HL Deb 12 March 1986 vol 472 cc649-71

4.33 p.m

Lord Molloy rose to call attention to the proposal for the establishment of an International Standing Consultations Commission to examine world disarmament proposals; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think that to a degree it is rather unfortunate that these two short debates should follow one another, because they are not by any means identical. Indeed, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, made a winding-up speech, because no other Tory uttered a word on this vital subject. He said that the Government's policy was quite firm. In no way would they abandon thermonuclear weapons unless there were some other method which could give a form of guarantee. My submission this afternoon is almost in answer to that statement.

I think we all agree that nuclear weapons are the millstone of madness around the neck of mankind, whether we are people from nuclear or non-nuclear powers. It is horrible to think that all the people who died of starvation and suffered the agonies that we saw in Ethiopia could be lucky if there were to be a thermonuclear war next month or next year. What then will happen to mankind? I am bound to say that I do not think we are doing enough as civilised, sensible people, whether we come from my country, the USSR, or the USA.

Perhaps I may say immediately that I do not intend in any way to be anti-United States or anti-Soviet Union, and certainly not anti-my own country. But I am anti-anyone who really believes that there is absolutely no answer but to hold out the possibility of slaying all mankind nearly forty times over. I believe that is the situation at which we have arrived.

In addition, the current situation with regard to nuclear weapons has retarded civilised progress, as well as offering the possibility of total annihilation. Of course, right at the source fear has made its contribution. The Americans are afraid of Communism and Russia; Russia is afraid of capitalism and America. Both are influenced by fear, but fear is a very bad adviser. We should also remember that its companion is hatred, and hatred is the father and mother of cruelty and intolerance. It is the aspect of intolerance which deeply concerns me.

Another aspect about which I believe we should be concerned is the almost psychological anaesthesia from which we are suffering at this particular moment in the western world. We will not see. We seem to be blind to the peril of a thermonuclear war and its terrors. We seem to think that somehow or other it will not happen. But it can happen. I have even heard people say that of course an atomic bomb has never been dropped. We all know that this is untrue. We all know what happened at Nagasaki and Hiroshima and how shattered and shocked we were, though at the time some of us may have had doubts as to whether it was good that it was done. We have come to realise that that was just a triviality compared with what could happen if a thermonuclear war were to break out under present conditions.

This planet has plenty of problems: the problems of oil pollution, disease and starvation. Only yesterday that great European politician Herr Willy Brandt, in the company of Mr. Edward Heath, made a statement, apropos of his remarkable book, on how there are literally millions of people in the world who are starving and hungry and that we in the West—or in the North, if you like—have the capacity to help them. While that appeal was being made, at the same time, Great Britain announced that it intended to spend another £584 million more on the Trident nuclear weapon. There must be something barmy going on when those two things can happen in this ancient Parliament on the same day.

A nuclear war will of course get rid of all the problems that we have. It will get rid of all the people. It will destroy absolutely the water of life. We have to ask ourselves how much time we have left. I must reiterate that I do not wish my submission lo be regarded in any way as anti-Russian or anti-American. It is merely that perhaps we can grope forward somehow and find an answer ultimately to abolishing nuclear weapons or at least to having them under iron control. In the end absolute riddance of them is essential.

The other day I was privileged to go to a Royal Society soiree and there I heard of remarkable things being done by British scientists It is absolutely fantastic how they are finding ways of growing more food, and making interesting machines which would be labour-saving and help to increase production. No doubt there are counterparts and equivalents of our Royal Society in other countries, which are bent on destroying pestilence and erasing starvation and try to do what Dean Swift said was worthy of the entire race of politicians; namely, to raise two blades of grass where one existed before. All this wonderful endeavour fades with the threat of thermonuclear war. It will not be a war to end wars. It will be a war to end civilisation.

Recently the British Medical Association issued a remarkable book, already referred to, I believe, called The Long Term Environmental Medical Effects of Nuclear War. I suggest to my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition on the Front Bench the possibility of a debate simply on this document—I also ask the noble Baroness opposite to have a word with the Leader of the House about it—produced not by some wicked red organisation or some pacifist and untrustworthy organisation, but by the British Medical Association. We should debate what is fascinating and terrifying reading. The book speaks of the effect of nuclear explosions and nuclear tests, the atmospheric effects, the dust and smoke effects, the generation of fire and smoke, the effects on agriculture and the biological effects on all humanity. Those are matters with which we should be concerned.

One can derive a little encouragement from the fact that there have been genuine endeavours in the past to grasp and to grapple with this terrible problem by providing some form of warning. We have had the warnings. We have tried to find an answer to the warnings. There have been some tiny achievements. It is not simply those with extreme Left-wing views who happen to be against nuclear war. Many good, decent people are dead against nuclear war. I have already mentioned the BMA. Others include the Physicians for Social Responsibility and also some eminent military leaders. But, alas, all their warnings have not been heeded.

Looking at a cross-section of people who are gravely apprehensive in our country, in the United States, and throughout the European Community and the British Commonwealth, one can safely say that this is not simply an issue of politics. It is a question of life and death. Even the President of the United States, in his hollowed-out retreat in Mount Weather, 80 miles north of Washington, might survive the initial blast, but he will not live for long afterwards. He will not be able to come out of the hole he is digging for himself. It would be much better to heed the warning given by the great United States President, Dwight Eisenhower, when he said: The conference table, though scarred by many frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield. Disarmament is a continuing imperative. We must compose differences not with arms but intellect and decent purpose".

Those words of President Eisenhower are very much applicable to today. Of course, we have had a few successes. We must take encouragement from them. The comprehensive test ban treaty, the Antarctic treaty, the treaty on outer space, the seabed treaty and the biological weapons convention—all these things we have somehow managed to achieve. We should take some degree of comfort from them in the hope that we can edge, slowly perhaps, towards finding an ultimate answer.

This year is the United Nations International Year of Peace. Within the United States, groups are already doing their best to draw the attention of their government to the fact that there are folk in the United States who do not wholly go along with the attitude that you can only be safe under some nuclear shield, with the capacity to wipe out millions of your fellow human beings. In the USSR, a four-day world disarmament conference is to take place next May in the Georgian city of Tbilisi. Even the great powers, and people within them, are moving towards another way of thinking.

World military expenditure is now running at £1,000 million a day or 650 billion dollars a year. Surely we can be compared to the Gadarene swine in that we are spending this massive amount of money without providing a single aspirin to relieve suffering or one loaf of bread. Instead, these vast sums—can it really be in true Christian spirit?—are spent on purposes that could wipe out all humanity. This is the issue that we must have the courage to face. I have mentioned eminent military leaders. We can perhaps do no better than to listen again and to read what the late Earl Mountbatten had to say. He said: The world now stands on the brink of the final abyss. Let us resolve to take all possible steps to ensure that we do not, through our own folly, go over the edge". That is the great challenge—that folly or blindness might push us over the edge.

