Space Policy

HL Deb 30 March 1988 vol 495 cc762-75

2.54 p.m.

Lord Shackleton rose to move, That this House takes note of the report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology on United Kingdom Space Policy (2nd Report, 1987–88, HL Paper 41).

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I must first of all apologise to your Lordships. It is necessary to use a number of terms which are peculiar to the space world. If anyone wants to check them, there is a glossary in our report. If I refer to the bus it has nothing to do with a London bus or the Clapham omnibus, it is in fact the structure that carries the instruments into space.

Our inquiry into United Kingdom space policy began in January 1987. We set out to discover what United Kingdom space policy was, how it was being implemented and how it might be improved. As we say in the report, this was easier said than done. At that time we were expecting a Statement of the Government's policy and we were expecting to have the space plan which had been drafted by the British National Space Centre for submission to the Government. We were advised that these were likely to be forthcoming. But there has been no Statement of government policy; nor has the original British National Space Centre report been published.

There has been so much talked about it that the first question I wish to ask the Secretary of State is whether this forgotten report could be published even at this stage. We could then know what former advisers thought about space. The whole space community has been left in suspense. And we are still in suspense, wondering for instance when the British National Space Centre will have a new director. British policy in space appears to be rudderless. Indeed, morale is appalling in that part of industry which is interested in space development. It is pretty poor in the British National Space Centre.

The Government may say that it is for the Government to make up their mind. But they have actually made up their mind once. They made a very encouraging gesture for the future of space. I want to tell your Lordships what they said and what they agreed to in 1985 after the Rome meeting of the European Space Agency. At that time it appeared that the Government were committed to space and to an adventurous space programme. I wish to quote from the actual agreement to which the Government attached their support. This said among other things that the member states of the European Space Agency, agree to a balanced long-term space plan for the next decade I stress the word "decade". The agreement continued: along the lines proposed by the Director-General leading to a comprehensive, autonomous European capability in space and containing the following major elements: in-orbit infrastructure programme, space transportation systems programme and programmes for earth observation, telecommunications, microgravity, space science and technology … The Ministers welcome and endorse the proposal to undertake as an optional programme in the field of in-orbit infrastructure the Columbus programme as a significant part of an international Space Station programme as proposed by the United States of America … The Ministers welcome and endorse the proposal to undertake as an optional programme in the field of space transportation systems the development of the Ariane 5 launcher". This programme is now going ahead, but it is going ahead without the United Kingdom which alone of the 13 member states has backed off from the 1985 agreement.

It is worth noting that Mr. Clarke commenting on the programme was very rude about it. He said that it was grandiose, that the European Space Agency was adding too much and that that agency was going ahead with a programme which was quite exorbitant. But that was the programme which we had agreed to support three years before.

Industry is not surprisingly confused and indeed worried. It was encouraged to invest quite considerable sums. Firms like British Aerospace, Marconi, Logica, GTS and others were all gearing up for what appeared to be a likely development in which we would take part.

The present policy of Her Majesty's Government, so far as we can detect it, is to spend £120 million on space. That sum has been repeated on a number of occasions by Ministers. It appears that this fixed sum—what we have spent—is the deciding factor regardless of the merits of the case.

The first announcement that there would be no increase was made by the Prime Minister in another place in a supplementary answer to a Question just before the Summer Recess. Yet four months later in November the Government's annual review of their expenditure on R&D said: following NASA's invitation to ESA to join in the international space station project, the UK plans to become a participant through the ESA Columbus programme. That is a most extraordinary contradiction in Government statements. One might say that it is an oversight and that it slipped in. However, it came four months after the Prime Minister made her statement. Indeed, when the review was published Mr. Kenneth Clarke, at a meeting of ESA Ministers in The Hague, made clear that he could not agree and that he refused at that moment to agree to Columbus or any of the new optional programmes. That caused great dismay to our European colleagues and to other members of the European Space Agency.

