SDI Research

HL Deb 03 February 1986 vol 470 cc965-98

8.26 p.m.

Lord Kennet rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what relation they consider SDI research stands in to SDI procurement and deployment, and to the viability of the ABM treaty.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, during the first week of December the Government were playing both Houses of Parliament and the press along. It had been reported for many months that there was shortly to be an agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom about SDI research. The rumours that this was approaching became more frequent and firmer and on Thursday, 5th December, the Prime Minister said at Question Time that she hoped the agreement would be signed "before Christmas". It was signed before noon the next day and throughout that week various attempts by interested Members of both Houses to get some news out of the Government, not only of what might be in the agreement (which might have been difficult) but when it was likely to be signed, had been systematically stalled.

On the first possible day I asked leave to raise a Private Notice Question about this matter in the House. This was refused. It proved impossible to have a day for debate as far as the eye could see. I apologise now for bringing this Unstarred Question on so late. During the course of being refused a PNQ I discovered what I had not known before—namely that no PNQ has been allowed in this House at all since the autumn of 1983. However, this is a general point which perhaps it might be right to take up through the proper channels.

Later questions on the secret memorandum of understanding between this country and the United States on SDI research have drawn quite insufficient answers in both Houses. Therefore there is good justification for a short debate this evening.

On 13th December I asked the Government in this House whether they agreed with the United States Assistant Secretary of Defence, Richard Perle, that: if we are successful (in SDI research) we will be putting a dome over the Soviet Union, that's the correct image"—

and whether it was to that end that British firms and institutions would now be working? In a supplementary answer the noble Lord the Minister of State said: My Lords, I am afraid that the warped objectives to which the noble Lord referred"—

that is me— are the product of the noble Lord's imagination".—[Official Report, 13/12/85; col. 461.]

That is the kind of answer that not only gets us no further, it even lacks the contingent advantage of being true. The idea that SDI should be able to shoot down Soviet missiles over Soviet territory is part of the present United States purpose, and the reason is obvious. It is that that would be the best place for the uranium and plutonium in the destroyed Soviet warheads to land. I can hardly believe that the Minister of State did not know that at that time. The history of the SDI proposal is well enough known. I will not trouble the House with any elements of it for the sixth time in the last three years. The moral of that history is that there is no doubt whatsoever that both the United States and the Soviet Union have been working on ballistic missile defence for many years—for decades. It is not a case of only the Soviet Union doing so or only the United States doing so. They have both been doing so.

But it was the United States which, nearly three years ago now, suddenly decided to make it very big business indeed. I am very sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, is not with us this evening. I should like, if I may, to quote something which I hope he himself would have quoted had he been here. That is something that he wrote in a recent article: Had anyone other than the American president ever invited scientists to try to render 'nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete', the suggestion would probably have attracted no more attention than had they been asked to square the circle or solve the problem of perpetual motion". That is written with an acerbity which is permitted only to people who have quite outstanding wisdom and experience but, since it is permitted to such people and since that is exactly what Lord Zuckerman has, the rest of us had better think pretty hard about what he says.

Will it work, SDI, this hair-trigger automation with the astronomical loss of life at stake? Scientists are divided. We have another expert to hand, one which perhaps is easier to understand, especially to the present Government, than conflicting scientists. It is a market expert and that market is the insurance market. Space insurance of any sort whatever is unobtainable now. It was unobtainable even before the recent shuttle disaster. Think how unattainable it will be in an SDI world! Think how the anti-ballistic missile defences themselves envisaged by SDI if they had been there would have reacted to the shuttle disaster! What would they have done on hair-trigger automation? Think also, of course, of the fact that the shuttle itself was carrying SDI experimentation into space. it was a partly-military mission.

Today, I think we should be more concerned with what happens in the unlikely event that SDI does turn out to work. The noble Lord the Minister of State thinks that it will. On 21st January, in answer to a parliamentary Question, he said that history leads us to suppose that it will. If he believes that most well-funded programmes of physical research have in the past succeeded or even if he believes that their success rate has been unrelated to informed estimates of the probability of their success before they started, then he and no doubt many others need briefing in the history of science as well as in the present actualities of science.

It is not likely to succeed but it may; and we must ask whether we should be in it given the possibility that it may succeed. Where do we stand? We are being dragged along behind the United States chariot. This is not surprising given the holds, the manifold holds, in related matters, defence matters, that the United States has over us, starting with the fact that our own submarine force is now dependent on fuel reprocessing in the United States, when just a turn of the tap will suffice.

The Prime Minister has supported research right from the beginning. I expect it to have been correctly guessed that she did so on a reflex action simply to support President Reagan against the "wets" and because nobody could tell her that the research was actually illegal. But it has all gone on. We now have this secret memorandum of understanding, the first and so far the only one concluded by the United States with any of its allies. We now have Secretary Weinberger speaking of recent support in Britain for SDI, not for SDI research. Of course that is what he speaks of. Did we expect him not to?

We have conferred a certain alliance status on this American programme, we and we alone. We now have Mr. Lamont in the House of Commons calling the SDI participation office in our own Ministry of Defence the counterpart of the SDI office in the Pentagon, as if we were in this together on equal terms. And all the time the Government have not spent a single pound on unclassified research or studies into what the British, let alone the European, interest in having this thing could possibly be.

The Government have spent nothing on research as to whether it would increase or decrease strategic stability. They are doing a classified study of something called "European architecture". In so far as we can attach any meaning to that expression, we must attach the meaning which would make it clearly against the ABM treaty. The ABM treaty forbids the passing of blueprints, knowledge or equipment about ballistic missile defence to any ally. We are being dragged along by a juggernaut which is accelerating. In the latest Pentagon annual defence guidance document the SDI has been promoted—it was not there last year—to top priority, a position it shares only with the modernisation of the US nuclear armoury itself. Of course that is what it shares it with! What else would it share it with?

This promotion within the Pentagon is to shield the SDI from the new congressional drive for a balanced budget. You can even now in the press watch the Washington "hawks" as they jostle to get the President to take steps which in practice will bind his successor to carry on, whoever he is.

My Unstarred Question is in particular about the relationship of SDI if it comes about to the ABM treaty. Mr. Timothy Renton, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, said in the House of Commons on 8th December: Neither the partial test ban treaty nor the space treaty prohibits the development of directed energy weapons in space". One of the cornerstones of the SDI programme is the X-ray laser. This has to be powered by a nuclear explosion or explosions. Is it conceivable to think that such a thing could become operational without being tested in its operational environment, namely, space? The partial test ban does prohibit this. The nuclear-powered X-ray laser will also be capable of striking downwards to create fire storms in cities—capable of! A firm called R and D Associates of California (which used to be more famous under the name of Rand) has carried out a study coming to this conclusion which the Government pooh-pooed. But I think it is quite a long time since Rand turned out wrong on this sort of technological forecast.

