Criminal Justice Bill [H.L.]

HL Deb 03 November 1987 vol 489 cc919-78

5.6 p.m.

House again in Committee.

Clauses 116 and 117 agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 226: After Clause 117, insert the following new clause:

("Offence of having article with blade or point in public place.

.—(1) Any person who has with him in a public place without good reason or lawful authority any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed (except a pocketknife with no blade which is longer than three inches or which locks when open) shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above, it shall be a defence for any person charged with an offence under subsection (1) above in respect of any article to prove that he had the article with him—

1. (a) for use at work:
2. (b) for religious reasons; or
3. (c) as part of any national costume.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) above shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

(4) In this section "public place" includes any highway and any other premises or place to which at the material time the public have or are permitted access, whether on payment or otherwise.

(5) This section shall not have effect in relation to anything done before it comes into force.")

The noble Earl said: At the same time I shall speak to Amendments Nos. 227 and 227A. The aim of Amendment No. 226 is to strengthen the law dealing with the possession of knives in public. It forms part of a two-pronged attack on offensive weapons, the second being the subject of a separate amendment to the Bill which we shall be discussing later. Scarcely a day seems to go by without a report of a knife attack. It is a deplorable situation and I am sure that the Committee agrees.

In London in the first half of 1987 robberies and street robberies involving sharp instruments increased by about 30 per cent. The carrying of knives is a subject which the police, particularly in London, have continually raised with Home Office Ministers over the last year. It has been suggested that youths in some parts now carry knives as everyday wear. The Government are convinced that this is a serious problem and that strong measures are needed to deal with it. We cannot have people going about the streets armed with knives.

If I may I should like to set out how this new offence complements the exisiting law on offensive weapons. The Prevention of Crime Act 1953 makes it an offence to have an offensive weapon in a public place without reasonable excuse or lawful authority. It then breaks down offensive weapons into two categories: those articles which are offensive weapons per se and those articles which the possessor intends to use to cause injury. For offensive weapons per se the onus is on the accused to prove on the balance of probabilities that he has lawful authority or reasonable excuse for having the weapon with him. But for all other articles, including most knives, the onus is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the possessor intends to use it to cause injury. Once that has been established, the accused still has the lawful authority or reasonable excuse defence to fall back on.

In our discussions with the police it has emerged that the threshold of having to prove that the knife carrier intends to cause injury is too high and severely restricts what they can do. Having found an individual with a knife, the officer cannot mount a case to show that the carrier intended to use it to cause injury. Thus he cannot seize the knife or take any further preventive action.

This amendment removes from the offence the need for the prosecution to show that the possessor of a knife intends to use it to cause injury. Broadly, it places the knife carrier in the same position as the possessor of an offensive weapon per se under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. The fact that a knife is as potentially dangerous, if not more so, than say, a sharpened comb or a cosh persuades us that the proposal is not unreasonable.

Obviously there will be times when a person has good reason for having a knife with him in public, and apart from the general defence of good reason or lawful authority we felt it right to give some assistance to the courts as to what should be regarded as acceptable, provided always of course that there is no more serious offence committed involving intent to cause injury. Thus, a tradesman who has his tools with him will have the defence of having them for use at work. A Sikh need not worry about carrying his kirpan with him, and—perhaps more important so far as I am concerned—a Scotsman need not fear having his skean dhu in his kilt stocking. Nor does the person who carries with him a normal sized penknife with which to do odd jobs such as letter opening need to worry. However, the list cannot be too long; the longer it is, the less effective will he the measure.

The penalty for the offence, which is triable summarily, is set at level 3, which stands at £400. That reflects the nature of the offence, which is not inherently serious. The Prevention of Crime Act 1983 can be brought to bear in cases that are serious. Stop, search and seizure powers are the same for these articles as for those which were established in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for prohibited articles and are the subject of a separate amendment, namely, Amendment No. 227, to which I shall come in a moment.

The Government believe that the habitual carrying of knives in public without good reason cannot be tolerated. Existing legislative controls have been found to be wanting and the purpose of this amendment is to put the matter right. There may be those who see this as an infringement of civil liberties; but I wonder if it really is. The simple message is that you should not have a knife other than a pocketknife with you in public unless you have to. I do not think that is a great deal to ask and in fact it represents no more than the existing situation for most people. Those who persist in carrying knives with them, perhaps without having formed actual intent to cause injury but just in case, as it were, will however find themselves on the other side of the law. The Government believe it is right they should do so.

Turning to Amendment No. 227, this clause extends police powers to stop and search by enabling them to stop and search persons and vehicles for articles with blades or which are sharply pointed. In line with existing stop and search powers under Section I of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the new power can be used only on the grounds of reasonable suspicion and in accordance with the safeguards set out in the code of practice on stop and search issued under that Act. That includes the requirement that the police must make a record of the search, which must include the object of the search and the grounds for making it. Because of the requirement to justify the use of their power, there is no question of the new power being a return of the sus law. It is essential that the police have this new power if they are to enforce the proposed new offence of possession of knives and other sharp instruments in a public place. I beg to move.

5.15 p.m.

Lord Mishcon

The Minister can rest assured that he has the support of those who sit on these Benches for the amendment that he has just moved. It was very reassuring to hear him say in such emphatic language that, for the reasons he gave, this is not a revival of any part of the sus law. Apart from expressing our general support for this measure, the only other reason for my rising to speak is in order to make a plea to the Minister for clarification.

I ask forgiveness of the Committee if I have misread anything in the amendment and especially in the first part of it, but when I looked at subsection (1) of Amendment No. 226 I saw: Any person who has with him in a public place without good reason or lawful authority any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed …shall be guilty of an offence". So far that is abundantly clear. However, in the part of the subsection that I have not read out there appear brackets in which is placed an exception to the matter that constitutes the offence.

That exception reads: except a pocketknife with no blade which is longer than three inches". In order to avoid wrestling with such negatives, I wonder why the draftsman did not say: except for a pocketknife with a blade which is longer than three inches". Everybody who reads the glorious English language contained in the statute will then know exactly what is meant. The negative form in the amendment as it stands at present does not form a clear statement of what is intended.

The phrase within the brackets is completed by the words: or which locks when open". That, again, constitutes part of the exception to the offence. Perhaps I am thoroughly ignorant, but I thought that those words envisaged the flickknife being the article that would not be an exception and something which was not a flickknife would obviously come within the exception. However, I read: except a pocketknife … which locks when open", which I thought was the definition of a flickknife.

As I said, it may be that I am being very dense, which would not be an unusual situation for the Committee to find me in. Nevertheless, I have a question to put to the Minister, and I am slowing down the speed of my speech in order that possibly an answer may reach him in good time. Will he kindly clarify that point? It would be nonsense for us to pass an amendment which, as I ventured to mention, in the first part of the exception is couched in language that is not clear and in the second part contains something which possibly we may not understand.

Perhaps I may continue speaking with exaggerated slowness of speech in order to find out whether the Minister is able to give an answer to my question.

Lord Mottistone

Perhaps the noble Lord will give way and allow me to make a brief comment, which may make it easier for him while he is trying to absorb time, because then he would not have to go on speaking. I very much welcome this amendment. About a year ago, my grandson—

Lord Mishcon

No.

Lord Mottistone

No? I thought I was helping.

Lord Mishcon

The noble Lord is always helpful, but all he is doing is making another speech in the middle of mine. I thought he was intervening in order to deal with a point that I raised. I feel that it would not be very tidy if we now had another speech on another subject. The noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, was helping. He can now see how effective that help has been.

The Earl of Caithness

The answer to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, is just as I thought. I felt it was better to wait for total clarification. The purpose of the exemption is to exclude pocketknives that have any blade which is longer than three inches. However, I take the point made by the noble Lord. Perhaps I may ask the appropriate authority to look again at the drafting of this amendment so that we are absolutely clear that it satisfies the point.

Lord Mishcon

I should be more than content with that, because it is a typically courteous reply. But will the noble Earl take on board the point that we are now asked to pass the amendment? I ask the Committee to forget the question of the English of the first exception and that it ought to be in positive terms and not in negative terms. We are excepting a pocket knife which locks when open. In other words, if you are in possession of a pocket knife which locks when open, regardless of the length of the blade, you are not committing an offence.

I should have thought that if you had a blade, whether it be three inches long, nine inches long or whatever, which locks when open, we are doing something here by way of exception which the Committee would not want us to do. I am either right or wrong. If I am right, then we ought not to be passing this amendment. I think that it ought to be taken back and at Report stage we should have the correct amendment brought before us. If I am wrong, of course I concede the point at once. But I ask the noble Earl before we vote on this amendment to explain where I am wrong.

Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone

I hope I have it right, but I think that the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Miscon, may be a sound one. I should like to know what it is intended to mean and not what it means. What I understood was that if I have in my pocket a pocket knife like a Swiss army pen-knife, which shuts, that is all right and I am not committing an offence. But I am committing an offence in two cases. One is if my shutting pocket knife has a blade longer than three inches and the other is if it locks when open, and if I have one which locks when open I am committing an offence. That is what I thought it was intended to mean. I am not arguing about what it does mean, because I am not sure that I know.

Lord Denning

Let me take up a point about the drafting of this clause. While I entirely go along with the objective, to stop these youngsters from carrying knives about, I am troubled about the wording of this clause. It covers carving knives, table knives in the house, choppers and axes in the garden. It covers all those most innocent articles which may be carried about anywhere.

But where is the burden of proof? As I read the first subsection, the prosecution has to prove, "without good reason or lawful authority". As I have always understood the criminal law, the prosecution has to prove every element in the offence. So what about the farmer's wife who has her carving knife and is going to do something with the three blind mice? What has to be proved against her? It has to be proved that she does not have good reason or lawful authority.

That is not the intention of this subsection. The intention of this subsection is that the youth, the farmer's wife or the gardener who is carrying one of these knives, weapons or articles has to prove that he has good reason or lawful authority. That follows from the next subsection, which states that: it shall be a defence for any person charged … to prove that he had the article with him— (a) for use at work". But equally he could say that he had it for use in the home for carving up the beef. Then there is the Sikh with his dagger for religious reasons. Obviously that is intended to give him a good defence.

I suggest that whoever drafted this clause should look again at the way in which the burden of proof will operate in the court when a person is brought before it. I should like to see the police being able to bring forward a youth or a man with his knife—whether it is a carving knife or something else—and to say, "You prove that you had a good reason for it". That is the first thing, to put the burden of proof clearly not on the prosecution but on the man who has the knife.

The other point is that the offence has to be in a public place and a public place is a place, to which … the public have or are permitted access". I would ask the question: does that include a railway carriage or a bus? Do those vehicles come within the definition of a "public place"? I should like to make it clear that a "public place" includes not only places that are fixed but also vehicles. Those are just drafting matters but it is important that we get this offence and the burden of proof quite clear in the drafting. But of course I entirely support the objective of the clause.

Lord Inglewood

Let me come back to enforcement for just one minute. In enforcement, as one heard explained, there were some clear tests which could prove difficult and there were others that were not always easy. Furthermore a police constable who comes up against a situation of this sort will have to make his decision very quickly. I have made this point during the last few years. From time to time we have omitted to consider the difficulties of the average police constable, who may be very young, in coming very quickly to a decision which will be accepted. If he does not do it properly, he will become extremely unpopular.

We are talking here not only of constables. We are talking of any person who may leave his kitchen door with something in his hand. I believe that the Government have said that they will look again at parts of this clause, and I sincerely hope that the Minister will confirm that.

Baroness Phillips

I should like to make an unreserved comment, in that I appreciate the very sensible points being raised by Members of the Committee who are lawyers. Understandably they seem to have dominated the debates on the Bill. But I think that sometimes a layman should have a word. I feel that here the Government are honouring a promise which they gave, and I should particularly like to thank the Home Secretary, because he made a promise to me when we talked about this subject.

I have raised this point—which is perhaps an apt remark—on more than one occasion not only about sale and not only about knives. I am delighted that the clause describes articles with blades, such as the Texas Star and all the other revolting things. I am also delighted that we have a subsequent clause which deals with the manufacture and sale.

We want the clause to be precise, but I think we are being a little too kind about the defence and about use at work. I am fascinated by the picture conjured up here of the farmer's wife walking about the highway with a knife. One wonders what kind of work she was doing at the time. But we do not want to make it easy for people to plead that they had to have an offensive weapon upon them. Let us narrow the clause as much as possible so that we cut down these terrible crimes which are increasing every day. I do not want to weary the Committee with descriptions of them, but I am delighted that this clause and the next two have come before us in the course of this Bill.

Lord Mottistone

11 1 may now make the speech that I started on earlier, I too should very much like to congratulate my noble friend the Minister on the introduction of this clause and the others, regardless of the wording. Just over a year ago my grandson, then aged 11, was given by somebody else—who bought it for him because he asked for it—a sword. It was about three feet long with a very sharp point —much sharper than my ceremonial sword—and it appalled me that it should be possible to get it. It was imported from a Far Eastern country and was freely on sale.

I consulted the chief superintendent of police, because I thought it was quite ridiculous that these things should be on sale in ordinary shops, and he said that there was nothing in the law to prevent it. I consulted the trading standards officer for my county and he said that there was nothing he could do to stop it. It seemed to me quite wrong that this sort of thing should be on sale as a curio. It did not need to be as sharp, as fierce or as useful to a potential murderer, even an accidental murderer, as it was. I am delighted that that kind of situation will not be able to recur thanks to the amendment and these kinds of things will not be on free sale in the future.

5.30 p.m.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

Members on these Benches also welcome the amendment. I have several points to make to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning. Everybody here agrees that anyone who is in possession of this kind of thing in a public place should have the onus shifted on him to justify that possession. The words: without good reason or lawful authority shift the burden having established the facts. That would be made perfectly clear if after "authority" one added the words: proof whereof shall be upon that person or words to that effect. I am sure also that subsection (4) would cover all the places to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, referred.

Broness Macleod of Borve

I wish to add a few words. Bearing in mind the times in which we are living these clauses are some of the most important in the Bill. I doubt very much whether the general public realise how many stabbings take place every day, every night in every city of the country. The hospitals are full of outpatients who come in because they have been stabbed. The press cannot even keep up with reporting the number of stabbings. That position arises all because the youth of today seem to think that they must be able to defend themselves and therefore they must carry an offensive weapon. I am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister for bringing this matter forward on behalf of the Government.

I understand that level 3 is £400. I make a plea that magistrates will be encouraged to impose the maximum penalty of £400. The words "public place" are very important as they include premises with slot machines, dance halls, pubs and the various places where young people assemble and leave at certain times. The measure is a very necessary one, especially the provision relating to the constable's power to be able to stop and search people. If people know that they might land up in a police van and perhaps with any luck be kept in overnight they may not take knives out with them. If they do not take the knives out with them they cannot commit an offence. This is a serious matter and I am pleased to be able to support all the amendments.

Lord Paget of Northampton

I am much more concerned with the question of self-defence. I believe that in practice the mugger often has a knife but he generally uses it to fight with his friends. When he is doing his job his hands are quite good enough because he is young and strong while his opponent is weak and often a woman. A man who is robbing bags, knocking down people in the street and taking their possessions is very seldom armed. He does not need to be.

This kind of crime is at its peak in Florida. Very recently the police advised the law-abiding citizens of Florida to carry arms and to come to the police station and be instructed in how to use them as the only effective way of checking the muggings which are a pest to that society.

I am not at all certain that they are not right and that that is not the right policy to take. I remember as a very small boy when Sir Henry Wilson was murdered in Eaton Square. It was a very dramatic incident because there were a lot of people and a lot of taxis there. Every passerby joined in the pursuit, went for the attackers and when they were cornered a taxi man, an unarmed citizen, went in and arrested them. I remember my father saying to me: "That's why London is a safe city. In any other capital they would have got away with it but in England it is the people who resist", and in fact that is what we did.

