Lords Sitting of 12 March 1986

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers: Read by the Lord Bishop of Rochester.

Channel Fixed Link: Exports
Lord Rodney: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what benefit the construction of a Channel tunnel is likely to bring to our export trade.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Transport (The Earl of Caithness): My Lords, by providing an improvement in communications between the United Kingdom and the Continent, the fixed link will improve the ability of British exporters to compete successfully in the large European market.
Lord Rodney: My Lords, I should like to thank my noble friend for that Answer. Does he not agree that with the advent of the Channel tunnel, British industry's transport costs will be reduced, thereby enabling it to compete on an equal footing with our Continental competitors?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, we hope very much that the transport costs will be reduced. We are, in fact, doubling the opportunities for British exporters. They are at the moment limited to air and ferry traffic. By permitting the Channel tunnel, we shall also be allowing road/rail traffic and pure rail traffic.
Lord Ezra: My Lords, in view of the advantages that the Channel tunnel will bring us, will the Government ensure, through the necessary improvement of our transport infrastructure, that all parts of the country can benefit and not only the South-East?
The Earl of Caithness: Yes, my Lords. We have touched upon this matter before in debates in your Lordships' House. Where British Rail and other forms of transport see advantages in using the whole country, I am sure that they will do so on a commercially justifiable basis.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, can the noble Lord say whether any comparable study has been made as to the effects on imports of the Channel tunnel?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, we hope that, with this Government's help to industry, it will be the exports that matter. I am sure that British companies will rise to the opportunities that we can offer them.
Lord Geddes: My Lords, will my noble friend estimate what effect the construction of such a fixed link will have on British ports?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, as to the ports themselves, there is bound to be some effect, I think, on the short sea crossings in the Channel area. We believe, however, that the long-term effect on ports more distant from the Channel tunnel will not be as great as some people anticipate.
Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, is there any reason at all to believe that it will be cheaper to go by the Channel tunnel than to go by hovercraft? Is he aware that the estimates at the moment seem heavily in favour of the hovercraft?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, we hope that by building the Channel tunnel we will offer four different opportunities for our exporters. The competition generated by four different forms of transport can only be for the benefit of this country.
Lord Tordoff: My Lords, is it not the case that the major advantage of a fixed link relates not to road transport but to rail transport, and it is on that basis that we stand to benefit? Does the noble Earl not agree that the direct rail link between our industrial centres and the heartland of Europe is the important part of the Channel tunnel and that the shuttles and the passenger transport are totally peripheral to that?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right when he stresses the importance of rail traffic going through the tunnel. As my noble friend Lord Jellicoe, chairman of the British Overseas Trade Board, said this morning, Western Europe is by far the largest market for our exports and accounts for something like 58 per cent. of our total world exports, or £46 billion. I understand that the British Overseas Trade board feels that the Channel tunnel will assist our exporters. The noble Lord is right in what he says about the new opportunities for rail.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, is it not a fact that one of the assessment teams that worked on the Channel tunnel proposals was dealing with the possible economic consequences? Would it not have been helpful if we had had a detailed report from that assessment team in the same way that we have had a detailed environmental appraisal?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, we believe that it is right for the potential investors to be offered the assessment of likely traffic and costs by those undertaking work on the tunnel, and not by the Government.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that I was talking about the whole economic aspect taking in the ports, the regions and the possible effect on imports? I gather that there was an assessment team dealing with the whole of this matter. Would it not have been helpful if we had had that sort of report to hand?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, it might have been helpful but, as the noble Lord will appreciate, it would have been wrong to release a lot of commercially confidential information contained in the assessment.
Lord Somers: My Lords, can the noble Earl give some details of what it is intended should be provided at this end of the rail system, what lines will be linked to the tunnel, whether traffic will go straight to a terminus, or what?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, much has yet to be decided and British Rail, together with potential concessionaires, are giving urgent consideration to the matter.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, since when have the economic consequences of this link been a matter of commercial confidentiality? Does not the whole country deserve to know what assessments have been made of the economic consequences?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, I did not hear the noble Lord correctly. However, I think that even he would appreciate that a lot of this stuff was commercial and therefore confidential.
Lord Rodney: My Lords, is it not a fact that this Channel tunnel was first conceived in the time of Napoleon and that if we had had another report, that would probably have delayed it for another 10 years?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, my noble friend is perhaps more optimistic than I am. I think that if we had had any more reports we might not have had the opportunities facing us at the moment.

South Africa: Reform Proposals
2.40 p.m.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what conclusions they have drawn from the speech of President Botha of South Africa on 31st January.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Young): My Lords, we welcome the positive proposals in President Botha's speech and hope that they will be speedily implemented. We now wish to see further movement towards the fundamental elimination of apartheid and the beginning of peaceful dialogue between the South African Government and genuine representatives of the black community.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, does the noble Baroness recall that recently, in answer to a similar question, she described President Botha's speech as a significant statement of principles? In view of the fact that since that speech he has specifically denied that there will be any change to the registration of racial differentiation, to segregation in housing, education,
622
health, what principles do the Government see in this speech in regard to an ending of the system of apartheid?
Baroness Young: My Lords, we believe that the speech was part of a process of reform and that it contained a significant statement of principles as well as positive steps for this parliamentary session, for example, the restoration of citizenship, the extension of freehold rights and the abolition of the discriminatory passbook system.
Lord Alport: My Lords, may I ask who my noble friend means when she talks of the "genuine representatives" of the black people?
Baroness Young: My Lords, I do not think it is for the British Government to say who should represent the South African blacks in negotiations with the Government.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, does the noble Baroness recall the details of the Commonwealth accord which was arrived at in Nassau six months ago and the provisions which were agreed by Her Majesty's Government with other Commonwealth governments? Does the noble Baroness recall that the accord said:
"It is our hope that the process and measures we have agreed upon will help to bring about concrete progress towards the objective stated above in six months' time"?
Will the noble Baroness accept that the six months are now at an end? Are Her Majesty's Government satisfied that the provisions of the accord have been agreed? Does she not agree that President Botha's speech falls very far short of that? Will the noble Baroness say what the position is with regard to Mr. Nelson Mandela? Have Her Majesty's Government any information about the possibility of his release? What protestations are Her Majesty's Government making to South Africa about that?
Baroness Young: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, will know that the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting took place in October. The six months is therefore is not quite up. On the point about President Botha's speech, one fact that we can warmly welcome is the South African Government's decision to lift the state of emergency.
The noble Lord will know that following from the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting the Group of Eminent Persons was set up, and we believe that they are making a good start in their deliberations in South Africa. Finally, on the point about Mr. Nelson Mandela, we have called on a number of occasions for his unconditional release.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, will the Minister acknowledge the fact that the visit of Mr. Leutwiler representing the creditor bankers of South Africa, and the time limit that he has placed on rescheduling of South African debts, plus the decision of Barclays Bank to cease further investment in the area, is an important pressure in this direction?
Baroness Young: My Lords, yes, it is an economic pressure.
Lord Monson: My Lords, how can Her Majesty's Government be so certain that the release of Mr. Nelson Mandela without any strings attached whatsoever would not make matters worse rather than better?
Baroness Young: My Lords, we believe that the release of Mr. Mandela would constitute a major act of national reconciliation in South Africa and could provide the impetus for a genuine dialogue.
Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, can the noble Baroness tell us who it is likely to conciliate? Is the noble Baroness aware that Nelson Mandela, basically upon his own confession, was found guilty of importing arms on a large scale to destroy the South African economy, and has frequently declared that if he is released he will continue that policy? If we are seriously opposed to terrorism do we really support the unconditional release of that sort of chap?
Baroness Young: My Lords, I have made plain the Government's position on this matter.
Lord Nugent of Guildford: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that we have had much experience in all parts of the world in dealing with problems—not quite as great as this but not far different? It is the first step to reconciliation for the existing rulers of the country to set up a dialogue with the accredited leaders of the native peoples concerned, and Mr. Mandela happens to be one of those. That is the first step which might make progress: if Mr. Botha would release him and start a dialogue with him.
Baroness Young: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that question.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, while we all welcome the end of the state of emergency, may I ask whether the noble Baroness is aware that the existing laws, for which there is no provision for change, give the South African police and security forces total power to detain without trial indefinitely and if necessary for life? Is the noble Baroness able to tell us what principle is involved in the restoration of citizenship which she mentioned, if that citizenship carries (as it does) no political rights whatever and does not allow citizens to exercise the vote? Are Her Majesty's Government prepared to accept those cosmetic modifications rather than the total destruction of the whole policy of racial discrimination?
Baroness Young: My Lords, the noble Lord will be aware that I prefaced my answer to his earlier question by saying that this was a process of change. We hope that there will be more change. The ending of the discriminatory basis for the carrying of identity documents removes an insult to the dignity of members of the black community.
Lord Alport: My Lords, does my noble friend include Mr. Nelson Mandela among the genuine leaders of the black people, including those who are associated with him in the movement of which at present he is the figurehead while still in prison?
Baroness Young: My Lords, I have said that we believe that the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela would in fact be a major act of national reconciliation. We believe that that could provide an opportunity for genuine dialogue and peaceful settlement in a very difficult political situation.

Forestry Commission: Assets Disposal Policy
2.52 p.m.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is their policy in relation to disposal of Forestry Commission assets.
The Minister of State, Scottish Office (Lord Gray of Contin): My Lords, the Government's present policy on Forestry Commission land sales is aimed at rationalising the commission's estate with a view to improving the efficiency and commercial effectiveness of the forestry enterprise. Details of this policy were given by my right honourable friend, the then Secretary of State for Scotland, in response to a Question in another place on 8th November 1984.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his helpful comment and the indication that there is no change in the Government's policy. Let me add that that will give some assurance to all parties in the forestry industry who were alarmed at recent reports that it was the intention of the Ministry of Agriculture to privatise all of the Forestry Commission's estates. Will the noble Lord assure me that the Government recognise the importance of the continuing partnership between the private sector and the state sector in this important industry which would be upset by these arrangements? Finally, will the noble Lord convey to his right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland our congratulations on his ability to head off this unfortunate scheme?
Lord Gray of Contin: My Lords, I appreciate the tribute which the noble Lord has paid to my right honourable friend and I shall certainly convey it to him. However, I must say that I think we should look at the situation in the knowledge that the disposals' policy is, from time to time, reviewed. That does not necessarily mean that there will always be a change at the end of any review. However, I think that the Government would be rather unwise not to carry on a continuing review of many of their policies, and that we seek to do.
Lord John-Mackie: My Lords, will the Minister tell us which Ministry actually deals with the Forestry Commission? The rumour came from the Ministry of Agriculture but it was then scotched by the department in Scotland. It would greatly help us if we knew exactly who was controlling the Forestry Commission.
Lord Gray of Contin: My Lords, the noble Lord is a former Minister of State in the Ministry of Agricul-

625
ture, Fisheries and Food, and he is also a former chairman of the Forestry Commission, and therefore I imagine that he is as well aware as I am of the procedure. However, let me remind him that the home countries have their Forestry Ministers. The lead in forestry matters is normally taken by the Secretary of State for Scotland.
Lord Gisborough: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that the whole point of establishing the Forestry Commission was to redress the situation whereby over 90 per cent, of the timber used in this country came from abroad? In fact, it still does so. Does my noble friend agree that as that is the whole object of the Forestry Commission, provided the trees are grown it makes no odds whatever who owns them? Further-more, bearing in mind the slow rate of return, the fewer owned by the Government rather than by the private sector the better, because it is a bad investment financially, but it is good investment for the timber.
Lord Gray of Contin: My Lords, I accept what my noble friend says, and of course he will be aware that part of the present forestry policy which the Government have been pursuing is that planting should be increased in the private sector and reduced by the Forestry Commission in the public sector.
Lord Hunt: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the sale of nearly 100,000 hectares of Forestry Commission land to private owners has already created problems as regards public access which was previously enjoyed when those forests which have now been disposed of were under Forestry Commission control? In the light of that, does the noble Lord agree that the further sale of 10,000 hectares, which is planned for this year, is bound to increase that problem and that matter for concern?
Lord Gray of Contin: My Lords, I take careful note of what the noble Lord has said, but it is not in accordance with my information. Public rights of way are not affected by a change of ownership. So far as concerns public access, we have no reason to believe that those parts of the Forestry Commission estate which have been sold have led to difficulties in regard to public access. Indeed, before the sales take place the Forestry Commission itself goes to some trouble to discuss with potential buyers the desirability of continuing access. So far as I am aware, there have been no major difficulties in this field.
Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the money that goes into private forestry does so for one reason only—that is, the tax advantages offered? If the noble Lord wants production in the country and money to go into productive industry, then it is a great foolishness to sell large tracts of land for large sums of money which are therefore frozen and cannot go into productive industry.
Lord Gray of Contin: My Lords, I would not accept that large areas of land have been sold by the Forestry Commission indiscriminately. As at 21st January this year just over 50,000 hectares of plantation and
626
plantable land had been sold in Great Britain as a whole, and that raised approximately £77·9 million. I must remind the noble Lord that that is a very small percentage of the total forestry estate. Indeed, the areas which have been sold have been selected by the commissioners themselves and have been seen by them as not interfering with their long-term development policy.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, am I right in thinking that in reply to my noble friend's question, the noble Lord said that the lead Minister with regard 10 the Forestry Commission is the Secretary of State for Scotland? If that is so, will he explain how that applies and how it works out in connection with the large forestry estates in Wales and parts of England?
Lord Gray of Contin: My Lords, when more than one Minister has responsibility in a particular area there obviously has to be a leader somewhere. As 60 per cent, of the forestry estate is in Scotland it is not unreasonable that the lead should be with the Secretary of State for Scotland.
Lord Somers: My Lords, will the noble Lord give some assurance that the commission is aware of the increased need for British hardwood? I know that softwood gives a quicker financial return, but there is a very great need for more hardwood.
Lord Gray of Contin: My Lords, I accept that point and it is well known by the commission.
Lord Roberthall: My Lords, would not the Minister agree that the whole problem of forestry, especially for European countries, has become much more difficult and important in the past few years because of the rapid destruction of the great forests in other parts of the world?
Lord Gray of Contin: Yes, my Lords, this is a fact, but of course it does not really bear on the Question regarding the Forestry Commission.
Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, would the Minister care to answer my question? Would not the £77 million received have been better invested in manufacturing industry?
Lord Gray of Contin: My Lords, I do not quite understand what the noble Lord is getting at. The money which was received has gone to the Treasury, and it is not the Treasury's custom to hypothecate for any particular purpose.
Baroness Seear: My Lords, is the noble Lord the Minister saying that a capital asset has been sold in order to put the proceeds into current consumption? Is that not very bad housekeeping?
Lord Gray of Contin: My Lords, the policy was clearly enunciated by my right honourable friend in his Statement of 8th November 1984, and the selling of forestry lands has been done in accordance with the best discretion of the Forestry Commission itself. The fact that these lands were surplus to their requirements is I think sufficient reason that they should be disposed

627
of, and I think it is quite wrong for any Government sponsored commission or corporation to retain land which it does not require.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, I welcome the statement that the policy is the policy outlined in November 1984, but in reply to the Question the Minister somewhat ominously remarked that disposals policy will always be reviewed. Can I have some assurance from the Minister that any major disposals, such as have been suggested in the press commentary on the proposals of the Ministry of Agriculture that there be a total privatisation of the Forestry Commission estate, will not be pursued without the permission of Parliament? I know you have the power to do so, but it would be a major change of policy, and can I have some assurance in that regard?
Can I also have an assurance that the social obligations which are recognised by the Forestry Commission access agreement, the research and development in forestry, will be taken care of in any changes that might be envisaged?
Lord Gray of Contin: My Lords, as to the second point the noble Lord raised, I think I indicated that where disposals have taken place the Forestry Commission have gone to considerable efforts to ensure that access will be continued. So far as the first point is concerned, if the Government were at some future time to decide upon any major change to the policy already enunciated in November 1984, then of course Parliament would be informed in the usual way.
Lord Moyne: My Lords—
The Lord President of the Council (Viscount Whitelaw): My Lords, I apologise to my noble friend but I feel that we have spent considerable time on this Question. Having had a long question, if I may humbly say so, from a very important figure who has been chairman of the Forestry Commission and therefore who had a right to be heard, I hope the House will feel, with all apologies to my noble friend, that we should pass on to the next Question.

