Lords Sitting of 22 July 1988

Preamble
The House met at eleven of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Worcester

Football League Clubs
Lord Harris of Greenwich Lord Harris of Greenwich asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they will publish details of their proposal for a compulsory national membership scheme for Football League clubs before presenting legislation to Parliament.
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, a working party under the chairmanship of my honourable friend the Minister for Sport is being set up to look at the principles and implementation of a national membership scheme. We will publish details of the scheme when the working party has completed its work.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, in thanking the noble Lord for that reply perhaps I may welcome the fact that he is going to publish the views of the working party before moving to any form of legislative action.
Perhaps I may ask him two questions. First, does this proposal relate exclusively to football and to no other sport? There is a great deal of anxiety throughout other sporting interests in this country that they will be covered. Perhaps the Minister can say whether that is true or false. Secondly, are the Government going to suggest that steps of this sort should apply to third and fourth division football clubs? If that is so, many will be driven out of business and very few of those clubs cause the police anxiety as regards public disorder.
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, in answer to the noble Lord's first question, the proposal refers exclusively to football. On the second question regarding third and fourth division football clubs, we shall have to wait until the deliberations have been completed.
Viscount Craigavon: My Lords, perhaps I may ask the Minister whether those people not represented on the working party will be encouraged to make submissions on their particular aspects of knowledge?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, I am not entirely sure to whom the noble Lord is referring. However, I assure your Lordships that the Football Association, the Football League, the Home Office, the Department of the Environment, the police and an expert on computer technology will be on the working party. I suspect that that probably covers most causes.
Lord Dean of Beswick: My Lords, is the Minister not aware that the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, is correct, in that the last legislation which was bulldozed through another place and then bulldozed through this House towards the extreme end of the parliamentary Session was ill-conceived
1584
and is still in some respects unnecessary? Perhaps the noble Lord will reassure us that the working party's report will be made available in time for your Lordships' House to discuss it fully in advance of any proposed legislation? To do that any other way could well end up disastrously for some of the poorer clubs, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said.
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, I hope that my initial Answer made that quite clear.
Lord Harmar-Nicholls: My Lords, even at this late stage, would it not be possible for the Luton Football Club scheme to be voluntarily accepted in order to avoid legislation, which is always a problem? The operation of that scheme makes legislation unnecessary.
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, I do not believe that it is fair to try to accept a decision when we are setting up a working party or to try to pre-empt its views of alternative possibilities.
Lord Peston: My Lords, following the earlier question, can we be assured that the working party will take cognisance of the views of those of us who actually go to football matches, stand on the terraces and travel by public transport? Therefore, we are aware of the facts of the matter, which are that there is not a great deal of football hooliganism except in one or two isolated spots. A scheme of this sort seems to me to be quite excessive.
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, the noble Lord is not the first to have brought this matter to your Lordships' attention and I shall bring it to the attention of my honourable friend.
Lord Monson: My Lords, are the Government seriously proposing that it should be illegal for someone who only wishes to attend a football match once every two or three years without possessing a membership card to do so? Are they aware that football is not the cause of young male aggression but merely one of many convenient outlets for it?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, the Government accept that football is not the sole cause of hooliganism. But I believe that all your Lordships will be aware that there have been the most horrific scenes over the past few years.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, following on from the last question, does the noble Lord appreciate that those of us who have followed football for half a century or more and who love the game want to do our best to deal with hooliganism? Does he appreciate that we recognise the truth of what he said on 24th June—and he said this twice—that hooliganism at football matches is a symptom of the general violence in society and must be dealt with? Is it not unfortunate that those invited onto the working party have already said they they condemn the whole scheme as impractical and expensive for smaller clubs? Is the National Federation of Supporters Clubs, which represents the people who go through the turnstiles, going to be invited? One fears that this scheme has been devised on a national basis by people who have never been through a turnstile in their lives.
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, the FA and the league are to be represented on the committee. I should like to think that they will be listening to the supporters of their various clubs, because they are the life blood of what is their club.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, the noble Lord referred to horrific scenes at football matches. Is he aware that much of the public disorder that takes place occurs outside football grounds? Is he further aware that introducing on a statutory basis some form of national membership scheme will not in any way prevent disorder in the streets around grounds but could drive a number of the smaller clubs out of existence?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, I consider the matter in this way. If the Government were seen to he doing nothing after the scenes in West Germany we have all seen on television there would be an uproar. That is why we have this working party and why it is to produce a report.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, is it not the case that the Government have made up their mind and are asking the working party to work out the details without going into what should be done to deal with hooliganism?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, the working party is set up in part response to previous voluntary attempts to deal with the problem which have not been a success to date.

Child Abuse
11.14 a.m.
Lord Harris of Greenwich Lord Harris of Greenwich asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether the social services inspectorate of the DHSS is satisfied with the numbers of qualified staff dealing with alleged child abuse cases in the social service departments of inner London boroughs.
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, as a result of concern about social work staff levels the department's inspectorate carried out a survey of referrals to social services departments in London, including child abuse cases. The results of the survey were made available to London directors this week.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for that reply. Does he not agree that there is deep concern about a situation in which it is said that over 600 children at risk of sexual or physical abuse are not being supervised by social workers because of severe staff shortages in inner London? That is the situation in some of the most deprived areas in this country. What do the Government propose to do about it?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, of course the situation is extremely serious. No one can deny the case made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris. It is for local authorities to determine priorities for allocating their resources. Urgent action is needed by
1586
authorities to achieve better management and deployment of staff within available resources and staffing levels. The social services inspectorate met with London directors of social services this week to urge such action and will be monitoring and reviewing the effects over the remainder of the year.
Baroness Jeger: My Lords, can the Minister say whether his Ministry or the Government are giving any advice on the structure and content of training for social workers in this field? Does he not agree that it is inter-agency training that is needed so that not only social workers but health visitors and community nurses—even the magistrates who make the place of safety orders—are better informed about these difficulties?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, there is a need for inter-agency improvement. The Government accept that there is a need to improve the training provided for social services staff but they wish to see improvements which benefit all staff and not just the few who are at the qualification stage.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that following the Cleveland report it is a matter of serious concern that the answers he has given indicate an absence of any intention on the Government's part to take immediate action? Is the noble Earl further aware that some of us find it surprising that the Government, who on a number of occasions have been ready to intervene in the affairs of local government, are not prepared to take some form of action on this occasion.
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I stress again to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, that the Government are acutely aware of the situation and regard it as extremely serious. The Government are doing everything possible speedily to solve the problems. I am sure your Lordships know that on 6th July my right honourable friend the Minister for Health undertook to introduce a new Bill to make child care law simpler and clearer.

Iranian Airbus Disaster
11.17 a.m.
Lord Kennet Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they objected to a draft statement in the Council of Ministers of the European Community about the United States' shooting down of an Iranian airliner when all other member states, including those with naval forces in the Gulf, agreed to it.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Glenarthur): My Lords, it is not customary practice to comment on confidential discussions between the Twelve in political co-operation.
Lord Kennet: Very well, my Lords, let us try another tack. Can the Government confirm that the recent unanimous statement of the United Nations Security Council did not make any claim that the shooting down of the Iranian airliner had been an act of self-defence but stated, or implied, that it was, on

1587
the contrary, a tragic mistake? Can the Government therefore confirm that the claim by the President of the United States and our Prime Minister that it was an act of self-defence has now been decently buried?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I think the noble Lord will be aware that there are two investigations in hand at the moment; one by the United States Navy and one by ICAO. Therefore, I am unable to comment further on the details because we must await the outcome of those investigations. We welcome the unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 616. It is a significant achievement that the Security Council was able to agree on the text which was also broadly acceptable to Iran.
Lord Mellish: This is a most extraordinary situation. While we all agree that the shooting down. of the Iranian aircraft was tragic, and no one can deny that, it is followed almost immediately by an offer by Iran to sue for peace. Does the Minister learn any lessons from that?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, like the noble Lord I too deeply regret the loss of life. Many of us share his view; we all have deep sympathy for the bereaved. It is certainly a tragedy for all concerned. It underlines the urgent need for an early end to the Iran-Iraq conflict and to attacks on shipping. The signs of acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598 by Iran are very encouraging but much remains to be done. We have to urge both sides to negotiate rapid and detailed implementation plans.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: My Lords, if it is not out of order, I revert to the Question on the Order Paper. I ask my noble friend whether our European friends might not have appreciated that the British Government have more practical experience of the problems facing the commanding officer of a ship at war already in action with gunboats than any of them? Is it not correct that the view of the British Government, based upon that experience, is entitled to great respect?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. We certainly have that experience. We are also keen to ensure, as my noble friend would expect, that the principle of the right to navigation in the Gulf is upheld and all that goes with it.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, we strongly welcome the support which Her Majesty's Government gave yesterday to the United Nations resolution and to the five points contained in it. Can the noble Lord tell the House that the Government are satisfied that British naval forces in the Gulf are aware of the detailed movements of passenger aircraft in the area so that the possibility of any future tragic error may be avoided?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord that lessons are being studied as regards the safety of civil aircraft in the Gulf and that all possible steps will be taken to prevent this kind of thing happening again.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, will the noble Lord clearly dissociate the Government from the point of view
1588
expressed from the Labour Benches that a good way to get a country to do what one wants is to shoot down a civil airliner flying over the territorial waters of the country in what is not a war zone?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, it is up to the noble Lord to place whatever interpretation he finds it necessary to place. I confess that I did not find it necessary to place that interpretation on any of the remarks.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, I am very much obliged. I do not know whether it is the noble Lord's hearing or a deliberate attempt to misrepresent me. There is not a tittle of truth in what he said.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, I am extremely sorry that I should have been misunderstood. I was referring to the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Mellish. If I have missed the fact that he left the Labour Party some time ago then I apologise to him and even more so to the Labour Party.
Lord Mellish: My Lords, I wish to get it straight. I am not on the Labour Benches.
The Lord Privy Seal (Lord Belstead): My Lords, questions are addressed to Her Majesty's Government. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has set an extremely bad example in sending people off down this particular road.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, I ask the House to take note of the fact that I have apologised.
Lord Belstead: My Lords, the apology has been accepted and now is the moment to move on to the next business.

Youth Training Scheme: Regulations
11.25 a.m.
Lord Henderson of Brompton Lord Henderson of Brompton asked Her Majesty's Government:
What progress has been made in the drafting of the regulations under the Social Security Act designed to ensure that young people not ready for youth training schemes are able to receive income support; and, in particular, what steps are being taken to make sure that young people designated while in school as having a moderate learning difficulty are clearly included in the definition of those who should benefit from the regulations.
The Earl of Arran: We are satisfied that the arrangements for 16 and 17-years-olds adequately cover those who cannot benefit from the YTS opportunities that are available. However, we will review the situation should experience prove that there is a problem with young people with moderate learning difficulties.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for that moderately satisfactory reply. I ask him to review, not in the future, but immediately, after what he has heard at Question Time today, the regulations that are the subject of

1589
this Question. Is the noble Earl not aware that while I admire the work of the Department of Employment as regards including the handicapped in the YTS, the definition in these draft regulations is too restrictive? Is the noble Earl aware that those incapable of work or training are defined as suffering from,
"some disease or some bodily or mental disablement"
which is,
"unlikely to end within 12 months because of the severity of the disease or disablement".
Does the noble Earl not agree that this definition is far too restrictive and cannot and should not cover those with moderate learning difficulties? Would the noble Earl kindly ensure that the draft regulations are amended to cover those with moderate learning difficulties who should benefit under the scheme?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, if the forthcoming legislation reveals groups that are out on a limb, as I have already said, that situation will be kept under constant review. The YTS is open to all young people judged to he eventually capable of obtaining employment. A YTS place is guaranteed to all eligible young people with disabilities including those with moderate or severe learning difficulties if they want a place. Therefore, the YTS is able to help young people who are not yet capable of work. Special provisions are made to enable disabled young people to profit from the YTS.
Baroness Turner of Camden: My Lords, is the Minister aware that there is already a great deal of concern about the possibility of young people being conscripted into the YTS because of lack of financial support'? Does the noble Earl not agree that it is even more disturbing if young people with learning difficulties are similarly treated? Does he not further agree that it would be to the advantage of the public and the taxpayer generally to ensure that such persons had income support until they were able properly to benefit from a YTS place?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, I am aware of the point that the noble Baroness makes. Benefit is now paid and will continue to be paid to young people continuing in full-time education, where a young person is severely mentally or physically handicapped as a result of which he is unlikely to obtain work within the next 12 months and in certain other circumstances. I have those details before me which I can reveal to the noble Baroness if she so requires.
Lord Hayter: My Lords, does the Minister realise that we are not talking about young people with mental disability, to quote the draft regulations, but about those with moderate learning difficulties? Would it not be much more appropriate for them to be interviewed, not by a medical practitioner, but by a careers officer?
The Earl of Arran: My Lords, it is the normal practice for a medical practitioner to carry out the interview. It has been the practice for many years that medical evidence of incapacity is normally required for the purpose of obtaining invalidity benefit though it is the independent adjudication officer who decides what is acceptable evidence. A doctor is best placed to give an opinion on incapacity for work.

Criminal Justice Bill [H.L.]
11.27 a.m.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Earl Ferrers): My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons amendments be now considered.
Moved, That the Commons amendments be now considered.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[References are to Bill 70 as first printed for the Commons.]
COMMONS AMENDMENT
1 Clause 1, page 2, line 8, at beginning insert 'Where extradition procedures under this part of this Act are available as between the United Kingdom and a foreign state,'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 1. It may be for the convenience of the House if, at the same time, I speak to Amendments Nos. 2 to 6, 11 and 52 to 55. These are drafting amendments which are aimed at clarifying the scope of Part I of the Bill.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 1.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
2 Clause 1, page 2, line 9, leave out 'a foreign' and insert 'that'.
3 Page 2, line 12, leave out 'a foreign' and insert 'that'.
4 Page 2, line 13, leave out from 'in' to end of line 16 and insert
'accordance with those procedures.'.
(1A) In this Part of this Act—
"extradition procedures" means the procedures set out in sections 3 to 10 and 12 to 17 below; and
"extradition arrangements" means arrangements made with a foreign state under which extradition procedures will be available as between, the United Kingdom and that state.'.
Page 2, line 18, at end insert 'and relating to the operation of this Part of this Act'.
Page 2, line 21, leave out from 'arrangements' to 'with' in line 22 and insert 'relating to the operation of this Part of this Act in particular cases (in this Part of this Act referred to as "special extradition arrangements") made'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 2 to 6 en bloc.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 2 to 6.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
7 Clause 1, page 2, line 38, at end insert—
'(aa) any conduct which by virtue of subsection (7)(b) below is treated as conduct in the territory of a foreign state and which satisfies the conditions in paragraph (a) above;
or".'.
8 Page 3, line 4, leave out 'outside the United Kingdom'.
9 Page 3, line 14, at end insert 'punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment'.
10 Page 3, line 19, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
'(b) conduct on a colony or dependency of a foreign state, or a vessel, aircraft or hovercraft of a foreign state, shall be treated as if it were conduct in the territory of that state'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 7 to 10 en bloc. It may be for the convenience of the House if at the same time I speak to Amendments Nos. 267, 269 and 273. These are drafting amendments which arise from a need to clarify what is for the purposes of the Bill an extradition crime.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 7 to 10.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
11 Clause 2, Page 3, line 29, leave out, 'this Part of this Act shall apply' and insert 'extradition procedures shall be available'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 11. I spoke to this with Amendment No. 1. I commend the amendment to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 11.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
12 Clause 4, page 5, line 40, at end insert—
(3A) The High Court of Justiciary may, by Act of Adjournal, make rules as to the procedure for service under subsection (2) above in Scotland.'.
13 Page 5, line 44, at end insert—
'(4A) An authority to proceed shall specify the offence or offences under the law of the United Kingdom which it appears to the Secretary of State would be constituted by equivalent conduct in the United Kingdom.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 12 and 13.
It may be for the convenience of the House if at the same time I speak to Amendments Nos. 40, 41 and 274. These are technical amendments relating to the procedure for extradition, particularly as regards Scotland. I commend the amendments to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 12 and 13.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
COMMONS AMENDMENTS
14 Clause 5, page 6, line 8, leave out 'a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate or by' and insert—

'(i) the chief metropolitan stipendiary magistrate or metropolitan stipendiary magistrate designated for the purposes of this Part of this Act by the Lord Chancellor; or

(ii)'.

15 Clause 6, page 6, line 40, leave out 'a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate' and insert 'the chief metropolitan stipendiary magistrate or a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate designated as mentioned in section 5(1)(a) above'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 14 and 15.
It may be for the convenience of the House if I speak at the same time to Amendments Nos. 20, 22,
1592
31, 32, 57, 258, 275, 288, 397 and 398. This group of amendments to Clauses 5, 6, 8 and 12 of the Bill and to related provisions in Schedules 1 and 14 have two main purposes. First, to embody in law the present arrangements whereby extradition cases in England and Wales are dealt with at Bow Street Magistrates' Court; and secondly, to delete references to committal in custody and to make provision for the fugitive's committal in custody or on bail. I commend the amendments to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 14 and 15.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
16 Page 6, line 43, leave out 'subject to subsection (4) below'.
17 Page 7, line 1, leave out 'Subject to subsection (4) below,'.
18 Page 7, line 12, leave out from 'state' to 'sufficient' in line 13 and insert 'there is no need to furnish the court of committal with evidence'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 16 to 18. I know that some noble Lords dislike the principle reflected in Clause 6(4) but this has been debated extensively during the passage of the Bill. The Government remain fully committed to the establishment in certain circumstances of extradition arrangements which do not have a prima facie requirement. However, in carrying this through into the operation of the committal arrangements, the wording of this subsection could be improved and this is the intention of these amendments. I commend them to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 16 to 18.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
19 Clause 6, page 7, line 43, leave out from 'court' to 'unless' in line 45.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 19.
It may be for the convenience of the House if at the same time I speak to Amendments Nos. 21, 23 to 30, 33 to 35, 260 to 264, 276, 277, 279, 280 and 282 to 286. Although this group of amendments cover a lot of paper, they are largely technical and seek to correct and to improve the drafting of provisions relating to appeals by the requesting state and the fugitive both under Part I and in amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 and the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act. I commend the amendments to the House
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 19—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
20 Clause 6, page 7, line 46, leave out 'may commit him in custody or on bail' and insert 'shall commit him'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 20. I spoke to this with Amendment No. 14. I commend it to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 20.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
21 Clause 6, page 8, line 2, at end insert—
'(8A) if the court commits a person under subsection (8) above, it shall issue a certificate of the offence against the law of the United Kingdom which would be constituted by his conduct.'
22 Page 8, line 3, leave out from beginning to 'shall' in line 5 and insert—
'(9) A person may be committed in the exercise of the power conferred by subsection (8) above either to custody or on bail.
(10) If the court commits a person to custody in the exercise of that power, it may subsequently grant him bail if it considers it appropriate to do so.
(11) If—

(a) the court is not satisfied as mentioned in subsection
(8) above in relation to the person arrested; or

(b) his committal is prohibited by a provision of this Part of this Act, it'.

23 Clause 7, page 8, line 6, after 'order', insert 'of committal'.
24 Page 8, line 7, after 'above', insert 'in respect of the offence or, as the case may be, any of the offences, to which the authority to proceed relates'.
25 Page 8, line 11, at end insert—
'(1A) If the state seeking his surrender immediately informs the court of committal that it intends to make such an application, the court shall make an order providing for his detention, or directing that he shall not be released except on bail.
(1B) Rules of Court may specify—

(a) a period within which a state must make such an application unless the Court grants a longer period; and

(b) a period within which the court of committal must comply with such an application.'

26 Page 8, line 12, leave out 'refuses to state a case' and insert 'of committal fails to comply with an application under subsection (1) above within the period specified in Rules of Court'.
27 Clause 7, page 8, line 21, leave out subsection (4) and insert
'(4) Where the court dismisses an appeal relating to an offence, it shall by order declare that that offence is not an offence in respect of which the Secretary of State has power to make an order under section 9 below in respect of the person whose return was requested.
(4A) An order made by a metropolitan magistrate under subsection (IA) above shall cease to have effect if—

(a) the court dismisses the appeal in respect of the offence or all the offences to which it relates; and

(b) the state seeking surrender does not immediately—

(i) apply for leave to appeal to the House of Lords; or

(ii) inform the court that it intends to apply for leave.

(4B) An order made by the sheriff of Lothian and Borders under subsection (IA) above shall cease to have effect if the court dismisses the appeal in respect of the offence or all the offences to which it relates.'
28 Page 8, line 23, leave out subsection (5).
29 Page 8, line 31, at end, insert—

'(6A) The House of Lords may exercise any powers of the High Court under subsection (3) above and subsection (4) above shall apply to them as it applies to that Court.

(6B) Subject to subsections (4A) and (4B) above, an order under subsection (1A) above shall have effect so long as the case is pending.

(6C) For the purposes of this section a case is pending (unless proceedings are discontinued) until (disregarding any
1594
power of a court to grant leave to take any step out of time) there is no step that the foreign state can take.'

30 Page 8, leave out line 32 and insert—
"(7) In the application to Scotland of this section, subsections (6) and (6A) shall be omitted and, in".
33 Clause 7, page 9, line 3, leave out from beginning to 'that' in line 5 and insert—
'(3) Without prejudice to any jurisdiction of the High Court apart from this section, the court shall order the application's discharge if it appears, to the court in relation to the offence, or each of the offences in respect of which the applicant's return is sought'.
34 Page 9, line 15, at end insert 'relevant to the exercise of their jurisdiction under section 3 above or subsection (3) above.
35 Page 9, line 17, leave out from 'pending' to end of line 22 and insert '(unless they are discontinued) until (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 21 to 35 en bloc.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 21 to 35.(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
COMMONS AMENDMENTS
36 Clause 9, page 9, line 29, leave out 'to await his return'.
37 Page 9, line 46, leave out 'confirmed' and insert 'conferred'.
38 Page 10, line 3, leave out subsection (6).
39 Page 10, leave out line 6 and insert—
'(7) Unless the person to whom it relates waives the right conferred on him by subsection (8) below, he shall not be returned to the foreign state'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 36 to 39.
Perhaps I may speak at the same time to Amendments Nos. 42 to 50, 255 and 287. The purpose of these amendments is to improve the drafting of some additional safeguards inserted into Clause 9 during consideration of the Bill in another place, and to take account of the experience of a recent extradition case. None of the amendments goes to the substance of what Clause 9 at present contains. The new statutory right to make representations to the Secretary of State remains, as does the right to seek judicial review of the decision to return the fugitive. I commend the amendments to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 36 to 39.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
COMMONS AMENDMENTS
40 Clause 9, Page 10, line 8, after 'as', insert—
'(a) in England and Wales,'.
41 Page 10, line 9, after 1981, insert 'or
(b) in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary by Act of Adjournal'.
42 Page 10, line 10, leave out 'the person, to whom the order would relate and insert, 'he'.
43 Page 10, line 12, leave out 'issue' and insert 'make'.
44 Page 10, line 13, leave out subsection (9).
45 Page 10, line 16, leave out 'until the end of the proceedings for judicial review' and insert 'so long as the proceedings for judicial review are pending'.
46 Page 10, line 19, leave out from 'as' to end of line 23 and insert 'pending (unless they are discontinued) until (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal'.
47 Page 10, line 24, leave out subsection (12) and insert—
(12) A warrant under this section—

(a) shall state in ordinary language that the Secretary of State has considered any representations made in the exercise of the right conferred by subsection (3) above; and

(b) shall explain in ordinary language the rights conferred by this section on a person whose return to a foreign state has been ordered under this section.

and a copy shall be given to the person to whom it relates as soon as the order for his return is made.'.
48 Page 11, line 8, after 'withdrawn', insert 'or unless an order is made for it to lie on the file'.
49 Page 11, line 10, at end insert—
'(14A) In the application of this section to Scotland, the reference in subsection (14) above to an order being made for the charge to lie on the file shall be construed as a reference to the diet being deserted pro loco et tempore.'.
50 Page 11, line 21, leave out subsection (16).
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 40 to 50 en bloc. The amendments are consequential with Amendment No. 12 to which I spoke earlier. I commend the amendments to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 40 to 50.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
51 Clause 10, page 11, line 32, leave out 'that he waives the rights conferred on him by section 8 above'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 51. It may be for the convenience of the House if at the same time I speak to Amendments Nos. 256 and 257. These are drafting amendments intended to bring Part I of Schedule 1 of the Bill into line with Clause 10 and to remove an otiose phrase from that clause. I commend the amendment to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 51.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
52 Clause 11, page 11, line 44, leave out 'this Part of this Act shall apply to' and insert 'extradition procedures shall be available in the case of.
53 Page 11, line 45, leave out 'they' and insert 'the arrangements'.
54 Page 11, line 47, leave out 'them' and insert 'the arrangements'.
55 Page 12, line 8, leave out 'this Part of this Act applies to' and insert 'extradition procedures are available in the case of'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 52 to 55 en bloc. They were spoken to with Amendment No. 1. I commend the amendments to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 52 to 55.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
56 Clause 12, page 12, line 1 1, leave out from 'person' to 'the' in line 21 and insert 'committed under section 6 above is still in the United Kingdom after the expiration of the relevant period, he may apply to the High Court or the High Court of Justiciary for his discharge.
(1A) Unless he has instituted proceedings for judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision to order his return, the relevant period is—

(a) the period of two months beginning with the first day on which, having regard to section 8(2) above, he could have been returned;

(b) where a warrant for his return has been issued under section 9 above, the period of one month beginning with the day on which that warrant was issued.

(1B) If he has instituted such proceedings, the relevant period is the period expiring one month after they end.
(1C) Proceedings for judicial review end for the purposes of this section—

(a) if they are discontinued, on the date of discontinuance; and

(b) if they are determined, on the date on which (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal.

(1D) If upon an application under this section'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 56. This is a technical amendment made necessary by the changes made to Clause 9 in this House. Clause 9 now incorporates a statutory period in which the fugitive may seek judicial review. The provisions in Clause 12 which enable a fugitive to be discharged if his surrender is delayed must be amended to take account of this. I commend the amendment to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 56,—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
57 Clause 12, page 12, line 24, leave out 'from custody'.
Earl Ferrers: I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 57. This is consequential on Amendment No. 14. I commend the amendment to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 57.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
58 After Clause 17, insert the following new clause:
"(Persons serving sentences outside country of conviction)
(1) This section applies where—

a request is made—

(i) by some person recognised as a diplomatic representative of a foreign state in the case of which the Extradition Act 1870 applies or as between which and the United Kingdom extradition procedures under this Part of this Act are available; or

1597

(ii) by or on behalf of the Government of a Commonwealth country which is a designated Commonwealth country, as defined in subsection (1) of section 2 of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967, or the Governor of a United Kingdom dependency, as defined in subsection (2) of that section,

for the arrest and return of a person in the United Kingdom who is alleged to be unlawfully at large from a prison in which he was serving a sentence in pursuance of international arrangements for the repatriation of prisoners sentenced in one country ("the country of conviction") to serve their sentences in another ("the country of imprisonment"); and

(b) there are furnished with the request—

(i) particulars of the person whose return or surrender is requested;

(ii) particulars of the offence of which he was convicted (including information sufficient to justify the issue of a warrant for his arrest under the relevant legislation);

(iii) a certificate of the conviction and sentence; and

(iv) a certificate of the international arrangements for repatriation under which he was held.

(2) Where this section applies, the relevant legislation shall have effect—

(a) if the request is from the country of conviction, as if the person to whom the request relates were alleged to be unlawfully at large from a prison in that country; and

(b) if it is from the country of imprisonment, as if he were alleged to have been convicted of a corresponding offence under the law of that country committed there,

and the question whether the person to whom the request relates is to be returned shall he determined, subject to subsection (3) below, in accordance with that legislation.
(3) A person shall not be returned under subsection (2)(b) above unless—

(a) the offence was committed in the country of conviction; or

(b) the offence was not committed there but was committed in circumstances in which he might be returned on a request made by the country of conviction.

(4) In this section "the relevant legislation" means—

(a) if the request is made by some person recognised as a diplomatic representative of a foreign state in the case of which the Extradition Act 1870 applies, the Extradition Acts 1870 to 1935 as they apply in the case of that state;

(b) if it is made by some person recognised as a diplomatic representative of a foreign state as between whom and the United Kingdom extradition procedures under this Part of this Act are available, the following provisions of this Act, as they apply in the case of that state—

(i) section 1(1) to (8); and

(ii) sections 2 to 17; and

(c) if it is made by or on behalf of the Government of a designated Commonwealth country or the Governor of a United Kingdom dependency, the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 as it applies in the case of that country or dependency.

59 Clause 18, page 14, line 9, leave out '17' and insert '[Persons serving sentences outside country of conviction]'
60 Page 14, line 10, leave out 'and Schedule 1 to this Act'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 58 to 60. The purpose of the new clause introduced by Amendment No. 58 and consequential Amendments Nos. 59 and 60 is to deal with a highly technical difficulty which arises in connection with the transfer of sentenced persons. The clause enables such prisoners to be extradited either to the country of conviction or to the country of imprisonment. I commend the amendments to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 58 to 60.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
61 Clause 19, leave out Clause 19, and insert the following clause:
Application of general extradition arrangements to colonies.
'(1) Upon the making of an Order in Council under section 2 above, the provisions of this Act specified in subsection (2) below shall, unless the Order otherwise provides, extend to every colony, as regards the extradition arrangements to which the Order refers, but subject—

(a) to the modifications set out in subsections (3) to (6) below; (b) to any further modifications as to procedure prescribed by the law of the colony; and

(c) to the limitations, restrictions, exceptions and qualifications, if any, contained in the Order.

(2) The provisions of this Act mentioned in subsection (1) above are—

(a) section 1(1) to (8);

(b) sections 3 to 10;

(c) sections 12 to [Persons serving sentences outside country of conviction]; and

(d) this section.

(3) A reference to the colony shall be substituted for any reference to the United Kingdom or Great Britain.
(4) An extradition request may be made to the governor and the governor may exercise the powers of the Secretary of State.
(5) A reference to a consular representative recognised by the governor shall be substituted for the reference in section 4(1) above to a diplomatic representative recognised by the Secretary of State.
(6) Any reference to a magistrate, judge or court shall be construed as a reference to such judicial authority as the law of the colony may provide.
(7) Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that in any colony specified in the Order—

(a) the Extradition Act 1870 shall have effect with the amendments made by this Act; and

(b) the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 shall have effect with the amendments and repeals so made.'.

62 After Clause 19, insert the following new clause:
Special extradition arrangements—colonies
'(1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that this section shall extend to any colony specified in the Order in the case of foreign states with whom there are no general extradition arrangements, subject to the limitations, restrictions, exceptions and qualification, if any, contained in the Order.
(2) Where arrangements have been made in respect of a person under which extradition procedures under this Part of this Act will be available as between a colony to which this section applies and a foreign state, such extradition procedures shall be available in the case of that person, as between the colony and the state with whom the arrangements have been made, subject—

(a) to the modifications of the provisions of this Act specified in subsection (2) of section (Application of general extradition arrangements to colonies) above set out in subsections (3) to (6) of that section;

(b) to any further modifications as to procedure prescribed by the law of the colony; and

(c) to the limitations, restrictions, exceptions and qualifications, if any, contained in the arrangements.