If that is right then the nuclear-powered X-ray laser is a weapon of mass destruction and it is consequently also against the space treaty. Ministers, I submit, should be alert in this field and not legalistic. The facility at Fylingdales is being turned by the United States, which runs it, into a phased array radar. That is what the famous radio station at Krasnoyarsk in the Soviet Union is. We object to Krasnoyarsk because it is a phased array station not on the periphery of a signatory of the ABM treaty—the Soviet Union. Why should we believe that the up-dated Fylingdales will be in accordance with the ABM treaty? It will be a phased array radar not on the periphery of a signatory of the ABM treaty. Britain is not a signatory; the United States is. The Yorkshire Moors are not on the periphery of the United States. May we hope that the Government will meet this criticism in a forthright manner.

The ABM treaty prohibits the transfer to non-signatories of technical descriptions and blueprints. Has it occurred to the Government that this gives United Kingdom industry working on SDI research a commercial interest in the destruction of the treaty as soon as it begins to bite where it was intended to bite? SDI also stands in the way of a comprehensive test ban, which I think we all desire, or ought to desire, because if the Soviet Union were to get their own SDI, as they no doubt would in time, we would need to re-think our own Trident warheads. The Government claim that the Trident can cope with anything the Russians can produce in the line of BMD, but they were saying that before this immense pressure had begun to be brought to bear on the Russians precisely to get their own SDI.

Lastly, and most important of all—I will not go into this again, because I have explained it so often—the SDI contributes, not to strategic stability but to strategic instability. If there is any doubt left in the Government's mind, may I recommend to them the recent studies conducted by Messrs. Kent and Mayer—two separate studies. They are fairly conclusive. The secret memorandum of understanding replaces the 1975 secret memorandum of understanding on defence trade in general, which was not due to expire until 1995. I think the House would be interested to know why it has been appropriate to withdraw a general understanding and replace it by one mainly centred on SDI. The memorandum of understanding waives the national laws in both countries about buying American and buying British, and about the balance of payments programme requirements in the United States. It provides for a flow of information between governments. It is not clear whether it seals off the flow of information between the United States Government and United States industrial exploitation in general. I think we should worry about this, in view of the fact that it is intended to be a secret memorandum of understanding and the bits I have just quoted have already been published in the United States press.

There is a general suspicion in industry in both countries that the United States may be going to cream off our ideas now, and that we shall find there is no return when it comes to bulk purchases which are economically interesting. In this context, I should like to ask the Government to give us news of what has happened to the special office in the Ministry of Defence which was to ensure a two-way street in the Trident programme procurement.

It is also interesting that the first contract between the United States Government and any British firm for SDI research did not go through this memorandum of understanding it all; it by-passed the Ministry of Defence. It was a contract for optical computers signed by Messrs. Ferranti—a British firm. Optical computers will be used for the nuclear-powered laser X-ray above all other things. In other words, if they are procured or deployed they will break the ABM treaty. According to general US industrial studies at the moment, Europe can expect to get about 1 per cent. of SDI expenditure. If that is right, I wonder what percentage of the 1 per cent. will be coming Britain's way. I also wonder what effect the new congressional resistance to any of the work going to Europe at all, which is beginning to be felt, will have. In Congress they have now heard of British participation, and not all of them like it by any means.

To sum up, SDI should not be looked at in isolation, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said in a wise speech as Secretary-General of NATO on 28th December. The Soviet Union has now, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington foresaw in that speech, launched an unprecedentedly realistic disarmament proposal which has moved away from the original Soviet all-out requirement of a ban on SDI research, but is still, of course, conditional on no procurement or deployment. In the view of many the Government must, in the interests of this country, dissociate themselves from the determination of the President of the United States that SDI shall not be on a disarmament negotiating table. They must bring him back to his own commitment, entered into jointly with the Soviet Union, to prevent an arms race in space, because if this country does not do it, why should we expect any other country in the world to do it?

8.45 p.m.

The Lord Bishop of Birmingham

My Lords, I should like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, on raising in your Lordships' House the important Question standing in his name. The Question is concerned with relations. I myself am not competent to speak about strategic relations, nor am I competent to talk technologically about relations of components to anti-ballistic missiles and the like. However, I intend to address myself to moral relations in this matter.

The treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, signed by President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev on 26th May, 1972, was an important agreement between two super-powers to limit useless expenditure and to decrease international tension. The picture that President Reagan has painted of the morality of ABM nuclear defence beyond what is allowed in that treaty is very beguiling. It seems at first sight so sensible to research, develop and deploy weapons which would make nuclear missiles of no avail in war, because they would be shot down or exploded before they could do their devastating damage. It seems so sensible to prefer that kind of defence to the dangers of nuclear deterrence which results, as we know, in an arms race in nuclear missiles.

But, in fact, even if a successful deployment of anti-ballistic missiles were to be possible, this would appear to the other side to be an offensive weapon, not a defensive weapon, because it would enable the side which possessed it to initiate a pre-emptive strike with impunity. Furthermore, it could not defend a country from attack by cruise missiles or submarine-launched missiles. And so, for all the high-sounding rhetoric, and perhaps I should add for all the goodwill which may underlie it, the claims of SDI to a higher morality than nuclear deterrence are quite unfounded. Indeed, because SDI introduces a new element of instability it could be said on moral grounds to be retrogressive.

Article 5(1) of the ABM treaty states unequivocally: Each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, space-based or mobile land-based. That seems to me to be clear enough. It is therefore a matter of deep concern when the head of the National Security Council of our chief ally, the USA, said that no aspect of the development of space-based BMD components is prohibited under the 1972 treaty, and that the treaty only referred to the technology which was available then.

As has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, in a very revealing extended review in the New York Review of Books, this statement not only showed an intended breach of the present treaty, but also a new version of the treaty. Before development of space-based ABM systems or components can take place, it is necessary to give six months' notice of withdrawal from the treaty under Article 8. To do that would destabilise even further the situation brought about by the massive increase in expenditure in the American SDI.

I realise how much we depend upon our chief ally in matters of defence and the close relationship that exists between us. Nonetheless, I believe that we have to point out that the intention to develop SDI is contrary to the treaty and against the best interests of international peace. Indeed, it is hard to understand how matters have progressed to the present situation, unless we assume that major vested interests are at stake. According to the New Scientist, Boeing has SDI contracts of 217 million dollars, McDonnell Douglas of 122 million dollars, and Lockheed of 0.5 billion dollars. It would seem that the careers of too many people, and the profits of too many defence corporations, are involved to halt what Mr. Gorbachev has called "an illusion". I find it a tragic and terrible situation when a description by a potential enemy whose word one does not always trust seems more sensible than those of one's chief ally.

It is sometimes said that research is quite different from development, and that it is not research but development that is forbidden under the ABM treaty. It is further said that the Russians are deeply engaged in development and that they have already breached the ABM treaty. These matters are not so clear as they appear to certain people. In the first place, research means inquiry into the fundamental principles and practice of a project. Development means experimentation with the practice to see whether it works in conditions other than that of the experimental laboratory, while deployment means the procurement of weapons and their installation for operational purposes. These are not just my own personal definitions. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary describes research as "careful search or enquiry"; development as "fuller working out" or "stage of advancement"; and to "deploy" as "to bring into effective operation". To fudge the meaning of these words is to breach a solemn treaty, and seems to me on objective grounds to constitute a serious moral objection.