Nuclear Defence
3.3 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, having regard to the recent report of the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment on the environmental consequences of nuclear war, they will take urgent steps to reduce this country's dependence on nuclear weapons.
Minister of State for Defence Support (Lord Trefgarne): My Lords, no one doubts the awful consequences of a nuclear exchange, not least for the environment. But unilateral reduction in nuclear
628
weapons of the kind envisaged by the noble Lord would make those consequences more likely, not less so, and therefore form no part of our policy.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that I am not advocating a unilaterial reduction in our armaments at the moment, although that might be a good thing to do at some other time? At the moment is it not the case that the Prime Minister has just rejected an offer from the Soviet Union to follow the example which they themselves have unilaterally given already, which is to discontinue testing nuclear weapons? In these circumstances ought not the Government to take into account, for example, the report of the British Medical Association which has just been issued and says:
"The nuclear weapon strategy of the United Kingdom must take explicitly into account the likelihood that even a limited nuclear war, particularly in Europe, could trigger a nuclear winter."?
In these circumstances should we not have had a different answer from the Prime Minister to Mr. Gorbachev's proposals?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the reply which my right honourable friend gave to Mr. Gorbachev had of course to take into account the proposition that we cannot be persuaded to accept proposals which would detract from, rather than contribute to, our security. As for the position of the British Medical Association—I think the noble Lord referred to them—responsibility for defence policy rests with Her Majesty's Government.
Lord Mellish: My Lords, will the Minister express a view on whether in the event of Britain not having any nuclear weapons at all—being absolutely and completely without nuclear weapons—there is any guarantee that we would not be bombed by somebody else with nuclear weapons?
Lord Tregfarne: My Lords, if we were to abandon the independent nuclear deterrent which this Government and all their predecessors since the late 1940s have sustained, I think we would be exposing ourselves to the gravest risks.
Lord Renton: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that owing to the vast superiority and quantity of Russian nuclear weapons compared with ours and those of our European allies, and also owing to the vast superiority of Russian conventional forces in Europe, it would be suicidal for us and our European allies, if I may quote the words of the noble Lord's Question, to
"reduce this country's dependence on nuclear weapons"?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, my noble friend has underlined the answers I gave earlier, but I would of course add that the United Kingdom is a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and we have the benefit of that membership with the United States.
Lord Melchett: My Lords, does the noble Lord remember that last year before the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment had produced their report the Government said that they were waiting for that SCOPE Report before deciding whether the nuclear winter hypothesis was a good one

629
or not? Now they have had a chance to study the SCOPE Report do they accept its conclusions that in the event of even a limited nuclear war a nuclear winter is likely to occur?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I am aware that there are a number of views along the lines that the noble Lord offers. The SCOPE Report was in fact published in two volumes. I understand that Volume 2 was published at the end of last year and, for some curious reason, we await Volume 1.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, is the Minister aware how appalled many of us are by the Prime Minister's statement that nuclear weapons would continue to make an essential contribution to peace—to peace!—and security for the foreseeable future? Nuclear weapons make a contribution to peace? It is like saying that disease should be maintained in the interests of health. Does the Minister appreciate that we shall have an opportunity to develop this point in speeches tonight?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I dare say that that will happen, but the Government's position remains that nuclear weapons do indeed make an important contribution to peace now and, I dare say, in the future, as they have for the past 30-odd years.
Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, will the Minister confirm that, despite the extreme views expressed on both sides, the Government think that we have far too many nuclear weapons on both sides, and that a serious effort will be made to reduce them, and that that would be in the interests of peace?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, yes, I agree that it would be desirable to create a balance at a lower level of nuclear weapons on both sides, but I do not think that we can approach that position by unbalanced or unverifiable changes as some advocate.
Lord Melchett: My Lords, I was grateful to the noble Lord for reminding me that the working papers of the SCOPE Report in Volume 1 have not yet been published, although I believe they are available in the scientific literature. What I asked the noble Lord was whether the Government accept the conclusions of the SCOPE Report, which last year they said they were awaiting before they came to a view on the nuclear winter hypothesis.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I am afraid that we have not yet had a chance to come to a view on the SCOPE Report, but we look forward to seeing it in due course.
The Earl of Halsbury: My Lords, can it be arranged through the usual channels that in years to come we abstain from nuclear questions during Lent? It would be wonderfully heartening to those who are endeavouring to control other forms of self-indulgence, and according to canon law the noble Lord could blow off steam on Sundays.
Viscount Whitelaw: My Lords, without referring any further to the noble Earl's suggestions, many of
630
which I might find admirable in one sense if not in another, perhaps it would be reasonable to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, said, that there will be opportunities to pursue this subject in the debate later. Therefore the House might feel that now is the time to proceed on beyond Questions.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, with one qualification—
Noble Lords: Order!

Business
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, it is usual at this point to say a word about the arrangements for this afternoon's two short debates. The number of speakers for the two debates this afternoon in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Jenkins of Putney and Lord Molloy, is such that it is not necessary to propose any formal time limit, but I am sure that noble Lords will enter into the spirit of these short debates by keeping their speeches within the 15-minute limit which applies to the mover of the Motion.

Business of the House
Viscount Whitelaw: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the debate on the Motion in the name of the Lord Bottomley set down for 19th March shall be limited to 5 hours and that Standing Order 35 and paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Rules for the Conduct of Short Debates set out in Appendix H to the Companion to the Standing Orders shall apply to the debate with the substitution of "5 hours" for "2½ hours" and "25 minutes" for "20 minutes".—(Viscount Whitelaw.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Legal Status of Nuclear War
3.11 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney Lord Jenkins of Putney rose to call attention to the legal status of nuclear war; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, as Jane Austen would probably never have said, it is a truth universally known to mankind that the more important the subject the fewer are those who wish to discuss it. Nevertheless, that may give those of us who do take part the opportunity to develop our arguments a little more fully than otherwise might have been the case. One hopes that that may be of some benefit. It will give me the opportunity, if your Lordships will permit me, to repeat a personal reminiscence which I have inflicted upon your Lordships once before. But as it is essential to introduce my own attitude to this subject and my knowledge of the subject (and if he had stayed in his place it would certainly have helped the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury), I hope that your Lordships will bear with me to that extent.
The personal reminiscence is that on 5th December 1940 the Clarendon Press issued No. 42 in its series of Oxford pamphlets on world affairs. The booklet was

631
entitled What Acts of War are Justifiable? It was written by a memorable man, A. L. Goodhart, who was at that time Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Oxford. There will be noble Lords in this House who will recall not without reverence the personality of A. L. Goodhart.
What Acts of War are Justifiable?—I still have my copy of this little pamphlet—was provided by the Bureau of Current Affairs to officers in the three services. I received my copy in 1941 when I was commissioned in the Royal Air Force. Those facts in themselves might have conceivably persuaded the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, who intervened the other day, that my interest in the defence of this country is not, as he supposed, something that happened last week, but has been going on possibly for even longer than his own. It is a most powerful and informative tract. It carried great weight and at the beginning of the last war the British forces were informed by the civilised ideas that it enunciated. Under the influence of those ideas pilots dropped their bombs into the sea rather than risk killing civilians, if they could not find the exact military targets. Aircrews lost their own lives rather than risk killing defenceless old people, women and children. They died rather than be guilty of breaking what Professor Goodhart called the "greatest triumph of international law", the separation of civilians from combatants.
Goodhart in his pamphlet condemned the Nazis for their devastation of Rotterdam and for their aerial bombardment of Coventry and London which was already taking place as he wrote. Nevertheless, he said:
"This need not make us despair for the future. International law as recognised by the civilised nations will not cease to exist because one state has deliberately violated its provisions … It is to re-establish the laws of war in a world threatened with barbarism that this war is being fought".
Alas, Coventry was followed by Hamburg and Dresden. We were breaking the rules of war even more barbarously than the Germans. In the end came Hiroshima and Nagasaki; acts which possibly even bear comparison with those of the Nazis because they carried on into following generations and because they marked what may yet prove to be the beginning of the end of our civilisation.
Goodhart was right to say that when he wrote we had no cause for despair. But those who do not despair about what has happened since are deceiving themselves. The combination of the capacity to exterminate the human race simultaneously with the removal of international inhibitions against doing so must be a totally lethal one. The question therefore becomes not whether but when. The answer? That we do not yet know, but there is as yet no sign of that worldwide rebellion which alone can prevent the nuclear weapon achieving the end which many of us have seen it directed towards, which is the destruction of the human race.
And people yet still act as though the use of this weapon is a rational possibility. The Prime Minister, as I said just now, refused an opportunity to discuss the question of a test ban, presumably because we are committed to testing Trident.
It is significant that the indiscriminate mass slaughter of civilians without pretence of target
632
limitation, the use of the nuclear weapon in war, was carried out at the time by the only nation capable of the deed, the United States. The inability of the American Government to see evil other than in the Soviet Union consorts ill with this massive crime of their own. This is not to say that since 1945 the world has taken a fatalistic view of the consequences of the American action in Japan. Just as the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the League of Nations in 1938 declared civilians to be safe and sacrosanct under international law so the London Agreement on War Criminals in 1945 reasserted that view. They declared that international law was superior to national law, that Government leaders and subordinates were equally guilty when a war crime was committed and that superior orders were no defence and that a war crime included:
"wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages".
The wanton destruction of humanity itself was not mentioned as, even when those rules were adopted, understanding of the full horror of the ultimate use of the nuclear weapon in its later form was still in the future. Concern nevertheless continued. In 1977 an extensive new protocol was adopted which was:
"to reaffirm and develop the existing protections".
Under this protocol methods of war were limited to those not causing widespread damage to the environment or causing unnecessary suffering. The study, development, acquisition or adoption of new weapons was prohibited if they were in breach of the protocol. Furthermore, civilians were not only protected from attack—they were not even to be threatened with it. I wonder who among us in any part of the world truly feels unthreatened today.
The British Government of the time then followed the United States in entering a reservation to the protocol declaring that, as far as they were concerned, nuclear weapons were not covered by it. It is upon that reservation that all governments since have chiefly relied in their claim that nuclear weapons are not in breach of international law. I think that the right thing to have done, if that was the intention, would have been to refuse to sign the protocol which was chiefly intended by those who introduced it to protect against nuclear weapons and to condemn nuclear weapons.
Instead, we, the British representatives, followed the Americans in pretending (on our side, very quietly pretending) that it was possible to cancel out the main purpose of a protocol, and indeed all previous humanitarian legislation, by signing subject to what I suggest was an invalid reservation. And even if it was valid, it was not effective on any other previous legislation but only in respect of that protocol itself, which was to be in extending, clarifying and making further the existing laws of war. This was really an appalling act and it was performed by two members of a government which I must freely admit was a Labour Government. Both of them have since left to join the Social Democratic Party, which of course—and its position is quite understandable—remains a pro-nuclear party.
It may be that the Labour Party's increasingly unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament was among the reasons for their departure from the party and their formation of a party which was not lumbered, as they perhaps saw it, with Labour's

633
commitment to nuclear disarmament. But the manner in which the action was announced indicated something rather less pleasant than a conviction in favour even of nuclear weapons; because this vital decision affecting the future of everyone was buried among pages of Written Answers on 14th December 1977. There were two columns in answer to a Question from Mr. Roderick MacFarquhar, MP, who, like the two Ministers directly concerned, has also since joined the Social Democratic Party.
Among a wadge of print without any separate paragraphs there were a couple of lines which indicated that the British acceptance of the protocol will be subject to the reservation that they,
"did not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons".
This is the basis, the invalid and lamentable basis, of the Government's claim that they are not in breach of international law by deploying nuclear weapons. I think they are, and I believe that they know it. The Minister who actually carried out the operation was Mr. Evan Luard, a distinguished fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford University, who was Under-Secretary at the time to Dr. David Owen, who was the responsible Foreign Secretary.
So we come full circle at Oxford University, from Goodhart, who said that civilians were sacrosanct, to Luard, who says that they may be murdered provided it is done with nuclear weapons on behalf of the British Government—and not on behalf of himself personally, of course. Incidentally, the full text of the reservation was quietly deposited in the House of Commons Library away from public notice where it still rests and may, I think, be inspected by noble Lords.
I look to this House to save the reputation of Parliament in this matter and in doing so to rescue Goodhart's claim from oblivion. He said, and I repeat it:
"It is to re-establish the laws of war in a world threatened with barbarism that this war is being fought".
If Goodhart was wrong, if governments continue to pretend that the mass destruction of people and preparations for such destruction are permissible, then, as I have said before, our species is likely to have a future which is nasty, brutish and short.
I hope that when he comes to reply to this short debate the noble Lord the Minister will abandon his brief and say that he too wants to avoid the collapse of our civilisation into total and irretrievable ruin. This is what will happen to us if we go on as we are now, unless we can respond in that way when we see something offered from the other side instead of saying, "No, we must go on with what we are doing". It is because everybody on both sides says, "No, we must go on with what we are doing, we have a duty to maintain our right to have nuclear weapons internationally and nationally"—that, if we go on saying that, eventually the nuclear weapon will destroy us.
I say that we want a new outlook on this matter. We want a readiness to discuss. The first thing that the Government could do would be to look again at the decision they have taken on the question of the test ban. They could at least be ready to discuss it. If it is
634
bluff, let the Government go and call that bluff. Let us at least start those discussions on a realistic basis and not with the sort of ritual dance which has been going on at Geneva for far too long, in which each side puts forward its own proposals and fails to listen to the other. Let us have some real negotiations, some real discussions on the reality of the subject; and then, and only then, shall we be able to approach the question of removing the nuclear shadow which still hangs over mankind. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.
3.27 p.m.
Lord Rea: My Lords, I think that we should all be very grateful to my noble friend Lord Jenkins for raising this highly important and relevant matter. I am the first to admit that I am not well versed in legal matters, but the topic is of such basic importance that I felt that a medical input could be justified. I am extremely surprised and sorry that we do not have on the list of speakers any noble and learned Lord; for I think we could have had a very useful input from the legal profession.
In our personal lives, most of us try to live within the law because the laws of this country are reasonable and are designed to protect citizens who are going about their daily business. However, we know that aggression is a basic human characteristic and that, properly directed and controlled, it can act as a spur to achievement. Who has not heard of aggressive marketing? As far as I know, I do not think that aggressive doctoring would go down very well, but occasionally even violent aggressive behaviour can be justified for self-defence or under extreme provocation. But within society the law lays down strict limits to aggressive behaviour. Assault, even with bare fists, is usually regarded as an offence and the use of offensive weapons is certainly illegal. The mere possession of a potentially offensive weapon is often held to be an offence in itself. This, I submit, is obviously relevant to our discussion this afternoon, but I shall speak more of that a little later.
Conduct between nations when they are not at war is governed by a series of international agreements. The United Nations is the main but by no means the only forum where agreements on a huge number of topics are discussed and drawn up. As most people are aware, the conduct of nations while at war is also subject to regulation by international conventions and agreements. These are usually drawn in the light of painful experience after wars are over. As my noble friend has pointed out, this is a point we may not be so lucky as to reach should a nuclear war occur.
The international agreements which seem to be relevant to the issue of nuclear war have mostly been described by my noble friend—The Hague Convention of 1907, for example. Article 23 in the annexe says, among other things, that it is especially forbidden to employ poison or poisoned weapons or to employ projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. Article 25 of the Convention says that bombardment of towns which are undefended is prohibited. Article 27 states that all necessary steps must be taken to spare buildings dedicated to religion, art and science and also hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected,

635
provided they are not being used for military purposes. It is not easy always to distinguish, but efforts must be made to do so.
A further part of The Hague Convention concerns the rights of neutral powers, stating that the territory of a neutral power is inviolable. After the 1914–18 war the 1925 protocol of the League of Nations, banning asphyxiating or poisonous gas, was signed by many states, including ourselves; and gas was not used in World War II. After the Second World War the Geneva Conventions of 1949 dealt with the protection of civilians in time of war, including obligations to see that the population of an occupied state was fed and healthy. As my noble friend has pointed out, it made clear the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. As he mentioned, most recently in 1977 there have been additional protocols to the Geneva conventions. Among these is the statement, which is a slight variation on the one he gave—and I quote:
"It is prohibited to employ weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering".
There is a further quote:
"It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause widespread long-term and severe damage to the natural environment".
At that time I imagine that referred to defoliants, which had recently been used by the United States in the Vietnam war. But now, with the increasing documentation of the probable climatic effects of widespread nuclear war, this paragraph is doubly relevant. It is interesting that when the protocol was written the concept of nuclear winter had not even been discussed.
Other articles in these protocols make more specific the need to avoid attacks which strike military and civilian objects without discrimination and to avoid damage to the environment which might prejudice the health and survival of the population. These are necessarily very sketchy extracts from the many conventions and protocols which form the basis of international law governing the rules of war, but I feel that the relevance of these points to the effects of nuclear weapons is fairly clear. Radioactive dust does not respect the frontiers of neutral nations and it would be almost impossible to avoid damaging the centres of population which include hospitals, or to avoid killing and terrorising large numbers of civilians.
The recent publication, mentioned by my noble friend, from the British Medical Association in its detailed report The Long-term Environmental and Medical Effects of Nuclear War two days ago is highly relevant. The report reveals the increasingly convincing evidence, including the SCOPE report, that nuclear winter would be a very real possibility, in the northern hemisphere at least, if only half the existing stocks of nuclear warheads were used. As my noble friend has mentioned, by putting a reservation on their agreement to the 1977 protocol, the United States and the United Kingdom tacitly admit that nuclear weapons will have effects which are outlawed in the protocol and reserve the right to use them: in other words, to break the agreements when it suits them.
The use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent is the cornerstone which, we are told, has preserved peace in
636
Europe for 40 years. This implies that but for the risk of starting a nuclear war, the Russians would by now have tried to overrun Europe with the tanks of the Red Army. Our Prime Minister only two days ago said that our nuclear weapons are not negotiable. But the present situation is one of mutual overkill capacity to a vast extent. If both sides possessed only one-tenth of their present nuclear weaponry, a terrible deterrent would still be in the hands of each nuclear power. If we unleashed just 50 per cent, of our present weapons, civilisation in the northern hemisphere, as we know it, would probably become extinct. We have now reached the situation that if a massive first strike—and surely that would be illegal—were launched to take out the USSR's capacity to retaliate, the dust and smoke of such an attack could destroy our own environment even if not a single nuclear missile was sent against us in retaliation.
If the use of nuclear weapons would contravene international law, it is surely relevant to ask whether it is legal to possess and deploy them. I know legal experts do not agree that this is so, but the logic would seem to be there. I should like to quote from The Times Law Reports of 21 st June 1984. I am sure that some of your Lordships will have read this and other examples could be found, but this one has been shown to me. It describes the case of Patterson v. Block. I quote:
"Where a defendant had with him a lock-knife, which was not an offensive weapon per se, and the only evidence against him was his statement to the police that he carried it for his self-defence, the justices could properly draw the inference that for the purposes of defending himself he would if necessary use the knife to cause injury to the person".
Lord Justice Kerr, with whom Mr. Justice Woolf agreed, so held in the Queen's Bench Divisional Court on 20th June when dismissing the appeal of Daniel Anthony Patterson against his conviction by Camberwell Green justices for possessing an offensive weapon.
The fact that other people in the community might also be walking around with lock-knives who might attack the defendant was not held to be relevant for a defence. The noble Lord the Minister will doubtless give us the thinking which exempts states carrying offensive weapons which would be illegal in use from being guilty of possession of offensive weapons.
At present the initiative in proposing a freeze or reduction in nuclear weapons is with the USSR. Mr. Gorbachev has put forward his well-known three-phase plan leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century, and the USSR has observed an eight-month moratorium, unilateral, on nuclear weapon testing. The response of the Prime Minister, which is to escalate and modernise our nuclear weapons stock in reply to this initiative, is unimaginative and, in my view, dangerous, let alone economically disastrous with the escalating costs of Trident.
I can think of no period in history in which a gradual build-up of military power by two opposing blocs did not end in conflict. The build-up of nuclear weapons in the second half of this century alarms most thinking people and, as I have mentioned, has already reached gross overkill capacity. This country is in a position to play a very positive role by responding cautiously but I positively to Mr. Gorbachev's proposals. In my view,