We are left with a programme for space which is built on an expenditure of £120 million a year. A little earlier it was said that the figure was £112 million. However, if the Government say that it is £120 million, we are happy to accept that. Our point is that the Government have got their sums wrong and that is the result of their own policy. As we said in our report, that level of spending gets the worst of all worlds—too much for real savings and too little for lasting achievements. If the budget is to stay at that level, some people think that the United Kingdom might as well bow out of space now and stop rocking our European colleagues.

Can we afford to bow out of space? Let me summarise some of the reasons why the all-party committee felt that the United Kingdom ought to be in space. It is a very broad case and it is not a simple one to make. It has many separate ingredients. First, there are a number of successful applications in space already. Communications is the obvious example. It is broadly commercially successful. The business of the City could not be conducted without it. There are also some successful applications as regards earth observation. I have no doubt that there will be many more to come. There is much to learn in the field of science which is exciting. There is much to learn not just about astronomy but about the nature of the earth itself and how to manage it. Many noble Lords will be aware of the hole which appeared in the ozone layer in the Antarctic. That was not discovered from space but from land by the British Antarctic Survey. It will be monitored from space. Space is important in earth observation in countless ways. Some noble Lords who will speak later will be able to give reasons for that. It is very valuable in crop forecasting, oceanography and meteorology.

Thirdly, we need to be in space for defence reasons. That is an interesting subject. Although the committee was confined to considering the civil applications of space, it could not ignore the fact that there are military satellites. We had evidence from the Ministry of Defence. Needless to say, it told us nothing, even in camera. However, if noble Lords want up-to-date information, I have a report which gives it. No one likes to talk about resolution. They think that the highest resolution is 10 metres, using the French Spot satellite. However, the current generation of United States military observation satellites, such as the Big Bird series in comparatively low orbit, provides resolution of objects on the ground of less than a metre. Indeed, the new Key Hole series is supposed to get resolution down to 20 or 30 centimetres. France also, in connection with its Helios programme (about which it speaks openly, although we are not supposed to mention Zircon), is expected to get down to a low figure for resolution. If noble Lords wish to check that for themselves, I recommend the report, which comes from the Assembly of the Western European Union. Mr. Stokes, an MEP, was responsible for the report. It is a valuable document. We only received it because we checked with our European friends. Defence is an important area because we cannot afford wholly to rely on others to give us information as we always have in the past.

The next aspect is that of technological development. That does not involve a straightforward argument. It is not easy to tell which is the chicken and which the egg in the relationship between space technology and national development. However, it is fairly certain—although people in industry and people such as the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, are more competent to speak on the matter than I—that the technological leaders of the 21st century will be those who have gone into space technology. I feel sure that the Secretary of State, who is so interested in developing technology, will realise that that is not just the view of those who have invested in space. They have invested in space partly because of encouragement from the Government and partly because of the inspiration it has given to them.

As regards the element of foreign relations, I do not need to stress how unfortunate the somewhat abrasive remarks of Mr. Clarke have been to our European friends and allies. It is bodies such as the European Space Agency with which we shall have to co-operate. That is a very successful example and it is not a bureaucratic, grandiose organisation. I do not know who told Ministers that it was. I do not know who went there to examine it. If they do not believe me, they can read the Chatham House Report. The ESA is one of the better European institutions. What has been said to such people as Dr. Luce, who is the director, has been hurtful. I am glad to say that those people are very forgiving and that even now they do not want us to withdraw. However, serious harm will be done to European integration by that kind of behaviour.

That brings me to my last point. It is the other side of the coin of international co-operation—the political element of national competition. When all the major industrial countries of the world and several of the developing countries invest heavily in space, there must be a good reason for it. What do we know that they do not, in deciding not to compete? I cannot believe that we alone are right. In the 21st century that will be a challenging area.