It is a very modern idea for anybody to suggest that a sword is an offensive weapon. I shall have some more to say about offensive weapons. The sword was always regarded in the old days as the weapon of defence but in the dangerous conditions of the unpoliced streets of those days a man was expected to wear one. This Chamber in which we are talking was designed in the expectation that its members would come wearing their swords. The two Front Benches were constructed so that they would be out of the reach of sword thrusts.

We seem to have gone to the other extreme. I am very concerned with this matter because I have taken very great interest in a man called Butler who was a collector for the Royal National Lifeboat Institution. When he took that job, knowing the danger of travelling on our tube trains today and knowing that we are no longer much safer than we were in the 18th century if at all, he got himself a sword stick in order to defend himself. He wanted it for no other purpose and nobody suggested that he did.

Mr. Butler was attacked in a tube train. A mugger got him by the throat and banged his head against a wall. The mugger then got hold of his collection box. Mr. Butler succeeded, skilfully I think, in getting his sword stick drawn and running through his assailant. He was then prosecuted, fined, and sentenced to prison although it was a suspended sentence. Certainly in my lifetime I have never known a conviction that met with such massive condemnation. I wrote a letter protesting about it and I have received more than 700 letters. Not one of those letters had a word to say for the conviction. That is an awful lot of letters.

The proposed measure is all right as long as it is clearly recognised that the carrying of a sword stick or any other such instrument can be justified if it is there for defence. That is a matter for the jury to decide. The onus will be upon the person carrying the sword to justify what he has done by claiming that the sword was being worn merely for his defence.

When I read about that case I felt that there was a strong case for people who use the Underground to have such a weapon. I do not say that primarily because I wish to defend myself because I would not be active enough to be able to get a sword out and use it if I were attacked. I am almost 80. Certainly punching is no longer much good to me. But I should not like ever to put myself in the position of suffering the indignity of the people who were in Mr. Butler's carriage and who did not go to his rescue. In those circumstances I should like to have something with me which would enable me to go to the rescue of someone who was mugged in my presence.

Perhaps I can use the Committee as a sample audience. How many Members of the Committee have seen somebody mugged in their presence? I would venture to suggest that it is quite a high proportion of the Committee. The question is whether one can do anything.

I was much impressed by a police lecturer who spoke on arms and offensive weapons. After all, an offensive weapon is a nonsense. You can have a sharp or heavy weapon; you cannot have an offensive weapon. An inanimate thing cannot have that quality. The offensiveness must rest in the bearer. The police lecturer was asked whether a heavy spanner was an offensive weapon. His reply, which I thought admirable, was, "Sir, that depends on the length of your hair". If you are a skinhead with bovver hoots, it is an offensive weapon. If you are an ordinary, normal man walking along, it is not. That is the basic sort of evidence upon which one goes and upon which one ought to go.

Let the burden of proof be on the defendant. But let it be clearly understand that an Englishman has a right to defend himself and to put himself in a position to do so. In Butler's case, it was recognised that he had a right to defend himself. It was recognised that he had a right to run his assailant through and that the wounding he committed was lawful. The prosecution withdrew those charges against him. However, his crime was that he put himself in a position to defend himself. I cannot believe that that should be a crime.

Lord Simon of Glaisdale

The words in parenthesis in subsection (1) seem to me to be right. The exception made there is a pocket knife with no blade which is longer than three inches or which locks when open. In other words, the draftsman intends that the exception shall not extend to a flick knife. The drafting is in what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has called a negative form.

I respectfully agree with my noble and learned friend, Lord Denning, concerning the onus of proof. Therefore I differ, with some temerity, from the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson. It seems to me on reading subsection (1) with subsection (2), that in subsection (2) the onus is on the defendant to bring himself outside the criminal offence. He has to prove that on a preponderance of possibilities. When compared with subsection (1), it seems to follow inevitably that it is for the prosecution to prove that the act was committed without good reason and that this must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

If that is the intention, the noble Earl and the draftsman have got it right. However, I suspect that the intention really is that the onus of proof should be on the defendant in all cases, as the noble Lord, Lord Paget, thinks that it should be. There are two ways of dealing with the matter. If I am right about the exception, the clause can go forward. If I am wrong about the onus of proof, the clause can go forward. The second option is that the clause should be withdrawn and reconsidered. The third course is for the clause to be passed and consideration given to it between now and Report stage as there is obviously a difficulty in construction that had led to a difference of opinion. If the drafting is found to be wrong or not what was intended, it can be put right at Report stage.

Of those alternatives, the second is the better. We should pass the clause, allow consideration and, if it is wrong, put it right at Report stage. I say that because the purpose of the clause is obviously accepted unanimously by the Committee. The only question is one of drafting.

Lord Campbell of Alloway

I make two brief drafting suggestions for my noble friend's consideration between now and Report stage in the hope that the Committee will accept the clause as it stands.

The first suggestion is the matter of a public place, which, includes any highway and any other premises or place". That cannot be extended to include ships, aircraft or public service vehicles. I wonder if consideration can be given to an extension because the place would be construed, as we say, ejusdem generis, to include premises or a highway. And ships, aircraft or public service vehicles would not be included.

Secondly, it seems to me a pity that the words, without good reason or lawful authority are included in subsection (1) at all. If we take them out and put them in paragraph (a) of subsection (2), requiring the defendant to prove that he had such items with him for good reason or with lawful authority, then the intention and burden is clear and there can be no argument. In that context, I wish to say, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Paget, that good reason would include self-defence as recognised by law.

Earl De La Warr

Perhaps I may ask my noble friend to help me concerning the words in brackets in subsection (1). Whatever he finally chooses to do, perhaps he can agree with me when I suggest removing the negatives so that the subsection reads, including a pocket knife with a blade longer than three inches or which locks when open". I do not wish to do my noble friend's drafting for him. However, I should like to know whether he agrees that in that simple and wholly positive way we would be moving on the same lines.

Having made that point, I am not absolutely certain about the question of a knife which locks when open. That is sometimes a perfectly ordinary object which one can buy in a shop. I think that small penknives sometimes have a locking mechanism to stop one cutting one's finger. That is a quite separate point.

Lord Havers

I should like to say to my noble friend the Minister that I have a slight anxiety concerning the words in parenthesis. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon, and I should be content if the matter was dealt with today in the form of an undertaking from the Minister that the matter will be looked at again by the draftsman.

The Earl of Caithness

Perhaps I can clarify—once and for all, I hope—the subtle but vital point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, about the exceptions to the offence. Our intention, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham said, is that a pocket knife, no blade of which is longer than three inches, should be excepted unless it has a blade which locks when open. We believe that the clause achieves that result; but it is clear from our discussions today that it would be sensible for me to look again at the drafting. I will gladly do so between now and another stage.

I am grateful for the welcome which has been given both to this amendment and to the ones that I have also spoken to. In particular, I should like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, for her hard work over the years on this matter. When I joined the Home Office, one of the first papers that I read on the question of knives had her name to it. I know we all owe her a debt of gratitude for her continued involvement with this particular matter.

Perhaps I can take up the point of the public place. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington. He will be delighted to hear that! We have not often agreed so far, but on the seventh day all is calm and peace between us. The public place, as defined, does include the railway carriage and bus: that was the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning. However, again I want to be absolutely clear on that, and I shall also look at that point.

Regarding the burden of proof, which was raised by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Denning and Lord Simon of Glaisdale, I do not think there is a need to specify the burden of proof. What we are talking about is an excuse or exception. The Magistrates' Court Act 1980—as the noble and learned Lords will know better than I do—places the burden upon the defendant in such a case. Subsection (2) refers to the defendant because of the way it is worded.

The noble Lord, Lord Paget of Northampton, said that the thug who carries the knife is really fighting his friend. I find that difficult to believe or agree with in view of the evidence that we have received. Let me repeat that in London during the first half of 1987 robberies and street robberies involving sharp instruments increased by about 30 per cent. It is a major concern to the police that people are on the streets carrying knives and using them in a most offensive way.

If a knife is carried in a public place for self-defence, it is an offensive weapon under the 1953 Act, and has been such for 24 years. To legitimise the carrying of weapons for defensive purposes, as the noble Lord suggested, would run entirely contrary to the law of this country and to the purpose of this clause, which is to reduce the carrying of such weapons. I hope that the Committee will accept this amendment. As I have said, I shall look again at the drafting in order to be absolutely satisfied. If necessary, I shall also discuss the matter with any noble Lord who is concerned between now and another stage so that we can be sure we have it right.

Lord Mishcon

In view of what the noble Earl has said (and in view of the very helpful suggestion, if I may say so, that was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Havers) we can quite happily pass this amendment, it being clearly understood what we are intending to pass, and that being clearly stated, if necessary, in another amendment at Report stage.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

5.45 p.m.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 227: After Clause 117, insert the following new clause:

("Extension of constable's power to stop and search.

.—(1) In section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (powers of constable to stop and search)—

1. (a) the words "or any article to which subsection (8A) below applies" shall be inserted—
1. (i) in subsection (2)(a), after the word "articles": and
2. (ii) at the end of subsection (3);
2. (b) in subsection (6), after the word "article", in the second place where it occurs, there shall be inserted the words "or an article to which subsection (8A) below applies"; and
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3. (c) the following subsection shall be inserted after subsection (8)—
• "(8A) This subsection applies to any article in relation to which a person has committed, is committing or is going to commit an offence under section (Offence of having article with blade or point in public place) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988."

(2) In section 5(2)(a)(ii) of that Act (annual reports to contain total numbers of searches for offensive weapons) after the word "weapons" there shall be inserted the words "or articles to which section 1(8A) above applies".").

The noble Earl said: I beg to move Amendment No. 227, which is for the insertion of a new clause.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 228: After Clause 117, insert the following new clause:

("Offensive weapons.

.—(1) Any person who manufactures, sells or hires or offers for sale or hire, exposes or has in his possession for the purpose of sale or hire, or lends or gives to any other person, a weapon to which this section applies shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both.

(2) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument direct that this section shall apply to any description of weapon specified in the order except—

1. (a) any weapon subject to the Firearms Act 1968; and
2. (b) crossbows.

(3) A statutory instrument containing an order under this section shall not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before Parliament and has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(4) The importation of a weapon to which this section applies is hereby prohibited.

(5) This section shall not have effect in relation to anything done before it comes into force.

(6) In the application of this section to Northern Ireland the reference in subsection (2) above to the Firearms Act 1968 shall be construed as a reference to the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 1981.").

The noble Earl said: I beg to move Amendment No. 228 and at the same time speak to Amendments Nos. 229 and 275. I have already explained during our debate on Amendment No. 226 the importance of the Government's proposals to strengthen the law on the carrying of knives in public. Amendment No. 228 now before the Committee complements that measure by giving the Secretary of State new powers to prohibit the manufacture and sale of certain kinds of offensive weapons.

Under existing law (the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959) the only weapons whose manufacture and sale are unlawful are flick knives and gravity knives. But times have changed since then and fashions in weapons with them. It is true that the weapons most commonly used in crime are domestic articles like the humble kitchen knife or Stanley knife. It would clearly be impossible to ban items such as these; and this is why, in relation to knives, we have gone for a strengthening of the law on possession rather than supply. However, I am sure that many Members of the Committee will have seen at least some of the frightening array of weapons that can now be purchased. While some of these can be claimed to have a legitimate sporting or recreational use, there are clearly others that do not. It is difficult, for example, to see what possible legitimate use there could be for knuckledusters, hand claws or belt buckles with knives concealed within them. The proliferation of such weapons arouses apprehension and puts innocent lives at risk. We do not think it right that dangerous articles which have no recognised use should be available to the public. It is clear from our consultations with interested parties that there is general support for a ban on weapons of this kind.

In formulating proposals to prohibit such articles, we thought it important to ensure that the controls were clear to traders and public alike and that they could not easily be circumvented. At the same time we have sought to avoid the risk of catching items which have a proper and legitimate use. We believe that this amendment will be able to achieve these aims.

The amendment provides the Secretary of State with the power to make an order by statutory instrument applying the prohibitions on manufacture, sale and so on in the clause to weapons specified in the order, excepting firearms and crossbows which are the subject of separate legislation. The prohibition will extend to the giving and lending of such weapons and their importation will also be banned. In effect this will extend the controls which currently apply to the supply of flick knives and gravity knives to a wider range of offensive weapons. The weapons to be prohibited will be specified by order. By using order-making powers it will be possible to add new items as they come on to the market; it will also help to prevent any attempted circumvention of the law by, say, a change in the name or design of a prohibited weapon.

Affirmative orders made under this legislation will of course be subject to parliamentary approval. Consultation about the terms of an order will allow the legitimate interests of traders to be taken properly into account.

The banning of specific weapons should leave no one in doubt about which items are prohibited and which are not. Failure to comply with the legislation will be a summary offence for which the maximum penalty will be six months' imprisonment or a fine not exceeding level 5 (that is £2,000) on the standard scale, or both.

We are currently considering what weapons should be specified in the order; but, as I have said earlier, there are some, such as handclaws, knuckledusters and belt buckle knives, which appear to be obvious candidates. The Government believe it is right that nasty items of this kind should be taken out of circulation.

Turning to Amendment No. 229, this amendment makes provision for a justice of the peace to issue to the police a warrant to enter and search premises where there are reasonable grounds to believe that they will find on the premises weapons, the manufacture, sale or hire of which are offences. It is intended to cover circumstances where the police might not otherwise be able to gain access, such as where articles are sold from private premises not open to the public. Such a provision is necessary if the police are to be able to enforce the ban on the manufacture and sale of these articles.

The applications for search warrants under this provision and the conduct of such searches will be required to be carried out in accordance with the provisions in the code of practice issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for the searching of premises by police officers. I commend these amendments to the Committee. I beg to move.

6 p.m.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

I rise to support these amendments. I am particularly happy about the inclusion of a reference to selling offensive weapons in the clause. I understand from my son who has been involved in a protective capacity in this matter, that the sale of these weapons in tobacconists' shops has been taking place. That is really quite monstrous. What I also find quite appalling is the sending of catalogues through the post to young people giving a vivid description of these horrific weapons. A measure to prevent that kind of activity is long overdue.

However, I am puzzled by the exception of crossbows. Is that because crossbows are expressly dealt with in some other legislation? I imagine that must be the answer. More than once in this Committee the potential menace of the crossbow has been mentioned. That must be the explanation and I welcome it.

As far as Amendment No. 229 is concerned, that provision concerning the requirement of reasonable grounds for the action to be taken along with the emphasis which the noble Earl has placed on the need for police compliance with the code of practice ought to dispel our fears that this is sus under another name. In view of the safeguards which are included we on this side of the Committee welcome the amendments.

Lord Havers

I am a little surprised by the use made by my noble friend of the word "complements" as regards the other two amendments. I think that the amendment does much more than that. It seems to me to be an essential part of the general reform. It is the sale, as the noble and learned Lord has already pointed out, which is the most important point. It is often said that there would be no thieves without receivers. If we can get rid of the sellers it may be that those who would be in possession of these hideous weapons would not find them readily available. I think that this is an absolutely key part of the whole reform and I am delighted that it has been brought forward.

Lord Silkin of Dulwich

I have one point of doubt on this particular amendment and perhaps the Minister can resolve it. It arises partly from what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Havers, has just said. I am not clear as to whether the term "weapon" which is referrred to in the clause and which governs it, includes the type of article which we have been dealing with under the clauses which we have just been discussing. On the face of it, looking at these clauses as a whole, it rather looks as though it does not.

Immediately above Amendment No. 228 on the Marshalled List, in relation to Amendment No. 227 we have the word "weapons" after which there should be inserted the words: or articles to which Section 1(8)(A) above applies. It looks as though such an article is not a weapon. If that is the correct interpretation is it also true in relation to Amendment No. 228?

