HL Deb 24 February 1987 vol 485 cc154-66

6.58 p.m.

Viscount Davidson

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Viscount Davidson.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD in the Chair.]

Clauses 1 to 4 agreed to.

Lord McCarthy moved the amendment:

Before Clause 5, insert the following new clause:

("Collective bargaining conciliation machinery. .—(1) It shall be the duty of the Board to enter consultation with the workers' organisations concerned in order to establish and maintain joint machinery appropriate to national conditions, and utilisation of the collective bargaining machinery for voluntary negotiations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements, with provision for reference to arbitration in default of such settlement in such cases as may be determined by or under the agreements. (2) The conciliation machinery so established shall ensure respect for the right of workers to organise and will not cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reasons of union membership or because of participation in union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours. (3) The workers' organisations shall participate in such conciliation machinery at all levels of administration with the British coalfield.").

The noble Lord said: This new clause derives from a debate at Committee stage of the Bill in another place when the Member for Salford, East, moved an identical new clause except for the fact that in the second line of the clause he said the word "organisation" and we say "organisations". Thus we are adding a single "s" to that word in our new clause. Otherwise the clause is the same as that moved in another place.

The reason we are adding that "s", so far as we understand it, is because that was the single point of substance which was made by the Government against the clause. They suggested that if we included the word "organisation" rather than "organisations" we might be doing some undercover activity for the National Union of Mineworkers and, to make it quite clear, we put in the plural.

The argument that was advanced by the honourable Member for Salford, East, in another place is essentially the argument which I wish to advance tonight. It is that Clauses 5 to 8 of the present Bill, as I said at Second Reading, represent the consequences of recognising the Union of Democratic Miners. As was said in another place and in this place on Second Reading, we are not contesting that. What we are saying is that certain consequences follow from the recognition of the Union of Democratic Miners at national level and at area level. At both levels the National Coal Board, or British Coal as it now is to be called, has decided to recognise the UDM. Consequently there are consequences for the recognition of the UDM in the ancillary bodies of the conciliation machinery; and that is what Clauses 5 to 8 are intended to cover.

We have no desire to divide the Committee or to quarrel with those consequences. However—and this is the second point which was made in another place—we would argue that the NCB, or BC, is not carrying through the consequences, because what in essence it is doing is ending what might be termed the exclusive bargaining rights of the National Union of Mineworkers for the grades it represents. Under the terms of Section 46(1) of the 1946 nationalisation Act, the National Coal Board was informed by statute that it had to provide negotiating machinery with those unions that represented substantial proportions of the workers that it employed. Until the recognition of the UDM that meant in effect the recognition of the NUM, which was the only union representing substantial proportions of the grades it sought to organise.

As a result of recent events the UDM arose and developed to a position where it has something like 28,000 or 30,000 members, and British Coal decided that it had to recognise the UDM. Therefore there are consequences, and we do not think that those consequences have been followed through. The consequences are the ending of the exclusive bargaining rights in the coal industry of the National Union of Mineworkers. Therefore at national level and at area level a system of what one might call parallel unionism has been established—a system where two unions have their own individual and independent rights for negotiation and where they exist, so far as I can see, from the point of view of the NCB in positions of equal authority so far as national negotiations are concerned and in the case of area negotiations so far as the Nottingham area is concerned.

The problem is that British Coal has not carried through these consequences to the level of the individual unit. What it is trying to do at that level—and this was the argument advanced in another place—is to operate a kind of two-class system, a preferential system, in which there is a majority union and a minority union, and in which, in particular in those areas where the Union of Democratic Miners is the majority union (for example, in Nottingham), the NUM has very restricted bargaining rights. That is the essential problem with which this new clause seeks to deal.

We are saying that on the evidence we have—and I do not think this was denied by the noble Lord when we discussed this on Second Reading—at the level of the individual unit British Coal is operating a two-class system in which there is a majority union, the UDM, which still in effect is the sole bargaining agent at that level, and certain peripheral facilities are offered to the minority union—in that case, the National Union of Mineworkers. It is allowed to represent individuals as the friend of individuals; it is allowed representation on certain local issues. It is not allowed collective bargaining rights—for example, in respect of bonus schemes and so on—and it is not given what would normally be regarded as equality of representation with the majority union.