Finally, perhaps I may quote Professor Wolff on space. He said: It is what is going to switch people on". The British are not very easily switched on, unlike the French who are very committed. To the French, leadership in space is a matter of national sovereignty. That is not a reason which, on the whole, appeals to the British. Professor Wolff continued: If the space programme did nothing else but that, the cost to the nation would still be worthwhile. It is the tragedy of this country that we have been so screwed down to utilitarian thinking that we have left out the inspiration, and the inspiration is what finally makes it worthwhile". Sceptics will say that it costs a lot of money. That is quite true. It is certain that we cannot afford to do it alone. We need to look at all the ingredients and not just at the immediate commercial benefits. We need to look at the economic and long-term commercial benefits. In economic terms, 70 or 80 years ago no one saw the commercial value of the aeroplane. We know the commercial value of motor cars; it is another £800 million.

That brings me to the place of the public and private sector in the development of space. The cost of most space activity is enormous and, frankly, the risks are too great for the private sector to carry the main burden at this stage of development. The technological risks are high; the commercial risks are high; the the time scale for profitability is long. In those circumstances, few companies can afford to gamble their whole future. However, some have invested a great deal. Some of the programmes just depend on public support to build up the infrastructure for future development by the private sector.

As I have said, we cannot do that alone. We need to be in ESA. Anyone who thinks, as the Government appeared to think at one time, that we can join at a later date, should know that the conversations which I have had with European leaders indicate that we cannot expect any favours in the long run. Their national interests will force them to close ranks and they will get the contracts.

We said that the United Kingdom must play a more constructive part. The plans should be published and promoted by a reinvigorated British National Space Centre. An expanded earth observation programme—which follows from our earlier report on remote sensing whether it is earth observation or remote sensing—and collaboration with the Canadian RADARSAT are ways to achieve this.

With regard to our own programme, we took the view that we should not contribute to Hermes and we supported the Government in that. For the foreseeable future, space offers enough opportunity for tele-controlled craft for the involvement with man in space to be—at least for the Europeans—an expensive and hazardous diversion. There are scientists who say that they do not want astronauts putting their sticky fingers on their beautiful instruments at this stage. Anyhow, it is not necessary to put a European into space. Given that the Americans are to build a space station, Europe is right to participate in that through the Columbus programme. We argued that British participation should be confined to the advanced pressurised module and, subject to certain qualifications, the polar platform.

We also take the view that HOTOL is a long way in the future. The proof of concept stage is now nearly complete and if that is satisfactory we should press on. The fact that it is a classified patent should not restrain us from allowing our European allies access to it, but I certainly hope that the British will develop this aspect. For these and other reasons we recommended that total national expenditure over a period of five years should rise to £200 million, of which about £25 million and no more would probably come from industry.

On 10th February the Government decided to miss the European boat. That was the day on which decisions on optional programmes had to be taken. The Government decided not to join Ariane 5 and they decided not—or did not agree—to join the Columbus programme. The only new step, which I very much welcome, was that the earth remote sensing satellite data centre should be built. Of course we have put a lot of money into ERS-1. That is the first ESA satellite for earth observation, which is due to fly in 1990.

I can only say that I was appalled by the other decisions of the Government, if they were decisions. Effectively they cut us out of participation in European space projects. However, there is a ray of hope. When he was not slanging the Europeans, in rejecting the Columbus programme, Mr. Clarke used the words: "as presently proposed". There have been changes. While I regret very much that we are where we are, we have to accept that to a large extent the Government's decisions are irrevocable. But if it is the intention to stick with a maximum expenditure of £120 million, what do we do next?

There are two deadlines which have to be met urgently. Once concerns the Canadian RADARSAT on which a decision has to be taken before tomorrow night. It is a crucial part of the earth observation programme. We have joined discussions with the Canadians and the Americans. The Canadians have put off a decision two or three times. If we do not join they will either cancel the project or, more likely, they will turn to the United States to make the platform for RADARSAT. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Shaughnessy, will speak in this debate and will be able to argue this point more forcefully.

We originally proposed that we should be the prime contractor for the polar platform, which is also a vital earth observation platform. ESA has now extended the deadline to the middle of April and participation is still possible. I hope that we shall also support ERS-2. The advantage of RADARSAT is that it provides a more direct, less European, a more national, element in our programme. Furthermore, it will be operational, whereas the ERS-1 is purely experimental. For an extra £10 million we could participate in both the polar satellite and RADARSAT. We could participate in one of those within the existing budget.