But what of the claims that this is just what the Russians are doing? I would refer Members of your Lordships' House to Question Time on 21st January when the noble Lord the Minister agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, that it was a respectable view that the Russians spent as much on anti-aircraft as they do on anti-ballistic missile research. Further, the noble Lord did not answer the question by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, that much of their re-search on lasers, phased array systems and so on are just as likely to be connected with other spheres of defence as with SDI systems. From his silence I take it he agreed.

As for the charges that the Russians have already broken the ABM treaty, specific charges are spelled out in American publications, and the October number of the NATO Review suggests that Soviet success in research would call in question NATO's policy of flexible response. We do not know, I presume, how far the Russians have advanced their research, but at least they have offered to stop their work at Krasnoyarask if the Americans stop their development in the United Kingdom and the Thule in Greenland. It seems to me hardly likely that the Russians would invest large resources of men and money into systems which their leader has publicly called "an illusion".

I cannot see that these considerations in any way alter the moral judgment against major work on SDI: for what is the point of research if it does not lead to development and deployment in breach of the treaty? It may turn out—I hate to say this—that the tragic demise of the shuttle "Challenger" is a blessing in disguise if it prevents or delays the development of SDI.

I have tried to speak about the morality of the development and deployment of SDI. I now turn to consider in this connection the morality of research into SDI components and systems. I take it that we are here concerned, as one possibility, which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has mentioned, with a nuclear pumped laser beam, which derives its sources or "pump" of energy from a 100 kiloton nuclear device; and because a satellite containing such a laser, if permanently in position, would be vulnerable to space mines or deceived by decoy launches, it would be kept in a submarine and "popped up" or launched into space on the command of surveillance satellites which registered Russian nuclear missiles rising from their launch pads.

There are grave moral problems about SDI deployment of these laser beams which reflect also upon the morality of their research; because research is pointless unless it is oriented towards development and deployment. What are these moral problems? In the first place, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has indicated these X-ray laser beams need for their energy pump the detonation of a nuclear bomb. That in itself is a grave consideration. Secondly, the system could not be tested without the detonation of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. That is morally unacceptable. Thirdly, the command to "pop-up" a laser station, and to detonate a nuclear device, would be given automatically by a surveillance satellite. There would be no time for human involvement, except for a minimum; and if there were, there would be insufficient time for human decision making. I conclude therefore that X-ray laser beam nuclear pumped defence is morally unacceptable. I take it that there would be uncertainty whether the laser beams would actually be able to cause a nuclear missile to explode as they would be untested. That adds to the immorality of the system. I take it that this has already been recognised by our chief ally the United States of America since President Reagan, after the Geneva Summit, said that what the United States was researching on was a "non-nuclear defence system". However, we have as yet had no clear statement that research on the pop-up nuclear pumped X-ray laser beam has been dropped; and the sooner we hear it the better.

A second possibility lies in the chemical laser or excimer, which would eliminate missiles not by explosion, but by heat; or possibly there is the so-called electro-magnetic rail-gun, using intense magnetic fields to create the force to shoot small projectiles at very high velocity. Whether these and other wierd new weapons can be made effective only research and development could show. I certainly do not know. Clearly they could not be tested against Russian missiles except during war. Thus they would be untested.

Even more important is the question of how they would be deployed, even if they were to be researched and developed satisfactorily. They would have to be fired by the command of a super-computer which had precisely the right software—and that in itself is doubtful, because the software would need a precise and exact knowledge of Russian missiles, which I presume we do not have. Secondly, the supercomputer would have to link up surveillance, with the possibility that a quarter of a million objects could be aloft at one time. The computers would have to operate, I am informed by those who know, at between 10 million and a billion floating point operations per second. It is reckoned that the software would need to contain between 10 million and 100 million lines of error-free code.

The Pentagon's present Worldwide Military Command and Control System has 10 million lines of code. It has been plagued with errors, and it has been reckoned that 62 per cent. of all messages failed to get through. Errors are very common. IBM's 370 computer software contained 5,000 errors when it first came out. Whether it is possible to build super-computers which would oversee all that is involved in surveillance, in distinguishing genuine nuclear missiles from decoys, in targeting lasers or rail-guns at more than 1,000 missiles, including MIRVED missiles at different layers of their flight, whether it is possible to allow for human intervention and also be sufficiently flexible to enable the system to continue if many of the terminals go out of action—whether such supercomputers can ever be made I am not in a position to know. Billions of dollars are being spent on their research. What is clear is that, if they can be constructed, we shall have a kind of anti-ballistic missile defence that is full of risk, untested in war-like conditions against the USSR, wide open to the possibility of error with automatic operation and the minimal of human control.

As we pass from research to development, from development to procurement, from procurement to deployment, at each step we are involved in greater breaches of the anti-ballistic missile treaty, unless of course we have given six months' notice of withdrawal—I should say not "we", but our ally. What is more, the risk vastly increases; the risk of technology untried and untested in the circumstances of war. Way back in 1977 the Council for Science and Society published the result of its work on The Acceptability of Risks. It concluded that, as there are no objective ways of deciding the acceptability of a risk in the public interest, it was better to concentrate on the fairness of a decision about a risk rather than the acceptability of the risk itself.

This is where we find ourselves in very deep trouble. In this country we have decided to participate in research for SDI, although our "Strategic Defence Initiative Office" at the Ministry of Defence is likely only to pick up the fragments which fall from the rich man's table. As a country, we are not likely to benefit in terms of security, first, because an SDI umbrella would not extend over this country; secondly, because under Article 9 each party to the agreement bound itself not to transfer to other states nor to deploy outside its national territory ABM systems or their components limited by the treaty.

We have not been consulted about the risks involved in SDI research and development; in charges of breach of the treaty; in the instability that would ensue if SDI were to be successful; in starting an SDI race as well as an arms race; if SDI were actually tried out under conditions of warfare; in laser beams being used not just against nuclear missiles but to incinerate enemy cities; and about the risks involved for the whole world, including the developing world, if billions of dollars badly needed for basic human needs are squandered on what seems a mistaken and dangerous exercise.

If the public knew the facts, I do not believe that they would be prepared to entrust their destiny to a computer network known not to be free from errors in its software. There is a moral question here: how far is it right to continue to support an ally—a generous ally on whose defence we rely—in an undertaking that, by moral reasoning, to say nothing of strategic analysis and technological appraisal, seems fundamentally wrong-headed? When the noble Lord the Minister answers, I hope very much that he will address himself to the moral aspects of the Question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, as well as to its strategic and technical aspects.

9.1 p.m.

The Earl of Bessborough

My Lords, we should be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for raising this subject again. As I said in the noble Lord's previous SDI debate in May of last year, I am not only in favour of the United States going ahead with SDI research—and I emphasise the word "research"—but consider it essential. I shall not repeat what I said then about military space systems and about the views of Dr. Geoffrey Pardoe, so well deployed in his book The Future of Space Technology. As I have said before, this is a case where perhaps I know either too much or too little. However, I believe it is timely to remind ourselves of one or two features surrounding this question.