637
consideration of the level of conventional weapons should be part of any deal which might reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons.
The hope of all of us is surely that one day political freedom will be permitted in the Eastern bloc and in the USSR. That will come only if first there is a freeze, and then a balanced stepwise reduction in nuclear and conventional weapons—but I am straying into the territory of the next debate in which people much more distinguished than myself will be talking about disarmament.
3.40 p.m.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, my two noble friends have already established the legal side of this Motion. I have no doubt that the Government spokesman will be anxious to put the political side, irrespective of its legality. May I add my voice to that of my noble friend Lord Jenkins of Putney and ask the Government spokesman, rather than reading the Civil Service brief, to recognise that this is a national and international debate in which the Government should take part? There should be question, discussion and argument all over this country as there is all over the world.
It is a pity that no noble Lords from the Government side have thought fit to enter this argument. It is not altogether surprising that no Liberal or SDP member is taking part. We know their difficulties, both within their parties and between them. Nevertheless, this is an essential debate. I hope that the noble Lord who is to wind up will recognise that this is a debate about the future of mankind. All that we are asking him to do is to take the argument and the debate seriously and, above all, to recognise that there is a counter argument to that which the Government put forward as though we were going back to the old days of TINA—there is no alternative. It is the alternative which I should like to suggest is worth discussing this afternoon.
A few weeks ago, a noble Lord in this House expressed surprise that my noble friend Lord Jenkins should be concerned about security in this country. That reminded me of the days before the war when many of today's noble Lords, who were then prominent in Government circles, were amongst the appeasement camp and accusing those of us who were opposed to the Nazis and Fascists of being warmongers. At that time, we were pointing out how important sections of the Establishment in this country were in fact helping Hitler to rearm. They were giving him the armaments and the resources to do so. I suggest that the assumption that before the war it was right to be within the appeasement camp is very similar to the assumption that is made today that there is no argument as to whether Britain should continue to possess nuclear weapons.
I hope that the noble Lord who is to wind up will participate in the spirit of the debate—putting a case and contradicting one—because surely the job, task and opportunity of the House is to stimulate discussion throughout the country.
I do not think anyone would deny that we are talking this afternoon about an issue in which there is
638
either universal security or universal insecurity. This affects the whole human race. It does not make any of us feel more secure to know that this year we have five times the resources to wipe out the human race than we had last year or that we shall have 10 times the resources next year and 20 times the resources that we had in the 1950s. The escalation of nuclear weapons is not bringing security to the people of this country or to anyone on our planet.
The case that the Government have put consistently when we have put the issue of deterrence to them, has been that it has brought peace for 40 years. They say that the deterrence of nuclear weapons has produced the longest period of peace that Europe has known for many centuries. Is that not the old mistake of the argument of post hoc propter hoc? Is it not the case that there is no way of proving that the possession of nuclear weapons has prevented war or maintained peace?
The principle of deterrence is really better described as the threat of retaliation. That is what deterrence is. If we examine the threat of retaliation we do not find that it has bought peace. It did not bring peace to Vietnam. It did not bring peace to Afghanistan. It did not bring peace to the Falklands. It has not brought peace to the Middle East. It has not brought peace in Southern Africa. Nevertheless, the supporters of nuclear weapons continue with the assumption that because there has been no major European war for the past 40 years that is due to the fact that we have threatened to retaliate—we have used the weapon of deterrence.
Lord Howie of Troon: My Lords, I have followed the argument carefully, but is my noble friend equating like with like? There have been a number of wars since 1945, but they have tended to be between people who are not in what we might call the nuclear club. When my noble friend talks about the threat of retaliation, there was no question of that between the Russians and Afghans, and so on. Will he turn his mind to the notion that where powers face each other with nuclear weapons they do not go to war but that where countries face each other without nuclear weapons they do? It is a paradox, and not a happy one. Will he face it?
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, I shall gladly face it. I suggest that the logic of my noble friend's argument is that we should supply nuclear weapons to the Middle East, Southern Africa and South East Asia and that then if both sides had nuclear weapons there would be no conflict. There is another side to the argument which I want to take up shortly. If my noble friend will wait a few minutes he will see that I am approaching the point he made.
It seems to me that the possession of nuclear weapons, while it may have coincided with a period during which there has been no war between those few nations that hold them, has created, sustained and inflamed political conflicts between the nuclear powers. I do not need to tell my noble friend that, in the past, world wars have started from little local conflicts. The fact that for 40 years there has been no major European conflict does not mean that there cannot be one, nor does it mean that if there is a

639
conflict in a remote part of the world it cannot, as in the past, lead to world conflict but, this time, a world conflict in which the weapons of the major powers are sufficient to annihilate the human race several times over.
Another argument that is constantly used by the supporters of the nuclear case, and particularly by this Government, is that the removal of the nuclear side of our armaments would lead to unemployment in this country. I think that that is scraping the barrel. Of course if you stop the manufacture of anything you will lose jobs, unless those workers and that investment are turned to something else. But surely it has been the case for centuries that swords can be turned into ploughshares, and, when one looks at the paucity of manufacturing investment in this country, when one looks at the reduction of employment in the manufacturing industry of this country, one can surely argue much more validly that the use in that manufacturing industry of such resources as have been put into the nuclear industry would have maintained employment, maintained investment and given us a much healthier manufacturing sector.
It is not just the words of those of us who have argued on moral grounds that have to be listened to in this new stage of the nuclear debate. There are military leaders who now say quite clearly that the concept of a nuclear war is outdated and makes military nonsense, and that the emphasis that is put on the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons is bad for their conception of military strategy, particularly because of the advances that have been made in nuclear technology over the last 10 years or so.
This concept of deterrence through the possession of nuclear weapons presupposes that a nuclear war will be fought. The whole strategy depends upon that. Indeed, unfortunately, there are increasing sections of the United States military establishment which have started to talk about the concept of nuclear victory. That surely makes nonsense. It sounds like a kidnapper holding one pistol to the head of the hostage and another to his own head and saying, "Unless you do so-and-so, I will shoot us both."
Already this afternoon we have had reference to the BMA's report which was published this week and which is worth quoting, because those who are still considering that there is such a thing as a nuclear victory should just listen to the words not of the politicians, but of those who have been spending many months in studying scientifically the consequences of a nuclear conflict. I would simply encapsulate the central meaning in a quotation from three of the eight conclusions.
The report reads like this:
"The United Kingdom is vulnerable to the effects of a nuclear winter. Only if a large proportion of the population were killed in the attack would there be enough food for the survivors. Distribution difficulties and radioactive fall-out would limit the availability of remaining food supplies. Quite small climatic changes in the appropriate seasons could prevent the growth of future crops. Climatic effects on agriculture in other countries and the disruption of international trade could prevent the import of food needed to keep survivors alive.
"In addition to starvation, long-term medical effects include increases in cancer rates, genetic diseases and acquired immune deficiency syndrome. The nuclear weapons strategy of the United Kingdom must take explicity into account the likelihood that even
640
a limited nuclear war, particularly in Europe, could trigger a nuclear winter."
So the supposition on which the whole concept of nuclear deterrence is based is the supposition of human suicide.
Is there, then, no alternative? I suggest that there is and that there have been specific alternatives proposed by thoughtful men and women in many countries, including our own. This debate is not really about unilateral and multilateral defence. It is a debate as to whether or not in the position of this country, at this time and for the rest of the century, it makes sense to retain nuclear weapons.
Without nuclear weapons we are not defenceless. There is a military school of thought which considers that what is loosely termed "defensive deterrence" is more efficient and more effective than nuclear weapons in the present age, but it depends upon the removal of nuclear weapons from Europe. It is only such a removal, and it is only with such a defensive stance, that the political negotiations which can undermine political tensions and political conflict become possible.
We have heard it assumed this afternoon that without nuclear weapons there would be a heavy overbalance of conventional weapons on the Soviet side. This is not borne out by any examination of the figures, and the International Institute of Strategic Studies can be quoted in support of what I am saying. Of course, it depends on how you use the figures. But within NATO there are many members, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, Norway and Denmark, which are considering, discussing and arguing, in a way that we are not in this country, the use of defensive deterrence based upon conventional weapons as an alternative to the nuclear strategy, because they are determined that whatever else happens a third world war will not be started by either side from within Europe.
I think it is a pity that these political policies, which could lead to political solutions to the tensions between the two great power blocs, have been so neglected by this Government, because the concept of a defensive strategy does allow negotiations, does allow an approach on the lines of detente and does allow, above all, much greater confidence in the operations of the United Nations. But, when the present Government are faced by the opportunity of strengthening the non-proliferation treaty through that Clause 6 in it which calls for a reduction in nuclear arms, if other countries like Israel, South Africa and Pakistan are not going to develop their own nuclear weapons, the Government answer with Trident.
When the USSR offers an agreement or a moratorium on testing, the Government turn their back on it. When there has been the suggestion of the removal of intermediate range weapons from Europe, we get the negative letter from the Prime Minister which was published yesterday. When many people in many countries are calling for Europe and, above all, for NATO to declare the principle of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, the call is turned down by this Government. When the tragically late Olof Palme made his proposals on behalf of the Swedish Government for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe there was no response from this Government.

641
There can be no response to these political initiatives so long as the Government are held within this rigid posture of the assumption that we must have nuclear weapons if we are going to be defended. That is not true politically and it is not true militarily.
I hope that the noble Lord who is to reply will accept this argument and will use the channels of the Government to see that this argument is an open one throughout the country. That is what we are asking for. We are not saying that we have the perfect truth here; we are saying that it must be argued nationally but it must be argued on the basis of real facts and not simply of prejudices.
4.1 p.m.
Lord Graham of Edmonton: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, prevailed upon the Minister to take this debate seriously. I make no such plea because I know the Minister and I know that he intends to take the debate very seriously indeed.
The legality of using nuclear weapons and the legal status of nuclear war is a proposition most certainly worthy of debate. I want to join other noble Lords who have participated in the debate in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, and to say to him that he has done this House and many outside who follow our affairs a service in raising this matter. The noble Lord certainly set a very responsible tone. I am glad that the following speeches have taken a lead from that. I fear, however, that somehow it will be almost an exercise in futility for although we have had quoted resolutions, of texts, of conventions—and indeed I intend to do some of that myself—the conventions will be judged by many as mere words, if not of rhetoric then as so much hot air.
The last thing that I intend to do is to denigrate the expression of views, especially those by governments, assembled formally into declarations. But as has already been said, we are faced with a yawning gap which has grown over the years between the words of nations and the deeds of nations. We have had and will have again opportunities to debate the grand strategy in the use of nuclear weapons—global strategy, East and West issues and conflicts, star wars, the real end or the sharp end of the nuclear debate—yet we are entitled as we are doing in this debate to return to some of the basics.
What do we want to see happen? What do we want to see outlawed? We recognise, as I am sure does the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, that our battle for sanity is with the super powers and not with world opinion. My authority for some of what I have to say is drawn from The Laws of Armed Conflict, a collection of conventions, resolutions and other documents produced by the Henry Junant Institute of Geneva in 1981. I want to begin by referring to Resolution 1653 of the United Nations General Assembly, a declaration on nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. In that resolution the General Assembly considered,
"that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would bring about indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilisation to an even greater extent than the use of those weapons declared by the aforementioned international declarations and agreements to be contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime under international law".
642
The General Assembly believed,
"that the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, is a direct negation of the high ideals and objectives which the United Nations has been established to achieve through the protection of succeeding generations from the scourge of war and through the preservation and promotion of their cultures".
That is still a matter of record.
I move to 1970. My attention was drawn to Resolution 2936 on 29th November 1972. The resolution recalled the declaration in 1961 which I have just read out and recalled the resolution of 30th November 1966,
"on the strict observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, and of the right of peoples to self-determination",
believing,
"that renunciation of the use or threat of force and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be fully observed as a law of international life".
If I may get down to basics, the use of nuclear weapons in war is one of the most important and serious problems of our age. It endangers the entire future—even the existence—of mankind. No one around this House who argues from either point of view will dispute that once nuclear weapons are used they will threaten the very existence of mankind. If we are raising the question of legality, as we are in this debate, many legal writers and interpreters oppose the use of nuclear weapons. They have not been alone. The International Red Cross has regularly condemned the use of nuclear weapons. The International Law Institute adopted in 1969 a resolution on the difference between military and non-military objects. Many hold the view that all nuclear weapons are prohibited on the basis of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Reference has been made to that by more than one previous speaker.
In my research I was struck by a paragraph from the Toledo Law Review, which was part of an article by Erik Castren entitled: The Illegality of Nuclear Weapons. The passage that I am about to quote sums up the core of the debate which is taking place at this time:
"We are dealing with a means of mass destruction which is both blind and beyond human mastery and which, depending on the circumstances (like the flow of the air and weather conditions) will kill both soldiers and civilians alike without making any distinction, and destroy both military and non-military objects. The effects of such destruction may continue for an extended period of time, possibly even after peace has been restored and throughout the next generation. Thus, we have a conflict with some of the most important principles of the laws of war, such as the upholding of the difference between soldiers and civilians and military and non-military objects, and the duty to refrain from those measures whose effects will extend long into the state of peace".
As I have already indicated, the reality is that it is clear that the status and standing of international declarations is in some kind of disrepute. All laws, national and international, ultimately depend on the pressure of public opinion for their effective observance. I believe that the observance of the existing law is ensured only through knowledge of it, and informed public opinion is not only the best guarantee that international law will be kept; it can also become a source of law in itself and set a standard of behaviour binding upon governments. The resolution of disputes between nations is becoming

643
more and more a legal matter. At least that is the avowed determination of the members of the United Nations in order to save,
"succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained".
Article 2 of the charter says:
"All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered".
Reference has been made to the 1977 protocol. Although my noble friend Lord Jenkins and others have pointed out the inhibiting or excluding clauses in that protocol, I hope that the Minister will be prepared to say more—as must have been said by him before, and by his predecessors—about why the specific use of nuclear weapons was excluded from that protocol.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, if the noble Lord will allow me to intervene for clarification, is he arguing that the view of the Opposition is that the United States and Britain should renounce even the threat of nuclear war in all circumstances?
Lord Graham of Edmonton: No, my Lords. I am not arguing that in all circumstances the ultimate use of nuclear weapons must be wholly abandoned—not unilaterally. Our posture is one of discussion and negotiation, and we support the negotiations that are taking place at this particular time.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, then the noble Lord is saying that there are circumstances in which it would be right for the United States and for Britain to violate the protocol and the laws that he is describing.
Lord Graham of Edmonton: No, my Lords, I am not saying that it would be right to violate the protocol. I am saying that I want the Minister to explain to the House why in 1977 that exclusion was made and why it has been maintained in the policy of the present Government.
In this debate, we are able not merely to look at the narrow confines of the words on the Order Paper but also to say something about our attitudes in general—always wanting to avoid having the debate slip into a debate of the type we have sometimes had before. I simply want to reiterate what was said by my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition in the House yesterday and what has been said by my noble friends behind me earlier in this debate.
The Government must apply themselves more seriously to the points that are contained in the nuclear freeze agreements. The Labour Party strongly supports a freeze on nuclear weapons as a first step to their reduction. We want a freeze on the testing and deployment of all new systems, both offensive and defensive. We believe that could be achieved by some fairly simple technical methods, if the two sides agree on the objectives and on the cut-off points. While I say that those methods may be simple, I realise the enormity of each step. Yesterday the Prime Minister, in debate, failed completely to take advantage of the initiatives that have been presented to this Government, to the West and to the NATO countries
644
by the latest pronouncements by the Leader of the Russian nation.
As I have already said, the reality is that it is clear that the status and standing of international declarations is in some kind of disrepute, outwith the arguments that are beginning to develop, even in this debate, as to what was meant, what was said, and what was intended. This debate has revealed that there is on record declarations by governments, pacts and agreements that in reality are being bypassed around the super power table. We are all aware of the series of bilateral talks that have dominated world peace efforts these last few years. We wish them well from this Front Bench, but in the meantime it is entirely proper that we use those forums of world opinion to seek to influence what happens at the negotiating table when there are but two super powers sitting at it. In that context, we are all indebted to my noble friend Lord Jenkins for reminding us that even in your Lordships' House we have a role to play. I believe that we have done just that today.
4.15 p.m.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, in rising to reply to this debate I am conscious of the fact that I have about one and one-quarter hours in which to effect my reply. However, your Lordships may prefer it if I contain my remarks within a rather shorter period.
The first responsibility of any government must be the security of the nation. We live in a world where nuclear weapons inescapably exist. It is a world, moreover, in which such weapons are also in the hands of the Soviet Union, a huge power with a massive military strength and a proven willingness to use that strength when it thinks that it can get away with it. In such a world, Western governments are not merely entitled but are positively bound to protect their people's right to peace and freedom by something more substantial than just good motives and hoping for the best. This Government need no convincing of the horrors of war. Any large-scale conflict, but particularly one involving nuclear weapons, would have horrific consequences. The aim not only of this Government but of all their predecessors, and indeed of the present and past governments of all our NATO allies, has been to preserve the peace.
Contrary to what some noble Lords opposite would have us believe, it is important to make the point that NATO is a defensive alliance. It has no aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, or anyone else. That is why the United Kingdom, together with our NATO allies, has adopted the strategy of deterrence. That strategy remains—as it has for more than 35 years—the cornerstone of British and NATO defence policy. Our primary objective is not to win a war but to prevent one starting in the first place, while at the same time working for balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament.
The United Kingdom of course has pursued the policy of deterrence, firmly based on a strategy that is entirely defensive. The inherent right of self-defence is recognised by the UN charter. We seek no first strike capability. As NATO leaders have repeatedly made clear, no NATO weapon, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used in Europe except in response to attack.