There are other arguments which noble Lords will be able to develop. The launch of RADARSAT and of the polar platform—which will be about 1998—could keep us in space, in Europe, and indeed to some extent could enable us to keep faith with our earlier undertakings.

Before I close perhaps I could ask the noble Lord to look again at the Government's decision to block any increase in the Horizon 2000 science programme. On that subject, Mr. Clarke said that Professor Bill Mitchell, the chairman of the Science and Engineering Research Council, and I had to make it clear that there could be no justification for such a proposal".—[Official Report, Commons, 12/11/87; col. 578.] That was a reference to an increase in the science programme.

Did Professor Mitchell really say that there could be no justification for that proposal? Because all the scientists who are involved know that it is going to wreck the programme. I know that he said that if he had the money he would rather spend it elsewhere. That is fair enough. But I think that the Government want to be more accurate, unless the Minister can confirm that that is in fact what he said, in which case there is plenty of evidence to show that he is wrong.

I hope that we shall remain in Europe. I hope that we shall play our part, a part which the Government mapped out three years ago. I hope that the Minister will recall that this is a subject which is vital to the long-term future of this country. It is 20 years since the noble Lords, Lord Jellicoe and Lord St. Oswald, and I initiated a debate on space in the course of discussing the air Estimates. I remember the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, saying that he had no intention of flinging satellites round the moon. There are hundreds of satellites. That is no reflection on the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham.

Moreover, unlike the captain of the Star Ship Enterprise who goes boldly into space, the noble Lord does not appear to be going anywhere into space as captain of the Department of Enterprise. We look to him to override some of the very earth-bound thinking. I do not think that he is just a little earthling; I think he is capable of a measure of judgment. I shall be surprised if, at the end of the debate, he finds any support on the Government side—I should be prepared to take a large bet and I will myself contribute to funding our involvement in the European space agency. My Lords, I beg to move.

Moved, That this House takes note of the Report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology on United Kingdom Space Policy (2nd Report, 1987–88, HL Paper 41)—(Lord Shackleton.)

3.18 p.m.

Viscount Caldecote

My Lords, I am sure that the House will be extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, for so ably and comprehensively introducing the report of his committee on United Kingdom space policy. I believe that it is a most valuable report indicating how we may make the best use of our opportunities in space. I shall not go through all the recommendations with which broadly I agree.

The exploitation of space, with its very special environment, creates extreme difficulties. It is a very awkward issue to deal with. The technology is expensive, effective international collaboration is highly desirable but extremely difficult to achieve and the return on investment is long-term and uncertain. I welcome very much this comprehensive report on United Kingdom space policy. It is particularly important in helping us to assess the optimum level of expenditure in this field.

There are two main divisions of space policy. First, there is research. The objective of research in any field is to increase knowledge, for example in astronomy, microgravity and the like. But in this kind of research there is no clear indication of the practical value that will result.

It can therefore be argued, as some have done, that it should receive extremely low priority in present circumstances because the British problem principally concerns how to use existing knowledge more effectively rather than how to add to it. On the other hand, if effort in this field is too low, experienced teams break up, the best research workers go abroad and the long-term advantage is lost. I am told that when the decisions which led to the virtual break-up of the British National Space Centre were taken last year, advertisements immediately appeared around the country, particularly near the works of such companies as British Aerospace, Marconi and the like, tempting people who had been working on our programmes to go and work in France, Germany or Italy.

I shall not pursue further the issue of research. There are other noble Lords who are more competent to do so and I shall leave it to those experts to argue the case relating to the research effort. I should like to concentrate on opportunities in space for its commercial exploitation.

Space is a new environment with many special features but there is no doubt at all in my mind that there will be major commercial developments there over the next 50 years. Some 25 years ago when I was working in the British Aircraft Corporation a lot of work was being undertaken on research satellites. The company produced for instance the Skylark rocket, which was very successful. It was purely a research tool. At that time it was realised that it was very important to get into the commercial exploitation of space.