SDI is indeed an initiative: an initiative to engage in a wide range of research to explore whether it is technically, economically and logistically practicable to deploy an array of complex orbital battle stations with a capability to destroy other spacecraft or, even more difficult, a salvo of enemy ballistic missiles. But with reference to the noble Lord's specific Question, I would say this. Until we know the nature of the problems and the possible solutions, it is impossible to presume that we shall procure and deploy operational systems. As the ABM agreements do not preclude research, the question of contravention can in my view only arise should the research lead to possible deployment of new defence systems—and we are many steps away from that position.

As my noble friend Lady Young said in last May's debate, the whole point of the SDI research programme is to establish whether advances are possible that would make reliance on defence systems a feasible option. There is great confusion in some minds on this issue of the SDI. First, much of the technology—data handling, opto-electronics, etc—has nothing to do with space. It happens to be needed to work in a spacecraft environment if we do get around to needing it.

Secondly, the range of stimulating SDI research is very wide and much is relevant in the non-space defence field—as I shall mention later—and, indeed, elsewhere in the civil domain. He who appreciates where the technology applications are valid is indeed in a very strong cost-benefit situation.

As I have said before, we must pursue the research phase of SDI, and this will require research and demonstration in the space environment. We shall need launchers of both expendable and recoverable types in order to get there. At this poiint—and unlike the right reverend Prelate in his very eloquent speech—may I take this opportunity of expressing the deepest sympathy for all in the United States who, professionally and personally, have suffered so traumatically from the recent shuttle disaster.

Noble Lords

Hear, hear!

The Earl of Bessborough

My Lords, it says very much for the care and safety-consciousness of NASA and its contractors that in 25 years, those are the first deaths to occur in space in a United States space mission. As this week's Economist points out, compared with the number of deaths in the first 25 years of pioneering aviation, that is a safer record than anyone had a right to expect. I support totally the views expressed by President Reagan that we must all continue to move forward in the field of space endeavour, in spite of that disaster. Indeed, I am glad to read in this evening's Standard that the shuttle may fly again by the summer.

Man must go on exploring, not only this planet but also the universe itself. We must be grateful to those pioneers who will enable us to know whether SDI will provide us with more security in future years. Nor must we forget, as I mentioned earlier, the several spin-offs and how the shuttle has, in the words of Christopher Thomas in The Times of 30th January, made life on earth better, whether in helping farmers or those employed in medical research, in genetics, in the growing of proteins, or in the study of viruses.

As Christopher Thomas says, the commercial potential of the shuttle seems limitless, especially in so far as developing tougher materials is concerned and the production of microscopic latex spheres which measure everything from blood cells to ingredients in cosmetics. As we know, the satellite communications business is booming; worth 3 billion dollars last year whereas 10 years ago it hardly existed. Moreover, as George Shultz, the American Secretary of State, said to the Pilgrims on 10th December: the revolution in technology is already under way; and prudence clearly requires that we examine all new possibilities. Certainly the Soviets are doing so. Technology does not stop; history does not stop; the balance of power keeps changing its form". All of us who care about avoiding war and preserving peace must adapt our thinking to new conditions, especially when the new conditions offer a hopeful opportunity and a positive vision of a safer future.

SDI is going to happen anyway, whether we approve or disapprove, and I believe that as a country it is far better for us to participate than to be left out in the cold. At the same time, I should be interested in the views of my noble friend Lord Trefgarne on EUREKA, which is the European Community's own independent space defence initiative, and how far we are now participating in it. I believe we are participating in EUREKA as well as in the American space defence initiative.

I will not repeat what I said on this subject in May last but I shall be interested to hear whether my noble friend has anything to add to what my noble friend Lady Young said on that occasion. But, in so far as the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is concerned, as I said earlier it is impossible to presume that we shall procure and deploy operational systems and ABM agreements do not preclude research.

9.10 p.m.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, I do not find myself able to follow the noble Earl very far down the road which he treads in this matter.

The Earl of Bessborough

My Lords, I was not expecting it.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, the noble Earl was not expecting me to do so and I am glad of that because if I were to do so it would only be at the risk of fracturing a friendship which I have grown to value; therefore, I shall not pursue it very far.

However, I agree with the noble Earl on one aspect; that is, all of us whatever our views cannot but be shaken and sorrowful about the disaster which overtook "Challenger" and its crew. We cannot refrain from having the most profound sympathy, particularly for the relatives of all of them. I shall say a word about that in a moment.

First I should like to join in the appreciation which has been uttered to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for introducing this matter once again. It is a matter of profound importance and we have not made an awful lot of progress on it. Therefore, it is right while we have a deep disagreement and feeling that the Government have not grasped the reality of the matter that we should continue to question it; and that, of course, is what we are here to do.

I was particularly glad to hear from the right reverend Prelate, because his presence introduced into the subject a moral note which I believe has been sadly lacking from these debates. We have been proceeding on the assumption that this is a weapon like any other weapon. It is not. It is a profoundly different change in the possibilities before mankind, and the impossibilities before mankind. If we do not recognise that fact we may fall into the trap which the noble Earl indicated when he expressed the view that because we know how to do something we must go ahead and do it. We have reached the point when we must know that there are some things which we must not do, and we are now at that point.

The star wars idea has wide appeal in the United States but in most of the rest of the world it has gone down like a lead balloon. The distribution of opinion in this House probably reflects roughly the distribution of opinion in the country. I think the people of this country are not in favour of it. What I have seen of the opinion polls on the subject seems to support that view. The strategic defence initiative was named star wars by the President himself, who has that optimistic naiveté which is such an attractive—

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, if the noble Lord would give way, may I ask him on what possible authority he states that President Reagan called his programme star wars? It is a designation which he loathes and in fact it was invented by a headline writer on one of the American national newspapers.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, the noble Lord may be right, but my information was that it was tossed off first by President Reagan and picked up by the headline writer. I do not think it matters very much. It is not very important, but if the noble Lord thinks it is important I shall certainly attribute it to the headline writer rather than to President Reagan. Whether or not he actually coined or adopted the name, the whole star wars attitude and the acceptance of the proposition that it is possible to erect a cover over the United States to preserve its people is typical, I think, of what I call an attractive and peculiarly American characteristic. It is a characteristic which has often led them to total disaster in the past and will lead them to ultimate disaster if they proceed with it at this point. As the noble Earl has said, the most recent catastrophe was the tragic loss of the spacecraft and its crew. I think it is a loss which those of us who feel that "Challenger" was flung into space by the Pentagon because of its SDI links find a horrible and senseless waste of valuable lives.

A year ago our Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, greeted the SDI announcement with proper scepticism. He seemed somewhat less confident about the matter than the Minister who will reply to the debate. However, nothing has happened since a year ago which seems to be a cause for increased confidence. I should have thought, on the contrary, that if one had any confidence a year ago one would have rather less confidence now. Therefore, I am surprised to hear that the noble Lord believes that star wars can work. Indeed, if it were to work I am not at all sure that it would not be worse than if it did not work.

