact" rather than "to promote contact", qualified by,
"so far as is reasonably practicable".
Today's amendment would substitute merely the word "practicable". The amendment we are considering would require an authority to act unless it is not in the child's interests rather than where it is "consistent" with the child's welfare as laid down in the present paragraph 13. Nevertheless, we are attracted to the change of emphasis in this particular situation and would like to consider the amendment for that reason.
In this case, unlike the first amendment, there seems to be good reason for emphasising the promotion of contact regarding a relatively limited range of children who are most at risk of losing touch with their families. If, therefore, I may summarise, I should like to consider further whether we can do
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something along the lines of Amendment No. 75 to emphasise the need to promote contact in that limited class of case. We feel that Amendment No. 72 covers too wide a class of children to make it right to put that extra duty on local authorities. I hope that in the light of my explanation the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Prys-Davies: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble and learned Lord for the tone of his observations on these two amendments. I appreciate the difficulties connected with Amendment No. 72 but I thought the noble and learned Lord much more encouraging over Amendment No. 75. We feel that if paragraph 13 could be strengthened it would give powerful steering to local authorities to put more effort into promoting contact. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 73, 74 and 75 not moved.]
7 p.m.
Lord Elwyn-Jones Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 76:
Page 80, line 38, at end insert—
("and,
(c) where the child has sufficient understanding to give or withhold his consent, he has consented to the appointment of an independent visitor.").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment will, I hope, be acceptable to the noble and learned Lord. It introduces the role of the independent visitor. That role is to advise, visit and befriend a child in care who has been out of touch with parents for more than a year. What is proposed concerns page 80, line 38, at the end of the provisions relating to what should be done in different situations following the words:
"Where it appears to a local authority in relation to any child that they are looking after that—"
I am proposing an additional paragraph which reads:
"(c) where the child has sufficient understanding to give or withhold his consent, he has consented to the appointment of an independent visitor".
As I have said, that role is to advise, visit and befriend a child in care who has been out of touch with parents for more than a year. The Bill extends the appointment of independent visitors to all children in care, not just to those in secure accommodation or community homes, when education and hospital care is involved as is the case at present. That provision in the Bill is very welcome. However I sould like to add as a precautionary step that an independent visitor should not be forced on an unwilling older child since that might be not only counterproductive but a curious form of befriending.
This is a short, but I hope helpful, amendment which I move.
Baroness David: My Lords, I should like to support the amendment. We all know what it is like to have an unwelcome visitor and people we would rather not see when they come to the front door. It is in line with the general philosophy of the Bill that we do not try to make children do things that they do not want to do or see people that they do not want to see if it is not absolutely essential. This seems to be an

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amendment with which we all ought to have sympathy. I hope that the noble and learned Lord is able to see his way to accepting it.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, the purpose of the amendment is clear and I am sympathetic to that purpose. The Bill places a duty on local authorities to appoint an independent visitor where communication between the parents and child is very infrequent or where the child has not been visited during the preceding 12 months. The job of an independent visitor is to advise and befriend the child from a standpoint which is separate from that of the local authority. A visitor can offer valuable support to an isolated child without many outside friends.
I think that the idea is a good one, but we now think it that might not be wise to have an independent visitor where a child is with a family, and that it would be wise to limit the appointment of independent visitors to cases where children are placed in residential establishments and not with families. However, that is a matter for another day.
I can see that the essential purpose of our proposal would be frustrated if a child who is able to make mature decisions does not wish to have a visitor appointed for him. I am therefore happy to consider this matter further. To thrust a visitor on an older child who does not want a visitor might well have the kind of results that the noble Baroness, Lady David, pointed out from her own experience. We will consider the matter further.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, perhaps I may be permitted to remind your Lordships of the observation that the artist, Sickert, made on one occasion to a visitor who stayed too long and talked too much. Sickert said to him, "Do come again when you have a little less time". In the circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness David Baroness David moved Amendment No. 77:
Page 82, leave out lines 44 and 45 and insert—
("(2) An authority may receive contributions from a contributor only if there is an exceptional and positive cause to do so and the contributor agrees to make the contributions.").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I moved a similar amendment at Committee stage which attempted to delete all reference to parental contributions from the Bill. Although that amendment was supported by every child care organisation and indeed every local authority association, the Government did not look very kindly on it. In bringing forward these amendments, we are trying to do a little less. In speaking to Amendment No. 77 I am also speaking to Amendment No. 78.
These amendments follow exactly the recommendation of the House of Commons Social Services Committee in 1984: namely, the Short committee which has been referred to a great many times in the course of the proceedings on this Bill. That recommendation appeared in paragraph 353 of the report. The amendments enable a local authority
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to collect contributions, and parents to make them, where there is a positive reason to do so and where there is genuine agreement by the parents. In arguing against the detailed arguments in favour of abolishing contributions that I put forward at Committee stage, the noble and learned Lord made a number of points (cols. 217–219, of 17th January 1989).
The noble and learned Lord's first objection was that the Bill lays greater emphasis on reasonableness. This is true, but local authorities will still have to make a decision in each individual case rather than being able to have a policy of not requiring contributions at all, which many local authorities would wish to have, and it would make it very much simpler for them.
Secondly, the noble and learned Lord said that the Bill encourages local authorities to reach agreement over contributions. It may well do, but so does the present legislation. The fact remains that under present legislation and under the Bill, if no agreement can be reached, the parents are taken to court. At court parents are not entitled to legal aid for representation. The court looks only at the ability to pay and not at the reasonableness or otherwise of the local authority's claim.
Thirdly, the noble and learned Lord referred to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, that payment encouraged a sense of responsibility and dignity and enabled parents to feel that they had not completely lost touch with their children. That may be true in the case of some parents, but this amendment would enable parents to make payments if they wished. However, for the majority of parents, parental contributions are an additional burden and there is not much dignity in being pursued through courts for arrears, which frequently happens to those who fail to pay.
Parents who strenuously oppose their children being taken into care feel that the subsequent imposition of charges adds insult to injury. It is difficult to see how the collection of contributions helps parents to feel responsible for, and maintain contact with, their children.
The Family Rights Group, which has made a considerable study of this matter, has experience of several cases where parents have been taken to court over contributions in circumstances where the local authority were denying them all contact with their children. That naturally leads to resentment. Contributions are dealt with by a different section of the local authority from the social services department; it is the finance department which chases them up. The finance department has no personal contact with the parents and no knowledge and understanding of the circumstances surrounding their case.
The Family Rights Group's experience in casework and training is that social workers are extremely reluctant to get involved in collection of parental contributions or in negotiations about how much people should pay. They regard it as a matter to be dealt with by the finance sector. Indeed, social workers frequently fail to pick up the fact that parents might well be entitled to family credit, which would exempt them from liability to contributions.

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The Family Rights Group has cases of families which are eligible for family credit, but not claiming it, but are still being chased for parental contributions.
In relation to handicapped children whose parents are not currently required to make contributions, it is unclear from the noble and learned Lord's comments at Committee stage whether under the Bill it will be possible for them to be charged in future. Perhaps he will clarify that matter in reply.
I said at the beginning of my remarks that the Social Services Committee of the House of Commons in 1984 recommended that parents should not be forced to make contributions to their children's maintenance unless they volunteered to do so. I am told on good authority that the Social Services Committee in another place, which is now sitting, is about to come unanimously to the same conclusion. It seems to be a matter of considerable importance when two committees made up of all parties decide, five years apart, that this is the sensible thing to do. One considers also that all the voluntary associations and the local authority associations are against forcing people to pay. I believe that is a very powerful argument. I look forward with slightly more optimism this time to what the noble and learned Lord will say than I had as a result of the response he gave me at Committee stage, remembering that this is a slightly diluted amendment. I beg to move.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, in view of the forcefulness with which the noble Baroness, Lady David, moved her amendment at Committee, I am not entirely surprised to find that we are back on this subject at Report.
I well understand the concern that insensitive use of the power to recover contributions can place on families and children of limited means and put them under pressure. I was interested in the views attributed to a joint working party of the AMA and ACC in 1983 that there would be savings of cash and time if charges were dispensed with. But I do not think it follows from these points that the recovery of contributions should nowhere be permitted. As I said last time, there seems to me to be nothing objectionable in principle in enabling local authorities which are looking after a child to ask for contributions from the parents, who in other circumstances would have to maintain the child themselves, if they are satisfied that the parents can afford to pay and the contributions sought are reasonable. The answer to insensitive charging must be to improve practice, and I would expect the greater emphasis placed on reasonableness by the Bill to have impact in that direction.
The noble Baroness is referring to the practice under the current system. Our system under the Bill is putting greater emphasis on reasonableness. The local authority associations may also wish to repeat their guidance to local authorities which was referred to in the Select Committee report, which states:
"Regard must be given to the effect on families of meeting the charges and the effect this has on their relationship with social workers. Any scheme needs to be as reasonable and as non-punitive as possible".
In any case there should be no question of the authority "chiselling"—to use the expression used by
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the noble Baroness, Lady David in Committee—money out of unwilling victims. The procedure in Schedule 2 provides several checks on unreasonableness.
First, paragraph 20(5) states:
"The authority may not specify in a contribution notice a weekly sum greater than that which they consider—(b) it is reasonably practicable for the contributor to pay (having regard to his means)".
Secondly, paragraph 20(8) states that where the contributor agrees the sum which he is to contribute he may withdraw his agreement at any time.
Thirdly, paragraph 19(4) says:
"A parent is not liable to contribute during any period when he is in receipt of income support or family credit".
Fourthly, paragraph 21(1) states that if the contributor does not agree with the contribution notice or, having agreed, withdraws his agreement, the authority connot recover the contributions without a court order.
I shall look into the legal aid situation because I believe it appropriate that it should be available. I shall check that situation. Fifthly, paragraph 21(3) declares that the court in making a contribution order must pay due regard to the contributor's means and may not specify a sum to be contributed greater than that specified by the authority in the contribution notice. Sixthly, under paragraph 21(11) the contributor will be able to appeal against a decision of the court in accordance with rules of court with the benefit at this and the preceding stage of legal aid if he is eligible.
In addition, the contributor will be able to make representations under the new procedure to be established under Clause 22 if he wishes. I would venture to suggest that this is designed to ensure that the outcome is entirely reasonable and affords great protection against the kind of situation which the noble Baroness described.
As regards the suggestion from the 1983 working party report that there would be savings if the collection of contributions was dispensed with, there is no reason why individual authorities should not decide on that ground alone if they wished that contributions should not be collected. Paragraph 19(1) simply requires the authority to consider whether it should recover contributions. It may take account of any relevant considerations in reaching its decision. I believe that it follows from what I have said that I am unable to support the first Amendment, No. 77, and I remain opposed to the second which is not new. I have the greatest respect for the committee whose recommendation is reflected in Amendment No. 77, but I find it hard to visualise circumstances which would give exceptional and positive cause, to quote the amendment, for receiving a contribution. This is, I have to say, a difficult proposition to put into practice. The second amendment would remove the mechanics for recovering contributions, leaving what remained unenforceable. The noble Baroness asked in Committee whether the Bill will introduce charges to the parents of handicapped children who are currently not subject to such charges. I said in answer to the question that there is no charge where disabled children, or anyone else, is in National Health Service provision, but there can be a charge for children for

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whom services are provided by a local authority, just as under the present law.
I cannot add very much more to this and to what I said last time. The emphasis on reasonableness in the Bill is in marked contrast to the rather rigid language of persons being liable to make contributions in Part V of the Child Care Act 1980, which it replaces. I said, and I believe it is worthy of repetition, that experience under the present law is on the basis of these rigid provisions. While the Social Services Committee was inclined to pooh-pooh the idea, I believe, as I said last time, that there is something in the comment of my noble friend Lady Faithfull that it can help parents, or at least some of them, to feel that they have not lost contact with their children if they have to pay something towards their support when they are in a position to do so.
We have tried to be as reasonable as possible in this matter and to promote a balanced approach to what can be a difficult question in some circumstances. I hope the noble Baroness feels able not to press the amendment.
7.15 p.m.
Baroness David: My Lords, my amendment means that parents could make contributions. The amendment states,
"an authority may receive contributions from a contributor",
so that can be done. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving me an extensive answer. I shall read it with great care. I am particularly glad that he said he would look into the question of legal aid.
I am not altogether happy with the situation that is left. It seems a pity that one has two committees, five years apart, that have made the same recommendation and that that does not carry a little more weight. I do not believe that it would be wise to divide the House at this time. From what the noble and learned Lord has said, I believe that I have the right to come back at the next stage if I so wish. I believe that course is left open to me. I shall read very carefully what he has said and I give warning that I may well return to this issue at the next stage of the Bill. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 78 not moved.]
Clause 26 [Care and supervision orders]:
Lord Mishcon Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 79:
Page 21, line 24, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
("(1) On the application of—

(a) any local authority,

(b) any authorised person,

(c) the child, or

(d) any person who has parental responsibility for the child, the court may make an order placing the child with respect to whom the application is made in the care of a designated local authority.