(3) The provisions of this Act mentioned in section (Application of general extradition arrangements to colonies) (2)(a) to (c) above shall extend to the colony so far as is necessary for the purposes of the arrangements.
(4) If the governor or the Secretary of State issues a certificate—

(a) that such arrangements have been made; and

(b) that extradition procedures are available in the case of the person named in the certificate as between the colony and the foreign state to the extent specified in the certificate.

it shall be conclusive evidence of all matters stated in it.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 61 and 62. The revised Clause 19 inserted by Amendment No. 61 ensures that the

1599
substantive law contained in the Bill can have effect with appropriate modifications in one dependent territory or dependent territories generally. It therefore ensures that new extradition arrangements made by the United Kingdom can apply to a dependent territory or to dependent territories. The revised Clause 19 was introduced in another place because after consideration it was thought that the earlier version could be improved upon and be made clearer.
The clause introduced by Amendment No. 62 allows the ad hoc extradition procedures which are being introduced by United Kingdom law by Clause 11 of the Bill to be made available in the colonies by order in council. Its terms follow the provisions of Clause 11 but with modifications so that the wording is appropriate for the colonies. The modifications reflect those made by revised Clause 19 in respect of the application of general extradition arrangements to the colonies. For example, references to the United Kingdom or Great Britain will become references to the colonies. I commend the amendments to the House.
Moved That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 61 and 62.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
63 Clause 20, page 14, line 35, at end insert—
'(2A) The following shall be inserted after paragraph 9—
"9A. The offence of torture under section [Torture] of the Criminal Justice Act 1988."
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 63, and perhaps at the same time I may speak to Amendments Nos. 182 to 186 en bloc and also Amendments 364, 386, 393 and 427. The amendments will enable the United Kingdom to ratify the United Nations convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1984. The United Kingdom Government played an active role in the process of drafting the convention and we co-sponsored the resolution permitting its adoption by the General Assembly. We were among the first nations to sign the convention, which we did on 15th March 1985.
I am delighted that the Bill presents an opportunity to legislate on those important aspects of the convention which require primary legislation, so that we can proceed to ratification. It is especially fortunate that we can take this step in 1988, which marks the 40th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights on 10th December 1988. I know that the noble Lords, Lord Mishcon and Lord Harris of Greenwich, and their colleagues in another place, are as keen as we are to see this legislation in place so that we can ratify the convention as quickly as possible.
Perhaps I may quickly run through the main features of the amendments. The heart of the matter is the new clause contained in Amendment No. 182. It creates a new offence of torture which is committed by a public official or a person acting in an official capacity or with the consent or acquiescence of such
1600
a person. It consists in the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, which may be either physical or mental pain or suffering. The maximum penalty for the offence is life imprisonment.
The courts will have jurisdiction to try a person on a charge of torture wherever in the world the offence is committed and whatever the nationality of the person charged. The consent of the Attorney-General is required before proceedings are begun. In cases where the alleged offence is committed abroad, it may of course be more sensible to extradite the person than to try him here.
Amendments Nos. 184 and 185 deal with extradition. Amendment No. 184 makes torture an extradition crime for the purposes of the Extradition Act 1870. It will automatically become an extradition crime for the purpose of arrangements made under the new extradition law in Part I of the Bill, because it carries a maximum penalty of more than 12 months' imprisonment.
Amendment No. 185 covers a situation where there is no extradition arrangement in force with another state which is party to the torture convention. In such a case the convention itself may be treated as if it were a formal extradition arrangement—but limited, of course, to the crimes of torture which are specified in it. I hope that your Lordships will welcome these amendments. If they are acceptable, we intend to ratify the convention before the end of the year.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 63—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, all of us on the Opposition Benches certainly welcome the decision of the Government which will enable us to ratify the torture convention. It is probably through lack of application that it was not done before. However, I am not saying that critically because this has been outstanding for some time. Clearly it was essential that we should be able to fulfil all our obligations in regard to the convention against torture. The practice of torture is something which we have resisted and fought against.
It is rather a depressing thought that Voltaire at the beginning of the 18th century expressed satisfaction that torture was no longer an instrument of government action. Alas, how wrong that forecast proved to be. We are pleased that we have now been brought into line and can deal with this important basic requirement of decency and human rights.
Lord Renton: My Lords, I think it is worth pointing out, if somewhat briefly, that subsection (3) of the new clause in Amendment No. 182 fills an important gap in our law. Indeed, it makes a considerable addition to it.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, I should just like to add something to the remarks made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones. This matter was indeed raised in another place and I am glad that the Government have produced these most important amendments. Normally I look with considerable suspicion at any provision added to the list of offences for which a person can be sent to prison for life. However, on this occasion, it seems to

1601
me entirely appropriate. I very much welcome what the Government have done as a result of listening to the expressions of concern from both Houses on the matter.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I am most grateful to your Lordships for agreeing with these amendments. I think that they will make a substantial improvement even if, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, says, rather later than anticipated by Voltaire.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
11.45 a.m.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
64 Clause 21, page 15, line 12, leave out '(2)' and insert '(4)'.
65 Page 15, line 33, leave out from beginning to 'or' in line 36.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 64 and 65. Perhaps I may speak also to Amendments Nos. 66, 68 and 350.
These amendments make a number of small changes to Clauses 21 and 22, which deal retrospectively with the admissibility of historic documents—such as diaries, sletters and business documents. Important amendments tightening the drafting of these provisions were made in your Lordships' House at an earlier stage. These amendments refine those changes.
Briefly, Amendment No. 64 corrects a technical error in Clause 21. Amendments Nos. 65 and 68 delete from Clause 21 and reinstate in Clause 22 one of the conditions which may render a document admissible. That is because the standing committee in another place considered it an inappropriate consideration for the personal documents covered by Clause 21, where one would expect the person to remember the incident recorded if it is to have any credence in court.
Amendment No. 66 improves the drafting of the condition relating to intimidation. Your Lordships will recall that this condition was inserted at the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington. It is one of several most helpful suggestions, if I may say so, which he made to improve this part of the Bill. Some noble Lords expressed concern that the drafting was somewhat obscure and complex, and my noble friend Lord Caithness undertook to consider whether it might be improved. Amendment No. 66 is the result of that consideration.
Amendment No. 350 modifies the application of one of the conditions in Clause 21 to service courts to suit the different circumstances of such courts.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 64 and 65.—(Earl Frrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
66 Clause 21, page 16, line 4, leave out from 'not' to end of line 8 and insert 'give oral evidence through fear or because he is kept out of the way'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 66.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 66.—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Hutchinson of Lullington: My Lords, I rise to move that the House do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 66. The Minister has just said that this amendment refines the clause and improves the drafting and that it arises as a result of some criticism of the drafting of the original clause. I suggest to the House that this amendment substantially alters, and in a most significant way, the effect of the original clause, which was amended as a result of an amendment that I moved on Report.
The clause began as a short clause containing 10 lines making any statement in a document admissible so that there was no necessity for a witness to give oral evidence. It was called in the side note "first-hand hearsay". As a result of very strong criticism about the breadth of that provision and the injustice which would inevitably arise in criminal trials if the clause stood as drafted in the original Bill, the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, agreed to reconsider the whole of that part of the clause and to bring it back on Report. As a result of that co-operative attitude, there were extensive consultations between those two stages of the Bill, and on Report 1 was able to move an agreed amendment which incorporated the 27 lines which now appear in the Bill between line 21 on page 15 and line 8 on page 16; that is, Clause 21(2) and (3). That merely deals with the power to have a statement made by a witness read in a criminal court instead of calling the witness, and enables the court to act on that statement which is not cross-examined too.
While welcoming the amendment the noble Earl said that the amendment,
"will, I think, strike a sensible balance, on the one hand in ensuring the admissibility of reliable documents in evidence, and on the other hand preserving the oral tradition of our system of trial". [Official Report, 17/11/88; col. 140.]
The words now to be struck out are words which were put into the amendment. They come from the Criminal Justice Act 1925 and cover the reading of a deposition taken at the magistrates' courts. Those words have stood the test of time since 1925. They provide that the statement may be read, because the person who made it has not appeared to give oral evidence. He has been kept out of the way by means of the procurement of a person accused in proceedings in which the statement is sought to be submitted, or on his behalf. It is proposed that those words should go, and that the clause should read:
"The person who made it does not give oral evidence through fear or because he is kept out of the way".
Your Lordships will see two substantial changes. One is that the word "appear" has gone, and so the clause reads:
"does not give oral evidence through fear",
and, secondly, the connection between instilment of fear or the keeping out of the way of the witness with the person in the dock is removed. So the situation proposed by the amendment is that if there is evidence—the question is of course what sort of
evidence—that the witness suffers from

1603
fear—presumably he may well be at court because the word "appear" is removed—or there is evidence that he has not turned up and he is being kept out of the way by anyone, then the statement can be read.
Hitherto the situation has always been that before one allows the statement to be read without cross-examination one must establish that the reason for the witness being kept out of the way is connected with the person in the dock. I suggest that it is crucial to have that connection. In innumerable cases a witness may give a strong statement to the police accusing a person of crime, and yet when the statement is examined material and information come to light to show that the witness is not worthy of belief. He is lying, exaggerating or just plainly mistaken. But that fact can only be established by questioning that witness in the witness box. There may be a document of some kind which proves overwhelmingly that the witness was not where he said he was or that what he is saying is completely untrue.
For the original statement to be used as credible evidence in those circumstances is enormously dangerous and may lead to a serious miscarriage of justice. Therefore I suggest that there must be a safeguard of some kind to allow that procedure only if the accused is involved in the threats that keep the witness away.
Leaving the amendment as it is could give rise to every kind of perversion of the course of justice. Any interested party could see to it that the principal witness was put in fear. A dishonest police officer could give hearsay evidence of the witness having suffered threats and the witness could be told to make himself scarce and not to come to court. It will be within the knowledge of many of your Lordships that in many cases up and down the country witnesses try not to come to court. They say that they are too frightened to give evidence and that they fear the results of giving evidence. That is continually given as a reason and is not accepted.
I understand that the basis of the amendment is that in terrorist cases it might give rise to problems to have to establish that the person being tried is connected with the keeping away of the witness, because it may be that the person being tried is to be proved to be a member of some organisation and that therefore in deciding that the witness is being kept away by someone in that organisation one may be deciding an issue which is an issue in the case, before the verdict in the case.
This matter went through in another place almost without discussion. I say in answer to that suggestion that trials within trials take place in criminal cases to decide whether a confession has been made voluntarily. The issue is decided in the absence of the jury. The judge trying the case may decide that the statement has been made voluntarily. The jury will then come back, and it is possible for the accused to suggest to the jury that the alleged confession was not made voluntarily, and the jury may find in that direction. No one could suggest that the issue has already been decided because the judge took a different view. I say that only in answer to the suggestion as to the basis of the amendment.
Lastly, there was a case called Loughlin which was decided in 1985 and is reported in 1985 Criminal
1604
Appeal Reports at page 157. It was a terrorist case tried at the Central Criminal Court by Mr. Justice Jones. When a similar suggestion was made in order to try to have a statement read under the law as it then stood and stands today, he said:
"That it is difficult to prove by admissible evidence"—
that this putting in fear has taken place—
"cannot ever be a good ground for proof by inadmissible evidence".
If the amendment stands, one asks the question: what will happen in court? Will the evidence be the evidence of a police officer who comes into court and says that the witness is not there? "I have seen the witness. He says that he was threatened last night by a lot of men with guns that if he came today his life would be in jeopardy". Will it be evidence given by a friend who said that he saw the witness? Will it be hearsay evidence? It is bound, is it not, to be hearsay evidence which will also be uncross-examinable? I suggest that this amendment should not be accepted.
12 noon
Lord Irvine of Lairg: My Lords, we support the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, that this House should disagree with the amendment. The short point is this. As the Bill left your Lordships' House, what had to be shown was that the witness had not appeared to give oral evidence and that his non-appearance was procured by or on behalf of the defendant in the case. But Amendment No. 66 rewrites that condition and substantially alters it, because the new clause reads:
"The person who made it does not give oral evidence through fear or because he is kept out of the way"
We are decidedly unhappy about this amendment. It removes any need to show a causal connection between anything that the defendant and his friends may have done and the absence of the witness. The right of a defendant to have the evidence against him tested by cross-examination is a fundamental right, not to be lightly removed. We accept that a defendant who sets out to intimidate witnesses deserves no sympathy if he forfeits that right as a result. The right must clearly be forfeited if the absence of the witness is due to action by the defendant or his friends. That was the state of the provision when it left this House.
Let me give two examples. First, let us say that a defendant is being prosecuted for assault. An important witness is an old lady who was a passer by at the time of the incident. She gives a damning statement to the police which may be completely inaccurate and might be shown to be so under cross-examination. But she does not give evidence because she is genuinely fearful that the defendant will do something to her if she testifies against him. In fact her fear is quite ill-founded; neither the defendant nor anyone else has given her cause for concern. Nonetheless if this amendment is accepted in its present form her statement can go in and the defendant has no right to cross-examine her. I find that rather shocking. I hope that there will be some on the Benches opposite who will find that rather shocking too.
Let me give another example. Suppose one has the kind of case, which is perhaps not that uncommon, where the victim's family, let us say, would do anything in their power to secure a conviction of the person the family believe to be guilty. But they

1605
become aware that a prosecution witness—the important prosecution witness,let it be—has been having doubts about the accuracy of his statement since he made it to the police. If they keep that witness away, by virtue of this amendment his original statement can go in without the opportunity of cross-examination.
I suggest, in support of the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, that it is quite unacceptable that a defendant should, through no fault of his own, be deprived of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him. This provision was in a proper form when it left this House and is in an unacceptable form now.
Lord Renton: My Lords, the objections which have been raised to the Commons amendments could mostly be raised also against Clause 21 as it stands. Clause 21 is incidentally, if I may say so in passing, a mind-bending piece of drafting. We are faced with a choice of evils. The clause was not entirely satisfactory as it stood. One must accept that there are difficulties about the position that will arise if the Commons amendment is accepted. We are faced with a choice of evils. But I prefer the Commons amendment and consider it a lesser evil. After all, if it is to be accepted in principle that the statement of a witness may be read in court because he would be in fear of giving evidence, it seems to matter scarcely at all in principle whether or not he is present in court.
I prefer the language of the Commons amendment to the language of the Bill as it stands. The revised form of words is wider but it is less clumsily expressed. I think therefore that we should agree with the Commons on this amendment.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, very briefly I support the Commons amendment. Whether one regards it as on the balance of evils or not is perhaps another question. It is said by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, "Well, the old form of drafting has stood the test of time since 1925". In a sense he is right. But times have changed. We are now in a situation of having to change with the times in order to seek to curtail the growing menace of criminality in this country and to deal not only with a specific problem, which is not relevant in this context, of juries being put in fear but of witnesses being put in fear. I do not regard it as anything other than a relevant and useful contribution which the Commons have made to assist in the fight against crime to say, "Does it really matter whether the witness is in court or is not in court if he is put in fear? Does it really matter whether it can be assuredly proven that he was put in fear or kept out of the way by the accused?" That is sometimes a very difficult fact to prove. In these circumstances, on balance surely it would be wrong to reject the Commons amendment.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, I do not want to repeat much that has been said, or anything if I can avoid it. I have always been a determined enemy of sacred cows. Sacred cows are friends of professional criminals. I cannot think of anything which has been said from either of the two opposite Benches which would he likely to escape, in a suitable case, the eye of an alert judge at the trial.
1606
If it did escape the eye of an alert judge at the trial, it would not escape the jury, especially if the defendant were defended by a reasonably competent counsel.
My belief is that there is a curious love-hate relationship among some legal experts with juries. On the one hand if we try to interfere with juries people say that they are the palladium of our liberties. But if we once give them the chance to decide between truth and falsehood, they say "Oh, they mustn't be allowed to hear this or that because they can't be trusted to find out the difference".
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I was interested to hear the views of the noble Lords, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington and Lord Irvine of Lairg. The purpose of subsection (3) is quite simple. It is to render admissible statements which are made to a police officer where the witness is subsequently kept away from the trial. One might take as an example somebody who is kidnapped or does not give evidence through fear. Subsection (3), which can be traced back to Section 13(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, was inserted by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, at an earlier stage in the Bill. At that time concern was expressed about its obscurity and complexity by the noble Lords opposite, including the noble Lords, Lord Mishcon and Lord Irvine of Lairg. That is why I found it rather curious when the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, said that he thought that the words were better in their original than in their present form.
As a result of the remarks that were made when this measure passed through the House before, my noble friend Lord Caithness explained that, as the wording was taken from an existing statute, we considered that it would be all right, but nevertheless, we would look again at the new subsection. We looked at that subsection and we agreed with the view that the form of words chosen was rather archaic and somewhat obscure. We took the view that the subsection was too narrowly drawn to cover some of the circumstances for which it was needed.
It would not, for example, have covered the situation where a potential witness in a terrorist trial was kidnapped by members of a sectarian organisation before he could come to court, unless it could be proved in court that that was done on behalf of the accused or, in other words, that he had links with the organisation. But as the alleged links might be an issue in the trial itself, that would not be a very satisfactory state of affairs. Nor does it cover the kind of case where, because of threats or intimidation, a witness will not give evidence at the trial. This amendment therefore seeks to substitute a new form of words for Clause 21(3)(b) which go to the nub of the circumstances which we are trying to address. In another place it was accepted as being a sensible improvement.
I agree, of course, that we must be cautious about letting in written evidence because of ill-founded fear on the part of the witness. But there are cases, and terrorist cases are the clearest example, where the wider formulation of the amendment is right. The judge always has a discretion to admit or not to admit the document. He will have in mind all of the circumstances of the case.

1607]
I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, will agree that it is preferable to keep Amendment No. 66 as it was approved in another place. I am sorry that we have found it necessary to tinker with the noble Lord's original wording, but I think that Amendment No. 66 carries on the process of improving the scheme and would be better left as it is.
12.15 p.m.
Lord Hutchinson of Lullington: My Lords, I am disappointed with what I have heard in answer to the argument in support of this Motion. The argument has simply not been dealt with. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, talks about a sacred cow. This is not a sacred cow at all, if I may say so with great respect to the noble and learned Lord; it is a sacred principle. The sacred principle is much more important than the cow.
The sacred principle is that in a criminal trial the trial should be fair. I do not know how on earth this wonderful jury will make up its mind if a statement is read which accuses someone of committing a crime and the defending counsel has in his hand a document which proves clearly that the witness is not telling the truth. But the defending counsel cannot produce that document unless the witness is there for him to put it to the witness. How on earth will the jury make this brilliant decision that the statement which is being read is a pack of lies from start to finish?
The observations that have been made, if I may say so with the greatest possible respect, do not show any kind of knowledge of what happens in criminal cases. The noble Lord, Lord Renton, said that the objection applied to the whole of the rest of the clause. But the whole of the rest of the clause deals with statements being read because somebody is dead or mentally unfit or is abroad. Those are all matters of proof. The trouble with this part of the amendment is that it is not concerned with a question of proof. If somebody says that they are frightened or that they have been put in fear by an anonymous person, and if the police give hearsay evidence in court that the witness is being kept away because he is terrified, that is not a question of fact. It cannot be proved.
Lord Renton: My Lords, the noble Lord must have misheard me. I said in passing that Clause 21 as a whole was a mind-bending piece of drafting. But the argument which I used in favour of the Commons amendment was related simply to the Commons amendment.
Lord Hutchinson of Lullington: My Lords, as regards the mind-bending drafting, of course it is inelegant drafting, but it really does not matter, if I may say so again with the greatest of respect, whether it is elegant or inelegant. This is a matter of absolutely fundamental principle, and a matter of the fairness of a criminal trial. In those circumstances I feel bound to take the view of the House on the matter.
On Question, That the House do disagree with the Commons in Amendment No. 66.
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 42; Not-Contents, 45.

DIVISION NO. 1

CONTENTS

Addington, L.

Jeger, B.

Annan, L.

Lawrence, L.

Ardwick, L.

Leatherland, L.

Bonham-Carter, L.

Longford, E.

Broadbridge, L.

McGregor of Durris, L.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove,L

McNair, L.

Morton of Shuna, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Mulley, L.

Cocks of Hartcliffe, L.

Nicol, B. [Teller]

Craigavon, V.

Porritt, L.

Dormand of Easington, L.

Rea, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Russell of Liverpool, L.

Falkland, V.

Sainsbury, L.

Fitt, L.

Shackleton, L.

Gallacher, L.

Shaughnessy, L.

Grey, E.

Stallard, L.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Hayter, L.

Tordoff, L.

Henderson of Brompton,L

Turner of Camden, B.

Underhill, L.

Hutchinson of Lullington, L. [Teller]

White, B.

Winterbottom, L.

Irvine of Lairg, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Ampthill, L.

Kinnoull, E.

Arran, E.

Lauderdale, E.

Ashbourne, L.

Long, V. [Teller.]

Auckland, L.

Lyell, L.

Balfour, E.

McFadzean, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Mackay of Clashfern,

Bclstead, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Bessborough, E.

Marley, L.

Blake, L.

Mersey, V.

Borthwick, L.

Munster, E.

Boyd-Carpenter, L.

Newall, L.

Broxbourne, L.

O'Brien of Lothbury, 1

Butterworth, L.

Oxfuird, V.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Peyton of Yeovil, L.

Carnock, L.

Renton, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Rippon of Hexham, L.

Elles, B.

St. John of Fawsley, L

Ferrers, E.

Saint Oswald, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Shannon, E.

Gainford, L.

Swinfen, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Teviot, L.

Windlesham, L.

Headfort, M.

Wise, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Motion disagreed to accordingly.
On Question, Commons Amendment No. 66 agreed to.
12.24 p.m.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
67 Clause 22, page 16, line 36, leave out 'under section 27' and insert 'in accordance with section 27 below or an order under paragraph 3A of Schedule 12 to this Act or under section'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 67. In doing so, I shall speak to Amendments Nos. 69, 70, 71 and 353. Amendments Nos. 70 and 71 improve the structure of Clause 27 which provides a letter of request procedure for obtaining evidence from abroad. Amendment No. 353 contains the order-making power to apply a modified form of the procedure to service courts. Amendments Nos. 70 and 71 are consequential on the order-making power.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in the said amendment. —(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
68 Page 16, line 43, at end insert 'or

(iii) the person who made the statement cannot reasonably be expected (having regard to the time which has elapsed since he made the statement and to all the circumstances) to have any recollection of the matters dealt with in the statement'.

69 Clause 24, page 17, line 32, leave out 'under section 27' and insert 'in accordance with section 27 below or an order under paragraph 3A of Schedule 12 to this Act or under section'.
70 Clause 27, page 18, line 26, after 'Where' insert 'on an application made in accordance with the following provisions of this section'.
71 Page 18, line 37, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—

'(3) An application for an order under this section may be made by a prosecuting authority'.

(3A) If proceedings have already been instituted, a person charged with an offence in the proceedings may make such an application.'.

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 68 to 71. I spoke to Amendment No. 68 in speaking to Amendment No. 64.
Moved, that this House do agree with the Commons in the said amendments.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
72 Clause 29, page 20, line 5, at end insert 'in any case where the court gives leave for, or requires, evidence or a glossary to be so furnished'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 72. With the leave of the House, perhaps I may speak to Amendment No. 354 as well. They are technical amendments providing that the court must give leave for evidence to be furnished in the form of schedules, summaries or glossaries.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in the said amendment.—(Ear/ Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
73 Clause 30, page 20, line 7, leave out 'closed circuit'.
[Amendment No. 74 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
75 Page 20, line 35, leave out subsection (5).
76 Clause 32, page 22, line 13, at end insert—

'(3) Unsworn evidence admitted by virtue of section 38 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 may corroborate evidence (sworn or unsworn) given by any other person'

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 73 to 76. In doing so, perhaps I may also speak to Amendment No. 357. These are small but important technical changes to clauses dealing with children's evidence. Amendment No. 73 deletes the words "closed circuit" to leave the simple description "television link". Amendments Nos. 75 and 357 remove a subsection in Clause 30 and in the corresponding schedule dealing with service courts.Those set out examples of what the rules might cover. However, we believe them to be unnecessary. Amendment No. 76 relates to the corroboration of children's evidence and puts beyond doubt that unsworn testimony may corroborate by other sworn or unsworn testimony.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in the said amendments.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
77 Clause 33, page 22, line 16, leave out 'section' and insert 'Part of this Act'.
78 Page 22, line 17, at end, insert—
'(1A) Subject to Rules of Court, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under section 35 below shall be exercised by the Criminal division of the Court, and references to the Court of Appeal in this Part of this Act shall be construed as references to that division.'
79 Page 22, line 18, leave out 'section' and insert 'Part of this Act'.
80 Page 22, line 24, leave out 'section' and insert 'Part of this Act'.
81 Page 22, line 30, leave out from "'sentence"' to end of line 33 and insert 'has the same meaning as in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, except that it does not include an interim hospital order under Part III of the Mental Health Act 1983'.
82 Page 22, line 36, leave out '(7)' and insert '(6A)'.
83 Page 22, line 36, at end, insert—
'(6A) Subsection (1A) shall be omitted'.
84 Page 23, line 9, leave out 'reference in subsection (5) to' and insert 'references in subsection (5) to the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and'.
85 Page 23, line 10. leave out 'construed as a reference to' and insert 'respectively construed as references to Part I of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 and'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 77 to 85. In doing so, I should like to speak to Amendments Nos. 290 and 291 as well. They are all strictly drafting amendments.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in the said amendments.—(Earl Ferrel's.)
Lord Renton: My Lords, although my noble friend has said that this is merely a drafting matter, there is a drafting point to which I wish to draw attention in the hope that in future the same mistake will not be made again. In Amendment No. 78 we find that, subject to rules of court, we are going to legislate to the effect that:
"the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal …shall be exercised by the Criminal division",
and so on. When we indulge in primary legislation, surely it should not be subject to rules of court. In this particular example, I think it is quite unnecessary to say that. If Parliament decides that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal shall be exercised by the Criminal Division of that court, that should be the law. We do not want to have the possibility of that being altered at a later stage by rules of court. I do not expect my noble friend to reply to that point unless he cares to rise and say that note will be taken of it.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, there may be something in what my noble friend says. However, it is possible that he has not fully considered this possibility. In order to achieve what the statute will now say if the Motion to agree with the Commons is carried, it may be necessary to spell it out in detail by rules of court. The power of the rules committee extends, unless I am mistaken, to the amendment of statute. It also extends to filling in the details which a statute requires to be filled in before it can be effective.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend Lord Renton for saying that he did not expect a reply from me unless I cared to take note of what he said. I am quite happy to say that I shall take note of what he said, as well as taking note of what my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham said.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
12.30 p.m.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
86 Clause 39, page 26, line 9, after 'way', insert 'or a number of
such offences'.
87 Page 26, line 14, leave out 'are' and insert 'appear to the court
to be'.
88 Page 26, line 15, leave out 'first-mentioned offence' and insert 'offence, or one of the offences, triable either way'.
89 Page 26, line 20, at end insert—

'(1A)Where a magistrates' court commits a person to the Crown Court for trial on indictment for a number of offences triable either way and exercises the power conferred by subsection (1) above in respect of a summary offence, the magistrates' court shall give the Crown Court and the person who is committed for trial a notice stating which of the offences triable either way appears to the court to arise out of circumstances which are the same as or connected with those giving rise to the summary offence.

(1B) A magistrates' court's decision to exercise the power conferred by subsection (1) above shall not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any court.'.

90 Page 26, line 35, at end insert 'except as provided by subsection (8A)
(8A) If the prosecution inform the Court that they would not desire to submit evidence on the charge relating to the summary offence, the Court shall dismiss it.'
Earl Ferrers: I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 86 to 90 en bloc. In moving the amendments perhaps I could also speak to Amendments Nos. 366 to 369. I hope that your Lordships will consider that these are essentially technical amendments. If you wish me to explain them I shall be happy to do so.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 86 to 90.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
91 Clause 42, page 28, line 4, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and
insert—
'(2) For the third and fourth columns of the entries relating to an offence under section 2(1) (possessing, etc. shotgun without shotgun certificate) there shall be substituted—

"(a) Summary

6 months or the statutory maximum or both.

(b) On Indictment.

3 years or a fine; or both.".'.

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 91. This is a technical amendment to clarify the penalties available following summary trial for possession of an uncertified shotgun.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 91.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
92 Clause 48, page 29, line 32, after 'with' insert 'offenders in respect of.'
93 Page 30, line 4, leave out from beginning to 'provision' in line 12 and insert—
'(b) may apply, with or without modifications, any enactment contained in—

(i) the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973;

(ii) the Criminal Law Act 1977; or

(iii) any other Act not mentioned in paragraph (a) above; and

(c) may make such incidental or consequential provision as the Secretary of State considers necessary or expedient.
(3A) Without prejudice to the generality of this section, an order under this section may make—
'(a)'
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 92 and 93 en bloc
Clause 48 enables the Secretary of State by order to empower service courts (courts-martial and standing civilian courts) overseas to suspend wholly or partly prison sentences which they impose on civilians under their jurisdiction. Ordinary criminal courts would have power to deal with offenders who breached such orders. The amendments make technical improvements to make it clear that the courts have power to say how the offender should be dealt with and to make clear that the power to make an order under this clause includes a power to apply, with appropriate modifications if required, those Acts which are relevant to a civilian court dealing with a suspended sentence imposed by a court martial or standing civilian court.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 92 and 93.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
94 Clause 49, page 31, line 13, leave out 'Part of this Act' and insert 'section and sections 50, (Powers to specify maximum fines for summary offences under subordinate instruments—conversion of references to amounts to references to levels on scale—England and Wales), 51, 53 and 55 below'.
95 Clause 50, page 31, line 37, leave out 'maximum'.
96 After clause 50, insert the following new clause:
Powers to specify maximum lines for summary offences under subordinate instruments—conversion of references to amounts to references to levels on scale—England and Wales
'.—(1) Where an instrument which was made under an enactment on or after 11th April 1983 but before this section came into force confers on any authority other than a harbour authority a power by subordinate instrument to make a person liable to a fine on conviction of a summary offence of an amount shown in the second column of the standard scale, as that scale had effect when the instrument was made, a reference to the level in the first column of the standard scale which then corresponded to that amount shall be substituted for the reference in the instrument conferring the power to the amount of the fine.
(2) If an order under section 143 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 alters the sums specified in section 37(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, the second reference to the standard scale in subsection (1) above is to be construed as a reference to that scale as it has effect by virtue of the order.
(3) This section shall not affect so much of any instrument as (in whatever words) makes a person liable on summary conviction to a maximum fine not exceeding a specified amount for each period of a specified length during which a continuing offence is continued.'.
97 Insert the following new clause:
Fines on summary conviction for offences under subordinate instruments—conversion to references to levels on scale—Scotland
'.In the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, after section 289GC (which was inserted by section 52 of this Act) there shall be inserted the following section—
"Fines on summary conviction for offences in subordinate instruments conversion to references to levels on scale
289GD—(1) Where an instrument which was made under an enactment on or after 11th April 1983 but before the commencement of section [Fines on summary conviction for offences in subordinate instruments—conversion to references to levels on scale—Scotland] of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 confers on any authority other than a harbour authority a power by subordinate instrument to make a person on summary conviction liable to a line of an amount shown in the second column of the standard scale, as that scale had effect when the instrument was made, a reference to the level in the first column of the standard scale which then corresponded to that amount shall be substituted for the reference in the instrument conferring the power to the amount of the fine.
(2) This section shall not affect so much of any instrument as (in whatever words) makes a person liable on summary conviction to a maximum fine not exceeding a specified amount for each period of a specified length during which a continuing offence is continued.":.
98 Clause 51, page 32, line 3, leave out from 'before' to 'and' in line 4 and insert 11th April 1983 (the date of the commencement of sections 35 to 50 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982).2.
99 Page 32, line 5, after 'confers', insert 'on any authority other than a harbour authority'.
100 Page 32, line 13, leave out 'Subject to section 53 below,'.
101 Page 32, line 17, leave out £125 or less,' and insert 'less than £25,'.
102 Page 32, line 18, leave out 'more than £25 but not more ' and insert 125 or more but less'.
103 Page 32, line 19, leave out 'more than £50 but not more' and insert '£50 or more but less'.
104 Page 32, line 20, leave out 'more than £200 but not more' and insert '£200 or more but less'.
105 Page 32, line 21, leave out 'more than £400' and insert '£400 or more'.
106 Clause 52, page 33, line 9, leave out from 'before' to 'and' in line 12 and insert '11th April 1983 (the date of commencement of Part IV of the Criminal Justice Act 1982);'.
107 Page 33, line 13, after 'confers', insert 'on any authority other than a harbour authority'.
108 Page 33, line 23, leave out 'Subject to section 53 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988,'.
108A Page 33, line 22, after 'I' insert 'on the standard scale'.
109 Page 33, line 28, leave out 125 or less' and insert 'less than £25,'.
110 Page 33, line 29, leave out 'more than £25 but not more' and insert 125 or more but less'.
111 Page 33, line 31, leave out 'more than £50 but not more' and insert '£50 or more but less.'
112 Page 33, line 33, leave out 'more than £200 but not more' and insert '£200 or more but less.'
113 Page 33, line 35, leave out 'more than £400' and insert '£400 or more.'
114 Clause 53, page 34, line 33, after 'fine', insert 'not exceeding an amount less than level 4 on the standard scale'.
115 Page 34, line 34, leave out '(if it does not otherwise so extend).'
116 Page 34, line 35, leave out 'maximum fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale' and insert 'fine not exceeding level 4.'
117 Page 34, line 36, at end insert—
'(2) Where any enactment or instrument ("the enabling legislation") (however expressed) provides that a person who contravenes any provision of an instrument ("a regulatory instrument") made by a harbour authority—

(a) by virtue of the enabling legislation; or;

1614

(b) by virtue of an instrument made under the enabling legislation.

'shall be guilty of a summary offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding an amount less than level 4 on the standard scale, the power conferred by the enabling legislation shall by virtue of this section enable the harbour authority to provide in a regulatory instrument that a person, as regards any summary offence created by the regulatory instrument, shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4.'
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 94 to 117 en bloc. This is a group of technical drafting amendments to the clauses which deal with fines under secondary subordinate legislation. I apologise for the scale and complexity of the amendments, but I assure your Lordships that they are purely technical and do not change the policy in any way.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 94 to 117.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
COMMONS AMENDMENT
118 Clause 63, leave out Clause 63 and insert the following new clause:
'Fines imposed and recognizances forfeited by coroners
(1) A fine imposed by a coroner, including a fine so imposed before this section comes into force, shall be treated for the purpose of its collection, enforcement and remission as having been imposed by the magistrate's court for the area in which the coroner's court was held, and the coroner shall as soon as practicable after imposing the fine give particulars of the fine to the clerk of that court.
(2) A coroner shall proceed in the like manner under subsection (1) above in relation to a recognizance forfeited at an inquest held before him, including a recognizance so forfeited before this section comes into force, as if he had imposed a fine upon the person forfeiting that recognizance, and subsection (1) above shall apply accordingly.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 118. I should like also to speak to Amendment No. 423.
Clause 63 enacts provisions in Section 49 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. Your Lordships will be aware that coroners' legislation has been consolidated this Session in a new Coroners' Act. We therefore need a slightly different version of Clause 63 from the one with which we started. Subsection (1) of the new clause is the same in substance as old Clause 63 and subsection (2) simply applies similar conditions on the forfeiture of recognizances.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 118.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
119 Clause 64, page 41, line 17, leave out from 'subsection' to end of line 22 and insert
'(3)—
"(3A) Where a person is convicted of an offence under section I, subsection (1) above shall apply in relation to him with the substitution of two years for twelve months.".'
Page 41, line 22, at end insert—
'(2) Nothing in this section shall have effect in relation to an offence committed before this section comes into force.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 119 and 120 en bloc.
Clause 64 was inserted in the Bill during earlier proceedings in your Lordships' House at the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Monson. It increases from one year to two years the minimum period of disqualification for the offence of causing death by reckless driving. However, the drafting of the clause was not quite right and the present amendments correct it.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 119 and 120.—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Monson: My Lords, I should like to take the opportunity to express my appreciation to the other place for tidying up my drafting, while strongly endorsing the principle of the amendment.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
121 Clause 65, page 42, line 9, at end insert 'and without regard to any restrictions, on forfeiture in an enactment contained in an Act passed before the Criminal Justice Act 1988.'.
122 Page 42, line 16, at end insert—
'(2) At the end of section 12(4) of that Act (which authorises a court, on making a probation order in respect of an offender or discharging an offender absolutely or conditionally, to order him to pay costs or compensation) there shall be added the words "or to make an order under section 43 below".'
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 121 and 122 en bloc.
Amendment No. 121 establishes that the general power in Clause 65 to order forfeiture of property is not fettered by any restrictions in existing, specific, forfeiture powers.
Amendment No. 122 will enable the courts to make a forfeiture order in conjunction with a probation order or an order for conditional or absolute discharge. Because a forfeiture order is technically a sentence, it may not under present legislation be combined with a probation order or an order for conditional or absolute discharge. Forfeiture is likely to be increasingly used by the courts as a result of the widening of the powers of' forfeiture in Clause 65. There are also likely to be numerous occasions where the court will be satisfied that the imposition of a probation or discharge order is appropriate but where forfeiture is also justified; for example, where there has been a conviction under Clause 128 for possession of an article with a blade or point in a public place.
It is eminently reasonable that the court should be free to make a forfeiture order in such cases without being prevented from making a probation or discharge order as well. Similarly a court which regards a probation or discharge order as an appropriate disposal should not be prevented from making a forfeiture order where that seems necessary.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 121 and 122.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
123 Clause 71, page 48, line 42, leave out from 'imprisonment' to 'which' in line 43 and insert 'or detention in a young offender institution'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 123. Perhaps I may also speak to Amendments Nos. 126 to 131, 139 to 149, 292 to 304, 418 and 420.
The purpose of all the amendments in this large group is to improve the drafting of Part VI of the Bill. That part contains powers to freeze and confiscate the proceeds of crime. The procedures are quite complicated. It is important that the law should be clear and precise with no room for doubt about the scope and intention of those powers.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 123.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
124 Clause 72, page 49, line 32, after 'that', insert 'there are reasonable grounds for thinking that'.
125 Clause 73, page 50, line 13, at end insert—
'(1A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above, a restraint order may make such provision as the court thinks fit for living expenses and legal expenses'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 124 and 125 en bloc.
The purpose of' these amendments is to improve the safeguards for suspects whose assets may be restrained by an order of the High Court pending their trial. The first amendment would require the High Court to be satisfied before freezing any assets that there are reasonable grounds for thinking that a confiscation order might be made at the end of the proceedings. The new concept here is that of "reasonable grounds".
The second amendment makes clear on the face of the Bill that the court can allow a person whose assets are frozen to draw out sufficient money to cover his reasonable living and legal expenses. These are important additional safeguards.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 124 and 125.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
126 Clause 77, page 54, line 9, after 'expenses', insert 'incurred by a person acting as an insolvency practitioner'.
127 Page 54, line 23, leave out from 'the' to first 'any' in line 33 and insert 'justices' clerk shall apply the money received for the purposes specified in this section and in the order so specified.

(3A) The justices' clerk shall first pay any expenses incurred by a person acting as an insolvency practitioner and payable under section 83(2) below but not already paid under subsection (1) above.