Sir Geoffrey Howe asked a number of questions, and none of those questions seems to me to have been answered. He asked if it would work and what would be its impact on the Soviet Union. Some of the answers are becoming clear. We are beginning to know what is the impact on the Soviet Union—and some noble Lords may say, "Well, they are putting forward all kinds of peace proposals and therefore it has been a good impact". But, of course, simultaneously with those proposals which they are putting forward, as a cautious nation they, too, are beginning to step up the kind of development which is now being pressed on with in the United States.

I fear that this will not prove to be a peace umbrella but is likely to lead to the destruction of our civilisation by precipitating a nuclear war. As Sir Geoffrey Howe said: Even if the ballistic missile indeed showed signs of becoming, in President Reagan's words, impotent and obsolete, how would protection be extended against the non-ballistic nuclear threat, the threat posed by aircraft or cruise missiles, battlefield weapons or, in the last resort, by covert action …? Again he said: If it initially proved feasible to construct only limited defences, these would be bound to be more vulnerable than a comprehensive system to counter-measures. Would these holes in the dyke produce and even encourage a nuclear flood …? So the Foreign Secretary a year ago was saying in effect what I have said, in rather blunter words perhaps, tonight: that this development, instead of leading toward peace and protection, may render nuclear war more likely. That is not my opinion, but the Foreign Secretary speaking.

Leaving the Foreign Secretary on one side for a moment, it is generally accepted that multiplying offensive systems would be far cheaper than producing effective defences. Therefore we must surely expect to see a large expansion of offensive systems on both sides. This expansion will be undertaken in the hope of maintaining retaliatory capability—that is, strategic stability through mutually assured destruction—while the development is taking place. Yet further expansion of new weapons and the associated command, communications, control and intelligence systems will lead many people to wonder if stability is in fact being lost rather than gained in the process. That is one of the dangers, and it is the immediate danger.

Hence the force of another of Sir Geoffrey's questions, the true strength of which did not seem to be fully recognised at the time either by the members of his Government or by those of us who were surprised to find that he was taking a sceptical view of the new idea. He said: Finally on the technology side, could we be certain that the new systems would permit adequate political control over both nuclear weapons and defensive systems, or might we find ourselves in a situation where the peace of the world rested solely upon computers and automatic decision-making? What have we been saying here today; what has the right reverend Prelate been saying, and what has the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, been saying? It is precisely that. Because it was said a year ago by none other than the Foreign Secretary, that does not invalidate what we are saying tonight; it strengthens it, and what we are saying strengthens what he was saying a year ago.

What has happened to him in that year? Let us hope that we shall hear from him. In this dreadful situation there is a natural disagreement between those responsible for defence and those responsible for foreign policy. It happens in the United States. We know that the hawks are located in the Defense Department and the doves, in so far as there are any, in the State Department. The same applies in our society: the Ministry of Defence is hawkish and the doves, so far as we have them, are in the Foreign Office. That perhaps should not surprise us.

Here is the problem that faces us. I turn from the Foreign Secretary to something said by Dr. Julie Dahlitz, who is a considerable expert in the international significance of weapons and the consequence of national treaties. She points out that most of the significant treaties relating to outer space are being observed, and that SALT II is being observed by the United States, even though it did not ratify it. There has been no complaint on either side about breach. She says that the outer space treaty, the ABM treaty, the partial test-ban treaty, the SALT I treaty, the SALT II treaty, the convention on the registration of outer space objects, the international telecommunications convention, the hot line modernization agreement and the nuclear accidents agreement have for several years all been observed on both sides and there has been no complaint on either side about non-observation.

Dr. Dahlitz takes the view that the arrival of SDI would break through that situation because the Americans have declared openly that they intend, if necessary, to breach the ABM treaty. It may be doubted whether we have chapter and verse for that contention, but we have. Secretary Weinberger was asked in Congress by Congressman Dicks: At what point do you envision working on SDI coming into conflict with the terms of the ABM treaty? This was his answer: we … have the right to withdraw from that treaty unilaterally after 6 months' notice so as to enable us to proceed along the lines the scientists would be requesting". So Secretary Weinberger already foresees denouncing the ABM treaty if developments make it scientifically necessary to proceed with Star Wars and to do so.

It is not too happy a situation. The conclusion that Dr. Dahlitz draws is that, SDI is inconsistent with the objectives of the ABM treaty and its implementation would be in breach of specific provisions of that treaty". That is absolutely the same point that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is raising in this Question. The object of that treaty was and is to maintain conditions of stable deterrence until disarmament can be achieved. If we go ahead on a basis that calls into question the existing agreements, we are undermining the branch on which we sit; and we may—and I fear would—live to regret it.

We should also, I believe, consider that the Soviet Union has recently put forward a series of quite staggering proposals. I wish to quote in conclusion a short paragraph from the long speech that Mr. Gorbachev made on 15th January. I believe that most of us would agree with it. He said this: Instead of spending the next 10 to 15 years in developing new space weapons, which are extremely dangerous for mankind, weapons allegedly designed to make nuclear arms unnecessary, would it not be more sensible to start eliminating those weapons and finally doing away with them altogether? The Soviet Union, I repeat, proposes precisely that".

9.26 p.m.

Lord Gladwyn

My Lords, once again, thanks to my noble friend Lord Kennet, we have the opportunity of considering the disastrous star wars project, launched some three years ago by a no doubt idealistic President of the United States, largely on the advice of the so-called father of the hydrogen bomb, the violently anti-Soviet Doctor Edward Teller. The project is also enthusiastically supported, on purely political grounds so far as we can see, by those mostly West Coast Republicans who are keen, above all, on heavy United States nuclear rearmament and who rightly see in it the possibility of scuppering the arms limitation talks at Geneva and the consequent abandonment of the proven doctrine of mutual assured destruction in favour of the so-called doctrine of mutual assured security, which, as I have said repeatedly in this House, affords no security for anyone except possibly the Americans and very doubtfully even for them.

On the actual practicability of the project, apart from its political implications, my honourable friend Mr. Paddy Ashdown, lately of the Foreign Service and the Royal Marines, has recently undertaken some research. I should like to refer to a number of his findings. Each of the SDI's three-layer operations to destroy missiles, first, as they boost out of the atmosphere, then, in mid-course flight and, finally, as they fall towards their target, will have to work perfectly first time and with flawless co-ordination—in itself something that is very difficult if not impossible to imagine.

Then, according to the initial calculations of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the most reputable, I believe, of all the great American scientific institutions, chemical lasers to perform the first, or booster, defence would require the pre-positioning in space of 1,300 tonnes of fuel in a series of battle stations which would, it says, take 10 space shuttles making three trips a year, 3,000 or 4,000 years to assemble. Alternatively, using ground based lasers and mirrors in space to do the job would require up to 60 per cent. of total United States domestic power output. In any case, protection in the mid-course phase would, so the MIT says, necessitate what it calls cryogenically cooled instruments—whatever those may be, although they could, I suppose, be called super cooled instruments—many times more sensitive than any that we have at present. Studies indicate that for every 10,000 objects to be coped with in this layer, the United States would need 70,000 devices for effective interception.