(1A) On the application of any local authority or authorised person the court may make an order putting him under the supervision of a designated local authority or of a probation officer.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, perhaps I may once more bring to the attention of the House something that is of great concern to the Children's Legal Centre and other organisations that are well known for their moderation, goodness and experience in looking after young people. The purpose of this amendment is to enable children and parents to apply for compulsory care orders. That will arise when a request to a local authority for accommodation under Clause 17 has been refused. As the Bill stands at present there is not a provision for a parent or a child to challenge such a decision of a local authority.
An amendment was moved in Committee, but it was later withdrawn. Another amendment was moved which would have brought in, as it were, by a back door what is intended by the amendment before us. It would have reintroduced Section 3 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963. It would have provided that following a period of notice, parents could apply to the juvenile court for an order requiring the local authority to take care proceedings if they felt that their child was beyond their control. That amendment was also withdrawn.
In Committee, the noble and learned Lord took a certain stance. I am sure that he needs no reminder of that stance; but I wonder whether I may be permitted to remind the House of what the noble and learned Lord felt at that stage. I shall paraphrase cols. 333–334 of the Official Report of 19th January. If in any way I paraphrase wrongly, I know he will chastise me—and correctly so. It would be a case of deserved corporal punishment, if I may remind the House of an earlier debate.
He said that he did not agree with the principle that a child should be able to apply for a care or supervision order in respect of himself. Here I shall quote directly what the noble and learned Lord said:
"It is important that the needs of a child are fully investigated before proceedings are brought—a responsibility which in almost all cases a local authority is best placed to meet".—[Official Report, 19/1/89; col. 334.]
The experience of those connected with the matter is that the children to whom the amendment is addressed will have already contacted social services for help—they will either have done it themselves or someone will have done it on their behalf—and investigations should have been carried out.
The noble and learned Lord also made reference to the recommendations of the Review of Child Care Law that care proceedings should usually—not inevitably—be brought by a local authority social services department. But that debate was in the context of whether the police or the NSPCC should continue to institute care proceedings. There was no discussion about the plight of children who have been failed by the social services. The noble and learned Lord went on to say:
"It is, of course, always open to a child to go to a local authority and bring his situation to the attention of the authority. The authority then has the statutory duty to see that the child is properly looked after".
That is absolutely right and no one can argue with it. It is perfectly in order when the machine works properly. There is then no difficulty. However, we are dealing with what happens when a local authority has

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failed to comply with its statutory duty. The amendment is addressed to that problem.
The Children's Legal Centre and various other organisations are worried about the growing problem of social services departments not being prepared to receive children into care. This is usually for resource reasons but sometimes because they do not accept as being genuine or as being in need of urgent attention a child's allegations of abuse. Some officers of social services departments may tend to minimise the harm involved. I shall not bore the House at this stage, although I know that it is extremely interested in the problems of such children, with all the details of the cases of children under the age of 18 who have been assisted by the Central London Teenage Project, the Children's Society project concerned with runaways. I assure the House that I have many detailed cases. Each one highlights the desperate steps that these young people have taken to get away from home. They have done so for good reason and without help being afforded to them by social services departments.
The amendment also deals with a parent's right to apply. I shall again paraphrase the noble and learned Lord. He said at cols. 369–370 of the Official Report for 19th January that the seeking of a care order should be a matter of last resort with the authority considering whether or not the situation could be met by the provision of services in the first instance or accommodation on a voluntary basis. The noble and learned Lord was absolutely right in saying that. However, my point in the amendment is that there may be circumstances in which the local authority fails in its statutory duty. The Bill provides no remedy at all for such children or such parents. At the moment they can go by way of wardship proceedings, through next friends such as teachers or youth workers, and a care order can be sought. However, Clause 70(2) expressly precludes such applications in the future.
In the debate on this issue the noble and learned Lord stated clearly at cols. 1345–1346 of the Official Report of 20th December that in his view the appropriate course of action for those wishing to challenge the decision of a local authority was through judicial review.
One knows that the process of applying for judicial review is a complicated and costly affair. An application for judicial review will be granted by the court only on certain well known grounds. It will not enable the court to look at the way in which decisions are made. It does not enable the court to consider the case on its merits.
The court cannot substitute its own decision for the decision of the local authority unless, in accordance with what is known as the Wednesbury principle, there was sufficient information before the local authority to enable the court to make its own decision. Usually, the court either cannot entertain the application or can only send back the matter for the local authority to make its decision in the proper way. If that happens one can well imagine that a local authority may decide to reach exactly the same decision in order to save its face or for the reasons it gave before. However, what the court cannot do is to
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consider the welfare of the child in its deliberations and substitute, as I said, its own decision.
It is for that reason—to help children and parents in that predicament—that the amendment seeks to give the child and the parent the right to go to court to make an order placing the child, with respect to whom the application is made, in the care of a designated local authority. Obviously in an inappropriate case the court will not make the order. However, some provision must be made to deal with the kind of case which I brought to the attention of the House as, indeed, it was brought to the attention of noble Lords in Committee.
I must repeat that it is not my own brainchild; it is the agonised wish—I use that word advisedly—of the Children's Legal Centre and other such organisations that those children and those parents should be looked after in that way. I beg to move.
7.30 p.m.
Baroness Faithfull: My Lords, I must say that in principle I am sad about the amendment. I am sad about the fact that it should have to be. I think that for children to feel that they must go to court against their parents is something which one would not want to encourage in any way.
However, there are two instances where there are very real difficulties. The first is where the mother or the father suffer from a mental illness and the children cannot tolerate that illness. Indeed, in some cases the children are frightened of it. The second instance is a very sad situation. It is where some local authorities—the ones I know of are in London—are closed on certain days so that if there are any problems the children—or indeed the parents—cannot go there. Therefore if a child is being ill-treated or cruelly treated and goes to the local authority for help, he or she cannot receive it because the office is closed.
Therefore I am in some dilemma over the matter. In principle, I think that it is a sad amendment to have to put forward. I regret the fact that it has to be put forward; but I see the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, which is illustrated by the two cases that I have cited.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, in Committee I set out our reasons for objecting to the child being able to apply for a care or supervision order. Indeed, the noble Lord has summarised with his customary accuracy and brevity, what I said at greater length at that time. I believe those reasons apply equally well to applications by persons with parental responsibility.
First and foremost, care proceedings are very serious matters with major implications for the child himself, the parents and others with parental responsibility, and of course the local authority. The needs of the child should be fully investigated before proceedings are brought. The local authority will have a specific responsibility under paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 to take steps to reduce the need to bring care and supervision proceedings, for instance by providing other services; and, so far as is consistent with their general duty, to promote the upbringing of children who are in need by their families (and of

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course, the parents would be able to make representations at that stage under the new procedure if they wished).
Those are important responsibilities designed to ensure that children are placed in care only as a last resort. Authorities, efforts to find other solutions could be sabotaged if the child or parents were able to pursue an application regardless. There are no particular grounds referred to in the amendment, and it would be possible for any person named to pursue an application without any preparation. It is true that the authority could argue its case before the court; but surely it is much better to prevent inappropriate applications from getting that far.
In Committee I mentioned the review of child care law which saw other reasons for restricting the power to bring care proceedings to local authorities and authorised persons. It said, at paragraphs 12.15 and 12.16:
"As any obligations under a care or supervision order will fall on (local) authorities they seem to us the most natural applicant for such orders. Indeed, given their wide powers to provide other social services and help to parents and children, and specifically to prevent care becoming necessary they alone may often be in a position to judge when compulsory intervention is the best or only feasible way forward.
"Weight is lent to the argument by the fact that the question whether to make an order and, if so, what order to make may depend to a significant degree on the resources and facilities which the social services department are willing to make available if an order is made, and on what their long term plans for the child are. It is difficult to see how proceedings could be brought without the agreement and co-operation of social services departments. Given that agreement and co-operation, it is difficult to see why others should, in general, need an independent right to start proceedings."
The noble Lord referred to that and mentioned its context. But that seems to me to be a general statement which underlies the recommendation of the Committee. The review continues to say:
"We also see some advantage in ensuring from the outset of what may become a long history of compulsory intervention that the social services department are in the lead and firmly identified by themselves and others as having the primary responsibility for the child".
I would only add that there is no provision in existing law for the child, the parents or other private individuals to initiate care proceedings. Under Section 3 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963, to which reference was made, parents may seek a court order requiring the authority to bring care proceedings, but this is little used, and we are proposing, as I mentioned before, that it should be repealed. An amendment seeking to restore this was considered in Committee. In my view, it would be inappropriate, for the reasons I have touched on, for the local authority to be compelled to seek a care or supervision order. The whole thrust of the scheme in the Bill is not to extend opportunities for bringing these proceedings, but in the other direction, and that is why police and local education authority powers will not be renewed.
As I have said on other occasions, the local authority's power to provide services under Part III, and its duty to seek to prevent the need to initiate proceedings, are among the most important features of the Bill. I should not like to see those features diluted by a provision of the kind proposed in the amendment. I should have thought that underlying
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the anxieties expressed in the amendment there is something extending a great deal further than the bringing of care proceedings and it is a question of enforcement of the general duty. In that respect, as the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said, the law provides the remedy which is appropriate for a breach of duty and there are of course reserve powers vested in the Secretary of State. I hope therefore that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and and learned Lord for the consideration which he has obviously given to what I said and, indeed, to what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull. Like the noble Baroness I got no joy in moving the amendment and drawing attention to cases where local authorities may fail the needs of the children. If I may say so, with the utmost respect, I do not think that the noble and learned Lord pointed in any direction where such children, or parents in that position, such as those mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, for example, will be helped.
As I tried to point out, pointing towards an application for judicial review or compelling local authorities to carry out their statutory duty is not an easy way to cover such cases. I told the House that the inspiration for the amendment was the Children's Legal Centre and other organisations which are endeavouring to look after some of the children who have left home for one reason or another, and to deal with their problems.
I think that it is appropriate at this stage for me to withdraw the amendment so that I can take advice from those organisations upon their reading the remarks made by the noble and learned Lord. In those circumstances therefore I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Earl of Dundee: My Lords, I beg to move that further consideration on Report be now adjourned until not before 8.40 p.m.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