645
The Soviet Union has never given a comparable assurance.
While deterrence has kept the peace in Europe, it is an appalling fact that since the end of the Second World War, in approximately 160 conventional wars, more than 20 million people have been killed. Western Governments have consistently pressed for discussion at the United Nations on the problem of the conventional arms race. For we wish only to live in peace, safe in the knowledge that we have the ability, as a last resort, to resist any attempt to blackmail us by the threat of superior force.
There is no rule of international law dealing specifically with the use of nuclear weapons. The use of such weapons is governed by the general laws of war. Thus any use of nuclear weapons would have to be judged as lawful or not in the light of the particular circumstances in which they were used, just as is the case with any other weapon. Neither can it be said—in spite of noble Lords opposite—that the use or possession of nuclear weapons is prohibited, by analogy, by treaties dealing with other types of weapons.
Experience has shown that in the progressive development of arms control measures it has not been possible to extrapolate from earlier rules of international law, whether customary or conventional, in order to take account of technical progress. It has always proved necessary to develop new agreements to cope with new weapons and new situations. There may be some superficial appeal, for example, in drawing an analogy between nuclear weapons and poison, poisoned weapons or poisonous gas, but it has to be recognised that a nuclear weapon is in fact none of those and is of a quite different nature.
It is worth recalling that all five nuclear weapons states—the United States, USSR, United Kingdom, France and China—have given assurances that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, save in defined circumstances. Those are the so-called negative security assurances. In the case of the United Kingdom, the assurance was by the United Kingdom delegation at the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in May 1978, in the following terms:
"We are now ready to give the following assurance to non-nuclear weapon states which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or other international binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices. Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its Armed Forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a Nuclear Weapon State".
None could deny that by any objective standard there are too many weapons in the world today. We do not share the gloomy forecasts of those who claim that war is inevitable or that weapons, once possessed, are bound to be used. This would be to deny the validity of the concept of deterrence. But there is no doubt that the world would benefit from a reduction in the level of armaments on both sides. That is why we attach so much importance to the easing of tension between East and West, and to the achievement of realistic, balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament. To this end, Britain has played a leading role in the search for greater international security and a reduction of tension.
646
We have been in the forefront of all the multilateral negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament since 1945, and have become a party to most of the treaties concluded. We have always strongly supported United States and Soviet bilateral negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons and welcomed the SALT I and SALT II agreements, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Britain, France and the United States have each signed agreements with the Soviet Union on "hotlines" and on prevention of accidential nuclear war. In 1975, 35 countries adopted the Helsinki Final Act on security and co-operation in Europe. In continuation of this process the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe began in Stockholm in January 1984.
Of course, arms control negotiations are unlikely to be fruitful in a climate of mutual suspicion. That is why the British Government have been working actively to establish and foster better relations with Warsaw Pact countries. Over the past 18 months my right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have had a number of significant meetings with Soviet leaders. In particular, they had an opportunity to hold extended discussions with Mr. Gorbachev when he visited the United Kingdom in December 1984. My right honourable friends visited Moscow in March 1985 for the funeral of President Chernenko, and Sir Geoffrey Howe has subsequently had two meetings with the new Soviet Foreign Minister. We also hope that Mr. Shevardnadze will be able to visit the United Kingdom later this year. We hope that these meetings lead to a better mutual understanding, which is the only sound basis for improvement in East-West relations.
In pursuit of this aim the Government warmly welcome the current negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms. The Government fully share the agreed United States-Soviet objective of working out effectively agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, and limiting and reducing nuclear arms.
President Reagan's recent response to the Soviet proposals of 15th January has the full support of the NATO Alliance. The United States will try to build on the positive elements contained in the Soviet proposals during future rounds of the Geneva negotiations. The Government will continue to support the United States in the negotiations, and look forward to maintaining the closest contact.
May I briefly turn to some of the points that have been raised in the debate this afternoon. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, suggested in his opening speech—a matter to which the noble Lord, Lord Graham, also referred—that the statement which the United Kingdom made in connection with the 1977 protocol is somehow invalid. That is not so. Indeed, the International Committee of the Red Cross in presenting the draft proposals made clear that it was not then the intention to broach problems relating to nuclear weapons. The negotiating history of the protocols shows clearly that they are not in any way intended to regulate the use of such weapons. The

647
United States and the United Kingdom made this explicit when, on signing the protocols, they both stated that their signature was subject to the understanding that the new rules were not intended to have any effect on, and do not regulate or prohibit, the use of nuclear weapons.
The noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, said that the possession of nuclear weapons by the super-powers had not prevented war taking place outside Europe. As I mentioned earlier, that is regrettably true. We have had many reminders since the end of World War II of the horrors of conventional war. We have also seen many important disputes between the super-powers: the crisis over Cuba more than 20 years ago being an obvious example. But we have not seen a major conflict between the super-powers or in Europe since the end of the Second World War. That is a very real achievement and I have no doubt that the possession of nuclear weapons by the West has played a major role in achieving it.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, can the noble Lord elucidate one part of his argument? About 5 minutes ago—I did not want to interrupt him then—he was recalling the declarations of each of the nuclear powers that they would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power, if I have the Minister right. In that case, would not the people of this country be more secure if we were a non-nuclear power?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I read out the assurance that we gave at the time which, of course, referred to not using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power except in certain denned circumstances. I think that our possession of nuclear weapons, which serves as a deterrent not only against those who do not have them but, more importantly, against those who do, has served us well over the years.
I turn now to the second point of the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, that the concept of nuclear deterrence depended on the assumption that nuclear war is in fact going to be fought. But the reality is quite the reverse. The whole purpose of the concept of deterrence is to prevent nuclear war, or any war, being fought.
Finally, I pick up one of the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Graham—I referred to another earlier—regarding the position in the United Nations General Assembly. The noble Lord referred to a number of declarations from that body. These resolutions are not legally binding. The United Nations Charter does not confer a legislative power on the General Assembly. Indeed, the wording of the resolutions is, I suggest, more appropriate to a moral condemnation or a policy programme than to a considered legal statement.
I have listened to the noble Lords opposite with a steadily growing suspicion that some of their arguments are based on a desire to attach to our successful and defensive deterrent policies some measure of moral stigma. Indeed, at least one noble Lord has sought to brand them as illegal. Morality may be left as a matter of personal judgment, but accusations of illegality need objective substantiation. None has emerged this afternoon.
648
As I have explained, the Government do not accept that it is either immoral or illegal to retain nuclear weapons to prevent others using force, or the threat of force, against us. We believe that while these weapons exist stable nuclear deterrence remains the policy most likely to prevent the outbreak of war of any kind between East and West, including nuclear war. There is, therefore, in our view, a moral duty on the part of the Government not to abandon that policy, except for one which makes the risk of war even less. Short of that goal, the Western Alliance, with its policy of nuclear deterrence, remains the best guarantee of the values we seek to defend.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I should like to thank all those who have taken part in this debate. The noble Lord the Minister will understand that my congratulations to him may be slightly less warm than they are to others. I do not think that he really gave us an answer to some of the points we have raised, and that of course means that we shall have to raise them again. However, I hope we shall do so in a somewhat different form, so that the noble Lord will perhaps be able to reply more fully.
Before I sit down, and since, as the noble Lord has mentioned, we are well ahead of time, I should like to make one point. The question that we have been debating is really: are nuclear weapons illegal or not? There has been a tribunal on this very question sitting at the invitation of a body called Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament. It has issued an interim report and I should like to read one paragraph from it:
"The Tribunal was satisfied that current and planned weapons development, strategies, and deployments violate the basic rules and principles of international law both customary and conventional. The procurement and use of such weapons involve infringements of the Charter of the United Nations, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 on the Law of War, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Geneva Protocols of 1977".
That supports my argument. The attempt of the governments of the time to put a reservation upon that protocol—and the present Government realise it—was in fact ineffective, and they and all other nations who deploy nuclear weapons are in breach of the rules of war. In this I make no exclusion of any nation whatsoever. So far as I am concerned, in itself the nuclear weapon is an illegal weapon and the laws of war prohibit its use and deployment.
Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord in the middle of his peroration. He referred to a tribunal, but he did not say who were the members of that tribunal. I should be grateful for that information, if he could supply it either now or later.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I can supply it now if noble Lords will permit me to do so. It might be as well to put it on record. The chairman is Sean MacBride, who I think is the only man who holds the Nobel prize, the American Congressional Medal of Honour and the Lenin Peace prize. Then, Richard Falk; Dorothy Hodgkin, who will be known to some of your Lordships as a highly reputable and well balanced person, who is very knowledgeable on this subject; and Maurice Wilkins also is a member of the tribunal. All these people are distinguished lawyers.

649
I am sorry that none of the lawyers in this House took part in this debate. I hope this means that we shall be able to attract them on to the floor later and that we shall have the opportunity in future of hearing from them. If they wish to brief themselves on the subject, I would recommend that they get in touch with Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament. I should be very glad to put any of our legal luminaries in touch with Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament so that they may brief themselves fully on the subject; and I think they could do this at least.
Whether or not they decide that they feel an immediate conviction about this issue, I believe that if they were to read some of the literature which is available to them on this subject they would begin to think again. That is the purpose of this debate. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

World Disarmament
4.33 p.m
Lord Molloy Lord Molloy rose to call attention to the proposal for the establishment of an International Standing Consultations Commission to examine world disarmament proposals; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think that to a degree it is rather unfortunate that these two short debates should follow one another, because they are not by any means identical. Indeed, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, made a winding-up speech, because no other Tory uttered a word on this vital subject. He said that the Government's policy was quite firm. In no way would they abandon thermonuclear weapons unless there were some other method which could give a form of guarantee. My submission this afternoon is almost in answer to that statement.
I think we all agree that nuclear weapons are the millstone of madness around the neck of mankind, whether we are people from nuclear or non-nuclear powers. It is horrible to think that all the people who died of starvation and suffered the agonies that we saw in Ethiopia could be lucky if there were to be a thermonuclear war next month or next year. What then will happen to mankind? I am bound to say that I do not think we are doing enough as civilised, sensible people, whether we come from my country, the USSR, or the USA.
Perhaps I may say immediately that I do not intend in any way to be anti-United States or anti-Soviet Union, and certainly not anti-my own country. But I am anti-anyone who really believes that there is absolutely no answer but to hold out the possibility of slaying all mankind nearly forty times over. I believe that is the situation at which we have arrived.
In addition, the current situation with regard to nuclear weapons has retarded civilised progress, as well as offering the possibility of total annihilation. Of course, right at the source fear has made its contribution. The Americans are afraid of Communism and Russia; Russia is afraid of capitalism and America. Both are influenced by fear, but fear is a very bad adviser. We should also remember that its companion is hatred, and hatred is the father and
650
mother of cruelty and intolerance. It is the aspect of intolerance which deeply concerns me.
Another aspect about which I believe we should be concerned is the almost psychological anaesthesia from which we are suffering at this particular moment in the western world. We will not see. We seem to be blind to the peril of a thermonuclear war and its terrors. We seem to think that somehow or other it will not happen. But it can happen. I have even heard people say that of course an atomic bomb has never been dropped. We all know that this is untrue. We all know what happened at Nagasaki and Hiroshima and how shattered and shocked we were, though at the time some of us may have had doubts as to whether it was good that it was done. We have come to realise that that was just a triviality compared with what could happen if a thermonuclear war were to break out under present conditions.
This planet has plenty of problems: the problems of oil pollution, disease and starvation. Only yesterday that great European politician Herr Willy Brandt, in the company of Mr. Edward Heath, made a statement, apropos of his remarkable book, on how there are literally millions of people in the world who are starving and hungry and that we in the West—or in the North, if you like—have the capacity to help them. While that appeal was being made, at the same time, Great Britain announced that it intended to spend another £584 million more on the Trident nuclear weapon. There must be something barmy going on when those two things can happen in this ancient Parliament on the same day.
A nuclear war will of course get rid of all the problems that we have. It will get rid of all the people. It will destroy absolutely the water of life. We have to ask ourselves how much time we have left. I must reiterate that I do not wish my submission lo be regarded in any way as anti-Russian or anti-American. It is merely that perhaps we can grope forward somehow and find an answer ultimately to abolishing nuclear weapons or at least to having them under iron control. In the end absolute riddance of them is essential.
The other day I was privileged to go to a Royal Society soiree and there I heard of remarkable things being done by British scientists It is absolutely fantastic how they are finding ways of growing more food, and making interesting machines which would be labour-saving and help to increase production. No doubt there are counterparts and equivalents of our Royal Society in other countries, which are bent on destroying pestilence and erasing starvation and try to do what Dean Swift said was worthy of the entire race of politicians; namely, to raise two blades of grass where one existed before. All this wonderful endeavour fades with the threat of thermonuclear war. It will not be a war to end wars. It will be a war to end civilisation.
Recently the British Medical Association issued a remarkable book, already referred to, I believe, called The Long Term Environmental Medical Effects of Nuclear War. I suggest to my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition on the Front Bench the possibility of a debate simply on this document—I also ask the noble Baroness opposite to have a word with the Leader of the House about it—produced not by some

651
wicked red organisation or some pacifist and untrustworthy organisation, but by the British Medical Association. We should debate what is fascinating and terrifying reading. The book speaks of the effect of nuclear explosions and nuclear tests, the atmospheric effects, the dust and smoke effects, the generation of fire and smoke, the effects on agriculture and the biological effects on all humanity. Those are matters with which we should be concerned.
One can derive a little encouragement from the fact that there have been genuine endeavours in the past to grasp and to grapple with this terrible problem by providing some form of warning. We have had the warnings. We have tried to find an answer to the warnings. There have been some tiny achievements. It is not simply those with extreme Left-wing views who happen to be against nuclear war. Many good, decent people are dead against nuclear war. I have already mentioned the BMA. Others include the Physicians for Social Responsibility and also some eminent military leaders. But, alas, all their warnings have not been heeded.
Looking at a cross-section of people who are gravely apprehensive in our country, in the United States, and throughout the European Community and the British Commonwealth, one can safely say that this is not simply an issue of politics. It is a question of life and death. Even the President of the United States, in his hollowed-out retreat in Mount Weather, 80 miles north of Washington, might survive the initial blast, but he will not live for long afterwards. He will not be able to come out of the hole he is digging for himself. It would be much better to heed the warning given by the great United States President, Dwight Eisenhower, when he said:
"The conference table, though scarred by many frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield. Disarmament is a continuing imperative. We must compose differences not with arms but intellect and decent purpose".
Those words of President Eisenhower are very much applicable to today. Of course, we have had a few successes. We must take encouragement from them. The comprehensive test ban treaty, the Antarctic treaty, the treaty on outer space, the seabed treaty and the biological weapons convention—all these things we have somehow managed to achieve. We should take some degree of comfort from them in the hope that we can edge, slowly perhaps, towards finding an ultimate answer.
This year is the United Nations International Year of Peace. Within the United States, groups are already doing their best to draw the attention of their government to the fact that there are folk in the United States who do not wholly go along with the attitude that you can only be safe under some nuclear shield, with the capacity to wipe out millions of your fellow human beings. In the USSR, a four-day world disarmament conference is to take place next May in the Georgian city of Tbilisi. Even the great powers, and people within them, are moving towards another way of thinking.
World military expenditure is now running at £1,000 million a day or 650 billion dollars a year. Surely we can be compared to the Gadarene swine in that we are spending this massive amount of money
652
without providing a single aspirin to relieve suffering or one loaf of bread. Instead, these vast sums—can it really be in true Christian spirit?—are spent on purposes that could wipe out all humanity. This is the issue that we must have the courage to face. I have mentioned eminent military leaders. We can perhaps do no better than to listen again and to read what the late Earl Mountbatten had to say. He said:
"The world now stands on the brink of the final abyss. Let us resolve to take all possible steps to ensure that we do not, through our own folly, go over the edge".
That is the great challenge—that folly or blindness might push us over the edge.
A great European statesman, Olof Palme of Sweden, proposed many years ago his international security committee and also an international independent commission on disarmament. At one time it seemed that his proposals might take root. But, alas, that did not happen. There have been many conferences. But there is, of course, between the great powers a lack of trust. I can understand the British Government, the United States Government, or the Government of the USSR, saying that they will not drop their nuclear shield because they are not sure that others will drop theirs, despite promising so to do.
The argument has always been the matter of verification. The new leader of the Soviet people, Mr. Gorbachev, has adumbrated—one might say that he has outlined in detail—the possibility of on-site verification of any agreement. I understand that, initially, even the President of the United States thought that it was not a bad idea; that is, until some of his advisers got at him. Advisers on both sides are very dangerous people. I know of no well-known adviser, Russian or American, who has made any recommendation whatever for trying to find a way to stop the making of thermonuclear weapons and for their numbers, gradually, on a basis of trust and confidence, to be reduced.
I can understand, therefore, that without verification we shall not move forward. It is possible, I believe, for this country—we can still play the honest broker—the United States and the USSR to establish a standing consultations commission comprising the best scientists of the United States, of Russia, and also of the United Kingdom, the European Community and the Warsaw and NATO pacts, with ultimate freedom and full power to examine any suggestion for the reduction of nuclear weapons. I do not have the time to go into the details of how this might be achieved. Indeed, I do not know how precisely it could be done. However, someone at one time recommended that man might be able to fly—that this was a possibility. Leonardo da Vinci thought of an idea. As we know, it was copied centuries later by the Wright brothers, who actually did fly.
If, after all the summit meetings and all the proposals to stop nuclear explosions and to reduce the existence of nuclear weapons, both in the East and in the West, there could be complete verification, so far as this was humanly possible, by the international body that I have suggested—operating to the total satisfaction of my Government, the Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States, together with other powers that might be interested—it must be followed by day-to-day on-site inspection.

