Radioactive Waste Management: ECC Report

HL Deb 14 April 1989 vol 506 cc487-539

11.25 a.m.

The Earl of Cranbrook rose to move, That this House takes note of the Report of the European Communities Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (19th Report, 1987–88, HL Paper 99).

The noble Earl said: My Lords, this morning we are discussing two reports which are on related subjects. However, from the very beginning I should like to emphasise their distinctness. Paragraph 187 of the European Community Committee's report emphasised: steady progress towards a solution of the radioactive waste problem should be independent of any decisions on the future of nuclear power". That is the very firm line which we took.

The Government have already published a response to the report of the noble Lord, Lord Nelson, and no doubt the noble Lord will take that into account in the debate. We do not habitually expect a written response to reports of the sub-committees and Committee on the European Communities and, therefore, I shall place great weight this afternoon on the reply of my noble friend Lady Hooper. However, I hope that she will deal with issues of policy which are clearly apparent in the report of the European Communities Committee, even though I may not have time to touch on them all myself.

I see my own role as introducing the report to your Lordships and I intend to highlight its general features. I do not have time to recapitulate the many recommendations made. For example, I shall not revert to the points summarised in paragraphs 62, 194,195, 200, 201, 202 and 209. Those points are largely directed towards the European Community itself for action but I should appreciate it if my noble friend were able to give us the Government's views on the issues dealt with there.

The inquiry was prompted by the second triennial report from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council covering developments under the Community's 12-year action plan in the field of radioactive waste which runs from 1980–1992. It was important for us to obtain a Community perspective. To that end we visited disposal sites, reprocessing plants and research sites in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, as well as those at Sellafield and Drigg. To keep the European perspective, we heard oral evidence from the Commission of the European Communities, from the European Environmental Bureau and from two MEPs. As regards our own national programme we received written and oral evidence from the statutory regulators, advisers, practitioners, from NGOs represented by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace and from two academic researchers, Professors Blowers and Dr. Lowry. We also received written evidence provided by all those institutions listed on page 5 of the report. I should like to record my thanks to all those who assisted us in that way in our inquiry.

It is not a lightweight report because we deliberately chose to produce a comprehensive review, as far as we could, of the entire subject of radioactive waste management and disposal. I am particularly grateful to our specialist adviser, Professor Lewis Roberts, for his help in compiling the information section and particularly those in Parts 2, 3, 4 and 8. I hope that what we have produced is not exactly a child's guide to the subject, but may prove a parliamentarian's vade-mecum through the thorny thickets of this subject. Indeed. I hope it will be more than that. I hope that it will be helpful to a much wider readership; especially to those who give service in local government where decisions have to be made; to those in education and to all those who want to get to grips with the problems covered by this report.

I think I should remind your Lordships that we were, in fact, really a bunch of quite ordinary Lords. We had no prior commitment to any point of view. We started this inquiry with the general sense of unease, suspicion, anxiety that typifies public attitudes to these issues when they are confronted. However, I am glad to say that we ended up confident that disaster does not loom. There is much science involved; there is heavy expenditure to be incurred: extreme care is needed, and watchfulness is essential from the regulatory authorities. With those provisos, we come out of this inquiry convinced that our society can cope safely with these frightening wastes, provided we have a firm lead and positive direction from central government. We want no more shifts, sideways jumps, or even the back-tracking that have so far featured in national policy. These wastes exist. They must be dealt with as expeditiously as possible in order to ensure the safety of present and future generations.

The first main conclusion of the committee to which I wish to draw attention is that radiation protection standards are uniform and operating effectively throughout the Community. Doses to the public from the nuclear industry are the smallest component in national exposure. The report draws attention to risks from radon in houses—a subject that is now being tackled with as much vigour as we know how. Paragraph 45 concludes that, further reduction or even total elimination of the doses from the nuclear industry … could make only a minimal contribution to an improvement in public health". I quote those words not to reflect complacency but to impress the sense of reassurance received by the committee—reassurance that national and EC-wide regulations based on international standards are serving to protect the public.

The second important conclusion is that there has been adequate research to demonstrate that safe methods of disposal are achievable in the European context. Given the hazards of long-term near-surface storage of these dangerous wastes it is, as paragraph 210 states: irresponsible to wait any longer for some hoped-for but unspecified alternative". The right procedure depends on the radioactive characteristics of the waste. Categories IV and V of Table 2, on page 22, can safely be buried in shallow repositories, given a degree of engineering containment.

We followed members of the environment committee of the House of Commons to France and, like them, we were impressed by the technology in use at the La Manche repository. When we went to Drigg we were pleased to note the improvements in hand that have taken place since the Commons visit. Our conclusions, reported in paragraph 116, were that this work should be completed as soon as possible, together with improved packaging of wastes designated for disposal at Drigg.

In France some intermediate level waste is disposed of near surface. In the Federal Republic of Germany all wastes are to be buried in deep repositories. In the United Kingdom the decision has now been made to construct a deep disposal facility that will take all intermediate level waste and some, ultimately all, low level waste when Drigg is full. The responsibility for developing this disposal site falls on NIREX. As we know, on 21st March the Secretary of State announced that he had allowed the appeal of BNFL against Cumbria County Council's refusal of planning permission to drill an exploratory borehole at Sellafield. NIREX's latest report Going Forward is fresh from the presses. A copy was sent to me and I have encouraged NIREX to send copies to your Lordships. I hope that some have been received. The company has also taken the trouble to provide me with an advance draft of the relevant chapters from the technical version, and I am grateful for that help. I shall mention that again in a moment.

In the meantime, there are important questions which arise from the decision to permit an exploratory borehole at Sellafield. I put these to my noble friend. First, will a similar decision follow to permit a borehole at Dounreay? Secondly, assuming that indications are satisfactory from a first borehole, what will be the next step? What permissions will be required to proceed to the extensive, site-specific geological investigations that will be needed, as we point out in paragraph 208? Will an EIA be required? Thirdly, assuming these further investigations are also favourable, how will the public obtain the information needed to be assured that safe disposal can go ahead? Fourthly, will this be the definitive site? Fifthly, will retrievability as discussed in paragraphs 152 and 153 be an option?

Referring back to the NIREX papers, I cannot but note how clearly these reports demonstrate this company's extreme apprehensiveness with regard to public opinion. Many potential sites in prospect that are at least as good as Sellafield and Dounreay were rejected out of hand to avoid expected local opposition. The decision chart I have seen is a travesty of the dispassionate, science-based technical decision chart quoted in the BPEO process by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in its 12th Report.

I find it a fearful prospect if we envisage that every further step in the development of a safe disposal site, which the nation needs, will have to be imposed by central government in the national interest—imposed on local authorities who feel that they have to resist in order to reflect public sentiment. The committee confronted this difficult issue in Part 9 of the report. We listened to all varieties of opinion. To some extent we blame both the industry and the regulators for the present unhappy circumstances. We believe it is important that the industry is not seen as the sole arbiter of its own actions. Equally, we believe that the Government are not seen to be unduly influenced by short-term political considerations (paragraph 189).

The committee was particularly impressed by the work of the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) and hoped for a more significant role for this body. After discussions with RWMAC the committee was persuaded that there was some utility in taking natural background radiation as a standard of comparison (discussed in the evidence sections on page 118). I received a letter from Professor Knill last November reporting that his committee would discuss the establishment of a standard measurement of artificially-induced radiation relative to background. He also mentioned the first meeting of the RWMAC public interest panel. I should be grateful if my noble friend could tell me what advances there have been on this front. In particular, I should be glad of assurances that the Government will take notice of recommendations in paragraph 192.

Three other outstandingly important questions concerning forward plans are raised in this report. First, paragraph 120 sums up the committee's views on decommissioning. The need for complete removal of all structures surrounding a closed reactor should be examined carefully. Techniques for permanently sealing a structure in situ should be explored. Research is needed in order to develop policy in this field.

Secondly, there is the contentious issue of reprocessing (discussed in Part 8) and the committee's conclusions in paragraph 169. Magnox fuel must be reprocessed on environmental grounds. The committee believe that current THORP contracts should be completed, but further options need to be reviewed in relation to oxide fuel in particular. The Government must give a clear lead to the reprocessing industry in this instance.

Finally, there is the issue of high level wastes. At present in the United Kingdom these exist in the very horrid form of nitric acid solution. The radioactivity is intense. Considerable heat is generated and requires to be dissipated by artificial cooling. Solidification through the vitrification process is an available technique and as such should not be delayed. Subsequent storage of the solidified waste will be necessary for some years to allow further cooling. But the need for this cooling period should not give false reassurance that time is on our side. In paragraph 118 the committee states its conviction that work towards a final disposal of high level waste should be pursued vigorously to prevent unnecessary delay. No agency has yet been constituted to undertake that essential task. The Department of the Environment has direct responsibility. For the sake of public safety the Government must bring forward plans as soon as possible.

I close with a quotation from paragraph 193 of the report: Radioactive waste management is a key environmental issue in the Community. The safe handling of radioactive wastes raises difficult technical problems, but in addition, raises questions of public confidence and public acceptability". Those are the key issues that the Government must face. But neither the Government nor the nation need forget that we are not alone in meeting this task. It is being tackled throughout the Community. Strength lies in co-operation and in joint endeavour, in the sharing of research and in the exchange of experience. My Lords, I beg to move.

Moved, That this House takes note of the report of the European Communities Committee on radioactive waste management (19th Report, 1987–88, HL Paper 99)—(The Earl of Cranbrook.)

11.41. a.m

Lord Nelson of Stafford

My Lords, we are debating two reports this morning and it falls to me to introduce the debate on the second. I understand that my Motion is to be proposed after my noble friend's Motion is put. Therefore, I shall do that at the end of the debate.

I advise your Lordships right from the start that we have just received the Government's reply to our report. It will not be published until next week. I hope that all noble Lords who are participating in this debate have now received copies of it. I am glad to say that there is a large measure of agreement between the committee and the Government. But there are one or two important points of difference which I shall touch on during my remarks.

First, I pay tribute to the specialist advisers who helped us with this inquiry. They were Sir John Hill, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority; and Professor Williams, professor of government and science policy at the University of Manchester. Their knowledge and experience was of great assistance to your committee. The evidence that was submitted to us was also of great assistance and it was given by a wide range of interested parties. I express our gratitude to them for the time they gave in submitting evidence to us.

This inquiry came at an extremely interesting time because we were conducting it against a moving background. It was a moving background for two reasons. First, the government proposals for the privatisation of the electricity supply industry were in the process of being formulated. The White Paper was produced during our inquiry, but the Bill itself did not appear until after the findings of our inquiry had been published. Secondly, at the same time public opinion was becoming more aware of the dangers of atmospheric pollution including that of the so-called greenhouse effect. At the beginning of our inquiry that was not a public issue, but we identified it as being of importance to energy policy.

During the inquiry the momentum in the public arena grew until today hardly a week goes by when we do not get a publication or statement about atmospheric pollution, particularly as regards the greenhouse effect. The difficulty is that many of these pronouncements are not so well informed, though some are. Our difficulty was to differentiate between those which were informed and those which were not.

We started our inquiry by asking ourselves whether there was a basic need to maintain a proportion of non-fossil fuel generating capacity as laid down by the Government. We found no evidence to show that previous instabilities in fuel prices and availabilities were going to change in the period ahead of us. That indicated that the maximum options for a variety of fuel supplies should be maintained including that of nuclear power on top of oil, gas and coal. Added to this was the growing uncertainty about the fear of atmospheric pollution. We looked into this question because it seemed to be so relevant.

The evidence that was presented to us was pretty sketchy to say the least. But we were convinced that potential dangers in the long term were such that they could not be ignored. Your committee recommended that further studies should be made of this particular phenomenon especially of the greenhouse effect. That is now being conducted by another committee under the chairmanship of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Carver, who is speaking later in this debate. Your committee concluded that these factors taken together fully justified the Government's decision to maintain the nuclear option in the future. Hence there was a case for maintaining a long-term research and development programme in the nuclear field.

We took fully into consideration two relevant factors the first being to what extent fuel saving and greater efficiency in the use of fuels would affect the issue. The second factor was how great was the practical potential for renewable sources of energy. Both those factors were taken into account, and important as they are, we did not feel that they in any way altered the conclusions that the committee came to.

In the light of that conclusion we then pursued the question of the fast reactor. The committee concluded that, in view of the excellent progress that had been achieved in this field and its possible long-term potential, it was right for work to continue, but at a reduced rate in view of the long-term period involved. We considered that the scheme should be continued through a centrally-managed and integrated European programme. The scale of the British effort should be such as to justify our participation in the European programme.

Up to this point we were largely in agreement with the Government. But here there is a major difference. In this fast reactor programme there is a design project under way for a new fast reactor for commercial operation. In their reply the Government take the view that this should be funded by the private interests of the supply industry or the equipment suppliers. Your committee took the view that this was not a practical approach. Money for this work would not be forthcoming from the private sector until there was a foreseeable market for the new product. Therefore we recommended that a measure of public funding should be put behind the project at this stage. I hope that the Government will consider this matter again.

We suggested also that the Government should revise their programme for the use of the prototype fast reactor at Dounreay which they are proposing should be closed in 1994. We suggested that this was an important test vehicle which could play an important part in the European programme to which I have referred. We considered that the Government should look at this again with a view to keeping the reactor operating beyond the proposed closure date for this purpose. In your committee's opinion such a decision would benefit not only our participation in the European programme but also the people of Caithness, referred to in the Government's reply as a factor in their decision. Perhaps, therefore, the Government will look again at the matter before any final decision is taken implementing the proposed shutdown.

The second issue to which we addressed ourselves was the effect of electricity privatisation on the nuclear programme. The measure raises many matters of detail which are not appropriate for our debate today. They will be debated when the Electricity Bill comes before your Lordships very shortly. However, there is one aspect which we consider important. We asked ourselves the question: under these measures who would be responsible for the long-term research and development necessary for the maintenance of the electricity supply industry, its direction and its funding? This quickly resolved itself into a further, rather more fundamental, question: who is responsible under the Bill for the long-term security of supply of power to the nation? Your Lordships will be aware that this responsibility has been carried very effectively in past years by the CEGB. The board has promoted long-term programmes of research to meet these needs involving environmental issues and all the questions relating to security of supply in the long term. It has arranged either for funding from central government or by consumers.