Visual Display Units: ECC Report
7.40 p.m.
Lord Allen of Abbeydale Lord Allen of Abbeydale rose to move, That this House takes note of the Report of the European Communities Committee on Visual Display Units [22nd Report, 1987–1988, HL Paper 110].
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should like to begin by thanking the members of sub-committee C and our witnesses, especially Dr. Hunter from the Brussels secretariat. As the report explains, we did not agree with everything that he proposed but we greatly appreciate all the trouble that he took and all the help that he gave. I must apologise to those who have been studying our report that the attempt to be helpful by putting the relevant paragraph numbers into the summary of the recommendations on page 14 slightly misfired as we managed to put in the wrong number but such things, alas, happen.
For once this is not an occasion when we are pressing the Government to think again; but it is right that we should spend a little time discussing the issues raised in the report, given that they affect so many people and that so many fears and apprehensions are held.
Early last year, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a framework directive setting out measures to improve and safeguard the safety and health of workers and supplemented that general directive by five detailed directives on specific issues. That foray by the Commission into the well being of workers in the workplace was generally welcomed, but that welcome did not extend to the draft directive on visual display units. That is the directive which the sub-committee decided to examine and which forms the subject of the report that we are discussing.
It is important to bear in mind that that directive is only part of the much wider and generally satisfactory approach. The draft directive sets out in some detail the steps to be taken to see that VDU work does not compromise the health or safety of the operators and deals, for example, with eye testing, seating, lighting, training and information for operators about health risks. However, before I go on to talk about the report two issues of a rather more general character arise. The first is that most of our witnesses thought that a code of good practice would suit the problem better than legislation by way of statutory regulations; but Dr. Hunter explained to us that under Article 118A of the Treaty the Commission was bound to look for legislation to implement directives dealing with health and safety matters, and that codes of practice were not a sufficient compliance. That is a fact of life which could well be relevant to other Commission proposals.
Secondly, much of the evidence related to provisions in the draft directive requiring compulsory eye tests to be carried out by qualified opthalmologists, but it then turned out that that was a mistranslation. In the original French text, there was no requirement for compulsory tests and when there were tests the only requirement was that they should be carried out by those who were skilled in such tests. That mistranslation caused a great deal of wasted effort. I wonder whether the Government know of any way of avoiding a recurrence.
I must confess that I could not help thinking about the communication difficulty which the baker had in explaining to the bellman his problems over the snark:
"I said it in Hebrew—I said it in Dutch;
I said it in German and Greek;
But I wholly forgot (and it vexes me much)
That English is what you speak!"
To return to the draft directive, we heard a good deal from our witnesses about health hazards of various kinds. There can be no doubt that VDU use is at times responsible, for example, for musculo-skeletal disorders and for stress; but we were impressed by the evidence which suggested that those problems could best be met by good office management, by proper attention to the ergonomics of the workplace and by suitable pacing of the work. We heard too about eyesight problems, and although
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there seemed to be little evidence of the VDU work causing permanent visual defects, it can well happen that previously unrecognised abnormalities are disclosed. There are good grounds for providing for arrangements for eye testing and spectacles.
The area where there were most fears was the possible effect on pregnancy. It is worth making the point at this stage that the Social Affairs Council recently reached a common position, as the modern phrase goes, on amendments to the parent framework directive proposed by the European Parliament. One of those amendments was that provision should be made for special protection for high risk groups such as pregnant women.
Research has been going on in a number of countries, but so far it seems that the evidence linking adverse effects on pregnancy with VDUs is inconclusive. We were told that there is no biologically plausible cause for any such link. But the fears exist, and that question, which is exceedingly complex, will have to be looked at again when we have the results of the study currently in train in this country.
Our conclusion, to put it briefly, was that in the present state of scientific knowledge, and with all due deference to the points made by my noble friend Lord Baldwin in the debate last week, it would be best to rely upon good office management, good workplace design and consultation with those who work with VDUs.
We thought that it was a mistake for the Commission to have gone ahead, as it told us, merely because of the weight of public concern and not on a scientific evaluation of the risks. It seemed to us that the scientific evidence over the whole field was far from conclusive.
There are some other reasons for caution. It is not much good going for statutory regulations if they cannot be enforced. There can be no doubt that enforcement here would present formidable problems to the Health and Safety Executive inspectors and local authority environmental health officers. There is then the highly relevant fact that two international bodies—the International Standards Organisation (ISO) and the European Committee of Normalisation (CEN)—are working in this field. CEN includes members of EFTA as well as the Community countries. Its findings, I believe, are mandatory, but as I understand it, it has a discretion to allow member states to choose between codes of conduct and legislation. We thought it wrong to go ahead with the draft directive when these other discussions on precisely the same issues were in progress.
Given that this is a debate squeezed into the dinner hour, I am making a rather shorter speech than perhaps the importance of the issues warrants. The lights also seem to be fading as we proceed. However, I must find time to say that both the Health and Safety Executive and the TUC have issued admirable booklets of guidance but neither body could say how widely these booklets were read and still less how much they were acted upon.
To summarise, I wish in conclusion to ask the Government whether they have any comment on the

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two general points I raised earlier: whether they agree, broadly speaking, with the sub-committee's conclusions as set out in the report; whether they have any thoughts about extending the publicity for the excellent guidance which is already available; and what the present state of play is both on the discussions in Brussels on the draft directive and also on the CEN and ISO deliberations. When one thinks of the vast number of VDUs in use and the ill-effects which some of them have undoubtedly caused and the widely held fears about them, this is a topic which, as I said at the outset, is of quite considerable importance to a great many people. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the Report of the European Community Committee on Visual Display Units (22nd Report, 1987–1988, HL Paper 110).—(Lord Allen of Abbeydale).
7.52 p.m.
Lord Hunter of Newington: My Lords, I am glad to speak in this very short debate about visual display units and to give support to the chairman of Sub-committee C, the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Abbeydale. I must explain that I have only recently become a member of the European Select Committee but I wish to make a few comments about our experiences and perhaps make one or two suggestions.
If one thinks what are the basic requirements for legislation about health hazards and matters of that nature, the first requirement is to have a body of expertise that understands the meaning of scientific evidence and the possible pitfalls. Some years ago I chaired a committee in Europe to do with medical research and one of our principal recommendations was that the Commission should strengthen its scientific advice.
The second is to have the views of employers and trade unions as to what is the best way to proceed. As the noble Lord, Lord Allen, has said, in this country this is well understood and through the Health and Safety Commission and its executive these matters are well handled. They have discovered in the light of wide experience that one does not really want to legislate when one is dealing with a moving situation; for example, when new technology is being introduced. I do not think there is any doubt that if the proposals about the VDUs had been made by the Health and Safety Executive then there would be recommendations and not proposals for legally binding regulations.
There are other important aspects about this which one might call the two "Cs". One is cost and the other is contempt. Taking the second of these first, if regulations are inadequate, unsuitable, unnecessary or misdirected, then the consequence is that the countries concerned begin to view regulations of this kind with contempt and are in danger of ignoring them. One has also to recognise the wide variation of existing conditions in European countries. In one of the more advanced technologically, like Germany, there would be no difficulty in producing what is required in the situation to do with VDUs; that is, improving the general conditions in the offices from the point of view of lighting, positioning, and so on.
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The fact is that in this regard good office design and management are the important requirements.
When it comes to cost, we have a glorious example concerning a topic which your Lordships' House must be very tired of; that is, the cost of eye testing. But as the noble Lord, Lord Allen, has said, this difficulty was compounded by translation difficulties from French to English which produced in the English version a requirement of eye testing by opticians. If it were implemented it would be enormously expensive for someone, perhaps the employers, and much of it would be unnecessary. But once again one wants to avoid unnecessary expense, particularly in some of the less affluent countries in the Community.
Lastly, I wish to say, in light of my brief experience, that there is a very important difference between the status, authority and methods of proceeding of the Commission in Brussels and the way that we would proceed in this country. In Europe when a treaty base permits a choice of instruments, the choice of the form of presentation of the instrument is initially by the Commission. Once this choice is made by the Commission, the formal position is that it can only be amended by the unanimous decision of the Council of Ministers. But the Commission can be persuaded to change the instrument of its own volition if it sees that there is significant opposition in the Council.
In these circumstances it is, I believe, very important for the Commission to get the best possible advice and not have the Council of Ministers making decisions, as has been said, on the basis of public concern, as has happened with VDUs.
7.55 p.m.
Earl Baldwin of Bewdley: My Lords, I hope I may be forgiven if I slip away a few minutes before the end of the debate, if that is the way the time goes. Otherwise I shall not get home tonight. I am not a scientist and I do not operate a VDU. My reason for taking part in this debate is that I have some acquaintance with the nature of allergic reactions referred to in the report. I wish to add some thoughts to the evidence that has been gathered by the committee.
I am involved with an allergy support group. The reason the group exists and the reason I have had to study some of the literature is that mainstream scientific medicine has not yet quite caught up with what is happening to people who react strongly to foods, chemicals, inhalants and electromagnetic fields. I think this is reflected in the type of evidence which the committee received, or perhaps did not receive.
Those operating in the field of clinical ecology, now more usually known as allergy and environmental medicine, are familiar with the effects on patients of exposure to VDUs. I see that both Dr. Mackay and Professor Wilkins in their evidence linked this with fluorescent lighting. That is certainly borne out by the experience of allergy patients. It is all part of a wider picture of what some people in the field call "electronic smog". I have read that man is exposed nowadays to some 200 million times the background radiation of his forebears—I do not know how accurate that figure is—from TV

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transmissions, power lines, microwave appliances and the like. It seems that he may be imperfectly adapted to it. Those who are doing work in this area include Dr. Jean Monro of the Lister Hospital, who now has her own clinic in Hertfordshire. She has published research jointly with Dr. Cyril Smith of Salford University. Drs. Dowson, Kenyon and Lewith from Southampton are also working in this field. There are of course others.
They are finding some interesting facts. The strength of the current or field appears to be of less importance than its coherence. It seems to be a matter of resonance with the human electrical field, which is itself very weak—of harmonic interaction. Thus there is probably no traditional dose-response relationship. Furthermore, there may be no absolutely safe lower limit. All this may be less surprising to those who have a knowledge of homeopathy, with its infinitesimal doses, than to those in the more traditional medical areas.
A weak electrical field appears to be no guarantee of a lack of patient response. The symptoms people exhibit are a lot wider than such symptoms as skin rashes. They run the whole gamut of allergic reactions, and these can be severe. Among the commonest symptoms are psychological ones. I emphasise that in view of the reference to psychological symptoms in the report, where the inference is that signs of stress in office workers have psychological causes.
Popular opinion notwithstanding, it is the virtually unanimous experience of practitioners in this branch of allergy over about 50 years that physical causes, whether food colourings, petrol fumes or electrical influences, can switch on and off the symptoms of depression, fatigue, anxiety or overactivity. In such cases no amount of counselling or good office management, as recommended in the report, is going to meet these people's needs. I should add that I am not saying that psychological causes cannot exist as well. That is far from the case. The point is that physical causes are common and are usually overlooked. The numbers who are at present susceptible to these influences seem to be rising, but they are hard to estimate in absolute terms.
I want to refer, quite quickly, to one or two of the arguments that feature in the report. If and when this debate is studied later on, I hope my remarks may be taken in conjunction with what I said in the debate on pollution on 1st February to which the noble Lord, Lord Allen, was good enough to refer. I remarked on evidence and proof and what guidance science can and cannot be expected to give. That will save repeating my arguments.
On page 6 of the evidence Dr. Mackay of the Health and Safety Executive states that as the fields surrounding VDUs do not exceed national or international standards,
"we are on pretty firm ground now in saying that visual display units are very unlikely to represent a physical hazard to the user".
With respect, that must be nonsense. Just look at how the safety limits have been coming down and down over a wide range of substances for many years.
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Those substances include X-rays, lead, the pill and others that I mentioned last week. Just look at how national standards vary wildly. I think the Russian standard on some electromagnetic emissions is about 1,000 times tighter than ours. Then consider the gaps in our knowledge about the effects of 'VDUs. Those were recognised in the report. One informed source told me that the present standards are almost entirely arbitrary.
To me, the words I quoted are verging on the reckless. That is all the more so as we know that official research on the actual health effects of VDUs is not only inconclusive but, to quote Dr. Mackay himself on page 7 of the report, "very difficult methodologically". He goes on to say that a UK study is being done,
"hopefully to confirm in our own minds that there definitely was not a problem".
I was again somewhat taken aback, as I did not think scientists conducted studies with the intention of finding anything. I believed they set out to discover what the facts were. But perhaps the witness there was speaking in the heat of the moment.
Again on page 7, mention is made of studies which "by and large" do not suggest that there is an "excess risk to pregnancy". I take that to mean that there are some studies which show a risk to pregnancy. Should that not be a signal to proceed with extreme caution until a great deal more is known? We are dealing with human beings, not research statistics.
My final worry about the report centres on the argument of the CBI on page 19, which is accepted by the committee in paragraph 53. It is to the effect that in the absence of hard evidence and reliable research, it follows that a directive is not warranted. I do not believe that that does follow. It is one of those plausible arguments which is too readily accepted in this country where potential environmental health hazards are embraced until proved to be detrimental. As I argued in last week's debate, these decisions are political ones to take. They go wider than the scientific case. I hope I am not being unfair in pointing out also how often the argument about costs to industry seems to come out on the winning side, and how seldom the consumer is given the benefit of the doubt. But doubt there is. It is simply not the case, as I have tried to show, that
"The scientific consensus from people who have a disinterested concern…has consistently said"
that VDU's are safe. I am quoting from evidence on page 42.
There is no time to go into why the evidence from environmental medicine is disregarded by mainstream medical science. It has to do, I think, with the emergence of a new paradigm in the understanding of health, and the two-generation timelag before new ideas gain acceptance. Historically, the pattern is familiar, but the consequences for the sick are unfortunate.
I find this a most interesting report, but I conclude by urging those who take the decisions to look as widely as possible for their evidence and to use science as their servant and not as their master in formulating policies that affect our health.
8.5 p.m.
Baroness Turner of Camden: My Lords, I wish I were able to welcome the report of the Select Committee on visual display units. I am afraid I cannot do so. I had hoped that the committee would recommend support for the European directive. As we have heard, it has not done so, despite the evidence it received and despite some of its own conclusions.
Over the past decade and a half, the number of VDUs in use has increased very substantially, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Allen, when introducing the report. In 1985 it was estimated that around 2 million VDUs were in use in Britain. The number is now much greater. There is no doubt at all, as the committee itself says, that the widespread use of VDUs has significantly altered the work pattern of office based employees. During this time, the number of complaints of health problems by office workers has increased. I know that from my own experience as a trade union official for many years in a white collar union. Twenty years ago, those who sought union assistance on health and safety questions were almost all in manufacturing industry, or else working in laboratories. Now that has changed and there are significant numbers of complaints from office workers, mainly women. Many of these complaints are associated with VDU work.
The committee agrees that there is widespread concern about the possible effect of VDUs on the health of workers. I can myself attest to that. In my own union, the Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union—I was formally an official of ASTMS, one of the founding unions of MSF—about 40 per cent. of our 650,000 members work in offices. It has been our experience that many employers have introduced VDUs with little or no consideration for the workers involved. Often the VDUs have simply appeared on the premises. Employees often get worried and upset when this happens.
As a result of our research, and also that of other organisations, including trade union international organisations, it would appear that there are five main categories of possible hazard associated with VDUs and five main categories of possible injury. There are the repetitive strain injuries, known as RSI, then there is musculoskeletal strain, stress, skin rashes, eye disorders and also possible reproductive hazards. All these conditions are specifically referred to in the report. All are covered to some extent by the directive.
The committee itself apparently believes that there is a link between these conditions and VDU work. As regards repetitive strain injuries, the committee says that there is little doubt that these are associated with work on VDUs. However, the committee believes that most problems can be resolved by good office management. That is fine, but in many cases there is not good office management. Where that is the case, injuries will tend to continue and even increase.
In offices where there is not good management, and also where trade union organisation is weak or nonexistent, employees will tend to make light of this condition for fear of losing employment, thus making things worse for themselves and rendering evidence
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more difficult to come by. The committee says that more should be done to ensure that guidelines on the use of VDUs are met. The noble Lord, Lord Allen, made reference to the very good guidelines which exist. But again there is no compulsion, and thus nothing is likely to be done.
One cannot emphasise too often that a good employer will do the right thing without rules or a directive. The rules and directives are required for the bad employer of whom numbers still exist, particularly in areas where there is high unemployment and where there is competition for the available jobs.
Musculoskeletal disorders produce pain in the back, neck and shoulder and also sometimes in wrists, hands and legs. That is another condition associated with VDU work. The greater the length of time spent on intensive VDU work without rest or pauses, the greater the risk of developing that type of disorder. That can be prevented by limiting the length of time spent on VDU work each working day, redesigning jobs to include a variety of tasks and ensuring that VDU work stations are ergonomically designed. Those matters are covered by the Commission directive. However, again the Committee believes that good management is the solution. Of course it is. Again I emphasise that one does not find good management everywhere.
The same recommendation is made in relation to stress. It is acknowledged that there is probably less stress if the operator has control over his or her workload. The Committee accepts that some employers could do more to ensure that operators have occasional breaks. But, again, no compulsion on employers is recommended. Again the Committee seems content to rely on exhortation and goodwill.
Moreover, there is also evidence that operators suffer from skin problems more frequently than office workers not doing VDU work. I have noted from time to time that women's magazines carry letters from readers complaining about the condition, and asking what they should do. The recommendations usually relate to maintenance of appropriate humidity levels and prevention of excessive temperatures. A Swedish study undertaken in 1988 compared skin diseases among VDU operators with other non-VDU office workers. It appeared that there was a higher degree of skin soreness and other forms of dermatitis among VDU operators than among other workers. That point has already been referred to in the speech made be the noble Earl, Lord Baldwin of Bewdley.
Reproductive hazards have long been of concern. There is a great deal of controversy surrounding the possible association between VDU work and adverse reproductive outcome—miscarriages and foetal damage. It is admitted that scientific studies have been rather limited and the results not clear. Quite obviously, more work needs to be done in that area. Meantime, it seems right that women who are or are trying to become pregnant should be able to transfer to non-VDU work if they wish to do so. Certainly my own union has negotiated such arrangements with a number of employers.
As for eye disorders, the Committee itself says that it believes that there is an association between eye