I remember very well that the company, together with the Society of British Aircraft Constructors, sent a deputation to the Government which made a case to the then Postmaster General and the Minister of Aviation that we should enter the field of communication satellites. The then Minister of Aviation turned to the Postmaster General and asked, "If we put up a communication satellite will you take any interest in it?", and the reply was, "We might take one or two lines". As we all know, tremendous advances have taken place in communication satellites, but as a result of that attitude and the decision by the government of the day, we lost 10 to 15 years of exploiting opportunities to develop telecommunications through satellites.

I believe that it is very important to make sure that we do not take the same kind of damaging decisions now and that we do not miss opportunities as we did then through lack of government support and a wrong, or perhaps vacillating, policy for this new industry. If we can get ahead in this field it will be of great benefit to manufacturing industry and consequently to our national prosperity.

I understand that in the field of satellite communications British Telecom and Mercury enjoy a protected position and a monopoly until 1990. After that date the position is not clear because then they may not still enjoy that monopoly. On the other hand they may do so. Naturally they and other customers such as clients for the direct broadcasting satellites buy their satellites in the cheapest market where they can get the best value for money. There are many manufacturers and suppliers of satellites in the world but very few contracts. It is therefore a highly competitive business.

The profit from putting up such satellites for communications ultimately accrues almost entirely to the operators and therefore there is very little flow of profit available to industry to support further development. It is impossible for manufacturers such as British Aerospace, Marconi, Logica and the like to justify a substantial investment on such a poor risk-reward ratio.

However, the situation would be transformed if an assurance could be given that after 1990 the British Telcom-Mercury monopoly would be restricted to telecommunication satellites giving access to the public service network. That would allow British industry to form consortia with operators and financial institutions for point-to-point private service networks, which would enable companies that take communications on the satellite networks to provide their own point-to-point services. Many companies would have to take those services on one satellite in order to make it a commercial proposition. I understand that at the moment that is not possible because of the monopoly.

I ask Her Majesty's Government through the noble Lord the Secretary of State who is to reply to tell us at least that they are seriously considering removing the monopoly position that now exists so that British industry can plan ahead. If planning started today a satellite could probably not be put up until 1992 or 1993, but if industry were given a clear indication that there were opportunities and that it would not be kept out by a monopoly, I have not the slightest doubt that it would take those great opportunities, consortia would be formed and money would be forthcoming from the City, just as has happened in the case of the Channel Tunnel, which is also a very long-term investment.

In the United States the experience of de-regulation has been quite remarkable. The expansion of the services available to the public has been considerable and they have been greatly improved. That has led to a great expansion of the industry itself, with considerable benefit to the national prosperity and the strength of its economy.

An important aspect of working in space is the requirement for reliability of components. In an aircraft the vital elements can be triplicated and if one goes wrong it can be put right when the aircraft lands. However, if something goes wrong in a satellite, to put it right, even if that is possible at all, is a very expensive undertaking. There is therefore an enormous premium placed on reliability. The big space programme undertaken by the United States some years ago gave a great impetus to the design and production of very reliable components, which is of the greatest importance particularly in the electronics industry.

The other area of great opportunity lies in earth observation and remote sensing and surveying satellites, to which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, referred. We must accept that there has been some change of circumstances since the report of the Select Committee was published. Her Majesty's Government have made clear that they believe that £200 million is too large a sum to spend on research and development in this field. They plan to spend £120 million. Since that decision was taken further work has been done by industry and it is now clear that the UK could participate effectively in the European Space Agency-USA collaborative programme Columbus—in the polar orbit satellite platform in particular—and in the Canadian RADARSAT programme, which was also mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and on which, as he indicated, a decision is very urgently needed. The United Kingdom could take part in those two programmes effectively with a total UK contribution of something like £10 million to £15 million per annum of new money in 1989 rising to about £30 million per annum from 1990 onwards, thus making a relatively modest increase to the £120 million that the Government are already proposing to spend.