Finally, we shall have to assume, apparently—the point has already been made, I believe, by one or two noble Lords—that computers capable of effective command and control of the massive and complex interlocking system can be built despite the fact that we shall require them to be, some say, several million times more effective than today's versions and faultless at first-time operation without any kind of practical testing.

I shall be interested to know whether the Government think that there may be something in these conclusions. If, as I suspect, the noble Lord who is to wind up cannot comment on them, perhaps I could have his comments later in writing.

Never mind. Let us still assume, for the purpose of the argument, that sufficient progress may have been made in the next five or 10 years—as I think was mentioned—as a result of the research costing perhaps some hundreds of billions of dollars, to make it possible that an ABM space system covering the United States, although not necessarily Europe, could successfully be "deployed"—as they say—as the result of an operation which, I imagine, would in itself take a few more years to carry out.

What then? All would be well. We need not have any apprehensions, so President Reagan tells Mrs. Thatcher at their famous meeting in Camp David. Before "deployment" the Americans, in accordance with the ABM treaty of 1972, would negotiate with the Russians presumably with the object of getting the Politburo to agree to the establishment of what would be represented as a purely defensive "shield". It has even been suggested—rather later I think—that if the Russians would agree to this they might be assisted in constructing—at their own expense of course—a rather similar shield in order to give similar protection to the Soviet Union.

Surely this is driving fantasy too far. Are we to suppose, having got to the point at which they might be able to prevent Soviet missiles from hitting the United States, that the Americans would then only deploy this marvellous system with the consent of the Russians? It certainly looks as if—short of an actual denunciation of the ABM Treaty of 1972 at six months' notice on the grounds under the treaty that for some reason it may prejudice the supreme national interests of the United States—this would be the only legal way of proceeding. But it has now been made abundantly clear by the Administration that they could in no circumstances be subjected to what they call a Russian veto in these negotiations—that is to say, a refusal by the Russians to agree. They could, therefore, as we must assume, go ahead, treaty or no treaty, whatever the Russians might say. Naturally they have every reason to suppose that they would.

Indeed, how could Congress, after having voted such vast sums on a project within sight of success, agree to its being indefinitely held up by Russian insistence? Whatever we may think of Soviet intentions we must at least admit that the Russians have every reason to fear the accomplishment of the SDI project and to seek to prevent its development by all means in their power. Obviously, if it ever did materialise the Americans would have the capability of bombing them while they would no doubt not have the capability of bombing the Americans.

There are indeed, as I have said, strong reasons for supposing that it can never materialise at all. But the Russians can hardly fail—given the firm assurances to the contrary of Doctor Teller and many other top scientists working with him—to act on the assumption that it might work. What then can they do? It seems that there are three possible courses of action, all or any of which might be adopted. They can, and they no doubt will, refuse to conclude any deal on arms limitation until the SDI project is either withdrawn or substantially modified. I say "either wihdrawn or substantially modified": they could not and, in the absence of some such agreement, they no doubt would not, reduce the numbers of their very powerful strategic missiles but, on the contrary, would greatly increase them so as to counter any perceived threat by SDI. Or they could endeavour to make progress on a star wars project of their own.

The first two of these possibilities would seem to be almost inevitable in the circumstances contemplated. The last is very probably out of the question. Given the vast sums involved and the consequent strain on the Soviet economy, together with the faint hope of any real success, there is very little reason to suppose that that course would be followed. Alleged evidence that the Russians are even now contemplating it must, I suggest, be taken with a large grain of salt. Most of such evidence is based on Soviet efforts to reinforce a land-based ABM system, which of course is permitted by the treaty of 1972. The phased array radar station at Krasnoyarsk and perhaps elsewhere is probably a violation of the treaty, but perhaps not. In any case there is no particular reason for us to be very afraid of it.

The Americans, after all, now possess a perfectly reliable second strike capacity and there is every reason to suppose that, with their existing huge programme of nuclear rearmament, they will be able, even given agreement on arms limitation, to maintain this second strike capacity for many years to come. Suggestions that the Soviet Union might contemplate a first strike against America are chiefly put about by those who have an interest in doing so. Only if they thought that star wars would really become a reality might the Russians contemplate such absurd action as a first strike against America.

To sum up an argument necessarily briefly developed—one cannot do any more here—perhaps I may say that there is strong reason to suppose both that the SDI project is ultimately doomed and that it must be a gravely destabilising factor. As I see it, the real danger is that persistence in its pursuit may endanger the continuance of the North Atlantic Alliance, on the maintenance of which most people in this country believe that our safety and our independence primarily depend.

I do not say now, but in some years' time, if progress in Geneva is seen to be held up by insistence on the star wars programme, there may be governments in Western Europe which no longer want to be "protected" by the United States nuclear umbrella, and may prefer—no doubt fatally, I agree—to come to some arrangement with the Soviet Union. I would ask the Government to tell us whether they feel there may be something in these gloomy apprehensions, but perhaps it has never occurred to them that there might be.

I have spoken for too long already, but my final remark is that, apart from the so-called "tough guys" in America—the Californians and no doubt the born-again Christians—there are I believe a very large number of Americans, more particularly on the East Coast, who are alarmed—indeed highly alarmed—by the apparent attempt, favoured by the distribution of a great deal of money to a great many people, either to get back to the position of power which the United States enjoyed when it had the monopoly of the atom bomb or, failing that, to establish a kind of "fortress America", the inhabitants of which could lead peaceful lives untroubled by the wicked world outside. The prospects raised by star wars are every bit as serious as that.

9.38 p.m.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, I should like to beg the indulgence of the House at the beginning of my remarks on two counts. The first is that I fear my speech may be slightly longer than would seem apropriate for someone speaking from the Back-Benches late at night on an Unstarred Question. The second is that what I have to say may be somewhat tedious and technical in content.

My justification for both these factors is that up to now it seems to me that the public debate on the strategic defence initiative has been long on rhetoric and dogma but a little short on fact and reasoned analysis. If I may say so with respect, I believe that the debate in your Lordships' House tonight has sometimes suffered from this defect. Not much of it dealt with the relationship between the strategic defence initiative and the ABM treaty, which I understood to be one of the major reasons for this Question being tabled in the first place. One or two speakers have referred to it, but for the most part we have had the familiar arguments about technical feasibility, about the effectiveness of the SDI as against mutual assured destruction and second strike capability; we had many references to Soviet arms control proposals, but only on one or two occasions were we brought to address the problem of the relationship between the strategic defence initiative and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. We had suggestions that the x-ray laser lies at the heart of the strategic defence initiative programme. It does nothing of the kind. It is one of the possible elements in the programme. It certainly does not lie at the heart of it, and it certainly does not for one moment decide whether it shall be successful or unsuccessful.

We had a suggestion that we should take note of the idea that the SDI places a dome over the Soviet Union. It was suggested that the aim of the SDI was to do precisely this. Of course it is not. In any concept of strategic defence as at present envisaged only some 25 per cent. of Soviet missiles would be expected to be destroyed in the boost phase. The rest would be destroyed in the mid-course phase and the re-entry phase, which are not over the Soviet Union but in space over the United States of America.