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complaints and VDU use, and that there is a case for routine testing of people who experience difficulties with VDUs. However, paragraph 47 of the report says that it is not felt that there is a case for insisting that all employers should meet the cost of special glasses required by an employee for VDU work. Again, many good employers do so already. Why should not the bad employers come up to the level of the good? If glasses are needed to do the employer's work, why should he not bear the cost?
The directive itself is a very moderate document. Its purpose is the laudable one of protecting the safety and health of workers. It specifies that employers shall be obliged to perform an analysis of work stations in order to evaluate safety and health risks and should take remedial measures where necessary. It stipulates that there should be adequate training of workers, and adequate information—something very lacking where there is not good office management. It provides for the consultation of workers or their representatives. It specifies that there should be appropriate eye examinations, and that workers should be provided with special glasses, if an examination reveals that they are required. I noted what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Allen, in presenting the report, with regard to translations; but I am sure that problem can be sorted out.
Those are very moderate measures indeed. As I have already said, most good employers would find no difficulty at all in complying with them. The very valid point is made by the Commission that safety measures in the long term are of benefit to employers since they tend to reduce the amount of time lost by employees. Why should good employers who already do the right thing suffer competition from bad employers who simply save on safety measures instead of spending money to ensure the health and safety of their employees?
I do not think that it is adequate to say that the public concern, which admittedly exists, can be met by explanation and by the recommendations of the report. That is sufficient where good office management exists; but what of those situations where it does not?
Nor is a code of practice adequate. That is also made clear in the report. It is clear that a code would not meet the requirements of the directive. It would appear to be the directive or nothing. Therefore the committee should have recommended support for this very moderate directive. Failure to do so will not allay public concern—quite the reverse. Because the committee has not recommended support for the directive, I cannot commend the report to your Lordships' House.
8.15 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Social Security (Lord Skelmersdale): My Lords, I have listened with much interest to the helpful and constructive points made by noble Lords during the course of this important debate. When we started I thought that unanimity would break out in the Chamber, but clearly that was not to be.
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Your Lordships' Select Committee on the European Communities has produced a detailed and incisive report on the European Commission's proposal for a directive on VDUs. As the noble Lord, Lord Allen, has said, the VDU proposal is one of six proposals for workplace health and safety directives. They are part of the programme to establish minimum standards of health and safety at work under Article 118A of the treaty. There is growing recognition that it is important that competition in the single market is not distorted by differences in health and safety standards with which employers in different member states are required to comply. If those differences are not redressed, industry in the United Kingdom—where health and safety standards are high—could be at a disadvantage with our competitors.
The new treaty provision in Article 118A provides specifically for Community measures on health and safety at work reflecting the belief that a truly common market needs to ensure comparable, high standards of health and safety for all its workers. The Government support that belief.
However, as I made clear in answer to a parliamentary Question from my noble friend Lord Oxfuird yesterday, we are particularly conscious of the importance of not imposing unnecessary burdens on industry, particularly small businesses. I am glad to say that the United Kingdom secured this as a specific requirement in Article 118A. We are doing our utmost to ensure that it is fully respected. But we are not seeking exemptions from the requirements for small businesses. Rather, we are looking for provisions that are flexible and sensible enough to be applied in all workplaces as appropriate, and which avoid unnecessary administration and cost burdens. Against that background I agree with the comment on page 5 of the Select Committee's report that the draft directive on VDUs warrants closer investigation, and I am very glad that we are debating it this evening.
The stated aim of the directive is to lay down minimum safety and health requirements to protect VDU workers. It would require member states to take all necessary measures to ensure that VDU work cannot compromise the safety and health of workers. It would require employers to analyse VDU work stations to evaluate safety and health risks. New work stations put into service two years after the directive comes into force would be required to comply with the minimum standards set out in the annex to the directive. These mainly concern the ergonomic design features of the VDU display and keyboard, and of the work station—desks, chairs and ancillary equipment such as lighting. Employers would be required to adapt existing work stations so far as is reasonably possible to comply with those minimum standards.
All workers would be given adequate training before starting work with VDUs and at regular intervals thereafter. They would also have to be given health and safety information. Eye examinations would be a requirement for all workers before starting VDU work, with special glasses being provided if the eye test showed this necessary. Employers would be required to consult their

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employees or their representatives about the measures to comply with the directive.
The proposal covers an area of public interest. It is estimated that some 3 million people curently use VDUs, and the number is steadily rising, while many more of us benefit from the greater efficiency which they bring. Technology is advancing—for example, in the design of new portable machines and laser technology.
It is important that the approach we adopt, while ensuring adequate attention to possible health and safety levels, does not inhibit desirable advances in design. I took careful note of the remarks of the noble Earl, Lord Baldwin of Bewdley, in that respect, because I have been responsible in the past for many of the subjects he touched upon.
We do not in the United Kingdom at present have legislation requiring specific health or safety precautions for users of VDUs, but employers' general duties are laid down in the Health and Safety at Work Act to ensure—so far as is reasonably practicable—the health, safety and welfare at work of all employees. As the House will know, the Act enables enforcing authorities to take action if a situation arises in which VDUs are causing a serious hazard. In addition, the Health and Safety Executive—for which I was glad to hear the full approval of the noble Lord, Lord Hunter of Newington, both with respect to its understanding and to its ability and practice of acting when necessary—has issued guidance on VDUs including a useful free booklet. Over a million copies have been distributed. I have arranged for copies to be made available in the Printed Paper Office of your Lordships' House.
In addition, the Health and Safety Executive is encouraging trade unions and the CBI to undertake proper education of workers on the realities of work with VDUs. The Government certainly support this process of disseminating sensible information. These arrangements amount to a flexible approach for providing information about possible risks and how to deal with them.
It would be possible to make regulations under the Health and Safety at Work Act relating specifically to VDUs and such regulations would probably be required if the directive goes through, but the view of the Executive and the Commission, with which the Government agree, has been that this is neither necessary nor appropriate. Your Lordships' Select Committee considers that the scientific evidence of major health hazards is weak and I believe it is too tenuous to justify more rigid requirements in an area where technological change makes flexibility essential.
Part of my work in the Department of Social Security takes me into headquarters buildings—I have now completed my second tour—where our staff, especially in the clerical grades, make great use of VDUs. I frequently stop and talk to officials using this equipment and inquire as to headaches, backaches and the like. Only last week I was in a general office where I was told that headaches did not persist after the operative had got used to the equipment, and it was particularly interesting to be
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told that in the office in question only half of the officials wanted improved lighting. As a result prismatic lights are to be installed in the next few weeks in one end of that particular room. I believe that this is the right approach—flexibility is the name of the game. This directive is far too prescriptive.
We warmly endorse the Select Committee's main conclusion that there is inadequate justification for the directive. We share the view that most of the problems, such as musculoskeletal disorders and stress, that can be associated with VDUs—I do not think that there is any argument between us about that—can be prevented by good management and work organisation, with effective information and training. This can best be achieved by our continuing to provide accurate information and encouraging employers.
Why did the European Commission decide that a directive on VDUs was necessary in the first place? That is indeed a very good question and the answer is far from self-apparent. The European Commission in evidence to your Lordships' Select Committee said that the directive was a response to the vast volume of concern about work with VDUs although there was little hard evidence of serious health risks. The Government feel that public concern is not in itself sufficient justification for a directive. I appreciate that what I have just said is anathema to the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, but I hope that she will follow my next few words very carefully indeed.
This begs a very important question which the noble Lord, Lord Allen, very nearly asked: why is it necessary to introduce such a measure at a time when work is well advanced in international standards-making bodies—the International Standards Organisation and its European equivalent (CEN)—on a new international standard for ergonomic aspects of VDUs in offices? These standards will cover much the same ground as the directive, but in greater detail and with more countries participating. I should add that the United Kingdom is both chairman and secretary of the relevant sub-committee of the International Standards Organisation through the British Standards Institute. We are therefore well placed to contribute to the discussion. The Government welcome the Select Committee's recommendation that the Community should await the publication of the ISO and CEN work before deciding whether there are grounds for a Community measure.
That is essential to the Government's support of the Select Committee report. I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Allen, that the ISO work is a set of multi-part standards covering screens, keyboards, lighting and so on, to some of which I have already referred. Some of these are very well advanced as draft international standards. Others will become draft proposals this year. It is probable that voting upon them in CEN will occur at the same time as in ISO in the next year or so, therefore it is hoped we shall probably know the results in 15 or 18 months' time.
I also endorse the view of the noble Lord, Lord Hunter, that the Commission and the Council of Ministers should be properly advised by experts. That point has been made regularly over the past eight years when I have been listening—and