A great European statesman, Olof Palme of Sweden, proposed many years ago his international security committee and also an international independent commission on disarmament. At one time it seemed that his proposals might take root. But, alas, that did not happen. There have been many conferences. But there is, of course, between the great powers a lack of trust. I can understand the British Government, the United States Government, or the Government of the USSR, saying that they will not drop their nuclear shield because they are not sure that others will drop theirs, despite promising so to do.

The argument has always been the matter of verification. The new leader of the Soviet people, Mr. Gorbachev, has adumbrated—one might say that he has outlined in detail—the possibility of on-site verification of any agreement. I understand that, initially, even the President of the United States thought that it was not a bad idea; that is, until some of his advisers got at him. Advisers on both sides are very dangerous people. I know of no well-known adviser, Russian or American, who has made any recommendation whatever for trying to find a way to stop the making of thermonuclear weapons and for their numbers, gradually, on a basis of trust and confidence, to be reduced.

I can understand, therefore, that without verification we shall not move forward. It is possible, I believe, for this country—we can still play the honest broker—the United States and the USSR to establish a standing consultations commission comprising the best scientists of the United States, of Russia, and also of the United Kingdom, the European Community and the Warsaw and NATO pacts, with ultimate freedom and full power to examine any suggestion for the reduction of nuclear weapons. I do not have the time to go into the details of how this might be achieved. Indeed, I do not know how precisely it could be done. However, someone at one time recommended that man might be able to fly—that this was a possibility. Leonardo da Vinci thought of an idea. As we know, it was copied centuries later by the Wright brothers, who actually did fly.

If, after all the summit meetings and all the proposals to stop nuclear explosions and to reduce the existence of nuclear weapons, both in the East and in the West, there could be complete verification, so far as this was humanly possible, by the international body that I have suggested—operating to the total satisfaction of my Government, the Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States, together with other powers that might be interested—it must be followed by day-to-day on-site inspection. They must take full cognisance of the possibility that once there has been an agreement and the specialists of the international committee say, "Yes, it has been carried out", they would have to stay there. What could be carried out in one month could then be restarted a month later.

If you are asking me to say that perhaps the great international powers are cheats, I shall say yes we have done a good bit of cheating in our time—as have the Soviets and the Americans. So let us make sure that there can be no cheating and that the powers of this international committee would be to give firm, complete, assurance not only that agreements have been carried out but that there is no opportunity whatsoever of any secret reinstallation of nuclear weapons.

If I am told that that is an idle dream all I can answer is this. I would prefer my dream to the nightmare which some people would like in having nuclear war. If we examine the possibility of the commission which I have outlined—it would take a long time to get the views of our American allies, of the Soviet Union, of our EC allies and the British Commonwealth of Nations—but we could think about whether we could make this a reality. If the mighty scientists of this world know how to slay every American and every Russian 40 times over is it not possible that they might also be able to find a way to say that we can make certain beyond all peradventure that the slow diminution of nuclear weapons can become a fact and that this joining together of international scientists from all our countries to form this great commission could very well be the saviour of mankind?

I conclude with the firm belief deep within me that while I have not gone, and cannot go, into the absolute detail, I believe that the threat we face is so enormous that no suggestions which might have some merit or possibility should be disregarded. I am grateful to your Lordships' House for listening to me and I beg to move for Papers.

4.53 p.m.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Lord for his proposal, which I consider a valuable one. He mentioned that it was first made by the late Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Olof Palme. His proposal did not come quite to nothing. He did himself gather an international committee which has produced extremely valuable reports in this very field. He was chairman of it. The British member was my right honourable friend Dr. David Owen.

The noble Lord, Lord Molloy, spoke on the possibility of gathering the mightiest scientists in the world to have an opinion on disarmament proposals and to watch it happen, if it ever does. I would commend to his attention, and to that of your Lordships, the Pugwash Conferences which, since they were founded by Einstein, Mme Joliot-Curie and Bertrand Russell in the 1950s, have indeed done just that and have produced some powerful reports. The problem is not in giving them authority to review matters, inspect them and to have an opinion, but to give anybody the authority to see that it is actually done.

First, we why do we want disarmament at all? I am sometimes struck in these debates by the assumption that there are people who are fully aware of the horrors of nuclear war, should it happen, and those who are less than fully aware. Some of us seem to be trying to convince others that nuclear war would be intolerable. I think that we can skip that stage of the argument. It would be—and the only worthwhile argument is how best to avoid it. That is the argument that I shall address this afternoon.

The reasons for thinking that disarmament is a good way to avoid war used to be familiar, but are perhaps dropping out of sight a little now. They are not because it would automatically and without further ado usher in the new golden age. The reasons are less glamorous. They are these. The arms race wastes real wealth. The wealth of humanity is being sucked into the rich north and especially into the United States now one of the great debtor nations. That wealth is then actively wasted. All around people are starving—as Willy Brandt reminded us in this building yesterday—yet that wealth is deliberately and elaborately spent on the one product of human labour, arms, which not only does not make new wealth (gambling machines do not do that either) but which destroys wealth. The industrialised north takes wealth out of circulation and lays it aside in great heaps which are expensive to maintain and to renew and which create the daily possibility that everything will be destroyed The industrialised north has now taught the agricultural south to copy this zombie pattern of behaviour.

The second great reason for thinking that disarmament is desirable is the risk of accident or madness. That is obvious. The third is the split-second reactions now required even of sane men in good control. Under SDI—if it ever came about—these would be delegated to machines.

Disarmament cannot disinvent weaponry but it can remove Armageddon from its present time horizon of seconds to one of many months—the time which would be necessary to rebuild the weapons which have been destroyed. If the noble Lord, Lord Molloy's commission were now in full existence, what would it find? It would find in effect two disarmament plans on the world agenda: the American one of last November; and the Russian one of 15th January with later additions, principally Mr. Gorbachev's speech to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of 25th February.

How would it judge them? First, it would see that the American plan consists of positions advanced in several of the numerous forums in which disarmament is now discussed but never set out as a whole in a way which would show the relation of one part to another. There is a proposal to reduce inter-continental nuclear delivery means, a proposal to reduce intermediate range nuclear forces, a proposal to start a new arms race in space, a proposal to abolish chemical weapons accompanied by a proposal to make some more in America, a refusal to consider a complete test ban, etc.