653
They must take full cognisance of the possibility that once there has been an agreement and the specialists of the international committee say, "Yes, it has been carried out", they would have to stay there. What could be carried out in one month could then be restarted a month later.
If you are asking me to say that perhaps the great international powers are cheats, I shall say yes we have done a good bit of cheating in our time—as have the Soviets and the Americans. So let us make sure that there can be no cheating and that the powers of this international committee would be to give firm, complete, assurance not only that agreements have been carried out but that there is no opportunity whatsoever of any secret reinstallation of nuclear weapons.
If I am told that that is an idle dream all I can answer is this. I would prefer my dream to the nightmare which some people would like in having nuclear war. If we examine the possibility of the commission which I have outlined—it would take a long time to get the views of our American allies, of the Soviet Union, of our EC allies and the British Commonwealth of Nations—but we could think about whether we could make this a reality. If the mighty scientists of this world know how to slay every American and every Russian 40 times over is it not possible that they might also be able to find a way to say that we can make certain beyond all peradventure that the slow diminution of nuclear weapons can become a fact and that this joining together of international scientists from all our countries to form this great commission could very well be the saviour of mankind?
I conclude with the firm belief deep within me that while I have not gone, and cannot go, into the absolute detail, I believe that the threat we face is so enormous that no suggestions which might have some merit or possibility should be disregarded. I am grateful to your Lordships' House for listening to me and I beg to move for Papers.
4.53 p.m.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Lord for his proposal, which I consider a valuable one. He mentioned that it was first made by the late Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Olof Palme. His proposal did not come quite to nothing. He did himself gather an international committee which has produced extremely valuable reports in this very field. He was chairman of it. The British member was my right honourable friend Dr. David Owen.
The noble Lord, Lord Molloy, spoke on the possibility of gathering the mightiest scientists in the world to have an opinion on disarmament proposals and to watch it happen, if it ever does. I would commend to his attention, and to that of your Lordships, the Pugwash Conferences which, since they were founded by Einstein, Mme Joliot-Curie and Bertrand Russell in the 1950s, have indeed done just that and have produced some powerful reports. The problem is not in giving them authority to review matters, inspect them and to have an opinion, but to give anybody the authority to see that it is actually done.
First, we why do we want disarmament at all? I am sometimes struck in these debates by the assumption
654
that there are people who are fully aware of the horrors of nuclear war, should it happen, and those who are less than fully aware. Some of us seem to be trying to convince others that nuclear war would be intolerable. I think that we can skip that stage of the argument. It would be—and the only worthwhile argument is how best to avoid it. That is the argument that I shall address this afternoon.
The reasons for thinking that disarmament is a good way to avoid war used to be familiar, but are perhaps dropping out of sight a little now. They are not because it would automatically and without further ado usher in the new golden age. The reasons are less glamorous. They are these. The arms race wastes real wealth. The wealth of humanity is being sucked into the rich north and especially into the United States now one of the great debtor nations. That wealth is then actively wasted. All around people are starving—as Willy Brandt reminded us in this building yesterday—yet that wealth is deliberately and elaborately spent on the one product of human labour, arms, which not only does not make new wealth (gambling machines do not do that either) but which destroys wealth. The industrialised north takes wealth out of circulation and lays it aside in great heaps which are expensive to maintain and to renew and which create the daily possibility that everything will be destroyed The industrialised north has now taught the agricultural south to copy this zombie pattern of behaviour.
The second great reason for thinking that disarmament is desirable is the risk of accident or madness. That is obvious. The third is the split-second reactions now required even of sane men in good control. Under SDI—if it ever came about—these would be delegated to machines.
Disarmament cannot disinvent weaponry but it can remove Armageddon from its present time horizon of seconds to one of many months—the time which would be necessary to rebuild the weapons which have been destroyed. If the noble Lord, Lord Molloy's commission were now in full existence, what would it find? It would find in effect two disarmament plans on the world agenda: the American one of last November; and the Russian one of 15th January with later additions, principally Mr. Gorbachev's speech to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of 25th February.
How would it judge them? First, it would see that the American plan consists of positions advanced in several of the numerous forums in which disarmament is now discussed but never set out as a whole in a way which would show the relation of one part to another. There is a proposal to reduce inter-continental nuclear delivery means, a proposal to reduce intermediate range nuclear forces, a proposal to start a new arms race in space, a proposal to abolish chemical weapons accompanied by a proposal to make some more in America, a refusal to consider a complete test ban, etc.
The Soviet proposal, on the other hand, is a comprehensive one. It mentions everything and relates everything to everything else. Again and again in his proposal of 15th January, and in his later speech to the Party Congress, Mr. Gorbachev harps on the totality of the arms control problem, on the comprehensiveness of his proposed solution, and the need to activate all the negotiating fora. Even though bits of

655
the Soviet plans would present the West in general, and this country and France in particular, with some obvious difficulties, the fact that this is a complete package makes it not only easier to understand and judge, but also intrinsically more likely to succeed.
Let me dwell on this point about comprehensiveness. The main reason why success in disarmament has in the modern world been so very limited is that we have been tackling it piecemeal. The favourite British Government words have for decades been "building blocks" and "step by step". That approach was bound to fail and it has failed, conclusively, over an entire generation. The reason is this. One cannot hope to achieve balanced reductions in one kind of weapon alone. They will reveal the imbalances in neighbouring kinds of weapons. One cannot hope to achieve reductions between two countries alone. They will reveal the threatening might of neighbouring countries. Attempts to do these things are wasted and if we now insist on renewing those attempts after such abundant proof of their uselessness that would be a form of treachery towards the peoples of the world. There is a point where ignorance of history becomes treachery. Therefore the Soviet proposal is convenient and timely simply because it is comprehensive. What we do not like in it can be put right in negotiations—that is what negotiations are for.
There has, unfortunately, been some misrepresentation in the West. The Prime Minister was at it yesterday in the House of Commons; The Times was at it this morning. At Question Time yesterday the Leader of the Labour Party, Mr. Kinnock, asked the Prime Minister,
"why will she not at least pursue discussions based on the [Soviet] proposal to get SS20s out of Europe altogether"?
The Prime Minister said that Mr. Kinnock was mistaken in thinking that that was the offer that Mr. Gorbachev had made. She said:
"He has not made a total zero-zero offer. He has made an offer which would mean that a number of the missiles went to the far east of the country and could, of course, be moved back. That is totally different from a zero-zero option".—[Official Report, Commons, 11/3/86; col. 805.]
First, even if that were a correct statement of the facts, the argument is weak. It would be no easier for the Soviet Union to bring the weapons back from the far east of the country than it would be for the Americans to bring the cruise missiles and Pershings back from the United States if they were removed from Europe. They are at present brought by air to Greenham Common, Molesworth, and to other places in Germany, Italy and so on. I have seen them flying in myself, and so obviously have many noble Lords. Nevertheless, that is not a correct statement of the Soviet offer.
On 14th February General Chervov, who is the general officer in the Soviet General Staff concerned with international negotiations and disarmament, said of the SS20s which the Soviet Union has offered to remove from Europe, including from Russia:
"They would be destroyed, destroyed under careful and reliable control, national and international control, including on-site inspections".
He also said that their launching pads and infrastructure would be destroyed. It is not a question
656
of moving them to the far east from whence they could come back.
All right. It was not Mr. Gorbachev himself speaking; it was as if not Mrs. Thatcher but, say, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff was speaking. Does that make it any less binding on that government? Why should the Prime Minister go to the House of Commons and speak as though she did not know of this statement? Or did she not know of it? The Soviet proposal is for a separate zero-zero, or whatever the agreement may turn out to be, in Asia, negotiated with the interested parties there and corresponding to the European one.
Why again does the Prime Minister consistently treat the whole Soviet initiative as if it were about nuclear weapons only? Why do so many United States spokesmen do so? Do they really believe that? Who is telling them that?
The Soviet proposal includes strategic weapons reductions; intermediate nuclear force reductions; prevention of an arms race in space; a comprehensive test ban; conventional disarmament; mutual and balanced conventional force reductions; chemical disarmament; confidence-building measures; even the removal under the INF rubric of the short range nuclear missiles which they have moved into Czechoslovakia and East Germany since the build-up of cruise and Pershing II in the West. It also includes INF in Asia; discussions about terrorism; about aid; about open societies; about religious persecution; about what the Russians call "social and personal rights" (which we call human rights); about regional problems, and about world debt. Many of these discussions President Reagan has rightly called for.
I had so much hoped to be able to spend the time today talking only about what ought to be done and not about trying to stop the presumably Washington-originated slide towards misrepresentation of the other side's position. The fact is that the Soviet proposal is highly important for two reasons. It is the first comprehensive disarmament proposal to be made by either side since 1961, which alone would make it an historic moment. About that there can be no question. I also judge—and here I may be wrong—that it is the most constructive and useful disarmament proposal ever made by the Soviet Union.
Taken with the rest of Mr. Gorbachev's five-hour speech to the party congress last month, it constitutes I believe one of the rare turning points in Soviet history; certainly comparable to Khrushchev's famous speech when he came to office. We wanted these things to happen in Russia and they are beginning to happen in Russia. This is not a turning point which can be safely understood through the dark glasses of the Western press nor even, I most strongly urge, through the resumes of officials who are almost as busy as the Ministers whom they serve. It is the duty of every person who seeks to influence the destiny of this country to read these lengthy documents for himself, and in full. Members of both Houses can obtain them free through the BBC monitoring service, and there are copies in the Libraries of both Houses. Presumably the Soviet Embassy will be glad enough to provide them for others.
I have said and repeat that not everything in the Soviet proposals is satisfactory. The United States

657
proposals contain many valuable elements. There is no obvious clash coming on intercontinental weapons—reduction to half was originally an American proposal in 1977. The Russians rejected it then with deplorable roughness. We can be delighted that they have now accepted it and have built it into their own more complete formula.
In INF, the gaps are rapidly shrinking. On MBFR, new formulae are coming forward, including one from this country, which are introducing new hope. On space, the situation is deadlocked and will remain so until this president or the next clearly demotes the American SDI plan to the nearest prudent hedge of research. On chemical weapons, the United States Administration should make the spending of the money which Congress has voted for a new generation depend on negotiations, and our Government should urge them publicly to do that.
On the test ban, the United States should agree to come back to the negotiating table, which they have left. They are morally bound by the Partial Test Ban Treaty to do so and our Government should publicly urge them to do just that, too. We in the West cannot simply let the extended Soviet moratorium on testing pass by without any response. I know that it is difficult for the Government, but that is because of their own ill-considered decision to use the Polaris replacement programme to make a great leap forward in military nuclear power. That brings me to the direct impact on this country.
Once again we must first clear away the misrepresentations. The Government say that the Soviet proposals would require the "freezing" of our independent nuclear deterrent and thus the cancellation of its modernisation programme, irrespective of what that might be, whether Trident or something else. The Government say that now is not the time to do that—maybe later. However, now is not the time that the Soviet Union suggests we should do it. The Soviet plan explicitly recognises the legitimacy of West European independent nuclear forces until the conclusion of the disarmament process alongside their own.
In the Soviet Phase 1, which is supposed to last until some time between 1991 and 1994, the word they use about our nuclear forces is not "freeze" but "build up". They invite us not to build up our nuclear forces. The difference is quite clear. It is only in the second stage envisaged by the Soviet proposal, which would last, if everything went forward with the greatest imaginable despatch, from 1991 to 1997, that the idea of "freezing" comes in. Since the purpose of the whole thing is to achieve the complete abolition of nuclear weapons "by the end of 1999", I must say that the idea of freezing what we have two or three years before that does not seem to me so very terrible. The Russian plan does not suggest that the super-powers themselves should freeze their nuclear weapons at any time. No doubt this is an oversight, but it is worth pointing out to them.
It would certainly be possible, as the Soviet plan now stands, for the super-powers to modernise what legitimately remained during the disarmament process right up to the last day of the reduction. Our best approach to this would no doubt be to ask them to assume the same restraint as we do, and at the same
658
moment; that is, during the second phase, some 10 years ahead if the plan is begun immediately.
We should also be putting ideas of our own into the melting pot; even pouring them in, and they should be European ideas. We should propose a European Disarmament Monitoring Agency, which could be linked with regional agencies of the same sort elsewhere in the world. Ultimately—and here I come back to Lord Molloy's ideas—there will of course have to be a world monitoring agency, but the regional approach would be useful even now. The security not just of the super-powers but of all the world will be at stake during a disarmament process, and we shall want our own means of knowing whether engagements are being kept.
The links between such a system and the on-site inspection which the Russians are now offering in an increasing number of fields—in the test ban, in the destruction of the SS20s, etc.—are obvious The European Agency would have something in common with, but would be wider than, the long-standing proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, and it would provide a specific purpose for Eureka, which seems at the moment to be a bit short on purposes.
Lastly, I will end as I always like to with a word of praise for the Government: in the House of Commons on 5th March, at column 181, Mr. Renton, the Minister for Disarmament in the Foreign Office, answered a Written Question with the following words:
"We would like to see the ABM treaty reaffirmed and strengthened".
My Lords, so would we. That has been a strong Social Democrat plank over the last years. We are delighted that the Government should be stealing our clothes. If I may conclude with a question, how would the Government like to see the ABM treaty reaffirmed and strengthened, and when?
5.12 p.m.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, my first word must be of congratulation to my noble friend Lord Molloy on selecting this subject; and having done so his persistence has succeeded. I want to look at the broad situation and the actual proposals for disarmament which the suggested international commission should examine.
At Question Time today I indicated that many of us were appalled by the reply which the Prime Minister has made to the Soviet Government in saying:
"Nuclear weapons would continue to make an essential contribution to peace and security for the foreseeable future".
That view is based on the theory of the nuclear deterrent: that both the super-powers, fearing the effect of a nuclear war on their populations, would maintain peace—a peace of fear, and a peace of terror. I want to submit that a peace which is based upon fear cannot possibly be stable. Each side seeks from strength, perhaps from superiority, to build up its arms so that it might meet the other. Inevitably the result of that situation is that a time comes when it feels that the other side is stronger than it is, and war begins.
I want to look at what has happened since this theory of the nuclear deterrent was urged. In the first

659
place, it has made nuclear weapons far more deadly. Five years ago the United Nations General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to appoint a commission of leading scientists to look into this issue of nuclear weapons. He appointed 12 of the leading scientists of the world. What did they report? They said that a nuclear weapon now in existence was 4,000—I repeat, 4,000—times as deadly as the weapon which fell on Hiroshima. That resulted in 200,000 deaths. A weapon now, according to that report of the scientists—one weapon—could kill 9 million people, a number greater than the whole population of London.
The first effect of the policy of the nuclear deterrent has been enormously to increase the power of destruction of nuclear weapons. The second effect has been to make a nuclear war more likely; more likely because now the nuclear missiles can be thrust through the air to within a few hundred yards of the target at which they are aimed. The idea would be that they would be aimed at military and political targets. Even so, millions would be killed. But no one who knows anything about the history of war believes, even if that war began with nuclear weapons being aimed only at military or political targets, that that would remain the aim of both sides. Inevitably it would become a war of total destruction. Therefore, I want to submit—and I submit it seriously in argument—that the theory of the nuclear deterrent is not a theory which can guarantee continued peace in the world.
I want to consider the kind of situation which this proposed international commission would examine. There is now the hope of summit meetings between the two sides. I regard that hope as a victory for the peace movement of the world, which has brought pressure on both sides, has brought pressure on the United States of America for some action to be taken to prevent a nuclear disaster. But I am a little disturbed that on both sides, while the hope of a summit remains, difficulties are now being raised and a climate created where the summit might not begin with the hope that we had thought it would have.
In the notable speech which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has made, he described in detail the proposals which the Soviet Government have made both about the comprehensive test ban treaty and about the timetable for ending nuclear weapons, for abolishing the missile systems in central Europe and moving towards disarmament. I need not repeat what the noble Lord said in detail, but my attitude is one of non-alignment. I am not pro-Soviet. I have criticised in Moscow itself the policy of the Soviet Government in Afghanistan and in Poland, its treatment of dissidents, its treatment of the independent peace activists and conscientious objectors. I have felt able to do that in Moscow because I have not failed to criticise also the crimes committed by the West: our own appalling crime in exiling the whole population of Diego Garcia so that it could become an American base.
At present the American Government are exiling the whole population of a large island in the Pacific, transferring it to an island which is an overcrowded slum so that the island may be used for an experiment to see how close nuclear weapons can come to their target. They are being flown 4,000 miles from California
660
to that island in the Pacific and are reaching their target within a few hundred yards. The population of that island has been exiled, just as we have exiled the population of Diego Garcia. I am a world citizen and therefore I feel I have a right to criticise what is wrong in the Soviet Union, because I recognise that the first duty of citizens of the West is to criticise the crimes which are committed in their own countries also.
I remain optimistic. I believe that the peace movement of the world is now so strong that, if unity can be obtained within it within a few years, it will be able decisively to alter the policy of governments and even the nature of governments. In our world disarmament campaign in the United Kingdom we have now secured common agreement on a policy statement by over 120 of the major peace movements of the world. That unity will grow. Action will grow and I believe that within a few years we shall have such a movement in the world making nuclear weapons impossible, making for an advance towards disarmament, as will give hope to our children and to our children's children that they may live in a world of peace.
5.26 p.m.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, the Motion of my noble friend deals with the central problem and challenge facing the world and we must be grateful to him for moving it and also for his speech. He has described the horrors of nuclear war and no one would dissent from his conclusions, certainly not after reading the British Medical Association report to which he referred. My noble friend also mentioned the proposal for an international standing commission. We await the comments of the noble Baroness on that with interest. My noble friend also mentioned Mr. Olof Palme. I know that we all share the sense of acute loss of a man who worked unremittingly for peace. We particularly remember his chairmanship of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security to which my noble friend referred; his support for the Brandt Report and his efforts to resolve the Iran-Iraq conflict. He was the independent leader of a relatively small country who played a significant and admirable role on the world's stage.
The Motion deals with disarmament. The adjournment of the fourth round of Geneva talks makes this a timely debate and an occasion to assess the position. Like other noble Lords, I make an effort to follow developments which are, I am bound to say, very complicated. My general feeling is a mixture of disappointment, frustration and impatience qualified with a hope that all is not lost and that there are still real possibilities of progress on a number of fronts. One of the difficulties is that, side by side with the talks, there has been a good deal of propaganda and counter-propaganda, of proposals and counter proposals but very little progress after the friendly encounter between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. How therefore are things progressing both on the nuclear and non-nuclear talks? How much realism is there in the offer of cuts on both sides? We should, to get the picture clear beyond doubt, place the statistics on the record. The following figures were in a chart in the Economist on 22nd February. I assume that the Minister will agree that they are accurate. First, long-range missiles and bombers: United States,