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sometimes responding—to reports and comments from Members of your Lordships' Select Committee on the European Communities. I hope that the latter—namely, the Council of Ministers—is properly advised by its own national networks, including in our case of course the experts in your Lordships' House.
Sometimes the scientific and technical advice of the Commission leaves a certain amount to be desired and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunter, on that point.
It would be most unwelcome to industry if the directive was implemented in its present form. There would be substantial costs in modifying equipment and implementing additional measures such as eye tests. The directive would constrain the development and use of new kinds of equipment. Article 10 provides for the annex (which contains the detailed requirements for VDUs and work stations) to be adapted to technical progress, but the Government share the Select Committee's view that this process may have drawbacks.
In dealing with the details of the directive I propose to concentrate on Articles 5 and 6 and the annex which set out the requirements, and Article 9 which deals with eye tests.
Whether or not Articles 5 and 6 are acceptable will depend largely on the content of the annex. This would require all VDUs to have a separate keyboard and so prevent the use of many portable computers and other equipment. Requirements for work desks, document holders and position of VDUs would be costly and perhaps impossible to meet in some situations, such as where VDUs are built into specialised work stations.
The directive is also too wide in scope. It would apply to all work with VDUs however intermittent or occasional and to many kinds of equipment not commonly thought of as a VDU; for example, pocket calculators.
A good deal of concern has already been expressed about the requirement in Article 9 for workers to have eye tests which would be costly for employers. There is no scientific justification for pre-employment eye testing. Workers with existing eye defects are not especially likely to suffer eye problems when using a VDU. Eye problems from VDU work are caused by fatigue; the structure of the eye is not affected. VDUs do not place greater demands on the eyes than other office work. People who wear bifocals may need special glasses for VDU work, but such problems are best dealt with individually as they arise.
Nonetheless, I note your Lordships' view that there is a case for routine eye testing for people who experience difficulty working with VDUs. The Health and Safety Executive will of course want to consider this and I shall undertake that it shall do so. If eye tests are necessary, Britain has a comprehensive network of High Street opticians that employers could use. They have no need to set up their own testing facilities. I am advised that under the directive, as the Committee believe it to be drafted, the cost to industry would be some £13 million a year.
I spoke those words advisedly because I took the point that the noble Lord, Lord Allen, made about
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the mistranslation from the French. On behalf of the Government, I very much regret this unfortunate occurrence. Regrettably, with nine official languages in the European Community, mistranslations sometimes occur. Our officials take every opportunity, and will continue to do so, to impress upon the European Commission the importance of getting those documents correctly and properly translated.
It is perhaps understandable that there has been interest in the possible health hazards of VDUs. Many workers have had their working routines profoundly changed by computers and other aspects of new technology. Naturally some people will experience feelings of concern and will focus these on the equipment itself. VDUs are a case in point.
There have been allegations that VDUs cause miscarriages and other pregnancy problems but there is no substantive evidence that any such hazards actually exist. The Health and Safety Executive is, however, investigating this and two other health-related matters in the context of VDUs, as the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, knows. Nonetheless there is no substantive evidence as yet that any such hazards exist. This is the Government's view. The Government therefore welcome the Select Committee's recommendation that employers and trade unions should make every effort to educate and inform people about the realities of using this equipment. The Health and Safety Executive will continue its own efforts to do so.
In conclusion, the Government agree with the recommendations of your Lordships' committee that there is inadequate justification for the directive. We shall attempt to win support for our view in negotiations in the European Community.
I apologise that I have spoken rather longer than the average length of speech in this debate. I am extremely grateful on behalf of the Government that through the good functioning and workings of the House we have been able to contain this debate within our allotted time.
8.31 p.m.
Lord Allen of Abbeydale: My Lords, we have had a most interesting short debate. My experience suggests that it would have been disquieting if we had managed to produce a report which received unanimous approval. That would indeed give grave cause for suspicion. I listened with careful attention to what the noble Earl, Lord Baldwin of Bewdley, said. I should like to study in Hansard in more detail his very interesting remarks. He seemed to me to pick with unerring exactitude some of the evidence given to us which caused us some disquiet. I am always suspicious of a sentence that misuses the word "hopefully". The example that he chose was one that made us scratch our heads when we heard it.
On the interesting speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Turner of Camden—I resist the temptation to call her my friend!—I venture to suggest that perhaps she underrates the problems of enforcement, of ensuring that one has good office management by regulation. I also take the point that the TUC evidence—which did not reach the heights of

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eloquence that her speech reached tonight—did not altogether coincide in its conclusions with the views that she so clearly put to us today. I am comforted with the thought that the next time we are debating a report from Sub-Committee C we are likely to have the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, speaking in support of the report as she has now been good enough to join the sub-committee.
In general, I find myself in agreement with the Government. That is not a universal experience for me. I am grateful for the information that the Minister has been able to give us. I should like to rub in the point that he made: that in our report we are not slamming the door and saying that everything is perfectly all right, and that nothing needs to be done. There are various inquiries going on. In particular, we have these international discussions. We shall all have to consider the subject again when we have the result of those discussions.
I should like to thank those who have taken part in the debate. I commend the report to the House.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Viscount Long: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until 8.40.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
[The Sitting was suspended from 8.34 to 8.40 p.m.]

Children Bill [H.L.]
Consideration of amendments on Report resumed on Clause 26.
Lord Mishcon Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 80:
Page 21, line 29, at end insert—
("or
(c) adjourning the hearing for a specified period of time to permit a programme of rehabilitation and giving directions for its implementation if the court thinks fit.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the House will remember that there was some discussion at Committee stage in relation to the court being given a specific power to adjourn a hearing for a specified period to admit a programme of rehabilitation, and to be able to give directions for its implementation if the court thought fit. It was felt on that occasion that there was a strong case for seeing whether the court could be given sufficient power to grant a specific adjournment in order to see whether the whole process under the Bill could be avoided when it was a fairly extreme process with a discussion about rehabilitation with a report back to the court.
The noble and learned Lord, while graciously receiving the spirit of this, took the view—though I did not think that it was strong enough to deter me from my objective—that it might lead to obligatory adjournments and consequent delay in the Bill when the whole ethos of the Bill for very good reason was to speed up procedures and to provide proper timetabling, and so on.
Nobody intended that these adjournments should be long or that they should be obligatory. The whole purpose was to provide the court with the discretion to order an adjournment for a specific reason. Obviously, no court would order that unless it was satisfied that there was evidence of a prospect of success. If there was any other provision in the Bill which specifically enabled a court to try to see whether rehabilitation would not work, one would not mind. One could say that it was referred to vaguely in another part of the Bill and the court has an obvious right to do it. However, there is no such provision. While orders for access under Clause 29 may be made within the context of a rehabilitation plan, there is no provision for orders to be made about placement, for example, residential establishments or specific directions such as psychiatric assessments, or attendance at a clinic or a family centre.
The noble and learned Lord had one other point which he put very clearly to the Committee on that occasion as he could not support the amendment. He felt that giving the courts direction-making power ran counter to the philosophy behind the Bill, which was that case-management was a matter for local authorities and not the courts. One quite understands that and we were not proposing an amendment giving the courts wider powers. We felt that what the noble and learned Lord was worried about would be if the court could review decisions once a child was in care. We were aiming to see whether, in the court's wisdom, an adjournment could avoid a child being placed in care.
It seems that not a scrap of harm could be done by the acceptance of this. Nobody believes that a court will behave foolishly or cause long delays as a result. It could do good in the right cases. Any machinery which leads with wisdom and kindness to seeing that a care order is not made, or that rehabilitation takes place, must be an advantage and not a disadvantage. It is in that spirit that I move the amendment.
8.45 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, the effect of the proposal would be to allow the court in care proceedings to make a new kind of order—an "adjournment order"—when an application for an order is made. I have some difficulty with this point. As I explained previously in Committee, the rules of court will provide for adjournments and we do not think that their use should be encouraged unless they are necessary for the case to proceed. Adjournments contribute to delays, which we are anxious to keep to the minimum, and I would not wish to introduce a provision which runs counter to this.
When we last debated the subject, concern was expressed that a court might feel obliged to make a care order in situations where they felt it would not be appropriate for the child to return home immediately after several months in interim care. It was suggested that an adjournment which would allow the court to give directions for a programme of rehabilitation would give the courts a useful alternative. However, this would go against our committed principle that management of cases is a matter for the local authority not the courts. The

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function of the courts is to make decisions on the matters which are brought before it, but it is the local authority which has continuing responsibility placed on it by statute for developing and executing plans to promote the welfare of the children concerned. Further, courts are not sufficiently knowledgeable about the availability of local authority resources which might need to be deployed, nor are they responsible or accountable for them. I do not therefore think the proposal in the amendment would be appropriate.
Further, I do not think it should be necessary in view of the changes we are proposing in the Bill. I have already mentioned the power that will be contained in the rules to adjourn. We have included provisions in Clause 33 to restrict the length of interim orders. This and other measures aimed at reducing delays mean that children should not be in interim care for long periods before the case is determined at a final hearing.
The court will under the Bill have an increased choice of orders it can make. In fact, under Clause 1 the care court will be obliged to have regard to the range of powers available to it and will be subject to the duty not to make an order unless to do so would be better for the child than making no order at all. For example, before the case is finally disposed of, it would he possible to make a residence order in favour of the parents together with an interim supervision order under Clause 35(3). Similarly, at the full hearing the court may conclude that a supervision order might be more appropriate. The changes in the Bill introduce a more effective form of supervision than is currently available. The court can make requirements on the parents, and the powers of the supervisor have also been improved. This should increase the usefulness of supervision as an alternative to care.
However if the court decides to make a care order it can use the very wide powers regarding contact which the Bill introduces to ensure that close links are maintained between the child and his family—so long as this is in the child's interests. At present courts can consider matters of access only if access has been refused or terminated. Clause 29 of the Bill includes a presumption of reasonable contact with the parents and others and the court will have powers to make orders as to contact and to impose conditions that it thinks appropriate. Before making a care order the court will be called upon to consider the arrangements proposed by the local authority for contact, so this will always be a matter which the court will be required to examine carefully.
The Bill will also introduce new provisions aimed at requiring local authorities to focus more clearly on returning children home than they are required to at present. Paragraph 13 of Schedule 2 places a new duty on the local authority to promote and maintain contact between the child and his family. We shall also be requiring the local authority when applying for an order to give the court a statement of its general plan for the child. As I explained when we debated this subject in Committee, that will be provided for in rules of court.
In the debate in Committee reference was also made to a proposal which would allow the court to
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discharge a care order and order a return to the family over a fixed period. That is sometimes referred to as "phased rehabilitation" and will also be covered. We do not believe that this would be practicable. Local authorities and others need to be clear what their respective legal powers and responsibilities are. Following the discharge of a care order, the order of a mandatory period for rehabilitation work would leave the position of the respective parties unclear. There would, of course, be no difficulty about this being done on a voluntary basis and indeed preparing a child for his return home, including frequent contact visits, should be a normal prelude to the discharge of a care order.
I believe that within the structure required by the Bill it is important to maintain the distinction between the responsibility of the court to decide issues which come before it and the responsibility of the local authority for the continuing management of the child. I understand why the amendment was proposed and we have thought about the matter carefully. However, we conclude that it would not be an appropriate addition to the Bill having regard to the considerations that I have outlined.
Lord Dormand of Easington: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord is saying that the rules of court permit such instances to take place. Can he tell the House how often they happen in practice? I understand that the amendment places more importance on the fact that such events should occur before that which is proposed in the two previous paragaphs.
If the spirit of the amendment is to be carried through more needs to be done than the court at present makes provision for. I speak as a non-legal man but I believe that this is an important aspect of the proposal now before the House.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, although the noble Lord may not be a legal man, I know that he has a great deal of experience relating to children of a variety of ages. The court has the power to grant an adjournment if necessary. I find inconsistent with the principles that we have adopted the idea that in some way the court should be in charge of the rehabilitation programme. The purpose of the amendment is that a programme of rehabilitation should be carried out. As regards rehabilitation and so forth, the local authority has responsibility for the management of the case. Therefore it is not appropriate for the court to say to the local authority, "This is what you must do", and give directions for it. The local authority has that responsibility. To try to put it on the court confuses the responsibility and the allocation of it.
The court must decide, for example, whether a care order should be made. It is a precise question and the conditions are clearly set out in the Bill. The court must say yes or no to that. We believe that there is a danger in giving the court the lesser option; namely, to direct the local authority to do something less than take responsibility for the care of the child.
In so far as adjournment is within the conception or principle of the Bill the court has the power to order that under the rules. However, the purpose of

