§ 2.49 p.m.
§ Lord BrockwayMy Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
§ The Question was as follows:
§ To ask Her Majesty's Government what action they propose to take in response to the moratorium on all nuclear weapon tests unilaterally declared by General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union until 31st March 1986.
§ The Minister of State for Defence Support (Lord Trefgarne)My Lords, we have made clear on numerous occasions that declaratory gestures of this type have no real value in arms control terms. We remain committed towards achieving balanced, verifiable arms control agreements which contribute to British security. In particular, we remain committed to seeking progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty.
§ Lord BrockwayMy Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer. May I ask him whether he has noted President Reagan's invitation to Soviet scientists to witness a nuclear detection system and to monitor an underground test in Nevada? Does this not indicate that one of his reasons for not signing the comprehensive ban is to carry out further experiments, some of which may be more dangerous? While the Soviet Government may decline the invitation, because they are carrying out unilaterally no underground tests, will the Government do three things: first, press President Reagan to ratify the 1974 and 1976 test ban treaties; secondly, complete the hopeful negotiations on verification; and, thirdly, sign the comprehensive treaty?
§ Lord TrefgarneMy Lords, if I may take first the first of the noble Lord's supplementary questions, where he referred to the 1974 threshold test ban and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosion treaties, I understand that the United States wishes to carry out or achieve better verification provisions for those treaties before they can move ahead; and I can well understand its anxiety in that respect. But the United States has indicated that those measures, such as 792 proposals for test site observers, are a basis which could work towards an effective verification regime for those treaties. So perhaps the situation is not quite so black as the noble Lord suggested.
Verification remains the key on the signing of a comprehensive test ban treaty. We believe strongly that such a treaty would be without value if it does not have effective verification provisions within it.
§ Lord Cledwyn of PenrhosMy Lords, while we appear to live in an age of declaratory gestures which are not always helpful, is it not the case that the deputy Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Komplektov, recently said that the Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate on site verification and the possibility of a full test ban treaty? Can the noble Lord tell us what steps Her Majesty's Government are taking towards the possibility of talks on those two subjects?
§ Lord TrefgarneMy Lords, the Soviet Union has indicated that it would be willing under certain conditions, as I understand it, to accept observers of Soviet nuclear tests; but apparently the proposal is tied, in a way which is not entirely clear, to United States prior acceptance of the moratorium. That is a matter with which we should have some difficulty, for reasons which the noble Lord will understand. We have made clear in the past, as I endeavoured to make clear in the main Answer to the Question this afternoon, that declaratory gestures such as the moratorium which the Soviet Union has been proposing are without value while they are not properly verifiable.
§ Lord Cledwyn of PenrhosMy Lords, with great respect, does the Minister not agree that the moratorium is not a declaratory gesture but a fact which has been taking place for some months? Will the Minister therefore say what steps Her Majesty's Government are now taking to clarify whether or not the moratorium is the condition that he describes it to be?
§ Lord TrefgarneMy Lords, it is always difficult to get to the bottom of exactly what the Soviet Union is proposing, because it keeps on attaching conditions to whatever is proposed. The fact remains that the United States proposal, to which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, referred, where President Reagan invited observers to watch an American nuclear test, was without conditions of any kind.
§ Lord MayhewMy Lords, will the noble Lord confirm, however, that the unwillingness of the Government to resume negotiations for a comprehensive treaty is due to difficulties of verification and not to the fact that further tests are needed for the Trident project?
§ Lord TrefgarneNo, my Lords. The Government position on this matter is that we should like to see the verification problems addressed before the negotiations are resumed. We do not think there will be much point in negotiations while these problems loom large and have not been solved.
§ Lord Jenkins of PutneyMy Lords, is the noble Lord aware that to call a unilateral decision to stop testing a declaratory gesture is to murder the English language? In the circumstances, will he not make a similar declaratory gesture, if that is what it is, and decide that this Government too will stop testing? If a unilateral decision to stop testing is a declaratory gesture then a large number of us on this side of the House will welcome it.
§ Lord TrefgarneMy Lords, I do not think that the limited unilateral and indeed declaratory gesture to which I have referred is any substitute for a long-term durable agreement. That durability will be achieved by resolving the problems, not by sweeping them under the carpet.
§ Lord MolloyMy Lords, the Minister has quite correctly said that the key to all this seems to be verification acceptable to both sides. Would it not be possible for Her Majesty's Government to consider talking to the United States and to the USSR, to have a conference and a discussion about what they feel might be the first realistic step towards ultimately achieving verification, which would mean so much to all mankind?
§ Lord TrefgarneMy Lords, what the noble Lord has in mind would be a meeting of technical experts, for example, to address the problems of verification, which are not inconsiderable, and the Government would support that.
§ Lord BrockwayMy Lords, will the Government reconsider their attitude on this issue by an immediate signing of the comprehensive treaty? Is the Minister not aware that all world opinion, except for America, this Government and France, is in favour of the signing of the comprehensive agreement? Will he not respond to world opinion?
§ Lord TrefgarneMy Lords, there is really no point in entering into an agreement where there is scope for widespread cheating. That must remain the position while it is not possible to verify the effective compliance with such an agreement.