(3B) If the money was paid to the justices' clerk by a receiver appointed under this Part of this Act or in pursuance of a charging order, the justices' clerk shall next pay the receiver's renumeration and expenses.

(3C) After making—

(a) any payment required by subsection (3A) above: and

(b) in a case to which subsection (3B) above applies, any payment required by that subsection,

the justices' clerk shall reimburse any amount paid under section 84(2) below.

(3D) The justices' clerk shall finally pay'.

128 Page 54, line 36, leave out 'and the balance' and insert—
'(3E) Any balance in the hands of the justices' clerk after he has made all payments required by the foregoing provisions of this section'.
129 Clause 83, page 60, line 27, leave out 'the insolvency practitioner's negligence; and the insolvency practitioner' and insert 'his negligence in so acting; and a person so acting'.
130 Page 61, line 1. leave out 'the foregoing provisions of this section' and insert 'this part of this Act'.
131 Clause 84, page 61. line 23, leave out '(3)(b)' and insert '(3B)'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 126 to 131 en bloc. These amendments were spoken to with Amendment No. 123.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 126 to 131.— (Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
132 Clause 85, page 61. line 33, leave out from beginning to 'or' in line 34.
133 Page 61, line 36, at end insert 'or convictions concerned'.
134 Page 61, line 39, at end insert 'if having regard to all the circumstances, it considers it appropriate to make such an order'.
135 Page 61, line 45, leave out from beginning to 'and' in line 46.
136 Page 62, line I, leave out 'substantial'.
137 Page 62, line 3, at end, insert—
'(2A) The court shall not order compensation to be paid in any case where it appears to the court that the proceedings would have been instituted or continued even if the serious default had not occurred.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 132 to 137 en bloc.I shall also speak to Amendments No. 419.
The purpose of these amendments is to lighten the burden on people who have good cause to apply for compensation in a case where their assets have been frozen or sold, but the prosecution was mistaken. As the Bill was, the application would have to show that his loss was "substantial"; but a loss, though small in itself, could nevertheless be severe on the applicant. Therefore we were persuaded that we should remove the condition that it be "substantial".
We also think that it may be too burdensome on the applicant to make him prove to the court that what went wrong with the prosecution was itself the cause of the proceedings being started or continued at the relevant time. Instead, we propose to replace this condition with a requirement that the court should refuse compensation if it considers that the default in the prosecution did not bear on the decision to carry on the proceedings.
These amendments are the result of views put forward by the Opposition in another place.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 132 to 137.—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Irvine of Lairg: My Lords, when your Lordships examined this Bill in Committee, we expressed the view that Clause 85 (or Clause 79 as it then was) was a very mean-minded clause. It seemed to us that a defendant who was acquitted in all
1618
ordinary cases ought to be compensated for the loss that he had suffered through the imposition of a restraint or charging order, and the Bill, as I think that the noble Earl has in effect acknowledged, at that stage fell short of that objective in several respects. These amendments certainly represent an improvement but it is a very limited one. Amendments Nos. 133, 134, 137 and 137 are only drafting amendments.
We acknowledge that Amendment No. 132 is useful in that it removes an unnecessary restriction on the court's jurisdiction to exercise its discretion. The best change comes with Amendment No. 136 in that it is no longer necessary for the applicant, as the noble Earl has pointed out, to show substantial loss. The meaning of the word "substantial" was doubtful in the context and was capable of creating an injustice However, the worst defect of this clause still remains; namely, the need to show that there was a serious default on the part of the investigating or prosecuting authority in deciding to initiate or continue proceedings. It would appear that in the Government's eyes a person still does not merit compensation merely because he has been proved innocent. It is only in the exceptional case where that person can show serious official default that he or she will be compensated.
We predict that as a result Clause 85 will be little used but that when it is used there will be a lengthy re-hashing of' the evidence relating to the alleged offence leading to a great waste of judicial time, a general unwillingness on the part of the courts to criticise those concerned with the investigation of crime, a continuing stigma attaching to those who have already been acquitted when their application for compensation fails, a consequent devaluation of the "not guilty" verdict and a loss of morale among the officers whom the former defendant will be forced to accuse of serious default. It is a depressing prospect and certainly we would welcome the noble Earl's comments on what we regard as valid criticisms.
Lord Renton: The noble Lord has not tabled any Motion relating to these amendments and therefore, as I understand it, there is nothing we can do but accept these Commons amendments. I should have thought from my rather quick attempt to assimilate them, that they were sound and in accordance with what we would have wished had we thought of them when the Bill was before us.
There happens to be a misprint in the Marshalled List in the last line of Amendment No. 137. The word "or' should read "or". No doubt that can be corrected in the ordinary way.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, when the correction to which my noble friend has drawn attention is made, perhaps the printer can look at the spelling of the word "proceedings" in the preceding line.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I had hoped that the noble Lord, Lord Irvine, would have been pleased with these amendments, and I am sorry to find that his welcome is only a cautious one. We do not accept that it is right to compensate where a person has been acquitted by the usual process of law. Where there

1619
has been serious default, that adds a quite different dimension.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
12.45 p.m.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
138 After Clause 90, insert the following new clause:
'(1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide that for the purposes of any part of the law of Northern Ireland which appears to Her Majesty to correspond to this Part of this Act sections 86 to 89 above shall have effect as they have effect for the purposes of this Part subject to such modifications as may be specified in the Order.
(2) An Order in Council under this section may contain such incidental, consequential and transitional provisions as Her Majesty considers expedient.
(3) An Order in Council under this section shall not be made unless a draft of the Order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 138. We wish to ensure that confiscation orders are enforceable throughout the United Kingdom, regardless of the jurisdiction in which they were made. We propose to bring forward legislation in due course to enable confiscation orders to be made and enforced in Northern Ireland. Clause 93 already contains a power to enable Northern Ireland orders to be enforced in England and Wales. We shall need an equivalent power to enable them to be enforced also in Scotland. That is the purpose of this amendment.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 138.—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Renton: My Lords, surely we should agree with this new clause. However, in the last line of subsection (1), as printed in the Marshalled List, we find the unusual word "midifications". I do not know whether that is an instruction to those concerned to pursue a middle way or whether it has something to do with followng the advice of the Alliance, but I think that it is necessary to have the word corrected to "modifications".
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, my noble friend is unduly perceptive this morning, if I may say so. Of course, he is quite correct, it is a typographical error.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
139 Clause 91, page 65, line 30, leave out 'specified,' to 'and' in line 36 and insert 'this Part of this Act shall apply to external confiscation orders'.
140 Page 65, line 37, leave out from 'proceedings' to 'there' in line 39 and insert 'which have been or arc to be instituted in the designated country and may result in an external confiscation order being made'.
141 Page 66, line 5, leave out 'and which arc retained there shall nevertheless' and insert 'shall'.
142 Page 66, line 7, at end insert—
'(1A) In this Part of this Act
"external confiscation order" means an order made by a court in a designated country for the purpose—

(a) of recovering—

(i) property obtained as a result of or in connection with conduct corresponding to an offence to which this Part of this Act applies; or

(ii) the value of property so obtained; or

1620

(b) of depriving a person of a pecuniary advantage so obtained; and

"modifications" includes additions, alterations and omissions.'.
143 Page 66, line 9, at end insert—
'(2A) The power to make an Order in Council under this section includes power to modify this Part of this Act in such a way as to confer power on a person to exercise a discretion.
144 Clause 93, page 66, line 40, at end insert—
'(2) In subsection (1) above "constable" includes a police officer engaged on central service (as defined in section 43(5) of the Police Act 1964).'
145 Clause 95, page 68, line 20, at end insert 'not below the rank of senior executive officer'.
146 Page 68, line 46, at end insert—
'(6) The references to senior executive officers in subsection (2) above include reference to equivalent departmental grades.
'(7) This section shall cease to have effect on the day appointed under section 3(2) of the Land Registration Act 1988 for the coming into force of that Act'.'
147 Clause 96, leave out Clause 96 and insert the following new clause:
Abolition of power to make criminal bankruptcy order
'—(1) The power to make a criminal bankruptcy order which section 39 of the Powers of Criminal Court Act 1973 confers on the Crown Court is abolished.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) above—

(a) shall affect any criminal bankruptcy order made before this section comes into force; or

(b) shall prevent the taking of any step following such an order.'.

148 Clause 97, page 70, line 6, leave out 'in England and Wales'
149 Page 70, line 19, leave out from 'Proceedings' to first 'the' in line 29 and insert 'are concluded—

(a) When (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of a confiscation order being made in the proceedings;

(b) on'.

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 139 to 149 en bloc. These amendments are consequential upon Amendment No. 123 to which I spoke earlier. I beg to move.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 139 to 149. —(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
COMMONS AMENDMENT
150 Clause 104, page 75, line 20, at end insert—
'(1A) Harm to a person's mental condition is only a criminal injury if it is attributable—

(a) to his having been put in fear of immediate physical injury to himself or another; or

(b) to his being present when another sustained a criminal injury other than harm to his mental condition;

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 150. At the same time, I should like to speak to Amendment No. 159.
Amendment No. 150 clarifies the basis for compensation for mental harm and extends eligibility to cover a person who, though present at the scene of the crime, was not placed in immediate fear of injury. The revised wording meets concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, during the Report stage of the proceedings in this House. He pointed out that the provision as drafted would not cover a person present at the scene of the crime who did not see the attack coming and was not put in fear of immediate physical injury.

1621
Amendment No. 159 is a consequential drafting amendment. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, will approve these amendments.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 150.—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Irvine of Lairg: My Lords, the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, observed when I spoke to Amendments Nos. 132 to 137 that my welcome to them was somewhat cautious. I wholeheartedly welcome the amendments which the noble Earl has just mentioned.
The Bill was wholly inadequate as it was originally drafted, but the effect of the changes which have been made, and especially of new Clause 104(1A)(b), is to bring the jurisdiction of the board much more into line with the practice of the courts in dealing with nervous shock in personal injury cases and to remove some of the serious anomalies to which the original wording would have led. To us on these Benches it appears that the Government have gone as far as we urged in this House.
Lord Renton: My Lords, I hope that I have my mind on the point. I wish to make a comment with regard to Amendment No. 150, which states:
"Harm to a person's mental condition is only a criminal injury if it is attributable",
and then two factors are mentioned.
Earlier we considered Amendment No. 182 dealing with torture, which embodies what we have agreed as part of a European convention. I pointed out there that in subsection (3) of the new clause it states:
"It is immaterial whether the pain or suffering is physical or mental and whether it is caused by an act or an omission".
Here we find that harm to a person's mental condition is defined as relating to its being a criminal injury. One must assume that what is written into one part of statute affects another part. That is a well-known principle of interpretation of statutes. It does not worry me that subsection(3) of the new clause in Amendment No. 182 is to be interpreted in the light of Amendment No. 150. Indeed, that may well be the best thing. However, it seems to be a modification. This is very much a technical matter of interpretation for the judges who are sitting on criminal cases.
Not having given notice to my noble friend Lord Ferrers, it would not be right to ask him to comment. However, we should take note in passing that these two provisions will have to be read together.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
151 Clause 104, page 75, line 23, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
'(b) assault;'.
152 Page 75, line 26, leave out 'in Scotland, 'the offence of.
153 page 75, line 37, leave out 'in Scotland, 'the offence of.
154 Page 75, line 38, leave out 'or false imprisonment or, in Scotland, abduction' and insert—

'(ja) false imprisonment;

(jb) abduction:.

155 Page 75, line 39, leave out from beginning to 'and' in line 40 and insert—
(k) trespass on a railway;'
156 Page 76, line I, leave out subsection (3).
157 Clause 105, page 76, line 23, after 'the', insert 'law of England and Wales or'.
158 Page 76, leave out lines 24 to 26.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 151 to 158 en bloc. I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 160 to 162, 164, 165, 171 to 177, 311 to 313, 315 to 318, 318A, 320, 32113 and 324 to 331.
These amendments make drafting changes in the provisions which put the criminal injuries compensation scheme on to a statutory footing. The result is provisions which are clearer, will be easier to use by the criminal injuries compensaton board and will be less open to misinterpretation.
I can assure your Lordships that there is no change of substance. The amendments either contribute—with Amendments Nos 163 and 166, which we shall discuss in a moment—to a re-ordering of the material in Part III in Schedule 7 or are genuinely minor drafting changes.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 151 to 158.—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Irvine of Lairg: My Lords, earlier we had considerable discussion in this House about the best means of achieving the result which was generally agreed on all sides to be desirable, that train drivers who suffer injury or nervous shock as a result of railway suicides or suicide attempts and the like should be entitled to claim compensation from the board. As I understand it, Amendments Nos. 155 and 156 represent the Government's solution to the problem.
I have one doubt in my mind. It may be ill-founded. I seek this reassurance from the noble Earl. Is it indeed correct to say that trespass upon a railway is an offence under the law both of Scotland and of England and Wales as opposed to being merely a civil wrong? It may be that it is a criminal offence and is covered by some by-law or regulation of which I am quite unaware. If it is a criminal offence, there is no problem. If it is not, the Bill seems simply to be assuming that it is when it is not. The consequence is either that compensation will still be unavailable or that we may have criminalised by the back-door conduct which was never criminal before. I simply seek information on this point.
Lord Renton: My Lords, I can assist the noble Lord. In England—I cannot speak to the law in Scotland— it is a criminal offence but one which is triable only summarily, if I remember aright.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I can give the assurance which the noble Lord, Lord Irvine, requires, that trespass is a criminal offence.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
159 Clause 105, page 77, line 43, leave out subsection (8).
160 Clause 106, page 78, line 5, leave out from beginning to 'after' in line 7 and insert—
'(1) An award of compensation may be made—

(a) to any person who satisfies the Board that he has sustained a qualifying injury;

(b) to any person who satisfies the Board that he is a dependant of a person who died'.

161 Page 78, line 8, leave out 'dies' and insert 'died'.
162 Page 78, line 8, at end insert—
'and in this subsection "satisfies" means satisfies on a balance of probabilities.'
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 159 to 162 en bloc. They are consequential and are taken with Amendment No. 150. I beg to move.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 159 to 162.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
163 Clause 106, page 78, line 9, leave out subsections (2) to (5) and insert—
'(1A) The heads of compensation are those specified in subsections (1B) to (1E) below.
(1B) An award may be made under subsection (1)(a) above—

(a) for the injury; and

(b) for any loss of or damage to property of the claimant which occurred in the course of his sustaining the injury,

but compensation shall only be payable under paragraph (b) above if he relied on the property as a physical aid and for damage only if the damage impaired the utility of the property as a physical aid and shall only be for the cost of replacing it with other property of equal utility as a physical aid or carrying out repairs to restore its utility as a physical aid.
(1C) if a person dies as a result of a qualifying injury—

(a) an award of compensation for funeral expenses may be made to any person other than a public authority but shall not exceed a reasonable amount;

(b) where a claim falls to be determined in accordance with the rules of the law of England and Wales, an award of compensation for bereavement may be made to any person falling within section 1A(2) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976;

(c) where a claim falls to be determined in accordance with the rules of the law of Scotland, an award of compensation for loss of society may be made to any person who is a member of the deceased's immediate family within the meaning of section 10(2) of the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 and

(d) an award may be made to a dependant of the deceased (whether or not an award is made to him or to any other person under paragraph (a), (b) or (c) above) in respect of any loss of support suffered by the dependant.

(1D) Subject to subsection (1G) below, if a person who has sustained a qualifying injury dies otherwise than as a result of it. the Board may award compensation to a dependant of his in respect of any loss which he has suffered by reason—

(a) of any reduction in earnings (not being prospective earnings) by the deceased; and

(b) of any expenses and liabilities incurred by the deceased as a result of the injury.

(1E) If—

(a) a woman is awarded compensation for rape; and

(b) she has given birth to a child conceived as a result of the rape; and

(c) at the time of the award she intends to keep the child,

the Board shall award her the additional statutory sum in respect of each child so conceived that she then intends to keep.
(1F) The Board may make an interim award, but without prejudice to their power on a final determination.
(1G) If a person who has sustained a qualifying injury dies otherwise than as a result of it, the Board may not award
1624
compensation to a dependant of his if before he died he became entitled, otherwise than on an interim award, to a payment of compensation in respect of it.
(1H) If—

(a) a deceased person was entitled to payment of compensation for an injury; and

(b) a claim for compensation for the same injury is made by one of his dependants,

any compensation awarded to the dependant shall be reduced by the amount of the compensation payment to which the deceased was entitled; and proportionate reductions shall be made on awards to two or more dependants.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 163. I should like also to speak to Amendments Nos. 166, 321, 321A and 322A.
These amendments also re-order the material in Clause 106 and Schedule 7. The main effect of this is to create in readily accessible form in Clause 106 a single list of the circumstances in which compensation is to be paid for criminal injuries. I can assure your Lordships that the purpose is purely clarification and, with one minor exception, these amendments make no change of substance.
The exception is in Amendment No. 163. It results from a suggestion made in another place that the provision which allows the board to pay a special additional award to a rape victim who conceives as a result of the offence and who decides to keep the child should be amended to take account of the possibility of multiple births. That is a remote contingency but one which we agree should be provided for. This is done in Amendment No. 163. I beg to move.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 163.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
COMMONS AMENDMENTS
164 Clause 106, page 78. line 27, leave out 'make a claim for' and insert 'be awarded'.
165 Page 78, line 29, after 'his' insert 'medical'.
166 Page 78, line 34, leave out from 'Act' to end of line 38 and insert—
"the additional statutory sum" means £5,000 or such other sum as may for the time being be specified by virtue of an order under subsection (8) below; and
"dependant"—

(a) where the appropriate law for the determination of a claim is the law of England and Wales, has the same meaning as in the Fatal Accidents Act 1976; and

(b) where it is the law of Scotland, means a relative within the meaning of the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976.

(8) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument substitute a different sum for the sum specified in subsection (7) above.
(9) A statutory instrument containing an order under subsection (8) above shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.'
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 164 to 166 en bloc. They were spoken to with Amendment No. 151. I beg to move.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 164 to 166.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
167 Clause 107, page 78, line 39, leave out from beginning to end of line 15 on page 79 and insert—
'(1) It is for the claimant to satisfy the Board, on a blanace of probabilities—

(a) that he took all reasonable steps within a reasonable time to inform the police, or such other authority as the Board consider appropriate, of the circumstances of the injury to which the claim relates and that he has cooperated fully with the police or with such other authority as the Board consider appropriate, in bringing to justice any person responsible for causing the inury;

(b) that he has given the Board, or such such other authority as the Board consider appropriate, all the assistance in connection with the claim which it is reasonable for him to give; and

(c) that there is no possibility that a person responsible for causing the injury will benefit from an award,

and if a claimant fails so to satisfy the Board, they may, if they think fit, refuse an award or award less than they would otherwise have awarded.
(1A) The Board may also, if they think fit, refuse an award or award less than they would otherwise have awarded because of any of the following—.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 167. Perhaps I may also speak to Amendments Nos. 168, 169 and 170 at the same time.
This group of amendments deals with the board's powers to reduce or withhold compensation. The government amendments, Nos. 167, 168, 169 and 170, were introduced in another place following a number of discussions in this House about the shortcomings of the drafting of the present Clause 107. The drafting of the clause as it left your Lordships' House was unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, it contained awkward double negatives. Secondly, it contained two separate concepts of conduct in subparagraph (1)(a)(iii) and subparagraph (1)(b)(ii). One of those concepts would have covered contributory negligence which the board does not consider on the present scheme when looking at an applicant's conduct. Thirdly, on reconsideration it became evident that the conduct of an applicant connected with the occasioning of an injury could not sensibly be described as conduct which took place after the injury. Those defects have now been remedied by the amendments without otherwise altering the tests which are set out in the clause. I beg to move.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 167.—(Earl Ferrers.)
1 p.m.

AMENDMENTS TO COMMONS AMENDMENT 167
167A Subsection (1)(b), line 3, leave out ("and").
167B Subsection (1)(c), at end insert ("; and
(d) that there was not misconduct on his part connected with the injury, but he shall be required to do so only if the Board raises the issue").
167C Subsection (1A), line 3, leave out ("any of the following").

CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENT TO THE BILL
167D Page 79, line 18, leave out sub-paragraph (ii).
Lord Morton of Shuna: My Lords, if these amendments were kept separate they would not follow correctly, so I shall speak to them all together. Amendment No. 167 is a considerable improvement
1626
to Clause 107. I should declare an interest as a member of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. The difficulty that remains is that Amendment No. 167 begins:
"It is for the claimant to satisfy the Board, on a balance of probabilities".
There follow three items, and then:
"The Board may also, if they think fit, refuse an award or award less than they would otherwise have awarded because of any of the following".
The "following" include the applicant's convictions or,
"conduct on his part connected with the occasioning of the injury".
The purpose of the amendments that I propose is to move conduct at the time of occasioning the injury into the first paragraph—in other words, where it is for the claimant to satisfy the board rather than the other way round. In logic it is virtually impossible for somebody who was not at the scene of the incident to satisfy himself that the applicant's conduct did not contribute to his injury, whereas it is quite possible for the applicant himself to have the onus of proof of that because he usually knows what happened. That is the sole purpose of these four amendments.
The burden of proof is put on the applicant only if the board raises the issue. That gives the applicant warning that his conduct at the time of the incident may be put in question. But the onus of proof is not always an easy aspect to understand. If the police come across a man who is injured having obviously been in some kind of fight outside a public house and there is evidence that he has been required to leave the public house because he has caused some kind of disturbance, the board—with the present onus on the applicant— would tend to be rather suspicious of the applicant's conduct and might consider that he had voluntarily taken part in a fight. An award might be refused.
Under the scheme as drafted in the Bill the board would have no option if the applicant said that somebody just came and hit him. There would be no evidence on which it could pursue its suspicion because the onus of proof would be on it. As a member of the board I consider that entirely wrong. But if the Government insist on their amendment, the best calculation is that £1 or £2 million a year will be paid out to people whom the board considers, under its present scheme, should not have it. If that is what the Government want to happen I do not intend to force a vote. I hope however that the Government will accept the amendments. I beg to move Amendment No. 167A.
Lord Renton: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna, is just as lucid and persuasive when he is speaking from the Back Benches as when he is speaking from his position on the Front Bench: I cannot think that there was no room for him to speak from the Opposition Front Bench on this occasion.
Lord Morton of Shuna: My Lords, because I have a particular interest it was thought appropriate that I should speak from the Back Benches.
Lord Renton: My Lords, that may be so. In my ignorance I fail to understand that. The noble Lord is not criticising the Commons amendment so far as it goes. He is merely trying to add to it but trying in a way that I find rather unusual. The noble Lord says

1627
that the applicant shall not be required to prove that there was no misconduct on his part unless the board raises the issue. I must confess that I do not remember those kinds of conditions being written into a provision dealing with burden of proof. I do not believe that it fits in very well here, but I should have thought that when we are considering Commons amendments—which, in this instance, are an improvement on our own drafting—we should acknowledge that there has been no change of substance in what we suggested to the Commons. We should not be prepared at this very late stage to add to the substance of the matter, even if it were necessary—which I doubt. Quite frankly, the terms of the amendment as it stands are very wide. I cannot believe that the board would consider that the claimant had discharged his burden of proof if it became clear—whether the board asked him to raise the matter or not—that there has been no misconduct on his part. The amendment has the further defect (this is clearly a drafting defect) in that it introduces another negative.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, I agree with my noble friend. I prefer the text of the Commons amendment as it stands. I agree with what my noble friend said. I do not like the phrase "connected with" where it occurs in the first line of the amendment. It is obscure and could be misunderstood. I should have preferred the words "no misconduct" if they were to be used at all, instead of "not misconduct".
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I appreciate the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna, that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board should not have to pay compensation in cases where it is undeserved. Amendments proposed by the Opposition and accepted by the Government have already limited the present discretion of the board to withhold or reduce awards. An attempt to remove altogether the board's power to refuse or reduce awards on account of previous convictions or unlawful conduct, however serious, was defeated only on a Division.
Under the Bill there is already a considerable burden of proof on the claimant. He first has to prove to the board that he sustained a qualifying injury. Then he must prove that he took all reasonable steps to inform the police about it and co-operate with the police in bringing the perpetrator to justice. He must prove that he has co-operated fully with the board and any other relevant authority in connection with the claim. He also has to prove that there is no possibility that a person responsible for causing the injury will benefit from an award. When the claimant has done all that, the board will still have a discretion to refuse or reduce an award, if it thinks fit, because of any criminal convictions or unlawful conduct of the claimant, or his conduct at any time connected with the injury. In considering all these matters the board can take account of hearsay and opinion evidence.
Therefore, the board will have a very wide discretion to refuse or reduce awards. This Bill introduces statutory rights to compensation for criminal injuries. Both this Bill and its predecessor separate the issues of criminal convictions and
1628
conduct and matters on which the claimant must satisfy the board. We have some sympathy with the intention behind the amendment, but I do not believe that it would be right at this stage further to widen the board's discretion as proposed in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna. Nor in our view would it be fair to place that further requirement of proof on the claimant. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will be content with the original amendment.
Lord Morton of Shuna: My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has taken part in the debate. Perhaps I may say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, that one has to use some of the words used in the Bill. I took the words "conduct connected with" from the Government's drafting in the Bill as it is. That is where it came from.
I appreciate that the amendment as drafted is perhaps not the best ever piece of drafting. I take total responsibility in this House for that, but I shall convey to those who approved the drafting the views of the noble Lord, Lord Renton, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham. That may be interesting to them.
The position to which I am seeking to return with these amendments is the position on which the board has operated for the past 24 years. The Bill is making a change in making the person's conduct at the time of his injury something which he does not have to prove but which the board has to prove. However, as the Government are not prepared to accept the amendment, I do not wish to divide on the issue and I ask leave to withdraw it.
Amendment to Commons amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 167B to 167D not moved.]
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
168 Clause 107, page 79, line 18, leave out 'occasioning of the'.
169 Page 79, line 20, leave Out subsection (2).
170 Page 79, line 21, at end insert—
'(2A) The references to convictions and conduct in subsection (1A) above are references to convictions and conduct at any time, including a time after the injury.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 168 to 170 en bloc.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 168 to 170.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
171 Clause 107, page 79, line 22, leave out from 'Where' to 'shall' in line 24 and insert 'the person who sustained the injury is dead, the references to the claimant in subsections (1)(a) and (b) and (2) above'.
172 Clause 108, leave out Clause 108 and insert the following new Clause—
—(1) If the Board have determined a claim after a hearing, an appeal on any ground which involves a question of law alone shall belie—

(a) to the High Court if they determined it under the law of England and Wales; and

(b) to the Court of Session if they determined it under the law of Scotland.

(2) No appeal to the Court of Appeal shall be brought from a decision of the High Court under this section except with the leave of the high Court or the Court of Appeal.
(3) An appeal shall lie, with the leave of the Court of Session or the House of Lords, from any decision of the Court of Session under this section, and such leave may be given on such terms as to costs or otherwise as the Court of Session or the House of Lords may determine.'.
173 Clause 110, page 80, line 32, after 'convicted', insert 'in England and Wales'.
174 Page 80, line 35, leave out from 'Board' to end of line 36 and insert 'in a county court for an order for the repayment by the offender to the Board of the whole of the award or such part of It as the court thinks fit.'.
175 Page 80, line 37, leave out subsections (2) and (3).
176 Clause 111, page 81, line 23, after 'convicted', insert 'in Scotland'.
177 Page 81, line 28, leave Out subsection (2).
1.15 p.m.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 171 to 177 en bloc.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 171 to 177. (Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
178 Clause 113, page 82, line 7, at end insert—
'(2) In addition and without prejudice to any powers which the Crown Court may possess to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings a judge of the Crown Court may order that the hearing of a challenge for cause shall be in camera or in chambers.'.
Earl Ferrers: I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 178. This amendment was made in response to concerns expressed in your Lordships' House in particular by the noble Lord. Lord Wigoder, and in another place that it should he made clear in the Bill that judges have the power to hear challenges for cause otherwise than in open court. The Government accept that that is a desirable clarification and I hope that your Lordships will agree with this amendment.
Moved, that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 178.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
179 Clause 118, page 85, line 32, at end insert
—1C.—(l) Subject to section 22(2)(b) of the Prison Act 1952 (removal to hospital etc), an offender sentenced to detention in a young offender institution shall be detained in such an institution unless a direction under this section is in force in relation to him.
(2) The Secretary of State may from time to time direct that an offender sentenced to a detention in a young offender institution shall be detained in a prison or remand centre instead of a young offender institution, but if he is under 17 at the time of the direction, only for a temporary purpose.".'
180 Clause 119, page 86, line 18, leave out '(b)'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 179 and 180 en bloc. I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 332 to 341, 362, 363, 384, 385, 400, 414 and 415.
1630
These amendments make various minor changes to provisons which will bring about a unified custodial sentence for young offenders in order to replace the detention centre order and the youth custody sentence.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 179 and 180.— (Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
181 Before Clause 128, insert the following new Clause—
—(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, when a person has been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the Secretary of State shall pay compensation for the miscarriage of justice to the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction or, if he is dead, to his personal representatives unless the non-disclosure of the unknown fact was wholly or partly attributable to the person convicted.
(2) No payment of compensation under this section shall be made unless an application for such compensation has been made to the Secretary of State.
(3) The question whether there is a right to compensation under this section shall be determined by the Secretary of State.
(4) If the Secretary of State determines that there is a right to such compensation, the amount of the compensation shall be assessed by an assessor appointed by the Secretary of State.
(5) In this section "reversed" shall be construed as referreing to a conviction having been quashed—

(a) on an appeal out of time; or

(b) on a reference —

(i) under section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968;

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 181. I should also like to speak to Amendments Nos. 348 and 426. I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, who was assisted by the noble Lords, Lord Mishcon, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington and Lord Harris of Greenwich, who persuaded us in Committee that we should use the opportunity which is presented to give statutory effect to the United Kingdom's obligations under Article 14, paragraph 6, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Your Lordships will know that we already meet those international obligations in practice. However, successive governments have acknowledged that legislation would be necessary to meet the letter as well as the spirit of the covenant.
Perhaps I might assist your Lordships by touching briefly on some of the main features of the proposed statutory scheme. The meat, if one may so describe it, is in subsection (1) of the new clause. The wording follows quite closely the wording of Article 14(6) of the international covenant. The effect is that compensation is payable by law where the conviction has been reversed outside the normal judicial process, where it has been shown beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a miscarriage of justice, where the miscarriage of justice is revealed by the emergence of a new or newly discovered fact and where the convicted person was not responsible for the new fact not emerging in time to be taken into account by the normal judicial process.
While it is for the Secretary of State to determine an applicant's entitlement to compensation, the

1631
amount of an award will be determined by an independent assessor. That is also the arrangement under the present non-statutory scheme. As at present, the assessor will be asked to make assessments in accordance with the general principles applied in the assessment of damages in civil cases.
The new schedule deals with matters concerning the appointment and qualifications of assessors. They will be practising lawyers or members of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board or past or present holders of judicial office. Your Lordships will recall that the present non-statutory arrangements described in the statement made by the Home Secretary on 29th November 1985 go somewhat wider than our obligations under international covenant. In particular, my right honourable friend is prepared to pay compensation on a discretionary basis in cases where someone has spent a period in custody following a wrongful conviction or charge as a result of a serious default on the part of a member of a police force or some other public authority or in some other exceptional circumstances.
My right honourable friend will continue to exercise his discretion as to whether compensation should be awarded in such cases. I hope that your Lordships will approve these amendments.
Moved, that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 181.—(Earl Ferrers.)
AS AN AMENDMENT TO
COMMONS AMENDMENT NO. 181
181A Subsection (1), line 4, leave out ("beyond reasonable
doubt").
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, I first express our gratitude from these Benches to the noble Earl for having tabled this important and significant Amendment No. 181 which, as he said, embodies what has been urged and is now given proper place in our legislation.
The process of the need to remedy miscarriages of justice is not an easy one, but it is essential that the legal system should provide for it. What is significant now is that we are moving from an ex gratia basis of compensation to statutory provision for it to be given.
Coming to my Amendment No. 181A, your Lordships will observe that subsection (1) of the new clause reads:
"Subject to subsection (2) below, when a person has been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently this conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the Secretary of State shall pay compensation for the miscarriage of justice".
and so on. I submit—and this is the purpose of my amendment—that we should leave out the words "beyond reasonable doubt". They are unnecessary and impose too high a standard.
It is significant that in the statement to which the noble Earl referred— namely, that of the Home Secretary on 29th November 1985—there is no equivalent to the insertion of the requirement of' a proof, so to speak, that it is "beyond reasonable doubt". The words that we submit are perfectly adequate to meet the situation are,
"shows that there has been a miscarriage of justice".
1632
That phrase is definite and clear enough to be properly interpreted. We do not see the need to include "beyond reasonable doubt". Those words will add a new factor of difficulty when the victims of miscarriages of justice seek a remedy. Therefore, I hope it will be agreed that the words are unnecessary and damaging to the purpose of the new clause. I beg to move.
Lord Hutchinson of Lullington: My Lords, I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, in his amendment. I should like to put a question to the noble Earl on this matter of miscarriage of justice which is of some importance.
Compensation is to be paid for a miscarriage of justice and the conviction of the person has to be reversed or the accused pardoned on the ground that the new fact reveals that miscarriage of justice. Further, it is the Secretary of State who determines whether the person has the right, and it is his decision alone. Therefore, it is of crucial importance that we should understand what constitutes a miscarriage of justice.
The important issue is this. What appeared, and is referred to in the Devlin Report— I had the honour to be a member of the committee which made that report—was that when a matter of this kind, a new fact, came to light and was considered by the Home Office it could either refer the matter to the Court of Appeal or it could deal with the matter itself and recommend a pardon. The criterion was different in the two cases. When a new fact goes to the Court of Appeal it is considered and if it arouses a lurking doubt as to the satisfactory nature of the conviction it allows the appeal. If the Home Office looks at the matter it has to be satisfied of the person's innocence before a pardon can be advised. Therefore, there are two different views on what amounts to a miscarriage of justice.
It is a crucial point. Let us suppose a new fact arises. It is brought to the attention of the Secretary of State and considered by him. The Secretary of State says to himself, "Well, if that fact had been available on appeal there is no question in my mind but that the Court of Appeal would have had a lurking doubt and would have quashed the conviction". It does not mean that the person is innocent. It means that there is a miscarriage of justice because the person was convicted on inadequate evidence.
Alternatively, the Secretary of State may look at the case and say, "The Court of Appeal might have done that but I am not satisfied that this person is innocent and therefore there has not been a miscarriage of justice". Those are two very different approaches and it seems to me essential that if compensation depends on the establishment of a miscarriage of justice, it should be absolutely clear what view the Secretary of State takes as to what amounts to such a miscarriage.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, the only course for the House is either to accept the situation as the Commons have left it or to accept the view which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, has put forward. I am not wedded to either alternative; but there is something to be said for the view expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones.