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the amendment is to put the court in charge of a programme of rehabilitation and it is inconsistent with that. If the local authority wants a programme of rehabilitation it has plenty of powers to achieve it. There is no point in involving the court. The local authority has responsibility for that as allocated by the law. There is no point in involving the court, which has responsibilities to say yes or no to applications made to it.
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, it is with a little sadness that I reply to the noble and learned Lord. At the same time I should like to thank him for the obvious care which he has taken in order to let the House know his position on the matter.
I had hoped that the noble and learned Lord had allowed in his contemplation the flexibility about which he has often spoken—and correctly so—in regard to the Bill. He wanted to have flexibility and coverage for all kinds of circumstances. He wanted to ensure that, in regard to children, people do not act like machines.
By the reasoning of the noble and learned Lord I believe that the court is bound to act as a rubber stamp. The judge will say, "Do I have enough evidence before me to say that a care order must be made? If I have, I make the care order even though I think that, because of my contemplation of the evidence, there is a chance of rehabilitation. But the local authority does not take that view. Before I make the care order I should like to have a short adjournment to see whether what I have in my mind is not possible".
In spite of wanting flexibility the noble and learned Lord has cut out that possibility. It is not for the court but for the local authority, which, presumably, must adopt an infallibility exercise and character. For those reasons it was with sorrow that I heard what the noble and learned Lord said. I believe that the amendment acts within the spirit of the flexibility of which he spoke and with the respect that I know he has for the judges and magistrates who may be dealing with the matters.
I can carry the argument no further. The armour of the noble and learned Lord appears to be impregnable on the matter. In those circumstances, but with great regret, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
9 p.m.
Lord Prys-Davies Lord Prys-Davies moved Amendment No. 81:
Page 21, line 30, at beginning insert ("Subject to its duties under section I of this Act,").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, a number of amendments were moved in Committee in order to reinstate the White Paper grounds for care. Therefore the Clause 26 grounds for care would include the provision that the order is the most effective means available to the court for safeguarding the child's welfare.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor reminded the Committee that, by virtue of Clause 1, the court, when considering a care application, was
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also under a duty to give paramount consideration to the child's welfare, to have regard to the range of powers available to it and to make such an order only if it considered that to do so would be better for the child than making no order at all.
The noble and learned Lord has been most reluctant to accept cross-referencing in this Bill and has defended the elegance of its structure. We appreciate by now, if we did not on the first Committee day, that the Bill must be read as a whole. Nevertheless, in practice this Bill will not be read as a whole. The Government can issue guidance and there may be training programmes which can be initiated. However, the fact remains that over the next few years, if not the next decade or two, social workers and non-legal people in the child care service will look up the care and supervision orders in the contents section of the Bill and will then turn to Clause 26 for the grounds of care, without realising that Clause 1 is also relevant.
I believe that I have travelled on this road more than once in Committee and before the House. This amendment has been moved to ensure that within the Bill, and particularly in this clause, there is an essential piece of signposting. As I said, we know that Clauses 1 and 26 should be read together but the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that everybody else knows that. I beg to move.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, in moving this amendment the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, explained that, having been together with this Bill for some considerable time, we understand its structure and that the welfare requirements placed on the courts by Clause 1 apply in full to all orders which the court makes about children. The introductory words to subsections (1) and (4) make that perfectly clear while subsection (3)(b) applies the check-list in subsection (2) to those proceedings. Therefore, that brings the whole machinery of Clause 1 into the care jurisdiction.
This is a question of judgment but I believe that we cannot underestimate the importance of Clause 1. I believe that it would be unwise to assume that we should encourage people to think that they can read this Bill starting in the middle. I have already undertaken to my noble friend Lord Mottistone to see whether we can put something in to Part I to go forward to the local authorities' duties. I have not yet been able to see exactly how that might be done but I have agreed to consider it. However, this is going in the other direction.
This is a drafting matter. Having taken the best advice I can about it, I have reached the conclusion that we have provided for the correct relationship between Clause 1 and this clause and that the proposed amendment is unnecessary. While I know that the noble Lord has cogently advocated the opposite point of view, nevertheless he may feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Prys-Davies: My Lords, I am rather disappointed in the response of the noble and learned Lord, but I am not surprised. At least the response makes for consistency. That has been the line adopted throughout by the noble and learned Lord

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and it preserves the elegance of the Bill. However, in the circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn
9 p.m.
Lord Banks moved Amendment No. 82:
Page 21, line 37, leave out ("the parent of a similar child to give to him") and insert ("a parent in similar circumstances to give a child of similar age, ability, temperament and need").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a further attempt to improve the grounds for care stated in Clause 26(2) of the Bill. As the Bill is drafted, the court is required to assess,
"the standard of care … which it would be reasonable to expect the parent of a similar child to give".
That wording is open to the criticism that it requires the court to make a subjective decision as to what is reasonable for the parent of a similar child. For example, there is a risk that the court will apply to a family in deprived circumstances the parental standards of the middle class, though such standards are not universally practised. The amendment requires the court to focus on the circumstances of the parent and on the nature and characteristics of the child and thus to compare like with like. I beg to move.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, this amendment operates on a most important provision. We have had considerable discussion about these matters. I believe that no fewer than three options have been suggested as to how to construct the last part of this clause, and we now have a fourth.
Perhaps I may try to analyse this problem. There are two concerns: one, that "similar child" lacks precision and is open to a range of meanings; and the other, not unrelated, that the phrase would not fix on particular qualities or attributes such as, to use the example I gave in Committee, a child with brittle bones. I agreed in Committee to consider what had been said and to discuss with the draftsman whether we could improve on "similar child" without complicating the matter. I am afraid that for the reason I touched on yesterday we have not been able to bring that to a conclusion. We shall do so as quickly as we can in the hope that the matter may be resolved before the Bill leaves this House.
The difficulty I have with the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Banks, is that it is too specific. It provides for "a parent in similar circumstances". I assume that that means in similar circumstances to the parent whose child is the subject of the care or supervision proceedings. Perhaps I may take an example. What if that parent were addicted to heroin or were so immature as not to be able to look after a child properly? Would those be appropriate bases for comparison? As for the child, the words in the amendment require all the characteristics to be taken into account, even though for a mentally disabled child "age", if that means natural age, may not be relevant. "Need" is presented as a distinctive characteristic but to some extent must be governed by the other three.
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I believe that it is important in this connection for the court to look at what a parent of a similar child could be expected to do. One is looking to try to get a yardstick for testing whether the parent in question has fallen short. If the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Banks, were accepted, I think the parent, with all that parent's disabilities or lack of qualification to look after the child properly, would have to be taken into account. What we really want to consider at this point is the definition of whether the parent really is able to give the standard of care which "a similar child" is entitled to expect. I took the example of a child with a special characteristic, say brittle bones. In such a case, is the parent in a position to give the kind of care which a child having that particular difficulty is entitled to expect?
Having looked at all these things and having considered this amendment as a fourth option, I am inclined to be confirmed in my initial view that the present phrase, "a similar child", may be the best that we can manage. It is the court that has to satisfy itself whether the conditions for a care or supervision order are met. There is something to be said for leaving it to the court to decide in each case what are the characteristics which "a similar child" needs to exhibit.
I am conscious that this is an extremely difficult and important question and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Banks, for bringing forward the further option. I hope the noble Lord will feel that we have fully considered this amendment. As I say, we are going to give further consideration still to this whole matter and I very much hope to be able to report to your Lordships at Third Reading what our concluded view is. I have no doubt that this part of the Bill will be very closely considered when the matter goes to the other place, but it would be good for us to reach a concluded view upon this important aspect of it.
Lord Banks: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for the answer he has given. It seems to be a question, in part at least, of whether we are thinking of a minimum standard of care which would apply to everyone or whether we are thinking of a degree of care which would depend on the circumstances of the parent. I am not quite clear which the noble and learned Lord has in mind but I am glad to know that the matter is to be considered further. In view of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 83 not moved.]
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 84:
Page 21, line 43, leave out ("separately or in any") and insert ("on its own or in any other").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is a simple amendment, consequential upon the inclusion of Part IV proceedings in family proceedings. The amendment has no substantive effect: it is a simply drafting amendment, and I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Mottistone Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 85:
Page 22, line 18, leave out ("or on behalf of a local authority") and insert ("the local authority except as a consequence of an order made under Part V").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I believe that in the debate we had on a somewhat similar amendment in Committee at cols. 361 and 362, my noble and learned friend and I were probably at cross purposes. I have endeavoured to put down another amendment which I think meets the point that he was perhaps implying.
Clause 26(6)(c) prevents an authorised person, which might be the NSPCC, from initiating care proceedings in respect of a child accommodated by a local authority. This follows no general principle as the society would still be able to take proceedings if the child were living at home, placed with relatives, in accommodation with another voluntary agency or in hospital. My noble and learned friend has argued that it would be inappropriate for the society to take proceedings if the child was in voluntary care or was an orphan. The society completely agrees with this view and would not initiate proceedings in those circumstances. However, the clause as presently drafted inhibits the society's ability to take independent action. Once an emergency protection order as been taken, the child may move to local authority accommodation.
Even where the society has acted as key worker, which in many cases it does, and has taken the emergency protection order, it would be prevented from carrying through the process where care orders seemed to be necessary. The society takes about 200 place of safety orders (which are to be replaced by emergency protection orders) each year, and approximately 120 of them result in care proceedings. Consultation takes place with the local authority before proceedings are taken.
The basis for the society, rather than the local authority, instituting proceedings is that the best interests of the child are met by such action. In the first place, it is more efficient since the society has the evidence, having taken the place of safety order. It is an essential part of the developing social work relationship between the society, the child and the family; and it is an essential part of the continued relationship with the child and the family. Many place of safety orders are taken in respect of children whom they already know and are working with.
In addition, this subsection would close down a real alternative to social services provision in circumstances where, for one reason for another, a service could not be provided, for example, during industrial action, though hopefully that would not happen, or—and this is much more likely—where the social services were overloaded and unable to allocate cases. One needs to remember that the social services look after us from cradle to grave; they do not only look after children, as the NSPCC does.
Therefore, it is important to realise that various social services operations cannot always cope with everything. As a result it provides an element of choice to child and family about the services available to them. There would be tragic implications if social services were unable to act and initiate proceedings in the appropriate circumstances. I hope that my noble
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and learned friend will be able, perhaps not to agree to this amendment but to come some way to making sure that the inhibitions currently presented by Clause 26(6)(c) are modified so that the NSPCC can continue to perform its services to the child public as it does currently. I beg to move.
Lady Kinloss: My Lords, if the NSPCC cannot take care proceedings, what happens to a child in circumstances where the local authority, for one reason or another, is unable to initiate proceedings? The child and his or her family would be left in limbo. Much of the emphasis of the Bill is on speeding up care proceedings in the court process. If neither of the two agencies is able to take care proceedings and act, where does that leave the child? This clause as drafted takes away an added safety net for the child.
9.15 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, as my noble friend has explained, this amendment would remove the restriction in Clause 26(6)(c) on authorised persons applying for a care or supervision order in respect of a child who is being provided with accommodation by a local authority in cases where the accommodation was being provided following an order made under Part V of the Bill. The present restriction is one of several restrictions in subsection (6) on such applications by authorised persons.
My noble friend has modified his original amendment at Committee stage to limit the relaxation he seeks to cases where the child is provided with local authority accommodation following execution of an emergency protection order. However, it would allow an authorised person to bring care or supervision proceedings in any emergency protection order case where the child had been provided with local authority accommodation, including cases where the local authority itself had obtained the order, or any other person had done so, including where the authority had taken over benefit of the order under regulations made under Clause 42(3).
I have difficulty in seeing that this would be appropriate. As I said in Committee, whenever it provides accommodation under the provisions of the Bill the authority will, by virtue of Clause 18(1) and 18(3), be under a duty to safeguard and promote the child's welfare and to make such use of services available for children cared for by their own families as it considers reasonable. Once the child has arrived in local authority accommodation, these particular duties devolve on the local authority in respect of the child.
Even more pertinently, it will be required by Schedule 2, at paragraph 6, to take steps designed to reduce the need to bring care or supervision proceedings. While the extent to which some of these responsibilities can be carried during the lifetime of an emergency protection order may be limited, the responsibility to find other ways of meeting the child's needs, short of taking care proceedings, will be very relevant. Relaxation of the restriction at subsection (6)(c) would allow authorised persons to cut across those responsibilities.