With firm commitments for the industry over perhaps four years for a programme of that kind I have not the slightest doubt that industry itself will also be prepared to put money into such a programme and reduce the figures even further so far as the government contribution is concerned. Industry indeed supports that kind of investment. Over the past year it has invested just over £1 million in order to support the polar platform and the RADARSAT programmes and to maintain a UK option for participation in those very important projects. If that private venture initiative and expenditure had not been undertaken, we should already have lost the possibility of participating in those important programmes.

There are great opportunities for industry. There is also an urgent need to show our European partners that we really are Europeans and that we want to take part in the collaborative programmes that are going ahead in Europe. If we do not do that how can we expect them to believe that we are serious about our commitment to the Europe of 1992? I urge Her Majesty's Government—and I hope that the Secretary of State will be able to reassure us on this point—to continue negotiations to ensure UK participation in the Columbus programme in an appropriate way, and I hope that they will take a decision to go ahead with the RADARSAT project in co-operation with Canada.

Finally, perhaps I may return to one point to which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, referred—the chaotic situation in the British National Space Centre. The director and the assistant director have both left. There is no leadership. The BNSC was intended to form a focus for space R&D expenditure activity and it showed every indication of succeeding in doing that until the sharp reversal of policy in 1987—less than two years after BNSC was set up.

I believe that investment in space should be concentrated mainly where opportunities for commercial return exist. But some research on a longer-term basis must continue. Above all, for success there must be stability of policy, including, but not exclusively, international co-operation, particularly in Europe. I am sure that activity in space will grow and become of increasing importance in the 21st century. UK industry must be in a position to participate effectively. Government must give support in pump-priming investment in research and the like. It is not solely for government; it is for industry also to take the initiative, as it has done. However, we must be in a position to co-operate and participate in European programmes as well as carrying out our own programme and where possible to take the lead in international co-operation.

3.31 p.m.

Lord Williams of Elvel

My Lords, the House will certainly be grateful to my noble friend for introducing this debate on United Kingdom space policy, not least because it gives us a chance to find out what United Kingdom space policy is. We all look forward to the intervention of the Secretary of State, in the hope that we shall be clearer at the end of his intervention about what direction the Government are taking. I am sorry to observe that he shakes his head, but we always live in hope.

One of the most depressing and, if I may say so, slightly annoying features of the Government attitudes towards space policy is the manner in which policy changes seem to dribble out. It is depressing because British Ministers frequently behave at international meetings as though they wished that they were somewhere else; and changes are apparently announced by the Prime Minister, as my noble friend Lord Shackleton said, in answer to Questions in another place. It is somewhat annoying because, as my noble friend has said, the signals that are sent out to other governments are generally negative and create doubts in their minds about the seriousness of our intentions. It is annoying because of the effect that such signals can have on governments who look to the United Kingdom to give a lead. Lectures on the internal problems of the European Space Agency—which is perhaps a coded way of saying that the French call too many of the shots—and the vague hope that private industry will pick up the tab, are no substitute for a clear and straightforward statement of policy. We hope that we shall have this from the Secretary of State at the end of the debate.

In order to help stimulate such a statement let me say as clearly as I can that the Opposition support the conclusions of your Lordships' Select Committee, and we urge the Government to do so. Britain cannot credibly maintain membership of the Euro space club by paying a bare minimum subscription to ESA. We cannot make any claim to change its priorities unless we are prepared to make a larger contribution. As my noble friend said, we must remain a member of ESA. There is no realistic option, as the committee pointed out. We can then argue about individual items in the ESA programme and quite possibly modify them. But we have in parallel to be prepared to co-operate in some projects that we do not like.

At the same time as an increased contribution to the ESA programme there must be a more effective national programme alongside. Without this parallel, fuller role in ESA the major benefits to the British aerospace industry, which the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, mentioned, will be lost. If our Government do not support British industry it is frankly absurd to expect other governments to do so. It must be the Government who take the lead. Even if a consortium of private sector British companies could be put together to make the massive investment in space that is required, the philosophy is wrong, as the noble Viscount explained very clearly.