Is it the Government's intention that the knives which are referred to in Amendment No. 226 should be subject to the restraints that are included in subsection (1) of Amendment No. 228? In other words, is it the intention that it should not be possible legally to sell articles of that kind? That would certainly be going a very long way and I rather wonder whether that is the Government's intention. The intention is not clear to me.

Lord Monson

I should like to take up the point made up by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elywn-Jones. Is the Minister satisfied that the existing controls on crossbows are strong enough? It is true that in the last Session a successful Private Member's Bill circumscribed the acquisition and possession of crossbows by the under-17s. As far as I know there is no evidence that it is the under-17s who are responsible for the misuse of crossbows which has occurred in various parts of the country over the past few years. Given that crossbows are a much more lethal weapon than any air weapon, is there not a case for requiring them to be licensed in the same way as shotguns?

On a quite separate point, will the Minister assure the Committee that Amendment No. 229 will not put at risk ex-servicemen who keep at home war souvenirs such as Samurai swords and bayonets?

The Earl of Caithness

I am grateful for the general welcome that has been given to these amendments and in particular for the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Havers.

Let me say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and to the noble Lord, Lord Monson, that our reason for not referring to crossbows is the legislation to which both noble Lords have referred; namely, the Crossbows Act of last year.

The second point which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, raised was that of catalogues. The offence includes all forms of sales including that by catalogue and mail order. I hope that he will rest assured and that he will be encouraged by that reply.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Silkin of Dulwich, asked about knives. I agree with him that in the wrong hands all knives are capable of causing injury. They are readily available in the home and the Government believe that for effectiveness the principal control should strike at possession, a matter which was dealt with in a previous amendment. It would be very difficult in law to distinguish between those knives which might be thought to be undesirable and those which have legitimate use. Many of the knives that are being used in incidents to which the Committee have already referred are legitimate instruments but they are being used wrongfully. That is why we have focused our attention on that particular aspect rather than on the sales.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 229: After Clause 117, insert the following new clause:

("Power of justice of the peace to authorise entry and search of premises for offensive weapons.

(1) If on an application made by a constable a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing—

1. (a) that there are on premises specified in the application—
1. (i) knives such as are mentioned in section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959; or
2. (ii) weapons to which section (Offensive weapons) above applies; and
2. (b) that any of the conditions specified in subsection (3) below applies,

he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises.

(2) A constable may seize and retain anything for which a search has been authorised under subsection (1) above.

(3) The conditions mentioned in subsection (1 )(b) above are—

1. (a) that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises;
2. (b) that it is practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the knives or weapons to which the application relates;
3. (c) that entry to the premises will not be granted unless a warrant is produced:
4. (d) that the purpose of a search may be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless a constable arriving at the premises can secure immediate entry to them.

(4) Subsection (1)(a)(i) shall be omitted in the application of this section to Northern Ireland.").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 8 [Administration of the probation service etc.]:

Viscount Brentford moved Amendment No. 229A: Page 126, line 12, leave out from ("consequence";") to end of line 13.

The noble Viscount said: The amendment relates to Schedule 8 and aims to delete paragraph 2(b). In a nutshell, the effect of the amendment would be to secure the continuance of the separate City of London probation services which at present prevails.

The City itself is a separate probation area within the national probation network. In effect this paragraph is an enabling provision permitting the City of London service to be abolished and absorbed into the inner London probation service.

It may be helpful if I explain why a separate probation service for the City of London is both advantageous and necessary. The City is a very different type of place from anywhere else in the United Kingdom. It has its own peculiar crime problems—a fact that was well recognised by the Royal Commission on the police in 1962. It is neither a typical inner city area nor is it typical of inner London as a whole. It has very few residents—some 5,000—but it has about 750,000 daytime workers mostly in finance-related occupations or similar businesses.

While there is an incidence of ordinary crime within the City; namely, offences like muggings and drug abuse, which are of such concern in inner cities, by and large such offences are simply not of major relevance to the City itself. On the other hand there are certain offences which are of very great concern in the City and perhaps I may suggest two to your Lordships.

One example is fraud and forgery cases. The percentage of fraud and forgery cases prosecuted in the City courts is well over twice that for the metropolitan district as a whole. That refers to the number of cases. If one were to consider the amount of time spent on them it would be a very much larger percentage. These offences are very serious and often they involve a custodial sentence for the offender. But there are often many cases where, for example, the amounts of money involved are relatively small or the offender is young and of previous good character. In that situation a custodial sentence would not be appropriate. Such cases regularly come before the City courts and the City service is very concerned with the supervision of that type of offender.

The second example is a high incidence of drink-drive offences in the City resulting from lunchtime business drinking. Offenders are often high salary earners who may be hurt by disqualification but not by the accompanying fine which is no real deterrent. The City of London probation committee and through it the City of London probation service have in consequence developed a pilot scheme under which the fine element can be replaced with a package based on a one year probation order requiring offenders to attend various courses involving the City police, the City of London road safety unit and St. Bartholomew's Hospital. The involvement of the hospital is particularly helpful in identifying those offenders who may have an underlying drink problem.

The cost in time is a far more effective deterrent to such offenders than is a cash fine. It will be apparent that the prevalence of certain types of crime by a largely white-collar, daytime population and the relative absence of others usually common in the inner cities make the priorities of the City of London probation service quite distinct from those of the inner London probation service.

At a time of emphasis on developing non-custodial methods of dealing with offenders, there is a real need for a forum to focus on those priorities. The City of London probation committee and its probation service provide that in what I believe is an imaginative way. It is an important feature of the continuing development of remedies for City-based crime.

Paragraph 2(b) of Schedule 8 was included in the Bill on the basis that it could prove economically advantageous to combine the City and the inner London probation services. The City Bench appreciates the need to secure value for money in the operation of the probation service generally. Many clients supervised by the City service live around, rather than within, the City. That is unusual, but it has its advantages because the offenders are working where the probation service exists.

Therefore, while the service considers the case for continuance to be highly desirable and entirely justified, if a full review of the present arrangement reveals that it should be altered the City would be prepared, at the request of the Secretary of State, to include in a Private Bill of its own on a future occasion the provision contained within the Bill now being discussed. In the meantime, I believe that there are compelling reasons for retaining the City service. I hope that the Minister will be able to accept my amendment. I beg to move.

The Earl of Caithness

I have listened with care to the speech of my noble friend Lord Brentford. As he outlined, the Government included the provision as a result of our concern over the cost-effectiveness of the structure of the City probation service. I can assure my noble friend that we intend no criticism to fall on the individual probation officers concerned. We believe that the problem is inherent in the very small size of the City probation service. As my noble friend said, the City concedes that there is some room for improvement and efforts have now been made to bring this about. He has proposed that the City should be given a year's grace and has given assurances that if, after that time, a further evaluation by the probation inspectorate shows that matters have not really improved, the City will bring forward a similar provision in a Bill of its own.

I am encouraged by the City's appreciation of our difficulty. It must be our role to encourage cost-effective practices whenever we find that there is room for improvement. I am grateful to my noble friend for outlining the compromise which the City has proposed. As I have said, this is encouraging and, on reflection, I do not think it would be unreasonable to wait and see how the City service manages over the coming year. We are not intent on abolishing the City service for the sake of it and if it has improved to our satisfaction, as demonstrated by an independent evaluation, then I agree with my noble friend that there can be no reason to combine it with the inner London area.

6.15 p.m.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

With great respect, I am more than mildly surprised by that reply. I am sure that the Minister accepts that cost effectiveness, as he said, applies to the City as well as to everybody else. It is highly doubtful whether a tiny service like the City of London probation service at the moment makes any sense whatever. The noble Viscount who raises this issue makes the very valid point that a number of special crimes such as fraud and forgery are particularly prevalent in the City. That is true. It is not an argument for a separate probation service for the City.

The noble Viscount acknowledged that most offenders in the City live outside it. That is true. One of the critical parts of a probation officer's duty is to carry out home visits. Therefore, home visits are carried out by officers of the service in nearly every case outside their own area. It is highly doubtful whether this practice is in the remotest degree cost effective and I am more than mildly surprised that this concession has been made. I hope very much that the same principles are going to apply to every service in the country. There should not be special exceptions of the kind apparently being made.

The Earl of Caithness

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, that we should treat the City with equity. That is what we are going to do. The City says that it can readily put its house in order, that it can meet the stringent targets we will set, and that, as a result, it will be as cost effective as the rest of the country. If the City does not meet the standards which we shall set down, it will introduce a Bill. I understand that it will be sponsoring a Private Bill next year; so a measure can readily be included if the targets which it says it can meet are not met.

Viscount Brentford

I am very grateful to my noble friend for his support. On the figures available I believe that the service is cost effective and that he will not regret this.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 230, 231 and 232 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington moved Amendment No. 233: Before Clause 118, insert the following new clause:

("Grants to voluntary organisations running crime prevention schemes.

In section 51(3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, the following paragraph shall he inserted after paragraph (g)— (h) towards the expenditure of any society, or individual engaged in the prevention of crime.")

The noble Lord said: The purpose of this amendment is to enable the Home Office to make grants to voluntary organisations that run crime prevention schemes. I speak from personal experience of this problem—the inability to obtain financial support—as a council member of NACRO. NACRO has been at the very centre of crime prevention for some years and it has now become a central plank in the Government's war against crime. The Minister, I know, will be familiar with NACRO's crime prevention unit, its safe neighbourhoods unit, and the work which those units do. They have projects in over 40 local authority housing estates. They establish inter-agency steering committees and carry out physical improvements. They make youth provisions, open housing offices, introduce resident caretakers and organise repair teams. The police co-operate strongly, providing home beat officers and so on.

That work has been enormously encouraging and sometimes quite spectacular in controlling the incidence of vandalism and local crime. The schemes have received much praise and encouragement from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and, of course, the Home Office. However, finance has to be sought from the private sector or from government departments not directly concerned with crime prevention such as the DoE, and the DHSS and organisations like the MSC. But not one penny comes from the Home Office, which after all is the most interested of the government departments.

Although the Home Office has power to give financial support to NACRO and other such organisations for their work on the resettlement of offenders, that comes after they have committed the offences. Surely it would be even better to give financial help to prevent people committing offences. I beg to move.

Baroness David

My name is to this amendment, and I should like to support it. I spoke about this amendment in the debate on the inner cities a week or so ago. I was talking about crime prevention. If the Government are serious about trying to improve crime prevention in the inner cities, one way in which they could show their good intentions is by accepting the amendment. I find it odd that the Home Office is the one department, as the noble Lord has just said, which at the moment does not give grants to voluntary organisations for such purposes. It is right and proper that it should do so. I hope that the Minister is prepared to accept the amendment.

The Earl of Caithness

There is nothing between the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, and the noble Baroness, Lady David, and the Government about the importance of crime prevention work by voluntary bodies. The question raised by this amendment is whether it would help to have a specific grant-giving power of the kind proposed. It may help to explain why if I say a word or so about our general approach to crime prevention. The thrust of that approach has been towards stimulating innovation and awareness of the importance of crime prevention.

Let me give the Committee some examples. First, there is the crime prevention unit which we set up within the Home Office to co-ordinate and give direction to the Government's interest in crime prevention. I think it is generally accepted that the unit's contribution has been positive and worthwhile.

Then there is the standing conference on crime prevention, which has been revitalised in recent years, and brings together people from a wide variety of backgrounds. Perhaps the most significant development has been the setting up of small working groups to look in depth at particular subjects. Five such groups set up last year have produced reports on residential burglary, car security, commercial robbery, shop theft and violence associated with licensed premises. These reports contain recommendations for practical down-to-earth measures based on the experience of those who have taken part. Last year's standing conference agreed to set up three new working groups—on juvenile crime; child molestation and abuse; and young people and alcohol—which will report later this year.

We have also devoted considerable efforts to publicity, including the successful "Magpies" campaign. Home Office spending of £2.5 million in 1986–87 is to be nearly doubled to £4.8 million in 1987–88.

The Government are playing a part in stimulating local crime prevention initiatives. The five towns projects were set up at the beginning of 1986, with the Home Office funding the salary costs of five full-time local co-ordinators. The projects, each of which has been of 18 months' duration, were located in Bolton, Croydon, North Tyneside, Swansea and Wellingborough. Steering committees comprising representatives of interested local agencies—for example, the police, various local authority departments, probation and social services, the voluntary sector, local business and local schools—were set up to oversee each project. Each co-ordinator undertook a detailed analysis of crime in the area, on the basis of which he or she identified target crimes and devised preventive measures which, with the steering committee's agreement, were then implemented. The measures were monitored to assess their effectiveness.

Although Home Office funding has now ceased, all five projects aim to continue, and in three locations to expand their activities considerably, using local resources and local funding. This demonstrates the considerable successes which these projects have achieved.

Finally, I should mention the Home Office crime prevention centre—current annual cost about £600,000—which plays an important part in developing police training in crime prevention and is being expanded to take on a wider role, and centrally funded Home Office research, worth £305,000 a year.

I mention these developments to illustrate the general point that the most sensible role for government is to stimulate interest in crime prevention and to encourage everyone, whether they be public authorities, companies or private individuals, to build the crime prevention dimension into other activities. We are doing a great deal to that end. My concern about going further and giving the Government a specific responsibility to provide grants on a continuing basis for crime prevention projects (because that is what the new clause implies) is that it would rather detract from this view of crime prevention as an integral part of other activities. The last thing we want is for crime prevention to be kept in some kind of ghetto, rather as was the case when it was seen as a matter for the police and the police alone.

Having said that, I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, that voluntary bodies have an important part to play. The local schemes which NACRO has established round the country are widely and in my view correctly respected. As the noble Lord knows, NACRO is financed to some several million pounds a year, although I admit not all of that comes from the Home Office. Volunteers have a distinctive contribution to make in this as in other fields.

I wonder, though, whether the absence of a specific statutory provision has acted as a bar on government funds reaching voluntary bodies for crime prevention purposes. In the region of £10.5 million was spent last year under the urban programme on projects involving crime prevention, and about half of it was used to finance schemes run by voluntary organisations. Voluntary bodies have been fully involved in the national crime prevention initiative under the community programme. They have sponsored over 90 projects and attracted about £11 million worth of government funding.

To sum up, I doubt whether the absence of a specific grant-giving power has in practice proved an impediment to central government funds reaching voluntary bodies for purposes which include crime prevention. And I have some misgivings about the signal which presenting crime prevention as a separate activity, with an expectation of government funding, would send out.

I shall draw the Committee's attention to the criminal statistics for England and Wales for 1986, which were released on 29th October. Recorded crime was about 7 per cent. more than in 1985. If one compares the first eight months of this year with the first eight months of last year, we see that there has been a significant change in that figure. It is down to about 1.5 per cent. But one swallow does not make a summer. The trend is still too high, but there are the first signs of a decrease. There is some reason to suspect that a great deal of that is due to the way we have been handling the money and encouraging crime prevention. Rather than the money going solely from a central source downwards, we have been encouraging everyone to be more responsible. We all know that 25 per cent. of burglaries are unforced, and that about 20 per cent. of car thefts occur because the car is left unlocked.

There is a great deal more that we as individuals can do. It is not merely a police problem, as has so often been the case in the past. It is up to all of us. I am extremely grateful to all the voluntary bodies which take part in this work, and to the neighbourhood watch schemes, to which people voluntarily give their time.

I believe that our present policy is the correct one. We should not be confined by the directness of the amendment. We should encourage and pump-prime, as and when necessary, crime prevention in its wider sense rather than in its specific sense.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

In my submission, what is proposed in this clause—namely, an empowering of the Home Office to give grants to voluntary organisations which run crime prevention schemes—is excellent. As has been said, the value of NACRO's work and its initiative in different parts of the country have been widely acclaimed by all kinds of sources.