1633
We can forget about the action of a Court of Appeal because it is not before the House as to whether that part of the amendment should be accepted. That is not a matter on which this House, in this debate, can express an opinion. If the Secretary of State has recommended a pardon because he happens to be satisfied that a person is innocent I cannot see what is added by insisting that the Secretary of State should have to pay compensation only where the innocence of the victim of the miscarriage of justice has been proved "beyond reasonable doubt". We would be in a ludicrous position if the Secretary of State is satisfied the person was innocent but not satisfied that there was no reasonable doubt about it. There is a great deal to be said for the argument of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, strictly as a matter of common sense and law.
Lord Monson: My Lords, I too welcome the admirable Amendment No. 181; but I believe that it would be even more perfect if modified in the way suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones.
Lord Renton: My Lords, I see a difficulty. If the words "beyond reasonable doubt" are not included it would mean that the Secretary of State would merely have to consider whether prima facie, the new fact disclosed a miscarriage of justice. I believe that will create an unsatisfactory situation. Therefore, in spite of what has been said, I confess that I would prefer the words "beyond reasonable doubt" to remain.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Renton for agreeing that those words should remain. I would say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, that I do not think there is anything sinister about them. The matter with which the clause deals is that of paying compensation to someone who is shown to have been the victim of a miscarriage of justice by reason of the later emergence of a new fact. It seems to be right and reasonable that the consequence of the new fact should be demonstrated "beyond reasonable doubt". That is the measure that the criminal courts will normally take.
I point out that the terms of the clause are not as rigorous as the article of the international covenant to which it gives effect. We undertook to recognise this in statute. The article provides that the new fact which has emerged should show "conclusively" that there has been a miscarriage of justice. We felt it right to follow our own usage in this respect despite the fact that the words are less strict. I hope that your Lordships will agree to keep those words. By removing the words "beyond reasonable doubt" we remove any standard of proof. The international convenant says that it must be proved conclusively; in other words beyond all doubt. We arc saying that it should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord says that there should be no standard of proof at all. I hope that he will agree that the words "beyond reasonable doubt" are reasonable. He referred to my right honourable friend's statement when he said that he was satisfied that it resulted from serious default. There must always be some criterion
1634
for a statutory scheme and we thought that "beyond reasonable doubt" was a sensible standard of proof. The noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, asked a specific question. The normal course is to refer cases to the Court of Appeal and to regard its view as binding. The Home Secretary has a residual discretion which he can apply where the new matters are ones that could not be considered by the Court of Appeal. I hope that, in view of those remarks, the noble and learned Lord will agree that the words "beyond reasonable doubt" are the proper ones.
1.30 p.m.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, I am disappointed in what has been said by the noble Earl. We are dealing with a provision which involves certain steps to be taken before compensation is paid where a person has been convicted. Subsequently, his conviction may be reversed by a court or he may be pardoned by the Secretary of State on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows that there has been a miscarriage of justice. If all that is established, that is the very basis upon which compensation for that miscarriage of justice is to be made. To add the factor of the requirement of proof beyond resonable doubt where the court that reversed the decision will have considered all the relevant factors, and the Secretary of State, when he has been responsible for a pardon, will have considered all relevant matters to a degree of establishing with confidence that a miscarriage of justice should be remedied, introduces an unhappy and somewhat dangerous withdrawal from a responsible position taken where there has been a miscarriage of justice and where there should be compensation.
If those words are retained it will damage the generosity—I use the word "generosity" but I prefer the word "justice"—of what is proposed. I doubt very much whether it adds to the problems that a public authority has for the protection of public funds. If the words "beyond reasonable doubt" are retained, they will diminish the value of this crucial concession in the interest of justice. I again urge the noble Earl to have another thought about this. I wonder whether it is too late for me to press that matter now; otherwise I shall have to take the opinion of the House.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I am happy to think about this for a long while, but the fact is that we can only make a decision now. The noble and learned Lord asks me to think about it and I presume he asks whether we accept the amendment. I cannot tell him that we accept it. I have tried to explain to him that the words in the article are considerably stronger. They say that the matter has to be proved conclusively and that there is no doubt. All we are saying is that it should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The noble and learned Lord is a reasonable person and I am sure that those words are an appropriate modification. He is suggesting words which provide no standard of proof at all. I do not believe that one can ever say, "Such and such is bound to be right and I know it is right". All one can say is that it is so beyond reasonable doubt. I hope the noble and learned Lord will agree that that is the correct form of words.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, I do not wish to repeat what I said before. I am delighted to have the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, on this matter. However, it is an important point of principle and I must ask for the opinion of the House.
1.36 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 181A) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 32; Not-Contents, 53.

DIVISION NO. 2

CONTENTS

Ardwick, L.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Broadbridge, L.

Kilbracken, L.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Longford, E.

Cocks of Hartcliffe, L.

Monson, L.

Donoughue, L.

Morton of Shuna, L.

Dormand of Easington, L.

Mountevans, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Nicol, B.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.[Teller.]

Ezra, L.

Falkland, V.

Shackleton, L.

Fitt, L.

Slallard, L.

Gallacher, L. [Teller.]

Strabolgi, L.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Turner of Camden, B.

Hooson, L.

Underhill, L.

Houghton of Sowerby, L.

White, B.

Hutchinson of Lullington, L.

Williams of Elvel, L.

Irvine of Lairg, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Arran, E.

Long, V. [Teller]

Auckland, L.

Lyell, L.

Balfour, E.

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Beaverbrook, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Marley, L.

Belstead, L.

Marsh, L.

Bethell, L.

Mersey, V.

Blake, L.

Munster, E.

Blyth, L.

Murton of Lindisfarne, L.

Borthwick, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Brentford, V.

Newall, L.

Caithness, E.

Norrie, L.

Carnock, L.

O'Brien of Lothbury, L.

Coleraine, L.

Oxfuird, V.

Colwyn, L.

Peyton of Yeovil, L.

Craigavon, V.

Rankeillour, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Renton, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Rippon of Hexham, L.

Effingham, E.

Strathclyde, L.

Faithfull, B.

Swinfen, L.

Ferrers, E.

Terrington, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Teviot, L.

Gainford, L.

Trumpington, B.

Glenarthur, L.

Windlesham, L.

Hooper, B.

Wise, L.

Keyes. L.

Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment to Commons amendment disgreed to accordingly.
1.44 p.m.
AS AN AMENDMENT TO COMMONS AMENDMENT No.181
181B Subsection (1) at end insert—
("(1A) The Secretary of State shall also pay compensation under this section—

(i) where he is satisfied that punishment has resulted from a serious default on the part of a member of a police force or of some other public authority; or

(ii) where the international obligations of the United Kingdom require the payment of compensation for a miscarriage of justice; or

1636

(iii) in any other circumstances where, in his opinion, a miscarriage of justice has occurred (whether or not the conviction has been reversed).").

Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, this amendment to the new clause proposes to add provision by way of compensation for matters which were expressly included in the Written Answer of the Home Secretary of 29th November 1985 when the decision was made to pay compensation to persons who had been wrongly convicted of criminal offences. The Written Answer is reported at col. 691 of Hansard for 29th November 1985. The Home Secretary said:
"In future I shall be prepared to pay compensation to all such persons where this is required by our international obligations. The international covenant on civil and political rights [article 14.61 provides that:
'When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed, or he has been pardoned, on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him'.
I remain prepared to pay compensation to people who do not fall within the terms of the preceding paragraph but who have spent a period in custody following a wrongful conviction or charge, where I am satisfied that it has resulted from serious default on the part of a member of a police force or of some other public authority".
The three items contained in my amendment are expressly provided for as a basis for compensation in the statement of the Home Secretary. My amendment reads:
"The Secretary of State shall also pay compensation under this section—
(i) where he is satisfied that punishment has resulted from a serious default on the part of a member of a police force or of some other public authority"—
those words are taken from the statement of the Home Secretary
"(ii) where the international obligations of the United Kingdom require the payment of compensation for a miscarriage of justice;"—
that is covered by the early part of the statement which I read—
"(iii) in any other circumstances where, in his opinion, a miscarriage of justice has occurred (whether or not the conviction has been reversed)".
That also emerges from the convenant itself and from the approval of it by the Home Secretary. I hope accordingly that there will be a faithful adherence to what was contemplated in the initial statement on 29th November 1985. These are matters where it is reasonable for the state, for the Secretary of State and for the Government to accept responsibility for miscarriages of justices in the circumstances set out in those three provisions included in the amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Hutchinson of Lullington: My Lords, I should like to support the amendment. The Government are always so reluctant to establish fundamental rights and seem prepared to do so only when driven to it by the requirements of international or European conventions. Surely a miscarriage of justice is often even more important than a criminal injury. Surely if ever statutory compensation was justified, it is for a miscarriage of justice. Here is a real opportunity to follow on from the minimal demand of the international convention and put what is at the moment a question of an ex gratia payment on a statutory basis.
Lord Renton: My Lords, we are invited to make a considerable addition to the Commons amendment which we have already welcomed; namely, the new clause in Amendment No. 181. Although I appreciate the desires of the noble and learned Lord, I seriously wonder whether the amendment he has tabled is either necessary or altogether sound in the way in which it is expressed. It starts off by saying, quite naturally and properly, that:
"The Secretary of State shall…pay compensation".
There is no discretion there; and that is clearly what the noble and learned Lord has in mind, and is in keeping with the terms of the new clause itself which we have already discussed. It then goes on to introduce a subjective test which is that the Secretary of State, although he has no discretion, must satisfy himself that the punishment has resulted from "a serious default". I must say that I should have preferred to see the provision read:
"Where punishment has beyond reasonable doubt resulted from a serious default on the part of a member of the police force or of some other public authority".
Is it really necessary for us to legislate on those terms? Because if there had been a serious default on the part of a member of the police force, it would have come to light. The Secretary of State would have had it drawn to his attention—probably in Parliament— and I therefore doubt the need for us to legislate on that point.
As regards the international obligations which "require the payment", that is most likely to be an obligation imposed by our membership of the European Economic Community. We find increasingly that obligations imposed in that way enter into our law without much delay or doubt. Therefore I also doubt the need for that provision.
I turn now to the last provision, which reads:
"In any other circumstances where in his opinion, a miscarriage of justice has occurred".
Again, we have the words "in his opinion". That again introduces a subjective test where the Secretary of State has no discretion. I should have thought that if we are to have this provision—which I doubt —the words "beyond reasonable doubt" would be better than "in his opinion". But taking it in the broad, I do not find this amendment to the Commons amendment sufficiently satisfactory or convincing to suggest that your Lordships should be advised to accept it.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, I am hound to say that on this occasion, although I gave my qualified blessing to the noble and learned Lord on the last amendment, I do not think that this one is as satisfactory. I can understand the case for it, although I think I should not wholly agree—partly on the grounds just stated. If it was proposed as an alternative to the Commons amendment, I think that there would be a case to be argued, although I could not agree with it all. However, I do not think that it can stand with the Commons amendment as an addition to it. On the contrary, it will lead to considerable confusion because the Commons amendment really does or does not fulfil our international obligations—and the House, without my entire approval, has decided that it does on the advice of my noble friend Lord Ferrers.
1638
The amendment adds another series of criteria which are basically inconsistent with the one which the Commons has suggested, not as an alternative but as an addition. It would lead to great confusion if it were passed.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I am especially grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham for his remarks and to know that at least on this amendment he has returned to the fold. I agree with my noble friend Lord Renton that this amendment will in fact be a considerable addition to the Bill.
The commitment to which we have agreed is to enact in our law the provisions of paragraph 6 of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The noble and learned Lord's amendmment goes far beyond this. We stand by that commitment to incorporate that international covenant but other elements of the existing scheme, set out in my right honourable friend the Home Secretary's Statement of 29th November 1985, would be difficult to define in statute. We can see no particular advantage in seeking to do so, particularly on the basis which the noble and learned Lord has proposed. The cases which would fall outside the terms of that article are almost by definition exceptional, and it would be almost impossible to foresee all possible exceptional circumstances. My right honourable friend is prepared to be flexible in looking at cases presented to him, and we should not lose that flexibility. We have already made it clear that the arrangements set out in the statement to which I have referred will be retained. But attempting to define them, or parts of them, in statute would reduce the present scope for flexibility, or be liable to create difficulties of interpretation. I certainly see that last point as presenting particular difficulty in the context of the amendment which the noble and learned Lord suggests.
The first part of the amendment, dealing with "serious default" is a specific part of my right honourable friend's Statement. The difficulties which are raised by attempting to make statutory provision are made apparent by the wording the noble and learned Lord has chosen. In the Statement, the question must be whether or not my right honourable friend is satisfied that a wrongful conviction or charge, not punishment, has resulted from serious default. In cases where there has been a conviction, we would expect that that conviction would have been reversed, either through appeal, or through grant of a free pardon, before the issue of compensation, and the question as to whether or not there had been serious default, was considered. In the absence of definition of the terms and provisions on which this particular part of the amendment relies, I do not think that a hasty statutory provision is to be recommended as a way forward. As I have indicated, my right honourable friend considers cases which might fall under this heading, as he considers any other application for compensation, carefully on their merits, and with flexibility. That approach is not something we should hastily lose.
The second part of the noble and learned Lord's amendment, set out in the paragraph at item (ii) go far beyond the matters with which Clause 131 is concerned. That clause is concerned with making statutory provision for a certain aspect of our international obligations. Moreover, it is specifically

1639
concerned with miscarriage of justice. This part of the amendment would provide a much more general and wide-ranging provision for compensation, falling far outside the more specific and necessary concerns related to miscarriages of justice. The words "international obligations" are nowhere defined in the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord. I do not believe it right to commend such a provision in the context of the specific matter of compensation for miscarriages of justice.
The third part of the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, which is set out under subparagraph (iii), is in some senses even wider. It would place a responsibility on my right honourable friend to decide for himself whether there had been a miscarriage of justice. As the existing provisions of Clause 131 make clear, and as has been made clear elsewhere on other occasions in the context of considering my right honourable friend's powers to intervene in criminal convictions, it is right and proper, and in accordance with our constitutional and judicial principles, that such matters are decided by the courts. It should not be a matter for my right honourable friend.
It is difficult to envisage a case where a conviction had not been reversed by the courts, or in exceptional circumstances by the grant of a free pardon, where my right honourable friend could possibly feel justified in paying compensation. It is too wide a power, affecting the principles upon which our judicial system operates, and too wide a power properly to devolve upon a Secretary of State. I cannot commend that part of the amendment, nor indeed the wide terms of the amendment at large, to your Lordships.
We have stood by our undertaking to make statutory provisions regarding the international obligations set out in paragraph 6 of Article 14 of the International Covenant. It would not be wise or appropriate so hastily and widely to extend to my right honourable friend and his successors the power to pay compensation from public funds.
2 p.m.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, it would be churlish not to recognise the importance and value of the broad concession made by the Government in Amendment No. 181. The language that I have inserted in my amendment is taken from the Home Secretary's Statement, in particular, the phrase "where he is satisfied", which the noble Lord, Lord Renton, found so unattractive. It may well be that that further elaboration must await another day.
The major victory, if I may put it that way, of the concession on the concept of compensation for miscarriages of justice is now embodied in the Criminal Justice Bill. In the circumstances I am afraid that for the time being—I am not giving any undertakings for the future—we shall have to be content with what mercy has already been provided for us. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment to Commons amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Commons Amendment No. 181 agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
182 Before Clause 128, insert the following new Clause—
'Torture.
.—(1) A public official or person acting in an official capacity, whatever his nationality, commits the offence of torture if in the United Kingdom or elsewhere he intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or purported performance of his official duties.
(2) A person not falling within subsection (1) above commits the offence of torture, whatever his nationality if—

(a) in the United Kingdom or elsewhere he intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on another at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence—

(i) of a public official; or

(ii) of a person acting in an official capacity; and

(b) the official or other person is performing or purporting to perform his official duties when he instigates the commission of the offence or consents to or acquiesces in it.

(3) It is immaterial whether the pain or suffering is physical or mental and whether it is caused by an act or an omission.
(4) It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section in respect of any conduct of his to prove that he had lawful authority, justification or excuse for that conduct.
(5) For the purposes of this section "lawful authority, justification or excuse" means—

(a) in relation to pain or suffering inflicted in the United Kingdom, lawful authority, justification or excuse under the law of the part of the United Kingdom where it was inflicted;

(b) in relation to pain or suffering inflicted outside the United Kingdom—

(i) if it was inflicted by a United Kingdom official acting under the law of the United Kingdom or by a person acting in an official capacity under that law, lawful authority, justification or excuse under that law;

(ii) if it was inflicted by a United Kingdom official acting under the law of any part of the United Kingdom or by a person acting in an official capacity under such law, lawful authority, justification or excuse under the law of the part of the United Kingdom under whose law he was acting; and

(iii) in any other case, a lawful authority, justification or excuse under the law of the place where it was inflicted.

(6) A person who commits the offence of torture shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.'.
183 Insert the following new Clause:—
'.—Proceedings for an offence under section [Torture] above shall not be begun—

(a) in England and Wales, except by, or with the consent of, the Attorney General; or

(b) in Northern Ireland, except by, or with the consent of, the Attorney General for Northern Ireland.'.

184 Insert the following new Clause—
'.—(1) Torture shall be deemed to be included in the list of extradition crimes contained in Schedule I to the Extradition Act 1870.
(2) For the purposes of the Extradition Act 1870 any act or omission, wherever committed, which constitutes torture and a corresponding offence against the law of any State in the case of which the Extradition Act 1870 has been applied by an Order in Council under section 2 of that Act shall he deemed to be an offence committed within the jurisdiction of that State.'.
185 Insert the following new Clause—
'.—(1) Where—

(a) no such arrangement as is mentioned in section 2 of the Extradition Act 1870 has been made with a State which is a party to the Torture Convention; and

(b) general extradition arrangements have not been made with that State under Part I of this Act.

Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that the provisions of this Act specified in subsection (2) below shall apply as between the United Kingdom and that State, subject to the limitations, restrictions, exceptions and qualifications, if any, contained in the Order, as if the Torture Convention

1641
constituted general extradition arrangements made with that State under Part I of this Act, but only in respect of the following offences—

(i) torture;

(ii) attempted torture;

(iii) counselling, procuring, commanding, aiding or abetting torture; and

(iv) being accessory before or after the fact of torture.

(2) The provisions of this Act mentioned in subsection (1) above are—

(a) section 1(1) to (8);

(b) sections 3 to 10 and

(c) sections 12 to [Persons serving sentences outside country of conviction.]

(3) An Order in Council under this section may not provide that a court dealing with a person arrested for an offence mentioned in subsection (1) above shall not be under a duty to determine whether the evidence would he sufficient to warrant his trial if the offence had taken place within the jurisdiction of the court.
(4) For the purposes of the provisions of this Act specified in subsection (2) above, in their application by virtue of an Order in Council under the section as between the United Kingdom and any other State any act or omission, wherever it takes place, which constitutes—

(a) an offence mentioned in subsection (1) above; and

(b) an offence against the law of that State,

shall be deemed to be an offence committed within the territory of that State.
(5) In this section "the Torture Convention" means the United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1984.'.
186 Insert the following new Clause—
'.—(1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council make provision for extending sections [Torture] and [Requirement of Attorney General's consent for prosecutions] above, with such modifications and exceptions as may be specified in the Order, to any of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man or any colony.
(2) Sections 17 and 22 of the Extradition Act 1870 shall extend to section [Extradition under 1870 Act] above.
(3) Sections 18 and [Application of general extradition arrangements to Colonies] above shall extend to section [Extradition under Part I] above.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 182 to 186 en bloc. The amendments are consequential upon amendment No. 63.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 182 to 186. (Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
187 Clause 128, page 88, line 19, leave out 'subsection (4)' and insert 'subsections (4) and (4A)'.
188 Page 88, line 23, after second 'a', insert 'folding'.
189 Page 88, line 24, after 'a', insert 'folding'.
190 Page 88, leave out lines 25 to 27 and insert 'the cutting edge of its blade exceeds 3 inches.'.
191 Page 88, line 30, leave out from 'place' to end of line 32 and insert—
'(4A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him—'
192 Page 88, line 39, leave out 'highway and any other premises or'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 187 to 192. I shall speak also to Amendment No. 396.
1642
Clause 128 was warmly welcomed by your Lordships when it was introduced in Committee. There were certain difficulties about the drafting which we attempted to resolve on Report. The amendments take the improvement a stage further.
For Amendment No. 192 we are indebted to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale. I know that he cannot be here today, but I should like to acknowledge his contribution. He pointed out that the definition of a "public place" in Clause 128 might be too narrowly construed so as to exclude, for example, a bus or railway carriage. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that there is no possibility of such public places being excluded.
Amendments Nos. 188, 189 and 190 are the result of discussions with knife manufacturers in Sheffield. They thought that it would be helpful to put on the face of the Bill a clearer definition of the maximum permitted length of a pocketknife. More importantly, they pointed out that locking pocketknives are now widely sold and used because they are safer for some purposes than non-locking knives. There is less risk of the blade closing accidentally on the user's fingers. So we concluded that we should not exclude small pocketknives from the exemption just because they had locking blades. What we want to exclude is knives with sliding blades. The amendments achieve that by limiting the exemption to small pocketknives with folding blades.
Amendments Nos. 187 and 191 simply clarify the drafting of the statutory defences. Amendment No. 396 is a consequential amendment for Northern Ireland.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 187 to 192.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
193 Clause 130, page 89, line 37, at end insert—
'(4A) It shall be a defence for any person charged in respect of any conduct of his relating to a weapon to which this section applies—

(a) with an offence under subsection (1) above; or

(b) with an offence under section 50(2) or (3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (improper importation),

to prove that his conduct was only for the purposes of functions carried out on behalf of the Crown or of a visiting force.
(4B) In this section the reference to the Crown includes the Crown in right of Her Majesty's Government in Northern Ireland; and
"visiting force" means any body, contingent or detachment of the forces of a country—

(a) mentioned in subsection (1)(a) of section I of the Visiting Forces Act 1952; or

(b) designated for the purposes of any provision of that Act by Order in Council under subsection (2) of that section,

which is present in the United Kingdom (including United Kingdom territorial waters) or in any place to which subsection (4C) below applies on the invitation of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.
(4C) This subsection applies to any place on, under or above an installation in a designated area within the meaning of section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 or any waters within 500 metres of such an installation.
(4D) It shall be a defence for any person charged in respect of any conduct of his relating to a weapon to which this section applies—

(a) with an offence under subsection (1) above; or

1643

(b) with an offence under section 50(2) or (3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979,

to prove that the conduct in question was only for the purpose of making the weapon available to a museum or gallery to which this subsection applies.
(4E) If a person acting on behalf of a museum or gallery to which subsection (4D) above applies is charged with hiring or lending a weapon to which this section applies, it shall be a defence for him to prove that he had reasonable grounds for believing that the person to whom he lent or hired it would use it only for cultural, artistic or educational purposes.
(4F) Subsection (4D) above applies to a museum or gallery only if it does not distribute profits.
(4G) In this section "museum or gallery" includes any institution which has as its purpose, or one of its purposes, the preservation, display and interpretation of material of historical, artistic or scientific interest and gives the public access to it.'
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 193.
The amendment provides two statutory defences to the general offences created by Clause 130. New subsections (4A) to (4C) provide a defence where the weapon is required for the purposes of the Crown or a visiting force. I can assure your Lordships that we are not expecting to see police officers or members of the armed forces equipped with prohibited weapons. We simply wish to provide for the situation in which, for example, the forensic science service may need to conduct comparative tests on an example of a weapon which it is suspected has been used to commit a crime. Or the police or the forces might sometimes need to evaluate the effects of a particular weapon.
New subsections (4D) to (4G) provide an exemption for museums and people who undertake weapons transactions with museums for the purposes of exhibitions and so on. The amendment will allow museums to conduct transactions between themselves and to loan out the specified weapons for cultural, artistic and educational purposes. The terms of the amendment have been agreed with the museum world.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 193.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
194 After Clause 131, insert the following new clause:
Assistance to Isle of Man and Channel Islands.
'In subsection (1) of section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (investigation powers of Director of Serious Fraud Office) after the word "above," there shall be inserted the words "or, on a request made by the Attorney General of the Isle of Man, Jersey or Guernsey, under legislation corresponding to that section and having effect in the Island whose Attorney General makes the request,
195 Insert the following new clause:
Transferred charges.
'(1) The Criminal Justice Act 1987 shall be be amended as follows.
(2) In section 4(1) (under which, on a notice of transfer in a fraud case, the functions of a magistrates' court, subject to certain exceptions, cease in relation to the case) after "5(3)" there shall be inserted", (7A).
(3) In section 5 (notices of transfer—procedure)—

(a) in subsection (4), for the words "without the person charged" there shall be substituted the words "in relation to a person charged without his";

(b) in subsection (5)(a), for the word "charged" there shall be substituted the words "in question";

1644

(c) in subsection (6)—

(i) for the words "the person charged" there shall be substituted the words "a person to whom it relates"; and

(ii) for the words "examining justices" there shall be substituted the words "a magistrates' court";

(d) in subsection (7)—

(i) for the words "charged" there shall he substituted the words "to whom the notice of transfer relates"; and

(ii) for the words "examining justices" there shall be substituted the words "a magistrates' court";

(e) in subsection (8)(b), for the words "whose written statement is tendered in evidence for the purposes of the notice of transfer" there shall be substituted the words "indicated in the notice of transfer as a proposed witness;" and

(f) in subsection (9)(a)—

(i) in sub-paragraph (i), for the words "the person charged" there shall he substituted the words "any person to whom the notice of transfer relates"; and

(ii) in sub-paragraph (ii). after the word "the", in the second place where it occurs, there shall he inserted the words "place specified by the notice of transfer as the".

(4) The following subsection shall be inserted after section 5(7)—
"(7A) If the notice states that the requirement is to continue, when a person to whom the notice relates appears before the magistrates' court, the court shall have—

(a) the powers and duty conferred on a magistrates' court by subsection (3) above, but subject as there provided: and

(b) power to enlarge, in the surety's absence, a recognizance conditioned in accordance with section 128(4)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 so that the surety is bound to secure that the person charged appears also before the Crown Court.".

(5) The following section shall be substituted for section 6—
Applications for dismissal.
"6.—(1) Where notice of transfer has been given, any person to whom the notice relates, at any time before he is arraigned (and whether or not an indictment has been preferred against him), may apply orally or in writing to the Crown Court sitting at the place specified by the notice of transfer as the proposed place of trial for the charge, or any of the charges, in the case to be dismissed; and the judge shall dismiss a charge (and accordingly quash a count relating to it in any indictment preferred against the applicant) if it appears to him that the evidence against the applicant would not be sufficient for a jury properly to convict him.
(2) No oral application may be made under subsection (1) above unless the applicant has given the Crown Court sitting at the place specified by the notice of transfer as the proposed place of trial written notice of his intention to make the application.
(3) Oral evidence may be given on such an application only with the leave of the judge or by his order, and the judge shall give leave or make an order only if it appears to him, having regard to any matters stated in the application for leave, that the interests of justice require him to do so.
(4) If the judge gives leave permitting, or makes an order requiring, a person to give oral evidence, but he does not do so, the judge may disregard any document indicating the evidence that he might have given.
(5) Dismissal of the charge, or all the charges, against the applicant shall have the same effect as a refusal by examining magistrates to commit for trial, except that no further proceedings may be brought on a dismissed charge except by means of the preferment of a voluntary bill of indictment.
(6) Crown Court Rules may make provision for the purposes of this section and, without prejudice to the generaliity of this subsection—

(a) as to the time or stage in the proceedings at which anything required to be done is to be done (unless the court grants leave to do it at some other time or stage);

(b) as to the contents and form of notices or other documents;

1645

(c) as to the manner in which evidence is to be submitted: and

(d) as to persons to be served with notices or other material.'

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 194 and 195, which can be discussed with Amendments Nos. 217, 360, 361, 373, 395 and 422. This group of amendments makes a number of detailed changes to the Criminal Justice Act 1987. Noble Lords will remember that the Act was passed with the co-operation of all sides shortly before the general election. We were grateful then for the co-operation given by your Lordships in considering that Bill so quickly. But we have found in preparing the secondary legislation which was needed for the new procedures that there are a number of defects in the Act. These amendments put them right.
Moved. That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 194 and 195.—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, I should like to make a number of observations on these amendments. First of all, I think it is perfectly right for the director of the Serious Fraud Office, if invited by the insular authorities in Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, to do his best to help them. Incidentally I should like to say to the noble Earl—I am sure he will be able to reassure me on this point—that I assume we shall he repaid for this service by the Jersey, Guernsey and Isle of Man authorities.
The reason I think it right to give the Government this power is because inevitably the police forces in these three islands, or I should say these three communities, are rather small. They do not have sophisticated services available to them. Inevitably when one is dealing with highly complicated fraud it is essential to have available the best expertise one can obtain.
However, it would only be right to draw to the attention of the noble Earl, if he has not seen it, the extremely interesting answer given me by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor about the position of the staffing of the Serious Fraud Office. The noble and learned Lord is not responsible for the office; the Attorney-General is. His answer this week indicated that the 1987 White Paper on public expenditure said that the establishment of the Serious Fraud Office was 79. There are unhappily only 55 officers now in post. Of these one is on loan from the Crown Prosecution Service. Nine positions are filled by agency staff.
By way of comment, it is only right to say that we supported the Government when they announced to Parliament first the establishment of the Crown Prosecution Service and secondly that of the Serious Fraud Office together with their range of responsibilities. Unhappily in both cases adequate resources have not been provided for them to do their job. It seems to me deeply regrettable that following a major inquiry by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Roskill, the Serious Fraud Office is denied the resources that should be available to it. It is now to be asked to take on an additional responsibility.
One cannot underestimate the possible degree of that responsibility. There has been abundant
1646
evidence in the last few years, as the noble Earl will be aware, in all three of these island communities, of the existence of a substantial drug trafficking problem relating to money laundering. There has also been substantial evidence of fraud, some of it associated with that money laundering.
The director of the Serious Fraud office will now be asked to take on additional responsibility when pitifully inadequate resources are provided for his existing responsibilities within the United Kingdom. This is an issue deserving serious attention from the Government in order to deal with a very real problem.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, for his remarks. He asked about Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man. We are discussing with the island authorities detailed arrangements for mutual co-operation. I shall certainly draw the noble Lord's view to the attention of my right honourable friend the Attorney-General.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, referred to the problems of drug trafficking and so forth. He expressed his concern that this was increasing and that it was a considerable expense. This is a matter with which we are deeply concerned. I realise that the noble Lord thinks that we may not have enough financial provisions for that. But this is a matter that we shall keep under control.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that in the case, for instance, of prisons, where the prison service in this country harbours longer-sentence prisoners from Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man, there is, quite properly, a repayment arrangement?
The Serious Fraud Office already has, as I have said, woefully inadequate responsibility. If it is to be asked to take on additional responsibilities, it is absolutely essential that that should be done on a repayment basis. I hope that the Minister will write to me about this issue so that this matter can be clearly established.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, the noble Lord raises an important point. I shall go into the detail of it and write to him about it.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
196 Clause 135, page 91, line 37, after 'him' insert ', not later than the end of the period of three months beginning with the day on which he asks for it,'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 196.
In another place the honourable Member for St. Helens South proposed that there should be a time limit within which, following a request, chief officers of police should be required to issue a certificate confirming that computer fingerprints have been destroyed. Amendment No. 196 gives effect to that proposal. It obliges chief officers to issue such a

1647
certificate within three months of the request. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 196.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
197 After Clause 135, insert the following new clause:
'Body samples—Northern Ireland.
—. Schedule [Body Samples—Northern Ireland] shall have effect with respect to the taking of samples from persons in Northern Ireland in connection with the investigation of offences to which it applies.'
2.15 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office
(Lord Lyell): My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 197. I think that it will be for the convenience of your Lordships that I speak at the same time to Amendment No. 359.
The effect of the new clause and the related new schedule under Amendments Nos. 197 and 359 will be to replicate for Northern Ireland, with one modification, the statutory provisions for the taking of body samples from those persons suspected of serious offences which apply for England and Wales under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984) and with which your Lordships are no doubt familiar.
This is one area of the ordinary law in Northern Ireland which is in much need of reform. At present the RUC has powers to take fingerprints and palmprints under the provisions of the Magistrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981. But its powers to obtain other samples such as semen, tissue fluid, body swabs, hair roots, etc., are currently governed by the rules at common law and the lack of statutory provisions for the taking of body samples is proving a severe handicap in the circumstances in Northern Ireland.
It was originally the Government's intention to include these provisions for the taking of body samples in the Northern Ireland order which will replicate most of the PACE 1984 provisions. However, due to the extensive scope and complexity of that order, it will not come into effect, subject to parliamentary approval, until 1989.
I hope your Lordships will agree with the Government's view that there should be no avoidable delays in assisting the RUC in its arduous task of dealing with serious and violent crime. The Criminal Justice Bill provides a timely opportunity to bring the law in Northern Ireland in respect of the taking of body samples essentially into line with that in England and Wales significantly earlier than would be the case under the new PACE legislation.
I now turn to the detailed provisions of the two amendments, the substantive element of which is contained in the new schedule introduced under Amendment No. 359. The schedule, with two modifications to which I shall come, replicates for Northern Ireland the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provisions for the taking of body samples in England and Wales.
The power to take body samples relates only to persons suspected of being involved in serious
1648
offences. The serious offences listed in the new schedule, which include murder, rape, kidnapping, sexual offences against children and various firearms and explosive offences, are the same as the England and Wales legislation.
In addition, the first of the two modifications to which I referred earlier provides that the powers to take body samples under this schedule will also apply to a person arrested under Section 12(1)(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984, which allows the police to arrest a person who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. The arrest powers in the Prevention of Terrorism Act are used with nothing like the same frequency in England and Wales as they are in Northern Ireland. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act did not specifically mention those in relation to body samples since the definition of "serious arrestable offence" in Section 116 of that Act was considered sufficient for those purposes. But because of the importance of the PTA arrest powers in Northern Ireland, and because the situation there is so very different from that in England and Wales, the Government believe it is important to ensure that this amendment specifically includes the PTA arrest powers so that persons arrested under Section 12(1)(b) of the PTA come firmly within the scope of these provisions.
The new schedule follows the PACE 1984 legislation in making the distinction between intimate and non-intimate samples and in providing that a non-intimate sample may be taken without the suspect's consent but that an intimate sample may only be taken with the suspect's consent. The definitions of "intimate sample" and "other sample—normally known as a "non-intimate sample—are also in line with the PACE 1984 legislation with one exception. This is where we come to the second modification. The difference is that for Northern Ireland the definition of "other sample" or "non-intimate sample" includes a swab taken from the suspect's mouth. Because the taking of a mouth swab unavoidably results in the taking of saliva, for which a statutory basis is required, it has also been necessary to add a sample of saliva to the definition of non-intimate sample.
This difference is being made for DNA profiling reasons. I understand that DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid. No doubt your Lordships are aware of the progress that has been made in the field of DNA profiling. It is proving of great benefit to the police not only in positively identifying those persons involved in violent crime but also in eliminating from police investigations others suspected of these crimes.
Under the PACE 1984 legislation for England and Wales, all samples that can be guaranteed to provide sufficient DNA material, such as blood, semen and body tissue, are classed as intimate and cannot be obtained without the suspect's consent. I understand that unwillingness to give consent for the taking of intimate samples is not something
which is causing problems in England and Wales at present, and that consent is normally forthcoming. However, this is not the case in Northern Ireland where among not only the terrorist organisations but also the perpetrators of the more serious non-terrorist crimes there is a more determined and systematic attempt to obstruct the RUC by denying it material which may be of forensic value.