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I fully appreciate the experience and responsibility of the authorised person in question. However, as I said before, the provision for an arrangement under which one authority cuts across responsibilities of another is not likely to be very satisfactory. I do not believe that that is the way to promote co-operative working between authorities and agencies within the framework of clear responsibilities for the local authorities that we wish to see.
Where the NSPCC knows the family or it can contribute in other ways to decisions about the appropriate way of proceeding, the appropriate course is surely to co-operate with the authority rather than having the responsibility to initiate proceedings itself. I suggest that this is the answer to my noble friend's contention that subsection (6)(c), in limiting the power of authorised persons to bring care proceedings, does not follow any general principle. The principle is that when the local authority acquires responsibilities for the child by virtue of providing him with accommodation, those responsibilities should prevail over any other considerations.
Having said that, when a child is accommodated by a local authority it would always be open to the authority to enlist the help of the society in preparing a case, attending as witnesses or even, in appropriate cases, processing the case on behalf of the authority. However, if this did happen the local authority would remain responsible for the proceedings and action could be taken only in a manner authorised by the authority. This would reflect the authority's legal responsibility for the child.
The foundation for this is the placing of the child in accommodation, which triggers the local authority's responsibility. I hope I have said enough to convince my noble friend and the noble Lady that this way forward is not appropriate. Other ways are available on the lines that I have suggested in order to encourage the distinctive and extremely valuable contribution that the society makes and I am sure will continue to make for children in need.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, I am most interested in what my noble and learned friend has said. I believe that there is still a difference of approach here. I am advised that what the society is seeking is a continuation of the present arrangements that work very well when it works closely with local authorities. They share out the job to to speak. The society had detected in this part of the Bill that it will be unable to continue its smooth working in conjunction wth the social services departments of local authorities. That is what it believes.
I am arguing to continue the status quo. My noble and learned friend is seeking to pursue the line that the Bill is trying to take about the future. It may be that the future will be better. I believe that the society would question whether that will be so, because the continuation of a relationship with a child is so important. We cannot possibly conclude the matter this evening. I shall recommend to the society that it talks to my noble friend's advisers, if it may, to see whether there is some way through and that there is nothing lost by this under the new framework.
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Perhaps I may leave the matter at that point and withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Banks Lord Banks moved Amendment No. 86:
Page 22, line 37, after ("includes") insert ("neglect:).
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment brings forward an amendment that was not moved at Committee stage because a similar amendment was moved and later withdrawn by the noble Baroness, Lady David. The amendment seeks to add the word "neglect" as part of the definition of ill-treatment in Clause 26(8). If neglect is not in this part of the Bill there is a risk that courts will consider that Parliament has deliberately left it out, particularly as in contrast, neglect appears in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Bill as a category of suffering from which children should be protected.
At Committee stage the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor argued that not all neglect will result in harm. That may be right so far as it goes, but the introduction of the word "neglect" will not create a risk of children unnecessarily being ordered into care. The court will still have to find that significant harm has resulted. Under Clause 26, the court will still have a discretion whether or not to make a care order. Under Clause 1(4), the court will also have to consider whether there is any better option for the child. "Neglect" is a readily understood word and its inclusion will help the courts. I beg to move.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, we considered amendments similar to this in Committee and I explained then why I would not wish to see "harm" defined as including neglect. These arguments still hold, but there is an additional reason why I prefer to resist this amendment, in view of Amendments Nos. 70 and 129 to which I spoke a short while ago.
In moving Amendment No. 70 I explained why we considered it best to give local authorities a duty under paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to take steps to prevent children suffering ill-treatment or neglect. That is a preventive operation. It is perfectly reasonable that the children should be prevented from suffering neglect. The amendment now proposed would provide for the definition of "ill-treatment" to include neglect. This would clearly be inconsistent in terms of the framework of definitions within the Bill.
Clause 26(8) concerns the definition of "harm" in so far as it is one of the grounds for the making of a care order. It is right that local authorities should seek to prevent children suffering neglect but the provisions of Clause 26(8) are of a different order from those in paragraph 4 of the schedule. As "neglect" does not necessarily constitute actual harm, though it may well cause it, we should resist incorporating it into subsection (8). As I said in Committee, it is essential that in defining "'harm" we consider what actually has occurred to the child. Where neglect produced harm, that will be covered, and a care order will be possible because or by virtue of the harm. I do not think it wise to do any more than this though the notion of neglect as a factor in producing harm is embodied in Clause 26(2)(b).

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It is necessary to have a proper basis for the care order. That basis includes as the starting point the harm done to the child. That harm may be produced by neglect. Not all neglect produces harm. Therefore it is not right to have "neglect" in the definition. It is the "harm" that should be in the definition.
I hope that in the light of that explanation the noble Lord may feel that on this aspect we have it right although I see the concern that arises from
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seeing "neglect" referred to in the preventive part of the Bill. I hope I have made clear the distinction in context between the two.
Lord Banks: My Lords, once again I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation. Naturally I feel disappointed that he could not accept the amendment but I see the logic of his arguments. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Banks Lord Banks moved Amendment No. 87:
Page 23, line 3, at end insert—
("(2) "a care order" may—

(a) contain directions about how it is to be carried into effect: and

(b) make such incidental, supplemental and consequential provision as the court thinks fit.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment empowers the court on making a care order to give directions as to how it is to be carried into effect. It proposes a discretionary not a mandatory power to give such directions. The power of the court in wardship to give both short-term and long-term directions and guidance has been valued by local authorities and parents. Access to the wardship jurisdiction is curtailed by Clause 70. This amendment seeks to preserve the valuable power to give consequential directions and guidance hitherto exercised in wardship cases.
In Committee on 17th January the noble and learned Lord indicated at col. 117 of the Official Report that rules of court will require a local authority when applying for a care order to provide the court with details of its proposals for the child should the order be granted. If the amendment is agreed the court will be able to make a care order without necessarily endorsing every detail of the local authority's plans for the child. For example, the court can say that it agrees with the need for a court order but disagrees with the nature of the placement proposed for the child. The wording of the amendment must be impeccable. It is taken verbatim from Clause 10(8)(a) and (b) dealing with Section 7 orders. I beg to move.
9.30 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, the words of the amendment are indeed impeccable in another context, but I suggest that they are not appropriate in this matter. We touched on the question of court directions when considering Amendment No. 80 and I argued that the management of cases is a matter for the local authority, not the courts. The Review of Child Care Law puts this succinctly:
"One of our guiding principles has been that the court should be able to determine major issues such as the transfer of parental rights and duties where there is or may be a dispute between parents and local authorities, while the management of the case should be the responsibility of the local authority".
The expertise of a court lies in its ability to hear all sides of the case, to determine issues of fact and to make a firm decision on a particular issue at a particular time, in accordance with the applicable law. It cannot initiate action to provide for the child, nor can it deliver the services which may best serve the child's needs. Nor, except under the wardship jurisdiction, does it have parental responsibility for the child. Those powers and responsibilities must lie with the local authority.
The present power of the court in family proceedings when placing a child in local authority care to give directions as to provision for the child will be brought to an end to dispose of an anomaly in current practice between care and other proceedings. The court will have powers of direction when making
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emergency protection orders but those will be limited to two specific and potentially problematic issues—contact and medical examination—which the holder of the order, whose parental responsibility will be qualified, will not usually be well placed to settle.
When speaking in Committee to an amendment similar to the one we considered earlier—namely, Amendment No. 80—the noble Baroness, Lady David, said that legislation should provide that directions can be given by the court in all proceedings but that in the light of what was said in the White Paper she did not expect the Government to agree. I saw that as an understanding of the scheme in the Bill which, by dint of conferring parental responsibility and the specific welfare responsibilities in Clauses 18, 19, 20 and 22, places full responsibility for carrying orders into effect on the local authority. We attach importance to this principle, which is fundamental. Shared responsibility is a prescription for no proper responsibility at all and may well lead to the phenomenon of passing the responsibility which is so destructive to good administration.
Your Lordships may recall that I said in Committee in another context that we propose to introduce in rules of court a requirement that the local authority discloses to the court its proposals for the child. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Banks, has reminded us of that this evening. The purpose of that requirement is to enable the court to decide whether the making of a court order will be of benefit to the child. Unless it knows what will happen in a general way when it gives the child into the care of the local authority it will be hard for the court to exercise that jurisdiction properly. However, once it gives the care of the child to the local authority, then it is the local authority's responsibility.
I hope that I have explained sufficiently our position on the matter and that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord sits down, I wonder whether he again wishes to put the view that even if there be a transparent error, or misjudgment, in the proposed directions of the local authority, which the court may see, the court should have no power to intervene to vary what it may see as the local authority's intention with regard to the child. The court's function is care order or no care order and no further.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I am sure that the noble Lord appreciates that courts can often manage matters in a way which does not require formal power. I have no doubt that in discussion as to whether a care order should be made, the court would have a view about the proposals. It may well be that in the light of discussion in the court, amendment of the proposals will result. However, the responsibility for making the proposals and carrying them out must be that of the local authority.
If, for example, the court's view was that some other course of action for the child would be advisable, it must consider whether it could make some order for the child other than a care order.

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The principle that the local authority is responsible for the child's care is the vital principle of the Bill. In the type of case to which the noble Lord has referred, I have no doubt that the court could bring its influence to bear on the local authority's judgment, leading perhaps to improvement in its proposals for the child. It would still be the local authority's responsibility.
Lord Banks: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord feels that the power of the court in wardship to give short-term and long-term directions, to which I referred in my remarks, has been unsuccessful or unhelpful in any way or has worked against the welfare of the children. I know that he can say that the court has parental responsibility, and so it is not the same as other cases, but putting that point on one side, does he feel that the operation of the power has been such as to suggest that it should now be abolished?
I understand the principle that the noble and learned Lord is seeking to adopt; that there should be a clear division of responsibility, and one can see an argument for that. In view of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 28 [Effect of care order]:
[Amendments Nos. 88 to 90 not moved]
Clause 29 [Parental contact etc. with children in care]:
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy Lady Saltoun of Abernethy moved Amendment No. 91:
Page 24, line 15, after ("parents") insert ("and relatives").
The noble Lady said: My Lords, as I said in Committee when we were discussing Amendment No. 159B, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady David, I should like to see the degree of kinship contained in Clause 29(1)(a) widened to include relatives. For that reason, I prefer this amendment to Amendment No. 92 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady David, although I shall support her amendment if mine is rejected.
Not all children have grandparents, and many have no siblings. Where that is the case, more distant relatives often become close to the child. In Committee, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor pointed out that Schedule 2 paragraph 13(1)(c) which provides that:
"any other person connected with him"—
"him" being the child—covered grandparents, siblings and more distant relatives. The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, then queried why, if this was so, there were two different restrictions—one in a schedule and one on the face of the Bill.
I have since been advised that what is on the face of the Bill in Clause 29(1) is enforceable by the court, but what is in Schedule 2 paragraph 13(1)(c) is not. For that reason I have come back with this amendment. I think it is very important that the contact with close relatives, whoever they may be and whatever their relationship, should be legally
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enforceable. The real point is whether or not what is in the schedule is enforceable in court. I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor could clarify that point. I beg to move.
Baroness David: My Lords, I think Amendments Nos. 91 and 92 are linked and it might be convenient and save the time of the House if I spoke to them together.
Noble Lords may be rather surprised to find that I have put my name to both these amendments. First, I thought that I should be very happy to support the noble Lady's amendment on "relatives". Then I wondered whether perhaps it was spread rather wide since whoever is mentioned in Clause 29(1) could be allowed to try to make an application to the court. I thought that it was perhaps more likely that "grandparents" and "siblings" would be acceptable than the wider concept of "relatives". That is why my name appears on the Marshalled List as regards both these amendments.
I hope that having restricted the terms of the amendment to "grandparents" and "siblings"—rather closer relatives than might be envisaged in the wider term "relatives"—it would be more acceptable. I moved the same amendment at Committee stage and the noble and learned Lord said that under paragraph 13 of Schedule 2 the authority was already under a duty to promote contact with any person connected with the child. He said that that was a stronger duty than the one in Clause 29. The significant difference between paragraph 13 in Schedule 2 and Clause 29 was that the first referred to promoting contact and the second to allowing contact. With respect, surely the crucial difference is not between the words "promote" and "allow" but between the fact that the people listed in Clause 29(1) have a right to apply to a court for a contact order if the local authority refuses adequate access.
As in accordance with the provisions of Clause 26 children will only be under care orders because of harm attributable to the parents or because the parents cannot control them, it is clearly important that children have strong rights to contact with other members of their immediate family—that is, grandparents and siblings. The only way in which these rights can be secured is if there is an attached right to go to court if the local authority appears to be unreasonably refusing contact.
A view used to prevail that children in care in a permanent or what was hoped to be a permanent placement should not see members of their previous natural family. That led to children never seeing and often never knowing about the existence of brothers, sisters and grandparents. Much unnecessary heartbreak and loss was caused by that policy. Happily now the situation has changed. I think that everybody recognises that it is possible to have a new family without relinquishing contact with the old.
It seems to me that that is why the amendment is important. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will not think that "siblings" is going too far. There are often very wide differences in age between siblings—10, 12 or more years—and an older brother or sister may very easily be able to take a strong interest in a much younger child.
9.45 p.m.
Baroness Seear: My Lords, does this provision really have to be restricted to relatives? After all, one can think of a great many cases where, say, a previous schoolteacher, or a godparent who is not a relation but has a close and valuable relationship with the child, should be allowed contact. Does this really have to apply just to relations?
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, Amendment No. 91 is the amendment being moved. I shall try to deal with the various matters arising in connection with it.
The duty on local authorities to promote contact with children whom they look after is provided at paragraph 13 of Schedule 2, to which the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun of Abernethy, referred. This is a positive duty to endeavour to promote contact, so far as is reasonably practicable and consistent with the child's welfare, between the child, his parents, any other person with parental responsibility and any other person connected with him.
Relatives clearly fall within this latter category. The provision for contact with grandparents, brothers, sisters and other relatives is therefore quite plain, though I do not doubt that this will be made even clearer to those implementing these provisions through guidance, as the noble Baroness, Lady David, pointed out on that earlier occasion. The fact that relatives are not referred to in Clause 29 does not reduce the effect of the duty under Schedule 2. The purpose of Clause 29(1) is somewhat different. Although this has not been raised, perhaps I should try to explain that to show the relationship between these two things. I shall then come back to deal with the matters that are more directly raised.
That provision in Clause 29(1) is intended to give certain persons a presumption of reasonable contact on the making of a care order, and this presumption is limited, rightly I believe, to those persons who have parental responsibility or who did so before the care order was made. It would not be appropriate to enter relatives in such a list as they will generally not have parental responsibility. Where contact between them and the child is reasonably practicable and in the child's interests they will in any event be able to secure contact by virtue of paragraph 13, as I have said.
Clause 29(1) is intended to give a stronger right to the very immediate people. But paragraph 13 of Schedule 2 is much wider in the scope of persons covered. There would be another effect of these amendments, and that would be to permit any relative, or any grandparent or sibling, to apply for a contact order without leave of the court. At present such persons would require leave under Clause 29(3) to apply for a contact order. So my answer to the point about enforcement is that anyone covered by paragraph 13 of Schedule 2 can apply to the court for leave to seek an order in terms of the provision of Clause 29(3)(b).
The usual requirement of leave to apply for a contact order reflects the approach taken by the private law as recommended by the Law Commission. The case for consistency in the public law is strong. Leave is intended as a filter against
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unwarranted interference but will not inhibit relief from being granted in cases in which contact is in the child's interest. In all but the most exceptional cases we would expect the local authority's duty to be to promote contact to render court proceedings unnecessary.
That is the real purpose of paragraph 13. It sets out what local authorities are supposed to do. That is basically to promote contact so far as possible and so far as is reasonably practicable with all the people connected with the child, so the child's contacts and connections are disturbed as little as possible by the making of a care order. But if it comes to an enforcement it seems right, when one has such a wide circle as that, that leave should be provided.
As I have just said, leave is intended as a filter against unwarranted interference but will not inhibit relief from being granted in cases in which contact is in the child's interest. The court will be quite willing to grant leave in cases where there is any real interest in the child. Again, as I have said, in all but the most exceptional cases we would expect a local authority's duty to be to promote contact to render court proceedings unnecessary. Even where recourse to the court is required I believe that the need to obtain leave is a valuable safeguard for the child against unwarranted interference.
That leaves only the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear. In relation to a care order, an application can be made under Clause 29(2),
"by a person mentioned in subsection (3)".
On that application,
"the court may make an order requiring the authority to allow the applicant … such contact with the child as may be specified in the order".
The persons include,
"any person who has obtained the leave of the court to make the application".
I do not think that it would be expected that a teacher would be expressly mentioned in the paragraph but a teacher could well come within the scope of that provision.
There are also other possible methods of establishing a relationship with the child that might be covered. It is a very open provision: leave seems reasonable because one could not have anyone coming along. The necessity for leave gives the court the opportunity to scrutinise the credentials of the person seeking that leave. It is, I believe, a good arrangement.
In cases not involving a care order it would he necessary to apply for a contact order under Clause 7 of the Bill.
Lord Simon of Glaisdale: My Lords, I am quite sure that it is my fault, but after what my noble and learned friend has said I confess that I still have no idea what is the meaning of a "person connected with him". I wonder whether my noble and learned friend would consider whether that should not be defined either in the schedule or in the interpretation clause.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I am certainly willing to consider whether that should be further defined. I am sorry that my noble and learned friend