What was argued by the spokesman for the Opposition in another place, the honourable Member for Salford, East, and what I referred to very quickly at Second Reading is the fact that this anomalous position inevitably leads to charges of victimisation. As the members of the National Union of Mineworkers in Nottingham and Derbyshire seek to exercise what they regard as their normal representative functions, they move beyond the limited functions granted to them by British Coal; and so we have had allegations of victimisation. I am not suggesting to your Lordships that they are proven. In any case some of the allegations are subject to industrial tribunals and therefore may be said to be sub judice. But the allegations have been made, for example, that Mr. Whetton of Bevercotes Colliery was dismissed for putting up a National Union of Mineworkers poster. As I say, I am not suggesting that British Coal would accept that that is what happened. There was an allegation that Mr. McGinty of the 0llerton Colliery was also dismissed for union activity. Similar charges in other pits have been made and some of them are before industrial tribunals.

It is inevitable that such charges should be made and that such disputes should arise if members of the National Union of Mineworkers and representatives and secretaries of local branches seek to act normally and to exercise the normal representative functions of collective bargaining at unit level which they have enjoyed since 1946 and even before that, before nationalisation. Therefore we propose in our new clause a way of solving this problem. What we are saying essentially is that British Coal has decided to operate a system of parallel unionism of equal rights at the level of the areas and in the national negotiating machinery. Therefore it must carry this through at the level of the unit. There must be parallel unionism with equal bargaining rights for the minority where there is a significant membership for both unions.

It was said, and most unjustly said I suggest, in another place in Committee that this was in some way an undercover attempt on the part of the Labour Party to produce benefits for the NUM rather than for the UDM. We do not deny this. There will be benefits in the sense of a return to the established position for the National Union of Mineworkers in Nottingham and also in Derby, where it is clearly a minority union. But the UDM still has only something like one-third or less of the overall membership of the National Union of Mineworkers, and there are many other areas, and units within those areas, where the UDM is in the minority and the NUM is in the majority.

Therefore we would argue very strongly that this is a fair and equitable distribution of advantage and disadvantage. We want to see this because we wish to encourage either of two things. We want especially, directly and exclusively to benefit the National Union of Mineworkers, and we want to do two rather different things. I mentioned them very briefly on Second Reading and I have to say a bit more about them now.

First of all, in terms of good industrial relations principles this is the logical consequence of the breakup of an exclusive bargaining agency. The minority union should be accepted in a position of parity at national level and at area level, but in those areas where the minority union is in the majority, the union which is in the majority overall should be accepted there to be in a position of parity. That is the logical, common sense consequence of breaking up an exclusive jurisdiction arrangement, and it exists wherever there is multi-unionism. So that is the externally determined logical argument in what we are suggesting, but we do not suggest that this is entirely done for logical analysis of collective bargaining principles.

As I sought to suggest at Second Reading, we believe that it is an unmitigated tragedy that there has been the division in representation and trade unionism in the coal industry. Nevertheless, it is a fact and one has to come to terms with that fact. There are a number of ways in which that event can develop, and it is because we believe that parity, rather than an attempt to give advantages to one union or another when it is in a majority position at unit level, is the best way to deal with this unfortunate division between unions that we argue for this clause tonight.

We believe that there are a number of ways in which such a division can go. It can go in the end to a perpetual argument and row between unions or, hopefully, it can go to reconciliation between two different unions. If it is to go towards some kind of accommodation—perhaps some sort of medium, middle-road position—then there must be equality there must be parity and there must not be the feeling that the employer is favouring one union rather than another. In order to facilitate that kind of approach we are moving the clause.

I want to turn very briefly to the three subsections within the clause, in order to argue how it works and how it facilitates and carries forward the objectives that we want to achieve, because one or another of these phrases in the clause has been the subject of certain objections in another place. Subsection (1) of the new clause merely restates in an attenuated and abbreviated form the substance of Section 46(1) of the 1946 nationalisation Act. We want it there to build on. We want it there as a way of emphasising the further consequential effects that we wish to achieve in subsections (2) and (3).

One has to say, however, that it does not do what some of the opponents of the clause in another place suggested that it did. It does not impose a rigid bargaining pattern on the industry. For example, it does not involve automatic arbitration. It merely reiterates and states in a summary form the essential provisions of Section 46(1) of the 1946 nationalisation Act, which, in effect, put a legal authority and responsibility upon the Coal Board to negotiate with unions representing workers in its employ.

Subsection (2) is based upon the provisions of Article 6 of ILO Convention 98, which emphasises the right to organise and bargain. What it does in the context of the new clause is to bring the question of the right to organise without discrimination, and the right not to suffer dismissal or other prejudice, within the negotiating machinery. What we are saying in the first sentence of subsection (2) is: The conciliation machinery so established shall ensure respect for the right of workers to organise and will not cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reasons of union membership". In other words, this shall be done and ensured by the conciliation machinery.