In aid of that observation, I quote what was said by Sir Kenneth Newman, the former commissioner, in an address in 1985 to the Howard League for Penal Reform.

He said: The resources provided by NACRO are used to build effective multi-agency initiatives against crime involving police, social services and housing departments. These initiatives are beginning to show results on some of the most difficult housing estates in London in reducing crime. It is true that NACRO derives its finance from various sources but it receives not a penny from the Home Office. As I understand it, when NACRO has approached the Home Office for financial support, it has been told that, although the Home Office has statutory power to give financial support to charitable organisations like NACRO for their work to resettle offenders, it has no statutory authority to give financial support to their crime prevention work.

If that be so, there is an omission here that the clause would remedy. It is extraordinary that there should be such an omission. I should have thought that there is now an immediate need to make the position good. The value of this work is great. I hope therefore that a favourable answer will come from a certain quarter to give effect to what is proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington.

6.30 p.m.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

The noble and learned Lord said that NACRO did not receive one penny from the Home Office; I am sure that he meant to say, for crime prevention.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

Indeed, I was relating it specifically to the apparent lack of statutory power to give financial support to charitable organisations for their work to resettle offenders and in particular to give financial support for crime prevention work. I am grateful to the noble Lord. In a specific matter help of this kind is needed and will be appreciated.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

The noble Earl was right in saying that a number of valuable initiatives are being taken in the private sector. Long may this continue.

I am connected with an organisation involved in just such work. I can assure the Committee that an amendment of this character if passed will not prevent valuable schemes going ahead. In regard to the impetus behind the movement to broaden the basis of community support for crime prevention schemes, it seems more than mildly anomalous that such provision does not already exist. When the matter was first raised in my presence, I was surprised that it was necessary because I assumed that it was already part of the responsibilities of the Home Office. I then discovered that I was wrong.

I hope that the noble Earl will think about the matter again. I trembled slightly for my noble friend when I heard those fatal words from the lips of the Minister, that there was nothing between the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, and the Government. That, we all know, is a preliminary to rejection of an amendment. That being so, 1 am sure that the noble Earl would not be conceding a great deal were he to say that he will look at the matter again. I do not believe that there is now the slightest risk of crime prevention schemes being driven back into the ghetto, as he rightly described it. I therefore hope that he will look at this again. I think that that is the general mood of the Committee and that my noble friend has made a persuasive case.

The Earl of Caithness

The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, has equally been well trained by the Home Office and he can read amendments as quickly as I can!

I am happy to look at this again. I say with sincerity that there is nothing between us; it is a matter of emphasis. May I take it away and have another look, without commitment, given that we all have the same end in view?

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

I am grateful to the Minister. I know that he will bear in mind that the power is permissive only. It would help if the money coming to an organisation could be used for whatever reason was considered important.

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 118 agreed to.

Clause 119 agreed to.

Schedule 9 agreed to.

Clauses 120 to 122 agreed to.

Clause 123 [Customs and Excise power of arrest]:

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 234: Page 86, line 4, leave out from ("In") to end of line 17 and insert ("this section and section 124 below "drug trafficking offence" means a drug trafficking offence as defined by section 38(1) of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 other than an offence under section 24 of that Act (assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking).").

The noble Lord said: I should like at the same time to speak to Amendments Nos. 235, 236 and 280.

The Committee will be aware that Clause 123 provides Customs and Excise with a power of arrest where it believes that someone who has been released on bail is unlikely to surrender to custody. Clause 122 provides Customs with a bail power to meet the problems it experiences in dealing with co-operative couriers. That clause does not for the time being extend to Northern Ireland. As the Bill is drafted, Clause 123 extends to Northern Ireland but there is no need for it to do so as the special bail provision in Clause 122 does not at present appear necessary in the Province.

Amendment No. 234 therefore removes the reference to Northern Ireland from Clause 123. However, the power to detain people for specified drug offences contained in Clause 124 is intended to extend to Northern Ireland and the definition of a "drug trafficking offence" presently contained in Clause 123 needs to be retained in Clause 124. This is achieved by Amendments Nos. 235 and 236.

Amendment No. 280 simply removes the reference to Clause 123 in the extent clause, Clause 138. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 123, as amended, agreed to.

Lord Monson moved Amendment No. 234A: After Clause 123, insert the following new clause:

("Amendment of section 164 of Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.

The following sections shall be substituted for section 164 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979—

"Power to search persons.

164.—(1) Where an officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that any person to whom this section applies is carrying any article—

1. (a) which is chargeable with any duty which has not been paid or secured; or
2. (b) with respect to the importation or exportation of which any prohibition or restriction is for the time being in force under or by virtue of any enactment,

such officer may, subject to the following provisions of this section, search him and any article he has with him.

(2) Where the proposed search is to take the form of a strip-search of a person, such a search must first be authorised by an officer of at least the rank of Senior Executive Officer.

(3) An officer may not authorise a strip-search of a person unless—

1. (a) he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is carrying an article as mentioned in (a) and (b) of subsection (1) above; and
2. (b) he has reasonable grounds for believing that it cannot be found without the person being strip-searched.

(4) An officer may give an authorisation under subsection (2) above orally or in writing but, if he gives it orally, he shall confirm it in writing as soon as is practicable.

(5) A person who is to be strip-searched shall be informed both orally and in writing before the search commences of the following matters—

1. (a) the object and nature of the proposed search; and
944
2. (b) the officer's grounds for authorising that search; and
3. (c) his right, if he so requests, to be taken before a Justice of the Peace who shall determine whether or not the search is to take place.

(6) A strip-search shall only be carried out by an officer of the same sex as the person to be searched.

(7) An intimate search may not be conducted under this section.

(8) If a strip-search of a person is carried out, a written record shall be made and kept (a copy of which shall be handed to the person searched, which shall state—

1. (a) which parts of his body were visually searched;
2. (b) why they were searched;
3. (c) the name, rank and particulars of the officer or officers responsible for authorising the search, of the officer or officers who conduct it;
4. (d) the grounds which gave rise to the suspicion referred to in subsections (1) and (5) above.

(9) The information required to be recorded by subsection (8) above shall be recorded as soon as practicable after completion of the search.

(10) In this section— 'strip-search' means a search which involves the removal of more than outer clothing.

Intimate searches.

164A.—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section if an officer of at least the rank of Senior Executive Officer has reasonable grounds for believing that a person who has been arrested and is being detained under section 138 of this Act as amended by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—

1. (a) may have concealed on him anything which—
1. (i) he could use to cause physical injury to himself or others; and
2. (ii) he might so use while he is in customs detention or in the custody of a court; or
2. (b) may have a Class A drug concealed on him

he may authorise such an intimate search of him.

(2) An officer may not authorise an intimate search of a person for anything unless he has reasonable grounds for believing that it cannot be found without his being intimately searched.

(3) An officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) above orally or in writing but, if he gives it orally, he shall confirm it in writing as soon as is practicable.

(4) An intimate search shall be by way of examination by a suitably qualified person.

(5) No intimate search may be carried out except—

1. (a) at a hospital
2. (b) at a registered medical practitioner's surgery
3. (c) at some other place used for medical purposes.

(6) If an intimate search of a person is carried out, a written record shall he made and kept (a copy of which shall be handed to the person searched) which shall state—

1. (a) which parts of his body were searched;
2. (b) why they were searched;
3. (c) the name, rank and particulars of the officer or officers responsible for authorising the search, of the suitably qualified person who conducts it and the qualifications of that person;
4. (d) the grounds which gave rise to the suspicion referred to in subsection (1) above.

(7) The information required to be recorded by subsection (6) above shall be recorded as soon as practicable after completion of the search.

(8) In this section—

• 'intimate search' means a search which consists of the physical examination of a person's body orifices.
• 'suitably qualified person' means—
1. (a) a registered medical practitioner; or
2. (b) a registered nurse.

Records of searches

164B.—(1) The Annual Report of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Customs and Excise shall contain the following information—

1. (a) the total number of searches;
2. (b) the total number of strip-searches;
3. (c) the total number of intimate searches.

(2) In the case of strip-searches, and intimate searches the information about such searches shall include—

1. (a) the result of the searches carried out;
2. (b) the total number of drug offence searches and the result of those searches." ").

The noble Lord said: The first thing to be said is that, despite the gratifying interest shown by the media, the amendment contains nothing radical, nothing unprecedented and nothing to challenge the philosophy of the Government; if anything, rather the reverse, one suspects.

The amendment represents a natural and logical progression from the action taken by the Government three years ago—albeit after considerable prompting by a number of noble Lords—to restrict and monitor searches, in particular intimate searches, made by the police forces of this country. These restrictions upon police search powers, which are supported by all political parties in the country, are embodied in sections 53, 54 and in particular 55 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Because of an accident of history, Customs and Excise has in general considerably greater powers than the police. This is an anachronism that can no longer be defended.

It has recently come to light that every year approximately 46,000 people are subjected to body searches by Customs at our airports and seaports. Of this total, between 11,000 and 12,000 are strip searches. In strip searches people are required not only to remove all their clothing but frequently to stand with their legs apart and sometimes to bend over and touch their knees or their toes, all this while completely naked. Another 820 or thereabouts per annum consist of intimate searches. I think that I can spare members of the Committee the graphic and unpleasant details of what these intimate searches entail. The most startling fact is that more than three-quarters of those searched turn out to be completely innocent. Between 160 and 170 men and women every week are subjected to the humiliations of a strip search and another 12 to the even greater humiliations, and indeed discomfort, of an intimate search. A moment's thought will demonstrate to the Committee how humiliating and how traumatic such searches must inevitably be, no matter how polite and considerate the Customs officers are. I fear that in a number of cases that consideration is not all that it might be.

In April 1987 a woman who was seven months pregnant arrived at Gatwick airport and was asked to remove her clothes. When she protested she was informed that she had no rights in the matter and that she was being made to strip because she had arrived from Tenerife, a place where drugs were said to be widely available. Following the incident she was admitted to hospital for 10 days suffering from severe shock, leading to complications in her pregnancy.

In March 1987 a woman arrived at Gatwick airport from Amsterdam. She was asked to remove all items of clothing because she had arrived from Amsterdam. She wrote saying: My experiences at Gatwick Airport have left me feeling humiliated and stripped of all human dignity".

Another young woman, six months pregnant, arrived at Harwich, also from Amsterdam. She was told to strip naked and then she was told to bend over so that the Customs officer could view her anus. She writes: I was treated like a criminal… I was left feeling confused, guilty and ashamed … I feel now as I did eleven years ago when at the age of 14 years 1 was sexually assaulted. Once more I feel dirty and violated".

A married couple, both aged 35, arrived at Harwich in December 1986 for the Christmas holidays. They were both stripped as well and when the man was naked his mouth and anus were inspected. He writes: We felt like the utmost violence was used against us".

A young black woman aged 23 was travelling back from a weekend in France. She too was told to strip naked and when she was naked she was asked to assume various positions so that a visual inspection could take place. She writes: No explanation was offered … and no apology was offered after [my] ordeal was over".

In December 1986 a 43 year-old professional woman arrived at Birmingham international airport from Germany. She too was strip searched. Although she strongly approves of action taken against drug smuggling, she writes: [I was] numb, unable to think, shocked and disorientated".

In September 1987 a man travelled to Holland with a party of war veterans to lay wreaths on war graves. He was accompanied by his 26 year-old daughter. She travelled back separately and arrived by boat at Hull, where she was stopped by Customs. She was taken into a room, and two Customs girls had her stripped and looked up her back passage. Her father writes: She will never forget this for the rest of her life".

Of course some terrible mistakes are always going to be made, but the object of the amendment is to reduce such mistakes to the absolute minimum. Essentially the amendment proposes the following safeguards: first, the authorisation for a search must be given by a senior officer of at least the rank of senior executive officer. This authorisation is to he confirmed in writing. Secondly, such a search can only be authorised if there are reasonable grounds to believe that whatever is being searched for cannot be found without a strip search or an intimate search.

Thirdly, the person to be searched must be informed of the object and nature of the proposed search and the grounds on which it is being done. The mere fact that a man or a woman has arrived from the Caribbean or from Amsterdam—two places which appear to arouse particular suspicion in the minds of Customs men—should not be sufficient grounds for embarking upon a search.

Fourthly, the person to be searched must be informed of the right to be taken before a magistrate to determine the question. The right in fact already exists and is embodied in the 1979 Act, but generally speaking those being searched are totally unaware of this right. Fifthly, those who carry out strip searches shall be of the same sex as the person searched. At the moment a woman can only be searched by a woman. It seems only right that men should have the privilege too of being searched by somebody of their own sex.

Sixthly, a written record relating to all searches shall be kept and a copy given to the person searched. The seventh safeguard is that intimate searches must only be carried out by medically qualified persons; and the eighth and last is that intimate searches must, first, follow an arrest and, secondly, be confined to searches for class A drugs—that it what we generally know as hard drugs—and dangerous weapons, thus bringing the Customs into line with the police.

All human institutions are fallible and all human beings are fallible. Customs officers are all human, and therefore mistakes will be made. But if the same controls and monitoring are imposed upon the Customs and Excise as noble Lords imposed upon the police three years ago, that will help to reduce drastically the number of distressing and traumatic incidents such as I have described. I beg to move.

6.45 p.m.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

I should like to support this amendment. Strip searches and intimate searches are really horrendous experiences for a person who turns out to be innocent. There must surely be safeguards against unnecessary searches and indeed against the odd bad apple in the service. The Customs are normally very meticulous and scrupulous about how they conduct themselves. They are needlessly brought under criticism if things go wrong; and they do, as the noble Lord, Lord Monson, has shown by the cases he has referred to.

They often go wrong because the Customs depend on information in so many cases. Every now and again information coming from a reliable source turns out exactly the opposite. I should have thought that the Customs people themselves would welcome this amendment because it safeguards them as well as members of the public. For those reasons I should very much like to support the amendment.

I wonder whether the noble Lord has any statistics as to how many of the body searches and the intimate searches were successful.

Lord Monson

I believe it was in the region of 25 per cent.

Lord Rea

I should also like to support the amendment. I have my name down among those who have tabled it. Very briefly, it is a logical amendment. It is consequential, if one can have an amendment to one Bill on an amendment which has been made to another Act. I am not quite sure whether that is the correct wording, because I am legally illiterate. But if it is thought necessary in an extreme case to undertake an intimate body search, the amendment does not prohibit it in any way. It just makes it more difficult for it to be done indiscriminately.

It will have the effect of making customs officials stop and think. For example, apart from only a senior officer being able to authorise it, with respect to intimate searches only a doctor or a nurse will be able to undertake the actual search and they will be able to do it only in a hospital, in a doctor's surgery or in another suitable place such as a clinic. In a hospital there are methods of examining people to detect what is inside them. Such methods are less invasive than a physical examination. There are now sophisticated soft tissue imaging methods which would be able to detect most of the things we would suspect immigrants or people coming in of carrying inside their bodies. I may want to come back to this a little later. I shall be interested to hear what the noble Earl has to say in his reply.

Baroness Masham of Ilton

I also have my name to this amendment. I should like to say to my noble kinsman that what we are seeking is good practice. We want to make an unpleasant experience as good for the innocent as it can be. I am also concerned that microfilm has not been included in the amendment. This could be concealed and used for spying and could be of great danger to the country. I should prefer microfilm to be included along with Class A drugs and other things.

The Earl of Caithness

Members of the Committee have rightly said that we are here discussing a most serious matter. The power of an officer, whether a police officer or a Customs officer, to search the person of an individual is granted by Parliament sparingly and only when it is entirely justified. It is only three years ago that we debated these matters with the utmost care during the course of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill. Smugglers are, however, unscrupulous people and can inflict great harm on society. I am thinking in particular of those who carry or induce others to carry substantial quantities of hard drugs concealed about them or, I regret to say, inside their bodies.