1649
Major advances in DNA profiling techniques have been made in recent years, and research in this field has revealed that a mouth swab taken by rubbing the area between the lip and gum, which would only necessitate the opening of the suspect's lips, can provide a reliable means of providing material for DNA analysis. In the particular circumstances in Northern Ireland, where the RUC has not only to contend with the continuing terrorist violence, but also the Province's own share of other violent crimes against the person, the Government are convinced that it is in the interests of protecting the law-abiding public to provide the police with powers to take a mouth swab, if necessary, without the suspect's consent.
The new schedule also sets out the statutory rights of and safeguards for person from whom samples are required, and your Lordships may find it helpful if I explain these in more detail. First, no sample can be taken, whether intimate or non-intimate, except with the authorisation of an officer of the RUC of at least the rank of superintendent. Secondly, that authorisation can only be given if the authorising officer has reasonable grounds, first for suspecting the involvement of the suspect in one of the serious offences listed in the schedule and secondly for believing that the sample will tend to confirm or disprove the suspect's involvement. Those authorisations will of course be justifiable before the courts.
Thirdly, an intimate sample may be taken only with the suspect's consent and then, other than a sample of urine, only by a registered medical practitioner. And, fourthly, the schedule replicates other Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provisions governing the destruction of samples obtained from persons acquitted of an offence, and those obtained from persons who were not connected with, or suspected of, involvement in an offence.
The Government will of course be issuing the Royal Ulster Constabulary with a code of practice on the taking of body samples, advance copies of which were placed in the Library of your Lordships' House on 14th July.
The specific safeguards in relation to the taking of body samples will be additional to the standard safeguards already available to all arrested persons under the existing Judges' Rules. In addition the safeguards for terrorist suspects include statutory rights of access to legal advice and to having a family member or friend informed of the arrest.
I hope your Lordships will agree that the legislation in Northern Ireland on the taking of body samples should be brought into line with that in England and Wales at the earliest opportunity.
The Government are convinced that the potential forensic value of the limited addition to the police power to take non-intimate samples as proposed in the new schedule before us this afternoon will be of significant benefit to the RUC in relation to the particular difficulties which they encounter in obtaining forensic evidence in their fight against serious and violent crime. I commend these amendments to your Lordships.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 197.—(Lord Lyell.)
Lord Stallard: My Lords, I am informed that this is the best time for me to speak to my own Amendment, No. 359A, to which the Minister has referred. It gives me no joy to have to discuss these amendments on a Friday afternoon. I would far rather have been somewhere else on a Friday afternoon.
Viscount Long: My Lords, has the noble Lord moved his Amendment?
Lord Stallard: No, my Lords. I have had long discussions with Officers of the House at the highest level and I am informed that they would wish me to speak to Amendments Nos. 359 and 359A because it is for the convenience of the House that they should be linked with Amendment No. 197. I should then wait until the appropriate amendments come up for a vote and move the amendments formally at that stage with no further debate. As I understand it, that is the procedure.
My interest in this matter goes back a number of years. I should perhaps express an interest in that I have been, for as long as I have been able to breathe, involved in the Anglo-Irish problem. For a number of years I was the chairman of a Northern Ireland group in another place. I continue to maintain that interest and to scrutinise so far as possible everything that happens here or there and from time to time intervene if in my view something is being done which might worsen the situation in Northern Ireland, which is already grave enough. I take the view that the situation would be even worse if we were to do something such as is proposed in Amendment No. 197: it would make the situation more grim more or less by default.
I have listened to the Minister this morning, and I accept most of what he has said, except that it seems so glib. The measure goes through and that is that because it relates to Northern Ireland. They are all wild, villians, gangsters and God knows what, and therefore they deserve different treatment from the criminals on this side of the water! It is not as simple as that. That is far too simple. We ought not just to accept that therefore it goes by default.
I should like to take noble Lords back a little in time. This whole matter was first raised in correspondence from the Northern Ireland Secretary of State in his letter of 25th May to the chief opposition spokesman in the other place. In that letter the Secretary of State informed the opposition party (because I understand that he had informed the other parties as well) of his intention to table an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill which would apply to Northern Ireland for consideration at the forthcoming Report stage in the other place.
The effect of the amendment was to bring on to the statute book in Northern Ireland essentially the same provisions about the taking of body samples from those suspected of serious offences as already subsists in England and Wales under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as the Minister outlined. 1 am sure that noble Lords will understand that the fact that this matter was raised in correspondence after the Standing Committee had completed its procedure, and that it was intimated that the matter would be raised at Report stage, of necessity created some dissatisfaction, to say the least, as it always does

1651
whenever that procedure is used and whenever someone appears to be pushing in something after the Standing Committee has met.
That meant that the Standing Committee was not able to scrutinise the proposals. There was no chance of scrutinising them because they were considered at Report stage. Noble Lords will understand that it is a different procedure on Report in the other place and that procedure precludes some detailed discussion of such matters. So the dissatisfaction grew.
It was then that I became interested in the matter, because while dissatisfaction and concern in this country are bad enough, they are even worse when they occur in Northern Ireland. We have to take seriously that kind of suspicion. I felt that I ought to look further and examine the correspondence. It has grown. Recently letters have been passing backwards and forwards between the Secretary of State and the chief opposition spokesman. A couple of weeks ago the letters were released for publication. No doubt those noble Lords who are involved with Northern Ireland affairs have read the letters, as I have, and may be as perturbed and confused as I am.
In his letter of 25th May the Secretary of State intimated that it had been this Government's original intention to await the outcome of the consultation on the draft Northern Ireland order, to which the Minister again referred this morning. They had originally intended to await the outcome of consultation, but for reasons that he gave it would take too long to bring into effect because the consultation process would have to be carried out and there would have to be parliamentary approval and so on; moreover he quite rightly claimed, and I do not disagree with him, that the RUC needed some extra assistance in order to get its procedures correct—the Government had decided that the Criminal Justice Act, which was still on its way through Parliament, would provide the possibility of bringing the law on the taking of body samples in Northern Ireland into line with the law in England and Wales. It was a convenient vehicle which happened to be there at the time. It seemed to be thought that because it was Northern Ireland it would go through on the nod and that would be that.
However, it is not as simple as that and that is why I became somewhat concerned about the whole matter. It certainly means that it would be brought in significantly earlier than would otherwise have been the case. As I said, the Secretary of State stressed the importance of the RUC's need for this kind of legislation to be provided as soon as possible—and the Minister also stressed the importance of that this morning—in order to deal with serious and usually violent crime. We do not dissent in principle from that at all. But the Secretary of State concluded his letter of 25th May:
"We proposed to depart from the detailed England and Wales provisions in only one relatively minor respect. For DNA profiling reasons we are including in the category of non-intimate samples a swab taken from a person's mouth. This would not necessitate the opening of the mouth as the practice is to take such swabs from between the lip and the gum".
The Minister has reinforced that today.
It was supported at that stage by the chief spokesman for the Opposition in the other place on
1652
the basis that the Secretary of State had said that it was only necessary to take such swabs from between the lip and the gum and it was not necessary to open the mouth any further in order to obtain sufficient material. On that basis he said that he was prepared to support the amendment and the schedule.
However, he pointed out to the Secretary of State that an article had appeared in the New Scientist which queried the accuracy of this method. It queried whether or not sufficient material would be obtained from this swab. There was a point of view that said that one would have to go further than a swab; one would have to open the mouth completely and put something in in order to obtain sufficient material for the test. He understood that that might mean scraping the inside of the mouth with a blunt instrument. If that were the case, it would appear that the Government had been wrongly advised. It was no longer a simple test of a swab of cotton wool between the lips without opening the mouth. This was pointed out to the Secretary of State. He was asked to confirm whether or not the test required taking a scraping from the inside of the mouth which would fall into the category of an intimate sample and mean that the person involved would have the right to refuse. That makes it a different kettle of fish altogether.
No confirmation was forthcoming at that point. The only reply from the Secretary of State was correspondence stating:
"I am sure you will be glad to know that the Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory had already successfully tested the technique on members of its own staff, and proved that usable amounts of DNA material can indeed be extracted from swabs taken from the mouth. My point in writing to you and to party leaders on 25 May was to explain that by defining the mouth as non-intimate, samples could be taken from it without consent. But I also explained that our purpose was to obtain material for DNA analysis where appropriate".
After stating that further details had been given in another place, the Secretary of State added:
"As we have made very clear, the technique simply involves the rubbing of the area between the lip and the gum with a sterile cotton bud. There is no question of 'scraping' the inside of the mouth because it is quite unnecessary".
That is what he said. It was on that basis that there was some measure of agreement.
However, the articles continued to appear. The New Scientist picked up the correspondence, the discussions and the debates that had gone on. An editorial on 7th July stated:
"The House of Commons last week debated whether 'mouth swabs' could capture sufficient DNA for genetic fingerprinting. Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, told MPs that swabs provide enough DNA and that New Scientist was inaccurate in suggesting otherwise. Mr. Hurd was skating on thin ice in his assertion, but it is more than hurt pride that prompts us to defend our story. The debate over mouth swabs is important because the government intends to give to police officers in Northern Ireland the power to take mouth swabs, by force if necessary, from suspected terrorists and criminals. Lawyers will have a field day if there is any possibility of an argument over what police officers can and cannot do. It is therefore important to specify what type of instrumental invasion police officers can make on someone's mouth in their pursuit of samples".
Again the article raised the question of the differences, asking,
"Does Stanley's description of the methodology accurately reflect what will take place in practice?".
That further confused the situation for me. We had experts disagreeing on at least two occasions in a reputable journal about the efficacy of these tests as outlined by the Secretary of State and by the Minister and whether they would be sufficient. It seems that

1653
that inflames the concern. People assume that they are perhaps trying to pull a fast one, trying to insert the test into the non-intimate category and, having inserted it, they will find that they have to take more and more serious measures, making it an intimate search without the protection that that would normally be afforded to the suspect or the prisoner. That, as the Minister will be only too well aware, worries those who are concerned in Northern Ireland.
In view of that obvious difference of view as expressed in the articles and by government spokesmen, I felt that it was necessary to put down this group of amendments to tidy up the interpretation clause. Amendment No. 359B, for example, seeks to insert into the substantive amendment what I have just been saying about intimate samples, and the same applies to Amendment No. 359C. I am endeavouring to reassure those people who have expressed a fear that something beyond what they thought would happen might happen. If we can reassure people we should do so, in view of all the other difficulties that they have.
My amendments would limit the definition as "non-intimate" of a swab taken from the mouth to one taken from between the lips and the gums which does not involve the opening of the mouth. This is in line with what the Government have already said in another place. I cannot continue quoting what Ministers have said, but on a number of occasions they have said that this exercise would not mean opening the mouth. I therefore see no reason why that amendment should not be accepted.
Lord Kilbracken: My Lords, I believe my noble friend meant to say "without opening the jaws", rather than "without opening the mouth".
Lord Stallard: My Lords, I would find it difficult to open the mouth without opening the jaws, but I accept why my noble friend says. This is an awful argument to get into on a Friday afternoon, but my noble friend is probably right.
My amendments to paragraph 9 deal with destruction of samples. The Bill in its present form provides for the destruction of samples once it is clear the individuals have not been involved in the matters under investigation. What we wanted in our correspondence was confirmation that this also involves the removal from all records of the information and the results obtained from the tests. It would clearly be a nonsense simply to destroy the samples but to retain in the records the DNA profile of a person who is innocent. I have seen no confirmation or agreement that that is so in relation to these samples. My amendment seeks to bring those samples into line with what I understand is the position with fingerprints. I see no reason why they should not be brought in to the same legislation as fingerprints.
Finally I share the concern expressed by many involved and interested observers of the Anglo-Irish situation about the way these provisions would apply to those arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. We have had many debates and discussions on that Act in the House, and noble Lords will be aware that the party to which I belong is pledged to repeal that Act. Therefore, we are not likely to encourage
1654
anything which would take it still further if, in the event, its life is limited.
We share that view in common with a wide range of responsible and careful organisations and individuals who have, on many occasions, expressed concern that arrests under Section 12 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act is often simply used for information-gathering purposes. There is a great deal of evidence to substantiate that. Those powers are applied unfairly to people with Irish connections. Those of us who are interested in the matter receive correspondence weekly and almost daily giving examples of this kind of picking up for information and releasing and so on.
The provisions as they stand allow for the building up of a large bank of information on people, the vast majority of whom are innocent of any crime. That can be substantiated. In my view, this would be a wholly unacceptable infringement on their civil liberties and my amendments take those concerns into acount.
Lord Monson: My Lords, perhaps I may ask the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, why we are discussing these amendments now rather than when we come to them.
Lord Stallard: My Lords, I have been discussing this matter since half past eleven this morning. We have finalised it and I shall not go into the matter again.
Perhaps I may continue. Since the tabling of these amendments I have discovered that the draft order to which I referred at the beginning of my remarks, which was to be laid and would take a year and therefore it was necessary to do this now so that the RUC would have the necessary powers, has now been made available for consultation. I have a copy. Of course, the consultation will take place during the Recess. It may surprise some people but it is not the best way to consult on this very important matter. The consultation period ends on 30th September and. as I understand it, that draft order in council would not be debated in this House. Therefore, unless I had tabled these amendments and provided an opportunity for this schedule and these clauses to be scrutinised, we should have had no further chance of discussion. Since there has not been another chance in the other place, I thought it was worth a Friday afternoon to look at the position because it is serious enough to many people who do not necessarily accept the instant views put forward by the Front Bench opposite on the need for this kind of legislation without any scrutiny.
I have attempted to outline the necessary safeguards to reassure all those people who have expressed grave concern about the procedures as well as the contents of the schedules as they stand. I hope that the Minister will be able to rethink the situation before we come to the amendments and decide to accept them.
Lord Morton of Shuna: My Lords, as we understood from the Minister that the intention is only to take a swab between the lip and the gum, I should have thought that there was a lot to he said for Amendments Nos. 359B and 359C.

1655
One can foresee that to allow a policeman to open a mouth to take a swab from anywhere within the mouth, which is what the Government amendment has suggested is a non-intimate sample, could be a fairly radical movement. No doubt the Minister will tell us where the mouth ends. Is the swab going right down the throat or where is it to go? Therefore, I should have thought that this amendment would be quite easy to accept if it is the Government's intention that it should be only between the lip and the gum, but if so it would be better to say so. Otherwise it is far more correct to say that the sort of forcing, which is perhaps what a dentist does, is an intimate transaction.
We also support Amendments Nos. 359D, E, and F. I should have thought that the only important record is the result of the test, not the wet swab which is the sample. Therefore, it is not the destruction of the sample which is critical but destruction of the result of the test, such as the Government have accepted under Clause 135 on the destruction of records relating to the fingerprints of people who from inquiries are shown to be not involved. Therefore, we support these amendments.
Lord Fitt: I rise briefly to support the reservations and fears expressed by my noble friend Lord Stallard. I am all too conscious that in such a debate it could be misinterpreted that in seeking to limit the powers of the police, one is in some way or other helping terrorism in Northern Ireland. I hope that my record in Northern Ireland and the support of my noble friend Lord Stallard will show that in no circumstances is that my intention or the intention of my noble friend Lord Stallard.
This week we have heard much both in this House and at the other end of the building, in the Palace of Westminster, about 1688, civil liberties, all that that alleged revolution brought about and its consequences for the citizens of the United Kingdom. There will be no argument that the 1688 revolution did not bring any benefits to Ireland. That is admitted by even those most rabid supporters of the alleged glorious and bloodless revolution of 1688. We still have the effects of that glorious and bloodless revolution every 12th July in Northern Ireland and with the 2,000 Orange marches which take place.
Therefore, in looking at these proposals by the Government, and taking into the account the remarks of my noble friend Lord Stallard, I hope that if we are to introduce laws in Northern Ireland they will be kept very much in line with legislation as it affects other parts of the United Kingdom. The more we depart from UK legislation, the more it will seem that Northern Ireland is a place apart; that Northern Ireland is different; that we must legislate purely and specifically for Northern Ireland; and the more it will be seen in Ireland that Northern Ireland is different. If Ireland really is different, those who want to create chaos and havoc by carrying on a campaign of terrorism will be justified in putting forward that point of view, particularly in the United States and in other parts of the world where the terrorists appear to be getting sympathy.
As regards the non-intimate search and this new forensic discovery of DNA, I have no doubt that in the first half-a-dozen cases that come before the courts where DNA samples are part of the evidence
1656
against an accused person we will have one expert saying that the evidence is all wrong and another expert saying that the evidence is all right. In murder cases we often have one psychiatrist saying that the accused is mad and the other saying that he is perfectly sane. There will be great controversy about the efficacy of these tests.
I must say at the outset—and the House will be aware of this—that people are now in prison, and have been sent to prison, on forensic evidence alone. I refer specifically to the Annie Maguire case where she and many other people were sent to prison purely and simply on forensic evidence. It must have been difficult for the jury to listen to the evidence put forward in that case. One can imagine a jury composed of laymen where DNA evidence is the main component and it being asked for a conviction. An ordinary jury composed of laymen would be absolutely nonplussed by listening to experts arguing about DNA. At the end of the trial the judge will say to the jury: "You have heard the evidence and I now invite you to find a verdict in conformity with the evidence". We have to be very careful about the introduction of new DNA methods.
I believe that the House will be well aware that over the past few years the RUC has been subjected to a good deal of criticism, some of which was justified but quite a good deal of it was completely unjustified. If we write into the legislation exactly what the RUC can and cannot do, it will be a protection both for the civil liberties of the individual and, just as important, a protection for the RUC. Over a number of years, and particularly over recent months, we have had totally unjustified criticism levelled at the RUC.
I realise that people including my noble friend will be opposing the introduction of DNA evidence. That opposition will be totally from the point of view of civil liberties. My noble friend wishes to protect the civil liberties of people in all parts of what is now called the United Kingdom. That is my point of view as well. There will be other people opposed to this legislation who are nothing other than IRA supporters. I do not believe that opposition to this legislation will be based upon a person accused of murder, burglary or rape. There is certainly no one in this House who will object to the DNA method being used in those circumstances.
When one enters the arena of the Prevention of Terrorism Act that is when controversy will arise. There will be people opposed to the use of DNA samples not because they are personally opposed to them, but because they believe that there may be some electoral disadvantage to them if they are seen to allow this legislation to go through without question. I believe that my noble friend has genuine reasons for expressing reservations in those two fields. Someone said earlier on that there are a great many big mouths in Northern Ireland and some of them happen to be Members of Parliament. That is well known in Northern Ireland. There is the question of what constitutes the mouth.
The other objection raised by my noble friend concerns the taking of swabs and when it is later found that the individual from whom they have been taken is not guilty of any offence. The swabs should be destroyed immediately because we do not wish to give the police the power to build up an arsenal of allegations against individual people. In his remarks

1657
today, and in the amendment which he will move later on, I believe that my noble friend has put I forward a very reasonable case in defence of the civil liberties of the people of Northern Ireland.
3 p.m.
Lord Monson: My Lords, I am sorry that I was out of the Chamber at the time when the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, introduced his amendments, and so I missed his explanation as to why these amendments are being discussed now rather than later. As someone who, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Fitt, has been celebrating the Tercentenary of the Glorious Revolution, I strongly support the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stallard; namely, Amendments Nos. 359B and 359C, while remaining open-minded about the other five amendments.
Lord Kilbracken: My Lords, I support my noble friend in his amendments and if he were to press them to a vote I would gladly follow him into the Division Lobby. There are two matters, one of which has been alluded to already, on which I feel that some clarification is necessary and I hope it may be possible for the Minister or for my noble friend to give it.
We keep hearing about swabs being taken from between the lip and the gum. My noble friend Lord Morton of Shuna, by a slip of the tongue, referred to a swab between the teeth and the lip. So far as I know, no part of the mouth exists between the lip and the gum, because the teeth intervene. If one looks it up in a dictionary one finds that the lips form the edges of the mouth—we all know where the lips are—whereas the gums are the firm fleshy integuments—that only means coverings—of the jaws and bases of the teeth. So no part of the mouth comes between the gums and the lips. It would therefore be perfectly possible for anyone undergoing this examination to claim that any search of the mouth was an intimate search and therefore was not permitted.
I understand that DNA analysis—genetic Fingerprinting—can be performed with a hair of the head, particularly if that hair has been pulled out by the root. I may be wrong, and that stage may not yet have been reached. However, I believe it has, and if not it shortly will be. If that is the case it will he possible already to obtain sufficient evidence to carry out DNA analysis by removing a hair of the head, which is a non-intimate search and would therefore he permitted.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, there is no doubt that genetic fingerprinting is an exceptionally important development in the investigation of major crime. As the House will be aware, it has been demonstrated in a number of major criminal cases in this country, cases where if there had been an absence of evidence based on genetic fingerprinting there certainly would not have been a conviction. There is no doubt about the importance of the issue.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, on one point. It was exceptionally unfortunate that the Northern Ireland Office waited until the Report stage of the Bill in the House of Commons before introducing an issue as important as this. It simply created a climate of suspicion which may well be
1658
wholly unjustified. It was a serious error of judgment and many of us realise that, particularly those of us who recognise the value, importance and quality of the work done by the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland.
In moving the Commons amendment the Minister said that it is perfectly all right to do this because in Northern Ireland there are a number of terrorists who have learnt how to create as many difficulties as possible for the investigating authorities. He went on to argue that it is right to do this in Northern Ireland but not necessarily right to do it in the rest of Great Britain. I am not quite sure that I agree with that view. I find it difficult to understand why it would be right to give the police power to do this with a terrorist suspect in Belfast but wholly wrong to do it with a terrorist suspect outside Harrods. I am certainly not disposed to vote against the proposals because my noble friends and I want to do everything we can in the battle against terrorism. However, I think the House should recognise that it would be quite impossible for the Government to deny them in the future if they are approached by the police in Great Britain for these powers, given the fact that they are now giving authority of this kind to the police in Northern Ireland.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I think that we have had a very thorough and detailed debate, not just on the new clause and the schedule which I introduced but also the amendments which have been tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stallard. Indeed, he and many other noble Lords have entered into a most lively discussion. I trust therefore that I shall be able to answer most of the questions and queries which have been raised. Thankfully there are no major scientific problems for me to solve.
In his opening remarks the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, referred to the letter from my right honourable friend to his honourable friend. With the leave of the House, I shall not comment upon that correspondence because I hope that sufficient answers will emerge in the course of what I have to say about the amendments. I hope that that course will be convenient for him and for other noble Lords. Therefore perhaps I may reply to all the amendments at the same time. I hope I have the noble Lord's agreement on that.
Lord Stallard: Yes.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I am much obliged. In that case I shall try to do that, as well as replying to the other points which have been raised. The noble Lord, Lord Stallard, raised five points in the amendment. Amendment No. 359A deals with the question of suspects detained under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984. If we were to omit paragraph 5 from the schedule, that would have the effect of excluding persons who were arrested or detained under the terrorism provisions. That action would mean that persons suspected of certain serious crimes which are listed in the schedule would be subject to the new law— namely, the schedule before us today—but suspected terrorists or anyone who is arrested under the aegis of Section 12(1)(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 would not.

1659
In the circumstances of Northern Ireland—and I take note of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Geenwich—I think that your Lordships will agree that it really would be quite absurd to deny the benefit of the advances in DNA profiling to the RUC in its fight against terrorism, let alone against the serious crimes which are listed in the schedule.
The noble Lord then went on to raise the issue of swabs and intimate and non-intimate samples, referred to in Amendments Nos. 359B and 359C. If I may, I shall deal with both amendments at the same time. In paragraph 6(1) the provisions in the two amendments would confine that part of the mouth which is defined in the schedule as "non-intimate" to the area between the lower lip and the gum.
In my opening remarks I sought to explain that DNA profiling can usually be obtained by taking swabs from the area between the lip and the gum—that is, upper or lower or in any particular area. The noble Lord, Lord Fitt, has temporarily deserted us, but I hope that we shall soon see him back. He pointed out that the shape and size of mouths vary. He was not necessarily thinking only of Northern Ireland. I believe that that is generally accepted by your Lordships.
Sometimes the area between the upper lip and the gum is the best place to take a swab for profiling; sometimes the area between the lower lip and the gum is better. Sometimes one side of the area between the lip and the gum may be more accessible than the other. I and my colleagues see no logic or justification in restricting the non-intimate area of the mouth in the way that the noble Lord has proposed. I am advised that such a restriction would make the provision completely unworkable.
I appreciate that the noble Lord and other noble Lords who have spoken, including the noble Lord, Lord Morton, who has perhaps also gone to obtain victualling, may wish to avoid giving the police the right to open the jaw without the suspect's consent. 1 said earlier that we do not consider that it will be necessary to open the jaw. I stress to the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, that the individual is already protected by the requirement that the police should use only reasonable force. I hope that your Lordships will agree that in a situation in which in each and every case that a mouth swab is obtained it could be necessary for the police to satisfy the courts that the degree of force used was reasonable in the circumstances will set a proper limit on the use of the provisions.
I shall move to the amendments moved by the noble Lord which deal with paragraph (9). Amendments Nos. 359D, E and F. Those amendments are intended to ensure that where samples have been taken from a person who is, in the event, not connected with a serious crime, they must be destroyed. That requirement is set out. The associated documents are also destroyed. We all share the noble Lord's concern on that point. I want to give him, and all noble Lords who have spoken on this mattter, an assurance that our practice will be to destroy both samples and DNA profiles in those circumstances. We should prefer to keep the legislative provisions in line with those applicable to
1660
the rest of the United Kingdom and to achieve the objective by administrative means. The assurance rests that the records and the sample will be destroyed.
I come to Amendment No. 359G, which relates to paragraph (9)(5). Amendment of paragraph (9)(5)(b) would have the effect of removing the exclusion from the destruction of samples provisions from persons arrested or detained under the terrorism provisions. That exclusion was introduced in Great Britain by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 on the grounds that terrorism and immigration were matters of such national importance that the police should be permitted to retain samples. In view of much of what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and others, it would be inappropriate to remove that exclusion in Northern Ireland, which is the part of the United Kingdom where the terrorist problem is greatest.
At least two other queries were raised by your Lordships. I shall try to deal with them, First, the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, referred to confusion among the scientists. That is what I have in my note that he said and I expect that he will accept it. There has been confusion in scientific articles; for example in the New Scientist. There were some lengthy and interesting articles in the Lancet. Some of these articles have mentioned samples based on saliva, which is not relevant in this case except in passing, as I pointed out in my earlier remarks. Another of the articles somewhat gravely misquoted scientists from the Home Office.
However, I give an assurance to the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, and to your Lordships, that it is clear that the Northern Ireland forensic science laboratory is obtaining sufficient DNA material in many cases from swabs taken from between the lip and the gum. The results of all these tests will be published in due course. So I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, will appreciate and be able to enjoy reading the results in issues of learned journals which are no doubt to come.
The noble Lord, Lord Morton of Shuna, felt that he was satisfied or reasonably content with what was suggested in Amendments Nos. 359D, 359E and 359F. The noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, asked me an etymological question about what constituted the gum and whether it included the teeth. I hope that the noble Lord will accept that DNA profiling will result from taking samples from between the lip and the gum. I understand that with samples taken in this way, if the swab touches the teeth, it will not in any way affect the results of the DNA profiling.
We are very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, for his forthright support for members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. I hope that I have managed to alleviate the concern over what he termed the climate of suspicion. I stressed at the outset and now re-emphasise that the schedule before us today is virtually identical to the provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, but with two modifications dealing with the intimate and non-intimate samples and with the mouth.
There are two more detailed points on which perhaps I may swiftly wind up. The noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, mentioned the hair sample. It is not clear that the taking of hair samples, which he rightly

1661
points out is permitted under the new provisions, will extend to removing hairs by their roots. I think that might be held to fall outside the terms of the new powers. I am given to understand—and no doubt we can discuss this later, perhaps in correspondence over science and scientific journals—that technically more than 12 hairs with tissue on the roots would be required for the purposes of DNA profiling.
The noble Lord, Lord Fitt, I believe, raised one particular point about DNA and tests. He grew quite eloquent about what juries would accept. I have records of at least eight cases in England and Wales where juries have returned verdicts—some guilty, some not guilty—as a result of DNA profiling. So it seems the juries are able to understand the results of DNA profiling if the process is explained in fairly simple terms. In Northern Ireland the first case involving DNA profiling to go through the courts was tried on 23rd June this year. The case was a rape and murder in East Belfast. It took place on 22nd October 1987 and the suspect was associated with semen recovered from the victim with a degree of certainty of one in 10 million. The defendant pleaded guilty to the offence and was sentenced to life imprisonment. That is the first case, but I know of many other cases in England and Wales with which 1 shall not weary your Lordships
I hope that I have set at rest the fears which were expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Stallard. In his opening remarks, he asked for reassurance. I hope that I have been able to reassure him that the powers which we seek in this schedule are not in any way out of order with the other powers which already exist, extremely successfully it seems, in England and Wales, as a result of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
Lord Kilbracken: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down may I ask him one question? He said that DNA analysis is possible on the basis of perhaps a dozen hairs, particularly if they are removed by the roots. Under paragraph (1)(a) of the proposed Commons amendment, a sample of hair other than pubic hair constitutes a non-intimate sample. If that sample can identify a person genetically, surely it should not be a non-intimate sample. There is no need to take swabs from the mouth if one just has to take out a dozen hairs of the head.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I told the noble Lord that I had received technical advice. I also stressed in my concluding remarks that there was a certainty of one in 10 million, but that was taken from semen in a particularly ugly rape and murder case. I think it is a question of degrees of certainty.
Naturally in DNA profiling what the police and, I believe, every one of your Lordships would wish is to prove conclusively, so far as is possible, degrees of certainty. The information that I gave the noble Lord about the 12 hairs taken by the root and the material on the roots of the hairs is as I had it this morning. But it does not alter the thrust of my main argument.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
198 After Clause 138, insert the following new clause:
'Court to give reasons for granting bail to a person accused of serious offence.
.—The following paragraph shall he inserted after paragraph 9 (decisions as to grant or refusal of bail) of Part I of Schedule I to the Bail Act 1976—
"9A.—(l) If—

(a) the defendant is charged with an offence to which this paragraph applies; and

(b) representations are made as to any of the matters mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Part of this Schedule; and

(c) the court decides to grant him bail,

the court shall state the reasons for its decision and shall cause those reasons to be included in the record of the proceedings.
(2) The offences to which this paragraph applies are—

(a) murder;

(b) manslaughter;

(c) rape;

(d) attempted murder; and

(e) attempted rape.".'.