661
1,814; Soviet Union, 2,547: warheads on land-based and submarine missiles and bombers; United States, 10,174; Soviet Union, 10,223: Cruise missiles: United States, 98 bombers with 12 missiles each plus 96 sea-launched missiles; Soviet Union 395 bombers with one missile each. The respective payloads of cruise are 2 million kilogrammes and 6 million kilogrammes. Both sides therefore have enough to blow up the world several times over. It is on the basis of these nuclear arsenals that the disarmament offers and counter-offers have been made in recent months.
It would be beneficial to the world and to the super powers to have reductions. They would also save money which neither can afford, especially the Soviet Union—and Mr. Gorbachev has made this clear in his recent speeches. He would like to see disarmament because his country needs economic rehabilitation. It also seems clear that neither side has a clear superiority over the other. I think this is the lesson of the figures in the Economist. The Soviet Union is bound to be concerned about the US D5s and the United States are bound to be worried about the SS 18s. But for the time being they are neck and neck in the nuclear race and our anxiety is to bring that race to an end.
It is always a pleasure to listen to my noble friend Lord Brockway and to pay tribute to a long life devoted to the cause of peace. Like him I was disappointed by the Prime Minister's response at Question Time in another place yesterday. It is in this context of virtual parity of nuclear weapons that I find her response to Mr. Gorbachev's offer somewhat puzzling. As I understand it, his proposal included a Europe zero option with the Soviet Union dismantling all their SS 20s in Europe in exchange for the removal of cruise and Pershing and also a British and French agreement to freeze the development of existing arsenals.
The Prime Minister yesterday said that Russian missiles would only be moved to the far east of the country and that a freeze would be one of "imbalance"—and that is the word she used. I agree with Lord Kennet's interpretation of the Gorbachev offer. In any event, a freeze at this stage would surely be advantageous because of the parity which I have just described. If the figures are agreed, there would be no disadvantage to either side and I have a feeling that we should be rather more constructive in our actions and more accurate in our statements if we are to make progress on disarmament.
I am afraid that I have to say—and I am reluctant and sorry to say it—that the Prime Minister yesterday was both negative and disappointing. My noble friend has referred to Trident, which the Gorbachev proposals suggested should be cancelled. My noble friend Lord Molloy said that it is now being re-costed at £584 million above last year's estimate so that the new expenditure will be £9,869 million. Trident therefore will be a colossal burden on the nation and not only an obstacle to arms reduction but a very real threat to the development of our conventional defence.
As to the Geneva talks, it must be regarded as deeply disappointing that, as they adjourn for a few weeks, no progress has been made. Hopes were raised at the summit which have now been dashed. The hopes were
662
that the two powers would achieve some understanding on arms control which would give meaning to a second summit. We all know what has happened. We referred to the possibilities when we debated these matters just before the summit took place. At the time that the negotiators were getting their heads down in Geneva, Moscow and Washington have been vying with each other in public proposals and counter-proposals. It has been a vivid demonstration of how not to succeed, how not to make friends and influence people. Both Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan should have agreed firmly at Geneva that they and their spokesmen would be silent while their representatives were trying to achieve something in Geneva. Those representatives must have been both confused and bewildered at what was going on.
The other spanner in the works has been the strategic defence initiative because the USSR has used the occasion in Geneva to put a brake on the INF talks in order to try to halt SDI. There has been a change here. I think it is a welcome one and I shall return to it in a moment. But the Soviet's September proposals for 50 per cent, cuts in strategic nuclear missiles and an interim INF agreement on medium-ranged missiles in Europe was dependent on a US agreement to abandon the SDI. This proposal, as the House will remember, led to a counter package from Washington in October which—and I am bound to say that I am not a defence expert—seemed to me when I studied it that it was not too far apart from the Soviet proposal of the previous month, although there were variations, notably the refusal to halt SDI.
Then the summit followed. What did that achieve apart from the welcome appearances of friendship between the two leaders? Nothing more I would have thought, than a joint call for accelerated negotiation in Geneva. But that was better than nothing. And it was followed just before the talks resumed with Mr. Gorbachev's public statement of January 16th (dealt with in some detail by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, in his speech) proposing his three-stage plan to achieve nuclear disarmament by the end of the century. This is the proposal of course to which the right honourable lady the Prime Minister has just responded.
This proposal took everyone by surprise and it was later read into the records at the Geneva talks. I mention these developments because for the first time—and this I believe is very important—the Soviets were no longer insisting on retaining SS 20s to match British and French nuclear forces. There were other details; but the whole was again dependent upon the abandonment of SDI. Reactions to this, as noble Lords will recall, were very mixed. Someone wrote that Washington was "exhilarated and confused". Predictably, President Reagan's ultimate response was muted. It also frightened the US's NATO allies in Europe, who thought that he might be contemplating negotiating US cruise and Pershing out of Europe.
A further development occurred when Mr. Gorbachev told Senator Edward Kennedy when he visited Moscow that his offer to eliminate medium-ranged missiles in Europe was no longer linked with the SDI. That seemed to me to be something to be welcomed and a substantial step forward; although I was slightly puzzled by the manner in which so great a modification was announced. President Reagan's

663
response on the eve of the Soviet Party Congress was to extend the proposed area for elimination of medium-ranged missiles from Europe to the entire world by the end of 1989. These proposals again have been written into the record at Geneva.
Mr. Gorbachev in his speech at the congress said that a further summit was pointless unless the two countries could agree, first, on medium-ranged missiles and, second, on a nuclear-test freeze.
I noted that President Reagan has come out for a further summit even without substantial movement on arms control. Again, on 3rd March, Mr. Arbatov, a senior Soviet official, also said that a further summit was in the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. On balance, even against the background of disappointment, we must welcome both these statements from Washington and Moscow.
That is where we stand at this moment in this debate. It is against that background that we must view my noble friend's proposal. Lest I appear too pessimistic, which is not my nature, I also think we must be grateful for some things. First, we are glad that, although public diplomacy on the scale we have witnessed tends to be disconcerting, it has in fact contained proposals which should be examined in detail. These should be transferred from the media to the conference table. If the possibilities of a freeze on the testing and deployment of new nuclear systems, both offensive and defensive, could be discussed and an agreement reached, that would be an enormous achievement. A realistic negotiation on reduction could then follow, and both sides have said many times over that this is what they want.
Secondly, one of the major obstacles to confidence has been the refusal of the Soviet Union to on-site verification, to which more than one noble Lord has referred. There seems now to be some easement in the Soviet position because Moscow has indicated that it might accept an international system to verify a test ban, taking up the offer of India and other states to place monitoring stations on their territories. They profess readiness for—I quote the statement from Moscow—
"certain measures of on-site verification to remove the possible doubts about compliance with a nuclear test moratorium".
There is a difficulty here, namely, whether the verification is dependent on an immediate moratorium; but is it not clear that this should be examined carefully and pursued carefully so that we may find out how serious and genuine the offer is? It is this apparent unwillingness to pursue proposals which appear to be practical that puzzles and worries people here and throughout the world.
There are again several other proposals from both sides which, in my opinion, deserve analysis and study. Some of them have been referred to by noble Lords. I agree that the proposal by Mr. Gorbachev on behalf of the USSR was one of considerable historic significance. Personally I like to see patient, step-by-step agreement on limited objectives. SALT I and also SALT II showed what can be done, and the undercurrent from Moscow and Washington gives me the feeling that both leaders would like to see some progress. We now have a pause before the next round
664
in May and before another Summit meeting. It is an opportunity for Britain and her allies to bring sensible pressures to bear.
5.43 p.m.
Baroness Young: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, for asking for this short debate. I welcome the opportunity to put on the record once again the Government's views on the current state of arms control and disarmament agreements and on the very best way to ensure the defence of Europe with our NATO allies. I also welcome the opportunity to comment on some of the proposals for new international bodies which were advanced by the noble Lord in his speech.
The British approach on arms control and disarmament is pragmatic, realistic and grounded in experience. Arms control and disarmament is not a process which governments pursue for their own sake, or in a vacuum. Our goal is peace; and if peace is to last it should assure the continuing security of all the parties involved. An international climate which promotes at least partial confidence is necessary for nations to start negotiations and for real progress to be made. Confidence should not be interpreted in only a narrow technical sense. It needs to be reflected in a serious approach to negotiations and the conduct of a country's policies, both at home and abroad, should contribute to confidence in its trustworthiness. Empty gestures, meaningless organisations and—worse still—empty agreements do little to advance either.
Ample fora already exist for the promotion of confidence. A variety of bilateral and multilateral negotiations are under way in Geneva, at the Conference on Disarmament, at MBFR negotiations and at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. In addition the United Nations provides a forum for exchanges of views and the examination of new disarmament proposals. The operation of the most important bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union—SALT I and the ABM Treaty, referred to just now by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn—are subject to continual scrutiny through a bilateral Standing Consultative Committee which meets regularly in Geneva. Further international bodies such as the proposed International Study Consultative Commission to which I think the noble Lord drew attention in his remarks, dedicated to the same broad objectives, would be a wasteful duplication of effort and a waste of scarce resources.
The noble Lords, Lord Molloy, Lord Cledwyn and Lord Rennet, all drew attention to the Palme Commission report—and I would add that the Government, as also the whole of the British population, were deeply shocked at the appalling assassination of Mr. Palme. The Government welcomed this report as a very important contribution to the arms control debate, which deserved serious consideration. Its conclusions helped to focus the attention of states on the need for a realistic programme of action, both nuclear and conventional, in the various disarmament negotiations. This appproach continues to be very much in line with the British Government's ideas.
It is of course vital that existing agreements should be seen to be complied with, and all possible steps

665
should be taken to increase their verifiability. And all new agreements must include a level of verification which ensures that there will always be a reasonable level of confidence that they are being complied with. Where any doubts arise on this score, the complaints procedures written into the agreement must ensure a fair and balanced examination of any complaint. These issues lie at the very heart of arms control negotiations and I cannot emphasise their importance too strongly. Adequate verification is essential if any arms control agreement is genuinely to enhance stability and security.
As the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, said, 1986 has been proclaimed by the United Nations as International Year of Peace. It is therefore particularly good that the prospects for real progress in the arms control and disarmament field appear more auspicious now than they have been for some considerable time. The Summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last November was a welcome success and has contributed greatly towards producing a favourable international climate.
The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, referred to a further Summit meeting. We fully share the view that a further Summit would build on the useful progress that was achieved in Geneva last year at the meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. However, as the two leaders have themselves acknowledged, results and deeds must be the mark of success in efforts to improve United States/Soviet relations, not just words alone.
The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, spoke about public diplomacy. Could I say to him that we fully share the view that public statements and propagandist proposals are not a substitute for negotiation. What is needed for progress to be achieved is quiet, patient and confidential exchanges. But perhaps I may say to him, quite frankly, with this in mind we found yesterday's call by the Leader of the Opposition for an exchange of letters between my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev to be published difficult to understand.
We, along with all other nations, have a vital interest in the negotiations between the two major powers. It is they who between them possess 95 per cent, of the world's nuclear weapons, as well as the greatest military capability in outer space. Though the long process of negotiating reductions in their nuclear arsenals has only just started, we have been encouraged by recent developments. We very much welcome the agreement to apply the principle of a 50 per cent, reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. Taken together with the instruction to the negotiators to accelerate the pace of the talks, this has provided a new impetus to the negotiations.
We have also welcomed the proposals contained in Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15th January, although they contained much that was already familiar. We have been considering intensively with our allies the new concepts which were in his statement. The United States has responded to the Soviet ideas with a range of constructive and realistic proposals of its own. We believe that these provide a sound basis for rapid progress both in the bilateral negotiations and in the multilateral negotiations at Geneva, in CDE at Stockholm and in the MBFR talks at Vienna. We will
666
continue to play our full part in these negotiations while also continuing to give President Reagan our full support in his efforts to achieve real and lasting progress in arms control.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said that the Soviet proposals were comprehensive; I think that was the word he used. They are indeed comprehensive on the nuclear front, but we believe that the coverage on conventional weapons and CW is very patchy. It is the Americans who have tabled a draft chemical weapons convention at the CD in Geneva. It is the West which has recently tabled new proposals at the MBFR talks.
One point reiterated at length in the latest Soviet proposals is the relationship of the nuclear arms of other states, including the United Kingdom, to the bilateral US-Soviet negotiations, something to which all noble Lords taking part referred. Our view remains firmly that British strategic nuclear forces are not relevant to any possible agreement on intermediate nuclear forces in Europe. The weapons systems concerned cannot be compared in their role or capabilities. In addition, given the very small size of our deterrent—less than 3 per cent, of the nuclear forces available to the Soviet Union—we do not believe that there is now scope for a British contribution to reductions of nuclear systems. But we have never said "never". If there were very substantial reductions in United States and Soviet strategic arsenals, and if no significant changes occured in Soviet defensive capabilities, then we would be prepared to reconsider our position and review how best to contribute to the arms control process.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, will the noble Baroness be very helpful and dot the i's and cross the t's? The Government have never said "never". Am I not right in thinking that the Soviet Union has never said "now"?
Baroness Young: My Lords, I did not quite hear the noble Lord's last word.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, the noble Baroness's last remark was that the Government have never said "never" about reducing and abolishing our independent nuclear force. Will she confirm to the House that the Soviet Union has never said "now", that it has never asked us to do that now, at the beginning of a disarmament process?
Baroness Young: My Lords, my understanding is that the Soviet Union, which has asked us to include those weapons in certain negotiations, has not put a precise date on that. If I am wrong about that, I shall of course let the noble Lord know.
On INF, the British Government's position is clear, and is based on our general approach to arms control measures. We want to see balanced, verifiable arms control measures which contribute to British security. In her recent reply to Mr. Gorbachev, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made her views on that matter known to the Soviet Union. As that has been referred to in a number of speeches this afternoon, perhaps I may make a few observations about it. The proposals put forward by Mr. Gorbachev for INF reductions would allow a number of SS 20s to be redeployed in the far east of the Soviet Union from

667
where they could easily be transported back to the European theatre in a time of crisis. This would defeat the intention of the original zero-zero option advanced by President Reagan that all land-based intermediate range nuclear missiles should be eliminated.
For the same reason, a freeze on nuclear weapons would be unacceptable. It would also make impossible the modernisation of our strategic deterrent, and without modernisation it would soon cease to be a credible deterrent.
Lord Kennet: My Lords—
Baroness Young: My Lords, may I just answer the point that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, made on this matter, before he gets up again. I remind him that this is not merely a technical matter. The United States would have to seek the political approval of its European allies for the redeployment of INF on their territories. That could obviously take some time. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, would face no such constraints and could redeploy its weapons as fast as any aircraft could carry them.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness. Is the Foreign Office unaware of the statement made by General Chervov that the SS 20s and so on to be removed from Europe under the Soviet proposals would be destroyed under international on-site control, as would their launch pads and infrastructure?
Baroness Young: My Lords, I take the point that the noble Lord has made. My understanding is that the Soviet Union has said that some of the SS 20s would be destroyed and others would be moved. They could be redeployed to the east of the Soviet Union. That is the point that I was making in my last remark in answer to the point that the noble Lord was making.
May I say to the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, who said that he thought that the strategic nuclear weapons were approximately in balance between the United States and the Soviet Union—he quoted, I think, figures from the Economist—that it is very difficult to make a comprehensive and accurate evaluation of the nuclear balance. The Economist figures are an attempt to do so, but one cannot evaluate the potential effectiveness of a weapon solely in terms, for example, of its payload. Britain's security must continue to rest in its ability, in concert with its NATO allies, to convince the Soviet Union that we are capable of defending ourselves.
I listened with great interest to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. I understand the sincerity of his views, but I can only say to him that we do not believe that his analysis is right, and the fact is that we have enjoyed in Europe since the ending of the Second World War the longest period of peace this century, and nuclear defensive weapons have played their part in that.
The alliance has repeatedly stated that no NATO weapons, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used except in response to an attack. But it would not be sensible to constrain our freedom of action against a potential adversary as powerful as the Soviet Union. The fact that NATO has not made a "no first use"
668
declaration in no way commits us to using nuclear weapons in any given circumstance. But to renounce that option in all circumstances would be to diminish the uncertainty in the mind of a potential adversary and thus to simplify his calculation of the risks of attack. The political and military realities which underline NATO mean that the Warsaw Pact will always have the initiative in choosing the timing and concentration of any attack on the European mainland.
NATO therefore needs to have both strong and balanced in-place forces to deter and, if necessary, repel any attack at short notice; and also the means quickly and effectively to reinforce its defences. The British Army of the Rhine is so constituted to contribute to that end. We must always remember that deterrence depends on the credibility of our forces' capability to provide a robust defence against aggression. For our part, the Government will do all in our power to maintain and enhance this capability.
We view the various current arms control, disarmament and related negotiations, including those of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, as a network of complementary activities. Progress in one area could enhance prospects in others. While the momentum developed as a result of the bilateral US-Soviet talks is very welcome and useful, we must never lose sight of the fact that other negotiations, such as those on MBFR in Vienna, also have their contribution to make. In Stockholm, we hope that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe will be able to agree on practical and concrete confidence and security building measures. Such agreements would contribute to reducing tension and the risk of surprise attack.
At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, our goal in the negotiations on chemical weapons—a global and verifiable ban on their development, production or stockpiling—is ambitious. A comprehensive treaty on these lines would represent a new milestone in arms control agreements. We therefore regard our present task as immensely important. Accordingly, the United Kingdom has put forward a number of detailed ideas which are designed to contribute to a solution to the remaining problems. All states seem to be agreed that the goal must be a complete ban on chemical weapons.
We may now be better placed than ever, as a result of work carried out in the CD over the past four years, to resolve the outstanding problems. In particular, there is general agreement on the basic framework of the convention and on a considerable amount of substantive language for its content. This debate is taking place in the shadow of the use of chemical weapons in the Iraq/Iran conflict and each new report intensifies the need for a worldwide ban.
Our policy with regard to the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty has been made clear on many occasions in your Lordships' House. We see such a treaty as one of the objectives in our overall arms control policy. But the issue of verification remains the central problem. Important security interests would be involved in any treaty. The risks to national and alliance security, which would be posed by undetected non-compliance, would be especially grave.