Strong and effective powers are necessary to enable Customs officers to detect and deter such people. But these powers must be exercised properly and with due consideration for the feelings and sensitivities of the ordinary travelling public. This is a delicate balance for Customs officers to strike. I think it is right to acknowledge that in the overwhelming majority of cases officers do this difficult job properly and with courtesy. I should like to pay tribute to the job Customs officers do in difficult circumstances at our ports of entry around the country. I hope that all Members of the Committee—although from what I have heard I am not sure that this will be so—will wish to support me in that.

In this amendment the noble Lord, Lord Monson, seeks to introduce new procedures and safeguards which are modelled to a large extent on those in the Police and Criminal Evidence 1984. It may assist the Committee if I describe briefly the extent to which PACE already applies to searches by Customs officers. The provisions relating to searches for weapons or other items which could be used to cause injury to the person concerned or to others apply directly to searches by Customs officers by means of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Application to Customs and Excise) Order 1985.

More generally, Section 67(9) of the Act requires officers to have regard to the relevant provisions of the codes of practice made under the Act. Annex A of Code C deals specifically with intimate and strip searches and lays down the circumstances in which such searches may be made. The codes are issued to all Customs officers together with detailed guidance on how they are to be applied. The Act applies to people who are arrested by Customs officers. For example, a custody record is kept and any search of the person is recorded on it. There are, however, some important differences in the circumstances in which police officers and Customs officers operate, and the PACE provisions are not always relevant.

For example, most searches conducted by Customs officers are of people who are not under arrest and whom it is quite unnecessary to arrest. Customs officers operate at a single point of entry. They have to decide instantly who, if anyone, they should intercept from a ship load or aeroplane load of people. Customs control areas are not public places for the purposes of the Act. Moreover, Customs need to be able to search for more than Class A drugs. Presumably the noble Lord, Lord Monson, is quite happy for smuggling in Class B drugs to continue, unaffected by the Customs. These are important differences and would make it quite inappropriate to adopt the PACE provisions wholesale.

On the other hand, people subject to Customs searches have some special safeguards. The most important is a right of appeal before the search is carried out to either a superior of the officer or a justice of the peace as the person prefers. Instructions were issued earlier this year that in every case the person should be informed of his right. Moreover, all searches of the person must be authorised by a superior officer. For an intimate search the appropriate grade is senior executive officer; for other searches, a higher executive officer. As with police cases, all intimate searches are carried out by a qualified medical practitioner.

In 1985 there were more than 46 million passenger movements into the United Kingdom. In total, 46,215 searches of the person ranging from the simple frisk to the more intimate search were conducted by Customs officers yet only 95 written complaints were received. I cannot break down that figure of 95 written complaints into how many were complaints against the searches. That is the total number of complaints and covers everything from the conduct of an officer to the delay the passenger may have experienced, and therefore may have missed his bus, his train or an ongoing flight. No one likes to be searched but these figures indicate that most people accept that some searches are necessary and that in a vast majority of cases they are properly carried out. The figures I have just given put the situation into its proper perspective.

I was surprised that none of the noble Lords who spoke for this amendment actually bothered to mention the report of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keith of Kinkel. That is a lengthy and wide-ranging report running to four handsome volumes. Some parts of it have been implemented in legislation. The recommendations relating to search powers have not been put into statute but have been taken on board administratively in guidance to Customs officers. I have to say that in some respects this amendment goes way beyond the recommendations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keith.

I do not wish to give the impression that the Government's mind is made up on these matters. My honourable friend the Paymaster General is currently reviewing search procedures and hopes to complete his review early in the new year. 1 cannot anticipate his conclusions but I can undertake to draw his attention to the important points made and the views expressed by the Committee today. I am afraid that the present amendment does not do the trick in a number of respects, and therefore I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Monson, will withdraw it in the light of the undertaking I have given.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

Can the noble Earl say a little more about these research activities and the nature of them? It would be very reassuring if we could know a little more about what is going on, if the information is available.

The Earl of Caithness

The tome produced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keith of Kinkel, covered more than just searches. I gather that it covered such things as VAT. Some of the recommendations have been implemented and some have not. It is those parts which have not been implemented that my honourable friend the Paymaster General is looking at.

As I have said, I cannot predict or anticipate what the conclusions of that work will be but I can reassure the Committee that much of PACE that is relevant to Customs and Excise has been put into force by the order in 1984 and some of the recommendations in the report of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keith, have been implemented by administrative action. Of course we seek what my noble kinswoman described as a better practice, but I do not think this amendment is the right amendment to achieve the solution that we all wish to see. I hope that the undertaking I have given will satisfy the Committee. We should await the results of my honourable friend's investigations.

Lord Pitt of Hampstead

The Minister said that this amendment is not the right amendment to give us what we want. He has not told us in what way it is not right.

What we are asking for is very straightforward. People should be told why they are being stopped and they should be told that they can appeal. They should be given a record of what takes place. What we have at this moment are lots of people who, having been searched, complain. They are annoyed. They are humiliated. Assuming that searches have to be made, what we want are ways and means of making that as kind as possible and with the minimum of humiliation.

Much of what is in the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Monson, will enable us to do that. Perhaps Class B drugs should be added. Then add them. The noble Baroness thinks that microfilms should be added. Then add them! Let us amend the amendment if we feel we need to in order to improve it; but let us not say that we are not prepared to make this attempt to improve the situation because we are satisfied that the situation is all right.

The situation is not all right. There are lots of people complaining. We get a lot of complaints about it. Let us see in what way we can improve it. This amendment is intended to do just that. I was hoping that the Minister would be more positive in his response to it. I do not see why he should be so negative about something which could improve a difficult situation. Why be negative about it? Let us find out in what way this amendment falls short of what we want, and let us improve it.

7 p.m.

The Earl of Caithness

I yet again appear to have let the Committee down by not making myself clear, and I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Pitt. I thought that I had given cogent reasons why the amendment could not be accepted. The amendment goes much too wide for the Customs, which is a very different operation from that operated by the police. It is not tailored to the Customs but to police needs. As I have indicated, we are looking into the question of tailoring such provisions for Customs needs, which my honourable friend is looking into. I believe that it is right that we should await that consideration before going, as it were, with a wrong amendment at this stage.

Lord Harris of Greenwich

Given the increased level of heroin and cocaine importation into this country it is obvious that there will have to be strip searches in some cases and in other cases intimate body searches. I do not think that any reasonable person can take any view other than that.

However, the question which arises directly on this amendment, which I think has now been adequately ventilated, is the framework of controls that apply to the Customs and Excise who, I agree with the noble Earl, do their job extremely competently. What would be helpful would be if the noble Earl—and I am not asking him to make any concession today of any sort—between now and Report stage of this Bill could let us have an indication of which of Lord Keith's recommendations have been implemented so far as concerns the Customs, and which particular recommendations are now being considered by his honourable friend.

The Earl of Caithness

I shall endeavour to meet the points that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has put to me.

Lord Monson

I am most grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Hutchinson, Lord Rea and Lord Pitt, for their support. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, put his finger on it. I did not expect for one moment that this amendment would be accepted with open arms by the Government. But nor did I expect to be turned down so totally flatly—a course which seems extraordinarily unreasonable.

The noble Earl has not succeeded in challenging my assertion that approximately 9,500 innocent people are strip searched or intimately searched every single year. However courteously the Customs carry out this task—and I accept that the great majority are courteous—this is an extremely unpleasant business for the victims, and the unpleasant memory remains with them for many months, if not years, afterwards. It makes them feel sordid, as at least one lady said.

A code of practice has some value; but why on earth do we not agree to embody this code of practice in statute? A code of practice is not totally binding: it can be circumvented. Why are the Government so resistant to incorporating these codes of practice in this Bill? I simply do not understand that. Why do the Customs retain powers which are not available to the police? Why are the Customs, for example, allowed to search people intimately for gold coins, watches or cigarettes? The police are not allowed to do so; why on earth should the Customs?

The Earl of Caithness

I really think, with due respect to the noble Lord, that that is one of the worst arguments that he has put forward. When a person comes into this country who is intent on smuggling he will probably have a small quantity of highly valuable drugs. That short period between arriving and going through Customs is the moment when the Customs have to act. Once he is through Customs he can cut down that small package into even smaller bits. He does not need to conceal it on his person. He can distribute it around the country. He can have it in various places around the country where he can pick it up at any time. He can leave part of it in a field and come back to it a year later.

How can the noble Lord say that the Customs are not different from the police? It is so wrong to suggest that. Given that what we are talking about is smuggling these very valuable drugs on the scale mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, surely it is right that the Customs must have different powers from the police, because they are acting in different circumstances.

Lord Monson

I was not talking about drugs at all. I was talking about gold coins, watches, cigarettes, alcohol, and so on. The Customs are allowed to search people for all things on which duty has not been paid, but the police are not allowed to search suspected jewel thieves for jewellery in this way.

Mention of hard drugs now seems to cause people to suspend all their critical faculties. Of course drugs are important, and the amendment specifically provides for the police to be allowed to search people intimately for Class A drugs. If it is thought that Class B drugs ought to be included, all well and good. The next time around we might include those— although one should note that the police are not permitted to search people intimately for Class B drugs.

Be that as it may, the noble Earl still has not been able to explain why the codes of practice, which he says in many respects have been adopted, have not been incorporated into law. It is not the case that people are always informed of their rights. They ought to be; but the examples I gave are fairly recent and it is clear that many people have not been informed of their rights in these matters.

If I thought that I had rather more support than I seem to have I would be tempted to press this matter to a Division tonight. I think what I shall do is closely examine what has been said and then try to come back with an amendment which incorporates some of the reservations expressed by certain noble Lords, which I hope will make it acceptable. Perhaps we can make a decision on it the next time round. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 124 [Remands of suspected drug offenders to customs detention]:

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 235: Page 86, line 22, leave out ("falling within section 123(4) above") and insert ("against section 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 or a drug trafficking offence")

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 236:

Page 86, line 33, at end insert— ("(4) The definition of "drug trafficking offence" in section 38(l) of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 shall extend to Northern Ireland for the purposes of this section but shall have effect in relation to Northern Ireland as if—

1. (a) the reference in paragraph (e) to section I of the Criminal Law Act 1977 were a reference to Article 9 of the Criminal Attempts and Conspiracy (Northern Ireland) Order 1983; and
2. (b) the reference in paragraph (f) to section I of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 were a reference to Article 3 of that Order.")

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 124, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 125 [Remands in custody for more than eight days]:

Lord Morris moved Amendment No. 237: Page 87, line 13, leave out ("28") and insert ("16")

The noble Lord said: It could well be considered that I am quite the wrong person to move this amendment. However, I feel strongly that the inclusion in this Bill of Clause 125 offers a considerable threat to the liberty of the subject. It is a draconian change in court practice, and I believe strongly that the question of the liberty of the subject is the business of all Members of Parliament and not just those Members of Parliament learned in the law.

I wanted to table this amendment because I wanted to afford my noble friend the Minister the opportunity of instructing the Committee on his justification for changing the time honoured rule of eight days to 28 days, which is a draconian change. I think that it would be valuable to consider the reasons for there being a limit to the period for which a person may be remanded in custody pending commital or summary trial. There are said to be two major purposes. First, the limit is intended to provide an unconvicted person, who has been sent to prison by a court, with reasonable opportunities of regaining his liberty by applying for bail. Secondly, it is intended to give the court and other parties an opportunity to reconsider the case with a view to bringing it to a conclusion as quickly as possible.

There is no question that the vast majority of formal hearings afford no benefit to either of those two major purposes. I accept that there is a strong financial argument particularly in terms of the legal cost and the cost to the legal aid fund. However, in my view, the inclusion of this clause expresses the age-old dilemma of government; namely, their duties as trustees to the taxpayer and their duties to consider with care the liberty of the subject. That is where the conflict arises.

A consultative document was published by the Government on 15th December 1986, with what was, I thought at the time, indecent haste. The consultation was for a mere 45 days over the Christmas Recess, up to and including 31st January. The Government made quite clear the fact that the benefits would include the saving of court time and administration on unproductive work, and would reduce escorting by prison and police officers and requirements for custody at court during the day and make savings to the legal aid fund. They went on to state that the greatest financial savings would be in expenditure on legal aid.

It goes without saying that in the introductory part of the same discussion document Her Majesty's Government made great play of the fact that they were at all times considering the liberty of the subject and wished to consider a new statutory emphasis on the duty of the court to consider actively the progress of the case. In the Bill we see an increase of the limit from eight days to 28 days—bang them in the slammer for 28 days—but there is no mention whatever of any emphasis on the court to consider the progress of the prosecution. That is critically important.

In my humble view, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, will go down in history for the introduction of the Crown Prosecution Service. It is of critical importance. It is my view that the service is seriously threatened by this move because it will not encourage the service to be more expeditious with the prosecution of crimes; it will encourage the work to expand to the time available. I have great concern about that matter.

I found the Government's argument as set out in the discussion document to be disturbing because they laid all their emphasis on the financial savings to the taxpayer, giving little consideration to the liberties of the subject. I beg to move.

Lord Monson

The Committee has just rejected, or at any rate deferred one amendment which would have promoted the freedom of the individual. However, I hope that the Committee will look favourably upon this amendment because I believe it to be worthy of acceptance.

7.15 p.m.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

Clause 125, the entirety of which I oppose, is directed at a category of persons whose position is thought by many to be a major scandal in our system of criminal justice: those who are remanded in custody prior to trial. However, the clause aims to do nothing whatever about the problem. In fact, this will make it worse. As the noble Lord, Lord Morris, has said, all this is in the name of some hoped for savings in costs which, in my view, will not be achieved overall in any event.

In 1974 there were 3,200 convicted prisoners and now there are well over 8,000. As with all prisoners, they suffer from chronic overcrowding in addition to all the other well-documented ills of the crisis that currently engulfs our prisons. We should remember that they are people in respect of whom about 38 per cent. are either found not guilty or the court imposes a non-custodial sentence. This clause is not concerned with improving prison conditions for remand prisoners, nor is it concerned with persuading courts to apply the Bail Act more consistently in a way which will reduce the number of remands in custody. This clause will take away one of the few safeguards that exists for the unconvicted prisoner.

Today the longest period for which magistrates can remand an accused person in custody is eight clear days. He must then be brought before them once again for a further remand in custody or on bail. If the Committee enacts this clause a magistrates' court in a designated area will have the power to remand in custody for up to 28 days if it thinks that nothing is likely to happen in the proceedings during that time. As I understand the matter, the Government's thinking is that this provision will save money because there will be less need for prison officers to spend time on escort duty.

My objections to the clause are essentially threefold. First, it reduces the defendant's chances of obtaining bail. That represents both an infringement of the civil liberties of an unconvicted person and the disregard of the public interest in reducing the number of persons in custody. In order that the noble Earl need not say so in reply, I acknowledge that by this stage the defendant will probably have had a full hearing of his case for bail and will have had it rejected. Likewise, it is true that in the Nottingham justices case in 1980 it was held that magistrates should not consider renewed applications for bail when there were no new circumstances unknown to the court when it rejected the previous application.

I notice that there is standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, Amendment No. 239 which would reverse that decision. If that amendment is moved by the noble Lord I shall support it. However, that is not the point at this stage. Accepting that it is the law that magistrates are not to consider renewed applications for bail where there are no new circumstances which were unknown to them when they rejected the previous application, it might be thought, in this state of the law, that in an ideal world the defendant would suffer no disadvantage by being remanded for 28 days, given that subsection (3) of the clause allows him to make a bail application during that period if he feels that circumstances have changed since his last application was rejected.