If one understands this, I think it answers some of the objections which were raised in another place on the basis of arguing that we do not need subsection (2) because, under the terms of the Employment Protection Act, we already have provision for unfair dismissal. But the provision for unfair dismissal is external. You go to the Industrial Tribunal and the remedy which you obtain there is compensation. You do not effectively obtain a remedy of reinstatement. Moreover, there are the Government's restrictions on access to the tribunal. Anybody with under two years' service has no right of unfair dismissal.

So what we are proposing here is not something which merely reiterates what is existing in statute. It is something which is going back to the situation as it existed before the Coal Board terminated the conciliation machinery; a situation which has existed since the beginning of that machinery; a situation in which questions of unfair dismissal were dealt with within the conciliation machinery with the acceptance on both sides that the proper remedy in cases where dismissal was found to be unfair was reinstatement or re-engagement. We are saying that that should be the case in circumstances in which dismissal is based on discrimination on grounds of union membership. So subsection (2) is not an unnecessary aberration. It takes us back to the situation as it existed before the board revoked the conciliation machinery.

But we agree that it is subsection (3) which is the central part of our amendment. It is subsection (3) which makes it clear that all recognised unions, including the minority union at unit level, should be allowed to participate in such conciliation machinery not on some kind of second- class basis but from a position of parity. The Government have said in another place, and to some extent when we discussed this at Second Reading, that there are various things wrong with the different subsections. Our position is that we are perfectly willing—indeed, we are eager—to accept any changes which the Government may want to make in terms of the drafting of this amendment.

If the Government say that the terms of subsection (1) are there in any case in the nationalisation Act and that they therefore do not see the need for any addition to Section 46(1) of the 1946 Act but accept the principle behind subsection (2) and, above all, subsection (3), then we shall not ask the Committee at this stage to divide, or argue that the provisions of subsection (1) are crucial.

The central point that we are trying to make is that the Coal Board, for reasons of its own which we do not wish to debate or divide upon tonight, has decided to move away from a position of exclusive jurisdiction. It has done it at area level and at national level, but it has not carried it through to unit level. It is critical for the future of the industry that it should be made quite clear that this in no way means any discrimination against one union or another, and in that spirit—if the Government accept-that principle—they should be prepared to accept our new clause. I beg to move.

7.15 p.m.

Viscount Davidson

When this Bill was debated at its Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, gave notice that he would be tabling an amendment of this kind. I gave reasons on that occasion why I believed that the introduction of such a clause was unnecessary and undesirable. The noble Lord has said nothing this evening to make me change my mind. The clauses in this Bill which give certain rights to unions other than the NUM—that is, Clauses 5, 6 and 7—were necessary to secure for thousands of men basic rights in the management of affairs outside the scope of their normal terms and conditions of employment. However, the proposed new clause deals with matters which do relate directly to the contractual relationship between employer and employee and which govern precisely those normal terms and conditions. Legislation exists which places certain very clear duties on British Coal in that regard. The detail of agreements entered into must be a matter for the parties to the agreements and not for politicians, whether in this House or in another place.

Legislation can lay down basic rights for employees. This has been done, particularly in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978. Some of the provisions in that Act are similar to subsection (2) of the new clause. We see no reason to go further in saying what should or should not be in one particular industry's conciliation machinery. I understand that British Coal, in line with its duty under the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, has entered into discussions with both the NUM and the UDM on proposals for new conciliation machinery. The task is made more difficult because of the failure of the NUM to come to terms with the existence of the new union. The extent of its recognition is a refusal to sit with the UDM. Joint negotiations on any matter are therefore out of the question.

This is why British Coal is in the process of discussing two separate conciliation agreements. Each of those agreements is designed to reflect the 50 per cent. plus one principle for negotiating purposes, whereby it is the majority union in each place of work with which British Coal will negotiate on matters relating to the terms and conditions of employment. That approach seems to me to be entirely sound from a management viewpoint and fully in line with employment legislation. Any other basis for collective bargaining could have a serious destabilising effect on industrial legislation in the coalfields.

I should also emphasise that the proposals give conciliation rights to minority unions, wherever they are. British Coal proposes that, where a union has a majority among mineworkers at a particular colliery, disputes should be resolved by negotiations between British Coal and that union. But where a dispute relates specifically to a minority union, its members would be entitled to discussions with management and to assist any individual member of their union in dispute with colliery management.