There will be benefits to come from space research. They will be extremely long-term and hard to predict precisely when and where they will come. After all, one profitable spin-off of the space programme of the 1960s was the non-stick frying pan, but it is easy to imagine what manufacturers of kitchen equipment would have said if one had invited them to take part in the space programme of the 1960s. It is easy for Oppositions to argue that the Government should spend money on almost anything because by nature Oppositions are not in government. If the funding requirements that the committee recommend were enormous then we should have to look carefully to see that we did not fall into that trap. However, they are not enormous compared with the sums that the Secretary of State announced in his Statement yesterday. The optimum level is believed to be around £200 million per annum, with spending through ESA accounting for about £130 million and the rest going to national and bilateral programmes. This seems to us to be relatively modest when compared with some of the major programmes that are going forward in France, Germany, the United States and Canada.

Not only is the target relatively modest, but if ever there was a suitable application of the proceeds of privatisation I should have thought that that was it. If we privatise industries, then it makes sense to invest the proceeds in the future of the nation. It is clearly in the national interest that the proceeds should be so invested. The Government will receive several billion pounds over the next few years from their privatisation programme, if we believe what we are told. Therefore, is the financial problem a real constraint? That does not seem to me to be an argument that can be fully sustained.

My noble friend drew our attention to two deadlines for decision that will have to be met within the next few days: that on RADARSAT and the polar platform. Participation in both projects would have direct and clear benefits for British industry as well as sending out a clear signal that we are still seriously in business. Participation in neither would signify that we are prepared to drop out of the race. I believe that these discussions will be the litmus test of the Government's intentions and we must hope that they do not fail us.

Nothing that I have said means that we would support indiscriminate expenditure. We share the doubts about programmes designed solely to put man, or for that matter woman, into space. But each programme has to be examined against a series of criteria, not simply against the criterion of whether participation in it will overrun an apparently fixed financial platform.

What will the programme do by way of spin-off for British industry? That is the point that the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, made. How will it help or hinder international collaboration, whether in Europe or bilaterally, with the United States or Canada? Will it help to raise the general level of civil research and development in British industry which we all recognise to be far too low? Will it add to the efficiency of our defence effort? These are the criteria by which space programmes should be judged—and perhaps by one other to which I shall refer in a moment. We must be able to pick and choose from the menu that is set in front of us. But to be able to pick and choose from the menu one has first to sit down at the table, be prepared to order a meal and accept that the restaurant may not be able to produce exactly what is wanted in exactly the way one wants it, and there may have to be a compromise. But in all events one has to participate, and participate with enthusiasm.

We contrast this with the somewhat dry language of the DTI White Paper of last January—on spending: "No increase is proposed". The DTI is taking a fresh look at the distribution of support for individual European and domestic programmes. There is not much excitement to be found there. And this would be the last criterion that I would add—excitement. From the evidence given to your Lordships' Committee there is one project which commanded tremendous enthusiasm—the HOTOL programme. One witness described it as the touchstone to a range of new technologies for Britain in the 21st century. Another witness, no less than the chairman of Rolls-Royce, said that it would require substantial government funding and a positive and long-term United Kingdom commitment to space vehicle development.

That is what we want and need—enthusiasm, excitement and long-term commitment—for even if there is no detectable and tangible commercial justification for Government to make long-term commitments to space research spending, there are other reasons. Simply put, we believe that it is exciting to extend the sum of human knowledge and push out the frontiers of our experience. I know that will be dismissed in some quarters as being old-fashioned romanticism, but I do not think it is the worse for that. That is the kind of message that needs to go out from your Lordships' House today if the supporters of space research are to mobilise, outside the scientific and political establishments, those constituencies which will really shift public opinion.

We must stress the benefits of being able to watch our own planet from satellites: how we can monitor pollution, agricultural development, find new water resources, discover new mineral deposits, learn to manufacture in gravity-free environments and develop new drugs. It is the excitement of it all that must be conveyed to the public. Then they will want to be part of it. If they want to be part of it, Britain will be part of it. That is the message. The message is very simple and I only hope that the Government have got it.