The Soviet proposal, on the other hand, is a comprehensive one. It mentions everything and relates everything to everything else. Again and again in his proposal of 15th January, and in his later speech to the Party Congress, Mr. Gorbachev harps on the totality of the arms control problem, on the comprehensiveness of his proposed solution, and the need to activate all the negotiating fora. Even though bits of the Soviet plans would present the West in general, and this country and France in particular, with some obvious difficulties, the fact that this is a complete package makes it not only easier to understand and judge, but also intrinsically more likely to succeed.

Let me dwell on this point about comprehensiveness. The main reason why success in disarmament has in the modern world been so very limited is that we have been tackling it piecemeal. The favourite British Government words have for decades been "building blocks" and "step by step". That approach was bound to fail and it has failed, conclusively, over an entire generation. The reason is this. One cannot hope to achieve balanced reductions in one kind of weapon alone. They will reveal the imbalances in neighbouring kinds of weapons. One cannot hope to achieve reductions between two countries alone. They will reveal the threatening might of neighbouring countries. Attempts to do these things are wasted and if we now insist on renewing those attempts after such abundant proof of their uselessness that would be a form of treachery towards the peoples of the world. There is a point where ignorance of history becomes treachery. Therefore the Soviet proposal is convenient and timely simply because it is comprehensive. What we do not like in it can be put right in negotiations—that is what negotiations are for.

There has, unfortunately, been some misrepresentation in the West. The Prime Minister was at it yesterday in the House of Commons; The Times was at it this morning. At Question Time yesterday the Leader of the Labour Party, Mr. Kinnock, asked the Prime Minister, why will she not at least pursue discussions based on the [Soviet] proposal to get SS20s out of Europe altogether"? The Prime Minister said that Mr. Kinnock was mistaken in thinking that that was the offer that Mr. Gorbachev had made. She said: He has not made a total zero-zero offer. He has made an offer which would mean that a number of the missiles went to the far east of the country and could, of course, be moved back. That is totally different from a zero-zero option".—[Official Report, Commons, 11/3/86; col. 805.] First, even if that were a correct statement of the facts, the argument is weak. It would be no easier for the Soviet Union to bring the weapons back from the far east of the country than it would be for the Americans to bring the cruise missiles and Pershings back from the United States if they were removed from Europe. They are at present brought by air to Greenham Common, Molesworth, and to other places in Germany, Italy and so on. I have seen them flying in myself, and so obviously have many noble Lords. Nevertheless, that is not a correct statement of the Soviet offer.

On 14th February General Chervov, who is the general officer in the Soviet General Staff concerned with international negotiations and disarmament, said of the SS20s which the Soviet Union has offered to remove from Europe, including from Russia: They would be destroyed, destroyed under careful and reliable control, national and international control, including on-site inspections". He also said that their launching pads and infrastructure would be destroyed. It is not a question of moving them to the far east from whence they could come back.

All right. It was not Mr. Gorbachev himself speaking; it was as if not Mrs. Thatcher but, say, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff was speaking. Does that make it any less binding on that government? Why should the Prime Minister go to the House of Commons and speak as though she did not know of this statement? Or did she not know of it? The Soviet proposal is for a separate zero-zero, or whatever the agreement may turn out to be, in Asia, negotiated with the interested parties there and corresponding to the European one.

Why again does the Prime Minister consistently treat the whole Soviet initiative as if it were about nuclear weapons only? Why do so many United States spokesmen do so? Do they really believe that? Who is telling them that?

The Soviet proposal includes strategic weapons reductions; intermediate nuclear force reductions; prevention of an arms race in space; a comprehensive test ban; conventional disarmament; mutual and balanced conventional force reductions; chemical disarmament; confidence-building measures; even the removal under the INF rubric of the short range nuclear missiles which they have moved into Czechoslovakia and East Germany since the build-up of cruise and Pershing II in the West. It also includes INF in Asia; discussions about terrorism; about aid; about open societies; about religious persecution; about what the Russians call "social and personal rights" (which we call human rights); about regional problems, and about world debt. Many of these discussions President Reagan has rightly called for.

I had so much hoped to be able to spend the time today talking only about what ought to be done and not about trying to stop the presumably Washington-originated slide towards misrepresentation of the other side's position. The fact is that the Soviet proposal is highly important for two reasons. It is the first comprehensive disarmament proposal to be made by either side since 1961, which alone would make it an historic moment. About that there can be no question. I also judge—and here I may be wrong—that it is the most constructive and useful disarmament proposal ever made by the Soviet Union.

Taken with the rest of Mr. Gorbachev's five-hour speech to the party congress last month, it constitutes I believe one of the rare turning points in Soviet history; certainly comparable to Khrushchev's famous speech when he came to office. We wanted these things to happen in Russia and they are beginning to happen in Russia. This is not a turning point which can be safely understood through the dark glasses of the Western press nor even, I most strongly urge, through the resumes of officials who are almost as busy as the Ministers whom they serve. It is the duty of every person who seeks to influence the destiny of this country to read these lengthy documents for himself, and in full. Members of both Houses can obtain them free through the BBC monitoring service, and there are copies in the Libraries of both Houses. Presumably the Soviet Embassy will be glad enough to provide them for others.

I have said and repeat that not everything in the Soviet proposals is satisfactory. The United States proposals contain many valuable elements. There is no obvious clash coming on intercontinental weapons—reduction to half was originally an American proposal in 1977. The Russians rejected it then with deplorable roughness. We can be delighted that they have now accepted it and have built it into their own more complete formula.

In INF, the gaps are rapidly shrinking. On MBFR, new formulae are coming forward, including one from this country, which are introducing new hope. On space, the situation is deadlocked and will remain so until this president or the next clearly demotes the American SDI plan to the nearest prudent hedge of research. On chemical weapons, the United States Administration should make the spending of the money which Congress has voted for a new generation depend on negotiations, and our Government should urge them publicly to do that.

On the test ban, the United States should agree to come back to the negotiating table, which they have left. They are morally bound by the Partial Test Ban Treaty to do so and our Government should publicly urge them to do just that, too. We in the West cannot simply let the extended Soviet moratorium on testing pass by without any response. I know that it is difficult for the Government, but that is because of their own ill-considered decision to use the Polaris replacement programme to make a great leap forward in military nuclear power. That brings me to the direct impact on this country.

Once again we must first clear away the misrepresentations. The Government say that the Soviet proposals would require the "freezing" of our independent nuclear deterrent and thus the cancellation of its modernisation programme, irrespective of what that might be, whether Trident or something else. The Government say that now is not the time to do that—maybe later. However, now is not the time that the Soviet Union suggests we should do it. The Soviet plan explicitly recognises the legitimacy of West European independent nuclear forces until the conclusion of the disarmament process alongside their own.