I have stated the position at length so that when he comes to reply the Minister does not rely upon that provision as any justification for this clause overall. Subsection (3) is utterly unrealistic. It is not living in the real world. The defendant sitting in prison will not be able to decide for himself that his circumstances have changed, pick up a telephone and instruct his solicitor. It will be necessary for the solicitor to visit the prison to talk to his client. In reality that just will not happen; it will never happen during the 28-day period.

It is an important civil liberty that under the present system an accused must be brought to court every eight days, at which time he has an opportunity to talk to his solicitor. If he is advised that there has been a change in circumstances, he can apply for bail on the spot. Instead of that system, what will happen is that the court will remand him for 28 days. And probably that is the last it will hear of him for another month—as certain a way as I can imagine of increasing the prison population still further.

I hope that the Committee as a whole will consider my second objection, already touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Morris, a powerful one; namely, that it is a safe bet that the maximum period of 28 days will in practice become the norm. The Government brought a new Crown Prosecution Service into our legal world but from the outset afflicted it with an acute lack of resources. The Committee will have frequently read in the newspapers about the disarray of a prosecution case. It has virtually become a characteristic feature of hearings in the courts. And from what I am told by those who practise there, such stories indicate only the tip of the iceberg.

At least, under the present system—the point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Morris—there is some pressure on the prosecution to demonstrate to a court every eight days that something is being done about the case. Yet, if Clause 125 is accepted it will be taken for granted that the Crown Prosecution Service has the right to have prisoners who are refused bail imprisoned for a month at a time while it tries, with the inadequate resources available to it, to get itself organised so that it can proceed with the case.

Meanwhile, what happens to the prisoner? He is shuttled from cell to cell at prisons, police stations and courts—often without notice being given to his family—by those whose sorry duty it is to cram all who are taken into custody into the number of available places.

Another consequence of the literal shambles into which the Government have allowed the Crown Prosecution Service to degenerate is that magistrates are wholly unlikely to be in any position to judge when the next stage in the proceedings ought to take place, as the clause requires them to do. With the present set-up, I cannot see how the prosecution will provide the information necessary for them to exercise in any proper way the judgment that the clause enjoins upon them.

As for my third objection, it may be thought legitimate to trade civil liberties for relatively small savings in public expenditure, but I do not believe that a case has been made out that Clause 125 will lead to any such savings even if thought to be justified as a trade-off against an important civil liberty. A figure of 38,000 prison officer hours a year has been quoted. That in itself is not vast; it represents roughly the basic annual hours of about 19 men. Apparently, it is based on some notional calculations about how many hearings ought to be needed in a perfect world compared with the number that actually take place.

I invite the Minister to tell the Committee what account has been taken of the fact that many prisoners who would not, or think they would not, in practice derive any benefit from attending hearings every eight days already agree voluntarily to be remanded in their absence under the Criminal Justice Act 1982? Has that been taken into account? Is the Minister confident that the hearings which take place today are unnecessary? Or does he feel that they are necessary? Moreover, will the Minister tell the Committee where in the equation we are to find the additional cost of solicitors who may have to travel long distances to prisons in order to interview their clients instead of meeting them at court? Indeed, those solicitors may well be at court for a large number of cases. Is the object of the exercise simply to save money for the prison service and instead to transfer the burden to the legal aid fund? If anything, costs could well be increased by those changes.

I anticipate that it will be said by the Minister that Clause 125 is being introduced on an experimental basis. It is an experiment with our civil liberties that we could well do without. It must not be forgotten that we are dealing with people who are presumed innocent. Also, in practice, there is an almost 40 per cent. likelihood that they will not be sentenced to a period of imprisonment. They should not have their prospects of bail curtailed for the sake of questionable economies and in order to alleviate pressures on a Crown Prosecution Service denied the resources by this Government to do the job with which it is charged. I oppose the Question that this Clause stand part of the Bill.

The Earl of Caithness

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Morris has proposed that the maximum period for remand in custody should be increased from eight to 16 days rather than to 28 days as the Government propose in Clause 125. The noble Lord, Lord Irvine, has gone further by opposing the Question that Clause 125 stand part of the Bill. The Committee will be familiar with the thinking behind our proposal. It is well known that many eight-day remand hearings serve no useful purpose and are wasteful in terms of time, manpower and resources.

Following a recommendation of the Court Escort Scrutiny, which estimated that 68,000 hearings could he saved by an increase to 28 days in the normal remand period, we concluded that it would be right to try to reduce the number of fruitless hearings, but that we should proceed cautiously by way of experiments in certain areas so that the full effects of an increased maximum remand period could be assessed. The fact that my noble friend Lord Morris has suggested an increase to 16 days indicates that he shares our understanding that many of today's hearings are unproductive. The question therefore is: why 28 days?

As I have said, the scrutiny team estimated that 68,000 hearings would be saved by an increase to 28 days. That would produce a net saving of £1.5 million a year in legal aid costs. Perhaps more important, it would reduce the requirement for prison officers to accompany defendants to court, freeing them for more productive work. That is an aspect to which I am bound to attach importance. I accept that, based, as they were, on a small sample, the figures for the number of hearings saved are necessarily speculative. But they do indicate an order of magnitude and, some would say, they err on the side of caution.

Estimates suggest that if we were to increase the remand period to only 16 days, 37,500 unproductive hearings would still take place and the potential benefits would be more than halved. The reduction in escort requirements would be correspondingly less. It has been argued that the safeguards for the defendant would be prejudiced by a 16-day—or worse a 28-day—maximum remand period. I cannot accept that argument. Clause 125 contains a number of important safeguards for the defendant.

In the first place, it preserves the eight-day period for the first remand. Secondly, there is a specific requirement for the courts to provide an opportunity for representations before remanding for more than eight days. Thirdly, we are preserving the defendant's right to apply for bail during the period of the remand. And finally, and perhaps most important, the clause requires the court, when considering remands of more than eight clays, to have regard to the overall length of time the defendant would then have been in custody.

I must emphasise to the Committee that we do not intend, as some have assumed, that 28 days should become the norm for remands in custody. It is a maximum, and the court would be specifically bound by the terms of Clause 125 not to remand beyond the date on which it expected progress on the case to be made. The aim is to help streamline and improve courts' management of cases, while maintaining the essential safeguards for the defendant.

The fear has been voiced that the increase to 28 days will serve to increase the remand population. I certainly share the objective that defendants should not be detained in custody unnecessarily. The growth in the remand population is one of the most pressing problems that we face. That is why we intend to proceed deliberately by mounting experiments in a few selected areas before implementing the new provision nationally. This will ensure that we can satisfy ourselves that the provisions do not in practice lead to an increase in the remand population. If the experiments showed that that was a likely consequence, then we would have to reconsider. I can assure the Committee that we would certainly not hesitate to do that.

My noble friend Lord Morris and the noble Lord, Lord Irvine, were concerned that what we are proposing would delay the case. I would remind the Committee that we are taking practical steps to help the courts. We have increased the number of places in bail and other hostels by over 300, and we have a number of schemes under way which would help the courts take more informed decisions about custody or bail. I would, in particular, draw my noble friend's attention to the Autumn Statement by my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer which he gave today. I think he will find in that some encouraging words and information about the question of bail hostels.

Statutory time limits governing the period which an accused may spend in custody awaiting trial were introduced in three pilot areas earlier this year. In the light of experience, we will decide how and when to extend custody time limits to the rest of the country. We have already heard of the good work in Scotland and the progress in helping the proceedings of the courts, and we shall not be slow to implement it here in the light of experience. So that should be another safeguard which will help my noble friend's concern.

In addition to these specific measures, the Government are tackling some of the long-standing administrative problems of the criminal justice system which have a bearing on improved decision making. There are now more court rooms in which cases can be tried; there are more judges to try them; and we have tried to reduce the burdens on the courts; for example through the extension of the fixed penalty scheme for certain road traffic offences. So I can assure my noble friend that we are conscious of the point that he makes; but we feel that we are going, and will continue to go, a long way to meeting his concerns.

To sum up, the benefits of a more flexible remand provision appear likely to be substantial and our cautious approach will ensure that any possible drawbacks to the scheme are ironed out. I hope that I have said enough to convince my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, so that they will not press further their opposition to the clause.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

I do not want to prolong this debate; but perhaps I may ask the Minister two or three questions, because the concern of those of us who think that this is an objectionable experiment is that the experiment is almost bound to be valueless. How is the experiment going to discover whether cases, which the CPS say they cannot bring on for 28 days, could have been brought on in eight days, 12 days or 20 days? How is that to be discoverable in any inquiry?

What about comparative costs? A saving of 68,000 hearings is a most extraordinary calculation. How are you to compare that with the cost of solicitors' journeys to distant prisons and of time spent in those prisons having conferences with their clients, the time of coming back to court and making another application, the time of having to see the client again and the cost of extra legal aid? How on earth are you to make those comparative costs?

On the question of escorts, has the Minister made, or are the Government going to make, any calculation of the huge sums whch could be saved by administering the prison officer escort service better than it is administered at the moment? For instance, there is enormous time wasted by prison officers manning courts in cases where it is totally unnecessary; prison officers sitting in the dock with defendants who are no security problem at all, staying there all day long doing absolutely nothing but earning overtime; prison officers assisting in courts down below with the gaoler, and so on doing completely unnecessary work.

Those are the costs which I suggest could really be saved, and it surely is wrong in principle to bring in measures which affect very much the position of untried defendants, when we want to solve a problem which is an administrative one. It is there, I suggest, that the saving should be found and not by withdrawing rights from untried prisoners.

Lastly, I would ask the Minister: who will monitor the experiment? One very much hopes that it will not be the courts themselves which will be monitoring the experiment. Will there be some outside body which will be making all these comparisons and monitoring this experiment?

The Earl of Caithness

I cannot yet say precisely how the experiment will be conducted; but I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, that I shall draw the points that he has made—and validly made—to the attention of those responsible for designing it. On the noble Lord's second point, I conceded that the calculations were bound to be somewhat speculative; but it must be the case that there will be some benefits in terms of reduced escort requirements. We are anxious that this provision should be of maximum benefit to all parties involved in the case and that it should not lead merely to longer remands. Naturally we therefore wish to ensure that the arrangements for implementing the provision are carefully worked out and that is why we are going to proceed cautiously.

With regard to the administration of prison officer escort duties, and the suggestion that these could be done better, I would refer the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, to Fresh Start, whch is designed to help in this regard. I was interested when I went to Manchester Prison to see how Fresh Start was working; how, in particular, the escort duties and the collection of prisoners from court were being adminstered better now that we have got rid of the mischief of overtime; and how the prison officers themselves now have an incentive not to work the extra hours. So I hope that considerable progress will continue to be made on that point.

As to the cost of solicitors going to distant prisons, that goes back to the problem which I have mentioned before to this Committee, and to the House, that what I find most distressing of all is that those who are innocent until proven guilty are held in the most overcrowded conditions, because those are the locals close to where the solicitors are in the city centres. So in answer to the point which the noble Lord has put about access to solicitors and visits it is very much easier than sending them to a distant prison.

Lord Morris

The amendment standing in my name on this point is not a substantive one and the more substantive and more proper matter is whether the clause shall stand part. I should have thought it very sensible if, rather wheezily, my amendment were withdrawn at this stage—I can hear tummies rumbling—so that we can literally ruminate on the totally unsatisfactory response which my noble friend has given to me, which has worried me considerably, despite the very gentle, courteous and carefully thought out arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, particularly with regard to subsection (3). I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

On Question, Whether Clause 125 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord Irvine of Lairg

I have already addressed the Committee and contended that the clause should not stand part of the Bill. I have listened with care to what the noble Earl has said, but with very great respect to him I do not begin to feel that he has replied properly to the arguments that have been addressed.

He has not met the argument against him that unconvicted defendants will have their prospects of bail seriously diminished by this provision. He has not met the point that that will inevitably increase the length of time that persons who are unconvicted and presumed to be innocent—about 40 per cent. of whom ultimately leave the court free people—will spend unjustifiably in prison.

But most significantly of all he has not begun to answer the charge that the Crown Prosecution Service is a shambles, is deprived of resources and is therefore quite unable to carry out the task which the clause gives it. I am left with the distinct impression, as the answer has been so poor, that by way of this clause the Government are engaged in a dangerous experiment with our civil liberties so as to make economies at the expense of those liberties. That is a matter to which we shall certainly return on Report.

Clause 125 agreed to.

The Earl of Arran

This may be a convenient moment for the Committee to adjourn. I suggest that the Committee stage begins again at 8.45 p.m. I beg to move that the Committee do now adjourn during pleasure.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

[The Sitting was suspended from 7.43 to 8.45 p.m.]

[Amendment Nos. 238 and 239 not moved.]

Clause 126 agreed to.

Clause 127 [Groundless appeals]:

[Amendment Nos. 240 and 241 not moved.]

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 242: Leave out Clause 127 and insert the following new clause:

(" Groundless appeals and applications for leave to appeal.

The following section shall be substituted for section 20 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968—

"Disposal of groundless appeal or application for leave to appeal.

20. If it appears to the registrar that a notice of appeal or application for leave to appeal does not show any substantial ground of appeal, he may refer the appeal or application for leave to the Court for summary determination; and where the case is so referred the Court may, if they consider that the appeal or application for leave is frivolous or vexatious, and can be determined without adjourning it for a full hearing, dismiss the appeal or application for leave summarily, without calling on anyone to attend the hearing or to appear for the Crown thereon." ").

The noble Earl said: In moving Amendment No. 242, it may be convenient to the Committee if I speak also to Amendment No. 269, which is consequential.

Section 20 of the Criminal Appeal Act provides a quick method of disposing of hopeless appeals. That is to ensure that manifestly unmeritorious appeals do not block up the system and delay the hearing of appeals which may succeed. At present, Section 20 only applies to appeals on points of law. Clause 127 is meant to apply to all appeals.

I regret that that clause is not quite right as it stands. A person who wishes to appeal against sentence must first obtain leave to appeal under Section 11(1) of the 1968 Act unless the trial judge certifies that the matter is fit for appeal. The extended version of Section 20 thus needs to apply not only to appeals but also to applications for leave to appeal. The new clause ensures that. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

New Clause 127 agreed to.

Clause 128 [Anonymity in rape etc, cases]:

Lord Meston moved Amendment No. 243: Page 88, line 2, leave out ("rape") and insert ("sexual or attempted sexual").

The noble Lord said: Perhaps I may speak to Amendments Nos. 244 and 246, as well as move Amendment No. 243. Those amendments are connected. Their purpose is to extend to the victims of all sexual offences the same anonymity as has been given to the victims of rape by the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. Clause 128 as it stands improves the protection given to rape victims—but rape victims only—by bringing forward the time from which they are entitled to anonymity to the time the offence is actually reported. As far as it goes, that improvement is welcome.

However, although the 1976 Act is called the Sexual Offences Act and although the sidenote to the clause says "rape etc.", it is only concerned with rape itself. The protection of anonymity is still not given to the victims of other abhorrent and humiliating sexual offences such as indecent assault, incest and buggery. Nor does it extend to conspiracy to rape and burglary with intent to rape.

Those should not be regarded as lesser offences whose victims are entitled to lesser protection. To give anonymity in rape cases and not in other cases is simply not logical. A distinguished academic writer wrote to The Times on 25th March 1986. He put the matter as delicately as possible when he said: But to make privacy for the victim depend on who penetrates whom with what and where appears quite absurd. And even the victims of rape are inadequately protected if the prosecution drops the rape charge for a guilty plea to a different, lesser, sexual offence. In such cases a conviction can be obtained at the high price of losing one's right to anonymity".

It is also worth mentioning that the Heilbron Report of 1975, upon which the 1976 Act was largely based, suggested that consideration might be given to what I propose in these amendments. Of course it was outside the terms of reference of the Heilbron Committee. It is not simply a matter of logic. I suggest that to deprive victims of sexual offences of anonymity is not in the interests of the victims themselves and not in the interests of justice.