To require British Coal to recognise minority unions for all purposes would go far beyond the 1946 Act and it would also be contrary to the position in other industries. There is no general legal requirement of this kind. In the coal industry it would lead to all sorts of difficulties, in particular when men working at the same face might receive quite different rates of pay. Would any union, no matter how small, qualify for recognition? That is what could be implied by the proposed new clause.

Of course there are industries in which more than one union is recognised in a single negotiating unit. But that is something for decision by the employer and not for imposition by statute. There is nothing in either this Bill or the 1946 Act which prevents British Coal from recognising minority unions for any purpose when it thinks that that would make good industrial relations sense.

When an identical amendment was introduced in another place, my right honourable friend the Under-Secretary of State said that he was puzzled by the new clause. The noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, has attempted to explain why he considers a new clause necessary. But I have to confess that I am equally puzzled. It has been said that by using a phrase such as, "appropriate national conditions", the clause could be used to deny rights to the UDM because, while the union is in a majority in some areas, it is in a minority nationally. I prefer not to ascribe such ulterior motives but rather to view the proposed new clause as misguided and unnecessary, albeit perhaps well meant. I hope that I am right.

Whatever the reasons for the amendment, I am sure that if the Government had included such a clause in the Bill as a means of ensuring representation for the UDM the history of the passage of the Bill would have been very different. We would have been accused of driving wedges into the union movement and of unwarranted interference in the affairs of the industry. However, the Government did not introduce such a clause; they saw no need to do so and they still see no need.

I repeat that legislation already puts a duty on British Coal to enter into consultations on conciliation machinery. Individual rights of employees are protected by a body of employment legislation, and it is not appropriate to legislate on the terms of conciliation agreements, which are matters for negotiation between British Coal and its employees. In view of what I have said, I hope that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Wedderburn of Charlton

I rise briefly to support my noble friend in the amendment which he has moved. The noble Viscount referred to the important clauses of the Bill which he spoke of as, "intended to give basic rights to workers on matters that were not within the normal scope of their terms and conditions of employment". I hope that I have quoted him correctly. He is therefore concerned with Clauses 5, 6 and 7. Accepting that, one might think that it was equally if not more important to ensure that similar rights are accorded to workers on matters within the normal scope of their terms and conditions of employment.

When the noble Viscount says that negotiations in this country are traditionally not a matter for legislation, he is right. However, there is perhaps a footnote exception; namely, that all the nationalised industries, and especially the National Coal Board in 1946, had placed upon them a statutory duty to negotiate with unions which represented and which still represent a substantial proportion of workers in the industry. The Government do not change that obligation.

Indeed, I expected the noble Viscount to say that the problem with subsection (1) was not so much that it introduced a new facet into industrial relations in the coal industry but rather that it repeated Section 46 of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946. To some extent, that is true. As my noble friend has said, subsection (1) is the basis for the other two clauses, to which I largely wish to address myself this evening.

In subsection (3) what is at stake is the participation of the trade union chosen by groups of workers at all levels of the industry in what is called in this particular industry the conciliation machinery or, more generally, the negotiation machinery which sets up various types of procedures, including disputes procedures. I fail to see on the argument of the noble Viscount what is wrong with that. There is a problem in the industry. There has been the break-up of a single bargaining agency. There are questions raised, both by the Union of Democratic Mineworkers and the National Union of Mineworkers, as to whether they are being allowed properly to represent their members.

On the day upon which a new Green Paper thrusts before us new proposals based on the notion of democracy in trade unions, it is quite startling to find that the Government are not prepared to advance arguments better than those advanced in another place and in this House in the face of a proposal that in an industry where negotiation has a legal framework and has had such a framework since 1946, a union should be ensured in its ability to represent its members at all levels of the industry's machinery. Contrary to what was said in another place on behalf of the Government, that certainly is not already enshrined in existing legislation.

Subsection (3) appears, in my submission, to advance a case helpful to the industry in clearing up the question of whether each union, in the new situation which is always plagued by the echoes of the strike, can represent its members at various levels, which is not covered in existing legislation.

Subsection (2), it is said by the Government (and I understood the noble Viscount to be repeating the claim tonight), tries to deal with the very important human right of being a member of a trade union and engaging in the activities of an independent trade union without dismissal or penalty by employers. The basic rights of the International Labour Organisation have not been renounced by this Government. It is said that those rights are covered by existing legislation. With great respect, I do not think that is the case. There are two reasons why that is not so.