669
It is simply not possible to ignore the question of verification in the hope that some cosmetic fudge will be sufficient to secure our interests. Such an approach does not recognise the central component of arms control negotiations. The aim of those remains to ensure that the overall level of armaments is reduced, while the level of both national and international security is maintained and enhanced. It would be irresponsible to ignore verification in the interest of political expediency or of concluding agreements.
The noble Lords, Lord Molloy and Lord Cledwyn, referred to what the Soviet Union has recently said on verification. But it is in fact unclear whether the Soviet proposals are an advance on their previous position. However, we welcome the Russian recognition of legitimate Western concerns about verification and we hope that they will follow these up with concrete proposals.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, that being the case, will the Government urge the United States to return to the test ban negotiations?
Baroness Young: My Lords, if the noble Lord will just let me complete my speech before he interrupts me once again with these points, I will note what he has to say. The establishment of an adequate verification regime is not merely a technical matter. Let us not forget that scientists' assessments are not the whole story, for the assessment of adequacy remains a political judgment backed up by technical findings. And such a judgment rests upon a range of considerations, including the extent of political confidence on the part of one party that others will comply with a treaty.
Since the subject has continued to be at the centre of the arms control debate, let me also reiterate our policy towards the United States strategic defence initiative. We share unequivocally the objective of the bilateral US/Soviet negotiators to prevent an arms race in space. At the same time, we believe that the American research programme—and I must underline that it is only a research programme—represents a prudent step in view of the extensive and long-standing Soviet activities in this field. The United States has made it clear that all of its activities are, and will continue to be, conducted in full compliance with all relevant international treaties and in accordance with the four well-known—indeed, cardinal principles—agreed between my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and President Reagan at Camp David in December 1984.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, raised the question of a link between SDI and Eureka. May I say on the Eureka initiative that we have taken an active part in the ministerial discussions at the Milan European Council and at the subsequent Eureka ministerial meeting in Paris and Hanover. We will host the third ministerial meeting in the first half of 1986. But it is a separate issue from SDI and the question of participation in SDI research, as indeed the French have made clear—
Lord Kennet: My Lords, simply on a correction of fact, I did not raise any link between SDI and Eureka.
Baroness Young: My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord if I misunderstood what he said, but I thought he had. At any rate, I have now set out for the record what the position is. He asked me at the end of his speech two questions which I should like to answer. First, he asked me to confirm an answer given by my honourable friend Mr. Renton in another place. As President Reagan has repeatedly confirmed, SDI research is consistent with the US present obligation including the ABM treaty. He confirmed that SDI will be conducted in conformity with a strict interpretation of the treaty. The Government have repeatedly made clear that we regard the treaty as an important element in preserving international peace and stability, and I can confirm that we want to see it reaffirmed and strengthened. Any suspicion of violations should be pursued according to the mechanisms provided for in the treaty.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, also asked me about the Conference on Disarmament. May I say to him that we believe that negotiations would be premature before there has been some progress on some of the outstanding issues, such as verification. As I have said, we have made it clear and the United States has made it clear that, so far as SDI is concerned, negotiations will be based on the cardinal principles agreed between my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and President Reagan at Camp David. It is on that basis that we have recently concluded an agreement with the United States to participate in its research programme.
We must not allow the hopes reposed in arms control and disarmament negotiations to founder either on propaganda or on inertia. The international climate has improved. The omens for progress are correspondingly better. Let us take advantage of this and translate the improved climate into positive results.
6.9 p.m.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, I should like to express my appreciation of the support that I have received from the spokesman for the SDP Benches, in the extraordinarily good speech by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. I should also like to thank my noble friend Lord Brockway. I always feel honoured when men of his calibre are behind me in full support. I felt privileged to listen to the magnificent speech by the Leader of my party, my noble friend Lord Cledwyn.
With regard to the speech of the noble Baroness, I thank her for it but I found it very hard to keep my seat sometimes and not get up to question what she was talking about. I wondered whether she, or those who drafted her speech, had even read what the Motion was about. I believe it is pretty "ribby" that, whenever you ask something in this House, all you get is an answer which has obviously been drafted by some faceless civil servants. That is becoming a little thick, and we are noting it in every part of this House. If anyone does not agree with what I have said, he can get up and say so now; and let those who agree also stand by what I have said.
When we have had these debates in the House the gravamen and fundamental standpoint of successive Ministers on the Front Bench has been this: "We should like to do what has been suggested; we are always so willing to do it. We do not listen to civil

671
servants. This is our point of view but we know full well what the crucial answer must be before we can give any assent. We want wholesome, factual, realistic verification". That is what this debate was about. We had very little answer in the speech that was written for the noble Baroness. I feel very strongly about that.
I acceded to the argument that has been put by former Ministers at the Foreign Office that verification is vital. You make a proposal that may be just a little acorn. It might die; it might wither on the vine; but, on the other hand, it might grow (who knows?) and might make a contribution to save mankind. That is what is wrong with this Government. They are not prepared to listen to anything from anybody outside their ken. Even the British Medical Association and this tremendous book have hardly received any mention. I wonder whether the civil servants ought to read this. It would be a very good job of work if they did. I have finished now and the noble Baroness can say what she likes.
Baroness Young: My Lords, I have tried to listen with great care to what the noble Lord has said. I hope very much that he will perhaps reconsider some of his remarks and withdraw the remarks that he has made about the advisers in the Foreign Office and other civil servants who, as he will know, are not in a position to speak for themselves and, I think we would all accept, do for Governments of all complexions a very good job.
Lord Airedale: My Lords, will the noble Lord also withdraw what he said about the withering of the acorns on the vine?
Lord Molloy: My Lords, I said "wither on the vine". The acorn can grow into an oak tree and the grape can also wither on the vine. There is nothing whatsoever wrong with that. It is also becoming very difficult to express one's deepest feelings when one has listened so very carefully to debates. If I have said anything harmful to persons individually, then of course I withdraw.
What I am trying to say is that I have listened carefully to the arguments of Ministers, as they have a right to be listened to. Their arguments have a right to be thoroughly examined. There is no point in making them otherwise. When you take full cognisance of that and find a reasonable answer and ask for consideration, I believe that that should be done as well. It does not matter from where a proposal comes in this Chamber; if it is reasonable it should at least merit—not acceptance; no way—the possibility of being examined. I hope that, with second thoughts, this may well be done. I ask your Lordships' permission to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

Parliament Bill [H.L.]
6.13 p.m.
Lord Perry of Walton: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Some years ago my colleagues and I on this Bench were looking at possible ways in which the structure of
672
this House might be reformed. It was at that time that I made my very first acquaintance with the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949. Until then I had laboured under the delusion that the people of the United Kingdom enjoyed a sort of God-given right to have a general election at least once every five years and that at that time they could remove from office any Government with whom they disagreed. When I discovered just how wrong I was, I suffered from a profound form of culture shock.
I realised for the very first time—and I was very ignorant—that our system of democratic government elected by universal suffrage rested on very shaky ground. I also discovered that my delusion, which by this time had been shattered, that the system rested on terra firma was shared by almost everyone that I met. I started talking to my friends and colleagues; I started talking to people I met on buses and trains and in clubs and in pubs; and I found an almost universal belief—and I still do—that, come what may, there will always be a chance to change the Government at the next election. When I told people that it was perfectly possible that, without any revolution and quite constitutionally, the next election could be the last one ever held, they were profoundly shocked, as I had been, and yet, however improbable it may be, it remains a finite possibility.
Parliament is sovereign and paramount. No matter what laws have been passed, they can always be repealed. It follows that one cannot safeguard a constitution by legislation. Were we to legislate that any change in the constitution required a referendum, as some have suggested, that legislation itself could be repealed by Parliament. The only actual safeguard would be the adoption of a written constitution which could, for example, state that the constitution could be amended only by a two-thirds majority in a referendum.
I share the belief of many other people that the adoption of a written constitution would be a very wise move, but it would undoubtedly take a very long time to achieve, and through that time we would remain, I believe, at risk. In short, there is no way in which, through legislation, the paramountcy of Parliament can be removed. It follows that should any Bill that changes the constitution be passed by both Houses of Parliament the Bill will become law and the change will come about. There is nothing that we can do to alter that fact other than by adopting a written constitution.
My Bill does not attempt to alter that fact. It is not a great leap forward. It is a very tiny step in what I believe is the right direction. It would have effect in only one circumstance; namely, when a Bill that changes the unwritten constitution is passed in another place but is rejected in this House. My Bill provides that in this particular circumstance, and only in this particular circumstance, the Bill may not be reintroduced in the Commons until five years and one day have elapsed since it was first passed. In effect, this would ensure that there was another general election before a constitutional change could be forced through without the agreement of this House.
I contend that this is a very sensible precaution. It would, for example, allow this House to prevent any government springing a surprise by introducing a

673
constitutional change that had not been mentioned in the election manifesto. As an example, and a purely hypothetical one, the Labour Party—and that is not a hypothesis—fought the last election on a manifesto that included the intention of abolishing this House. Let us assume for a moment that they had won the election and carried out that intention. That would have been perfectly fair. The electorate knew of that intention. But having won the election, they could then have legislated, in the only remaining Chamber, to extend the life of Parliament indefinitely. That second constitutional change was not in the manifesto on which they would have been elected; but nevertheless, it could be carried and the electorate would have no redress whatsoever. Noble Lords may say that this is an unlikely scenario, but if the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, were here—
Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I am, my Lords.
Lord Perry of Walton: —he could tell you (I now see that the noble Lord is here; I beg his pardon) and he will no doubt tell you from personal experience of the GLC that such things can happen. And those who made them happen there can and do stand for election to this Parliament.
I was interested and pleased to see when I read the book by Frederick Forsyth that he had reached the same conclusions as I have. He wrote a splendid novel—I wish I could—based on the precise situation that I have outlined. I commend The Fourth Protocol to your Lordships as a very enjoyable way of studying the matter further.
The Bill as drafted seeks to amend the Parliament Act 1911. That Act introduced a definite and special category of Bills called Money Bills. A Bill became a Money Bill if the Speaker of the House of Commons certified that it was. He was required to consult certain named persons before issuing a certificate; but the certificate, once issued, could not be challenged in any court of law.
It struck me that it ought to be possible, by amending the Parliament Acts, to introduce another new category of Bills—namely, Constitutional Bills—and to define such Bills as one certified by the Speaker as a Constitutional Bill. Constitutional Bills, like Money Bills, could then be made subject to special conditions.
Clause 1 of my Bill—and effectively, there is only one clause—would insert a new provision, Section 1A, into the Parliament Act 1911. Section 1A(3) of the Act would then define a Constitutional Bill as a Bill that had been endorsed with the certificate of the Speaker that, in his opinion, it contains provisions affecting either the powers of the two Houses of Parliament, or the relationship between them, or the relationship between Parliament and the Crown. It would exempt any Bill that sought to extend the maximum duration of Parliament and would say that such should not be a Constitutional Bill. That exclusion may seem surprising but there is a very good reason for it, which I shall explain in a moment.
Section 1A(4) of the Act would require the Speaker to consult certain persons before issuing a certificate. I felt that it was only right and proper that the noble and
674
learned Lord the Lord Chancellor should be one of them; and I considered that all three major parties represented in the House of Commons should be consulted through their leaders. The certificate of the Speaker, once issued, would, like that for a Money Bill, not be challengeable in any court of law.
Section 1A(1) of the Act would prevent any Constitutional Bill that had been passed by the House of Commons but had been rejected by the House of Lords from being reintroduced into the House of Commons until five years and one day after the date that it first passed in the Commons. Section 1A(2) of the Act, however, would ensure that a Constitutional Bill that was passed a second time by the House of Commons after an interval of five years and one day, and was then rejected again by the House of Lords, would still become law if the House of Commons so wished.
In other words, the supreme authority of the House of Commons would be retained but the power of delay of the House of Lords would be increased in respect of Constitutional Bills—and only in respect of them. I was not in any way seeking to increase the power of this House but I could not achieve the objective that I set out to achieve without doing so in that one respect.
That, in turn, leads me back to the reason why Section 1A(3) provides that a Bill that sought to increase the maximum duration of a Parliament would not be a Constitutional Bill. The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 currently require the agreement of both Houses to such a Bill and only to such a Bill. If such a Bill were included in the new definition of a Constitutional Bill, that requirement would be lost—because if a Constitutional Bill were to be passed a second time by the House of Commons, it could no longer be stopped by this House.
Finally, were this Bill to become law, any measure that sought to repeal it would in that respect be a Constitutional Bill. So, the current Parliament Acts could then be amended and repealed in the life of one Parliament only with the agreement of this House.
I do not pretend to have introduced a major safeguard; I claim only that this Bill could not do any harm and just might be something that we were all very glad we had adopted. I should like to see it become law during this Parliament, and I hope that the Government will accept it and give it time in another place. I commend the Bill to the House.
Moved, That the Bill be now read a second time.—(Lord Perry of Walton.)
6.24 p.m.
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, I feel privileged to follow the noble Lord who has just proposed the Second Reading of this Bill. We ought to thank him for bringing forward for our consideration a matter of great constitutional as well as practical importance. Earlier I was thinking that this was a day of debates on large subjects but with small attendances. However, I am glad to see that the Chamber has filled up somewhat for this topic which is one of profound importance.
I do not believe that we debate enough the role of Parliament in the constitutional fabric of government. We take far too much for granted. We assume that

675
there are far more safeguards than there are. People are under an almost complete illusion as to the stability and strength of our constitution. I have long been associated with the work of the Hansard Society and of its offspring, the Politics Association. Both organisations have tried to enlarge the area of interest and study of our parliamentary institution.
We take great pride in talking about Parliament as being the mother of Parliaments—which I believe is a misnomer anyway, because the Isle of Man claim to have had a parliament before us. One wonders what is the condition of our exported parliamentary system in many of the newly-independent Commonwealth countries today. I do not believe that we should feel very proud of some of them.
The public are very confused about Parliament in many respects. It is probably a pity that the proceedings in this House have been televised and that the House of Commons has not. The public have a higher esteem of your Lordships' House than they used to have.
Lord Harvington: My Lords, thank God!
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, the public think that it matters more than some political propagandists were saying. On the other hand, they have not received a particularly favourable impression from some of the noises coming from another place that they have heard on the radio.
I believe also that a lot of simple-minded people feel that so long as the Queen is on the Throne, she is reigning over us and we can all sleep at nights. They think that we still rule the waves and all that kind of thing. If there was not some kind of public belief in that fantasy then we would not be singing songs about it. I believe that the words of our national anthem are not any longer worthy of the intelligence of the British people, and yet we go on singing that anthem as though it represented some kind of literal portrayal of the position of Britain in the world and of the Queen's relationship with our enemies and whose function it is to frustrate their knavish tricks.
I sincerely hope that nothing that I am saying or will say will be regarded as any personal reflection upon Her Majesty, nor that any reference to political possibilities will be taken as a reflection of any existing political party as we know it today. However, I am going to be a little candid; it is not entirely within the range of constitutional theory.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord who has introduced this Bill for an ingenious suggestion for a remedial safeguard of some kind in respect of the constitutional position as between the powers of the Commons and the powers of the Lords. When people say, "It could not happen here", the answer is that it could. Anything could happen here. We are wide open to anything happening here. Theoretically there are no holds barred. This is not the first time that the lurking dangers of our flimsy constitution have been exposed for us to see. I remember in times gone by Sir Stafford Cripps, in his revolutionary days before we threw him out of the Labour Party, saying that socialism can never come to Britain through our parliamentary system. Of course, he was quite right; it never can and never will. That is why the Labour Party is referring
676
now to democratic socialists. The emphasis must be on the "democratic" because there is no working model of socialism in a true democracy anywhere in the world today; and that goes for Sweden which is the paradise to which so many people refer for their guidance to the Kingdom of Heaven.
Sir Stafford Cripps said that the first thing for a Labour government to do with a revolutionary programme was to pass enabling Acts of Parliament, to subjugate the Lords in the process, and thereafter rule by Orders-in-Council which a constitutional monarch would approve no matter what was in them. That could go on for quite a time and if things went smoothly a revolutionary socialist government could see about extending the lifetime of Parliament.
Then we had on the other side of the political extremes the National Front. It was impatient of the slow workings of the parliamentary system, with Oswald Mosley taking his copy from fascism and Nazi-ism. Europe told us that Britain was decadent and that it should sweep away all the junk of parliamentary procedures and get down to business in a real sort of way.
We are talking more about democracy these days and I think that, on the whole, our confidence in democracy is perhaps stronger than it was many years ago. But when we come to the lifetime of this Parliament what is so sacrosanct about five years? When I negotiated the equal pay agreements for the public services with Rab Butler years ago, and we introduced it in instalments over seven years, I asked: why seven years? He said that it was because there is a good biblical precedent for it. There is nothing sacrosanct about five years and in fact, as we all know, it used to be seven years. We have had extensions in the lifetime of Parliament in conditions of national emergency—wartime. I think I am right in saying that we had no election between 1910 and 1918 owing to World War I. We had no election between 1935 and 1945 owing to World War II.
I think a persuasive case can be made out for an extension of time for a Parliament like this one which can reasonably claim that it takes longer than five years to complete a peacetime revolution; that the programme of change is so drastic and so urgent that one wants a longer period of unimpeded progress towards the electoral promised land, and that there is every justification for suspending the intervening nuisance and disturbance of a general election and to get on with the continuity of our parliamentary and political programme.
I believe it is true that President Nixon toyed with the idea of a third term. He must have been of the same opinion that it would take longer than two terms to accomplish what he wanted to do. I think our present Prime Minister could be excused for believing that she needs an assured third term—an assured third term, my Lords; not a chancy one but a real one—to bring about her revolution of our society by peaceful parliamentary means.
The more sinister threat has been the stronger intentions in some political quarters to abolish this effete, unrepresentative, unelected piece of parliamentary obstruction; to abolish it because you cannot think of any sensible way of reforming it. That has been a real piece of political doctrine within recent