The arguments for allowing anonymity are not exclusive to rape. The victim should be spared the distress and embarrassment of publicity. There is an intangible stigma to such offences which attaches to the victim, however innocent. Victims should be encouraged to come forward to report offences. They may well be deterred by, among other things, a fear of publicity.

Another reason is that sexual crime is not a topic on which the press always shows self-restraint and self-censorship. It is not always deterred, even by the criminal penalties in the 1976 Act or by the Press Council. The Ealing vicarage case is a good example. I understand the police asked the press to show consideration to the victim. The Sun newspaper nevertheless felt it necessary to print a picture of the girl concerned, albeit with her eyes blacked out. Of course I accept that the amendment to the 1976 Act by Clause 128 would deal with that precise situation but the point I make is still valid. The press do not exercise restraint as they ought.

There is a further illogicality in the law as it presently stands, and it is this. Under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 the offender is allowed to have his criminal acts forgotten. The victim has no right to have the same acts forgotten. They can be referred to in the press and elsewhere many years afterwards.

If it is the policy of the Bill to consider the victims of crime then it is for the benefit of the victims of crime, particularly of these brutal crimes, that I beg leave to move the amendment.

Lord Monson

The amendment has a lot to commend it. I missed the first few sentences of the introduction by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, but it seems to me that if we are to have what is in effect censorship at all in this matter—and I am not at all sure that there ought to be censorship—then it is only logical that all sexual assaults should be covered. After all, serious indecent assault involving forced oral sex, for example, can be every bit as shaming and traumatic as rape for the victim and her family; so there is certainly logic in the amendment proposed by the noble Lord.

The Earl of Caithness

I well understand the reasoning behind the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Meston. I appreciate that there are crimes which can be as distressing to the victim as that of rape. But rape is a horrible crime in a category of its own and we believe that special considerations apply.

This is not a conclusion the Government reached on their own. Both the Heilbron Committee and the Criminal Law Revision Committee concluded that complainants in rape cases should be granted anonymity to encourage them to come forward. This is a major problem in investigations of rape: victims are understandably reluctant to submit themselves to the ordeal of court proceedings, and the fear of publicity increases this reluctance considerably. This is not true to the same degree with any other offence. The CLRC commented in its report on sexual offences: We do not consider that this is as significant a factor in other sexual offences and would therefore confine the anonymity of complainants to rape cases. I think that must be right. There surely must be overriding reasons for details not to be made public. If I may use the "thin-end-of-the-wedge" argument, where do we stop? The noble Lord's amendment is defective in that Clause 128 specifically covers offences with women victims, but the offences listed in Amendment No. 246 cover both boys and girls. But if we are to consider extending anonymity, why not to men who have been the victims of humiliating homosexual attacks or to elderly victims attacked in their homes who are fearful of publicity?

It may be helpful if I say that as far as sexual offences, or indeed any offences, with child victims are concerned, it is open to the court to use its discretion to forbid identification of the victim. This invariably happens; I cannot recall a case where a child victim of the offences covered by Amendment No. 246 has been identified and I cannot imagine that happening.

Of course it does not surprise me that the noble Lord, Lord Meston, struck on a very good point concerning the definition of the offence of rape in the 1976 Act. I can assure him that I will look again at that definition to see if it can sensibly be extended to include conspiracy to rape and burglary with intent to rape.

In a system of open justice such as ours, it is important that details should not be withheld unless there are overriding reasons. We believe that rape is a special case but we are not persuaded that anonymity should be extended further. In view of the undertaking that I have given, I hope that the noble Lord—although I am sure he will not be entirely satisfied with what I have said—will at least appreciate the Government's position.

Lord Meston

I am not entirely satisfied, although I am grateful to the noble Earl the Minister for his undertaking to look at the matter to the extent he has indicated. Of course rape is a peculiarly horrifying and brutal offence but it is not alone in the canon of horrifying and brutal offences. Indeed, I thought I indicated one or two which might be considered to be on a par. The fact is, if one seeks to compare the trauma undergone by a victim of rape with the trauma of the victim of incest or buggery, it is perhaps hard to draw any logical distinction.

This amendment was and is intended simply as one way of reducing the ordeal which victims of all sexual offences have to undergo. The other ordeals remain. The victims still have to bring themselves to go to the police station, possibly to attend an identification parade and also perhaps to undergo a medical examination—almost certainly to be cross-examined at a trial—and it is sometimes too late for the judge at court to allow them a measure of protection.

Nevertheless, at this stage of the Committee stage it is not my intention to press the amendment. Accordingly I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 244 not moved.]

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 245: Page 88, line 25, leave out ("legal") and insert ("criminal").

The noble Earl said: I beg to move Amendment No. 245 and at the same time speak to Amendments Nos. 272 and 273. Members of the Committee will be aware that at present a woman does not benefit from anonymity in reports of legal proceedings other than those concerning the trial of the alleged rapist. This is to discourage false or malicious allegations. If a woman makes an allegation there is no good reason why the press should not be able to report in full her trial for, say, wasting police time or perjury at the trial of the man accused. Thus, Clause 128 re-enacts what is now Section 4(7)(a) of the 1976 Act. This simply refers to other legal proceedings and goes too far. It means that there is nothing to stop newspapers identifying a woman in reports of a civil trial where she is suing her rapist for damages. This would be clearly undesirable, and Amendment No. 245 puts it right. If it is accepted it will mean that the woman's identity can be revealed only in reports of subsequent criminal proceedings other than the trial of the rapist.

Amendments Nos. 272 and 273 are consequential upon Clause 128. Amendment No. 272 rectifies a drafting error and it is consequential upon Clause 128(4) and was, I fear, simply missed when the Bill was redrafted.

Amendment No. 273 is a technical amendment. It is not necessary to repeal Sections 7(4) and 7(5) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act in their entirety. The amendment corrects that.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 246 not moved.]

9 p.m.

Lord Monson moved Amendment No. 246A: Page 89, line 3, leave out subsection (5).

The noble Lord said: I am puzzled why the Government propose to repeal anonymity for men—what one might call the sauce for the gander rule—so soon after Parliament passed it into law. In speaking to the first amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, I was very dubious about any form of censorship in this matter. If there is to be anonymity, surely it should apply to both parties. One must not forget that a man who is unjustly accused of rape can be the object of enormous public hostility, particularly where children are concerned, or if there is any suspicion of gang rape or anything as unpleasant as that.

This is particularly so for this reason. Men are not generally envisaged by their neighbours as being capable of climbing a drain-pipe and robbing a flat on the tenth floor or forging a £50 note or manufacturing a complex bomb to go off in a public place. But it is acknowledged that most men, theoretically, are capable of committing rape in certain circumstances. Therefore the natural reaction of friends and neighbours when a man is accused of rape is to say there can be no smoke without fire. That is what worries me. I beg to move.

Lord Meston

I oppose this amendment. The anonymity of defendants in rape cases was not a recommendation of the Heilbron Committee as I understand it. It was added, in the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, during the passage of the 1976 Act by a male chauvinist pig Committee stage in another place. It is not a logical comparison to say that because the victims are entitled to anonymity so should the defendants. The correct comparison is between the defendants in rape cases and the defendants in others cases. Defendants in other cases are not entitled to anonymity and there is no logical reason why defendants in rape cases should be singled out.

The Earl of Caithness

The noble Lord, Lord Monson, is concerned that anonymity should not be removed from rape defendants. It may be helpful if I set out a little of the background. The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 gives effect to some of the recommendations in the report of the advisory group on the law of rape. On introduction it made provision that anonymity of complainants, but not of defendants, is recommended by the group.

As the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has just reminded the Committee, it was in the Commons Committee on that Bill that support developed for the idea that defendants also should benefit from anonymity on the ground that rape was such an exceptional crime that complainants and defendants ought to receive equal treatment in respect of press reporting. The Bill was amended accordingly and provision for defendants' anonymity in rape cases is now contained in Section 6 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976.

In its 15th report, published in April 1984, the Criminal Law Revision Committee favoured repealing Section 6 of the 1976 Act. The committee took the view that the argument that victims and defendants should be treated alike in this respect was invalid. The Government agree with the committee.

Despite what the noble Lord, Lord Monson, said, we cannot see that rape defendants should be treated differently from those facing other serious charges. The basic principle should be that justice should be open, and the reason for making an exception in relation to victims is to encourage women who have been raped to come forward. That clearly does not apply to defendants. The existing law causes some difficulty. For example, if a man escapes from custody after being brought before a court before conviction, the police cannot say that he is a suspected rapist unless the Crown Court judge has specifically exercised his power to lift anonymity because it is imposing a substantial and unreasonable restriction on reporting proceedings and removal of the restriction is in the public interest.

I hope the Committee will recognise that this cannot be right. The rape victim deserves all the protection the law can properly give her; but the defendant should have no special consideration above that offered to a generality of defendants.

Lord Monson

With regard to the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, I do not really see where male chauvinism comes into it. I understood that militant feminists were in favour of total parity for the sexes. Obviously there are several exceptions to that rule and this appears to be one of them.

If the noble Earl reads tomorrow what I said in Hansard he will see that there is a certain logic behind my argument, and in particular the point that suspected rapists are likely to be the victims not only of verbal abuse but physical abuse. It is such a difficult offence to prove in comparison, for example, with burglary or some offence where fingerprints can be taken. However, although I do not feel strongly about this, I hope the Government will have a look at what I have said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 128, as amended, agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 247: After Clause 128, insert the following new clause:

("Judicial review of orders under sections 4 and 11 of Contempt of Court Act 1981 relating to trials on indictment.

. The following subsection shall be inserted after section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981— (3A) The High Court shall also have power in relation to a trial on indictment to make an order of certiorari with respect to an order under section 4 or 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981."").

The noble Earl said: With this amendment it will be convenient to discuss Amendment No. 288. I am sure that after I have spoken the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, will want to speak on Amendment No. 247A.

Under Sections 4 and 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 a court may make orders prohibiting publication of part of the proceedings before it. In particular, Section 11 empowers a court to forbid the press to identify names or other particulars mentioned at the trial; for example, the name of a witness. This power will clearly be necessary in some cases. If it is exercised at a summary trial its use can be questioned in the High Court. After hearing arguments from all the parties, the High Court could quash the order if it felt this was right. However, the High Court has no jurisdiction over matters arising on a trial on indictment. Thus, if the Crown Court made an order at such a trial under the present law it could not in practice be challenged before a superior court.

My amendment would change this. The High Court could entertain an application and quash an order made under Sections 4 or 11 of the 1981 Act. Order 53, rule 5(4), provides that, unless the court granting leave has otherwise directed, there must be at least 10 days between the service of the notice of motion or summons and the hearing. However, in the case of urgent applications by, say, the media, the court would normally be prepared to abridge time of its own motion. I understand that, except at weekends and in exceptional circumstances, the substantive application itself could be heard within 24 hours. In other cases it would be for the applicant to decide whether to make his application within the normal time limits or to seek abridgment of those limits.

The Committee will recall that a very similar amendment was moved by my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway during our debates on what became the Administration of Justice Act 1985. My noble and learned friend the then Lord Chancellor pointed out that that was hardly an appropriate addition to a Bill concerned with civil law but agreed that this was an important matter which my right honourable friend the Home Secretary would have to consider. We have considered the matter giving particular attention to the case of R. v. Central Criminal Court ex parte Timothy Crook and NUJ to which the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, referred in that debate. We accept that, in the interests of open justice, the High Court should be able to quash an order made by he Crown Court under the 1981 Act at a trial on indictment. My amendment will give the High Court such a power.

When we last debated this matter the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, and the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, supported this move. The noble Lord was also able to inform us that the Law Society favoured such a change. I hope that they will similarly support my amendment. Indeed, as neither is here I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, will support my amendment in their place. I beg to move.

Lord Irvine of Lairg

The Minister has kindly indicated that he may wish to give further thought to my Amendment No. 247A. I shall not allow my preference for late night argument to overcome my ability to take the hint. Put at its shortest, the Minister's Amendment No. 247 is very much in the right direction. The sole point of Amendment No. 247A is to carry the principle through to the end.

I believe that the Government have introduced Amendment No. 247 in response to a less than favourable decision earlier this year by the European Commission of Human Rights. The purpose of Amendment No. 247A is to ensure that the court in Strasbourg, if it is ever troubled with these matters, will be completely impressed with the change to our law.

So that the Minister, and those with whom he may discuss this matter hereafter, know what I have in mind I put briefly the two basic points. First, why confine to certiorari? Why not have the whole range of powers in judicial review—most importantly, in practice, mandamus? Secondly, the Government have accepted in principle High Court review of decisions under Sections 4 or 11 of the Contempt of Court Act. These are basically decisions to postpone a report of criminal proceedings or prohibit the identification to the public of an individual involved in a trial. Therefore the High Court's power of review should extend to any decisions by judges in these criminal proceedings under their common law powers. In particular, I have in mind the court's power to sit in camera. I say that only so that those who may consider this matter hereafter are aware of the essential thinking that lay behind my Amendment No. 247A. In view of the way in which the Minister approached the matter, it is not necessary for me to say anything more.

9.15 p.m.

The Earl of Caithness

If I may respond to the noble Lord. Amendment No. 247A would also give the High Court power to review decisions of the Crown Court made at a trial on indictment. It goes further than my own amendment in the two respects he mentioned. First, it would give the High Court power to require the Crown Court to make an order forbidding publication of a report of proceedings under the Contempt of Court Act 1981; whereas my amendment only empowers the High Court to quash such an order made by the Crown Court. Secondly, it would permit the High Court to review a decision by the Crown Court to sit in camera and a decision by that court to prohibit publication of proceedings before it.

Such an extension raises difficult questions which I will explain shortly. During the debates on the Administration of Justice Bill both the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, and my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham pointed out that we need to be careful before extending the jurisdiction of the High Court, wholesale, to trials on indictment. The Crown Court judge is in charge of the trial and needs to be able to deal with procedural matters as they arise without always looking over his shoulder at the High Court.

It would be quite wrong for the trial to be delayed endlessly by a procession of applications to the High Court for judicial review of every one of his decisions. This would be unjust to the accused and cause serious disruption to Crown Court business at a time when it is already under heavy pressure. This would risk endless disruption to Crown Court business with consequential delays for those awaiting the start of their trial, perhaps while they languished in custody. We need to consider each suggestion for extending the jurisdiction of the High Court with care to see if it is justified.

I am sure the Committee will agree with me that I should study what the noble Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, has said, and discuss it with my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor to seek his views on it. The noble Lord is right; I am not in a position to accept the amendment tonight. I should like to look carefully at it further.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

These are important matters for the press in relation to contempt of court generally, and to the restriction of the access of the public to the proceedings or part of the proceedings. There has been a tendency in some courts to do that without any necessary full authority. Similarly, an order restricting the publication of any report of proceedings is a serious matter for the press and the public. I am glad the noble Earl has indicated a willingness to look at this matter carefully when the time comes and before it appears again, as it undoubtedly will, on Report.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 247 A not moved.]

Clauses 129 to 131 agreed to.

Clause 132 [Costs and expenses of prosecution witnesses and other persons]:

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 248: Page 91, line 3, after ("attends") insert ("(at the court or elsewhere)").

The noble Earl said: With the leave of the Committee, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 249, 250, 251 and 252.

Clause 132 relates to the payment of fees and expenses to witnesses and interpreters. As presently drafted, it applies solely to witnesses and to attendance at a court. It is intended that the fees of interpreters and others whose attendance is required but who do not give evidence should also be covered. Amendments Nos. 249 and 250 achieve this. The clause also needs to take account of evidence given other than at a court—for example, by video link. This is achieved by Amendments Nos. 248 and 251. The last amendment in this group—No. 252—simply brings the similar provision in the Criminal Justice Act 1987 relating to the Serious Fraud Office into line with the wording of Clause 132. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment Nos. 249 to 252:

Page 91, line 13, leave out ("of witnesses").