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 198.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 198.—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, this amendment relates to Clause 138 which requires courts to give reasons for granting bail to defendants charged with murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, rape or attempted rape when the prosecution opposes bail.
Courts are now required to give reasons for refusing bail. I submit that there should be a general presumption against depriving people of their liberty. A requirement to give reasons for overriding this presumption is therefore justified. But if the same logic is applied to requiring courts to give reasons before granting bail, I submit that this turns on its head the presumption that defendants should be given bail unless there is a good reason to the contrary. The fear we have is that there is a danger that the message conveyed by Amendment No. 198, by requiring courts to give reasons if they grant bail, could lead to bail being refused in cases where it is now quite properly granted. It is by reason of that anxiety that I speak against the amendment.
Lord Monson: I have a partial sympathy with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, in his objections to the Commons amendment. I am sure the Government are absolutely right to include murder and attempted murder within the amendment. But as judges never cease pointing out, to the great annoyance of the tabloid press, there are degrees of rape and attempted rape. I suggest that there are also degrees of manslaughter.
It would be unfortunate if the Commons amendment led to those accused, although not of course convicted, of the lesser degrees of rape and attempted rape—for example where a divorced husband attempts to climb into bed with his exwife—and the lesser degrees of manslaughter—in other words manslaughter resulting from human carelessness rather than human aggression—being remanded in custody more often than would be the

1663
case if the Commons amendment had not been introduced.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, I have always had a long standing disagreement with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, on the subject of bail. There are points of agreement between us and points of disagreement. I believe that this saga started in my first term as Lord Chancellor, when I made a speech to the Gloucester magistrates. I should not like anyone to think that in the ordinary course of events I do not believe that the presumption should be in favour of bail. I have said that the presumption should be in favour of it on many occasions. However, I have always thought that there are certain cases where the Bail Act goes too far. The noble and learned Lord will remember that from our earlier exchanges.
I have always thought—and to some extent the Bail Act gives ground for believing that I was correct— that there are certain offences which are so serious that bail should ordinarily be refused. When I first went to the Bar, bail for murder was always refused. In those days, it was perceived wrongly that the real object of bail was to stop a man jumping bail and running away. However, the real object of hail in 19 cases out of 20 nowadays is to stop him offending while he is on bail.
I have always thought that there are certain offences for which the granting of bail ought to be justified simply on the grounds of the seriousness of the offence. The one exception to that is when the evidence for the prosecution, although adequate to deserve committal, is rather weak. In such a case, to deprive a man of liberty when he is untried is going too far, even in the case of a serious offence. Of the offences which require justification before bail is granted, murder and rape—and, I suppose, attempt to commit murder and rape if they are sufficiently explicit—are among those cases. On the whole, I accept the Commons amendment and I do not accept the position of the noble and learned Lord. On this occasion, I hack the Commons against the Bill as it stands.
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, when changes of this kind are proposed, I wish to know the motive. Is the amendment intended to satisfy public curiosity or interest? Is it designed to make the granting of bail more difficult or less difficult in certain cases? What is the motivation?
In many cases, it is difficult to give reasons why bail has been granted. A court forms an impression of a person and, in all the circumstances, comes to the conclusion that bail should be granted. If reasons must be given, they may include such matters as a wife who is going to have a baby; an illness, or that, on general grounds, it is suitable to grant bail pending trial. Such reasons may sound weak. When bail is granted, we ought to be satisfied that the court was of the opinion that it should be granted. That ought to be enough. I know that people say, "Fancy letting that man out on bail when he did that dreadful thing". There is a tendency to convict such people beforehand. However, I do not see the point of it.
I support the amendment of my noble and learned friend. Late as the hour is, I believe that this matter is important, and I am willing to join in a Division on
1664
the matter if my noble and learned friend feels moved in that way. However, he will have to give his reasons.
3.30 p.m.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, will not encourage his noble and learned friend to take the matter to a Division. Amendment No. 198 is important. It would be a pity for the noble and learned Lord to seek to remove it.
This amendment deals with the grant of bail. Bail decisions are among the most difficult decisions which the courts have to take. Amendment No. 198 implies no criticism of the courts' decisions. It is intended to deal with the acutely difficult matter of bail in very serious cases.
The amendment is concerned with the very few most serious offences—murder and attempted murder, manslaughter, rape and attempted rape. It occasionally happens—very rarely—that a person who is charged with such an offence commits another extremely serious offence while on bail awaiting trial. Although this happens rarely the consequences are severe. First, a very serious offence is committed which might—I put it no higher than that—have been prevented. Secondly, and more certainly, public confidence in the hail system is shaken to a quite disproportionate degree.
We do not dispute that a person who is accused of such an offence may qualify for bail. He is certainly entitled to full and proper consideration by the court. Indeed, the prosecution may have no objection to bail. In the case of a domestic murder, for example, the risk of re-offending may be minimal. But prosecution objections to bail are not made lightly. The court must give them the weight they deserve. Amendment No. 198 requires the court to give its reasons when it rejects prosecution objections to bail in those few most serious cases. A requirement to state reasons will help to focus the arguments for and against bail, and it may help to reassure the public that a court will grant bail in such a case only when it has fully considered all relevant matters, including the views expressed by the prosecution.
I think that it is desirable to retain this provision and I hope that the noble and learned Lord will not press his opposition to the amendment.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, I am not entirely surprised by that response. I think a dangerous trend is being created by the amendment. The granting of bail in appropriate cases is a matter of very great importance. Our prisons are choked with prisoners on remand in custody and the courts ought to be encouraged to grant bail as frequently as public safety justifies.
I believe that this amendment creates a precedent of courts being required to give reasons for granting bail. It is a
topsy-turvey situation that is proposed. I am very unhappy about it. Were it not for this late hour on a Friday I might submit to the blandishments of my noble friend and divide the House upon it. I think it is a mistake and a very regrettable mistake indeed. But in view of the lateness of the hour and all things considered I shall not pursue my opposition to the amendment.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
199 Insert the following new clause:
'Decisions where bail refused on previous hearing.
—the following new Part shall be inserted after Part II of Schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976—

DECISIONS WHERE BAIL REFUSED ON PREVIOUS HEARING
1. If the court decides not to grant the defendant bail, it is the court's duty to consider, at each subsequent hearing while the defendant is a person to whom section 4 above applies and remains in custody, whether he ought to be granted bail. 2. At the first hearing after that at which the court decided not to grant the defendant bail he may support an application for bail with any argument as to fact or law that he desires (whether or not he has advanced that argument previously). 3. At subsequent hearings the court need not hear arguments as to fact or law which it has heard previously.".'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 199. There is an error as printed in the Marshalled List. I think that it would be appropriate if I were to read the amendment as it should be printed. Under "Decisions where bail refused on previous hearing" should be written:
"(i) If the court decides not to grant the defendant bail, it is the court's duty to consider, at each subsequent hearing while the defendant is a person to whom Section 4 above applies and remains in custody, whether he ought to be granted bail.
(ii) at the first hearing after that at which the court decided not to grant the defendant bail he may support an application for bail with any argument as to fact or law that he desires (whether or not he has advanced that argument previously).
(iii) at subsequent hearings the court need not hear arguments as to fact or law which it has heard previously.".
The only difference is in the appearance of the words as written on the Marshalled List and the fact that they are not tabulated.
Amendment No. 199 is a result of the fact that during the earlier stages of the Bill in your Lordships' House there was a substantial debate on the effects of the divisional court's decision in the Nottingham Justices case. Your Lordships will remember that noble Lords opposite argued in particular that the judgment discouraged defendants and their solicitors from making early applications for bail because they feared that following an unsuccessful application there would be no second bite at the cherry, and that the courts felt inhibited from hearing in full a second or subsequent application.
The amendment clarifies the law in what I hope your Lordships will agree is a constructive manner. First, it makes it absolutely clear that the court is required to consider bail at every hearing. If, as has been suggested, courts may be in any doubt about their duty, that doubt should be removed. Secondly, we have thought it right to clarify in statute the court's position where no new arguments are advanced at a second or subsequent hearing. We remain of the view that the proposition in the Nottingham Justices judgment is basically right, and that the courts should not be clogged up by a requirement to hear identical arguments over and over again, even if they have no merit. But we were persuaded by the colleagues of the noble and learned
1666
Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, in the other place that second applications should be treated differently.
The court may not have all the information that it needs at the first hearing, and the second hearing will be the crucial occasion on which it takes a fully informed decision. This was in fact recognised by the divisional court in the Nottingham Justices case. The court explicitly approved the practice of the Nottingham City magistrates, which was normally to allow two full hearings. We accept that there is a good case on purely practical grounds for drawing the line after the second hearing rather than the first. This is the effect of the amendment.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 199.—(Earl Ferrers.)
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Mackay of Clashfern): My Lords, the Motion is that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 199 as printed on the Marshalled List but subject to the corrections intimated by the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, I rise to support the amendment briefly. It will effect an improvement that will mitigate the worst effects of the Nottingham Justices decision by allowing all defendants at least one further full bail hearing after an initial remand in custody.
Lord Hutchinson of Lullington: My Lords, I should like to support this amendment and express my gratitude to the Minister because I am one person who has fought over and over again the Nottingham Justices decision. It is a great pleasure to see that decision watered down.
I think that it should be made clear now that the wording has been altered. It now reads:
"At subsequent hearings the court need not hear arguments"
whereas before, as in the Nottingham Justices case, it stated that the justices should only hear fresh considerations. So far as I can see, the result is that there is absolutely no reason why the justices now should not hear as many applications as they wish, even if arguments very similar have been put before. It seems to me that under this provision they have a discretion to hear what they want to hear, and surely that is as it ought to be.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, for their agreement. Such happy harmony is very agreeable.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
200 Clause 143, leave out Clause 143 and insert the following new clause:
'Crown Court proceedings—orders restricting or preventing reports or restricting public access.
.—(1) A person aggrieved may appeal to the Court of Appeal, if that court grants leave, against—

(a) an order under section 4 or 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 made in relation to a trial on indictment;

(b) any order restricting the access of the public to the whole or any part of a trial on indictment or to any proceedings ancillary to such a trial; and

1667

(c) any order restricting the publication of any report of the whole or any part of a trial on indictment or any such ancillary proceedings;

and the decision of the Court of Appeal shall be final.
(2) Subject to Rules of Court, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under this section shall be exercised by the criminal division of the Court, and references to the Court of Appeal in this section shall be construed as references to that division.
(3) On an application for leave to appeal under this section a judge shall have power to give such directions as appear to him to be appropriate and, without prejudice to the generality of this subsection, power—

(a) to order the production in court of any transcript or note of proceedings or other document;

(b) to give directions as to persons who are to be parties to the appeal or who may be parties to it if they wish, and as to service of documents on any person;

and the Court of Appeal shall have the same powers as the single judge.
(4) Subject to Rules of Court made by virtue of subsection (6) below, any party to an appeal under this section may give evidence before the Court of Appeal orally or in writing.
(5) On the hearing of an appeal under this section the Court of Appeal shall have power—

(a) to stay any proceedings in any other court until after the appeal is disposed of;

(b) to confirm, reverse or vary the order complained of; and

(c) to make such order as to costs as it thinks fit.

(6) Without prejudice to the generality of section 84 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, Rules of Court may make in relation to trials satisfying specified conditions special provision as to the practice and procedure to be followed in relation to hearings in camera and appeals from orders for such hearings and may in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of this subsection, provide that subsection (4) above shall not have effect.
(7) In the application of this section to Northern Ireland

(a) subsection (2) shall be omitted; and

(b) the reference in subsection (6) to section 84 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 shall be construed as a reference to sections 52 and 55 of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978.'.

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 200. I should like to speak to Amendment No. 425 at the same time. During the Committee stage of the Bill in your Lordships' House, the Government moved an amendment which is now Clause 143 of the Bill. It provided that orders made in a Crown Court trial under Sections 4 or 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 could be challenged by means of a judicial review. Your Lordships will recall that there had been complaints, in particular by the press, that the courts' power to prevent or restrict the reporting of proceedings had occasionally been misused and that there was no remedy to correct any such misuse.
While Clause 143 was welcomed so far as it went, some noble Lords, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, felt that it did not go far enough. My noble friend Lord Caithness undertook to consider with my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor whether the scope of the clause should he widened to embrace other kinds of order which restrict the reporting of, or public access to, Crown Court proceedings.
Amendment No. 200 is the result. I think that it fully meets the concerns expressed during the Bill's earlier stages. Amendment No. 200 will allow challenges to the Court of Appeal in respect of any court which restricts reporting of Crown Court proceedings and any order which restricts access to those proceedings. This includes orders under the
1668
Contempt of Court Act or under Section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 and orders for hearings in camera.
I should make a few observations about the special procedure envisaged by subsection (6). It is intended to deal with those very few exceptional cases involving information of high sensitivity. We have not sought to protect such cases from challenge but we must ensure that information is not disclosed in the course of an appeal which would damage national security or identity, and therefore put at risk a member of the security services. The prosecutor must be confident that any evidence containing such information will be heard in camera. He must retain the option of not proceeding with the prosecution if the consequences of disclosure of that information would be excessively serious.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 200—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Irvine of Lairg: My Lords, Amendment No. 200 is a very welcome amendment. The Bill as originally drafted provided for review of Crown Court orders under the Contempt of Court Act forbidding publication of reports of proceedings. We on these Benches pointed out that it was anomalous that there should be no similar possibility of review where the court went further and decided to sit in camera. We made the point too that it was not clear whether there was also a common law jurisdiction to prohibit publication with which the Bill should have dealt.
The Government have now dealt with both points. The procedure to he adopted has changed somewhat from that originally envisaged. But we have no particular objection. Indeed, some of the detail is to be welcomed. I wonder whether it would not have been better for the power conferred by the new clause—that is the power to stay proceedings—to be exercisable upon the application for leave rather than having to wait for the hearing of the appeal. I think that would have been better. However, subject to that small point, we are happy to welcome the amendments with enthusiasm.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
201 After Clause 143, insert the following new clause:
'Summary' offence of possession of indecent photograph of child.
.—(1) It is an offence for a person to have any indecent photograph of a child (meaning in this section a person under the age of 16) in his possession.
(2) Where a person is charged with an offence under subsection (1) above, it shall be a defence for him to prove

(a) that he had a legitimate reason for having the photograph in his possesion; or

(b) that he had not himself seen the photograph and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect. it to be indecent; or

(c) that the photograph was sent to him without any prior request made by him or on his behalf and that he did not keep it for an unreasonable time.

(3) A person shall he liable on summary conviction of an offence under this section to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.
(4) Sections 1(3), 2(3), 3 and 7 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 shall have effect as if any reference in them to that Act included a reference to this section.
(5) Possession before this section comes into force is not an offence.'
202 Insert the following new clause:
'Possession of indecent photographs of children: Scotland.
.—(1) The following section shall be inserted after section 52 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982—
"Possession of indecent photographs of children.
52A.—(1) It is an offence for a person to have any indecent photograph of a child (meaning in this section a person under the age of 16) in his possession."
(2) Where a person is charged with an offence under subsection (1), it shall be a defence for him to prove—

(a) that he had a legitimate reason for having the photograph in his possession; or

(b) that he had not himself seen the photograph and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be indecent; or

(c) that the photograph was sent to him without any prior request made by him or on his behalf and that he did not keep it for an unreasonable time.

(3) A person shall be liable on summary conviction of an offence under this section to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.
(4) Subsections (2) and (8) of section 52 of this Act shall have effect for the purposes of this section as they have for the purposes of that section."
(2) Section 52A of that Act shall not have effect in relation to anything done before it comes into force.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 201 and 202. It may also be for the convenience of your Lordships if I speak to Amendments Nos. 216, 379, 383, 411 and 428.
These amendments create for England and Wales and Scotland a new offence of possessing an indecent photograph of a child under the age of 16. They penalise people who possess such photographs for their own use. We believe that people will be less willing to buy or to keep this material if they know that they put themselves at risk of a criminal conviction, and the penalties, especially the public shame, that may follow. This should reduce the market for what is a vile product. A photograph for these purposes includes a film or a video.
Amendments Nos. 379 and 411 apply to the new offence police powers of entry, search and seizure, and powers for the court to order forfeiture of the material which are already found in the Protection of Children Act 1978.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 201 and 202.—(Earl Ferrers.)
3.45 p.m.
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, I feel awful about raising these few matters on the amendments. But, believe it or not, I have been sitting here since half' past 12 expressly for that purpose. It shows just how far out of proportion one's view of things can get in this House. Had I known that body searches in Northern Ireland were to obtrude in our debate to the extent they have I might have given up long ago. I feel however that there are a few points to be made about the amendments. The first is that continuously a Bill of this kind in its passage through Parliament becomes loaded up with changes of a miscellaneous character which raise entirely different issues from the Bill's main ethos. This is criminal justice: on the whole we understand its main theme. But these amendments raise issues of pornography and video recordings and the discontinuance of the
1670
conventional vigilance of the police, replaced by the bureaucratic oversight of the working of the Video Recordings Act.
Here is another example of the proof of innocence being put upon the accused person. We passed one amendment only a few minutes ago; here is a second. This is becoming too frequent. One day soon we ought to consider, when we are putting the onus of proof on the accused, whether some specific authority of Parliament should be registered and not regarded as an option to be adopted as we go through the conventional consideration of a Bill of this kind. I know the difficulty. I have taken part in this myself—getting a conviction where guilt has to be proved. When one is sure that guilt is present in a case, but evidence is lacking because of the nature of the charge made—I speak particularly in relation to badger digging and things of that nature—to give protection, one sometimes has to say that if a person is acting in suspicious circumstances, he or she has to be asked to prove his innocence because it will be difficult to convict otherwise.
I pass now to a question that puzzles me. We are dealing here with an "offence for a person". Then we go on to say that,
"it shall he a defence for him to prove."
My first question is: are we talking about men and women or just men? This question is not as silly as it sounds. The tendency would be for this kind of traffic to take place among men. I wonder whether a woman having this so-called indecent photograph in her possession would be open to the same conditions of accusation and presumption of guilt as a man? There is also the question: what is an indecent video? That is an old one. I have been consulting Halsbury's judicial interpretations of this difficult word "indecent". It is linked with obscenity. We can be driven to regard as indecent something which is not indecent and should not be regarded as indecent. Is nudity indecent?
When we are talking of indecency, as apparently we are in other Acts, we are talking about an indecent act, a portrayal of something which is palpably indecent—explicit sexual intercourse, abuse and other portrayals of bodily activity which can be regarded as indecent. Is it indecent merely to have a photograph of a nude child?
I understand the point about "photograph" because part of the mischief which we are trying to prevent is the use of children for photographs. Therefore to bring paintings, drawings and things of that nature within the mischief of this Bill would obviously be carrying matters too far. All sorts of queer things can happen at present. I was told recently—and I wished I had asked for verification of what I am about to say—of a person who sent holiday photographs to be developed in the normal course to a shop which received the negatives for that purpose. That person then received a visit from the police because the negatives showed something which the shopkeeper thought should go to the police and having the name and address of the person who had lodged the negatives for development, he had the identity of the person concerned. The police turned up. That is really an astonishing happening.
I also mention—and I can verify this—a case about which I was consulted of a person in Scotland. The law in Scotland differs from that in England because

1671
they employ a term in their legislation which we do not have; namely, the word "lewd". In this case a man had two sons and a third boy joined them. They went to a glade, a glen, a beauty spot and waterfalls and they bathed in the nude. He took a photograph. Unfortunately, the third boy was the son of a policeman and when he told his father about it there was police activity. That man was prosecuted, fined £1,500 and his camera was confiscated. Is that an indecent photograph within the meaning of what we are now talking about?
I cannot question what they might do in Scotland. I always thought that they were not so daft in Scotland as we were in England about laws of this kind. However, in Scotland it seems that if you are producing something which is lewd, then you are for it.
We need to know what we are doing. I understand that we are now proposing to carry the Protection of Children Act further than it went at the time. It was bad enough when we were dealing with it. I see that the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, is in her place. She had much to do with earlier legislation. The mere photographing of a nude child in the garden by the father could be regarded as a subject about which to inform the police and for them to come along to see if an offence has been committed.
In order to overcome the problem of the market for these indecent photographs, we are pursuing not only those who take them but also those who possess them. We shall soon have big brother creeping up on us all wanting to know what we have in our pockets or in our wallets and asking. "Have you an indecent photograph, because if you have the presumption is that you are guilty, but we shall give you a chance to prove that you have it legitimately". Tell me what is the legitimate possession of a photograph of that kind? How long do you have to keep a photograph before you are accused of keeping it too long? "It was not in transit in your case. You were keeping it to look at it". How stupid can we get?
All legislation coming before Parliament relating to children is adding to the cumulative indictment of the social values of the family, with the increasing risks that apparently children run in almost every household in the land. We shall see when we come to deal with abuse later that no one will be able to keep a social worker out of the house. Surveillance of family activities may become almost unbearable.
We must ask why this legislation comes before us. I have tried to find out the origins of these matters. They are doing their business in the other place in an extraordinary and mysterious way. New clauses are added to the Bill. As far as I can tell, First and Second Readings and Standing Committees are going through without a word being said about them. This is the case in respect of these Amendments Nos. 201 and 202. In fact, on Amendment No. 202 more was said. It deals with the Video Recordings Act.
I must say a few words about the Video Recordings Act because I took a great part, a lone part, in it. If only Parliament had waited for the Government to complete their investigations and consultations into video recordings, how much better it would have been. However, we have the Act now. The proposal is that the inspectors of weights and measures shall now be the police force to look at the enforcement of
1672
the Video Recordings Act. This is another example of where bureaucracy is to replace the police. That is happening on an ever-widening scale. Bureaucracy is being given powers which normally have been reserved for the police. The police are identifiable officers to the public. Bureaucrats frequently are not.
This legislation gives the inspectors of weights and measures the power to enter, to inspect and in some cases to do more than the police are empowered to do. Is that right? It is convenient, but the truth of the matter is that the police have lost interest in enforcement of the Video Recordings Act since the transfer of the right to prosecute from the chief constables to the Crown Prosecution Service. Eccentrics like the Chief Constable of Manchester had a porn squad in pursuit of people in business with bookshops and radio shops. If one chief constable failed to get a conviction from a jury in regard to a specific film, another chief constable would try a prosecution in his area to see whether he could get a conviction. What was going on at that time was a scandal.
From that point of view one welcomes the transfer to a more sober and sensible force of overseers of enforcement. The industry does not find that unwelcome. There are aspects that need to be attended to in the enforcement of the Video Recordings Act, which only works because some parts of it were unworkable from the beginning and it has not been necessary to activate them in particular exemption clauses.
However, the hour is late. I can tell the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, that if I were a shop steward I would have called everybody out hours ago on the ground that we have had neither a luncheon interval nor even time for what the railwaymen call natural functions. We treat our Ministers abominably. The noble Earl has been here since whatever hour it was this morning that we started. I must not continue.
I feel that we are doing something which is a kind of appendage to this Bill which raises issues regarding separate laws of their own which should be dealt with in the proper context. We shall come up against the same problem when discussing the Finance Bill on Wednesday. It is as though we have a kind of Lord Mayor's Show in which the coaches gather and different interests are attracted as they go along. Ultimately, there is an omnibus Bill such as this one which has been trundling around the place since before the general election. This Bill has been added to as it has gone along and then at the very last moment, such as now, we are not even allowed a Committee stage to deal with amendments of this importance. We have to swallow or reject them late on a Friday afternoon. That is enough.
4 p.m.
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, is making unduly heavy weather of this subject. However, on one point I thoroughly agree with him. I believe that 76 pages of Commons amendments to any Bill are too much. This is a feast of amendments which would have satisfied even the gargantuan appetite of his late Majesty, Edward VII. We should never again have so many Commons' amendments. As regards this particular amendment, I am wholeheartedly in favour of it and because the

1673
hour is late I say no more except that if the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, looks at the Interpretation Act he will see that it states very clearly that "him" embraces "her".
Lord Monson: My Lords, I too must confess to some unease about this amendment as someone who takes the doubtless somewhat old-fashioned view that an Englishman's home is his castle, and that this principle extends even to perverted Englishmen, Scots and Welshmen, so long as they do not harm other people within the four walls of the home. It may be worth pointing out that this amendment includes not only photographs of children below the age of puberty, as is generally supposed, but also girls who may be no more than a month or two below the present age of consent, which is higher than the age of consent in many, if not most, other countries, and higher than the age of consent in Victorian England. That is perhaps a minor libertarian quibble. The main question concerns harm to children, the operative word being "harm".
I believe that one can reasonably assume that at least 1 per cent. of the adult population—the Cleveland doctors would have said 10 per cent., but I believe we can discount that—mainly men, but including some women, are afflicted with the obsession accurately described, or so one imagines, in that 20th century classic Lolita. We are therefore talking of at least 400,000 people. What is to be done with all these people? One cannot shoot them or lock them up in prison or secure mental institutions until they reach the age of 80, by which time one supposes that their desires will have diminished——
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: Speak for yourself!
Lord Monson: My Lords, I apologise to the noble and learned Lord. Neither in a democracy can one castrate them, either surgically or chemically. Most of those 400,000 people, apart from the very few who have been caught and are locked up, will be at large and potentially on the prowl. If one deprives them of the material with which to fantasise—I do not believe I need to be more explicit—are they not more rather than less likely to attack children?
I ask the Minister whether this amendment has come about as the result of a perfectly understandable gut reaction against this mainly disgusting material, or have the Government thought through the matter thoroughly and dispassionately? One would dearly like to know whether the Government have been assured by doctors and psychiatrists that banning the private possession of this material will lessen the risks to children rather than increase them. After all, that is what matters.
Lord Hutchinson of Lullington: My Lords, is the noble Lord suggesting that pornographic pictures of children should be supplied to those 400,000 people in order to keep them happy in their homes?
Lord Monson: My Lords, that is a matter for doctors and psychiatrists to decide and not for me.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, as a matter of fact that is just about the point at which there is disagreement.
1674
The noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, enjoyed himself this afternoon. He was kind enough to make some generous comments about myself for not having had the advantage of lunch. All I can say is that the noble Lord's intervention did nothing to alleviate such discomfort as he perceived in me. It was one that I was happy to endure.
I do not propose to go into a long defence of the amendment this afternoon. Everyone knows how it has come about. There is considerable concern about the sexual abuse of children and the bad way in which there can be trade in pictures or photographs of children. The noble Lord asked whether, although the amendment is in the male, it refers to the female. The answer is yes, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham said. The noble Lord asked whether Big Brother will be watching us. That is a matter for him to consider. He might take one view and others might take another. The noble Lord asked how long one has to have the picture. One has to possess it, and it would be up to the courts to determine whether or not a person was in possession.
The noble Lord asked how stupid can we get. I shall not propose to answer that question. He also asked: what is indecent? That is also a matter for the courts to decide. I have no intention whatever of getting into an argument on that subject this afternoon. The word "indecency" is used in the Protection of Children Act 1978. It is already an offence to take, to distribute or to show an indecent photograph. All we do in Amendment No. 201 is to say that it is an offence for a person to have an indecent photograph. There is no reason to think that the definition has given rise to difficulties, for example, with family snapshots. The courts are familiar with this type of concept. I hope therefore that your Lordships will agree to the amendment.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
203 After Clause 143, insert the following new clause:
"Enforcement of Video Recordings Act 1984.
.—The following section shall be inserted after section 16 of the Video Recordings Act 1984—
"Enforcement.
16A.—(1) The functions of a local weights and measures authority include the enforcement in their area of this Act.
(2) The following provisions of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 apply in relation to the enforcement of this Act by such an authority as in relation to the enforcement of that Act—

section 27 (power to make test purchases);

section 28 (power to enter premises and inspect and seize goods and documents),

section 29 (obstruction of authorised officers), and

section 33 (compensation for loss, amp;c. of goods seized under section 28).

(3) Nothing in this section shall be taken as authorising a local weights and measures authority in Scotland to initiate proceedings for an offence.
(4) Subsection (1) above does not apply in relation to the enforcement of this Act in Northern Ireland, but the functions of the Department of Economic Development include the enforcement of this Act in Northern Ireland.
For that purpose the provisions of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 specified in subsection (2) apply as if for the references to a local weights and measures authority and any officer of such an authority there were substituted references to that Department and any of its officers.
(5) Any enactment which authorises the disclosure of information for the purpose of facilitating the enforcement of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 shall apply as if the

1675
provisions of this Act were contained in that Act and as if the functions of any person in relation to the enforcement of this Act were functions under that Act.".'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 203. Perhaps I may speak at the same time to Amendment No. 430.
The purpose of these amendments is to enable trading standards officers to enforce the Video Recordings Act 1984. Your Lordships will recall that the Video Recordings Act introduced a system of classification for videos on similar lines to that which exists for cinema films. In each case the classification is undertaken by the British Board of Film Classification. The Act requires all videos to be classified and properly labelled. It makes it an offence to sell an unclassified video or to sell a video in breach of its classification; for example, to sell to a person under the age of 18 a video which has been classified as suitable for viewing only by people over the age of 18.
In order to maintain the effectiveness of the Act in years to come, we must ensure that it is properly enforced. The police enforce the Act but there is a limit to the amount of time we can expect them to spend on the basic regulatory function of visiting retail premises and checking that the Act has been complied with. The nature of this work is comparable to other enforcement tasks which fall to trading standards officers who are employed by local weights and measures authorities.
Amendment No. 203 gives trading standards officers the necessary powers to enter premises and seize evidence by applying the powers which they already possess under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968. The new arrangements will extend to weights and measures authorities in Scotland. In Northern Ireland the corresponding functions are carried by the Department of Economic Development. I commend the amendment to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 203.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
204 Clause 147, page 98, line 3, leave out '(at the court or elsewhere)'.
205 Page 98, line 6, leave out first 'subsection' and insert 'subsections'.
206 Page 98, line 11, after 'Service.'"., insert—
'(1B) In subsection (1)(b) above "attending" means attending at the court or elsewhere.'.
207 Page 98, line 20, leave out '(at the court or elsewhere)'.
208 Page 98, line 21, at end insert—
'(2A) The following subsection shall he inserted after that subsection—
"(3A) In subsection (3)(a) above 'attendance' means attendance at the court or elsewhere.".'.
209 Page 98, line 22, leave out 'amendment made by subsection (2)' and insert amendments made by subsections (2) and (2A)'.
210 Page 98, line 24, leave out 'Paragraph 8(1)(b) of and insert 'In'.
211 Page 98, line 26, leave out from beginning to 'for' in line 27 and insert—
'(a) in sub-paragraph (1)(b) of paragraph 8,'.
212 Page 98, line 29, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
'(b) the following sub-paragraph shall be inserted after sub-paragraph (4) of that paragraph—
"(5) In sub-paragraph (1)(b) above 'attends' means attends at the court or elsewhere.".'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 204 to 212. I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 365 to 405. These are technical amendments and I hope that your Lordships will approve of them. I commend them to the House.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 204 to 212.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
213 Clause 149, page 98, line 40, leave out from 'it' to 'of' in line 41 and insert 'is made only for purposes corresponding to those of any provision'.
214 Page 99, line 5, leave out '(including Schedule 02)'.
215 Page 99, line 7, at end insert '(4) and (5)'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 213 to 215 en bloc. These are all drafting amendments.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 213 to 215.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
216 Clause 149, page 99, line 8, at end insert, 'section [Summary offence of possession of indecent photograph of child];'.
217 page 99, line 8, at end insert 'section [Transferred charges]'.
Earl Ferrers: I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 216 and 217 en bloc. These amendments were spoken to with Amendment No. 201.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 216 and 217.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
218 Clause 152, page 99, line 43, leave out from 'relates' to end of line 44 and insert—

'(a) to the addition of two subsections at the end of section 8 of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986;

(b) to the insertion of a new subsection in section 24 of that Act; and

(c) to the substitution of two new sections for section 26 of that Act;'.

219 Page 99, line 44, at end insert—
'section 124;'.
220 Page 99, line 44, at end insert—
'section 127, so far as it relates to the Local Government Finance Act 1982;'.
221 Page 100, line 1, at end, insert—

'section 131;

section [Assistance to Isle of Man and Channel Islands];

section [Transferred charged];

section [Body samples—Northern Ireland];'.

222 Page 100, line 6, at end insert—
section 112A(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925;'.
223 Page 100, line 12, at end, insert—
'section 67(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967;'.
224 Page 100, line 15, at beginning, insert—
'section 6(1) of'.
225 Page 100, line 15, at end, insert—
'sections 171 and 368 of and Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975;
226 Page 100, line 17, leave out '11'.
227 Page 100, leave out line 19.
228 Page 100, line 19, at end, insert—
'section 52(7) of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982; the Criminal Justice Act 1982;'.
229 Page 100, line 20, at end, insert—

'the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985;

the Criminal Justice Act 1987;

the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987;'.

230 Page 100 line 25, at end insert—
'the Criminal Justice Act 1987;'
231 Page 100., line 34, at end, insert—

'section 60;

section 64;

section 65;

section [Torture];

section [Prosecution for Torture];

section [Extradition under 1870 Act];

section [Extradition under Part I];

section [Application to Channel Islands, Isle of Man and colonies];

232 Page 100, line 37, at end, insert —
'section [Summary offence of possession of indecent photograph of child];
section [Possession of indecent photographs of children. Scotland];
233 Page 101, line 2, at end, insert ', the Protection of Children Act 1978 and section 6(5) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980'.
234 Page 101, line 4, at end, insert—
'Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act 1967;'.
235 Page 101, line 6, at end insert—
'the Protection of Children Act 1978;'.
236 Page 101, line 11, at end insert—
'(7) Section (Enforcement of Video Recordings Act 1984) above shall come into force—

(a) on the day appointed under section 23(2) of the Video Recordings Act 1984 for the coming into force of the provisions of that Act not in force at the passing of this Act; or

(b) on the passing of this Act,

whichever is the later.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 218 to 236 en bloc. These are amendments to the commencement clause.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 218 to 236.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
237 Clause 153, page 101, line 13, leave out 'and 19' and insert '[Application of general extradition arrangements to colonies] and [Special extradition arrangements—colonies]'.
238 Page 101, line 15, leave out '(including Schedule 1)'.
239 Page 101, line 24, at end, insert—
'section 90;'.
240 Page 101, line 27, after 'to', insert '113 and'.
241 Page 101, line 27, at end, insert—

'section [Compensation,for miscarriages of justice];

section [Torture];

section [Extradition under 1870 Act];

section [Extradition under Part I];'.

242 Page 101, line 28, at end, insert—

'section [Assistance to isle of Man and Channel Islands];

section 132(a) and (b);

section [Enforcement of Video Recordings Act 1984];

section 151;'.

243 Page 101, line 34, leave out '(including Schedule 3)'.
244 Page 101, line 35, at end, insert—

'section [Compensation for miscarriages of justice];

Section [Torture]:

section [Requirement of Attorney General's consent for prosecution];

section [Extradition under 1870 Act];

section [Extradition under Part I];'.

245 Page 102, line 1, at end, insert—
'section [Assistance to Isle of Man and Channel Islands];'.
246 Page 101 leave out line 2.
247 Page 102, line 3, at end, insert—

'section [Crown Court proceedings-orders restricting or preventing reports or restricting public access];

section [Enforcement of Video Recordings Act 1984];

section 147(4);

section 151;'.

248 Page 102, line 10, leave out '(including Part 11 of Schedule 5)'.
249 Page 102, line 12, at end, insert—
'section [Possession of indecent photographs of children: Scot land];'.
250 Page 102, line 13, at end, insert—
'(4A) Section [Enforcement 'of Northern Ireland orders in Scotland] above extends only to Scotland and Northern Ireland.'.
251 Page 102, line 14, leave out 'Section 149 above extends' and insert 'Sections 132(c), [Body samples—Northern Ireland] and 149 above extend'.
252 Page 102, line 20, leave out ', including Schedule 12 to this Act'.
253 Page 102, line 38, at end insert 'except that the amendments of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 do not extend to Northern Ireland'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 237 to 253 en bloc. These are amendments to the extent clause.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 237 to 253.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
254 Clause 154, page 103, line 5, leave out subsection (2).
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 254. This is a privilege amendment.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 264.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
255 Schedule 1, page 104, line 7, at end insert—
'In section 3(3) (restrictions on surrender) after the word "otherwise" there shall be inserted the words ", or unless an order is made for the charge in respect of the offence to lie on the file".'.
256 Page 104, line 11, after 'given', insert 'in England and Wales'.
257 Page 104, line 17, at end insert—
'(2A) A notice under this section shall be given in Scotland in the manner prescribed by the High Court of Justiciary by Act of Adjournal and the sheriff may order the committal for return of a person with his consent at any time after his arrest."
258 Page 104, line 24, at end insert —
'1A. In section 26, in the definition of "police magistrate", for the words from "a" to the end there shall be substituted the words "the chief metropolitan stipendiary magistrate designated by the Lord Chancellor for the purposes of this Act and the Acts that may be cited together with it as the Extradition Acts 1870 to 1935.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 255 to 258 en bloc. The amendments are consequential upon Amendment No. 51.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 255 to 258.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
259 Schedule 1, page 104, line 27, leave out 'consisting of a contravention of section of and insert 'under'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 259. Perhaps I may speak at the same time to Amendments Nos. 265, 266, 268, 270, 271, 272, 278, 281 and 289. This group comprises the remaining amendments to Schedule 1.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 259.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
260 Schedule 1, page 104, line 42, at end insert—
'(1 A) If the chief officer or chief constable immediately informs the court that he intends to make such an application, the court shall make an order providing for the detention of the person in question, or directing that he shall not he released except on bail.
(1 B) Rules of Court may specify—

(a) a period within which the chief officer or chief constable must make such an application unless the Court grants a longer period; and

(b) a period within which the court must comply with such an application.'

260A Page 104, line 42 [Schedule 1], leave out 'refuses to state a case' and insert 'fails to comply with an application under subsection (1) above within the period specified in Rules of Court'.
261 Page 105, leave out lines 5 to 13 and insert—
'(4) An order made by a court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland under subsection (1A) above shall cease to have effect if—

(a) the High Court dismisses the appeal; and

(b) the chief officer or chief constable does not immediately—

(i) apply for leave to appeal to the House of Lords; or

(ii) inform the court that he intends to apply for leave.

(5) An order made by a court in Scotland under subsection(1A) above shall cease to have effect if the court dismisses the appeal.
262 Page 105, line 19, at end insert—
'(6A) The House of Lords may exercise any powers of the High Court under subsection (3) above and subsection (4) above shall apply to them as it applies to that Court.
(6B) Subject to subsections (4) and (5) above, an order under subsection (1A) above shall have effect so long as the case is pending.
(6C) For the purposes of this section a case is pending (unless proceedings are discontinued) until (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to take any step out of time) there is no step that the chief officer or chief constable can take.'
263 Page 105, line 25, after 'court', insert ', other than the reference in subsection (6A) above.'
264 Page 105, leave out line 28 and insert—
"(e) subsections (6) and (6A) shall be omitted; and, in".
265 Page 105, line 41, after 'conduct', insert 'in a designated Commonwealth country or United Kingdom dependency'.
266 Page 105, line 45, leave out 'Commonwealth country' and insert 'designated Commonwealth country of United Kingdom dependency'.
267 Page 105, line 46, at end insert—
'(aa) any conduct which by virtue of subsection (4)(b) or (bb) below is treated as conduct in a designated Commonwealth country or United Kingdom dependency and which satisfies the conditions in paragraph (a) above; or'.
268 Page 105, line 48, leave out 'Commonwealth country' and insert 'designated Commonwealth country or United Kingdom dependency'.
269 Page 106, line 7, leave out 'outside the United Kingdom'.
270 Page 106, line 13, leave out 'Commonwealth country' and insert 'designated Commonwealth country or United Kingdom dependency'.
271 Page 106, line 21, leave out 'Commonwealth country' and insert 'designated Commonwealth country or United Kingdom dependency'.
272 Page 106, line 22, after 'country', insert 'or dependency'.
273 Page 106, line 25, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
'(b) conduct in a dependency of a designated Commonwealth country, or a vessel, aircraft or hovercraft of such a country shall be treated as if it were conduct in that country;
(bb) conduct in a vessel, aircraft or hovercraft of a United Kingdom dependency shall be treated as if it were conduct in that dependency.'.
274 Page 107, line 9, at end insert—
'5A.—(1) The following subsections shall be substituted for subsection (2) of section 5 (authority to proceed)—
"(2) There shall be furnished with any such request—

(a) particulars of the person whose return is requested;

(b) particulars of the offence of which he is accused or was convicted (including information sufficient to justify the issue of a warrant for his arrest under this Act);

(c) in the case of a person accused of an offence, a warrant for his arrest issued in the Commonwealth country or United Kingdom dependency; and

(d) in the case of a person unlawfully at large after conviction of an offence, a certificate of the conviction and sentence,

and copies of them shall be served on the person whose return is requested before he is brought before a court under section 7 of this Act.
(2A) Rules under section 144 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 may make provision as to the procedure for service under subsection (2) above in England and Wales.
(2B) The High Court of Justiciary may, by Act of Adjournal, make rules as to the procedure for service under subsection (2) above in Scotland".
(2) The following subsection shall be added at the end of that section—
"(4) An authority to proceed shall specify the offence or offences under the law of the United Kingdom which it appears to the Secretary of Stte would be constituted by equivalent conduct in the United Kingdom.".'.
275 Page 107, line 10, leave out paragraph 6 and insert—
6. In subsection (1)(a) of section 6 (arrest for purposes of committal) for the words "a metropolitan stipendiary
magistrate or by" there shall be substituted the words—

"(i) the chief metropolitan stipendiary magistrate or a
metropolitan stipendiary magistrate designated for the
purpose of this Act by the Lord Chancellor; or

(ii) ".