We were told that in no way was the new organisation, National Power, going to take responsibility for this work. It was in competition with other power generators and could not afford to carry the burden. That must be carried elsewhere. Naturally we asked ourselves: where will it be carried? We sought information. We were told that it was going to be carried by all 12 of the distribution companies. How they would carry the burden together was not clear. Nor was it clear how the programme was going to be determined or implemented; nor how it was going to be funded. We found that pretty unsatisfactory.

A major issue in our report is this: who is responsible for the security of supply under the new proposals? Interestingly enough, the Government in their reply—which your Lordships have studied—donot address themselves to the fundamental problem that we have raised. However, they say that long-term research and development will be the responsibility of the Department of Energy. By implication it seems to me that if one is taking responsibility for long-term research and development one is taking responsibility—at the Department of Energy—for long-term security of supply. Perhaps the Government will clarify the point: it is a very important issue. In many respects the department is probably the place where responsibility should rest. In the event of the lights going out, it will be the Department of Energy and the Secretary of State for Energy, I suspect, who will have the chop, not 12 area boards separately, each of which will say that it is nothing to do with it individually. This is an important issue and I emphasise it.

There are a number of recommendations arising from our inquiry. Other members of the committee may wish to speak to them or emphasise the points I have been making. I shall take up your Lordships' time only on one issue. That is the future of the Atomic Energy Authority—the AEA. Our report pays a well merited tribute to the high quality and expertise of the staff of the authority. They are a valuable and great national asset. I emphasise that.

We paid tribute also to the excellent work that the authority has done since its formation in creating a new industry—and a very successful one—in a highly technological field. However, we must recognise that this is now a mature industry. Times have changed. We were left with considerable unease that the present size of the authority seems to be in excess of the needs of its tasks—12,000 people employed on eight different major sites. We gave some thought to this. What tasks? Here, we felt even greater unease. We were not able to obtain a clear picture of exactly what was the expected role of the Atomic Energy Authority in the years ahead. The issue is very important because while one questions what it should be there is an essential role for the expertise of the Atomic Energy Authority in meeting the essential existing regulatory and safety requirements of our nuclear industry. Such facilities will also be required for the long-term programme that we defined as being necessary.

How are these excellent facilities to be maintained but at the same time adjusted to a level more appropriate to future needs? We foresaw considerable dangers, if the position was not faced up to and realistically tackled, of loss of morale within this great organisation. Key people who would be required for the future might well be lost. We therefore urge in our report that the Government should face up to this issue, define what future Atomic Energy Authority tasks are, and enable the management of the authority to take the necessary steps to adjust accordingly. At the same time it must recognise that such adjustments and such restructuring will require adequate funds to see it safely through a difficult period.

Other members of the committee will, I know, add to my remarks. I have said enough. I look forward to hearing comments on our report. I shall welcome any further clarification that the Government care to give on the issues that the report raises. I shall be proposing the Motion in my name at the conclusion of the debate.

11.59 a.m.

Lord Gregson

My Lords, perhaps I may first pay tribute to the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, and the noble Lord, Lord Nelson, for the excellence of the reports that we are discussing. Their opening speeches covered the matters of concern in the reports and I should certainly not wish to duplicate those remarks. However, there is one issue on which I should like to reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Nelson, said.

There is undoubtedly widespread interest and concern throughout the world regarding what is called the greenhouse effect, a perfectly natural occurrence existing since the world developed an atmosphere millions of years ago. But there are quite frightening rapid changes taking place following the development of technology leading to a vastly improved quality of life and multiplied by the population explosion of the past 200 years. That has led to drastic effects on man and on his terrestrial environment. There has been a change from a linear effect over many thousands of years to an exponential one in recent years of almost unbelievable proportions. Whether that leads to a rise in the oceans of half a metre or five metres is really of secondary importance compared with the enormous changes that will take place in the weather patterns and the catastrophic effect that this can have on life on earth.

We have recently witnessed a tiny sample of that effect in the floods in Bangladesh and in the droughts in central Africa. Nearly all the dramatic changes taking place within the greenhouse effect are caused by the burning of fossil fuel in its many forms to provide energy either for heat or for power. That situation simply cannot continue. Moreover, since the present or future world population cannot be sustained without an enormous quantum of energy, we must find other means of provision rather than fossil fuels.

Electricity as a transfer system is the key since it allows transposition without adding to the greenhouse gases. But this means, of course, that we must find a primary energy source which also does not add to the greenhouse effect. We can and must make use of every available source of renewable power, such as the sun, the wind, the waves, and so on. We must practise conservation until it hurts, but even then we shall not have nearly enough energy to sustain life on earth with a rapidly expanding population.

The whole world, whether it likes it or not, will have to turn more and more to nuclear power, and, whatever the future is of this fascinating cold electro-chemical engendered fusion, nuclear power for the short term and medium term means thermal and fast reactors. In our case that means the PWR and the sodium-cooled fast reactor. The expansion of thermal reactors will rapidly increase the world demand for uranium, which by any standards is a scarce resource. Therefore, to depend only on thermal reactors would be sheer lunacy. For instance, it could easily lead—and almost certainly will—to another OPEC. The fast reactor could multiply that scarce resource a thousand fold. I say to the Secretary of State for Energy that I believe the fast reactor will be needed sooner than he thinks.

It is now a matter of history that in the PWR we have adopted a technology from overseas and the UK technology has been allowed to wither on the vine. The fast reactor situation is quite different. The technology which the UK pioneered many years ago has been adopted throughout the world and there is within this country an enormous reservoir of knowledge and expertise, and that particularly relates to the fuel technology.

I entirely agree that the way forward for a fast reactor system is within European collaboration, but the benefit that might flow to this country from within that collaboration depends critically upon the expertise we take into the European project. It has been proved over and over again that in order to make a success within a collaboration you have to have a home base of research. In Dounreay we have a unique reactor system that will test and qualify the fuel elements of a full-sized civil fast reactor wherever it is built.

It would be quite wrong to limit the life of that programme or, perhaps even worse, to place it at the whims and fancies of our European collaborators. I ask the Government to think again about the future support of the Dounreay establishment and the most successful work it has been doing. We shall be foolish indeed simply to cut off our nose to spite our face.

12.6 p.m.

Lord Ross of Newport

My Lords, I must start by frankly admitting to your Lordships that my credentials for contributing to the debate are minimal. I have come here today more to listen and to learn rather than to put forward any firm proposals. I must say straight away that I greatly enjoyed the speeches made by the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, and by the noble Lord, Lord Nelson. I also enjoyed the speech which has just been made from the Labour Benches.

Unfortunately my colleague and noble friend Lord Ezra, who is far better qualified than me to speak on the subject and who would normally speak for my party on energy matters, is unable to be here today due to a long-standing commitment elsewhere. My party is currently reviewing its energy policies and will, I anticipate, be publishing a wide-ranging discussion document in the fairly near future. I have no doubt at all that the two reports which we are discussing today will be studied most carefully by the people responsible for that report. In fact, I intend to make sure that the reports are studied.

I echo the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Nelson. For all our sakes, it must surely be of the utmost importance for the future energy needs of this country and Western Europe—and, for that matter, for the rest of the world—that a large measure of cross-party agreement should be reached on nuclear generation, the disposal of wastes and the alternatives which are available. Moreover, it must be reached with the minimum of delay. I have no doubt at all that the two reports before the House today, and that of the House of Commons Select Committee which was published two days ago, will contribute towards that end. I can say from these Benches that we certainly intend to play our part in that respect.

I turn first to the report, Research and Development in Nuclear Power. I must say that I find myself totally in agreement with conclusion 4.11, which reads: An R&D programme which caters for the possibility of a future expansion of the nuclear programme as well as its contraction should be planned for". That matter is dealt with at greater length in paragraph 3.34. My own view is that current spending on nuclear research—which the committee found to be satisfactory—is already out of balance with the rest of energy research. We would certainly like to see more expenditure on the latter. For instance, we should be spending more on renewables, on the more efficient use of energy and on the alternatives which have been referred to, such as wind, wave and tidal power.

We regret to learn that the Grimethorpe project established, I understand, during my noble friend Lord Ezra's chairmanship of the Coal Board, is now being abandoned. That, I gather, is pressurised fluidised bed combustion which reduces sulphur emissions. That is important so far as concerns acid rain and the greenhouse effect. Perhaps I may ask the committee, which has promised a further report, to look at that matter and report back to us, when it has finished enlarging upon the environmental impacts of decommissioning nuclear plants.

Evidently the committee of the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, is satisfied as to the effectiveness of deep geological disposal. However, I think the noble Earl will agree—he said as much—that that concept will take some selling to the general public. In that respect I accept that it is an enormous advantage actually to sit on a Select Committee. One gains a great deal of knowledge thereby and one can pass on such knowledge to the House. Moreover, one learns a great deal. From my past experience as a member of Select Committees in the other place, I know how helpful that can be. Unfortunately, however, one has to convince others of the correctness of one's decisions. In that respect the press is not terribly hopeful. An illustration of that is that we are now worried about how we will get rid of outdated nuclear submarines. The Norwegians have been extremely anxious following the sinking of a Soviet submarine in the Arctic.

The committee calls for more research into the disposal of unreprocessed spent fuel, and I welcome that call. In summary, I believe I can say that my colleagues and I find both reports worth while and informative, especially that on waste management, which although highly technical in parts is worthy of a much wider study. I hope that it will receive publicity.

We have a view that both reports come up with recommendations and conclusions that are slightly too complacent, although I suspect that a speech that is to be made later from these Benches may contradict that view. I shall understand that, because it will be made with knowledge of Dounreay. Most of us on these Benches, like Thomas, remain to be convinced. In the meantime, while continuing with the generation of nuclear power from existing plants, we should explore with greater vigour the alternatives, including the more efficient use of fossil fuels, especially coal of which we have an abundant supply.

I understand that the Coal Board is making great strides towards profitability. That is much to its credit. Despite the fears about cheap imported coal flooding the market shortly, I believe that with a little luck and workforce-management co-operation our coal industry can be as efficient and cost-effective as any in the world.

Finally, the recent news shows that nuclear fusion may provide another way forward. However, I learn from the report that even that much-lauded solution may give rise to some problematical side effects. The difficulties which face any government are such that we can only hope and pray that in the end the right decisions will be taken. I am sure that the reports will prove helpful in reaching such conclusions. I congratulate the chairmen and members of both those committees.

12.13 p.m.

Lord Carver

My Lords, as a member of the sub-committee under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, I wish to endorse the tribute that he paid to our specialist advisers. I should also like to pay a tribute to our chairman for the personal contribution that he made both through his knowledge of the subject and the skill with which he guided out deliberations.

I shall confine my remarks to one aspect only of the committee's report—the future or the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. The committee's opinion on that matter is given in the report's final paragraphs. I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Nelson, has said on that subject. I can only describe the Government's response to the report as extremely vague. The authority is a huge undertaking, employing some 12,000 people, including a large number of the nation's best scientists, engineers and technicians. I believe that it is by far the largest single research and development organisation in the country. It has much to be proud of in its history, although some of the decisions made in the past on the authority's recommendations are now seen to have been mistaken.

A number of factors now make it abundantly clear that a radical new look is needed for the future. One is the decision to base the near future of the country's nuclear energy programme on the pressurised water reactor (basically the American Westinghouse design). There is therefore no question of the authority designing a new type of reactor, unless and until the fast breeder reactor appears to be more likely to prove an economic competitor; and, as has already been said, a purely national design for that is no longer on the cards.

I find it ironic that one of the factors which persuaded the Labour Government in 1947 to develop our own atomic bomb, as it was called in those days, was that civil nuclear energy would be a by-product, and it was vitally important that the United States should not have a monopoly in that field. But here we are, 42 years later, abandoning all our British designs (Magnox and AGR) and firmly and rightly basing the future of our civil nuclear energy programme on an American design.

The operation of nuclear power stations is now a developed technology which requires a lower level of research and development. The same is true of research and development needed for the regulating authority and for the support of the fuel cycle. Both the Health and Safety Commission and British Nuclear Fuels will be reducing the amount of research and development they commission from the authority.

In their reply the Government have made clear that they expect that the privatised electricity supply industry will commission less research than did the CEGB, and is less likely to concentrate on fairly short-term research and development. It admits that the Government will, as at present, undertake any necessary research which may have longer term national implications", and pick up any omissions in that field where they consider that the privatised ESI has failed to reach the standards set by the CEGB. The future of research and development in nuclear fusion is even more problematical than that of the fast breeder reactor; but there again it is clear that once the JET project at Culham is finished and has been cleared up the effort made by the authority in that field is bound to be greatly reduced.

It is therefore absolutely clear that the tasks of the UKAEA in future will be on a far smaller scale than they are at present or have been in the past. The Government's attitude, despite their distaste for any form of liberalism, seems to be to wait and see what research and development is needed once the ESI is privatised; after that, to wait and see what is left for the authority to do; and meanwhile to encourage it to diversify and earn what money it can in any field (nuclear or other) in which it has expertise.

If that is the Government's intention, I do not believe that it is right for the authority, for its distinguished and skilful staff, or for the nation as a whole. It will encourage hanging on to establishments, organisations, real estate and employees of all kinds in case they are needed, with increasing overheads and decreasing value for money. An organisation which has to observe the safety and security standards of nuclear installations in unlikely to be able to compete on equal terms for non-nuclear research and development contracts which the Government are encouraging other research and development organisations, including government ones and universities, to look for. It would be wrong, and contrary to the Government's declared attitudes, in any way to subsidise the UKAEA in such competition. Potentially profitable nuclear activities have already been hived off to the CEGB, British Nuclear Fuels and Amersham International.

The authority itself and all those who work for it deserve a clear aim towards which to plan their future research and development programme and organisation. The sooner that is decided and clarified, the better for all concerned. The earlier those who may become redundant or wish to leave can know what the future holds, the better for them and for the nation. Their knowledge and skills could contribute much in other fields, not least the academic, where there are serious shortages in the science and mathematics disciplines. In considering the future of the UKAEA, the Government must not adopt a policy of wait and see but must bite the bullet, grasp the nettle, and produce a clear, radical design for the future.

12.19 p.m.

Lord Erroll of Hale

My Lords, I shall speak on the R&D report on nuclear energy as I was a member of the committee. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ross, about how valuable it is to be a member of a Select Committee. One learns a great deal and has some interesting experiences when finding out what goes on in establishments which one would never otherwise have an opportunity to visit.

When we began our inquiries we had to form some sort of estimate regarding the future place of nuclear power in Britain and in Western Europe. If it was to be a minimal place, would there be much need for further R&D? It was no good just looking at the provision of nuclear power in isolation. It had to be examined in relation to the total energy requirements, not only of Britain but of Western Europe.