In the Soviet Phase 1, which is supposed to last until some time between 1991 and 1994, the word they use about our nuclear forces is not "freeze" but "build up". They invite us not to build up our nuclear forces. The difference is quite clear. It is only in the second stage envisaged by the Soviet proposal, which would last, if everything went forward with the greatest imaginable despatch, from 1991 to 1997, that the idea of "freezing" comes in. Since the purpose of the whole thing is to achieve the complete abolition of nuclear weapons "by the end of 1999", I must say that the idea of freezing what we have two or three years before that does not seem to me so very terrible. The Russian plan does not suggest that the super-powers themselves should freeze their nuclear weapons at any time. No doubt this is an oversight, but it is worth pointing out to them.

It would certainly be possible, as the Soviet plan now stands, for the super-powers to modernise what legitimately remained during the disarmament process right up to the last day of the reduction. Our best approach to this would no doubt be to ask them to assume the same restraint as we do, and at the same moment; that is, during the second phase, some 10 years ahead if the plan is begun immediately.

We should also be putting ideas of our own into the melting pot; even pouring them in, and they should be European ideas. We should propose a European Disarmament Monitoring Agency, which could be linked with regional agencies of the same sort elsewhere in the world. Ultimately—and here I come back to Lord Molloy's ideas—there will of course have to be a world monitoring agency, but the regional approach would be useful even now. The security not just of the super-powers but of all the world will be at stake during a disarmament process, and we shall want our own means of knowing whether engagements are being kept.

The links between such a system and the on-site inspection which the Russians are now offering in an increasing number of fields—in the test ban, in the destruction of the SS20s, etc.—are obvious The European Agency would have something in common with, but would be wider than, the long-standing proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, and it would provide a specific purpose for Eureka, which seems at the moment to be a bit short on purposes.

Lastly, I will end as I always like to with a word of praise for the Government: in the House of Commons on 5th March, at column 181, Mr. Renton, the Minister for Disarmament in the Foreign Office, answered a Written Question with the following words: We would like to see the ABM treaty reaffirmed and strengthened". My Lords, so would we. That has been a strong Social Democrat plank over the last years. We are delighted that the Government should be stealing our clothes. If I may conclude with a question, how would the Government like to see the ABM treaty reaffirmed and strengthened, and when?

5.12 p.m.

Lord Brockway

My Lords, my first word must be of congratulation to my noble friend Lord Molloy on selecting this subject; and having done so his persistence has succeeded. I want to look at the broad situation and the actual proposals for disarmament which the suggested international commission should examine.

At Question Time today I indicated that many of us were appalled by the reply which the Prime Minister has made to the Soviet Government in saying: Nuclear weapons would continue to make an essential contribution to peace and security for the foreseeable future". That view is based on the theory of the nuclear deterrent: that both the super-powers, fearing the effect of a nuclear war on their populations, would maintain peace—a peace of fear, and a peace of terror. I want to submit that a peace which is based upon fear cannot possibly be stable. Each side seeks from strength, perhaps from superiority, to build up its arms so that it might meet the other. Inevitably the result of that situation is that a time comes when it feels that the other side is stronger than it is, and war begins.

I want to look at what has happened since this theory of the nuclear deterrent was urged. In the first place, it has made nuclear weapons far more deadly. Five years ago the United Nations General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to appoint a commission of leading scientists to look into this issue of nuclear weapons. He appointed 12 of the leading scientists of the world. What did they report? They said that a nuclear weapon now in existence was 4,000—I repeat, 4,000—times as deadly as the weapon which fell on Hiroshima. That resulted in 200,000 deaths. A weapon now, according to that report of the scientists—one weapon—could kill 9 million people, a number greater than the whole population of London.

The first effect of the policy of the nuclear deterrent has been enormously to increase the power of destruction of nuclear weapons. The second effect has been to make a nuclear war more likely; more likely because now the nuclear missiles can be thrust through the air to within a few hundred yards of the target at which they are aimed. The idea would be that they would be aimed at military and political targets. Even so, millions would be killed. But no one who knows anything about the history of war believes, even if that war began with nuclear weapons being aimed only at military or political targets, that that would remain the aim of both sides. Inevitably it would become a war of total destruction. Therefore, I want to submit—and I submit it seriously in argument—that the theory of the nuclear deterrent is not a theory which can guarantee continued peace in the world.

I want to consider the kind of situation which this proposed international commission would examine. There is now the hope of summit meetings between the two sides. I regard that hope as a victory for the peace movement of the world, which has brought pressure on both sides, has brought pressure on the United States of America for some action to be taken to prevent a nuclear disaster. But I am a little disturbed that on both sides, while the hope of a summit remains, difficulties are now being raised and a climate created where the summit might not begin with the hope that we had thought it would have.

In the notable speech which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has made, he described in detail the proposals which the Soviet Government have made both about the comprehensive test ban treaty and about the timetable for ending nuclear weapons, for abolishing the missile systems in central Europe and moving towards disarmament. I need not repeat what the noble Lord said in detail, but my attitude is one of non-alignment. I am not pro-Soviet. I have criticised in Moscow itself the policy of the Soviet Government in Afghanistan and in Poland, its treatment of dissidents, its treatment of the independent peace activists and conscientious objectors. I have felt able to do that in Moscow because I have not failed to criticise also the crimes committed by the West: our own appalling crime in exiling the whole population of Diego Garcia so that it could become an American base.

At present the American Government are exiling the whole population of a large island in the Pacific, transferring it to an island which is an overcrowded slum so that the island may be used for an experiment to see how close nuclear weapons can come to their target. They are being flown 4,000 miles from California to that island in the Pacific and are reaching their target within a few hundred yards. The population of that island has been exiled, just as we have exiled the population of Diego Garcia. I am a world citizen and therefore I feel I have a right to criticise what is wrong in the Soviet Union, because I recognise that the first duty of citizens of the West is to criticise the crimes which are committed in their own countries also.

I remain optimistic. I believe that the peace movement of the world is now so strong that, if unity can be obtained within it within a few years, it will be able decisively to alter the policy of governments and even the nature of governments. In our world disarmament campaign in the United Kingdom we have now secured common agreement on a policy statement by over 120 of the major peace movements of the world. That unity will grow. Action will grow and I believe that within a few years we shall have such a movement in the world making nuclear weapons impossible, making for an advance towards disarmament, as will give hope to our children and to our children's children that they may live in a world of peace.

5.26 p.m.

Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos

My Lords, the Motion of my noble friend deals with the central problem and challenge facing the world and we must be grateful to him for moving it and also for his speech. He has described the horrors of nuclear war and no one would dissent from his conclusions, certainly not after reading the British Medical Association report to which he referred. My noble friend also mentioned the proposal for an international standing commission. We await the comments of the noble Baroness on that with interest. My noble friend also mentioned Mr. Olof Palme. I know that we all share the sense of acute loss of a man who worked unremittingly for peace. We particularly remember his chairmanship of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security to which my noble friend referred; his support for the Brandt Report and his efforts to resolve the Iran-Iraq conflict. He was the independent leader of a relatively small country who played a significant and admirable role on the world's stage.

The Motion deals with disarmament. The adjournment of the fourth round of Geneva talks makes this a timely debate and an occasion to assess the position. Like other noble Lords, I make an effort to follow developments which are, I am bound to say, very complicated. My general feeling is a mixture of disappointment, frustration and impatience qualified with a hope that all is not lost and that there are still real possibilities of progress on a number of fronts. One of the difficulties is that, side by side with the talks, there has been a good deal of propaganda and counter-propaganda, of proposals and counter proposals but very little progress after the friendly encounter between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. How therefore are things progressing both on the nuclear and non-nuclear talks? How much realism is there in the offer of cuts on both sides? We should, to get the picture clear beyond doubt, place the statistics on the record. The following figures were in a chart in the Economist on 22nd February. I assume that the Minister will agree that they are accurate. First, long-range missiles and bombers: United States, 1,814; Soviet Union, 2,547: warheads on land-based and submarine missiles and bombers; United States, 10,174; Soviet Union, 10,223: Cruise missiles: United States, 98 bombers with 12 missiles each plus 96 sea-launched missiles; Soviet Union 395 bombers with one missile each. The respective payloads of cruise are 2 million kilogrammes and 6 million kilogrammes. Both sides therefore have enough to blow up the world several times over. It is on the basis of these nuclear arsenals that the disarmament offers and counter-offers have been made in recent months.

It would be beneficial to the world and to the super powers to have reductions. They would also save money which neither can afford, especially the Soviet Union—and Mr. Gorbachev has made this clear in his recent speeches. He would like to see disarmament because his country needs economic rehabilitation. It also seems clear that neither side has a clear superiority over the other. I think this is the lesson of the figures in the Economist. The Soviet Union is bound to be concerned about the US D5s and the United States are bound to be worried about the SS 18s. But for the time being they are neck and neck in the nuclear race and our anxiety is to bring that race to an end.

It is always a pleasure to listen to my noble friend Lord Brockway and to pay tribute to a long life devoted to the cause of peace. Like him I was disappointed by the Prime Minister's response at Question Time in another place yesterday. It is in this context of virtual parity of nuclear weapons that I find her response to Mr. Gorbachev's offer somewhat puzzling. As I understand it, his proposal included a Europe zero option with the Soviet Union dismantling all their SS 20s in Europe in exchange for the removal of cruise and Pershing and also a British and French agreement to freeze the development of existing arsenals.

The Prime Minister yesterday said that Russian missiles would only be moved to the far east of the country and that a freeze would be one of "imbalance"—and that is the word she used. I agree with Lord Kennet's interpretation of the Gorbachev offer. In any event, a freeze at this stage would surely be advantageous because of the parity which I have just described. If the figures are agreed, there would be no disadvantage to either side and I have a feeling that we should be rather more constructive in our actions and more accurate in our statements if we are to make progress on disarmament.

I am afraid that I have to say—and I am reluctant and sorry to say it—that the Prime Minister yesterday was both negative and disappointing. My noble friend has referred to Trident, which the Gorbachev proposals suggested should be cancelled. My noble friend Lord Molloy said that it is now being re-costed at £584 million above last year's estimate so that the new expenditure will be £9,869 million. Trident therefore will be a colossal burden on the nation and not only an obstacle to arms reduction but a very real threat to the development of our conventional defence.

As to the Geneva talks, it must be regarded as deeply disappointing that, as they adjourn for a few weeks, no progress has been made. Hopes were raised at the summit which have now been dashed. The hopes were that the two powers would achieve some understanding on arms control which would give meaning to a second summit. We all know what has happened. We referred to the possibilities when we debated these matters just before the summit took place. At the time that the negotiators were getting their heads down in Geneva, Moscow and Washington have been vying with each other in public proposals and counter-proposals. It has been a vivid demonstration of how not to succeed, how not to make friends and influence people. Both Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan should have agreed firmly at Geneva that they and their spokesmen would be silent while their representatives were trying to achieve something in Geneva. Those representatives must have been both confused and bewildered at what was going on.

The other spanner in the works has been the strategic defence initiative because the USSR has used the occasion in Geneva to put a brake on the INF talks in order to try to halt SDI. There has been a change here. I think it is a welcome one and I shall return to it in a moment. But the Soviet's September proposals for 50 per cent, cuts in strategic nuclear missiles and an interim INF agreement on medium-ranged missiles in Europe was dependent on a US agreement to abandon the SDI. This proposal, as the House will remember, led to a counter package from Washington in October which—and I am bound to say that I am not a defence expert—seemed to me when I studied it that it was not too far apart from the Soviet proposal of the previous month, although there were variations, notably the refusal to halt SDI.

Then the summit followed. What did that achieve apart from the welcome appearances of friendship between the two leaders? Nothing more I would have thought, than a joint call for accelerated negotiation in Geneva. But that was better than nothing. And it was followed just before the talks resumed with Mr. Gorbachev's public statement of January 16th (dealt with in some detail by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, in his speech) proposing his three-stage plan to achieve nuclear disarmament by the end of the century. This is the proposal of course to which the right honourable lady the Prime Minister has just responded.

This proposal took everyone by surprise and it was later read into the records at the Geneva talks. I mention these developments because for the first time—and this I believe is very important—the Soviets were no longer insisting on retaining SS 20s to match British and French nuclear forces. There were other details; but the whole was again dependent upon the abandonment of SDI. Reactions to this, as noble Lords will recall, were very mixed. Someone wrote that Washington was "exhilarated and confused". Predictably, President Reagan's ultimate response was muted. It also frightened the US's NATO allies in Europe, who thought that he might be contemplating negotiating US cruise and Pershing out of Europe.

A further development occurred when Mr. Gorbachev told Senator Edward Kennedy when he visited Moscow that his offer to eliminate medium-ranged missiles in Europe was no longer linked with the SDI. That seemed to me to be something to be welcomed and a substantial step forward; although I was slightly puzzled by the manner in which so great a modification was announced. President Reagan's response on the eve of the Soviet Party Congress was to extend the proposed area for elimination of medium-ranged missiles from Europe to the entire world by the end of 1989. These proposals again have been written into the record at Geneva.