First, as a matter of law, what the new clause tries to do is to maintain the practice in the industry of ensuring that dismissal or penalty on the ground of trade union membership of whichever union, or on the ground of trade union activity, does not in any way give rise to a threat to the job. The 1978 Act, upon which the noble Viscount relies, in Sections 23 and 58 provides some protection. However, the protection is by way of compensation, and for a person whose livelihood depends upon his employment, that is a distinction of a very material character, whether or not he obtains a special award as compensation in the industrial tribunal. Indeed there is an industrial relations reason under the same heading. These matters are better dealt with in the conciliation machinery and should be dealt with there. It is a great regret, whatever the truth of the matter, that members of the National Union of Mineworkers have been forced into the procedures of the industrial tribunals with, it appears, very arguable cases of discrimination.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is now manifest on the records of the judgments of the courts that the National Coal Board has until very recently engaged in policies which were discriminatory against members of the National Union of Mineworkers. In Ridgeway v.National Coal Board, decided by the Court of Appeal on 29th December last year, one met the case of the National Coal Board refusing to pay the same rates of pay to workers who were members of the National Union of Mineworkers that it had agreed to pay to workers alongside them who were members of the Union of Democratic Mineworkers, the very case instanced by the noble Viscount to support his argument that we did not need this clause.

That case did two things. First, it showed the uncertainty of the present law. It was one of those delightful cases for the lawyers where the industrial tribunal found for the two members of the National Union of Mineworkers and where the Employment Appeal Tribunal reversed that decision. It therefore required further fees for an appeal to the Court of Appeal, which reversed the Employment Appeal Tribunal decision but only by two Lords Justices to one. It came from the Court of Appeal by two to one that the National Coal Board had acted illegally.

This was the policy of the National Coal Board, however, and it might be thought that other lawyers, perhaps members of your Lordships' Judicial Committee, could possibly have taken the view of the Employment Appeal Tribunal. In other words, there is doubt. There is doubt that if the Court of Appeal judgment stands, the National Coal Board was acting illegally in this highly discriminatory policy. Do not the Government want to clear away such uncertainties? Do not the Government want to make sure of the very case that the noble Viscount put to us this evening; that members of different unions will not be paid different rates when working side-by-side underground in the pits? An amendment along the lines of the proposed subsection (2) would do that. It may be that, having received further advice, the noble Viscount will tell us that it is inadequately drafted. If so, one hopes that the Government will take it away, clear up the problem and say quite clearly that, in an industry which has suffered such agonies and which, for the past 40 years, has been based on some kind of statutory structure, there shall not be discrimination against members of one union or indeed of the other at all levels.

7.30 p.m.

Lord Rochester

From these Benches, I feel it incumbent on me to make a few comments on the amendment. I have listened carefully to what the noble Lords, Lord McCarthy and Lord Wedderburn, have said, and also to the Minister's initial response. With all respect, I do not think that an adequate case has been made out for the inclusion of the new clause in the Bill.

The legislation is not concerned with negotiating rights or with conciliation machinery. Therefore, it does not seem to me to be an appropriate vehicle for what the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, has in mind. Even if it were, I can see no adequate reason for this amendment to be made. As I understand it, the effect of the judgment in the High Court last June was to make it clear that the conciliation machinery which has operated in the past in the coal industry should be altered to accord recognition to the Union of Democratic Mineworkers. I regret the necessity for that change but feel that in the circumstances it was unavoidable.

My information, like that of the noble Viscount, is that British Coal is now discussing proposals for new conciliation machinery with the relevant trade unions as required by the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946. There does not therefore appear to be any need to provide for such machinery to be set up under this Bill.

For that reason, I do not find it possible to support the amendment. In the light of the words used by the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, when he first moved the amendment, and with that factor among others in mind, I hope that he will not press it any further tonight.

Viscount Davidson

I apologise to the Committee if I jumped up to speak rather too quickly. I thought that I had paused for rather a long time. I think it would have been better if perhaps the two noble Lords who have spoken had done so before I replied, Nevertheless, I shall try in a very short time to reply to some of the points they have made.

I do not propose to go into the details of the proposed new clause. As I said earlier, the main point of the Bill is to enable British Coal to establish parity between the two unions which now exist. What is proposed by British Coal is an agreement which offers the same rights to the unions depending on whether they are majority or minority. I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, for his support.

So far as concerns industrial tribunals, this is now the general law and there is no good reason why the coal industry should perpetuate separate and more stringent regimes for its own employees. There was no general law when in 1948 the National Coal Board and the NUM agreed the previous arrangements for wrongful dismissal and it is difficult to accept that British Coal should now perpetuate arrangements which would oblige it to go further for its employees than other employers have to do.