We had a suggestion that it was obvious that to improve offensive capabilities was going to be cheaper and easier than improving defensive capabilities. That is not necessarily so. It is an interesting statement of opinion and one which can be countered with exactly the opposite statement of opinion, and that has been done on many occasions.

Before I go on to the substance of my remarks, I should like to refer to the speech of the right reverend Prelate. When he began I must confess that I looked forward to some moral guidance on what is an extremely painful and difficult issue. I looked for it in vain. I fear that what we got from the right reverend Prelate was a rehearsal of all the familiar arguments which have been deployed against the strategic defence initiative in the technical and political field for at least the last two years. There was not one new argument there even on that basis, but for me at any rate there was certainly not a great deal of spiritual or moral guidance.

May I, again with great respect to the right reverend Prelate, tell him that it was with great sorrow that I heard him, of all people, refer to the tragedy of the "Challenger" space mission as "a blessing in disguise". The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, went on to refer to it as a "senseless waste". I would suggest that we might send from your Lordships' House messages a little more considerate and compassionate than those to the Government of the United States of America and its people.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, would the noble Lord give way? I suspect that the noble Lord has not read, or considered, either the whole of what I said on that point or the whole of what the right reverend Prelate said.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, that may well be so as I have as yet read nothing of what either the noble Lord or the right reverend Prelate has said. I shall do so with great interest tomorrow morning. If I find I am wrong I shall at once apologise. I somehow suspect that I shall find myself right.

I have two qualifications, I think, for putting before your Lordships what I think may be some of the factual background to this somewhat passionate and rhetorical debate. The first is that I have recently completed a book on the strategic defence initiative. I lay no claim for any special merit in that book. I simply say that in preparing it I have had to engage in conversations with hundreds of officials on the subject and studied, I dare say, thousands of official papers.

My second qualification for addressing the subject of the ABM treaty which, as I say, I thought was to be at the heart of our debate tonight, is that in the period leading up to the signature of the treaty in May 1972 I was, for six years, Minister of State in the Government responsible for arms control and disarmament and head of the British delegation in Geneva.

I am not suggesting for one moment that I had any direct part in the negotiations. They were, of course, bilateral negotiations. I was, however, in constant touch with the arms contol communities on both sides during this crucial period, and I was able to get some idea of what their negotiating aims and positions were. As I shall try to point out, that is an important factor in analysing this complicated issue.

We should first and principally consider some of the facts. I apologise that some of these are tedious repetition, but I believe that they need to appear in the Official Report of this House where they can be seen and studied.

The ABM treaty consists of 16 articles and a number of what are called agreed statements. For the purpose of examining the relationship between the strategic defence initiative and the ABM treaty, four articles and one of the agreed statements are especially relevant: Articles II, III, V, and VII and Agreed Statement D. The right reverend Prelate quoted only one part of one article, clause 1 of Article V, but there are other clauses which are equally and perhaps in some respects more relevant. Let me first quote Clause I(A) of Article II which is vital in that it defines for the purpose of the treaty an ABM system. I propose, with the indulgence of the House, to read it: For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles"— which are then defined— (b) ABM launchers"— which are then defined— (c) ABM radars"— which are then defined. It is important that those who wish to engage in this argument should study that article and definitions very carefully, since it can be argued that any system not covered by the definition is not covered by the treaty. That is my first point.

Under Article III each party to the treaty "undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components" except for a limited number of ground-based systems on each side.

Article V, which in my view is the key operative article of the treaty, makes the following provision; and it was Clause 1 of that article which was quoted by the right reverend Prelate: Each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based". In other words, the deployment of space-based defence systems is forbidden by Clause I of Article V. But the important point to note in the force of this argument is that research is not prohibited, largely because the negotiators in the conference at the time recognised that it would be quite impossible to enforce any such provision.

I will mention Article VII—although I shall not return to it—because it is an important article in the treaty. It reads: Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernisation and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out". That is a very important permissive provision.

Finally I want to quote, again in full, because it is most important in the context of public debate, Section D of the agreed statement, that is to say the section that is referred to as Agreed Statement D: In order to insure fulfilment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the parties agree"— this is crucial to the argument— that in the event of ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM intercepter missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars"— in the event that ABM systems based on these physical principles are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Articles XIII and XIV of the Treaty". And Articles XIII and XIV deal with the possibility of amending the treaty by a special consultative commission.

A number of very important implications flow from these provisions. One is (and I think it is worth repeating) that research is recognised as being different from and distinguishable from development and deployment. It may be argued, as it has been here tonight and many times before, that research has some inbuilt momentum which will inevitably lead to development and deployment. That is a subjective, political, personal judgment and is not a fact. The fact is that research into space-based systems, which is what is going on in the USA at the moment, is permitted by the treaty. Development and deployment are not.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, I am listening with the greatest interest to the noble Lord's lengthy exposition of the fact that the ABM treaty permits research. Can he, as a matter of fact, tell the House of any Member of this House who has said the contrary, or indeed of any reputable opponent of SDI outside the House who has said the contrary?

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, I could quote several cases of people saying that research is forbidden under the terms of the treaty because it will inevitably lead to development and deployment; and there are those who have suggested—and I do not say that the noble Lord has done so, but he asked the question—that the experimental research going on at the moment in the United States itself is in breach of the treaty. I shall endeavour to show before I sit down that that it not so.

As I said, development and deployment are not permitted by the treaty. But development and deployment of what? Some eminent legal authorities—and of course we can all quote our own legal authorities—suggest that agreed Statement D allows ABM systems based on other physical principles, etc., to be deployed subject to discussion between signatories of the treaty. In other words, I am going on to suggest that not only is research permitted by the treaty but there is a very strong argument under agreed Statement D that development and deployment might be subject to discussion between the signatories to the treaty.

Of course the strategic defence initiative specifically envisages the kind of exotic technologies which are not covered in Article II of the treaty but are covered by agreed Statement D.

Lord Gladwyn

My Lords, it surely means that one side cannot go ahead without the permission of the other.

Lord Chalfont

Precisely, my Lords. Of course it does. The United States President has made clear (as I shall make clear again in a moment if the House will be patient for a short while longer) that he will not proceed to development and deployment without such discussion.

Lord Gladwyn

My Lords, it has now been said that in no circumstances will the American Administration subject themselves to a Russian veto in such discussions.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, if the noble Lord will be patient, I will quote some facts to him which will make it clear, I think, that the United States takes a very restrictive view of the treaty and has said so. If the noble Lord will contain himself in patience for a moment, I will come to that point.

There are other experts who claim—and I daresay that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, would be on their side—that the combined effect of Articles II and III is to prohibit the development of any space-based system designed to intercept strategic missiles in flight and that it is perverse to suggest that an agreed statement appended to a treaty can invalidate the intent of one of the principal articles of that treaty. Those are the two interpretations of the treaty, generally known as broad and narrow interpretations of the treaty.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I would say that I maintain that the treaty would prevent the development of exotic (as he calls them) new systems based on other principles in the absence of an agreement between the two signatories under the procedure laid down in agreed Statement D.