Mr. Gorbachev in his speech at the congress said that a further summit was pointless unless the two countries could agree, first, on medium-ranged missiles and, second, on a nuclear-test freeze.

I noted that President Reagan has come out for a further summit even without substantial movement on arms control. Again, on 3rd March, Mr. Arbatov, a senior Soviet official, also said that a further summit was in the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. On balance, even against the background of disappointment, we must welcome both these statements from Washington and Moscow.

That is where we stand at this moment in this debate. It is against that background that we must view my noble friend's proposal. Lest I appear too pessimistic, which is not my nature, I also think we must be grateful for some things. First, we are glad that, although public diplomacy on the scale we have witnessed tends to be disconcerting, it has in fact contained proposals which should be examined in detail. These should be transferred from the media to the conference table. If the possibilities of a freeze on the testing and deployment of new nuclear systems, both offensive and defensive, could be discussed and an agreement reached, that would be an enormous achievement. A realistic negotiation on reduction could then follow, and both sides have said many times over that this is what they want.

Secondly, one of the major obstacles to confidence has been the refusal of the Soviet Union to on-site verification, to which more than one noble Lord has referred. There seems now to be some easement in the Soviet position because Moscow has indicated that it might accept an international system to verify a test ban, taking up the offer of India and other states to place monitoring stations on their territories. They profess readiness for—I quote the statement from Moscow— certain measures of on-site verification to remove the possible doubts about compliance with a nuclear test moratorium". There is a difficulty here, namely, whether the verification is dependent on an immediate moratorium; but is it not clear that this should be examined carefully and pursued carefully so that we may find out how serious and genuine the offer is? It is this apparent unwillingness to pursue proposals which appear to be practical that puzzles and worries people here and throughout the world.

There are again several other proposals from both sides which, in my opinion, deserve analysis and study. Some of them have been referred to by noble Lords. I agree that the proposal by Mr. Gorbachev on behalf of the USSR was one of considerable historic significance. Personally I like to see patient, step-by-step agreement on limited objectives. SALT I and also SALT II showed what can be done, and the undercurrent from Moscow and Washington gives me the feeling that both leaders would like to see some progress. We now have a pause before the next round in May and before another Summit meeting. It is an opportunity for Britain and her allies to bring sensible pressures to bear.

5.43 p.m.

Baroness Young

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, for asking for this short debate. I welcome the opportunity to put on the record once again the Government's views on the current state of arms control and disarmament agreements and on the very best way to ensure the defence of Europe with our NATO allies. I also welcome the opportunity to comment on some of the proposals for new international bodies which were advanced by the noble Lord in his speech.

The British approach on arms control and disarmament is pragmatic, realistic and grounded in experience. Arms control and disarmament is not a process which governments pursue for their own sake, or in a vacuum. Our goal is peace; and if peace is to last it should assure the continuing security of all the parties involved. An international climate which promotes at least partial confidence is necessary for nations to start negotiations and for real progress to be made. Confidence should not be interpreted in only a narrow technical sense. It needs to be reflected in a serious approach to negotiations and the conduct of a country's policies, both at home and abroad, should contribute to confidence in its trustworthiness. Empty gestures, meaningless organisations and—worse still—empty agreements do little to advance either.

Ample fora already exist for the promotion of confidence. A variety of bilateral and multilateral negotiations are under way in Geneva, at the Conference on Disarmament, at MBFR negotiations and at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. In addition the United Nations provides a forum for exchanges of views and the examination of new disarmament proposals. The operation of the most important bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union—SALT I and the ABM Treaty, referred to just now by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn—are subject to continual scrutiny through a bilateral Standing Consultative Committee which meets regularly in Geneva. Further international bodies such as the proposed International Study Consultative Commission to which I think the noble Lord drew attention in his remarks, dedicated to the same broad objectives, would be a wasteful duplication of effort and a waste of scarce resources.

The noble Lords, Lord Molloy, Lord Cledwyn and Lord Rennet, all drew attention to the Palme Commission report—and I would add that the Government, as also the whole of the British population, were deeply shocked at the appalling assassination of Mr. Palme. The Government welcomed this report as a very important contribution to the arms control debate, which deserved serious consideration. Its conclusions helped to focus the attention of states on the need for a realistic programme of action, both nuclear and conventional, in the various disarmament negotiations. This appproach continues to be very much in line with the British Government's ideas.

It is of course vital that existing agreements should be seen to be complied with, and all possible steps should be taken to increase their verifiability. And all new agreements must include a level of verification which ensures that there will always be a reasonable level of confidence that they are being complied with. Where any doubts arise on this score, the complaints procedures written into the agreement must ensure a fair and balanced examination of any complaint. These issues lie at the very heart of arms control negotiations and I cannot emphasise their importance too strongly. Adequate verification is essential if any arms control agreement is genuinely to enhance stability and security.

As the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, said, 1986 has been proclaimed by the United Nations as International Year of Peace. It is therefore particularly good that the prospects for real progress in the arms control and disarmament field appear more auspicious now than they have been for some considerable time. The Summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last November was a welcome success and has contributed greatly towards producing a favourable international climate.

The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, referred to a further Summit meeting. We fully share the view that a further Summit would build on the useful progress that was achieved in Geneva last year at the meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. However, as the two leaders have themselves acknowledged, results and deeds must be the mark of success in efforts to improve United States/Soviet relations, not just words alone.

The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, spoke about public diplomacy. Could I say to him that we fully share the view that public statements and propagandist proposals are not a substitute for negotiation. What is needed for progress to be achieved is quiet, patient and confidential exchanges. But perhaps I may say to him, quite frankly, with this in mind we found yesterday's call by the Leader of the Opposition for an exchange of letters between my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev to be published difficult to understand.

We, along with all other nations, have a vital interest in the negotiations between the two major powers. It is they who between them possess 95 per cent, of the world's nuclear weapons, as well as the greatest military capability in outer space. Though the long process of negotiating reductions in their nuclear arsenals has only just started, we have been encouraged by recent developments. We very much welcome the agreement to apply the principle of a 50 per cent, reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. Taken together with the instruction to the negotiators to accelerate the pace of the talks, this has provided a new impetus to the negotiations.