Page 91, line 17, leave out ("to compensate witnesses for expenses, trouble or loss of time").

Page 91, line 20, after ("attends") insert ("(at the court or elsewhere)").

Page 91, line 23, at end insert the following subsection— ("(4) Paragraph 8(1)(b) of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (control of certain fees and expenses etc. paid by Serious Fraud Office) shall be amended as follows—

1. (a) for the word "to" in the third place it occurs there shall be substituted the word "of"; and
2. (b) after the word "attends" there shall be inserted the words "at the court or elsewhere".").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 132, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 133 agreed to.

[Amendment No. 253 not moved.]

Clauses 134 to 136 agreed to.

Schedule 10 [Minor and consequential amendments]:

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 254: Page 131, line 9, leave out ("of registration").

The noble Earl said: I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 261, 262 and 263. These are all minor amendments largely consequential on provisions elsewhere in the Bill. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 255: Page 131, line 18, at end insert—

("Land Registration Act 1925

5A. In section 49(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925 (protection of certain interests by notice) for the words "or the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986" there shall be substituted the words ", the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 or the Criminal Justice Act 1988".").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 255A:

Page 131, line 27, leave out paragraph 8 and insert— ("8.—(1) The following paragraph shall be inserted after paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 43 of the Prison Act 1952— (aa) young offender institutions, that is to say places for the detention of offenders sentenced to detention in a young offender institution;

(2) The following paragraph shall be inserted after subsection (2)(c) of that section— (d) that a person aged 17 or over who has been sentenced to be detained in a young offender institution shall be detained in a prison or remand centre instead of a young offender institution.").

The noble Earl said: This is consequential to Amendment No. 217A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 256:

Page 134, line 11, leave out paragraph 22 and insert— ("22. The following section shall be substituted for section 30—

"Restitution of property.

30.—(1) The operation of an order for the restitution of property to a person made by the Crown Court shall, unless the Court direct to the contrary in any case in which, in their opinion, the title to the property is not in dispute, be suspended until (disregarding any power of a court to grant leave to appeal out of time) there is no further possibility of an appeal on which the order could be varied or set aside, and provision may be made by rules of court for the custody of any property in the meantime.

(2) The Court of Appeal may by order annul or vary any order made by the court of trial for the restitution of property to any person, although the conviction is not quashed; and the order, if annulled, shall not take effect and, if varied, shall take affect as so varied.

(3) Where the House of Lords restores a conviction, it may make any order for the restitution of property which the court of trial could have made." ").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendments Nos. 256A and 256B:

Page 134, line 14, after ("judge")") insert ("(a)").

Page 134, line 16, at end insert ("and (b) the following paragraph shall be inserted after subsection (2)(e)— (ee) to grant leave to arraign under section 8(1B) of the Act or direct under that subsection the entry of a judgment and verdict of acquittal;".").

The noble Earl said: The amendments are consequential on Amendment No. 47A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendments Nos. 257 and 258: Page 134, line 20, at end insert£

("Theft Act 1968 (c. 60)

24A. In subsection (5) of section 28 of the Theft Act 1968 (orders for restitution) for the words from "sections" to the end there shall be substituted the words "section 30 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (which relates to the effect on such orders of appeals)".").

Page 134, line 20, at end insert—

("Genocide Act 1969 (c. 12)

24B. In subsection (2) of section 2 of the Genocide Act 1969 (genocide offences etc. not to be regarded as political) for the words "and the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965" there shall be substituted the words ", the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 and Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1988".").

The noble Earl said: The amendments are consequential on Amendment No. 254. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendments Nos. 258A and 258B:

Page 137, line 31, leave out paragraph 46.

Page 138, line 8, leave out ("youth custody") and insert ("detention in a young offender institution").

The noble Earl said: The amendments are consequential on Amendment No. 217A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 259: Page 138, line 22, after ("detention") insert ("previously passed or made on or in relation to the appellant for another offence").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 259A: Page 139, line 15, leave out paragraph 57.

The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 217A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 260: Page 139, line 18, at end insert—

("Supreme Court Act 1981 (c. 54)

57A. In the proviso to section 47(5) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (variation of sentences) after the word "appeal)" there shall be inserted the words "and for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Schedule (Questions as to sentencing—supplementary) to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (time limit for notice of an application for leave to refer a case under section (Questions as to sentencing) of that Act)".

57B. The following paragraph shall be inserted after subsection (4)(a) of section 55 of that Act (constitution of criminal division of Court of Appeal)— (aa) reviewing sentencing under Part IIIA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988;".").

The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 40. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 260A:

Page 139, line 28, leave out paragraph 60 and insert— ("60. The following subsections shall be substituted for section 12(1) to (4)— (1) Subject to subsection (11) below, an offender under 17 sentenced to detention in a young offender institution shall be detained in a young offender institution unless the Secretary of State gives a direction for his detention in a prison under subsection (1A) below. (1A) The Secretary of State may from time to time direct that an offender who falls to be detained in a young offender institution by virtue of subsection (1) above is instead to be detained for any temporary purpose in a prison."").

The noble Earl said: This amendment was spoken to with Amendment No. 217A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 260B:

Page 140, line 19, at end insert— ("64A. The following paragraph shall be inserted after subsection (4)(a) of section 16 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (defence costs)— (aa) directs under section 8(1 B) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 the entry if a judgment and verdict of acquittal;".").

The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 47A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendments Nos. 261, 262 and 263:

Page 140, line 24, at end insert— ("64A. The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 shall be amended as follows. 64B. In section 5(4) (interpretation) after "1987" there shall be added the words ", by section 61(9) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988". 64C. In section 7(1) (constitution of apparent insolvency)—

1. (a) after the words "Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986" there shall be inserted the words "or by section 68(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988";
2. (b) after the words "(Scotland) Act 1987" there shall be inserted the words ", by section 61(9)(a) of the said Act of 1988"; and
3. (c) after the words "Act of 1987" there shall be inserted the words ", by section 67(1) of the said Act of 1988".")

Page 140, line 25, leave out ("of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985")

Page 140, line 31, at end insert—

("The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 (N.I.7)

(1) In Article 24(2) of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, for the words "or Part IV" there shall be substituted the words "Part IV or section [Offence of having article with blade or point in public place] of the Criminal Justice Act 1988".

(2) In Article 26(1) of that Order, for the words "or 22(1)" there shall be substituted the words "22(1) of section [Offence of having article with blade or point in public place] of the Criminal Justice Act 1988".")

The noble Earl said: These amendments are consequential on Amendment No. 254. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 11 [Repeals]:

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 264:

Page 141, line 18, at end insert—

("23 & 24 Geo. 5c. 12).	Children and Young Persons Act 1933.	Section 1(5) and (6).
1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6 c. 37.	Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937.	Section 12(5) and (6).")

The noble Earl said: In moving the amendment, I speak also to Amendments Nos. 265, 266, 269, 270, 271 and 274. These are largely repeals consequential upon provisions elsewhere in the Bill. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 265:

Page 141, line 18, at end insert—

("23 & 24 Geo. 5 c. 13.

Children and Young Persons Act 1933.

In Schedule 1, in third paragraph, the words "forty-two, forty-three".")

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 265A:

Page 141, line 18, at end insert—

("15 and 16 Geo. 6 and 1 Eliz. 2 c. 52

Prison Act 1952.

Section 43(1 )(b) and (c).")

The noble Earl said: This is consequential on Amendment No. 217A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 266: Page 141, line 25, column 3 at end insert—("Schedule 1.")

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 267 not moved.]

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 267A:

Page 141, line 27, column 3, at beginning insert— ("In section 7(1), the words "and do so only by reason of evidence received or available to be received by them under section 23 of this Act".").

The noble Earl said: This is consequential on Amendment No. 47A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 268 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 269: Page 141, leave out lines 28 to 32.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 270:

Page 141, line 32, column 3, at end insert—

("Section 42.").

The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 121. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 271:

Page 141, line 44, column 3, at beginning insert—

("Section 22(5). In section 34A(l)(c), the words "other than an order under section 35 of this Act".").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 271A:

Page 141, line 44, column 3, at end insert—

("In section 57(3), the definition of "detention centre".").

The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 217A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendments Nos. 272 and 273:

Page 142, line 8, column 3, at beginning insert— ("In section 4, in subsection (3), the words "before the Crown Court at which a person is charged with a rape offence" and "relating to the complainant", and subsection (7)(a).")

Page 142, line 9, leave out ("Section 7(4) and (5).") and insert— ("In section 7, in subsection (4), the words "and 6(4)(b)", in subsection (5), the words "and 6" and in subsection (6), the words "and section 6(1) as adapted by section 6(4)(b)." ")

The noble Earl said: With the leave of the Committee, I move these amendments en bloc. They are consequential on Amendment No. 245. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendments Nos. 273A, 273B and 273C:

Page 142, line 26, at end insert—

("1980 c. 9.

Reserve Forces Act 1980.

("In Schedule 1, paragraph 5(c)(ii) and the word "or" immediately preceding it.")

Page 142, line 36, column 3, at beginning insert—

("Sections 4 to 7. Section 12(5), (8) and (9). Section 14.")

Page 142, line 47, at end insert—

("1984 c.47.

Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984.

In Schedule 1, paragraph 4(1).")

The noble Earl said: These amendments are consequential on Amendment No. 217A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 274:

Page 143, line 10, column 3, at end insert—

("Section 15(5)(b) and (c).")

The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 264. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 11, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 137 [Commencement]:

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 275:

Page 93, line 13, at end insert— ("section (Offensive weapons);")

The noble Earl said: This is consequential on Amendment No. 228. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 276 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 277:

Page 94, line 2, at end insert— ("section (Increase of maximum term of imprisonment on summary conviction of offences under Prevention of Crimes Act 1953 and maximum fine for offences under Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959)")

The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 62. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 277A:

Page 94, line 2, at end insert— ("section (Offence of having article with blade or point in public place):")

The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 226. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 137, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 138 [Extent]:

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 278: Page 94, line 34, at end insert ("section 44;")

The noble Earl said: In moving Amendment No. 278, with leave of the Committee I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 279, 281, 282, 283, 284 and 285. These are all minor amendments to reflect the extent of several provisions in the Bill. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

9.30 p.m.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 279:

Page 94, line 34, at end insert— ("section [Offence of having article with blade or point in public place]; section [Offensive weapons]; section [Power of justice of the peace to authorise entry and search of premises for offensive weapons];").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 280: Page 94, leave out line 36.

The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 234. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendments Nos. 281 to 285:

Page 95, line 23, leave out ("and") and insert—

"((cc) the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1968; and").

Page 95, line 32, leave out ("or repeal").

Page 95, line 33, leave out ("or 11").

Page 95, leave out line 34.

Page 95, line 34, at end insert— ("(11) The extent of any repeal of an enactment in Schedule 11 to this Act is the same as that of the enactment repealed, subject to the Notes at the end of the Schedule.").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 138, as amended, agreed to.

Remaining clause agreed to.

In the Title:

[Amendments Nos. 286 and 287 not moved.]

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 288: Line 9, after second ("cases") insert ("orders under sections 4 and 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 relating to trials on indictment,").

The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 247. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 289:

Line 14, after ("Board") insert ("to create an offence of having an article with a blade or point in a public place;").

The noble Earl said: I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 290, 291 and 292. These amendments to the title of the Bill simply reflect the amendments which Members of the Committee have agreed during the Committee stage. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendments Nos. 290 to 292:

Line 14, after ("Board") insert ("to create further offences relating to weapons;").

Line 15, leave out ("of detained persons").

Line 17, after ("detention") insert ("to give a justice of the peace power to authorise entry and search of premises for offensive weapons;").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Title, as amended, agreed to.

On Question, Whether the House do now resume?

Lord Elwyn-Jones

Before the House is resumed, this is an appropriate moment first of all for me to congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, on the way he has borne this tremendous burden so well throughout these seven days. We are all seven day adventists! He has carried the burden of having to debate matters of considerable technicality with Lords of Appeal, lesser Lords, major Lords, minor Lords—the whole pack of us. If I may say so, he has done it with considerable ability and we congratulate him.

Time and again in the course of the Committee stage of the Bill no concession of substance has been made by the Government, but time and again the spokesmen for the Government have undertaken to consider a matter again and give it further thought. While no specific commitment has been made, we greatly hope that this has not been just a ritual exercise to shorten debate. On the contrary, we take the assurances and promises as proof of some serious intent on the part of the Government to meet the wishes and representations that have been made across the Floor of the Committee from the Official Opposition, and, if I may say so, from the Alliance. Therefore I must give due notice and warning that we shall expect substantial concessions and acceptances on Third Reading on some of the matters that have been canvassed in the Committee stage. Otherwise the whole purpose of the Committee stage of debate will be devalued.

I end on a serious note of expectation that what has been hinted at, promised and undertaken will be fulfilled so that this noble Chamber can be seen seriously to be performing its duties of examining, considering and discussing anew important matters affecting Parliament and the country.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

Perhaps I may add one word at this stage. The Minister has really borne a load which is not sustainable by one man in my view, and I pay a real and genuine tribute to the manner in which he has retained his good humour and his stamina throughout. He has obviously carried out an immense amount of work. We have launched a few torpedoes and scored a few hits but I do not think we can claim a sinking.

It is surprising, if I may say so, that on matters of law the noble Earl has received no assistance from those Ministers whose expertise is in that area. It is perhaps not surprising that he has capitulated on every point to the onslaught from the Cross-Benches. The Secretary of State has described this Bill as immense, and indeed it contains provisions affecting some of the most far-reaching principles underlying the criminal law in England and Wales, all of which require intense examination and for which there has been inadequate time.

Many of the amendments that we have put down have involved a great deal of thought and preparation and no conceivable party political content, and as with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which could so easily have been an historic piece of legislation, I fear that the same situation has arisen over this Bill, that if only the Minister had been able to adopt an approach of seeking consensus as to what would be best in the interests of justice this Bill might be a better Bill than at the moment it looks as though it will be. It is difficult to look forward to the Report stage with any optimism; but as an eternal optimist I think I can just about retain an ounce of enthusiasm for what there is to come.

Lord Renton

Nearly all of the contributions to our lengthy debates have been made either by noble and learned Lords or by noble Lords who have had quite a good deal of experience in the criminal courts. It is greatly to the credit of my noble friend Lord Caithness that he has never once, as a layman, appeared at a disadvantage in these discussions. By a felicitous slip of the tongue at one stage I referred to him as "my noble and learned friend", and I begin to feel that it was not very far from the mark. I most warmly endorse the tributes that have been paid to the skill and stamina that my noble friend has shown throughout these long debates.

As to the effect on the Bill of these discussions, as the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, has said, it is undoubtedly a better Bill, and I am quite certain that it will emerge as an even better one at a later stage as a result of representations made—and I should like to pay tribute here too—from all parts of your Lordships' Committee.

The Earl of Caithness

I am grateful for what has been said in the past few minutes. I am very grateful for the support that I have received from my noble friend Lord Renton and indeed others on the Back-Benches. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, is right. I have taken a number of amendments away for consideration and for discussion (particularly with my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor), and there is quite a lot that we have to come back to. Between now and Report stage there is plenty of work to do. If, when one is driving home late tonight one sees a light in the Home Office, do not be surprised if the midnight oil is already being burnt in preparation for consideration tomorrow and the forthcoming days as to what we are going to do. The Bill is already in better shape than when it arrived in this House seven days ago. I have no doubt that it will be in even better shape after Report and Third Reading. I look forward to those events and to continuing our discussion on this very important piece of legislation.

I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported with amendments.