In particular, in the long-term field, forecasting on future energy requirements is notoriously unreliable. Nevertheless, we had to do something in that direction before we could properly focus our inquiries. I suggest to noble Lords that they might find Part 1 of considerable interest in this regard because, thanks to the helpful work of our specialist advisers, to whom tribute has already been paid, we have been able to produce a fairly concise estimate of current production under different sources, and also some estimate of the future. That has enabled us to make some recommendations.

As regards the nuclear component in Europe, I think we were very surprised to learn, for example, that France is almost 100 per cent. dependent on PWR reactors for electricity generation. Sweden, on the other hand and at the other end of the scale, with one of the most advanced systems of nuclear generation, will phase out all its nuclear stations as a result of a public vote some time ago. An energy-poor country can ill afford to do so, but Sweden has yielded to relatively uninformed public opinion.

As we all know, Britain is an energy-rich country and therefore is not so dependent on nuclear power as the French. Indeed, at one time it was thought that we might be able to do without it. However, I think that the Government are to be congratulated on giving the commitment that 20 per cent. of electricity must be supplied by nuclear stations in this country. That gives a solid base on which to work.

We in the committee recognise that nuclear power is passing through a very difficult phase at present. Paragraph 3.74 mentions that in more detail. During the course of our investigations, we have found that the privatisation of the electricity supply industry leaves unresolved so far the question of who is to pay for long-term nuclear R&D. We comment on that dilemma in our report in paragraph 3.67 and further paragraphs.

There has been some Government response. I think it is a pity that the printed response is only available in the Roneo form, and there has not been much time to look at it. From a quick glance, I do not think that the Government have come out very clearly in their statement on the matter. They must make a clear statement on where responsibility will lie after privatisation. They must include in the statement their own share of the responsibility. Noble Lords who spoke earlier have referred to the matter as well so I shall not elaborate.

It is perhaps worth reminding noble Lords that one of the difficulties in our committee was that the scene was changing all the time while we were at work. The most dramatic example of that was when, on the very day we were visiting Dounreay, Her Majesty's Government announced their new policy for the fast reactor and some associated research. They thus threw into the discussion an entirely new state of affairs. It certainly made our discussions much more lively, but inevitably somewhat inconclusive. Indeed, we are not wholly satisfied with what the Government propose in that area.

Since the scene was moving so much, when the time came to write our report it would have been tempting to have waited six months or so to see whether some of the issues would be resolved in the meantime. However, we thought it right to press ahead and to accept that there were certain areas in which we could perhaps not be as definite as we wished. Perhaps I may put it this way. In our short journey down the nuclear road, so to speak, we found that we had reached a crossroads with a number of signposts, one or two of which were still being erected or dismantled by the Government. We could not go down all these roads as fully as we should have wished; but the wording on the signposts and a brief colloquial description of each road, as far down it as we could see, might help those noble Lords who are non-technical to grasp some of the essentials of a complicated and evolving situation.

The first signpost is labelled "Magnox and AGR—entry restricted". As regards research and development, that is finished with. They are British in design and manufacture, but no more are to be made. It is noted that the R&D, although it must continue, will be confined to keeping existing stations in full working order for the remainder of their lives. We believe that those arrangements are adequate.

The next signpost is "PWR"—the Westinghouse American design, to which my noble and gallant friend Lord Carver has referred. While it is sad to think that we are no longer in the forefront of nuclear station design, nevertheless I believe, and all of us in our committee believe, that the decision to go over to the PWR is right. Britain benefits from using a well proven design instead of trying to continue to go it alone. We shall also benefit from the extremely collaborative attitude of France which uses PWRs almost exclusively. It has had the good sense to standardise its design so that it could replicate the stations all through its territories. Perhaps we could learn that lesson when we come to PWRs Nos. 2, 3 and 4.

The prototype fast reactor is acknowledged to be a British success story. When we were at Dounreay we were most impressed with the quality of the science, technology and engineering. It is perhaps worth reminding noble Lords that it was initiated when uranium supplies were scarce and likely to become more expensive. It was therefore thought of as a better and more efficient way to use uranium. However, what in fact happened was that the demand for uranium, and the supply due to the demand, are now such that uranium is abundant and cheap. So the PFR is not yet an economic commercial proposition.

My noble friend Lord Gregson, who is a fellow member of the committee, referred to the probability of uranium becoming scarcer in the future and therefore more expensive. Of course that would make the PFR a commercial proposition. He may well be right. On the other hand, the committee could not see any hard evidence of that happening within the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, regarding Lord Gregson's point, we recommend that R&D should continue as an insurance policy, but on a reduced scale. We think that more could be done than the Government stated in their announcement while we were at Dounreay. But we must have enough work going onto keep the technology alive and for Britain to remain an effective partner in European collaboration. It is no good hoping to collaborate with others if we are not doing anything ourselves. The only way in which collaboration can be effective—andit will probably be between France, Germany and ourselves—is for us to play a full and active part in research and development, spending money on it in order to make the collaboration effective. Incidentally, we particularly welcome the Government's decision to sign the European fast reactor agreements referred to in paragraphs 3.57 and 4.18. That sets everything right on a formal basis. The next signpost labelled "fusion" is clearly marked "No through road". It is unanimously seen as entirely impracticable, except by means of international collaboration. We had several suggestions to make on this subject, but I shall not prolong my remarks today by referring to them, although they are contained in paragraphs 2.26 and 4.21.

Little has been said so far in this debate about British Nuclear Fuels plc. That is a remarkable company because it offers a complete fuel cycle service. There is only one other company in the world which offers that service and that is COGEMA in France. British Nuclear Fuels is the only major British company which is wholly dependent on the nuclear industry. We were impressed with its achievements. The bulk of the R&D for its major investment programme has been completed, but other R&D work will continue. I shall not say any more about that as it is referred to in our report.

As regards the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, I would only underline what my noble and gallant friend Lord Carver has said. It has got to be substantially restructured because it faces a reduction in its research contracts. It needs a proper, firm, clear statement from Her Majesty's Government on the functions to be carried out. It also requires an assurance of adequate Government funds for those purposes, so that restructuring can take place quickly.

Public health and safety is a big area. This is a very broad subject and it verges a little away from research and development into the political field as it deals largely with public attitudes and public apprehensions. Nevertheless we considered this matter and referred to it in our report. Indeed we have gone so far as to suggest that some organised research and development work should be carried out on the way in which the public see these developments, and on their fears and apprehensions. Many of those are exaggerated, but some are well-founded. That work should be carried out in a systematic and thorough way because, if public attitudes are hostile and uninformed, they can delay or arrest nuclear programmes. That is particularly important in the field of waste management. That subject was referred to so well by my noble friend Lord Cranbrook. However, health and safety is too big a subject for today's debate and, as I said, it contains a political element as well as scientific elements.

In conclusion, I hope your Lordships will agree that our report is timely and constructive. I also hope it is a help to the Government whose further response I eagerly await. Perhaps I may finally conclude on a lighter note. The journal of the American Chemical Society reports the prospect of cheap production of hydrogen gas from water. That would form an abundant source of energy. The process would use cadmium sulphide as a form of catalyst. Perhaps cadmium sulphide will one day render obsolete the nuclear stations of the world.

12.33 p.m.

Lord Sherfield

My Lords, I shall speak mainly about the nuclear report. I wish to add my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, for the manner in which he conducted the inquiry. As the noble Lord has said, it was not free from difficulty. While it was in progress the Government, which was in parallel reviewing the British nuclear research effort, shot no fewer than three of the committee's foxes. However, it is of some interest that, apart from one issue, the committee found little to criticise in the Government's decisions. The exception relates to the decision about the future of the fast reactors.

While the fast reactor, as noble Lords have said, is not at the moment competitive with the advanced PWR, energy forecasts are notoriously unreliable, even in the short-term. I mention as an example the sudden and unexpected current rise in oil prices. It is essential, quite apart from the greenhouse effect and all that, with which the noble Lord, Lord Gregson, dealt in his speech, that this option must be kept open. While, therefore, a substantial reduction in the 1988 level of R&D is entirely appropriate, it is of first importance that UK participation in the European project should be adequately funded. It is not, I think, to be expected that the whole of this should fall upon industry.

It is very doubtful that the £10 million figure to which fast reactor research has been reduced will be sufficient for this purpose, and this sum therefore should not be regarded as immutable. It should be kept under review.

Further, even though the French Super Phénix has recently been restarted, at least for one year, the Dounreay fast reactor is probably the most important test facility for metal oxide nuclear fuel in operation anywhere in the world. Yet the Government have given priority to the continuation of the reprocessing plant at Dounreay in preference to continuing the operation of the fast reactor for the longest possible period.

We now have the Government's reply on this point. They say that the continued operation of the PFR will: enable much useful information on fuel performance and materials behaviour to be obtained". That is true enough, but if it went on to 1997—at the moment it is due to close in March 1994—the information, especially on fuel burn-up, would be even more valuable, in particular to the European project. The Government's reply also says that the reprocessing plant will be needed to help with the decommissioning of the PFR. It is not clear from that brief remark what it involves and how essential it is. I think that this should be spelt out. But, in any case, I trust that the matter will be reconsidered, and I reinforce the plea of the noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, on this point.

As regards fusion, I personally find the Government's position acceptable. There have been some outstanding engineering achievements by the JET team at Culham. But the objectives of the JET project, which may well be attained, are still far away from proving the viability of a fusion power reactor. The success of the European project is much to be welcomed, and there will no doubt be some useful spin-off from it. Nevertheless, economic fusion power hot, or, I suspect, cold, has always seemed to me, as a layman, to represent no more than a highly desirable concept which may or may not materialise in an economic form towards the middle of the next century. Therefore, here again, it must make sense to devote the great proportion of any resources deemed justifiable after the JET programme at Culham is completed, to another international project. I strongly support the committee's recommendation that this project should not be NET (which stands for the Next European Torus) confined as it is to the EC countries, but the ITER project, which includes the United States and Japan.

The present position, which I believe involves NET and ITER teams working next door to one another, does not strike me as a sensible or cost-effective arrangement. The Government reply does not in fact deal with this point which is already a current problem.

I wish now to add a few words to what has been said about the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. First, I extend my sympathy to Mr. John Collier, the present chairman. When I was fortunate enough to succeed the noble Lord, Lord Plowden, as chairman of the Authority in 1960, I reckoned it to be one of the best and most interesting jobs in the country. Now the authority as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Carver, has said, is shorn of its moneymaking arms, the radio-chemical business and British Nuclear Fuels. In a misguided bureaucratic takeover it has lost the atomic weapons establishment to the Ministry of Defence, and it is left with the R&D work, the fusion and fast reactor section of which has now been cut to the bone. The chairmanship, once so rewarding, is now little better than a bed of nails.

I take this opportunity to pay tribute to Mr. Collier and his board for the resolute way in which they are facing up to the consequences. The UKAEA will need to be restructured, and even perhaps transformed into a new organisation. Its first-class work must be preserved and its first-class people looked after. The Government must not do in this case what they have tended to do in other cases. They must not compel an organisation to restructure itself while denying it the resources which alone can make an orderly and fruitful restructuring possible. The UKAEA's great services to the country deserve better treatment than that. I do not, no more than the committee as a whole, presume to suggest how the authority should proceed, and indeed it may not agree with some of the suggestions in our report. However, I trust that when the Government make their promised statement later this year it will contain some constructive and realistic decisions.

In the few minutes left to me I should like to say a few words about the report of the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, on radioactive waste management. It strikes me as a wholly admirable document which puts this emotionally charged subject into a down-to-earth, realistic perspective. I have been disappointed for years at the pusillanimity—the sheer funk—displayed by successive governments in facing up to the problem of the management of radioactive waste. They have cravenly given in to the ill-informed, popular clamour about it and have established no sensible policy. The noble Earl's report shows how far we have fallen behind what the Swedish Government have done and the French and German Governments are doing in this matter. Having said that, I must admit that in the past I with my colleagues in the Atomic Energy Authority have been no more successful than anyone else in the efforts we made to try to convince sections of the public of the facts of ionising radiation.

In the circumstances one can only welcome the small step now taken to allow NIREX to bore holes at Sellafield and, I trust, at Dounreay. Sharp objection to this limited proposal has immediately been raised. Most noble Lords will have received such an objection only yesterday. On receiving it I turned again to re-read what the committee had to say on the subject of deep disposal. Its views were described by the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, and I shall not quote them. But I prefer the collective view of the committee and the European Commission, and I express the earnest hope that in this specific case and across the whole field the Government will be encouraged by the positive attitude of the European Commission and the constructive recommendations of the committee to be rather more robust in handling this problem than they have been in the past.

12.44 p.m.

Lord Hatch of Lusby

My Lords, I shall confine my remarks to the report on radioactive waste management. I cannot do better than to start by congratulating both the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, on his introduction of the report and he and his committee on presenting a report which I would describe as a valuable contribution to the public debate. I emphasise the words "public debate". I shall refer later to what the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, who knows a great deal more about nuclear energy and the disposal of nuclear waste than I do, had to say about the place of the public in this debate.

The noble Earl concluded his speech by quoting from paragraph 193 of the report. I too will quote from it to make my point. It says: Radioactive waste management is a key environmental issue in the Community. The safe handling of radioactive wastes raises difficult technical problems, but in addition, raises questions of public confidence and public acceptability which are quite different in degree from those presented by the management of other toxic wastes". There seems to be a certain ambiguity in the opinion of the committee on that issue. Paragraph 181 of the report says: The Committee are concerned that the exaggerated fear of radiation from radioactive waste may be causing a misapplication of resources". I prefer the quotation of the noble Earl from paragraph 193. I prefer it because, although I do not claim to have any expert knowledge of this subject, I have some experience of the expression of public anxiety both in Lincolnshire, over the Fulbeck site, and throughout the North-East coast of England, from Scarborough to Middlesbrough, when the Cleveland area was being considered as a site. My function is not to be so outrageous as to argue with the scientists but to put something of the public concern about this issue before the House.

I am also concerned about the number of times the suggestion is made in the report that there should be greater use of the mass media. The fear seems to be that some people in the community believe that a cabal of some scientists—perhaps most scientists—along with some politicians and publicists are telling the public, "We know better than you". This is where I come to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, who spoke of the pusillanimity of public opinion.

Lord Sherfield

No, my Lords, if the noble Lord will excuse me, I spoke of the pusillanimity of successive governments.