We have also welcomed the proposals contained in Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15th January, although they contained much that was already familiar. We have been considering intensively with our allies the new concepts which were in his statement. The United States has responded to the Soviet ideas with a range of constructive and realistic proposals of its own. We believe that these provide a sound basis for rapid progress both in the bilateral negotiations and in the multilateral negotiations at Geneva, in CDE at Stockholm and in the MBFR talks at Vienna. We will continue to play our full part in these negotiations while also continuing to give President Reagan our full support in his efforts to achieve real and lasting progress in arms control.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said that the Soviet proposals were comprehensive; I think that was the word he used. They are indeed comprehensive on the nuclear front, but we believe that the coverage on conventional weapons and CW is very patchy. It is the Americans who have tabled a draft chemical weapons convention at the CD in Geneva. It is the West which has recently tabled new proposals at the MBFR talks.

One point reiterated at length in the latest Soviet proposals is the relationship of the nuclear arms of other states, including the United Kingdom, to the bilateral US-Soviet negotiations, something to which all noble Lords taking part referred. Our view remains firmly that British strategic nuclear forces are not relevant to any possible agreement on intermediate nuclear forces in Europe. The weapons systems concerned cannot be compared in their role or capabilities. In addition, given the very small size of our deterrent—less than 3 per cent, of the nuclear forces available to the Soviet Union—we do not believe that there is now scope for a British contribution to reductions of nuclear systems. But we have never said "never". If there were very substantial reductions in United States and Soviet strategic arsenals, and if no significant changes occured in Soviet defensive capabilities, then we would be prepared to reconsider our position and review how best to contribute to the arms control process.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, will the noble Baroness be very helpful and dot the i's and cross the t's? The Government have never said "never". Am I not right in thinking that the Soviet Union has never said "now"?

Baroness Young

My Lords, I did not quite hear the noble Lord's last word.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, the noble Baroness's last remark was that the Government have never said "never" about reducing and abolishing our independent nuclear force. Will she confirm to the House that the Soviet Union has never said "now", that it has never asked us to do that now, at the beginning of a disarmament process?

Baroness Young

My Lords, my understanding is that the Soviet Union, which has asked us to include those weapons in certain negotiations, has not put a precise date on that. If I am wrong about that, I shall of course let the noble Lord know.

On INF, the British Government's position is clear, and is based on our general approach to arms control measures. We want to see balanced, verifiable arms control measures which contribute to British security. In her recent reply to Mr. Gorbachev, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made her views on that matter known to the Soviet Union. As that has been referred to in a number of speeches this afternoon, perhaps I may make a few observations about it. The proposals put forward by Mr. Gorbachev for INF reductions would allow a number of SS 20s to be redeployed in the far east of the Soviet Union from where they could easily be transported back to the European theatre in a time of crisis. This would defeat the intention of the original zero-zero option advanced by President Reagan that all land-based intermediate range nuclear missiles should be eliminated.

For the same reason, a freeze on nuclear weapons would be unacceptable. It would also make impossible the modernisation of our strategic deterrent, and without modernisation it would soon cease to be a credible deterrent.

Lord Kennet

My Lords—

Baroness Young

My Lords, may I just answer the point that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, made on this matter, before he gets up again. I remind him that this is not merely a technical matter. The United States would have to seek the political approval of its European allies for the redeployment of INF on their territories. That could obviously take some time. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, would face no such constraints and could redeploy its weapons as fast as any aircraft could carry them.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness. Is the Foreign Office unaware of the statement made by General Chervov that the SS 20s and so on to be removed from Europe under the Soviet proposals would be destroyed under international on-site control, as would their launch pads and infrastructure?

Baroness Young

My Lords, I take the point that the noble Lord has made. My understanding is that the Soviet Union has said that some of the SS 20s would be destroyed and others would be moved. They could be redeployed to the east of the Soviet Union. That is the point that I was making in my last remark in answer to the point that the noble Lord was making.

May I say to the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, who said that he thought that the strategic nuclear weapons were approximately in balance between the United States and the Soviet Union—he quoted, I think, figures from the Economist—that it is very difficult to make a comprehensive and accurate evaluation of the nuclear balance. The Economist figures are an attempt to do so, but one cannot evaluate the potential effectiveness of a weapon solely in terms, for example, of its payload. Britain's security must continue to rest in its ability, in concert with its NATO allies, to convince the Soviet Union that we are capable of defending ourselves.

I listened with great interest to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. I understand the sincerity of his views, but I can only say to him that we do not believe that his analysis is right, and the fact is that we have enjoyed in Europe since the ending of the Second World War the longest period of peace this century, and nuclear defensive weapons have played their part in that.

The alliance has repeatedly stated that no NATO weapons, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used except in response to an attack. But it would not be sensible to constrain our freedom of action against a potential adversary as powerful as the Soviet Union. The fact that NATO has not made a "no first use" declaration in no way commits us to using nuclear weapons in any given circumstance. But to renounce that option in all circumstances would be to diminish the uncertainty in the mind of a potential adversary and thus to simplify his calculation of the risks of attack. The political and military realities which underline NATO mean that the Warsaw Pact will always have the initiative in choosing the timing and concentration of any attack on the European mainland.

NATO therefore needs to have both strong and balanced in-place forces to deter and, if necessary, repel any attack at short notice; and also the means quickly and effectively to reinforce its defences. The British Army of the Rhine is so constituted to contribute to that end. We must always remember that deterrence depends on the credibility of our forces' capability to provide a robust defence against aggression. For our part, the Government will do all in our power to maintain and enhance this capability.

We view the various current arms control, disarmament and related negotiations, including those of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, as a network of complementary activities. Progress in one area could enhance prospects in others. While the momentum developed as a result of the bilateral US-Soviet talks is very welcome and useful, we must never lose sight of the fact that other negotiations, such as those on MBFR in Vienna, also have their contribution to make. In Stockholm, we hope that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe will be able to agree on practical and concrete confidence and security building measures. Such agreements would contribute to reducing tension and the risk of surprise attack.

At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, our goal in the negotiations on chemical weapons—a global and verifiable ban on their development, production or stockpiling—is ambitious. A comprehensive treaty on these lines would represent a new milestone in arms control agreements. We therefore regard our present task as immensely important. Accordingly, the United Kingdom has put forward a number of detailed ideas which are designed to contribute to a solution to the remaining problems. All states seem to be agreed that the goal must be a complete ban on chemical weapons.

We may now be better placed than ever, as a result of work carried out in the CD over the past four years, to resolve the outstanding problems. In particular, there is general agreement on the basic framework of the convention and on a considerable amount of substantive language for its content. This debate is taking place in the shadow of the use of chemical weapons in the Iraq/Iran conflict and each new report intensifies the need for a worldwide ban.