677
memory. Well, if that were to happen we should see what an elected dictatorship could really do. At present our much vaunted British constitution is not worth the paper that it is not written on. Parliament would be the sovereign power and Parliament could, under our present electoral system, produce a government which is unrepresentative of the popular will, wielding power little short of tyranny.
Our electoral system provides no safeguard against a dictatorial government. Nor would our parliamentary system do so in the absence of a statutory constitution which had been approved by a referendum and could only be changed by one. We have no head of state who takes an oath to defend the British constitution. That is a point I made recently in a debate. Persons summoned to both Houses of Parliament do not take a pledge to defend the constitution or our parliamentary institutions. They do not mention them. It is an oath of personal allegiance to a personal Monarch. The reason for that is that the monarch is the constitution. The British constitution is the monarch. It is to the monarch alone that we make our oath of allegiance. As far as I understand it, there is no law of treason against the state; it is treason against the Crown because it is a breach of an oath of allegiance given to the Crown.
I have always understood that all power in this country derives from the Crown. Both Houses of Parliament were fashioned out of power wrenched from the Crown and both Houses still acknowledge the supremacy of the Crown. In any constitutional crisis, other than the appointment of the Prime Minister, how could the monarch safeguard the constitution? If the House of Commons passed a Bill to abolish the House of Lords and we threw it out, could the Commons invoke the Parliament Act to get rid of us? Would the monarch of the day give the Bill Royal Assent? That is a very important question because any political party that threatens to abolish this House must surely know that such a Bill would be rejected here and that it would not get through unless there was a general election intervening at which it was the principal matter for public debate, or it obtained some other authority for its action. What would be the role of the Crown in that event? In short, I think we are exposed to the gravest possibilities and we really do not know how grave they could be.
When I had a note about this Bill from the noble Lord, Lord Perry, I wondered how he had lighted on this idea. I had visions of him having a disturbed night, in which he dreamt that it had actually happened, and when he woke up in the morning he resolved to do something about it, because it might portend some serious constitutional development.
An all-powerful government elected by a near fraudulent electoral system to control Parliament could abolish the first and most historic Parliament. Suppose that so paralysed is the Head of State by convention and so entrenched the concept of a constitutional monarchy in which the Crown acts only on the advice of Ministers that the monarch decides that there is no option but for the Act to be given the Royal Assent. Is that a feasible hypothesis as to what might happen? I think it is what would happen. I cannot see any obstacle in the way of that process as our constitution is at the moment.
678
I think that we are in the dangerous position that when we destroy the Royal power we destroy the Head of State in any constitutional form that matters. We should be saying that this must not happen here. It must not be possible that it could happen here, and I think we ought to face the consequences of taking that decision.
Many dictatorships have begun by having elected leaders, and usually theirs is the last election for a long time, because power will never reform itself; it either has to yield or be overthrown. Sometimes when I have a disturbed night and think about the constitutional possibilities in this country, I feel rather frightened about the future, because I have a feeling that there are still to come strains on our institutions that they may not be able to bear in the rational and sober way that we have come to expect. I think that explosive situations can arise in countries which today have stable, conventional and historic traditions behind them in a manner which was never thought of in the past. When I think about all this, I ask, "Where is George Orwell today, when we need him so much?"
6.42 p.m.
Lord Airedale: My Lords, I trust that the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, will forgive me if I do not follow him in his debate about "God Save the Queen versus Land of Hope and Glory", if that is what he was getting at, because it seemed to me not to be strictly relevant to the measure before us, and I lack that seniority which enables the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, to range so delightfully far and wide beyond the terms of the Bill which we are discussing. However, I join with the noble Lord in thanking my noble friend for introducing so attractively this measure which, in his own words, he describes as "not a major safeguard". No doubt he is right about that, but it gives us great food for thought.
It is a Bill which I think has a positive and a negative implication. On the one hand, if it becomes an Act it will add to the law of the constitution, but on the other hand it may never need to be invoked. I imagine that we all hope and trust that it never will need to be invoked. So the question surely arises: are we justified in spending scarce parliamentary time in discussing a measure which will have only such remote implications?
It is a common human failing to do nothing until some rather acute situation arises. This is not a failing into which the prudent householder falls. He supposes, and earnestly hopes and believes, that it will never be necessary to use fire-fighting appliances in his house, but that does not prevent him prudently installing them. So I should have thought that this Bill was indeed worthy of your Lordships' consideration and worthy of consideration now, at a time when we seem to be heading much more for a hung Parliament than for the extremist situation which this Bill envisages. I imagine that we shall produce a very much more satisfactory Act if we set about it in the calmer atmosphere of today rather than if we wait and hurriedly cobble together a measure in the feverish atmosphere of an impending constitutional crisis.
I do not think that we should be deterred by the thought that those who might seek to commit the mischief which this Bill prohibits might contrive to

679
have the Act repealed first, because public opinion is rather good at standing in the way of people who seek to change the law without good reason. I think that this Bill is a worthy matter to be discussed. I am most grateful to my noble friend for having introduced it and I hope we shall give it a fair wind.
6.47 p.m.
Lord Wilson of Langside: My Lords, I hope that your Lordships will forgive me, though I did not put my name down to speak upon this Bill, if I detain you for a few seconds rather than minutes with a word or two about this Bill. I am persuaded to say just these few words by the attractive and persuasive way in which my noble friend Lord Perry presented the Bill to your Lordships and also by the good humoured but at the same time serious speech of the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby. I hope that your Lordships will seriously support this Bill because of course it restores your Lordships' House to the traditional position from which it was dislodged only in 1909 or 1910 by that wicked Earl, Lloyd George, when he said, in those immortal words which I need not repeat to your Lordships, that this House was no longer the watchdog of the constitution.
Quite seriously, from what has been said from all sides of the House tonight, this is what this Bill, which is paradoxical and ironic in the context of the history of your Lordships' House, will do. It will restore matters to that kind of position. For these reasons, I hope that your Lordships will give the Bill your enthusiastic support.
6.50 p.m.
Lord Silkin of Dulwich: My Lords, may I begin by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Perry of Walton, on the clarity, care and perhaps I might say courage with which he, from the Back Benches, has presented this Bill. Both he and the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, supported it on the basis that the events that it is intended to deal with are very unlikely to happen and very improbable. I rather wondered, on hearing that, what sort of scenario they were suggesting might be the scenario following the next general election. To some extent, my anxieties were assuaged by listening to my noble friend Lord Houghton of Sowerby whose speeches are always so very entertaining.
I realised from what my noble friend said in the middle of his speech that the real danger must be the possibility, not that some government of the left with a large majority might take power at the next election, which those on the Alliance Benches, I am sure, do not, for a moment expect, but rather, that the present Prime Minister may take it into her head to secure the third term that my noble friend was talking about without the difficulties and dangers of a general election. For my part, I am bound to say that I believe that this is equally unlikely and that the use of the term "improbable" which the noble Lord, Lord Perry of Walton, used, is a correct one—one which, in the circular that he kindly sent out to explain the Bill, he used three times. So we are not dealing with a situation that is particularly likely to be a problem.
I agree of course with my noble friend Lord Houghton that in this country, as in any other, anything might happen. I feel personally that it is far
680
more likely that if we were to have an extreme government that sought to take over power, they would do so not through the use of parliamentary procedures but through other procedures altogether and that they would need the backing of force to do so. Those qualities that the noble Lord, Lord Perry of Walton, exhibited in producing the Bill and, in producing what is no doubt a very ingenious way of endeavouring to meet the difficulties of avoiding entrenchment, are, I have to say, worthy of a better objective than this Bill. In my view at any rate this Bill is misconceived and should not pass into law.
Why is it unnecessary? The noble Lord, in the valuable explanation that he gave, justified the Bill on the basis, as he put it, that it is designed to prevent something that is improbable. However, not only is it improbable but in three-quarters of a century since the enactment of the Parliament Act, it has not been attempted. The noble Lord says, "Yes, but it is the current policy of the Labour Party to abolish the House of Lords, and abolition could also leave the Commons free to extend its life indefinitely". I am bound to say that the relevance of that point escapes me. Of course, if the House of Lords were abolished, the noble Lord's Bill would be unnecessary and ineffective. The Commons could then extend the life of a Parliament indefinitely without any bar from this House. The Bill is not directed to that point. The Bill assumes the continued existence of this House and seeks to add, in the context of that continued existence, to the delaying powers of this House. I find it very hard to believe that an extremist House of Commons, whether of the left or the right, would legislate to empower itself to extend Parliament's life indefinitely, retaining this House in being, rather than to abolish the powers of this House, which would be very much simpler. In short, in my view the noble Lord is tilting at a non-existent windmill.
Why, then, do I suggest that the Bill is ineffective? The noble Lord himself referred to the difficulties of entrenchment and accepted that Parliament can repeal any legislation. I would go further. This Bill seeks to achieve its ends by purporting to remove the power of the House of Commons to reintroduce a Bill, described as a constitutional Bill. That term is, incidentally, extremely widely defined, far more widely than is needed to deal with the mischief that the noble Lord suggests is the real mischief. In the Explanatory Memorandum, we have it described as the type of Bill that affects the role of Parliament, perhaps even wider. It removes the power of the House of Commons to reintroduce a Bill, so described, until five years and a day from its first passage in the Commons. I have difficulty in following how that power of the House of Commons can be removed. I do not follow how an Act of Parliament can prevent a Member of the other House from introducing any Bill he pleases. If it could do so, it would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of our constitution that no Parliament can bind its successor.
If this Bill could be effective in the way the noble Lord suggests, then the noble Lord's formula could be used to enable any Parliament to bind its successors to prohibit the passage of any legislation—legislation to privatise or to bring into public ownership, to restore or to remove the death penalty, and to introduce or

681
remove proportional representation. I wondered myself whether proportional representation might not fall within the very words of this Bill in its definition of a constitutional Bill. It is no answer to this point to say that here the bar is only for five years and a day. If it can be for five years, it can be for 25 years or 500 years. In short, the device of the noble Lord, which I accept is ingenious, could, if successful, be highly dangerous; at least as dangerous in its potentiality for future conflict as the improbable danger against which it seeks to protect our constitution. I personally do not believe that it will be dangerous because I cannot believe that it can ever be effective.
Finally, why do I say that it is wrong in principle and undesirable? The first reason is that legislation so constitutionally important—I say this with the greatest respect to the noble Lord—should not, in my view, be brought forward in this way as the last item on the agenda of a day when the House is not very well attended, a little better attended now than it was for some of the earlier debates but still hardly justifying a matter of such great constitutional importance, and brought forward by a Back Bench Member of the House, however distinguished. It ought not to consist of a major change whose repercussions have not been widely discussed within the whole context of our constitutional arrangements. Nor, perhaps above all, should we be debating and deciding upon so important a matter—the point I have already made—as the last business on a day of this kind.
Secondly, I regard it as wrong in principle and undesirable because, for the reasons I have given, if it were to be effected, it could have most far-reaching effects. It could erode a fundamental principle of our constitution to which I have already referred.
Thirdly, if effective, it could create a situation both dangerous and undemocratic. The noble Lord's Bill imposes a five-year waiting period irrespective of anything that might happen within those five years-irrespective, for example, of expressions of the people's will through general elections. Can it really be right to have that statutory delay even if within the five years the electorate has given a mandatory change in a general election?
Indeed, one could have this situation. A mandate to carry out a particular reform might be given in one general election, might be rejected by this House after the Bill had passed through the Commons, and the Government might decide to have an immediate further election resulting in a new and more powerful mandate to do the same thing. Should the five-year period nonetheless stand and prevent the execution of the people's will as it would if the noble Lord's Bill were given effect?
Fourthly, and finally, it is surely apparent from what I have said, irrespective of whether or not the House accepts the validity of all the points I have made, that a Bill of this nature could only give rise to conflict, uncertainty and frustration, none of which would be desired, I am quite certain, by the noble Lord who introduced it.
I hope therefore that the noble Lord will give full consideration to the very weighty arguments against the way in which he has sought to deal with the problem which undoubtedly exists and is bound to
682
exist in any country where there is no firm written constitution with a safeguard put into effect by a supreme court or some such body. I hope that having by his Bill prompted a useful, however somewhat thinly attended debate, the noble Lord will accept the sensible course of withdrawing it.
7.2 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Glenarthur): My Lords, I add my voice to those who have expressed gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Perry of Walton, for so lucidly explaining his Bill which has given us the chance to debate a matter of great importance—indeed, perhaps the most important constitutional issue there is; namely, the system of checks and balances that ensures the existence and continuation of our democratic form of Government.
The Bill, as the noble Lord has explained, seeks to anticipate a situation in which a newly elected majority in another place might be tempted to remove restrictions on the maximum duration of a Parliament which, since the Parliament Act 1911, has been set at five years. He suggests that it could do this in two steps: first by introducing a Bill to remove from the Parliament Act 1911 the stipulation in Section 2(1) that Bills containing any provision to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years are (unlike all other Bills) subject to a continuing veto from your Lordships' House if it sees fit; and then by introducing a second Bill extending the life of Parliament indefinitely. Each Bill, he claims, would, under the terms of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, become law after two Sessions, notwithstanding that this House had rejected them whenever sent up from the other place. Thus it is argued that the Government, by steps which were allegedly quite legal and constitutional, might prolong their life indefinitely, a result which would be quite irreconcilable with the spirit of our own and every other democratic constitution.
The Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Perry, seeks to avoid this possibility by requiring that any Bill certified by the Speaker, in consultation with the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor and other party leaders, as a constitutional Bill could not become law if rejection by this House in two successive Sessions occurred in the life of the same Parliament. By imposing a delay of five years and one day on the other place, Lord Perry's Bill seeks to ensure that a general election, and therefore the possibility of a new government, would need to take place before a constitutional Bill could be enacted without the agreement of your Lordships' House. The country would have a chance to vote on the constitutional issue in question.
I feel, however, that I should warn your Lordships that the effect of the Bill might not be limited to the extreme circumstances described by the noble Lord. On one interpretation, although opinions would differ on the question of whether such proposals would be constitutional under the Bill, it would prevent a government from altering the role of or abolishing your Lordships' House without an intervening election. In any case, abolition would give the

683
Government a free hand to extend their life, or push through otherwise controversial legislation, as we heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Silkin, just now.
Before I set out the Government's view on this Bill, I would like to make it abundantly clear that the Government are wholly committed to the principle of government by popular vote, expressed through our current system of elections to another place, and the limitation of the duration of a Parliament by statute, and to the principle of a bicameral legislature.
Your Lordships' House performs an essential role as a forum for revision and indeed introduction of legislation, for auxiliary debate and generally for sharing the legislative load. The limited powers of delay, which Lord Perry's Bill seeks to enhance, gives time for public opinion to declare itself on matters of great importance that might otherwise be rushed through a single chamber. In short, your Lordships' House acts as a substantial safeguard of constitutional government. While the Government always listen with interest to proposals to reform or protect the constitution or powers of the House, I can tell your Lordships that the Government have no proposals to legislate for any such changes.
While they consider the aims of the noble Lord, Lord Perry, to be entirely laudable, the Government are unable to support this Bill for a number of reasons. First, I trust that the noble Lord, Lord Perry, will not take it amiss if I say, rather as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Silkin, said, that in our view matters of such importance would not normally be supported by the Government without widespread debate extending beyond the legislature to the electorate, and until after trying to achieve as full support as possible, ideally across party lines. Indeed, if it were to be taken forward the issue is one that would normally be taken in a government Bill.
Secondly, as I have already mentioned, the Bill has consequences that might go further than the prevention of abuse and these need to be examined very carefully because the provisions could be seen as a curb on reform as well as on abuse. Thirdly, although the Labour Party, as we have heard, have made plain in their manifestoes a wish to abolish or at least to reform your Lordships' House, they curiously always seem to have found reasons for doing neither when in power. But as the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, said, there is an arguably sustainable—at least theoretical—view that an extremist government of the Left or Right determined to hold power indefinitely could be elected, although it would probably be a minority government. But even if it commands a majority in another place, is it likely to treat Lord Perry's Bill—or Act as it would be—as somehow entrenched and unrepealable? It was Oliver Cromwell, though he failed to prevent the abolition of this House in 1649 by the other place which had first been purged of opposition, who said (and I quote):
"That Parliaments should not make themselves perpetual is a Fundamental. Of what assurance is a law to prevent so great an evil, if it lie in the same legislature to un-law it again?"
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Silkin, said, with our unwritten constitution we cannot bind future sovereign Parliaments in any way.
684
Fourthly, assuming that this Bill, if enacted, were not repealed, would the Speaker not be put in a very delicate position in deciding whether a Bill was indeed a constitutional Bill? Could the Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor in a government bent on prolonging their life or abolishing your Lordships' House give the Speaker truly disinterested advice?
In conclusion, although it would be a tragedy if the unthinkable were to come about, I do not think there is any way in which a country can guarantee a bicameral legislature or regular elections for all time. A government with no commitments to the democratic principle are unlikely to feel deterred by this Bill, if enacted, from effectively abolishing your Lordships' House or elections, let alone constitutional Bills. We see many examples around the world of extremist or unrepresentative governments who ignore not only their country's legislation but even their own written constitution. Our ultimate guarantee in this as in so many other political matters, is the good sense of the people of this country in rejecting those who advance extremist views.
I have set out the Government's views on this Bill. While its aims are praiseworthy, for the reasons I have given, the provisions it contains are inappropriate. While it is not the Government's intention to oppose its Second Reading tonight, I have to say to your Lordships that the Government will not seek to provide succour for it at any future stage.
7.11 p.m.
Lord Perry of Walton: My Lords, I should like to start by thanking all those who have taken part in the debate. I should also like to thank the many noble Lords who wrote to me expressing support, but who were unable to be here. There is only one comment that I have heard tonight that has made me wish to change anything, and that is the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Silkin, about the intervening general election. I should be happy to see an amendment made to the Bill to the effect that five years and one day would only hold if there had not been a general election in the meanwhile. I had overlooked that possibility.
Many of the fears expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Silkin, and indeed by the noble Lord the Minister, seem to me to be based on the assumption that this House will always oppose any constitutional change that is passed in another place. That is very far from what I believe. I believe that the Bill would only be operative on very rare occasions. However, I note that I am duly caned for presumption both by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Silkin, and by the Minister for having dared to bring up such a matter from the Back-Benches. The trouble is that if I did not do so nobody else would do so, despite the fact that I spoke to members of both the Government and the Official Opposition suggesting that they might do so.
In view of what has been said on both sides of the House, if the Bill receives a Second Reading I should like to consider the possibility of moving that it be referred to a Select Committee where it could receive the type of detailed attention which it has been suggested it needs.
On Question, Bill read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Yorkshire Water Authority Bill
Recommitted to an Unopposed Bill Committee.
House adjourned at fourteen minutes past seven o'clock.