Lord Hatch of Lusby

My Lords, I accept that correction but the noble Lord spoke of public opinion as though it is ignorant. Of course we are ignorant. We are ignorant of the technical side.

Lord Sherfield

My Lords, nobody is more conscious or has more experience of the crucial importance of this issue in public opinion than I.

Lord Hatch of Lusby

My Lords, I accept that point fully, but it does not detract from the point that I was making; namely, that it is beginning to appear to many people as though there were a small cabal that considers that it knows, and that it is its job—this includes NIREX—to convince the public of its case. I suggest that it is far too important an issue with far too great a timescale to leave to a handful of experts and politicians. It is a matter that concerns every member of the community today and for many centuries hence.

I am therefore worried about the number of times that the report refers to the use of the public media as though that were the job of either the Government, NIREX or the committee itself. Paragraph 188 of the report states: the nuclear industry and the regulatory authorities have to learn how to make better and more frequent use of the mass communication media". I do not think that that is the way in which the problem should be tackled, or that it is the way in which the public will gain confidence from the knowledge that its interests today and in future centuries will be put first.

I have a proposal to make on that subject at the end of my speech; but, before I come to that, the other point that worries me about the report is that, so far as I can see, the submissions put forward by organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth—public organisations both of which use scientific opinions and briefings to the maximum ability of their resources—have apparently been rejected out of hand. I cannot see any serious attempt to tackle their proposals by the committee. For example, in paragraph 137, which deals with the established policy of ultimate deep disposal of high level and long-lived wastes, the committee states that this has been questioned in some quarters and that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace made the point that: It may turn out that all research on deep disposal of high-level waste is ultimately of little use, because the only socially and politically acceptable means for 'disposal' are in above ground repositories where retrieval is guaranteed". That proposal is rejected by the committee. I should like to know why.

In paragraph 148, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth argue that keeping waste on the surface keeps it in sight and therefore in mind. That proposal is again rejected in the committee's conclusions. Again, I should like to know why. I do not suggest for one moment that the committee has not discussed those submissions during its deliberations; but I suggest that in the report there seems to be no clear consideration and recording of why the submissions of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth—which, after all, represent a growing number of people in this country—have been rejected without the reasons for rejection being given.

One does not have to be a scientist to know that there is great danger in the whole issue of the disposal of nuclear waste. One need only stand on Hampstead Heath and watch the trains go by, knowing that they carry nuclear waste. It needs only one accident to bring that point right home to the public. There are genuine concerns; and although the committee has reached its conclusion, I do not feel that it has met them in its report, as the public would expect to do. For example—I shall give only a handful of examples—are there sufficiently reliable models of groundwater movement which would directly affect the whole issue of deep disposal? According to those who have advised Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, those reliable models do not exist. The sorption data currently available is claimed to be both unreliable and meaningless, especially if it is not obtained from the site under investigation.

There are two main points to which I want to draw the attention of the House. I do not believe that the report goes into anything like sufficient detail on the whole issue of the seismological database which is also obviously a major issue in deep disposal. There was an earthquake in Colchester in 1884. How do we know what will happen to the earth's crust? How do we know what will happen to the sea beds over that huge period of years that is involved in the disposal of waste? I do not believe that we know the answers to those questions—the report does not satisfy me on those points—or that it is possible to forecast that there will be no earthquakes or movements of earth during the long period that is projected.

Secondly—I need to say very little about this because my noble friend Lord Gregson made the point very clearly—what do we know about changes in climate? What do we know about the greenhouse effect? What do we know about the effects of the gaps in the ozone layer? Are not all those matters directly relevant to the future of the waste that is to be disposed of? I do not consider that the report shows sufficient concern about what, to a layman, is a matter of deep concern.

On that specific issue, perhaps I may raise one point of which I have given, with my apologies, very tardy notice to the noble Baroness who is to reply. What happened at Wylfa in July 1984? Wylfa is a power station. According to my information—I hope that it will be corrected if it is wrong—in July 1984 there was an earthquake tremor which measured 5.4 on the Richter scale. It had its epicentre 30 miles south of Wylfa. That was sufficient to cause cracks to appear. It is said that it was a coincidence that, at the same time, the crane used to transport spent fuel was put out of action for two to three years. I do not know whether that was a coincidence and I wonder whether anybody else knows. But I should like to hear what the noble Baroness has to say about what could be a catastrophic warning of what could happen if we dispose of our nuclear waste at depth. It has already been a warning of what can happen to nuclear power stations.

Finally, I come to paragraph 222, which is the burden of the committee's submission to the Government. It refers to the shifts in United Kingdom policy which, it states, have not improved public confidence and it is regrettable that a more consistent policy line has not been followed. The industry is not the sole arbiter of its own actions, and this is not adequately recognised". No, the industry is not the sole arbiter. In this country the people are the sole arbiter and that applies also to the Community. I do not believe that this is a party issue or an issue which can be left to any government. It seems to me that this matter is of such supreme importance to the Community as a whole that rather than putting the responsibility on government (which, as the committee has pointed out, constantly shifts their policy) it should be dealt with by an independent body composed of both scientists and non-scientists which will report on the facts as objectively as is humanly possible. That will allow the British nation—the electorate, the ordinary people—to judge on the facts that have been presented without party bias, without government authority, and without enormous mass communication indoctrination. The facts should be put objectively and the issue left to the people to decide.

1.2 p.m.

Lord Rugby

My Lords, in the history of the planet earth, species man is something of a newcomer. A pamphlet issued by Greenpeace of which I have a copy tells us that should earth's time-scale be reduced to a hypothetical half century, apelike man would have appeared three weeks ago; our great industrial revolution, likewise adjusted, would be a mere 60 seconds old—and what are 60 seconds? The point at which we have now arrived in that historical saga is one where man is confronted with a dilemma of which he is the architect; to a certain extent he also holds the key. Can this industrial progressive revolution continue without becoming the cause of a huge calamity? What steps, if any, should or can be taken to prevent that calamity? Is nuclear energy the tool with which such a calamity can be circum vented or will it itself be an inevitable cause of disaster?

Mythology tells us that Noah created an ark in order to ensure the survival not only of mankind but of all other species also. At this critical time, can nuclear energy be seen as a symbolic life-raft made manifest as a means of securing the survival of mankind? Can it be a saviour of all the species that dwell on earth? Can the plutonic reaction of its products be accepted as environmentally platonic? The answer to that question lies in the hearts and minds of a youthful and immature newcomer—mankind. In the formulation of careful, well-balanced, concerted, long-term judgments for the future, economics in monetary terms will certainly have to play a minor role. Such are the thoughts of a great many people, especially those who place little credence in the past motivation and abilities of their fellow men. Monetary considerations alone may well contain the seeds of disaster. One can imagine the ultimate scenario in which man is asked: why was it necessary to destroy planet earth? And his reply?—Because it was economic.

I turn now to the report. I do indeed see it as an entirely platonic document in a constructive sense. It contains great wisdom. I confirm that in the course of its preparation it has given the opportunity to very ordinary members of the team to seek advice from all who wish to offer it, to see for themselves, to learn there from and to form their opinions. Guidelines are presented therein for governments and Ministers in the most elegant form with no distortion of fact or over-emphasis. It plays the whole thing straight, and for that I congratulate and thank the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, who set up the drawing board for the inquiry and guided its deliberations. I also thank Professor Lewis Roberts, who filled so many gaps for the committee and from whom we sought and found enlightenment where so much obscurity prevailed, especially in my own case.

As to the contents of the report, and speaking with an independent mind, I was especially struck by that principle contained within the acronym ALARA which in a sense is a decision arrived at by applying an ad hoc balancing equation of risks and economics. Putting it into other words, perfection being always just out of reach, progression toward that goal is faced with ever-multiplying costs. In the end the line has to be drawn somewhere in order to achieve progress and as an end in itself. That is the ALARA line. Pressure groups tend to have a diverting effect as to where that line is drawn. In the end more complicated and costly solutions may be produced without their necessarily being the effective ones. The voice of dissent, although necessary in a democratic context, can, if overplayed, achieve precisely opposite and damaging effects from those which it set out to obtain. Alarmism must be carefully balanced on the scales if ALARA is not to have reason destroyed by prejudice.

This crucial issue of nuclear waste obviously cannot be regarded as that profligate disregard which was the hallmark, to its everlasting shame, of the so-called industrial revolution. Are the current solutions at Drigg and Dounreay right or are they a coloured political response to the media and pressure groups?

We now propose to bury our disused nuclear submarines in the deep trenches of the ocean. If that is deemed to be suitable for decommissioning military nuclear reactors, perhaps that is also the right route for waste from civil nuclear reactors. If that is acceptable and proven to be a near perfect and innocuous route for radioactive waste when properly packaged, then new horizons for conservation could appear.

The key to the future of nuclear power lies in the handling of its waste products. If that is done correctly—not necessarily with political or economic motivation but by carefully reasoned principles—I believe that a massive transformation of the world's environment would result which would be far greater and better than the one we can observe in the brief but catastrophic immediate past history of the industrial revolution.

1.10 p.m.

Lord Campbell of Croy

My Lords, I should like to start by congratulating my two noble friends who have so helpfully introduced the two reports for those of us who are taking part in the debate. I did not serve on either of the committees, but as noble Lords will possibly recall, I have been active at Question Time over the last three years in raising associated environmental questions, in particular the greenhouse effect.

I should like to deal briefly with both reports. The first report dealing with radioactive waste management states that the subject raises special questions of public confidence and acceptability. It points out that there is little understanding in the country of radiation and the possible hazards from it. I should like to pursue that further.

To most people nuclear technology is mysterious and it deals with great potential dangers. Radiation is invisible, but can be lethal. The spreading of enlightening information on these subjects is a delicate task. On the one hand, it must not appear simply to be propaganda in favour of the nuclear industry. On the other hand, it should not scare the public—for example, by emphasising the amount of radiation from ordinary life, for example, from radon gas in many houses, or the higher exposure from background natural sources in parts of the country where the rock below the soil gives off radiation. That exposure has existed for centuries. One should not scare the public by pointing out the amounts of radiation in medical premises, where radiation is part of medical treatment.

The committee nonetheless confirms that the total amount of radiation from the nuclear industry in Britain is a minute proportion of the exposure affecting the whole British public. Most of that radiation exposure comes from natural background sources and the amount is not dangerous. I agree with the committee's view that because the basic facts about radiation are still not generally known or understood, fears concerning radioactive waste are exaggerated. I go further. Those fears can easily be fanned and misdirected by people who want to set themselves up as supposed protectors of mankind or particular communities.

Whether we are dealing with waste, with low levels of radiation or high levels and long life, much more careful attention must be paid to explaining the facts and proposals to the public and the media, with the help of the Government. As regards the media, I believe that they have first to be approached and convinced. If this is not done with care and effectively, there will always be objections to any site chosen both before examination and testing and afterwards. Of course, there will no doubt be automatic objectors with no interest in facts or reason. For example, I shall tell the Government, if they have not already realised this, that on past and present showing the Scottish National Party—the SNP—is likely to object to any site in Scotland regardless of facts and reason, even when it is low-grade waste consisting of gloves and other material after use in medical departments in Scottish hospitals.

This is a temptation for demagogues who are looking for subjects to frighten people and campaigns to lead, however misconceived and irresponsible. Unfortunately it is easy to frighten people where little is known except by scientists and others who work in, or are familiar with, the industry. We have to take into account also the NIMBYsyndrome—not in my backyard. I quickly add that that does not apply to me. I should be perfectly happy, both at my home in Scotland and my tiny flat in London, for nuclear waste to be disposed of below them or near them, because I have been familiar with the nuclear industry for 30 years. I could satisfy myself that it was being done properly. I recognise that I am unusual in that respect.

While we shall not perhaps ever change the attitudes of demagogues and fanatics, I believe that the public as a whole will understand and accept the need for permanent disposal if the facts and the proposals are clearly explained. I remember that in the late 1940s and 1950s there was a quite different attitude from the British public. They were delighted, as indeed I was, with the thought that nuclear weapons, which were so horrifying at the time, could now be turned into a clean source of energy. Of course there were dangers, but these could be dealt with. This was a magnificent example of turning swords into ploughshares. Unfortunately that public attitude went sour some years later.

I note that permanent disposal of all categories of nuclear waste is what the Select Committee recommends. This is timely because NIREX has recently announced its proposals for a national centre for disposal of low and intermediate level waste and for testing the suitability of a site at Sellafield and perhaps Dounreay. The Government agreed to that last month. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth soon afterwards circulated what they call the geological case against those proposals produced by a geological consultant who worked, I note, for 12 years for the Coal Board. I do not mention that simply to imply that it was somebody from the other camp—that is, the coal industry. No, I mention that because it shows that he was employed by a national corporation as a geologist and therefore his views should not be dismissed lightly.

We should remember that NIREX is also considering a final destination for high-grade waste because the proposals that I have been referring to are for low and intermediate level wastes. The probability is that the solution will eventually be that the high level waste will be vitrified and buried far below the surface of the land or sea.

Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth start their document, in the foreword, by describing UK-NIREX as the "creature" of the nuclear industry, implying that it is a puppet or prejudiced. I believe that the same in the reverse direction could be said about Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. They have a record of being entirely opposed to a nuclear industry of any kind. This is no doubt for the best of motives, but it means that they have an interest in finding fault with any part of the industry's operations and they appear to be dedicated to getting the industry closed down. Who are the public to believe? The Select Committee's report does a particularly useful service because it comes from an independent body whose chief concern is the best interests of the United Kingdom, including safety.

I now turn to the other report on research and development. I believe that that is reassuring because it endorses the PWR decision after all the arguments concerning the AGR and the case put for that system. The conclusions on fast reactors and fusion seem to me for the moment somewhat overshadowed by the apparent developments reported in the last three weeks on fusion. Has a short cut been discovered without the need for intensely high temperatures? We still do not know. The press tell us that at least three teams in different parts of the world believe that they have made a breakthrough in that field.

We cannot dismiss the possibility that there has been a great advance. If fusion were to become possible earlier than previously thought, fast-reactor technology might not be needed. At this stage I do not wish to pour cold water on what we read in the press, because it would be exciting if a new and simple road to fusion had been found. My view is that research and development should continue in fast-reactor technology and be kept alive as proposed by the Select Committee. Success with fusion is probably still a long time away.