Our policy with regard to the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty has been made clear on many occasions in your Lordships' House. We see such a treaty as one of the objectives in our overall arms control policy. But the issue of verification remains the central problem. Important security interests would be involved in any treaty. The risks to national and alliance security, which would be posed by undetected non-compliance, would be especially grave.

It is simply not possible to ignore the question of verification in the hope that some cosmetic fudge will be sufficient to secure our interests. Such an approach does not recognise the central component of arms control negotiations. The aim of those remains to ensure that the overall level of armaments is reduced, while the level of both national and international security is maintained and enhanced. It would be irresponsible to ignore verification in the interest of political expediency or of concluding agreements.

The noble Lords, Lord Molloy and Lord Cledwyn, referred to what the Soviet Union has recently said on verification. But it is in fact unclear whether the Soviet proposals are an advance on their previous position. However, we welcome the Russian recognition of legitimate Western concerns about verification and we hope that they will follow these up with concrete proposals.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, that being the case, will the Government urge the United States to return to the test ban negotiations?

Baroness Young

My Lords, if the noble Lord will just let me complete my speech before he interrupts me once again with these points, I will note what he has to say. The establishment of an adequate verification regime is not merely a technical matter. Let us not forget that scientists' assessments are not the whole story, for the assessment of adequacy remains a political judgment backed up by technical findings. And such a judgment rests upon a range of considerations, including the extent of political confidence on the part of one party that others will comply with a treaty.

Since the subject has continued to be at the centre of the arms control debate, let me also reiterate our policy towards the United States strategic defence initiative. We share unequivocally the objective of the bilateral US/Soviet negotiators to prevent an arms race in space. At the same time, we believe that the American research programme—and I must underline that it is only a research programme—represents a prudent step in view of the extensive and long-standing Soviet activities in this field. The United States has made it clear that all of its activities are, and will continue to be, conducted in full compliance with all relevant international treaties and in accordance with the four well-known—indeed, cardinal principles—agreed between my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and President Reagan at Camp David in December 1984.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, raised the question of a link between SDI and Eureka. May I say on the Eureka initiative that we have taken an active part in the ministerial discussions at the Milan European Council and at the subsequent Eureka ministerial meeting in Paris and Hanover. We will host the third ministerial meeting in the first half of 1986. But it is a separate issue from SDI and the question of participation in SDI research, as indeed the French have made clear—

Lord Kennet

My Lords, simply on a correction of fact, I did not raise any link between SDI and Eureka.

Baroness Young

My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord if I misunderstood what he said, but I thought he had. At any rate, I have now set out for the record what the position is. He asked me at the end of his speech two questions which I should like to answer. First, he asked me to confirm an answer given by my honourable friend Mr. Renton in another place. As President Reagan has repeatedly confirmed, SDI research is consistent with the US present obligation including the ABM treaty. He confirmed that SDI will be conducted in conformity with a strict interpretation of the treaty. The Government have repeatedly made clear that we regard the treaty as an important element in preserving international peace and stability, and I can confirm that we want to see it reaffirmed and strengthened. Any suspicion of violations should be pursued according to the mechanisms provided for in the treaty.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, also asked me about the Conference on Disarmament. May I say to him that we believe that negotiations would be premature before there has been some progress on some of the outstanding issues, such as verification. As I have said, we have made it clear and the United States has made it clear that, so far as SDI is concerned, negotiations will be based on the cardinal principles agreed between my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and President Reagan at Camp David. It is on that basis that we have recently concluded an agreement with the United States to participate in its research programme.

We must not allow the hopes reposed in arms control and disarmament negotiations to founder either on propaganda or on inertia. The international climate has improved. The omens for progress are correspondingly better. Let us take advantage of this and translate the improved climate into positive results.

6.9 p.m.

Lord Molloy

My Lords, I should like to express my appreciation of the support that I have received from the spokesman for the SDP Benches, in the extraordinarily good speech by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. I should also like to thank my noble friend Lord Brockway. I always feel honoured when men of his calibre are behind me in full support. I felt privileged to listen to the magnificent speech by the Leader of my party, my noble friend Lord Cledwyn.

With regard to the speech of the noble Baroness, I thank her for it but I found it very hard to keep my seat sometimes and not get up to question what she was talking about. I wondered whether she, or those who drafted her speech, had even read what the Motion was about. I believe it is pretty "ribby" that, whenever you ask something in this House, all you get is an answer which has obviously been drafted by some faceless civil servants. That is becoming a little thick, and we are noting it in every part of this House. If anyone does not agree with what I have said, he can get up and say so now; and let those who agree also stand by what I have said.

When we have had these debates in the House the gravamen and fundamental standpoint of successive Ministers on the Front Bench has been this: "We should like to do what has been suggested; we are always so willing to do it. We do not listen to civil servants. This is our point of view but we know full well what the crucial answer must be before we can give any assent. We want wholesome, factual, realistic verification". That is what this debate was about. We had very little answer in the speech that was written for the noble Baroness. I feel very strongly about that.

I acceded to the argument that has been put by former Ministers at the Foreign Office that verification is vital. You make a proposal that may be just a little acorn. It might die; it might wither on the vine; but, on the other hand, it might grow (who knows?) and might make a contribution to save mankind. That is what is wrong with this Government. They are not prepared to listen to anything from anybody outside their ken. Even the British Medical Association and this tremendous book have hardly received any mention. I wonder whether the civil servants ought to read this. It would be a very good job of work if they did. I have finished now and the noble Baroness can say what she likes.

Baroness Young

My Lords, I have tried to listen with great care to what the noble Lord has said. I hope very much that he will perhaps reconsider some of his remarks and withdraw the remarks that he has made about the advisers in the Foreign Office and other civil servants who, as he will know, are not in a position to speak for themselves and, I think we would all accept, do for Governments of all complexions a very good job.

Lord Airedale

My Lords, will the noble Lord also withdraw what he said about the withering of the acorns on the vine?

Lord Molloy

My Lords, I said "wither on the vine". The acorn can grow into an oak tree and the grape can also wither on the vine. There is nothing whatsoever wrong with that. It is also becoming very difficult to express one's deepest feelings when one has listened so very carefully to debates. If I have said anything harmful to persons individually, then of course I withdraw.

What I am trying to say is that I have listened carefully to the arguments of Ministers, as they have a right to be listened to. Their arguments have a right to be thoroughly examined. There is no point in making them otherwise. When you take full cognisance of that and find a reasonable answer and ask for consideration, I believe that that should be done as well. It does not matter from where a proposal comes in this Chamber; if it is reasonable it should at least merit—not acceptance; no way—the possibility of being examined. I hope that, with second thoughts, this may well be done. I ask your Lordships' permission to withdraw the Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.