I should like to repeat that I have been advised by British Coal that proposals for new conciliation machinery are being discussed with the unions. That point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Rochester. It is not therefore necessary to take powers in relation to conciliation in the Bill. I would again ask the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, not to press his amendment.

Lord McCarthy

We are naturally disappointed by the replies of the noble Viscount. I accept that he has done his best to answer many of the points that have been raised, though I am sorry that he did not refer particularly to the points made by my noble friend Lord Wedderburn in respect of the Ridgeway case, the discrimination against the National Union of Mineworkers and the opportunity that the Government might have had at this stage to clear up the issue.

However, as I understand the noble Viscount, three arguments have been advanced and it does not seem to me that they hold up. First, he seemed to be saying in much of his original contribution and in his subsequent contribution that we cannot do what we want to do because it would represent an interference in the contractual autonomy of the parties to the collective bargaining process in the coal industry.

As my noble friend Lord Wedderburn has said, the nationalised industries have had from their inception a statutory structure which has regulated and affected their system of collective bargaining. In so far as we wish to regulate, change or support that structure, we essentially want to go back to the principles of Section 46(1) of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946. Therefore the argument that we should not interfere with the contractual relationships of the bargaining parties in the coal industry does not stand up. That comes extremely ill from a Government who have not only regulated collective bargaining in all kinds of ways—in the legislation of 1980, 1982 and 1984—but on this very day have proposed a whole series of new ways in which the internal affairs of trade unions shall be regulated. Therefore I do not believe that "hands off" is a consistent and comprehensive policy which this Government can advance against our clause at this time of night.

The second set of arguments which the Minister advanced seemed to be that the problem we are trying to deal with—and I give him credit for saying that we are trying to do this in the right spirit, misguided though we may be—is in a sense the fault of the National Union of Mineworkers. I do not want to misrepresent the Minister but he seemed to say that the problem is that the National Union of Mineworkers will not come to terms with the existence of the Union of Democratic Mineworkers.

I accept that there are problems in coming to terms with a breakaway union such as the UDM, but there is also a responsibility on the part of governments, if they take a serious interest in industrial relations, to assist such a coming to terms. What we have been arguing throughout this debate is that the proposals we suggest are one of the ways in which the Government might help the two unions to come to terms with each other and to do so because that is the logical and equitable consequence of the recognition of the UDM at area and national level.

Until and unless that is done, and unless some indication is given by the Government to the National Coal Board that it ought to be done, it is legitimate for the NUM to say that it is being discriminated against at unit level and that the alternative system of parity operates at national level and area level where it benefits the UDM; but if it does not benefit the UDM and if it discriminates against the NUM, then some quite different system is to be introduced at unit level. Therefore if the noble Lord says that he wants to help the unions and the industry to come to terms with each other, I suggest that he should support our amendment.

Finally, and I suppose this is in a way the one new fact which we have elicited from the Government this evening, the noble Lord has actually brought out into the open and defended at unit level the principle of 50 plus one. I say with sincerity and with whatever authority I can muster that I know not this principle of 50 plus one. It is a strange, bizarre and unusual principle to me. I do not know where the National Coal Board got it from. I do not know how it reconciles and justifies what it has done at area and national level where they do not operate 50 plus one; they operate parity.

If it were a legitimate principle, then surely it should operate at all levels. If it operated at all levels the UDM would not be recognised at national or area level. Therefore this strange and bizarre principle of 50 plus one which we know not, which we have never seen before and which I hope we shall never see again, is introduced at unit level. The inevitable consequence one must draw—and I draw it with regret and reluctance—is that it is introduced by the management of the National Coal Board because it benefits one union. That seems to me to be the last thing to do if you want to reconcile unions and get them to come to terms with each other.

Those are the arguments put before us by the noble Lord. We said on Second Reading that we regarded the division of the mining unions in this industry as a tragedy. We said we accepted that, given recognition, Clauses 5 to 8 were inevitable. We said that what was not inevitable was an endless and continuous battle between the two unions in which it could be said that both the employer and the Government take one side against the other. That is the inevitable consequence of what we have heard tonight. We shall not divide the Committee. On the other hand, we do not intend to withdraw our proposed new clause.

The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Hayter)

Is it your Lordships' pleasure that this amendment be withdrawn? The amendment is, by leave, withdrawn.

Remaining clauses agreed to.

Schedules agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported without amendment: Report received.