The Government's response reached me only this morning. I am grateful for the fact that it was sent to me, but it was posted to Scotland, missed me there and was returned to London. I note from paragraph 25 that the Government expect that the fast reactor will not be needed commercially in the next 30 or 40 years. No doubt that is one of the reasons for the proposal for it to continue in co-operation with other countries in the EC.

During the 1970s and 1980s the United Kingdom was ahead of the rest of the world in this technology, particularly in the prototype fast reactor at Dounreay. Great credit is due to all those who have worked there over the past 20 to 30 years. The Select Committee asked the Government to look again at the proposal to close down the prototype reactor and discontinue that line. I have not yet found in the document any response from the Government. I fully support the view of the Select Committee that the matter should be reconsidered. On re-examination the Government may find it useful in the continuing research and development now in prospect. I hope that the fact that, as far as I can see, there is nothing in the Government's response about this means that the decision is still open.

Lord Hatch of Lusby

My Lords, I did not wish to interrupt the flow of the noble Lord's speech, but before he sits down I should like to ask one question. He talked about the demogogic aspect of general debate on the nuclear issue and the disposal of waste. He asked: who is the public to believe? Does the noble Lord agree that within the scientific community, particularly those connected with the nuclear industry, there are various opinions, each of which should be publicised so that the public can see that there is no single monolithic scientific attitude to these problems and that in the last resort the people must decide?

Lord Campbell of Croy

My Lords, the noble Lord who is to follow me will no doubt also speak about this matter so I do not wish to say much more. However, I was pointing out that some people are glad to seize on the fears of the public concerning an issue about which they know little, except that it can be dangerous, and simply fan that fear. I have lived in northern Scotland for the past 30 years and I am aware that most of the good people living near and around Dounreay are familiar with the nuclear industry and are not opposed to it. That is not just for the sake of jobs but because they know about it, have grown up with it and are quite happy with it. People living in places with no nuclear plants nearby are more easily frightened.

1.25 p.m.

Viscount Thurso

My Lords, I am glad that the debate is taking place after NIREX has given voice to its plans. I am now able to take part in the debate untrammelled by the suspicion that I may be providing ground into which NIREX will drill holes and deposit its waste. I am able to say that at the moment I do not have an interest in that way.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, I am a "Yimby"—yes, in my back yard—not a "Nimby". If it is useful to the country and is desirable and sensible, you can bury the stuff in my lawn or in my back yard. I say that because I am confident of the sensible measures which will be taken to protect me and anyone else living near me from the effects of radiation and so forth.

I am glad that the spokesman for my colleagues has been able to assure us that our official policy is to seek a measure of cross-party agreement. I believe that we also should seek a measure of agreement from all parts of the country. These problems will not go away and they will not be solved by becoming entrenched in opposing camps. They will be solved in the best interests of the country only by people opening their minds to information and their ears to discussion.

I must admit that not only am I a "yes, in my back yard" man; I am also an ardent supporter of the value of the atomic energy industry to this country, to the world and to the future of mankind. That has been adequately and eloquently expatiated upon both in the reports before us and in the speeches which we have heard particularly from members of the two committees. Therefore, I should like to thank the chairmen of the committees on behalf of those of us whose minds and ears are open and who are prepared to listen and take an interest in the subject. I thank the members of the committees for their magnificent work, for their excellent contributions to the debate and for the manner in which they explained their reports and the subjects which they considered.

I should like to begin by commenting on the report of the Select Committee chaired by the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook. I was delighted by the phrase, "disaster does not loom". He sensibly modifies that by concluding that the Community safety policies are uniformly based and are operating effectively, that the UK limits on maximum exposure of the public are within the range of natural radiation doses experienced as people move around the world and that the limits for occupational doses are even below those which can be experienced in normal life in the community. I was interested to note that the Select Committee did not conclude that further reduction from the nuclear industry would make a significant improvement in public health.

In dealing with the question of radioactive waste we are in an area of emotion—of emotive reaction. It is a pity that a more full explanation is not given to the public in a way which it can readily understand. It was strange that the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, should choose to be cast in the role of the advocate of the uninformed and should accuse people who try to give information to the general public of being a cabal, trying to manipulate the media for its own uses. If you do not use the media to inform the public, what do you use? Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have already spotted that the media are of infinite value in getting one's case across and see that they, if possible, are never out of the media. They arrange stunts so that they appear in the media. I do not suggest that members of sub-committees should go around arranging stunts, or biting dogs, or anything of that sort, but I believe it is very important that the message of these two reports should be put out to the people of the country who, we all agree, have to be the final arbiters.

When we talk about low level and intermediate level waste, we are talking of substances which are not immensely radioactive. I know that most of us do not understand things like becquerels and sieverts and that sort of thing, but people understand fairly straightforward domestic similes. I believe it would be fair to say that much of the low level atomic waste is no more radioactive than a packet of coffee on the larder shelf and much of the intermediate level waste no more radioactive than a pallet load of fertiliser sitting on a farm. That is the sort of stuff of which we are so terrified that we want to keep it on the surface in case burying it should allow it somehow to creep around underground and get into our midst.

I believe that we must take the opportunities which we have of informing the public that although there is radioactivity in those things we are disposing of them sensibly. We are disposing of them as sensibly as we would dispose of any waste which arises within the community and we are disposing of them in places where they will remain safe and not get out at some future date and cause contamination to our environment.

I believe that the conclusions of the committee about the disposal of waste are eminently satisfactory in that regard and we should make them widely known. The committee concludes that the disposal of low level waste to shallow repositories is satisfactory and advocates continuation of work on deep disposal for long lived alpha-bearing waste. It recommends that we should continue research and development of the vitrification of high level waste. It recommends that repositories should be designed for 40 years of waste arisines and further, that there is no reason to oppose the centralisation of repositories because of environmental hazard to transportation.

Notwithstanding the vociferous opposition of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and so on, which are all fundamentally opposed to nuclear power, the committee firmly conclude that deep geological disposal should be pursued with determination, only advising us to take measures to allay public anxiety so that at least for some time there are facilities to retrieve or monitor the in place waste.

There is no doubt that public perception is creating difficulties. There are no technical difficulties in dealing with the problems. I believe that the committee has been most helpful in bringing that point to our notice. Therefore, I applaud the Select Committee's advocacy of a higher media profile for the nuclear industry. We must restore public confidence in this immensely valuable national asset which we have created in our midst. Therefore, I should like to join with other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate in thanking the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, for his work and his committee's work and all those noble Lords on his committee who have spoken today.

The noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, presided over a committee which dealt with something slightly different although connected with the atomic energy industry. He dealt with the question of long-term research and development following privatisation, the future of the atomic energy authority and the future of the fast reactor. I was delighted by the calls on his part and on the part of members of his sub-committee particularly the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Carver, to be aware of the dangers of the greenhouse effect. I have recently been round the world. I went to Hong Kong where everyone was saying that the weather "was quite unusual in that part of the world and they didn't usually have that much rain at that time." I went to New Zealand and the North Island was suffering from rain such as, "we never usually have at that time of year". I went down to the South Island where it was suffering from a drought, "most unusual at that time of year", and so on. I came home to find an unusual gale ripping my roof off and to find that the islanders of Shetland were claiming subsidies because of the unusual flooding and wet weather which they had had throughout the winter. I found that I had the happy end of the stick because an unusual amount of grass had grown on my farm and my sheep and cattle were unusually well as a result. However, you know, it is an ill wind which blows nobody any good.

There is no doubt that times are out of joint and we must believe that the greenhouse effect is probably the cause. We must guard against it and have weapons to deal with it if we are satisfied that it is the danger which we are told it is. In that respect, we cannot cast aside the atomic energy industry or the fast reactor. To be told that it may be needed in 30 years means that we need it in 20 years because there has to be a 10-year lead time before there can be a power plant of any kind, especially a fast reactor. The point at which we may wish to start developing research and design for a new project is probably only a matter of a mere 10 years away. I believe that it is foolishness of the highest order to close down our wonderful facility at Dounreay at this time when we are so near to using its ability as a research tool in any future development and when we see the Japanese deciding to go for fast reactors. They are prepared to spend sums in one year which are very nearly the same as the total sums which we have spent so far on fast reactor development. Therefore, I welcome the pleas which have come from the Select Committee on research and development, that Dounreay should be looked at again and that plea has also come from other quarters.

There are many things which would make life easier at Dounreay, not least of which is to allow it to compete without having one hand tied behind its back; for example, to allow it to take equity and to capitalise on the products which it sells and produces and the work which it has done and which it can do. If we say that Dounreay is to work like a commercial concern we must allow it to do what commercial concerns are allowed to do, such as taking equity and being able to make full use of what it has developed.

I have spoken for too long, but I feel strongly about this subject. Therefore, I conclude with a few words about the effect on Caithness of the closure of Dounreay. One cannot imagine the effect that it will have. It will be worse than the clearances. The clearances were mistaken and some were cruelly enforced, but they were a genuine attempt to develop Scotland's agricultural industry. The clearances did not take place to lay waste the countryside; they took place so that people could develop the new type of agriculture, prosper and improve the economy of the North.

The closure at Dounreay is far worse. It will cause many people to leave Caithness. My own quick estimate, made immediately after the announcement, was that it would cut the population of Thurso from 10,000 to 4,000 and that it would cut the population of Caithness in half. That was a quick estimate and a more recent calculation made earlier this week by consultants says that the area around Dounreay—Caithness, my home—should expect 40 per cent. unemployment after having been one of the better employed parts of Britain.

When something like that occurs in the North, my experience is that it results in depopulation. People do not sit around in the North hoping, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up. If the jobs are not there, they leave. They used to say in Orkney, "We do not have unemployment, we only have emigration". If Dounreay is hit in the way that we know it will be hit if nothing else is done to continue the programme there, or to provide other employment, there will be emigration from Caithness. After having devoted my life to the area, that is something that I do not want to see.

1.43 p.m.

Lord Plowden

My Lords, perhaps I should begin by declaring a past interest as I was appointed as the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority as long ago as 1954. Nuclear power no longer has the ready acceptance that it had at that time. The reasons are many, and some we have heard today, but perhaps the most important are the accidents that took place at Windscale at the time I was chairman of the authority; Three Mile Island; and Chernobyl. I believe that attitude will change in time as people come to understand more clearly the damage that the burning of fossil fuels is doing to the world's atmosphere and the effect that it is likely to have on the world's climate—the so-called greenhouse effect.

At Chernobyl over 30 people were killed and no doubt many hundreds will suffer from excessive radiation all their lives. A very large area of land round the reactor was contaminated and sheep as far away as on the Highlands of Scotland were affected. However, we must put this into perspective. Some years ago at Bhopal, in India, there was a severe accident at a chemical plant and many thousands of people died. In the past few weeks an accident has occurred in Alaska that has severely damaged the ecology in that part of the world. Those accidents were not due to nuclear power.

No sensible person assumes that nuclear power is likely to solve all the problems of the world's climate but I am sure— and it has been said in the debate this afternoon—that it can make a major contribution. I agree strongly with the sub-committee's comments that adequate research and development facilities must be preserved and properly used.

The privatisation of the electricity industry, whatever its merits or dermits, may I fear endanger the provision of adequate research and development. My first concern is the future funding of long-term strategic research and development and how it will fare in the new commercial enviroment. All the evidence leads one to believe that there will be a much shorter time horizon for research and development funding unless responsibilities are specifically placed for the longer-term research.

The generating bodies that will succeed the CEGB will not have the same responsibilities as the CEGB for long-term supplies of energy and long-term research and development to support it. I fully endorse the committee's view that the Government should encourage the electricity industry to devise arrangements for funding long-term research and development. If it fails to agree, the Government themselves must ensure that such arrangements are made.

Referring to the paper that we have received from the Government, does paragraph 32 mean that they accept this responsibility? Uncertainty is itself destructive and the period of uncertainty about responsibility should be as short as possible. The fast reactor and fusion are two major long-term projects in which we are now collaborating with Europe. It is right that we should do so in view of the cost and timescale of these projects.

We have entered into these collaborative arrangements and we must do so wholeheartedly. With the recent cut-backs there is a danger that our partners may regard this country as less than fully committed to these important projects. The cut-back on fast reactor research and development is extremely severe. It seems to rely on an assessment of fast reactors and the contribution that they can make, which the committee tells us is not supported by the French. However, if there is to be markedly more nuclear power, uranium will have to be burnt with an efficiency which can only be achieved effectively with a fast reactor. Therefore, I submit that research and development must be such as to keep the fast reactor option open.

I also submit—and here I agree with the committee—that the research and development programme must be sufficient to allow us to participate fully with our European collaborators; also the prototype fast reactor at Dounreay should continue to operate as long as it is useful to the European programme. If that costs more than has been allowed for, we should fund that money. Inevitably fusion is a very long-term prospect. I am aware of the belief of Sir John Cockcroft that we had solved that problem with the Zeta machine. Perhaps professors who have achieved it on a cold basis may be right. Even so, it is a long-term proposition. It is right that we should collaborate with others to the greatest possible extent.

I fully endorse the committee's view that fusion should remain the authority's responsibility up to and including the decommissioning of JET. However, I am not convinced by the suggestion that responsibility might then transfer to the Science and Engineering Research Council. Fusion is an energy technology and its successful development will require applied science and engineering. Those facts put it clearly in the authority's remit. The position will not change when JET closes down. To transfer fusion away from the authority, with all its expertise and experience, to the Science and Engineering Research Council, would inevitably be disruptive to the teams there, and I suggest that it would also be unwise.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Nelson, and my noble and gallant friend Lord Carver, I am concerned about the future, and the role and shape of the Atomic Energy Authority. All the organisations connected with nuclear power and carrying out research and development will be affected by the developing commercial pressures. But most of these organisations commission research and development in support of their main business. The Atomic Energy Authority is very different. Nuclear research and development is its main business. The authority has a wonderful record of scientific and technological achievements. I know from experience that it maintains the highest standards. Nevertheless, the Government's decision to cut support for the fast reactor and fusion research and development has meant a marked decline in the authority's scale of business and a need to reduce the number of employees. In the face of this and the uncertainties introduced by privatisation, I know that the authority is striving to become a leaner and fitter organisation. It aims to be better able to win contracts from industry and the Government by offering the best technology in a professional way and at the right price.

The move towards a leaner and fitter organisation is clearly in line with the Government's wish that the authority behaves so far as possible in a commercial manner. Yet the authority suffers from a big disadvantage as it may not participate in the commercial exploitation of any developments that it may make. That is surely quite wrong and it should be changed. I hope that paragraph 37 of the Government's paper means that this will be done. If the authority is to be restructured, it is essential that it receives a clear definition of its future role and a commitment to adequate funding to carry that out.