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is not clear about the matter after my exposition. The result seems to have been to introduce fog rather than clarity. My understanding of the matter is that "connection" includes relationship in any degree. However, I am willing to consider whether the matter should be considered further.
Lady Saltoun of Abernethy: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation. I am quite satisfied with it, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness David Baroness David had given notice of her intention to move Amendment No. 92:
Page 24, line 16, leave out from ("his") to the end of line 19 and insert—
("(c) where there was a residence order in force with respect to the child immediately before the care order was made, the person in whose favour the order was made; and
(d) his grandparents; and
(e) his siblings.").
The noble Baroness said: I should like to read what the noble and learned Lord has said, and for the moment I shall not move the amendment.
[Amendment No. 92 not moved.]
Clause 33 [Interim orders]:
Baroness David Baroness David moved Amendment No. 92A:
Page 29, line I, leave out subsection (8) and insert—
("(8) A direction under subsection (6) shall not affect any legal right the child had to refuse consent to the medical examination.").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, at Committee stage I moved an amendment along the same lines to ensure that courts are satisfied that the competent child consents to a medical examination before making an order for his or her examination as part of an interim care order. The noble and learned Lord agreed to bring forward an amendment to deal with that point and, similarly, in respect of medical examinations in emergency proceedings. Therefore, I did not speak at Committee stage to the amendment on emergency proceedings which was phrased along the lines of the amendment I am now moving. Any such court order would not affect any legal right of the child to refuse consent to the medical examination.
In the Committee stage debate I said that the effect of the Bill on doctors and young people was unclear. The reason I bring back the amendment before the noble and learned Lord has put down his own amendment is that it is now understood from Department of Health officials that a court order for medical examination will, as the Bill currently stands, affect children's existing rights to refuse consent to an examination.
These rights are, for 16 and 17 year-olds, the clear statutory rights under Section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 which reads:
"The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years to any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a trespass to his person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age; and where a minor has by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parent or guardian".
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For under-16s, the principles of the Gillick case obtain; that is, if the doctor is satisfied that the child has sufficient maturity to understand the implications of the proposed treatment or examination, the child may refuse consent.
It now appears that under the provisions of the Bill, although the court does not actually order doctors to conduct examinations and any individual doctor may refuse to carry one out, the court order will mean that a doctor who forcibly examines an unwilling young person, even a non-consenting 17 year-old, will not be guilty of trespass or assault.
This will surely put doctors in an extremely invidious position and could, for example, lead to social services holding lists of specific doctors who are happy to carry out forced examinations. More importantly, it is surely a totally unconstructive approach to the difficult issue of suspected child abuse. We have heard repeatedly in this House the central phrase of the Cleveland Report:
"the child is a person not an object of concern".
Surely that is a clear example of treating the child as an object.
The point of child abuse procedures should first and foremost be to protect the child and it cannot be in the child's interests to subject him or her to a forced examination. Where older children are concerned, they should be persuaded and not compelled. In Committee I spoke of strapping down children or knocking them out with sedatives, and that is what this provision could lead to.
Certainly, the Cleveland Report is quite clear on this issue. At paragraph 11.40 it states:
"One most important element must be the approach of the doctor examining any child, the consideration, kindness, explanation of the steps being taken. But in addition, with the older child of appropriate age and understanding his/her consent should also be obtained. According to Dr. Wynne, teenagers sometimes refuse, but usually come back on another occasion for the examination".
In advice from the standing Medical Advisory Committee, doctors are told:
"examination without consent may be held in law to be an assault … Depending on their age and understanding young children may also be regarded by a doctor as capable of giving consent to examination or treatment. In these circumstances it is the child's consent which is relevant".
The Home Office circular to chief officers of police on the investigation of child sexual abuse states that:
"a doctor should seek consent either from the child or a parent or guardian, where a child is not of sufficient age and understanding".
So, unless the principles of the amendment are accepted, we are witness to a backward step and some of the lessons hard-learned from the Cleveland affair will be thrown away. The wording of this amendment is hardly excessive. It does not define the existing rights of children to refuse consent. It does not ask the court or applicant to satisfy themselves as to the validity of consent. All it does is to ensure that the present relationship between doctors and young people is preserved.
Of course, in a number of cases, doctors will be satisfied that the young person does not have the capacity to refuse consent—for example, when the doctor is satisfied that the child has been coerced or terrorised by the abuser into refusing consent. However, where a young person has the age or

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understanding to refuse consent, then surely the right approach must be to persuade him or her to agree voluntarily to an examination, not to authorise a legal assault by the doctor.
I hope that the noble and learned Lord will reassure us that, if he cannot accept this amendment, an amendment along these lines will be forthcoming before the next stage of the Bill. I beg to move.
10 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, Clause 33(6) provides that where a court makes an interim care order or interim supervision order it may give such direction, if any, as it considers appropriate with regard to the medical or psychiatric examination of the child. Clause 33(8) provides that where an interim supervision order is made and the question of medical or psychiatric examination arises the court shall act under subsection (6) and as if paragraphs 2 and 5 of Schedule 3 were omitted from the schedule. These disapplied paragraphs provide that, among other things, no requirements as to medical or psychiatric examinations or treatment may be included in a supervision order unless the court is satisfied that the child, if of sufficient understanding, consents.
The amendment of the noble Baroness would delete subsection (8), the effect of which would be to reapply the provisions in paragraphs 2 to 5 of Schedule 3 because by virtue of Clause 26(10) a full order includes an interim order except where stated and puts in its place the statement about the child's right to refuse consent to a medical examination set out in the amendment.
The noble Baroness has put down a similar amendment in respect of court directions as to medical examinations where it makes an emergency protection order, on which I shall also comment if I may. The noble Baroness moved a similar amendment to Amendment No. 92A in Committee and questioned why the provisions of Schedule 3 do not apply in the Bill where interim care or supervision orders are made. I accepted that it was desirable to clarify this matter and undertook to consider it. Indeed, I thought that it would be possible to bring forward a government amendment to meet her point.
I also agreed, at the request of the noble Baroness, at Committee stage to look again at Amendment No. 196C about directions given when emergency protection orders are made, which is identical to the new Amendment No. 103A. I warned then—I believe that the noble Baroness was not present when I mentioned the matter when the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, moved the second amendment—that different considerations might lead to different outcomes between the two proposals. Having considered the matter further we find that if consistency on directions and consent is needed it should be between interim orders and emergency protection orders rather than between interim orders and supervision orders.
The circumstances of the emergency protection order and interim order will often be similar apart from the presence or absence of an emergency. The
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interim order is made to secure the child's welfare while inquiries are made by the local authority or authorised person and guardian ad liter to help the court decide what is the appropriate disposal for the child. Medical assessment or examination may be an important part of this process without which the needs of the child may not be fully established.
The same will often apply in emergency protection cases. If the child had an automatic right to prevent a medical examination the very necessary process of examination and assessment intended to help the court to establish what course of action was in the child's interest would be frustrated. It is not difficult to imagine cases where the child could be influenced to refuse consent against his interest either directly by an abusing parent or indirectly in the belief that he would get into trouble with his parents if he did not exercise a specific right to withhold consent. This would certainly be an unsatisfactory outcome.
As at present advised, we would be opposed to making the court powerless to order medical examinations in such cases. If the court is to have power to order that the child may be removed from his home in an emergency, or placed in care with effective parental responsibility transferred from the parents, it is surely not objectionable that the court should be able to order action designed to produce the right solution for the child, which order or direction can be made only in accordance with Clause 1.
That is not to say that the child should not be able to challenge a court direction or medical examination if he does not agree with it. The child who is subject to a medical examination direction would be able to apply for variation of a discharge of a direction if he is of sufficient understanding to apply. Furthermore, noble Lords will have noticed that Clause 33(7) specifically provides that a direction may be to the effect that there is to be no examination. In reaching such a decision the court will be able to take account of any views expressed by an older child.
As I have said before, the Government have tried hard to get the balance right when considering the need to take steps to protect children's welfare and the importance of recognising children's independence. We have borne in mind the real risks of embroiling children in disputes and of burdening them with individual decisions. These considerations are equally valid whether we are talking about the participation of children in decisions when their parents divorce or the medical examination of children under court orders. The approach we have taken in the Bill is to take the child's welfare as the paramount consideration.
I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady David, does not feel that I raised her hopes in Committee, only to dash them now, when I promised to clarify the position on consent. For the reasons I have outlined, we do not consider at present that it would be right to put into the Bill the specific provision in favour of the child for which she has asked. I hope that she will be prepared to accept this for the time being and not press her amendment.
This is a very difficult area. I am not entirely satisfied that we have reached the right answer yet.

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But it is a difficult area which I hope the noble Baroness will allow us to continue to consider.
Baroness David: My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for his reply. I cannot say that I am entirely satisfied. I am disappointed that he has not been able to find a compromise solution, but I shall read what he said very carefully. I certainly reserve the right to come back at the next stage because even he has admitted that it is a difficult area and that the right solution has possibly not been reached. However, for the moment I shall beg leave to withdraw the amendment. I apologise that I forgot to say that I was also speaking to Amendment No. 103A, but the noble and learned Lord dealt with that at the same time.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Earl of Dundee: My Lords, I beg to move that further consideration on Report be now adjourned.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at six minutes past ten o'clock.