6A.—(1) In subsection (I) of section 7 (proceedings for committal) for the words "a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate" there shall be substituted the words "the chief metropolitan stipendiary magistrate or a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate designated as mentioned in section 6(1)(a) above.
(2) For the words in subsection (5) of that section from "the court shall" to the end there shall be substituted the words "the court, unless his committal is prohibited by any other provision of this Act, shall commit him in custody or on bail—

(i) to await the Secretary of State's decision as to his return to the country on behalf on which the request for his return was made; and

(ii) if the Secretary of State decides that he shall be returned to that country, to await his return.

(5A) If the court commits a person under subsection (5) above, it shall issue a certificate of the offence against the law of the United Kingdom which would be constituted by his conduct.
(6) A person may be committed in the exercise of the power conferred by subsection (5) above either to custody or on bail.
(7) If the court commits a person on custody in the exercise of that power, it may subsequently grant him bail if it considers it appropriate to do so.
(8) If—

(a) the court is not satisfied as mentioned in subsection (5) above in relation to the person arrested; or

(b) his committal is prohibited by a provision of this Act, it shall discharge him".'.

276 Page 107, line 13, after 'order' insert 'of committal'.
277 Page 107, line 14, after 'above', insert 'in respect of the offence or, as the case may be, any of the offences, to which the authority to proceed relates'.
278 Page 107, line 14, leave out 'Commonwealth'.
279 Page 107, line 19 at end insert—
'1(A) If the country seeking his return immediately informs the court of committal that it intends to make such an application, the court shall make an order providing for his detention, or directing that he shall not be released except on bail.
(1B) Rules of Court may specify—

(a) a period within which a country must make such an application unless the Court grants a longer period; and

(b) a period within which the court of committal must comply with such an application.'

280 Page 107, line 20, leave out 'refuses to state a case' and insert 'of committal fails to comply with an application under subsection (1) above within the period specified in Rules of Court'.
281 Page 107, line 22, leave out 'Commonwealth'.
282 Page 107, leave out lines 31 and 32 and insert—
'(4) Where the court dismisses an appeal relating to an offence, it shall by order declare that that offence is not an offence in respect of which the Secretary of State has power to make an order under section 9 of the Act in respect of the person whose return was requested.
(4A) An order made by a metropolitan magistrate under subsection (1A) above shall cease to have effect if—

(a) the court dismisses the appeal in respect of the offence or all the offences to which it relates; and

(b) the country seeking return does not immediately—

(i) apply for leave to appeal to the House of Lords; or

(ii) inform the court that it intends to apply for leave.

(4B) An order made by the sheriff of Lothian and Borders under subsection (1A) above shall cease to have effect if the court dismisses the appeal in respect of the offence or all of the offences to which it relates.'
283 Page 107, leave out lines 33 to 38.
284 Page 107, line 43, at end insert—
'(6A) The House of Lords may exercise any powers of the High Court under subsection (3) above and subsection (4) above shall apply to them as it applies to that Court.
(6B) Subject to subsections (4A) and (4B) above, an order under subsection (1A) above shall have effect so long as the case is pending.
(6C) For the purposes of this section a case is pending (unless proceedings are discontinued) until (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to take any step out of time) there is no step that the Commonwealth country can take.'
285 Page 107, leave out line 44 and insert—
"(7) In the application to Scotland of this section, subsections (6) and (6A) shall be omitted, and,".
286 Page 107, line 50, leave out sub-paragraph (1) and insert—
'(1) Section 8 (application for habeas corpus etc.) shall be amended as follows.
(1A) The words "to custody" shall be omitted from subsections (1) and (2).
(1B) The following words shall be substituted for the words in subsection (3) from the beginning to "the court", in the second place where those words occur—
"(3) Without prejudice to any jurisdiction of the High Court or High Court of Justiciary apart from this section, the court shall order the applicant's discharge if it appears to the court, in relation to the offence, or each of the offences, in respect of which the applicant's return is sought,"
(1C) In subsection (5), for the words from "until" to the end there shall be substituted the words "(unless they are discontinued) until (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal".'.
287 Page 108, line 23, at end insert—
'8A.—(1) Section 9 (order for return to requesting country) shall be amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for the words "to await his return" there shall be substituted the words "under section 7 of this Act".
(3) In paragraph (b) of subsection (2), after the word "withdrawn" there shall be inserted the words "or unless an order is made for it to lie on the file".
(4) The following subsection shall he inserted after that subsection—
"(2A) In the application of this section to Scotland, the reference to an order being made for the charge to lie on the file shall be construed as a reference to the diet being deserted pro loco et tempore….".'.
288 Page 108, line 23, at end insert—
'8B. In subsection (I) of section 10 (discharge in case of delay in returning) for the words from "to" to "Act", in the first place where it occurs, there shall be substituted the words "under section 7 of this Act is still in the United Kingdom".'.
289 Page 108, line 27, leave out 'Commonwealth country' and insert 'designated Commonwealth country or United Kingdom dependency'.
290 Schedule 3, page 109, line 24, leave out paragraph 1.
291 Page 110, line 39, leave out sub-paragraph (a).
292 Schedule 5, page 112, line 35, leave out sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) and insert—
'(2) In subsection (1), after the word "shall" there shall be inserted the words "first be applied in payment of such expenses incurred by a person acting as an insolvency practitioner as are payable under section 17A(2) of this Act and then shall,".
(3) In subsection (3), for the words from "sum", in the second place where it occurs, to "balance" there shall be substituted the words "justices' clerk shall apply the money received for the purposes specified in this section and in the order so specified.
(3A) The justices' clerk shall first pay any expenses incurred by a person acting as an insolvency practitioner and payable under section 17A(2) of this Act but not already paid under subsection (1) above.
(3B) If the money was paid to the justices' clerk by a receiver appointed under section 8 or 11 of this Act or in pursuance of a charging order the justices' clerk shall next pay the receiver's remuneration and expenses.
(3C) After making—

(a) any payment required by subsection (3A) above; and

(b) in a case to which subsection (3B) above applies, any payment required by that subsection,

the justices' clerk shall reimburse any amount paid under section 18(2) of this Act.
(3D) Any balance in the hands of the justices' clerk after he has made all payments required by the foregoing provisions of this section" ".
293 Page 113, line 28, leave out 'the insolvency practitioner's negligence; and the insolvency practitioner' and insert 'his negligence in so acting; and a person so acting.'
294 Page 113, line 51, leave out 'the foregoing provisions of this section' and insert 'this Act'.
295 Page 114, line 8, at end insert—
'10A. In subsection (2) of section 18 (receivers: supplementary provisions) for "(3)(a)" there shall be substituted "(3B)".
10B. In section 19 (compensation)—

(a) in paragraph (b)(i) of subsection (1), the words "(and no conviction for any drug trafficking offence is substituted" shall cease to have effect; and

(b) at the end of that subsection there shall be added the words "if. having regard to all the circumstances, it considers it appropriate to make such an order".

(c) in subsection (2)—

(i) the words "and that, but for that default, the proceedings would not have been instituted or continued,", and

(ii) in paragraph (b), the word "substantial", shall cease to have effect; and

(d) the following subsection shall be inserted after that subsection—

"(2A) The Court shall not order compensation to be paid in any case where it appears to the Court that the proceedings would have been instituted or continued even if the serious default had not occurred.".
10C. The following subsection shall be inserted after subsection (5) of section 24 (assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking)—
"(5A) In this section "constable" includes a police officer engaged on central service (as defined in section 43(5) of the Police Act 1976).".
296 Page 114, line 23, leave out from 'specified' to `and' in line 30 and insert 'this Act shall apply to external confiscation orders'.
297 Page 114, line 31, leave out from 'proceedings' to 'there' in line 34 and insert 'which have been or are to be instituted in the designated country and may result in an external confiscation order being made.'.
298 Page 114, line 47, leave out 'arising' and insert 'which arise'.
299 Page 114, line 49, leave out 'and which are retained there shall nevertheless' and insert 'shall'.
300 Page 114, line 51, at end insert—
'(1A) In this Act
"external confiscation order" means an order made by a court in a designated country for the purpose of recovering payments or other rewards received in connection with drug trafficking or their value; and
"modifications" includes additions, alterations and omissions.'.
301 Page 115, line 2, at end insert—
'(2A) The power to make an Order in Council under this section includes power to modify this Act in such a way as to confer power on a person to exercise a discretion.'.
302 Page 115, line 27, leave out 'subsection shall he substituted for subsection' and insert 'subsections shall be substituted for subsections (12) and'.
303 Page 115, line 28 at end insert—
'(12) Proceedings for an offence are concluded—

(a) when (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal Out of time) there is no further possibility of a confiscation order being made in the proceedings;

(b) on the satisfaction of a confiscation order made in the proceedings (whether by payment of the amount due under the order or by the defendant serving imprisonment in default).'.

304 Page 115, line 43, at end insert—
'17A In subsection (3) of section 16 (application of proceeds of realisation and other sums) for the words from "sum", in the second place where it occurs, to "applied", in the third place where it occurs, there shall be substituted the words "sheriff clerk shall apply the money recieved—

(a) first, in payment of any expenses to payment of which a person is entitled under section 37(2) of this Act but which were not paid to him under subsection (1) above:

(b) next, in payment of the administrator's remuneration and expenses;

(c) next,".'

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their
1684
Amendments Nos. 260 to 304 en bloc. These are consequential amendments.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 260 to 304.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
4.15 p.m.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
305 Schedule 6, page 116, line 14, leave out from 'Scotland' to end of line 15 and insert 'a solicitor practising in England and Wales or Scotland or a person who holds or has held judicial office in England and Wales or Scotland'.
306 Page 116, line 29, leave out from 'may' to end of line 36 and insert 'at any time remove a person from office as a member of the Board if satisfied that—

(a) he has been convicted of a criminal offence:

(b) he has become bankrupt or has had his estate sequestrated or has made an arrangement with, orgranted a trust deed for, his creditors;

(c) he is incapacitated by physical or mental illness: or

(d) he is otherwise unable or unfit to perform his duties'.

307 Page 116, line 39, after 'practises', insert 'or has practised'.
308 Page 116, line 40, after 'Wales' insert 'or who holds or has held judicial office there'.
309 Page 116, line 41, after 'practises', insert 'or has practised'.
310 Page 116, line 42, after 'Scotland', insert 'or who holds or has held judicial office there'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 305 to 310 en bloc. These are minor amendments to the provisions governing membership of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments No. 305 to 310.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
311 Schedule 6, page 117, line 28, leave out paragraph 8.
312 Page 118, line 19, after 'financial' insert 'and'.
313 Schedule 7, page 118, line 26, leave out from beginning to end of page 119, line 4, and insert 'in the prescribed manner.
(2) In this Schedule "prescribed" means prescribed by rules under paragraph 17 below.
2. Unless the circumstances appear to them to be exceptional—

(a) in a case where the Board have not previously awarded compensation in respect of an injury they shall not determine a claim in respect of it which is made after the end of three years from the date of the incident giving rise to the injury; and

(b) in a case where they have previously awarded compensation in respect of an injury, they shall not determine any further claim in respect of it which is made after the end of three years beginning with the date of the notice under paragraph 5B(2) below relating to the award, or latest award, of compensation in respect of the injury.

3. If the Board—

(a) have previously awarded compensation in respect of an injury; and

(b) stated at the time of a previous award that the evidence before them showed that a particular medical condition might arise in the future as a result of the injury; and

(c) a claim is made in respect of such a condition.

the Board shall determine the claim whenever it is made.'
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 311 to 313 en bloc. These amendments were discussed with Amendment No. 151.
Moved, that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 311 to 313. (Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
314 Schedule 7, page 119, line 5, leave out from beginning to 'where' in line 7 and insert—
'Procedure
4.—(1) The Secretary of State shall make rules of procedure in relation to claims for compensation.
(2) Without prejudice to the generaility of sub-paragraph (1) above rules under this paragraph may in particular—

(a) specify matters which may be dealt with or which must be dealt with—

(i) by members of the Board's staff; or

(ii) by a member or members of the Board;

(b) make provision—

(i) for the determination of a claim without a hearing;

(ii) for the reconsideration without a hearing of a previous determination without a hearing; and

(iii) for the extent to which a previous determination may be altered on such a reconsideration;

(c) make provision as to circumstances in which a claim is to be or may be determined by a decision at a hearing on specified issues and as to the procedure for settling the issues which are to he considered;

(d) make provision about the conduct of hearings and in particular about the calling of witnesses, the admissibility of, and weight to be given to, hearsay and opinion evidence and the order of proceedings;

(e) make provision as to the confidentiality of information disclosed in connection with a claim; and

(f) make such incidental or supplementary provision as
appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate.

(3) Rules under this paragraph may make different provision for different descriptions of cases.
(4) Rules under the paragraph shall he made by statutory instrument.
(5) A statutory instrument containing any such rules shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
Applications for reconsideration of claims
5A.—(1)'
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 314. The amendment clarifies and repositions in its more natural place in Schedule 7 the provision enabling the Secretary of State to make rules for the board's procedures for dealing with compensation claims. It now appears alongside the other provisions in the schedule which relate to the determination of claims.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 314—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
315 Schedule 7, page 119, line 23, after 'determined', insert 'without a hearing'.
316 Page 119, line 27, after 'determined', insert 'without a hearing'.
317 Page 119, line 29, at end, insert—
Payment of compensation
5B.—(1) Except in prescribed cases compensation, whether on an interim or a final award, shall be paid in a lump sum.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Board to give a claimant written notice of the amount of an award.
(3) A claimant shall not be entitled to a payment unless the Board have received from him written notice to the effect that he has received a notice under sub-paragraph (2) above and accepts the amount of compensation specified in the notice as the proper amount'.
318 Page 119, leave out lines 30 to 33.
318A Page 119, line 45, leave out '1977' and insert '1988'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 315 to 318A en bloc. These amendments are consequential to Amendment No. 151.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 315 to 318A.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
319 Schedule 7, page 119, line 49, at end, insert—
'Appropriate law
5A. Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act, a claim for compensation under any of the heads specified in section 106 above is to be determined, and the amount of any compensation which falls to be assessed under any of those heads is to be assessed, in accordance with the rules of the law of England and Wales or the law of Scotland (including rules contained in Acts of Parliament but not including rules allowing a plaintiff or pursuer aggravated damages or interest) in accordance with which a claim in tort or delict arising out of the same facts for damages under a corresponding head would fall to he determined'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 319. The amendment provides that the appropriate law to be applied by the board to criminal injury cases should be the same as would apply if a civil claim for damages were pursued. It is a more satisfactory formulation in our view than the present wording.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 319.—(Earl Ferrers.)

AS AN AMENDMENT TO COMMONS AMENDMENT No. 319.
319A Line 8, after ("pursuer") insert ("exemplary or").
Lord Irvine of Lairg: My Lords, I move the amendment in the place of my noble friend Lord Morton of Shuna who, I can assure noble Lords opposite, is not victualling himself elsewhere on the premises but is I hope on a train to Scotland, which appears to be a sensible direction in which to be travelling at this time on a Friday afternoon.
Before Amendment No. 319, the Bill provided that compensation should not include exemplary or aggravated damages. The purpose of my noble friend's amendment is to call attention to the fact that in Amendment No. 319, perhaps by a slip, the reference to "exemplary" has fallen away. Before the

1687
amendment, paragraph 6(4) of Schedule 7 provided that:
"Compensation … shall not include any element … corresponding to exemplary or aggravated damages".
"Exemplary" was correctly in paragraph 6(4) of Schedule 7, but Amendment No. 319, we rather think by a slip, excludes only aggravated damages.
Aggravated damages are the extra compensation which is payable to a plaintiff for injury to his feelings and dignity and are truly compensatory; but exemplary damages are different. One of the circumstances in which the right to exemplary damages may remain is where there has been oppressive action by a government servant. This House in its judical capacity in Broome v. Cassell held that the concept of a government servant included the police. I should have thought it would have extended to prison officers as well.
Your Lordships should know that the present scheme as operated by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board excludes both exemplary and aggravated damages, and that was the original intention of the Bill. The fear of my noble friend Lord Morton of Shuna is that if this amendment is not accepted in cases which come before the board—for example of assaults by the police or prison officers—exemplary damages will be claimed. The argument would be that under the previous scheme exemplary damages were expressly excluded. Parliament, by putting in only the word "aggravated" has addressed the question but has implicitly admitted that claims for exemplary damages may be made. Therefore I beg to move this amendment.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, the noble Lord wondered whether the word "exemplary" had fallen away by a slip. I can assure him that it did not fall away by a slip. After the amendment had been put down we went to considerable trouble to ensure that the position was correct.
Under paragraph 6(4) of Schedule 7 of the Bill compensation payable by the board expressly excluded exemplary or aggravated damages. That reflected the position which prevailed under the present non-statutory scheme. As we accept that aggravated damages are compensation, they are therefore specifically excluded in Amendment No. 319 from the assessment of compensation under the new statutory scheme. Exemplary damages are not compensation. Now that the heads under which the board may pay compensation are clearly set out in Clause 106 as a result of Amendment No. 163, we do not consider that exemplary damages need specifically to be excluded. They are not compensation, therefore they do not fall to be paid under the provisions of the Bill.
Lord Irvine of Lairg: My Lords, it may be that the noble Earl is right. It appears to me however that the first thought was right and it would be a safer and surer course to follow to make it express that exemplary damages are excluded. But in the circumstances I do not press the amendment. I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment to Commons amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Commons Amendment No. 319 agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
320 Schedule 7, page 120. line 1, leave out from beginning to `no' in line 29 and insert—
'Private medical treatment.
6. In assessing compensation'.
321 Page 120, line 35, leave out from beginning to end of page 121, line 27.
321A Page 121, line 42, leave out 'compensation for rape under paragraph 17 above or'.
321B Page 122, line 5, leave out '1977' and insert "'1988'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 320 to 321 B en bloc. These were taken with Amendment No. 151.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 320 to 321 B.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
322 Schedule 7, page 122, leave out line 11 and insert 'for which no person wholly or partly pays except'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 322 and I should like to speak to Amendment No. 323 at the same time.
Under the present scheme, insurance benefits and pension rights may be disregarded by the board in assessing compensation but only where they accrue solely as the result of payments by the victim or a dependant. Amendments Nos. 322 and 323 are designed to make it clear that benefits from private insurance or pension arrangements which have been wholly paid for jointly by the applicant and spouse will not be deductible from awards made by the board.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 322.—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord Irvine of Lairg: My Lords, I must confess that I was sorely disappointed when I read these amendments. My first impression was that they would do something to correct one of the more undesirable and mean-minded aspects of this part of the Bill. But on the contrary, when one reads them carefully, what one sees is that they make it even clearer that there will be set off against the compensation payable by the Board any insurance or pension payment which results, even to a small extent, from the payment of premiums or contributions by an employer.
If the victim has paid all the premiums himself, he gets his full compensation. But if his employer has paid even a small contribution, the whole of the benefit is deducted from the board's award. In Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom, undertook to consider further what is an obvious injustice. I submit that the amendments are deeply unsatisfactory as they underscore this injustice rather than remove it.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, the noble Lord is perfectly correct that where compensation can be paid as a result of insurance it is considered that that in itself is not reason enough to get additional compensation

1689
from the board. In other words, if companies have taken out insurance policies for their employees to cover exactly this type of thing, that insurance cover should cover the employees and there should not be a call on public funds as well, except in the case where a person has taken out his own insurance or where the spouse has taken out an insurance on behalf of the other partner.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
322A Schedule 7, page 122, line 34, leave out `compensation for rape under paragraph 7 above'.
323 Page 123, line I, leave out from 'under' to end of line 3 and insert 'pension arrangements for which no person wholly or partly pays except'.
324 Page 123, leave out lines 30 to 45.
325 Page 124, leave out lines 1 to 5 and insert—
Miscellaneous rules
17.—(1) The Secretary of State may by rules—'.
326 Page 124, line 6, leave out from 'forms' to end of line 8'.
327 Page 124, line 11, leave out paragraphs (c) to (e).
328 Page 124, line 27, leave out paragraphs (g) and (h).
329 Page 124, line 30, at end, insert—
'(ga) specify cases in which compensation is not to be paid as a lump sum and how it is to be paid in any such case;'.
330 Page 124, line 34, at end, insert 'and
(j) make such incidental or supplementary provision as
appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate.
(1A) Rules under this paragraph may make different provision of different descriptions of cases.'
331 Page 124, line 35, leave out sub-paragraph (3).
332 Schedule 8, page 125, line 6, leave out from beginning to 'for' in line 10, and insert —
1. In any enactment for a reference to a detention centre or to a youth custody centre or to both there shall he substituted a reference to a young offender institution.
1A. In any enactment except—

(a) section 21 of the Firearms Act 1968;

(b) Schedule I to the Juries Act 1974;

(c) section 5 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974; and

(d) section 17(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982;

333 Page 125, line 13, leave out paragraph 2.
334 Page 125, line 19, leave out paragraph (a).
335 Page 125, line 26, at end insert—
'Army Act 1955 (c.18)
Air Force Act 1955 (c.19)
Naval Discipline Act 1957 (c.53)
3.A. In subsection (6)—

(a) of section 71AA of the Army Act 1955 and the Air Force Act 1955; and

(b) of section 43AA of the Naval Discipline Act 1957,
(each of which is concerned with the making of custodial orders against young Service offenders) the following paragraph shall be substituted for paragraph (a)—

"(a) where the offender is in or removed to England or Wales, any institution in which a person sentenced to detention in a young offender institution could he detained, section 1C of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 having effect in relation to the offender as it has effect in relation to an offender sentenced to detention in a young offender institution;".
3B. In sub-paragraph (6) of paragraph 10—

(a) of Schedule 5A to the Army Act 1955 and the Air Force Act 1955; and

(b) of Schedule 4A to the Naval Discipline Act 1957, (each of which is concerned with the making of custodial
1690
orders against young civilian offenders) the following paragraph shall be substituted for paragraph (a)—

"(a) where the offender is removed to England or Wales, any institution in which a person sentenced to detention in a young offender institution could be detained, section 1C of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 having effect in relation to the offender as it has effect in relation to an offender sentenced to detention in a young offender institution;".
336 Page 125, line 31, leave out paragraph 5.
337 Page 127, line 7, at end insert—

(a) to a licence under section 60 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 granted for his release from a youth custody sentence; or'.

338 Page 127, leave out lines 9 and 10.
339 Schedule 9, page 127, leave out lines 24 to 38 and insert—
'Army Act 1955 (c.18)
Air Force Act 1955 (c.19)
Naval Discipline Act 1957 (c.53)
2. In subsection (6)—

(a) of section 71AA of the Army Act 1955 and the Air Force Act 1955; and

(b) of section 43AA of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (c. 53) (each of which is concerned with the making of custodial orders against young Service offenders) the following paragraph shall be substituted for paragraph (b)—

""(b) where the offender is in or removed to Scotland, a young offenders institution;".
3. In sub-paragraph (6) of paragraph 10—

(a) of Schedule 5A to the Army Act 1955 and the Air Force Act 1955; and

(b) of schedule 4A to the Naval Discipline Act 1957, (each of which is concerned with the making of custodial orders against young civilian offenders) the following paragraph shall be substituted for paragraph (b)—

"(b) where the offender is removed to Scotland, a young offenders institution;".'.
340 Page 128, line 27, leave out '118(1)' and insert 'section 1 19(1)'.
341 Page 128, line 28, leave out '118(1)' and insert '119(1)'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 322A to 341 en bloc. They are consequential upon Amendment No. 163. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 322A to 341 en bloc.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
COMMONS AMENDMENTS
342 Schedule 10, page 129, line 37, leave out 'but without prejudice to section 12B(1) below,'.
343 Page 130, line 2, at end, insert—
'(3A) Any power to include a requirement in a supervision order which is exercisable in relation to a person by virtue of this section or the following provisions of this Act may be exercised in relation to him whether or not any other such power is exercised.'.
344 Page 131, line 35, leave out `but without prejudice to section 12B(1) of this Act,'.
345 Page 131, line 42, at end insert—
'(1 A) The court shall not include such a requirement in a supervision order unless it has consulted the local education authority with regard to its proposal to include the requirement and is satisfied that in the view of the local education authority arrangements exist for the child or young person to whom the supervision order will relate to receive efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude and to any special educational need he may have.'.
346 Page 133, line 11, leave out '12B'.
347 Page 133, line 28, leave out '12B'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 342 to 347 en bloc.
These amendments make minor changes to the provisions on supervision orders. The only one of significance is Amendment No. 345 which requires that before a court may include a supervision order imposed on a young offender a requirement to attend the school regularly—it should consult the local education authority. It must then be satisfied that in the authority's view suitable arrangements exist for the child's education. This amendment was brought forward by the Government in response to Opposition concern in another place. I beg to move.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 342 to 347.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
348 After Schedule 11, insert the following new schedule:
'ASSESSORS OF COMPENSATION FOR MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE.
1. A person may only be appointed to be an assessor for the purposes of section (Compensation for miscarriages of justice) above if he is—

(a) a barrister practising in England and Wales or Northern Ireland;

(b) an advocate practising in Scotland;

(c) a solicitor practising in any part of the United Kingdom;

(d) a person who holds or has held judicial office in any part of the United Kingdom;

(e) a member (whether the chairman or not) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

2. A person shall hold and vacate office as an assessor in accordance with the terms of his appointment.
3. A person shall vacate office as an assessor—

(a) if he ceases to be qualified for appointment as an assessor; or

(b) on attaining the age of 72;

unless the Secretary of State considers that it is in the interests of the efficient operation of section (Compensation for miscarriages of justice) above that he should continue to hold office.
4. A person may at any time resign his office as an assessor by giving the Secretary of State notice in writing to that effect.
5. Subject to paragraph 6 below, the Secretary of State may at any time remove a person from office as an assessor if satisfied that

(a) he has been convicted of a criminal offence;

(b) he has become bankrupt or has had his estate sequestrated or has made an arrangement with, orgranted a trust deed for, his creditors;

(c) he is incapacitated by physical or mental illness; or

(d) he is otherwise unable or unfit to perform his duties.

6. The power conferred by paragraph 5 above shall only he exercisable—

(a) in the case of a person who practises or has practised as a barrister or solicitor in England and Wales or Northern Ireland or who holds or has held judicial office in any of those parts of the United Kingdom, with the consent of the Lord Chancellor; and

(b) in the case of a person who practises or has practised as an advocate or solicitor in Scotland or who holds or has held judicial office there, with the consent of the Lord President of the Court of Session.

7. An assessor shall be paid such remuneration and allowances as the Secretary of State may, with the approval of the Treasury, determine.'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 348. This
1692
amendment was taken with Amendment No. 181. I beg to move.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 348.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
349 Schedule 12, page 136, line 26, at end insert—
Interpretation.
In this Schedule—
"procedural instruments" means—

(a) Rules of Procedure under section 103 of the Army Act 1955 or section 103 of the Air Force Act 1955;

(b) General Orders under section 58 of Naval Discipline Act 1957;

(c) rules under section 49 of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1968; and

(d) orders under paragraph 12 of Schedule 3 to the Armed Forces Act 1976; and

"Service courts" means—

(a) courts-martial constituted under the Army Act 1955 or the Air Force Act 1955;

(b) courts-martial constituted under the Naval Discipline Act 1957 and disciplinary courts constituted under section 50 of that Act;

(c) the Courts-Martial Appeal Court; and

(d) Standing Civilian Courts'.

Earl Ferrers: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 349. I should like also to speak to Amendments Nos. 351, 352, 355, 356, and 358. These are all purely drafting changes which improve the structure of Schedule 12. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 349.— (Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
4.30 p.m.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
350 Schedule 12. page 136, line 26, at end insert—
First-hand hearsay.
Sections 21 and 22 above shall have effect in relation to proceedings in the United Kingdom or elsewhere before Service courts with the substitution of the following subparagraph for section 21(2)(b)(i)
"(i) the person who made the statement is not in the country where the court is sitting; and".'.
351 Page 136, leave out lines 30 to 38 and insert 'Service courts'.
352 Page 137, leave out lines 9 to 14 and insert 'procedural instruments'.
353 Page 137, line 16, at end insert—
'Letters of request etc.
3A.—(1) In section 27 above "criminal proceedings" does not include proceedings before a Service court but the Secretary of State may by order make provision as to letters of request or corresponding documents for such proceedings.
(2) An order under this paragraph may make different provision for different classes of case.
(3) The power to make an order under this paragraph shall be exercisable by statutory instrument and a statutory instrument containing any such order shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of any enactment conferring power to make procedural instruments, procedural instruments may make such provision as appears to the authority making them to be necessary or expedient in relation to letters of request or corresponding documents for proceedings before a Service court:.
354 Page 137, line 29, at end, insert 'in any case where the court gives leave for, or requires, evidence or a glossary to be so furnished'.
355 Page 137, line 33, leave out from 'before' to end of line 39 and insert 'Service courts; or
(b) to proceedings or proceedings of specified descriptions before Service courts in specified places.'.
356 Page 138, line 16, leave out 'instruments to which this subparagraph applies, such' and insert 'procedural instruments, procedural'.
357 Page 138, line 21, leave out sub-paragraph (6).
358 Page 138, line 27, leave out sub-paragraph (7).
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 350 to 358. The amendments are consequential on Amendment No. 64.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 350 to 358.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
359 After Schedule 12, insert the following new Schedule—
'BODY SAMPLES—NORTHERN IRELAND
Scope of Schedule
1. This Schedule applies—

(a) to an offence (whether at common law or under any enactment specified in paragraph 2 below;

(b) to an offence specified in paragraph 3 below;

(c) to an offence not mentioned in either of those paragraphs—

(i) for which a person of 21 years of age or over and of full capacity (not previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years; and

(ii) which is serious for the purposes of this Schedule.

2. The offences mentioned in paragraph 1(a) above are—

(a) treason;

(b) murder;

(c) manslaughter;

(d) rape;

(e) kidnapping;

(f) incest with a girl under the age of 14;

(g) buggery' with—

(i) a boy under the age of 16; or

(ii) a person who has not consented: and

(h) indecent assault which constitutes an act of gross indecency.'

3. The offences mentioned in paragraph 1(b) above are—

(a) causing an explosion likely to endanger life or property contrary to section 2 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883;

(b) intercourse with a girl under the age of 14 contrary to section 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885;

(c) causing death by reckless driving contrary to Article 139(1) of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981

(d) the following offences against the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 1981—

(i) possession of firearm with intent to injure contrary to Article 17;

(ii) use of firearm or imitation firearm to resist arrest contrary to Article 18(1); and

(iii) carrying firearm with criminal intent contrary to Article 19;

(e) hostage-taking contrary to section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982.

(f) hi-jacking contrary to section 1 of the Aviation Security Act 1982; and

(g) torture contrary to section [Torture] above.

4.—(1) Subject to sub-paragraph (2) below, an offence not mentioned in paragraph 2 or 3 above is serious for the purposes of this Schedule only if its commission—

(a) has led to any of the consequences mentioned in sub-paragraph (3) below; or

(b) is intended or is likely to lead to any of those consequences.

(2) An offence which consists of making a threat is serious for the purposes of this Schedule if carrying out the threat would be likely to lead to any of the consequences specified in subparagraph (3) below.
(3) The consequences mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) and (2) above are—

(a) serious harm to the security of the State or to public order;

(b) serious interference with the administration of justice or with the investigation of offences or of a particular offence;

(c) the death of any person;

(d) serious injury to any person;

(e) substantial financial gain to any person; and (1) serious financial loss to any person.

(4) Loss is serious for the purposes of this Schedule if, having regard to all the circumstances, it is serious for the person who suffers it.
(5) In this paragraph "injury" includes any disease and any impairment of a person's physical or mental condition.
5. A person arrested under section 12(1)(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 is to he treated for the purposes of this Schedule as having been arrested on suspicion of involvement in an offence to which this Schedule applies and any reference in the following provisions of this Schedule to such an offence includes a reference to being or having been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism to which Part IV of that Act applies.
Interpretation.
6.—(l) In this Schedule—
"appropriate consent" means

(a) in relation to a person who has attained the age of 17 years, the consent of that person:

(b) in relation to a person who has not attained that age but has attained the age of 14 years, the consent of that person and his parent or guardian; and

(c) in relation to a person who has not attained the
age of 14 years, the consent of his parent or guardian;

"intimate sample" means a sample of blood, semen or any other tissue fluid, urine or pubic hair, or a swab taken from any of a person's body orifices except his mouth;
"non-intimate sample" means—

(a) a sample of hair other than pubic hair;

(b) a sample taken from a nail or from under a nail;

(c) a sample of saliva;

(d) a swab taken from a person's mouth;

(e) a swab taken from any other part of a person's body except a body orifice other than his mouth;

(f) a footprint or a similar impression of any part of
a person's body other than a part of his hand;

"parent or guardian" means in the case of a child or young person in the care or the Department of Health and Social Services for Northern Ireland or a Health and Social Services Board, that Department or Board; and
"the terrorism provisions"means—

(a) section 12(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984; and

(b) any provision conferring a power of arrest or detention and contained in an order under section 13 of that Act.

(2) A person is in police detention for the purposes of this Schedule if—

(a) he has been taken to a police station after being arrested for an offence; or

(b) he is arrested at a police station after attending voluntarily at the station or accompanying a constable to it,

and is detained there or is detained elsewhere in the charge of a constable, except that a person who is at a court after being charged is not in police detention for those purposes.
Intimate samples.
7.—(1) An intimate sample may be taken from a person in police detention only—

(a) if a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent authorises it to be taken; and

(b) if the appropriate consent is given.

(2) An officer may only give an authorisation if he has reasonable grounds—

(a) for suspecting the involvement of the person from whom the sample is to be taken in an offence to which this Schedule applies; and

(b) for believing that the sample will tend to confirm or disprove his involvement.