Any such restructuring should take full account of the interactive and multi-disciplinary nature of the authority's programmes and capabilities. The authority should continue to provide this country with the scientific and technical expertise both in support of safety and efficiency in the nuclear industry and in nuclear applied research and development. I wholeheartedly support the Committee's conclusion that there is a national need for continuing to work in the fields now covered by the authority. In order to do that the authority will require substantial special support from the Government, otherwise it fears a progressive wasting away of its magnificent and first class team of scientists and engineers. That would result in an inadequate underpinning of the country's nuclear programme. That is something which is absolutely essential should not be allowed to happen.

1.56 p.m.

The Earl of Lauderdale

My Lords, I join in this debate entirely as a layman. I did not sit on either of the Committees whose reports we have before us and to whose convenors we have listened with respect and admiration. On my own account as a layman I have raised the general problem of government funding for energy research. That is what brings me into the debate today. I raised the matter in the debate on the Queen's Speech, and I received a friendly pat on the back for what was described as a "thoughtful speech". But I received no answer then or since.

I am reminded of an occasion some 15 years ago when two young people who are now both doctors of science, but then a girl aged 9 and her younger brother aged 7, had tea with me and I took them in for a Wednesday debate. At the end of it the little girl slipped her hand into mine and said, "Yes, but what happens at the end of it all?" I said, "You must not expect the Minister on the Front Bench necessarily to understand all that is said, let alone remember it. But there is a pew of civil servants who are very highly qualified. They are looking for new ideas for government and if they once get an idea into their heads it has a way of surfacing years later as the Government's own thinking".

In addition to my noble friend who will reply to this debate, I hope that others within earshot will take note of one or two of the points I raise. What stands out in this debate is that since the convenors of the two committees spoke, all but one of the successive speakers have laboured and laboured again the call for the Government to think again about their funding of energy research. I believe there was only one speaker who did not really push that matter in the way that everyone else has done. That is little wonder when we have the opportunity to read the Government's response to this report. We have seen it all before; it was as usual and as expected. It was drafted to sound sympathetic but all its qualifications reduced it to damning with faint praise especially as regards the fast reactor and fusion.

It is worthwhile to draw attention to some of these qualifications. In paragraph 19 we are told that the nuclear R&D programme needs to be maintained and that is the recommendation of the Committee. The paragraph states that the Government are "in broad agreement". That is not full agreement. It is a good deal less than full agreement and it may be only half agreement. However, that is the phrase used to make it sound as nice as possible. In paragraph 25 it is stated that, The Government has decided to retain a position in fast reactor technology". What does "retain a position" mean? Does it mean a couple of office boys or professors? What on earth does it mean? It is supposed to sound a great deal. It may mean very little. It is not an unqualified assessment.

We are then told that there will be no need for a fast reactor in the next 30 to 40 years. If that is not a mortgaging of the future, I do not know what is. I suppose the idea is that if we leave it aside, then in 30 to 40 years' time, when it is found to be necessary, we shall buy it from the Japanese or the Americans.

Let us take the Government's reply again. On fusion, at paragraph 29, it states: 1990… will be the most appropriate time to consider" — only to consider— what further part the UK should play in this particular field of research", as if it is a branch of painting or something. If that is not playing the issue down, I do not know what is.

Then on long-term R&D, following privatisation, the reply accepts that the Government have an important role—not a critical role—a mere oversight, in seeking to ensure that strategic options are being maintained. This really is not good enough. However, it is the kind of thing that civil servants are adept at drafting. It reads all right but means little.

Paragraph 32 states that, the department…[will] assess the long-term implications and decide whether or not to fund the work referred to in that paragraph. Paragraph 35 states: The Government agrees generally and will be keeping under careful review —how often have we heard the phrase, "keeping under careful review", usually the Treasury having a hand in it as well? All this relates to the need for effective and expert continuing nuclear R&D capability. This simply will not do. If the Government are going to go further and say that there is not the money for it, or if they are going to vary their theme and try to push responsibility on to private enterprise, while being very vague indeed about the future of long-term research in the electricity supply industry, that will not do either.

I am using strong language. I shall now use other strong language in the Government's favour. One of the most important things in our national life, which has happened in the past few years, has been on the economic side. I refer to a critical change with regard to the public sector borrowing requirement, as it was known until 18 months ago. Year after year we were piling up national debt, borrowing anything from £3.5 billion to £12.5 billion in a single year between 1974 and 1987. Now the situation has been reversed. The technical term is no longer public sector borrowing requirement. It is public sector debt repayment. Even the language has changed.

What do we find? We find that in this year past the Chancellor has announced debt repayment of something like £12 billion with the advantage to the economy, or to the Treasury, of reducing annual interest charges on national debt by about £1 billion. This is greatly to the Government's credit. That alone in my view would justify any amount of privatisation although I have reservations about the ESI.

However, that is the context against which I draw your Lordships' attention to some figures that I obtained from Cabinet Office papers—they are quite open—about the amount invested by government sources in energy research in Germany, France, and Britain. I shall give the figures in pounds. The figure for Germany in the past year for which figures were available was £500 million a year. The figure for France was £380 million a year. What is the figure for Britain, with a booming economy, unemployment falling and a great sense of buoyancy? It is not £500 million. It is not £380 million. It is £190 million. This simply is not good enough. I hope that Select Committee Members continue to press the Government relentlessly, reminding them that, as the Select Committee on R & D concluded with such a satisfactory phrase, the Government are responsible for the long-term security of the nation's supply of energy.

2.5 p.m.

The Earl of Halsbury

My Lords, like those who have spoken before me, I should like to thank both the chairmen, the members of the committee and the authors of these two very interesting reports and to follow this up with an apology to both of them. It was only the day before yesterday that I knew that I was going to be free this morning of the Cardiff Bay Barrage Select Committee and able to participate in the debate. The result is that I have not studied the reports in depth as I shall, or would have done if I had had more time for preparation. I have been able to scrutinise them only for those matters that are already on my mind to see what they have to say about them.

These are all rather disconnected points because they are simply what are on my mind. The first is the reprocessing of spent fuel versus the non-reprocessing of spent fuel under two headings: first, postponing the reprocessing; and, secondly, the storage of it as if it were waste to which one would not have access. Both of these are I think wrong although one of the reports suggests that they are worth looking into. The reason I think they are both wrong is that by postponing the reprocessing we are passing the burden of cost over from our generation to the next. If we were to seal them up as if they were waste, and render them inaccessible for any kind of reprocessing, the spent uranium—which could be the basis for the fast reactor or the mixed oxide reactor—would become unavailable. One would be restoring it back to the earth; and one would practically have to mine it out; but one cannot do that because it will still be highly radioactive for quite a long time to come. Some of these materials have half-lives of something like 30,000 years. It would therefore be 300,000 years before the activity had sunk to one-thousandth of its original level

I remember very clearly a comment made by a speaker at the Nuclear Forum. The forum consists of a collection of people who are knowledgeable about nuclear power, nuclear energy, and so on. It has an annual meeting and an annual lunch. Indeed, the noble Duke, the Duke of Portland, was its president or its chairman (I am not quite sure which) for many years. I went to one of its annual conventions and on that occasion the forum included an authority on waste storage who said that, to fail to take action now is pure cowardice". That comment seems to me to be very much in line with the contents of the report and I congratulate its authors on coming down so formidably on the right side of the fence.

I turn now to the issue of Dounreay. There are two things which you cannot accelerate: one is the corrosion test, and the other is the ageing test. God has set his seal against accelerating them. A thing ages at its own speed, like me; it becomes corroded at its own speed. Whether I have become corroded yet I do not know, but I probably shall be one day. If one wishes to build something which is liable to age effects and corrosion, and one wants it to last for 30 years, then I am afraid that one must build a prototype and run it for 30 years so as to be sure that one has got the bugs out of one's technology.

The original reactor at Dounreay was primarily a materials testing reactor. The one which is presently installed there—the original having been shut down—is still a materials testing reactor; but it is also generating a significant level of useful power, I think that it is 600 megawatts thermal. However, I am quoting that figure from memory. That reactor must go on running because when it was built it was found that the design was in some ways at fault, just as the Super Phénix has been found to be at fault in some ways. The heat exchangers were suffering from corrosion and some new method of welding the tubes into their end plates had to be found which was more reliable than that which had been used originally. The authorities have found now that the technique known as explosion welding appears to have done the trick. However, those heat exchangers were re-tubed a few years ago. They must be allowed to run on to ensure that there is not a hidden snag before we eventually commit ourselves to building a full-scale fast reactor for power generation purposes.

There will of course be a tremendous hurly-burly about having any kind of fast reactor. The Green Peace voice and the "eco nuts" will disregard the fact that we have had one working at Dounreay for 30 years. The NIMBY factor will come into the matter and no one will want it. Possibly the best place to put such a reactor would be in Dounreay because the local population is used to having one there. It would really consist of nothing more than six of the nuclear boilers which we now have sitting in one large sodium pool which is shared between all of them.

I should like to put on record my memory of a piece of advice that the late Lord Hinton gave the House on this topic. He said that scaling up by a factor of six was the kind of mistake we made too often. Let it be scaled up by a factor of three; that would be much more satisfactory. Therefore the work at Dounreay must continue. The team must not be dispersed; indeed, it has taken years to put it together. Some of the older members of the team are ageing, for example, Cliff Blumfield, who used to run it, is now in retirement. However, his successor, who has been trained for the job, is now there. We must keep that team going so that it is there in reserve. Let us not think that it is just a matter of keeping going because the burn-up rates which are now being received are very high and significantly high. They make all the difference to the economics of the fast reactor because reprocessing fast reactor fuel is, in its own way, quite expensive

We must also remember that there is the mixed oxide reactor now coming forward. There you take the spent uranium oxide, after being reprocessed and recovered, and mix it up with plutonium as the fissionable element. I have no doubt that as uranium becomes scarcer we shall want to have the mixed oxide reactors alongside as thermal reactors. The whole system of nuclear power generation will never be mature and complete until we have thermal reactors working into fast reactors so that the two are in harmony with one another. You can breed enough plutonium in a fast reactor to re-fuel it about every 25 years. You can produce enough plutonium to fuel the initial fuel for a fast reactor in thermal reactors in about 15 years. I am quoting the figures from memory, but I believe that I am right.

The other point that I wish to pick up is the phrase that states that the PWR was a correct policy. It was a tragic mistake. I shall leave it to the historians of 30 years hence, when we are all dead and gone. They can get out the papers and see who influenced whom and how internal and external politics came into the decision. I shall not deal in personalities. I say only that it was a tragic mistake.

Let us take our latest AGR. Perhaps I may remind the House, as I often have before, that we do not talk of "the AGR" because there were three different designs, two of which were failures and one of which was a success. It has been duplicated at Heysham II and Torness. Torness was designed to produce 660 megawatts in each of the twin reactors; each of them is now turning out 688 megawatts continuously into the grid. That is about 4 per cent. more than their design rate. That AGR is one of the most superb pieces of engineering going. It is intrinsically safe. It has a monoface coolant. There is no reaction between the coolant and the metal of the construction, the moderator or anything like that.

The PWR that we shall have at Sizewell B will be out of date by the time it is installed because Westinghouse and Mitsubishi are working out a derated reactor with higher safety factors. If your Lordships want a good statistic, take Hunterston B and Longannet. Longannet power station is sitting on top of a drift mine. Its coal is about as cheap as anything one can get. Hunterston B is one of the successful AGRs. The 1987–88 figures for Hunterston B were 1.65p per kilowatt and for Longannet 2.2p per kilowatt. That should dispose of the idea that nuclear power is ceasing to be economic in comparison with fossil fuels. It is not.

Lastly, I wish to deal with a factor which has been introduced during the course of the debate. I owe this point to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, who talked about the need to get the press to educate the public. The press is a broker; no more than that. It sells advertising and buys entertainment, making a profit from the difference. As to what entertains, it of course depends upon who one is, but it has to cater for a broad range of people. There is a curious factor in human nature. We run a love-hate relationship with what frightens us. We hate being frightened, but at the same time we are rather fascinated by it. That is why bad news is cheap copy for the newspapers but good news is not. The press will never educate the public, because the circulation of a newspaper depends upon the public being in a muddle so that they buy it to find out what the muddle is all about.

That may be taking a cynical view of the press. Everyone thinks that its liberty is sacred, but I have no illusions about the sacredness of the liberty of the press. It is out to make money by selling advertising space and buying entertainment, and any kind of public disaster—Lockerbie, for instance—is merely cheap copy. The press does not have to pay people to think it out. It is there on its doorstep.

I have made a short speech, without much preparation, drawing on my long background in the subject, both as a member of a consortium that built nuclear power stations, most of which I have clambered inside during the course of building, and a long membership of what used to be Sub-Committee F (I believe that it still is). I believe that I did three four-year stints on that sub-committee. Finally it got rid of me. I should think that it was about time too.

Lord Campbell of Croy

My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down, and because he referred to me, he may be interested if I point out that he, rightly, has underlined the success of the AGR at Torness. That reminded me of the demonstrations in Scotland of all those who were against it being built on the site when the bulldozers were going in. That was front-page news, with photographs. The tremendous success and safety which the noble Lord has just described do not normally hit the front pages.

2.19 p.m.

Lord Williams of Elvel

My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, for introducing the radioactive waste report and to the noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, for introducing the research and development report. The debate has sparked off a series of interesting interventions from a number of noble Lords whose expertise outstrips mine. That is not difficult. The noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, has just given us an impressive technical display of pyrotechnics—if I may put it like that—on a matter to which he only addressed himself this morning or yesterday because he thought that he would be unable to speak.

I rise as an amateur in this business to put forward one or two thoughts to your Lordships. I only disagree with the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, on one point and that was when he said that the committee which he chaired with such distinction was composed of a group of ordinary Lords. His committee, if I may say so, was a group of extraordinary Lords, who were able to get their minds round an extremely difficult and technical problem. The report which he and his committee produced was, in my view, an excellent example of how people who are not trained in the business can come to understand very difficult and technical problems. So I congratulate him on that.

I enjoyed very much the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, not least because he seemed to me to put his finger on the fundamental problem of electricity privatisation: who, at the end of the day, is responsible for keeping the lights on? He quite rightly pointed out that it would be the Secretary of State. It is no good simply trying to cast off that responsibility and devolve it to any authority, privatised or otherwise. We shall come back to that debate, I have no doubt, when the Bill comes before your Lordships' House.

