§ 2.57 p.m.
Lord HuntMy Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will revise the procedure for reviewing the question of provisional release of prisoners serving life sentences, in the light of the High Court ruling in the case of Mr. Brian Handscomb.
§ Lord BeaverbrookMy Lords, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary is still studying the judgment, which relates only to prisoners serving discretionary life sentences and not to all life sentence prisoners, and will announce the Government's response in due course.
Lord HuntMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that Answer, but is he aware that it was precisely to avoid oversights in the review of life sentence cases which were occurring—if he will take my word for it—not infrequently in his department before 1973, that a joint committee was set up in that year composed of Parole Board members and officials of his department and chaired by the vice-chairman of the Parole Board, who was a High Court judge? Does not this case demonstrate the desirability of reinstating that committee, which did excellent work for 10 years until it was abolished by Mr. Leon Brittan in 1983?
§ Lord BeaverbrookMy Lords, yes, I am aware that the joint committee used to undertake this work but I think the court's criticisms were confined to the applications of certain aspects of the policy for dealing with the cases of life sentence prisoners announced in 1983. The court upheld the lawfulness of that policy, 896 which it described as unassailable. I do not think this judgment has any effect upon that policy itself.
§ Lord Hutchinson of LullingtonMy Lords, will the Minister appreciate that the court of three judges castigated the Home Secretary on the manner in which this policy had been carried out and pointed out that it had led to prisoners being kept in custody for a minimum of nine years, far beyond the time the sentencer had envisaged? Is the Minister also aware that the Home Secretary was castigated for accepting the arrogant view that he could ignore the judges' recommendation on tariff if he so wished and substitute his own view on tariff?
Does not the Minister feel that he owes an apology to all those who suffered from this injustice and also an apology to those Members of this House who pointed out at the time that this policy was probably unlawful and certainly autocratic and that it had upset the whole basis of the parole system as it had been administered since the days of my noble friend Lord Hunt?
§ Lord BeaverbrookMy Lords, no. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary would not accept that the parole system has been made less effective or has been in any way denigrated since the days of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. As I said, I cannot comment further on what my right honourable friend the Home Secretary's response will be at this stage.
§ Lord MishconMy Lords, will the Minister listen to the voice of sweet reasonableness? In regard to the judgment of the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench, would he not agree that as the judgment was delivered on 2nd March and as the matters dealt with—especially, if I may say so, by the learned Lord Justice Watkins—are matters of some urgency, the Home Secretary should have formed some opinion before now on just two of the main points? The first one is that the Divisional Court decided that to wait for three or four years before fixing the term that should be served by a prisoner for retribution and deterrence was wrong and that this should be done soon after the sentence, if not at the time of sentence, and that the Home Secretary should take regard of the wishes of the judiciary and should not impose his own views when deciding this period. Does not the noble Lord think that those two matters are somewhat simple to decide upon in regard to policy, having regard to the clear judgment of the court?
§ Lord BeaverbrookMy Lords, the terms of the declaratory relief offered to the applicants was settled only yesterday and this has inevitably delayed consideration of the implications of the judgment. The formal position is that the Government now have 28 days in which to consider the question of whether an appeal should be made.