(3) A officer may give an authorisation under subparagraph (1) above orally or in writing but, if he gives it orally, he shall confirm it in writing as soon as is practicable.
(4) The appropriate consent must be given in writing.
(5) Where—

(a) an authorisation has been given; and

(b) it is proposed that an intimate sample shall be taken in pursuance of the authorisation,

an officer shall inform the person from whom the sample is to be taken—

(i) of the giving of the authorisation; and

(ii) of the grounds for giving it.

(6) The duty imposed by sub-paragraph (5)(ii) above includes a duty to state the nature of the offence in which it is suspected that the person from whom the sample is to be taken has been involved.
(7) If an intimate sample is taken from a person—

(a) the authorisation by virtue of which it was taken;

(b) the grounds for giving the authorisation; and

(c) the fact that the appropriate consent was given,

shall be recorded in writing as soon as is practicable after the sample is taken.
(8) An intimate sample, other than a sample of urine, may only be taken from a person by a registered medical practitioner.
(9) Where the appropriate consent to the taking of an intimate sample from a person was refused without good cause, in any proceedings against that person for an offence

(a) the court, in determining—

(i) whether to commit that person for trial; or

(ii) whether there is a case to answer; and

(b) the court or jury, in determining whether that person is guilty of the offence charged.

may draw such inferences from the refusal as appear proper; and the refusal may, on the basis of such inferences, be treated as, or as capable of amounting to, corroboration of any evidence against the person in relation to which the refusal is material.
(10) Nothing in this paragraph affects Articles 141 to 152 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981.
Other Samples.
8.—(1) Except as provided by this paragraph, a non-intimate sample may not be taken from a person without the appropriate consent.
(2) Consent to the taking of a non-intimate sample must be given in writing.
(3) A non-intimate sample may be taken from a person without the appropriate consent if—

(a) he is in police detention or is being held in custody by the police on the authority of a court; and

(b) an officer of at least the rank of superintendent authorises it to be taken without the appropriate consent.

(4) An officer may only give an authorisation under subparagraph (3) above if he has reasonable grounds

(a) for suspecting the involvement of the person from whom the sample is to be taken in an offence to which this Schedule applies; and

(b) for believing that the sample will tend to confirm or disprove his involvement.

(5) An officer may give an authorisation under subparagraph (3) above orally or in writing but, if he gives it orally, he shall confirm it in writing as soon as is practicable.
(6) Where

(a) an authorisation has been given; and

(b) it is proposed that a non-intimate sample shall be taken in pursuance of the authorisation,
1696
an officer shall inform the person from whom the sample is to be taken—

(i) of the giving of the authorisation; and

(ii) of the grounds for giving it.

(7) The duty imposed by sub-paragraph (6)(ii) above includes a duty to state the nature of the offence in which it is suspected that the person from whom the sample is to be taken has been involved.
(8) If a non-intimate sample is taken from a person by virtue of subsection (3) above—

(a) the authorisation by virtue of which it was taken; and

(b) the grounds for giving the authorisation,

shall be recorded in writing as soon as is practicable after the sample is taken.
Destruction of samples
9.—(1) If—

(a) a sample is taken from a person in connection with the investigation of an offence; and

(b) he is cleared of that offence,

it must be destroyed as soon as is practicable after the conclusion of the proceedings.
(2) If—

(a) a sample is taken from a person in connection with such an investigation; and

(b) it is decided that he shall not be prosecuted for the offence and he has not admitted it and been dealt with by way of being cautioned by a constable.

it must be destroyed as soon as is practicable after that decision is taken.
(3) If—

(a) a sample is taken from a person in connection with the investigation of an offence; and

(b) that person is not suspected of having committed the offence.

it must be destroyed as soon as it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was taken.
(4) Proceedings which are discontinued are to be treated as concluded for the purposes of this paragraph.
(5) Nothing in this paragraph—

(a) affects any power conferred by paragraph 18(2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971; or

(b) applies to a person arrested or detained under the terrorism provisions.

Lord Lyell: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 359. I spoke to the amendment earlier in conjunction with Amendment No. 197.
Moved, That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 359.—(Lord Lyell.)
AS AN AMENDMENT TO COMMONS AMENDMENT NO. 359
359A Leave out paragraph 5
Lord Stallard: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 359A to Commons Amendment 359. I spoke to this in connection with Amendment No. 197. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment to Commons amendment negatived.
AS AN AMENDMENT TO COMMONS AMENDMENT NO. 359
359B Paragraph 6(1), in the definition of "intimate sample", leave out ("except his mouth") and insert ("including the mouth, except from that part of his mouth and by the method specified in "non-intimate sample" (c) below").
Lord Stallard: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 359B to Commons Amendment No. 359. I also spoke to this in connection with Amendment No. 197. Having failed to receive a satisfactory reply. I shall test the opinion of the House in the matter. I beg to move.
4.32 p.m.
On Question, whether the House do agree with Amendment No. 359B, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 359?
Their Lordships divided; Contents, 19; Not-Contents, 28.

DIVISION NO. 3

CONTENTS

Bruce of Donington, L.

McIntosh of Haringey, L.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Molloy, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Stallard, L. [Teller.]

Gallacher, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Houghton of Sowerby, L.

Turner of Camden, B.

Irvine of Lairg, L.

Underhill, L.

Jenkins of Putney. L.

White, B.

Kilbracken, L. [Teller.]

Williams of Elvel, L.

Longford, E.

NOT-CONTENTS

Ampthill, L.

Hanson, L.

Arran, E.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Auckland, L.

Hooper, B.

Beaverbrook, L.

Long, V. [Teller.]

Belstead, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Caithness, E.

Lyell, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Marley, L.

Dundee, E.

Munster, E.

Ferrers, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Gainford, L.

Slim, V.

Glenarthur, L.

Torrington, V.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Trumpington, B.

Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

Halsbury, E.

Resolved in the negative, and the amendment to Commons amendment disagreed to accordingly.
4.40 p.m.
[Amendments Nos. 359C to 359F not moved.]

AS AN AMENDMENT TO COMMONS AMENDMENT No. 359
359G Paragraph 9(5), leave out ("or

(b) applies to a person arrested or detained under the terrorism provisions.".

Lord Stallard: My Lords, in view of the unsatisfactory reply from the noble Earl, I shall divide the House on this amendment. I beg to move.
4.41 p.m.
On Question, Whether the House do agree with Amendment No. 359G, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 359?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 17; Not-Contents, 30.

DIVISION NO. 4

CONTENTS

Bruce of Donington, L.

McIntosh of Haringey, L.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Molloy, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Stallard, L. [Teller.]

Gallacher, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Irvine of Lairg, L.

Turner of Camden, B.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Underhill, L.

Kilbracken, L. [Teller.]

Williams of Elvel, L.

Longford, E.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

NOT-CONTENTS

Ampthill L.

Hanson, L.

Arran, E.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Auckland, L.

Hooper, B.

Beaverbrook, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Belstead, L.

Long, V. [Teller]

Caithness, E.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Lyell, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Mackey of Clashfern, L.

Dundee, E.

Marley, L.

Falkland, V.

Monson, L.

Ferrers, E.

Munster, E.

Gainford, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Glenarthur, L.

Slim, V.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Torrington, V.

Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

Halsbury, E.

Resolved in the negative, and the amendment to Commons amendment disagreed to accordingly.
4.48 p.m.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
360 Schedule 13, page 139, line 12, at end insert
6A. In section 112A(1) of that Act (inspection in connection with criminal proceedings), after the word "Prosecutions," there shall be inserted the words "the Director of the Serious Fraud Office".
This paragraph shall cease to have effect on the day appointed under section 3(2) of Land Registration Act 1988 for coming into force of that Act.'
361 Page 139, line 19, at end insert—
'Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 (c.36)
8a. The following paragraph shall be substituted for paragraph (iA) of the proviso to subsection (2) of section 2 of the administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 (procedures for indictment of offenders)—
"(iA) in a case to which paragraph (aa) above applies, the bill of indictment may include, either in substitution for or in addition to any count charging an offence specified in the notice of transfer, any counts founded on material that accompanied the copy of that notice which, in pursuance of regulations under section 5(9) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987, was given to the person charged, being counts which may lawfully be joined in the same indictment;". '.
362 Page 139, line 25, leave out sub-paragraph (2).
363 Page 139, line 29, at end insert—
'9A. In subsection (3) of that section, for the word "or" there shall be substituted the words "and a person aged 17 years or over may be detained in such a centre".'.
364 Page 140, line 9, at end insert—
11A. In paragraphs 1 (a) and 2(a) of the Schedule, after the word 'rape' there shall be inserted the word ', torture'.'.
365 Page 140, line 1, leave out '5" to "local' and insert '1" to "central".
366 Page 140, line 28, leave out paragraph 17 and insert—
'17. Section 9 shall be renumbered so as to become section 9(1); and at the end of the resulting subsection (1) there shall be added the following subsection—
"(2) A person who on conviction on indictment has also been convicted of a summary offence under section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (power of Crown Court to deal with summary offence where person committed for either way offence) may appeal to the Court of Appeal against any sentence passed on him for the summary offence (whether on his conviction or in subsequent proceedings) under subsection (5) of that section'.
367 Page 141, line 9, leave out sub-paragraph (1) and insert—
(1) In subsection (2) of section 11 (supplementary provisions as to appeal against sentence) after "9" there shall be inserted "(1)".'.
368 Page 141, line 11, leave out 'subsection (2) of that section' and insert 'that subsection—'.
369 Page 141, line 17, leave out from 'sentence' to end of line 41 and insert—
'for the offence triable either way shall be treated also as an appeal or application in respect of any sentence for the summary offence and an appeal or application for leave to appeal against any sentence for the summary offence shall be treated also as an appeal or application in respect of the offence triable either way.
(2B) If the appellant was convicted on indictment of two or more offences triable either way, the references to the offence triable either way in subsection (2A) above are to be construed, in relation to any summary offence of which he was convicted under section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 following the conviction on indictment, as references to the offence triable either way specified in the notice relating to that summary offence which was given under subsection (1A) of that section.'.
370 Page 142, line 40, leave out paragraphs 25 and 26 and insert—
'25. The following shall be substituted for the words in section 31 from the beginning of subsection (1) to "powers" in subsection (2)—
"(1) There may be exercised by a single judge in the same manner as by the Court of Appeal and subject to the same provisions—

(a) the powers of the Court of Appeal under this Part of this Act specified in subsection (2) below;

(b) the power to give directions under section 4(4) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976; and

(c) the powers to make orders for the payment of costs
under sections 16 to 18 of the Prosecution of Offences
Act 1985 in proceedings under this Part of this Act.

(2) The powers mentioned in subsection (1)(a) above".'.
25A. The following subsection shall be inserted after
subsection (2A) of that section—
"(213) The power of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal under section [Crown Court proceedings—orders restricting or preventing reports or restricting public access] of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 may be exercised by a single judge in the same manner as it may be exercised by the Court."
26. The following shall be substituted in the first subsection of section 44 for the words from the beginning to "judge", in the first place where it occurs—
"(1) There may be exercised by a single judge

(a) the powers of the Court of Appeal under this Part of this Act—

(i) to extend the time for making an application for leave to appeal;

(ii) to make an order for or in relation to bail; and

(iii) to give leave for a person to be present at the hearing of any proceedings preliminary or incidental to an appeal; and

(b) their powers to make orders for the payment of costs under sections 16 and 17 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 in proceedings under this Part of this Act.".

371 Page 144, leave out line 10.
372 Page 144, line 14, leave out 'shall also' and insert 'also to'.
373 Page 144, line 29, at end insert—
'Legal Aid Act 1974 (c. 4)
40A. In section 28(7A) of the Legal Aid Act 1974 for the words "the person charged" there shall be substituted "a person to whom the notice relates".'.
374 Page 144, line 43, at end insert
'41A. In each of sections 171 and 368 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 (which makes provision as to the presumption and determination of the ages of children) in subsection (3) for the words "and (d)" there shall be substituted the words "(d) and (e)".'.
375 Page 144, line 44, leave out 'the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975' and insert 'that Act'.
376 Page 145, line 7, at end insert—
'42A. In Schedule 1 to that Act (which lists offences against children under the age of 17 years to which special provisions apply) after paragraph
(a) there shall be inserted the following paragraph—
1700
"(aa) any offence under section 80(7) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 (commission of a homosexual act in certain circumstances).".'.
377 Page 145, line 7, at end insert—
'42B. In the said Schedule 1 after paragraph (d) there shall be inserted the following paragraph—
"(e) any offence involving the use of lewd, indecent or libidinous practice or behaviour towards a child under the age of 17 years.".'.
378 Page 145, line 21, at end insert
'Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978 (c. 17)
44A. The following sections shall be substituted for section 3 of the Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978—
"Extradition under 1870 Act.
3.—(1) An offence under section 1(3)(a) of this Act shall be deemed to be included in the list of extradition crimes in Schedule I to the Extradition Act 1870.
(2) For the purposes of that Act any act, wherever committed, which is any of the following offences—

(a) an offence mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 1 of this Act which is committed against a protected person within the meaning of that section;

(b) an offence mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection which is committed in connection with such an attack as is so mentioned;

(c) an attempt to commit an offence mentioned in the preceding paragraphs; or

(d) an offence under section 1(3) of this Act,

and an offence against the law of any State in the case of which the Extradition Act 1870 is applied by an Order in Council under section 2 of that Act shall be deemed to be an offence committed within the jurisdiction of that State.
Extradition under Part 1 of Criminal Justice Act 1988.
3A.—(1) Where—

(a) no such arrangement as is mentioned in section 2 of the Extradition Act 1870 has been made with a State which is a party to the Convention mentioned in the title to this Act; and

(b) general extradition arrangements have not been made with that State under Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1988,

Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 specified in subsection (2) below shall apply as between the United Kingdom and that State, subject to the limitations, restrictions, exceptions and qualifications, if any, contained in the Order, as if the Convention constituted general extradition arrangements made with that State under Part I of that Act, but only in respect of the following offences—

(i) an offence mentioned in section 3(2)(a) or (b) above;

(ii) an attempt to commit such an offence;

(iii) counselling, procuring, commanding, aiding or abetting such an offence;

(iv) being accessory before or after the fact to such an offence; and

(v) an offence under section 1(3) of this Act.

(2) The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 mentioned in subsection (1) above are—

(a) section 1(1) to (8);

(b) sections 3 to 10; and

(c) sections 12 to [Persons serving sentences outside country of conviction].

(3) An Order in Council under this section may not provide that a court dealing with a person arrested for an offence mentioned in subsection (1) above shall not be under a duty to determine whether the evidence would be sufficient to warrant his trial if the offence had taken place within the jurisdiction of the court.
(4) For the purposes of the provisions of that Act specified in subsection (2) above, in their application by virtue of an Order in Council under this section as between the United Kingdom and any other State, any act or omission, wherever it takes place, which is—

(a) an offence mentioned in subsection (1) above; and

(b) an offence against the law of that State,

shall be deemed to be an offence committed within the territory of that State."
44B. The following subsections shall be substituted for section 4(1) of that Act—
"(1) Sections 17 and 22 of the Extradition Act 1870 shall extend to section 3 above.
(1A) Sections 18 and [Application of general extradition arrangements to colonies] of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 shall extend to section 3A above.".'.
379 Page 146, line 15, at end insert—
'Protection of Children Act 1978 (c. 37)
48A. The Protection of Children Act 1978 shall be amended as follows.
48B.—(1) In subsection (1) of section 4 (entry, search and seizure) of the words from "are" to the end there shall be substituted the words "is an indecent photograph of a child".
(2) In subsection (2) of that section the words from "taken" to the end shall cease to have effect.
48C.—(1) In subsection (2) of section 5 (forfeiture) the words from "taken" to "distributed or shown," shall cease to have effect.
(2) In subsection (6) of that section, after "1(1) there shall he inserted "or section [Summary offence of possession of indecent photograph of a child] of the Criminal Justice Act 1988".'
380 Page 148, line 23, at end insert—
'63A. The following subsection shall be inserted after section 45(3)—
"3(A). The power of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal under section [Crown Court proceedings—orders restricting or preventing reports or restricting public access] of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 may be exercised by a single judge in the same manner as it may be exercised by the Court."'.
381 Page 148, line 33, at end insert—
'Civil Aviation Act 1982 (c.16)
65A. The following sections shall be inserted after section 93 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982—
"Extradition under Part 1 of Criminal Justice Act 1988.
93A.—(1) Where—

(a) no such arrangement as is mentioned in section 2 of the Extradition Act 1870 has been made with a Convention country; and

(b) general extradition arrangements have not been made with that country under Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1988,

Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 specified in subsection (2) below shall apply as between the United Kingdom and that country, subject to the limitations, restrictions, exceptions and qualifications, if any, contained in the Order, as if the Convention constituted general extradition arrangements made with that country under Part I of that Act, but only in respect of the following offences—

(i) an offence committed on board an aircraft in flight registered in that country;

(ii) an attempt to commit such an offence;

(iii) counselling, procuring, commanding, aiding or abetting such an offence; and

(iv) being accessory before or after the fact to such an offence.

(2) The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 mentioned in subsection (1) above are—

(a) section 1(1) to (8);

(b) sections 3 to 10; and

(c) sections 12 to [Persons serving sentences outside country of conviction].

(3) An Order in Council under this section may not provide that a court dealing with a person arrested for an offence mentioned in subsection (1) above shall not be under a duty to determine whether the evidence would be sufficient to warrant his trial if the offence had taken place within the jurisdiction of the court.
(4) Subsections (4) and (5) of section 92 above shall apply for the purposes of this section as they apply for the purposes of that section.
Extradition under 1870 Act.
93B.—(1) Sections 17 and 22 of the Extradition Act 1870 shall extend to section 93 above.
(2) Sections 18 and (Application of general extradition arrangements to Colonies) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 shall extend to section 93A above and to section 92(4) and (5) above as they apply for the purposes of section 93A above.".'.
382 Page 148, line 40, at end insert—
'Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (c. 28)
66B. The following section shall be inserted after section 3 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982—
"Extradition under Part 1 of Criminal Justice Act 1988.
3A.—(1) Where—

(a) no such arrangement as is mentioned in section 2 of the Extradition Act 1870 has been made with a State which is a party to the Convention; and

(b) general extradition arrangements have not been made with that State under Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1988,

Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 specified in subsection (2) below shall apply as between the United Kingdom and that State, subject to the limitations, restrictions, exceptions and qualifications, if any, contained in the Order, as if the Convention constituted general extradition arrangements made with that State under Part
of that Act, but only in respect of the following offences—

(i) an offence under this Act;

(ii) an attempt to commit such an offence;

(iii) counselling, procuring, commanding, aiding or abetting such an offence; and

(iv) being accessory before or after the fact to such an offence.

(2) The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 mentioned in subsection (1) above are—

(a) section 1(1) to (8);

(b) sections 3 to 10; and

(c) sections 12 to [Persons serving sentences outside country of conviction].

(3) An Order in Council under this section may not provide that a court dealing with a person arrested for an offence mentioned in subsection (I) above shall not be under a duty to determine whether the evidence would he sufficient to warrant his trial if the offence had taken place within the jurisdiction of the court.
(4) For the purposes of the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 specified in subsection (2) above, in their application by virtue of an Order in Council under this section as between the United Kingdom and any other State, any act or omission, wherever it takes place, which is—

(a) an offence mentioned in subsection (a) above; and

(b) an offence against the law of that State,

shall be deemed to be an offence committed within the territory of that State.
(5) In this section 'the Convention' means the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979.".
66C. The following subsections shall be substituted for section 5(I) of that Act—
"(1) Sections 17 and 22 of the Extradition Act 1870 shall extend to section 3(1) and (4) above.
(1A) Sections 18 and (Application of general extradition arrangements to Colonies) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 shall extend to section 3A above.".
Aviation Security Act 1982 (c. 36)
66D. The Aviation Security Act 1982 shall be amended as follows.
66E. In subsection (3) of section 9, after the word "above" there shall be inserted the words "and of section 9A below".
66F. The following section shall be inserted after that section—
"Extradition under Part 1 of Criminal Justice Act 1968
9A.—(1) Where—

(a) no such arrangement as is mentioned in section 2 of the Extradition Act 1870 has been made with a State which is a party to a relevant Convention; and

1703

(b) general extradition arrangements have not been made with that State under Part 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 specified in subsection (2) below shall apply as between the United Kingdom and that State, subject to the limitations, restrictions, exceptions and qualifications, if any, contained in the Order, as if the relevant Convention constituted general extradition arrangements made with that State under Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, but only in respect of the following offences—

(i) offences which are offences in pursuance of that Convention;

(ii) an attempt to commit such an offence;

(iii) counselling, procuring, commanding, aiding or abetting such an offence; and

(iv) being accessory before or after the fact to such an offence.

(2) The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988
mentioned in subsection (1) above are—

(a) section 1(1) to (8);

(b) sections 3 to 10; and

(c) sections 12 to [Persons serving sentences outside country of conviction].

(3) An Order in Council under this section may not provide that a court dealing with a person arrested for an offence mentioned in subsection (1) above shall not be under a duty to determine whether the evidence would be sufficient to warrant his trial if the offence had taken place within the jurisdiction of the court.
(4) For the purposes of the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 specified in subsection (2) above, in their application by virtue of an Order in Council under this section as between the United Kingdom and any other State any act or omission, wherever it takes place, which falls within section 9(4) of this Act shall be deemed to be an offence committed within the territory of that State.".
66G. The following subsections shall be substituted for section 39(1) of that Act—
"(1) Sections 17 and 22 of the Extradition Act 1870 shall extend to section 9 above.
(1A) Sections 18 and (Application of general extradition arrangements to Colonies) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 shall extend to section 9A above and to section 9 above as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1988.".'
383 Page 148, line 40, at end insert—
'Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 (c.45)
66H. In subsection (7) of section 52 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 after the word "thereof)" there shall be inserted the words "and in Part III of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (children in need of compulsory measures of care)".'
384 Page 148, 42, leave out paragraphs 67 and 68.
385 Page 149, line 10, after '15(11)' insert 'of the Criminal Justice Act 1982'.
386 Page 149, line 12, at end insert—
69A. At the end of part II of Schedule I to that Act there shall be added—
"CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988 (c.)
26. Section [Torture] (torture)."'.
387 Page 149, line 13, at end insert—
'69B.—(1) In subsection (1) of section 34 (endorsement of licences without hearings) and subsections (1) and (3) of section 35 of the Transport Act 1982 (licence receipts), after the word "constable" (in each place) there shall be inserted the words "or authorised person".
(2) The following subsection shall be added after subsection (10) of that section—
"(11) In this section and section 35 below "authorised person" has the meaning assigned to it by section 28(5) above."
69C.—(1) In subsection (1) of section 47 of that Act (evidence in fixed penalty notice cases) after the word "constable", in the second place where it occurs, there shall be inserted the words "or authorised person".'
(2) The following subsection shall be inserted after that subsection—
"(1A) In subsection (1) above "authorised person has the meaning assigned to it by section 28(5) above.".'.
388 Page 149, line 14, leave out 'the Transport Act 1982' and insert 'that Act'.
389 Page 149, line 16, at end insert—
'Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 (c.18)
70A.—(1) The following section shall be inserted after section 5 of the Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 (extradition)—
"Extradition under Part 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
5A.—(1) Where—

(a) no such arrangement as is mentioned in section 2 of the Extradition Act 1870 has been made with a State which is a party to the Convention; and

(b) general extradition arrangements have not been made with that State under Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 specified in subsection (2) below shall apply as between the United Kingdom and that State, subject to the limitations, restrictions, exceptions and qualifications, if any contained in the Order, as if the Convention constituted general extradition arrangements made with that State under Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, but only in respect ofthe following offences—

(i) an offence mentioned in paragraph (a), (b). (c) or (d) of subsection (1) of section 1 of this Act which is
committed by doing an act in relation to or by means
of nuclear material;

(ii) an offence under section 2 of this Act;

(iii) an attempt to commit an offence mentioned in
paragraph (i) or (ii) above;

(iv) counselling, procuring, commanding, aiding or
abetting such an offence; and

(v) being accessory before or after the fact to such an offence.

(2) The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988
mentioned in subsection (1) above are—

(a) section 1(1) to (8);

(b) sections 3 to 10; and

(c) sections 12 to (Persons serving sentences outside country of conviction).

(3) An Order in Council under this section may not provide that a court dealing with a person arrested for an offence mentioned in subsection (1) above shall not be under a duty to determine whether the evidence would be sufficient to warrant his trial if the offence had taken place within the jurisdiction of the court.
(4) For the purposes of the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 specified in subsection (2) above, in their application by virtue of an Order in Council under this section as between the United Kingdom and any other State, any act wherever committed, which is—

(a) an offence mentioned in subsection (1) above; and

(b) an offence against the law of that State,

shall be deemed to be an offence committed within the territory of that State.
(5) In this section and in section 6 below "the
Convention" means the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material opened for signature at
Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980".
70B. The following subsections shall be substituted for section 7(1) of that Act—
"(1) Sections 17 and 22 ofthe Extradition Act 1870 shall extend to section 5 above.
(1A) Sections 18 and (Application of general extradition arrangements to Colonies) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 shall extend to section 5A above.".'
390 Page 149, line 18, leave out from beginning to ('intimate' and
insert—
'71. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 shall be amended as follows.
71A. At the end of subsection (3)(b) of section 24 (arrest) there shall be added the words "other than an offence under section 12(1) ofthe Theft Act 1968".'.

1705
71B. In section 55(1)'.
391 Page 149, line 20, at end insert—
'71c. In section 65, in the definition of "intimate samples", for the word "orifice" there shall be substituted the words "orifices".'.
392 Page 149, line 21, leave out 'of that Act'.
393 Page 149, line 22, at end, insert—
'72A. At the end of Schedule 5 to that Act there shall be added—
"Criminal Justice Act 1988. (c.)
9. Section [Torture] (Torture).".
394 Page 149, line 26, at end insert—
'73A. In subsection (11) of section 22 of that Act (power of Secretary of State to set time limits in relation to preliminary steps of criminal proceedings), at the end of paragraph (b) of the definition of "Custody of the Crown Court" there shall be added
"or
(c) section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (custody after transfer order in fraud case).;" '.
395 Page 150, line 4, at end insert—
'Criminal Justice Act 1987 (c. 38)
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987 (c. 41)
79A. The following paragraph shall be substituted for subsection (6)(j) of section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and subsection (5)(k) of section 54 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987 (each of which sections relates to disclosure of information)—
"( ) a person appointed by the Bank of England under section 41 of the Banking Act 1987 to carry out an investigation and make a report;".
Criminal Justice Act 1987 (c. 38)
79B. The Criminal Justice Act 1987 shall be amended as follows.
79C.—(1) In subsection (2) of section 2 (Director's investigation powers), for the words from "attend" to the end (there shall be substituted the words "answer questions or otherwise furnish information with respect to any matter relevant to the investigation at a specified place and either at a specified time or forthwith".
(2) In subsection (3) of that section—

(a) for the words "a specified time and place" there shall be substituted the words "such place as may be specified in the notice and either forthwith or at such time as may be so specified,"; and

(b) for the word "class" there shall be substituted the word "description".

79D.—(1) In subsection (1) of section 11, for the words from "a report" to "containing" there shall be inserted the words "a report of proceedings to which this section applies which contains".
(2) The following subsection shall be inserted after that subsection—
"(1A) This section applies—

(a) to an application under section 6(1) above; and

(b) to a preparatory hearing and any appeal or application for leave to appeal relating to such a hearing.".

(3) The following subsection shall be substituted for
subsection (2)—
"(2) An order that subsection (1) above shall not apply to reports—

(a) of an application under section 6(1) above;

(b) of a preparatory hearing;

(c) of an appeal to the Court of Appeal under section 9(11) above; or

(d) of an application for leave to appeal under that subsection,

may be made—

(i) in a case falling within paragraph (a), (b), or (d) above, by the judge dealing with the matter; and

(ii) in a case falling within paragraph (c) above, by the
Court of Appeal."

(4) The following subsection shall be inserted after subsection (9)—
"(9A) In subsection (9) above 'engaged' means engaged under a contract of service or a contract for services."
(5) In subsection (15) the following definition shall be added after the definition of "publish"—
'relevant time' means a time when events giving rise to the charges to which the proceedings relate occurred."
79E. In section 13(1), for the words "operates only so as to make for Northern Ireland provision corresponding to" there shall be substituted the words "is made only for purposes corresponding to those of".
79F. In paragaph 6(1) of Schedule 1, for "(4)" there shall be substituted "(5)".'.
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987 (c. 41)
79G.—(1) Section 52 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987 (Powers of investigation in relation to serious or complex fraud) shall be amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for the words from "attend" to the end there shall be substituted the words "answer questions or otherwise furnish information with respect to any matter relevant to the investigation at a specified place and either at a specified time or forthwith.".
(3) In subsection (2)—

(a) for the words "a specified time and place" there shall be substituted the words "such place as may be specified in the notice and either forthwith or at such time as may be so specified,"; and

(b) for the word "class" there shall be substituted the word "description".

(4) In subsection (5) after the word "him" there shall beinserted "(a)" and at the end of the subsection there shall be added the words "; or

(b) in a prosecution for some other offence where in giving evidence he makes a statement inconsistent with it.".

396 Page 150, line 10, at end insert—
'(3) In Article 26(2)(c) of that Order, after the words "Article 22(1)" there shall be inserted the words "or section 128 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988", and after the word "weapon" there shall be inserted the words "or article, as the case may be.".'.
397 Schedule 14, page 151, column 3, leave out lines 16 and 17.
398 Page 151, line 17, column 3, at end insert—
'In section 8(1) and (2), the words "to custody".
In section 11(1), the words "in respect of a person in custody thereunder".'.
399 Page 151, line 24, column 3, at end insert—
'In Schedule 3, Part I, the entry relating to Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.'.

400 Page 151, line 32, at end insert—

'1968 c.27

Firearms Act 27,1968.

In section 21(2), the words "to borstal training, to corrective training for less
then three years or".

In section 52(1)(a), the words "preventive detention,
corrective training, borstal training,".'.

401 Page 151, line 32, at end insert—

'1969 c.12.

Genocide Act 1969.

Section 2(1)(b) and the word "and" immediately preceding it.

In section 3(1), the words "and sections 16 and 17 of
the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967".'.

402 Page 151, line 38, column 3, at end insert—

'Section 34(l)(f).'

403 Page 151, line 38, at end insert—

'In section 60, subsection (l)(b) and the word "and" immediately preceding it, and in subsection (2), the word "or section 16(2) or 17 of the said Act of 1967".'.

404 Page 151, line 42, at end insert—

'1972 c. 20

Road Traffic Act 1972.

In section 100, the words "or attempting to drive".'.

405 Page 151, line 46, at end insert—

'1973 c. 14.

Costs in Criminal cases Act 1973

In Schedule 1 paragraph 3.

406 Page 151, line 52, leave out 'to 41' and insert 'and 40'.
407 Page 151, leave out line 56.

408 Page 152, line 19, column 3, at end insert—

'In section 5(6), the words from the beginning to "and", in the second place where it occurs.'

409 Page 152, leave out lines 30 to 32.

410 Page 152, line 45, at end insert—

'1978c.26

Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978.

Section 3(2).

1978c.31.

Theft Act 1978.

In section (3) the words from "and" to the end.'.

411 Page 152, line 45, at end insert

'1978c.37.

Protection of Children Act 1978.

In section 1(6), paragraph (b) and the word "and" immediately preceding it and the words "and sections 16 and 17 of the 1967 Act".

In section 4(2), the words from "taken" to the end.

In section 5(2), the words from "taken" to "distributed or shown,".'.

412 Page 152, line 49, leave out 'Section 151' and insert—
'Section 22(7),
Section 32(7),
Section 134,'.

413 Page 152, line 57, at end insert—

'1982 c.16.

Civil Aviation Act 1982.

Section 93(3).

1982c.28.

Taking of Hostages Act 1982.

In section 3, subsection (l)(b) and the word "and" immediately preceding it and subsections (3) and (5).

1982c.36.

Aviation Security Act 1982.

In section 9, subsection (l)(b) and the word "and" immediately preceding it, and subsections (2) and (3).'.

414 Page 153, line 3, column 3, after '12', insert '(1) to '.

415 Page 153, line 13, column 3, at end insert—

'In Schedule 8, paragraphs 3(c) and 7(d)'.

416 Page 153, line 13, at end insert—

'1983 c.18.

Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983.

In section 5, subsection (l)(b) and the word "and" immediately preceding it, and subsections (2) and (4).'.

417 Page 153, line 27, at end insert—

'1985 c.37.

Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985.

Section 3(1)(b) and the word "and" immediately preceding it.'.

418 Page 153, line 34, column 3, after 'it', insert 'in subsection (3), the words "or 9".".

419 Page 153, line 39, column 3, at end insert—

'In section 19, in subsection (1)(b)(i), the words "(and no conviction for any drug trafficking offence is substituted)" and in subsection (2), in paragraph (a), the words "and that, but for that default, the proceedings would not have been instituted or continued," and in paragraph (b), the word "substantial".'.

420 Page 153, line 43, column 3, at end insert—

'In section 38(11), the words "in England and Wales".'.

1708

421 Page 153, line 43, at end insert—

1986 c.45.

Insolvency Act 1986.

Section 264(l)(d) and the word "or" immediately preceding it.

Section 266(4).

Section 267(3).

Section 277.

Section 282(2).

In section 293(1), the words "does not apply where the bankruptcy order was made
on a petition under section 264(1)(d) (criminal bankruptcy); and it".

Section 297(1).

Section 327.

Section 341(4) and (5).

Section 382(1)(c).

In section 383(1)(a), the words from "(being," to "question)".

In section 385(1), the definition of "criminal bankruptcy order".
Section 402.

422 Page 153, line 43, at end, insert—

1987 c.38.

Criminal Justice Act 1987.

Section 9(3)(a).

In section 11, in subsection (8)(e), the word "engaged" and subsection (11).

In Schedule 2, paragraph 1(2).'

423 Page 153, line 46, at end, insert—

'1988 c.

Coroners Act 1988.

In Schedule 3, paragraph 14."

424 Page 153, line 49, at end, insert—
'1A. The repeal in the Road Traffic Act 1972 does not extend to Scotland.'
In the Title
425 Line 11, after 'indictment' insert 'orders restricting the access of the public to the whole or any part of a trial on indictment or to any proceedings ancillary to such a trial and orders restricting the publication of any report of the whole or any part of a trial or indictment or any such ancillary proceedings.'.
426 Line 15, after 'Board', insert 'to make provision for the payment of compensation for a miscarriage of justice which has resulted in a wrongful conviction;'.
427 Line 15, at end insert 'torture and an offence of'.
428 Line 17, after 'weapons'., insert 'to create a summary offence of possession of an indecent photograph of a child;'.
429 Line 20, after 'detention', insert 'to make provision in relation to the taking of body samples by the police in Northern Ireland; to amend the Bail Act 1976;'.
430 Line 21, after 'weapons' insert 'to provide for the enforcement of the Video Recordings Act 1984 by officers of a weights and measures authority and in Northern Ireland by officers of the Department of Economic Development;'.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 360 to 430. So far as I know, there is nothing controversial about these. If the noble Lord, Lord Stallard, does not wish to divide the House again, and no one wishes to ask any questions, I propose to move these en bloc.
Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 360 to 430.—(Earl Ferrers.)
House adjourned at ten minutes before five o'clock.