The two reports have a somewhat different tone. One is a European Community report and the other a domestic R & D report. Therefore, in some sense, the radioactive waste report addressed Community issues—quite rightly, because that was its remit—but adopted a slightly different stance from that of the R& D report (if I may refer to the two reports in shorthand) which seems more to address the national issue. Also, as the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, and the noble Lord, Lord Nelson, have pointed out, the radioactive waste report imposed on itself a self-denying ordinance as to whether or not it was right to go ahead with a nuclear programme, whereas the R & D report considered that point in great detail, as the noble Lord told us, and came down very firmly in favour of it.

I shall respond first to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, that his committee came down very firmly in favour of a nuclear programme. I understand perfectly the reasons why the committee came down on that side. There is however a problem, not as to whether it is right or wrong but in practical terms about the decision. The noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, I believe, raised the problem about R & D under privatisation; the report also raised it. The problem is whether in real life under privatisation the idea that we can build a series of nuclear stations in this country is realistic. Is it realistic in financial terms? Who will put up the money? Is it realistic in technical terms, realistic in commercial terms and realistic in the terms in which the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, were discussing it? Is it realistic in terms of what the public reaction will be?

If noble Lords want a demonstration of the problem, I refer them to the experience in the United States of America. That country is a major exponent of civil nuclear power. It has something like 100 out of a total of 350 operating nuclear stations worldwide, so it is a major factor. But because of the regulatory problems in the United States, the environmental problems and the media problems, if I may put it like that, or perhaps because of the public opinion problems there (we should bear in mind that industry in the United States is privately owned) no nuclear plant has been ordered within the last 10 years. There are 12 plants throughout the United States which were ordered between 12 and 15 years ago. They have still not been commissioned because the environmental or public opinion problems associated with commissioning are so great. All this has happened since Three Mile Island. Three Mile Island turned a 1 billion dollar asset as it was before the disaster, into a 1 billion dollar clean-up problem. That problem occurred even though the disaster was an on-site disaster and did not go outside the perimeter of the site. If any noble Lords think that under privatisation, after a Sizewell B or Hinkley C type inquiry, the appropriate authorisation for nuclear plants will be given, they are mistaken. If any noble Lords think that it is not possible—the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, mentioned Torness in this regard—for the people living near a plant to stop the plant operating, and if they think that setting up a nuclear plant will be an easy exercise for a private operator, they should think again.

Lord Campbell of Croy

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Perhaps I should explain that the people shown in the newspapers as demonstrators were not people living in the immediate area of the plant but representatives for organisations who had gone there in order to demonstrate.

Lord Williams of Elvel

My Lords, perhaps I should make my point clearer. The other day I went down to Hinkley Point because I thought that I should at least familiarise myself with what was going on at a rather controversial station. I was told quite clearly by all sides on the inquiry that if the people round Hinkley C—the PWR reactor at Hinkley C was the object of the inquiry—decided they were not going to co-operate with the evacuation plans in the event of a major nuclear incident, Hinkley C would not be able to operate. It would simply be cut off. This has happened in the United States. Local authorities have said to bodies wishing to build nuclear reactors in their areas that they are not going to co-operate in the safety plans. Once that happens, as I was told time and time again by management and objectors, there is a fundamental problem. That has happened in the United States, and it is my strong belief that it will happen here if the industry is privatised.

Up to now the CEGB has received a great deal of public acceptance. It has behaved like a good citizen, it is trusted, and at least at the end of the day people can say that the Government are standing behind it and it is a governmental problem. But when the nuclear industry is privatised, I think that assurance will be removed. Whatever the R&D report may recommend, I believe there will be a major problem in constructing nuclear plants in this country over the next few years.

I accept automatically what the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, said, as it came from him. However, I was told the same thing by someone else. I was told that Heysham II and Torness are now superior, in terms of technological output, to the PWR being built at Hinkley C, and that Sizewell B is 10 years out of date compared with the PWRs the French are building. There are a lot of arguments on that particular issue. I prefer British technology; nevertheless, rightly or wrongly, I believe there will be a major problem with an intensive nuclear programme.

It is for that reason that I join with the noble Lord, Lord Ross of Newport, in saying that if that is the case we really must devote more resources to research and development into non-nuclear sources of energy. We must devote research into the greenhouse effect and see how far it is possible to desulphurise and remove carbon dioxide. We have to see whether that technology is remotely near for the next century. I do not know the answer, but we must certainly go down that road. We must look at cold fusion and the Pons/Fleishmann operation. That may be completely pie in the sky. We do not know what will come of it, but we must look at these issues. The consequence of not being able to adopt a nuclear programme, as recommended by the R&D report of the noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, will be serious.

Any nuclear programme will cause problems. We are now starting to close down the Magnox reactors. Berkeley has finished its 25-year life. It has now been shut down and will be there for 100 years. The programme in which we have engaged will leave us with a series of what I shall call nuclear cathedrals around the landscape as they are shut down. Medieval cathedrals, being of great Gothic design, are visited, but nuclear cathedrals will not be visited in any circumstances. We are leaving to our children a whole block of sites around the country that will be seen as a monument to an age that had not really understood what it was doing to posterity.

This leads me on to the issue of waste. In the short run, decommissioning of stations means more waste. That is one of the inevitable consequences of running down the Magnox programme. I leave aside the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Ross of Newport, however sympathetic I am to his view that we should be scuttling nuclear submarines in the sea and surrounding their nuclear cores with concrete. That seems an excessive way of dealing with our out-of-date nuclear submarine fleet. I also leave aside the more sensational idea put forward in a number of newspapers that jumbo jets full of plutonium will be flying into Sellafield from Japan and other countries, and may blow up in the air. I accept the assurance given by the Minister yesterday that the THORP programme will not lead to the United Kingdom being a nuclear dustbin for the rest of the world. The Minister said that only two bus loads of waste had come out of THORP. Two busloads are two busloads too many.

What are the real problems? As the noble Earl, Lord Cranbrook, said, nobody really thought about these problems when the nuclear programme was first embarked upon. I remember expressions such as "radioactive residues" and "atomic ash". Those were nice, comfortable expressions about which people did not have to worry too much. Until 1983 it was general policy to dump all the waste in the sea. It was then decided that perhaps it was too dangerous to dump the waste in the sea. In July 1983 the Government announced that we would no longer dump waste in the sea and that we would have to think of something else.

There was also the issue of land disposal. As the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, rightly said, governments have been extremely pusillanimous in their approach to this problem. There is the "not in my back yard" syndrome. A number of Members of Parliament and local authorities complained when it was proposed to dump radioactive waste in their constituencies or in their local authority areas. What, I ask myself, happened to the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, which reported in 1976? It said: There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe containment of long-lived, highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future". That was said in 1976. Due to the vacillations of governments—governments of both parties; I am not trying to defend one party against the other—we do not seem to have come much further. We are in a difficult position.

Where are we now? On the question of the R&D report—subject to what I have said about the difficulty, in my view, of implementing, under privatisation, any major nuclear plant programme in this country—I accept what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Carver, and the noble Lords, Lord Plowden and Lord Sherfield, have said about the role of the Atomic Energy Authority. That must be right. I also argue that we have invested so much in Dounreay that it would be a great mistake to downgrade it now. To return to my point about the United States—the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, made this point—if one has something there, one does not have to go through the business of setting up a greenfield site operation and all the inquiries related to it. One has it there, so for goodness sake, let us keep it there. One should not shut it down or downgrade it and so have to start it up again somewhere else with all the problems that that involves. I certainly support government funding for Dounreay and keeping its present capability and present research programme, but I accept the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury—it was a very pertinent point— that, if one has a pilot project, it must be a pilot project. One cannot upgrade it half-way through into something else. If one tests metal stress or corrosion, one must test it right down the line and should not try to believe that one has tested it when one has not.

The report on radioactive waste must be right in stating that this is a European problem, not just a United Kingdom problem. Different countries will treat radioactive waste in different manners. Nevertheless, there must be close European co-operation. There must also be close European co-operation with regard to a fast breeder reactor. I do not deny that, but the radioactive waste issue is so environmentally sensitive that European co-operation in some form or another is essential.

I am a little doubtful about deep disposal. I believe that the report just brought itself back from the brink by stating that, even if we go in for deep disposal, it should be retrievable because there may well be technologies in other countries—I shall deal with that point later—about which we do not know at the moment, but which can reduce the radioactive life of the waste. Certainly, there will be surface storage before the deep disposal opportunities become available. I wonder—the report referred to this matter—whether on-site storage is not just as relevant and something that we should pursue more closely.

The problem with deep geological disposal is the transport problem which the report addressed. I find it a very difficult case to argue. I could drop so many boxes from so many metres on to so many points and platforms and everything would be all right and nothing would happen. The trouble is that one never quite knows whether, at the end of the day, the box will be defective. Perhaps the 50th box, the 100th box or the 150th box is dropped on to a point and then something goes wrong. We must pay a little more attention to the question of transport to site than the committee was able to do. We should prefer to see low level and intermediate level waste deep stored rather than stored in shallow trenches. We are still a little doubtful about the exclusion of very low level waste from the definition of waste. Some of the local authorities that have read the report have represented to us that one could find some such waste on local authority tips—although one could just as easily find cocoa beans—which might lead to environmental problems.

I have taken up sufficient of the House's time. However, I wish to draw two conclusions. First, I believe that both reports show that no one is infallible and that we have had many changes, both in nuclear technologies and in the technology of radioactive waste, which we could not possibly have foreseen 20 or 30 years ago. We cannot predict future technologies. Everything that we say today should be adjusted to that uncertainty.

Secondly, although several noble Lords have said that governments have been pusillanimous or that the media have been at fault, I believe that the agenda is changing. I join the noble Lord, Lord Ross of Newport, and my noble friend Lord Hatch of Lusby in this matter. It is not just a question of a PR campaign. People have fundamental worries about the nuclear programme and in particular about radioactive waste. Environmental consciousness is certainly rising.

The Government and the industry may believe that the probability of a major accident in 1 million reactor years, which is the present estimate, is both demonstrable and tolerable. However, so far the public remains unconvinced. In my view it is quite certain that unless the industry, government and perhaps the European Community can demonstrate to the public that they can dispose of waste and build a nuclear programme in an acceptably safe manner, the future of the entire industry will be under threat, as it is in the United States. If they believe in their nuclear programme, that is the problem which the Government should address as their highest priority.

2.41 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Energy (Baroness Hooper)

My Lords, it is a daunting prospect to respond to a debate of such scope and significance, given the calibre of the participants. Nevertheless, I assure my noble friend Lord Lauderdale that I have tried to understand and will endeavour to remember what has been said. I start by wholeheartedly thanking both committees for their excellent reports and my noble friends who introduced them this morning. We are all very appreciative of the time and consideration that committee members put into these most topical reports and their recommendations on important but distinct aspects of the nuclear industry.

As is so often the case on such occasions, the contributions to the debate have been most stimulating and constructive. As well as attempting to answer specific points that have been raised, perhaps I may make a few general comments in the course of my remarks.

I turn first to the report on radioactive waste management published last September. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Elvel, that the committee was indeed composed of extraordinary Peers. It is most timely that its report should be debated today now that NIREX has submitted its report with recommendations for developing a deep disposal site. As my noble friend Lord Cranbrook pointed out, the Select Committee on the European Communities reported that it is a key environmental issue in the European Community.

But the problems that we face are no longer technical. Like other noble Lords, I take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, on this point, although he directed most of his remarks to my noble friend Lord Cranbrook and his committee. Much work has now been done which shows that the waste management issue can be solved. The committee confirmed that when it concluded that safe disposal routes could be developed. The Government welcome the conclusion and agree with it.

The main difficulties to which the committee has drawn attention are those of public understanding, confidence and trust. I regret that alarmism should be advocated, as the noble Lord, Lord Rugby, so temperately remarked, even in the course of this debate. I can reassure my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy that the nuclear industry funds major programmes of public information. Perhaps the best known is that of BNFL at Sellafield, although the CEGB, the SSEB and the AEA also have programmes. Indeed, the latter is funded by the Government.

It has been alleged that shifts in government policy over the years have tended to undermine public confidence. The Government believe that safe disposal routes for radioactive waste are available in the United Kingdom. The main task has been to identify the most appropriate method available for managing each category of waste. The strategy will continue to be fine-tuned in the light of advice that the Government receive from a wide range of independent bodies and the results of its ongoing research programme. We recognise the importance of this issue.

The Government's policy on disposal is quite clear. Heat generating waste will be stored at Sellafield for at least 50 years to allow much of the heat and radioactivity to decay. A decision can then be taken whether to store it still longer or to dispose of it deep underground. The Government are confident that the methods of storage envisaged are safe and acceptable and that disposal facilities can be built when needed. This is based on the results of extensive research in this country and overseas. The Department of the Environment retains a research programme which has been reoriented to check that findings from research in other countries also remain applicable to the United Kingdom.

The Government believe that long term on-site storage of low and intermediate level waste is undesirable, since nothing is gained by delay in its disposal. They welcome the committee's endorsement of this policy of disposal. I welcome the confirmation of this today by the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury. There is also wide scientific and international support for such an approach. Any policy which opts for continued storage rather than disposal is simply putting off a decision that will have to be taken one day.

As I mentioned earlier, the Government have only recently received NIREX's report containing its plans for the disposal of low and intermediate level waste in a deep repository. NIREX recommends that a repository should be constructed in the form of a mine under the land, and that the next steps should be to carry out detailed geological studies, including the sinking of boreholes, in the vicinity of Sellafield and Dounreay. The further evaluation of the geology of these two areas will enable NIREX to decide on their suitability for construction of a repository, or whether it will be necessary to evaluate other sites.

Perhaps because of the concern expressed, it may be helpful to the House if I go a little more fully into this timetable. NIREX's report and recommendations were submitted to the Government on 28th February this year. On 21st March the Government accepted NIREX's recommendations that a repository should be constructed in the form of a mine under the land and that the next steps would be to carry out the detailed geological studies that I have referred to. The Government agree that it is for NIREX to obtain the necessary planning permissions through the normal procedures, which will certainly include that of environmental impact assessment. Only when those investigations have been undertaken will NIREX be in a position to submit proposals for a substantive development to seek the necessary approvals.

The investigation programme, which will take up to 18 months to complete, will look not just at the geology but also at the social, environmental and radiological impact of such a development. NIREX is working to build just one national deep disposal centre to serve the nation for at least50 years. I am glad to hear that we have YIMBYs in our midst, and no doubt note will be taken in the appropriate quarters. The Government have, however, made clear that a public inquiry into the granting of the necessary planning consent for construction of the disposal centre will be necessary. An environmental assessment, as I have said, will be carried out in accordance with the guidance given by government departments under the current planning regulations.

The safety aspects will be examined in detail by the regulatory departments of government before disposal can take place. Initial construction will take several years, and it is expected that the first package of waste will be consigned in the disposal centre in the early years of the next century. I understand that NIREX is working to the year 2005.

Detailed records will be maintained and designs adopted to retain an ability to recover the waste if this were deemed necessary, certainly during the operational life of the centre. The Government believe that the continuing availability of Drigg for low level waste and the interim storage of intermediate level waste at nuclear establishments will meet needs until the deep repository is available.

My noble friend Lord Cranbrook specifically referred to RWMAC. The Government welcome the advice from the RWMAC, which it consulted on the NIREX Report. The setting up of a public interest panel is a matter for RWMAC, but the Government will take note of the outcome of any such meeting.

The committee has emphasised the need to proceed to disposal as soon as practicable. The Government welcome that conclusion. However, I emphasise that there can be no short-circuiting of the site selection procedure. It is for NIREX to obtain the necessary planning permissions; but only when further work has been undertaken will NIREX be in a position to submit proposals for a substantive development and to seek those necessary approvals. The development would have to comply with the strict safety standards laid down and enforced by the authorising and regulatory bodies.

The Government welcome the committee's acceptance of the conclusions of the report commissioned by the Department of the Environment on Magnox reprocessing. They also welcome the endorsement of government policy that THORP should be completed. The Government are confident that the methods of storage envisaged for heat generating wastes are safe and acceptable. We now have a clear duty to formulate the options for disposal as we see them at present, and to develop the supporting scientific and technical knowledge so that future generations will be better placed to make the eventual choices.

Reprocessing is a proven and safe technology which enables uranium and plutonium to be recycled as fuel. A change to a strategy of long-term storage and direct disposal would deny the strategic benefits of the recovery of uranium and plutonium. In the first instance it is for the CEGB to assess whether there are advantages to long-term storage of AGR fuel as an alternative to early reprocessing.

The noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, raised the question of cracks in a crane at the Wylfa plant by an earth tremor in July, 1984. In September, 1984, during the phased refurbishment of the Wylfa crane, small cracks were discovered in the support pillar. On examination, they proved to be aged cracks which would have occurred well before the earth tremor in July, 1984. That was confirmed by studies carried out by a civil engineering consultant. Those studies also confirmed that no damage to the reactor building had resulted from the tremor.

While on the subject of public perception I should like to take up the statement made by the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Elvel. He said that in the United States no new nuclear stations have been ordered in the past 10 years because of the Three Mile Island accident. That is true, but many nuclear stations have been commissioned since that accident. Evidence now exists to show that public opinion is beginning to move back in favour of nuclear in response to concerns about: the greenhouse effect, acid rain and other environmental issues.

Lord Williams of Elvel

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. Can she produce the evidence? What is the evidence?

Baroness Hooper

My Lords, the evidence is the interest which is being generated. It is demonstrated by the fact that in the United States commercial companies are showing themselves willing to start the generation of electricity in this way.

I now turn to deal with nuclear research and development. The topic was introduced by my noble friend Lord Nelson of Stafford with particular reference to commercial programmes.

As your Lordships will be aware, the non-fossil fuel obligation in the Electricity Bill is intended to ensure that the overall nuclear programme is maintained. The Government expect that the privatised ESI companies will focus on research which is relevant to their commercial needs; on near market and on research supporting their operations; and that they will aim to do this in an efficient and cost-effective manner. The future of individual research programmes and facilities will therefore be a commercial matter for the CEGB and SSEB and their successor companies.

It is of course possible, even probable, that the new privatised companies will not always see their R&D priorities in quite the same way as their predecessors did in the public sector. And after privatisation, just as now, the Government will have to assess the implications of any changes and decide whether the Government should become involved and which programmes should continue in the national interest. The department's energy R&D programmes, including nuclear, will continue to be reviewed annually by the Advisory Council on R&D.

As regards the privatised industry, my noble friend Lord Nelson of Stafford asked whether, if the Government have accepted ultimate responsibility for long-term energy R&D, have they have not also accepted responsibility for long-term security of supply. It is correct that the distribution companies will have a duty to supply under the Bill and it will be the duty of the director general of electricity supply to regulate the companies in that and in other respects.

As the Select Committee on Science and Technology recognises, in the important area of safety, the licence requirements ensure, and will continue to ensure, that the generating companies carry out nuclear safety R&D as well as operate their nuclear stations safely.

The committee has endorsed the Government's decision to transfer overall responsibility for nuclear safety research to the Health and Safety Commission from 1st April 1990. Guidelines are to be given to the HSC by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State. These will ensure that adequate and balanced programmes of nuclear research into thermal reactor safety continue to be carried out. The HSC's programme will be determined in the light of consultation with the industry on the industry's own programmes so that the commission has a complete picture of the UK safety research effort. The Atomic Energy Bill, which your Lordships have already considered, provides for the HSC to recover its costs from the industry.

On the subject of longer term R&D, I welcome the committee's endorsement of the Secretary of State's announcement of 21st July 1988 on the future of the fast reactor programme. The Government have decided to retain a position in fast reactor technology although the programme is being reduced in line with the expectation that there will not be a commercial need for fast reactors in the UK in the next 30 to 40 years.

The continuing work and retaining a position in the UK will be carried on as part of the European integrated effort to develop a common European fast reactor design. The European collaborative agreements signed earlier this year on 16th February formalised the UK's position as an effective partner in the European programme.

Perhaps I may say to my noble friend Lord Erroll of Hale and indeed to others who raised that subject that the United Kingdom is retaining a position in the technology. It has reduced expenditure in line with the extended timescale to commercialisation. Our European partners understand that that is the basis on which we continue to collaborate with them. We have as much access to their information as they have to ours.

I fully recognise, in relation to the fast reactor, that the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, is particularly concerned about the position at Dounreay; as are other noble Lords. The Government's decision on the fast reactor allows time to plan for the future. The consultants' report identifies a range of opportunities which must be pursued with vigour, supported by the Highlands and Islands Development Board and the Government. With the skilled and dedicated workforce of Caithness, the Government believe that the area will remain an attractive location for employers in the private and public sectors.

Viscount Thurso

My Lords, does that mean that we get the £30 million which the consultants recommend?

Baroness Hooper

My Lords, I understand that no decisions have yet been taken on the consultants' report. However, no doubt the noble Viscount's remarks will be taken into account when the decision is made.

In reaching a decision on the fast reactor, the Government very much hadin mind their obligations to the people of Caithness. I believe it was the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, who agreed with the Government that their funding of the prototype fast reactor to 1994 will produce much additional useful information on fuel development and the behaviour of materials. Funding of the reprocessing plant to 1997 will be necessary to enable the plant to assist in the de-commissioning of PFR. If PFR had been kept running until 1997, as the noble Lord suggested, the reprocessing plant would have needed to continue for a further period as the only plant designed and built to reprocess PFR fuel. As it is, the de-commissioning process will continue for a long time into the future.

In this context we are fully aware that the Japanese expenditure on fast reactor development is significant. However, the position in Japan is very different from that in the United Kingdom. The Japanese economy is much larger than ours and Japan has few indigenous energy resources, in which we are fortunate to be rich. Moreover, Japan is not as advanced in fast reactor technology as is the European collaboration.

In common with the Government, the committee takes a cautious approach to fusion, given its extremely long-term nature. The Government will, of course, fulfil their existing international obligations including the JET project at Culham. As the committee noted in its report, fusion research is such that international collaboration is the only practicable way forward. A review of the Community fusion programme is due in 1990 and that is why we are taking 1990 as the most appropriate time to consider what further part the UK should play.

I was urged by the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, to consider ITER rather than NET for post-JET projects. The Government recognise the importance of wide international collaboration as a means of sharing the cost of fusion research more widely. However, it is too early to say whether the original parties will wish to further worldwide international collaboration when the present ITER conceptual design activities are completed in December 1990.

There has been considerable worldwide speculation—surprisingly, voiced very little in this debate—on the growing number of reports that various groups of scientists have observed controlled nuclear fusion using comparatively simple apparatus in the laboratory at room temperature. The interest shown in these reports is understandable. If true, such experiments can have profound and far-reaching implications.

Speculation about the possible implications of these reports has come before the scientific evidence of the basic experiment has been validated. Due to the scientific uncertainties it would be quite wrong to speculate on the feasibility of scaling up the experiments to the point at which larger power outputs can be obtained. We must first establish whether it is possible and safe to do so. Experiments are under way at Harwell to validate and understand the electro-chemical processes that have been observed. I remind my noble friend Lord Lauderdale that if we put all our eggs in one basket, as I understood him to be advocating, and if we do not keep our programme under constant review we may not be ready to take up the challenge of such new developments.

The Earl of Lauderdale

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. The phrase "keeping under constant review" is one that we have heard for years and years, but it does not always mean very much. I hope that "constant review" means that. I am sure that my noble friend will see that it does.

Baroness Hooper

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his confidence. As the committee correctly notes and as was particularly pointed out by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Carver, and repeated by many of your Lordships, the changing picture of nuclear research and development will have a considerable effect on the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. I am very happy to have this opportunity to acknowledge the important contribution that the authority has made and continues to make.

Nevertheless, prospects for the authority's traditional business over the next two to three years are clear following the decisions taken last year to scale down work on the fast reactor and fusion. The authority has therefore begun to restructure its business and it now operates as a trading fund. It is expected to make a return on capital. It has borrowing limits and it is expected to operate increasingly as a commercial venture. In particular, it recognises the need to reduce overheads to the minimum possible. The Government are providing financial support for restructuring costs.

The Government recognise that there is a need to examine the AEA's future role, and to this end a firm of management consultants has been working with the authority in looking at strategic options for the future. The Government will consider those at the appropriate time. The noble Lord, Lord Plowden, and others deprecated the uncertainty that this may bring. The Government recognise that a long period of uncertainty would not be helpful to the authority and its employees. A statement will be made as soon as the Government have weighed the options and reached conclusions.

The noble Lord, Lord Gregson, and others referred to the greenhouse effect and the need for switching further to energy sources that are not producers of CO2, such as nuclear and the renewables. That is certainly an option that we intend to employ. However, in this context we recognise any effective response on climatic change and the greenhouse effect will have to be on an international scale. We are supporting the ongoing scientific programme in order to ensure that this is a long-term commitment because results will not be forthcoming for a number of years. The programme needs to be internationally organised because the whole world contributes to the problem and the whole world will need to work together towards its solution.

Our commitment to continued diversity of electricity supply will provide the basis for a flexible response to the situation as it develops and as we await the long-term scientific information. UK energy policies which are in hand will encourage increased energy efficiency, will encourage the use of natural gas as one of the cleaner fossil fuels and will increase development of nuclear power and the development and exploitation of the renewable sources of generation where they are shown to be economically viable and environmentally acceptable.

The noble Lord, Lord Ross of Newport, referred to clean coal technology and Grimethorpe. The current phase of the fluidised bed combustion process research being undertaken there has come to an end and the new topping cycle process which is being proposed for that site is under consideration.

The Government take into account many factors in considering research and development expenditure on diverse sources of supply and energy efficiency. These include the state of development of technologies, their closeness to commercial exploitation, the size of their potential contribution and who was funding R&D in the private and public sector. This is why we believe that is necessary to keep it under regular, if not constant, review.

We also believe that the inclusion of the non-fossil fuel obligation in the Electricity Bill will help to ensure that environmental problems such as climate change and acid rain are not needlessly added to. The noble Lord, Lord Nelson of Stafford, asked specifically about funding for the NNC design team. Funding of the design team at NNC is secure to the end of the first conceptual design phase. Decisions thereafter will have to be taken in the light of the progress made towards the design targets. This will be a matter for the electricity supply industry and the nuclear industry to take into account.

I hope that I have covered most of the points raised. I shall of course look carefully at Hansard to ensure that this is so. In conclusion, I should like to thank noble Lords for the opportunity that we have had to debate these important issues. Although there may be some points of difference between us, there is, I believe, a large measure of agreement on the overall approach that the Government are taking both on nuclear R&D and on radioactive waste management. Overall the United Kingdom has a record of which to be proud in our development of nuclear power. In maintaining it as an option for the future the Government are determined that we can continue to be proud of our achievements in this field and that safety will remain paramount in all operations, from research and development, through the operation of nuclear stations, to de-commissioning and radioactive waste management.

3.13 p.m.

The Earl of Cranbrook

My Lords, I am conscious that a specific question was asked of me by the noble Lord, Lord Hatch. I would not wish him to feel that I left it hanging in the air. He asked me what we meant in paragraph 181 by the "misapplication of resources". In essence, that was answered subsequently by the noble Lord, Lord Rugby, who made it clear that we were worried that the chase for perfection with ever multiplying demands put upon nuclear organisations could lead to very expensive controls which did not achieve any great advantage and thereby was a totally unnecessary expenditure. That was the purpose of those words.

The other points were all dealt with later on in the debate. I draw the noble Lord's attention to the remarks on the use rather than the abuse. I was not talking about the abuse of the communication media. I refer to the remarks of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, when the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, was perhaps sensibly taking a lunchtime break.

However, in a powerful speech my noble friend has responded to many of the important questions that were raised today. I drew attention to the fact that there are many rather small recommendations in our report. Our report came technically from the Select Committee of this House appointed to consider Community proposals. Perhaps I may reserve my position. I shall read her speech carefully in Hansard. If there are any other points still outstanding to which I feel an answer is needed, I shall try to use the committee system to write a letter to her.

Having said that, I must add that I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate today. I feel that the debate has done a great deal to clarify the issues on this subject which is moving as fast as ever. In fact, it has picked up speed and there are some extremely important and interesting developments which are about to happen.

With those words, I commend the Motion to the House.

Lord Hatch of Lusby

My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down—although I know he is not responsible for this matter—will he agree with me that as we have all been in agreement on the necessity for genuine education to the mass media it would have been appropriate if the debate had been televised? Will he further agree that this matter should be brought to the attention of the television committee of the House?

The Earl of Cranbrook

My Lords, I have no personal feelings on the matter one way or the other.

On Question, Motion agreed to