Lord Chalfont

Yes, precisely, my Lords. We are at one on this. I do not contest this with the noble Lord for one moment. What I am saying—and he will know, I hope—is that Articles 13 and 14 of the treaty provide for the treaty to be amended under a special Standing Consultative Commission and that, if the two signatories of the treaty get together, they can interpret agreed statement D under the terms of Articles 13 and 14. Of course, it would be against the provisions of the treaty, clearly, if the United States were to proceed with development and deployment without such consultation. I do not contest that for one moment, but in a moment I will explain why I do not think that that is in the least likely.

I had wanted to say a little about what it was that the negotiators of the treaty were attempting to negotiate. I have not now time to do that, as an already long speech has been further lengthened by a series of interruptions. But I should like to pass on vey quickly to deal with the point about the "narrow" and "broad" conceptions of the treaty. It is that all these arguments have been to a very great extent resolved in the United States of America. It is true that in October last year, just before the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, Mr. Robert MacFarlane, President Reagan's national security adviser, announced that the Administration favoured the "broad" interpretation of the treaty, according to which the testing and deployment of star wars systems would be permitted. This is the development to which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has been referring. Furthermore, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, has said, Secretary Weinberger stated as a fact, not as a statement of intention, that the United States has the right to withdraw from the treaty, to abrogate it.

But what has received considerably less publicity, and certainly has received none in your Lordships' House tonight, is that within a matter of days after those two statements President Reagan had signed a new National Security Decision Directive making it specifically clear that, while the Administration accepted that there might be more flexible interpretations of the treaty, it, the Administration, would conduct the strategic defence research programme according to the narrower, more restrictive, interpretation. In other words, as he assured the right honourable Lady the Prime Minister at their meeting last year, this is a research programme only; and both the United States Department of Defense and the Strategic Defense Initiative Office are required by law to ensure that all their programmes comply not only with the ABM treaty but with all existing arms control agreements. The strategic defence research programme at present envisages 15 major experiments. Every single one complies fully with the requirements of the ABM treaty of 1972—and they do not, perhaps I may say in parenthesis, include experiments with X-ray lasers.

The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, said that we should return to this subject as often as possible. My own plea would be for a period of discreet silence on the subject of the strategic defence initiative. It is progressing very well, as the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, has said. No amount of argument on this side of the Atlantic, even if it were to be ever so profound and informed, is likely to stand in its way. What we can do is to take a full and constructive part in it. In that way, we might be able to exert some influence if the Americans show any signs whatsoever of behaving dangerously or irresponsibly. So far there is no evidence to suggest that they are likely to do so.

9.59 p.m.

Lord Graham of Edmonton

My Lords, not for the first time I have appreciated and respected all the contributions in this debate. We are something of a repertory company. We not only know our own lines but other participants' lines as well. I very much appreciated the remarks of the right reverend Prelate. I immediately join in the oft expressed sorrow and regret at the horrendous tragedy which befell the "Challenger", her crew and the American people last week. It was a price no one should be expected to pay, and I mourn the loss of all the human lives and everything else that was concerned.

As we frequently are, tonight we are once more indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for using the procedures of this House to focus our attention on this most important area of national concern—nay, international concern. Earlier tonight the noble Lord reminded us that he has done so on six occasions. There are those of us who could quite cheerfully debate and discuss other highly contentious matters not far removed from defence procurement, and I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is among them. But he has shown persistently over a long period that in the realm of defence matters an understanding if not a resolution of unanswered questions relating to SDI properly should appear on our agenda. It is not only an occasion to ask questions but for the Minister to come to the House to face this and related questions.

If not on trial at least equally under scrutiny in this debate is the whole raison d'être of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a matter that quite properly took up a great deal of what the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, had to tell us.

Perhaps one of the major achievements of the 1970s arms control negotiations, the ABM treaty was signed in 1972 and has been a source of controversy not least since the escalation of the SDI programme by the American Government. Born out of a genuine search for arms control, what we are about tonight is trying to reconcile some awkward questions which flow from an examination of ABM and SDI. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has gone some way to answering some of them in his speech tonight. The treaty did not come easy. It took three years of difficult negotiations during the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (the SALT talks) 14 years ago, and even then there were doubts. In retrospect it was ambitious. It bans a territorial ABM defence and permits the development, testing and deployment of fixed ground-based ABM radars. The development, testing or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based systems or of components for such systems is prohibited. As a number of noble Lords have said, research, however, is not restrained in any way.

Over that 14-year period great strides have been made in many areas relevant to ballistic missile defence, including advances in sensors, microelectronics and data processing. A factor emerging in later years has undoubtedly been a sense that strategic defences can be provided—developed—which are not only effective but are less costly. The SDI sets out to research the feasibility of new defence technologies. That, of itself, cannot be bad, but we run into trouble when we face up to the reality of trust—or not—of suspicion, of an ability to work for the common purpose of global peace and security.

What we are about tonight is testing the uncertainties and distrusts which are now in the open arising from the diversions (the interpretations or reinterpretations) from the words of the ABM treaty. Equally we have to be clear as to the background and the understandings. Research, as I have shown, is not part of the ban, for the very good reason that both the United States and Soviet Union at the time and since have recognised that it would be impossible to devise effective or verifiable limits or bans on research. The Soviet Union is clearly on record as acknowledging this, perhaps for the very good reason that for years it has spent legitimately great effort and resources to research into new technologies, including high energy laser and particle beam weapons. The ABM treaty allowed each side freely to engage in research. Both are doing just that.

What, then, is the problem? It is posed in the Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, tonight—not least in the light of the statements made by Mr. Weinberger when he recently proposed a new interpretation of the ABM treaty that will permit testing and development as well as research.

There are two ways of looking at the SDI: first, to consider the threat that it poses to international stability and the potential for an escalation of the arms race; secondly, to consider the commercial value of the SDI to participating nations. The actions of the British Government, of course, are not only important but are of especial importance to this House, and are central to this debate. In that context, the memorandum signed by Her Majesty's Government with the United States last year must play a part in our deliberations.

Complete openness in matters of national security is not always possible or desirable, but we have been especially badly served in respect of that memorandum, which is, in all respects, a secret agreement of doubtful value to Britain. The suspicion will not go away that it is flawed, one-sided and not in the best national interest. That fear includes the suspicion that there will be a one-way traffic from Europe, and especially from Britain, across the Atlantic of our best brains, and the near certainty that we will gain nothing of significance out of it.

The Government have claimed that that agreement is much better than previous agreements with the United States on defence procurement, intelligence and other nuclear matters. There is a certain naïveté in believing that British research bodies will be given non-discriminatory access to the right to tender for research contracts. In a major speech to a subcommittee of the House of Representatives on 10th December last year entitled Barriers to European Participation in the SDI, John Pike, the associate director for space policy, said: During the course of recent negotiations the U S refused a British request for a commitment of 1.5 billion dollars for British companies, saying only that the level of participation would be substantial. This American reluctance is quite understandable since the actual amount of money that British companies are likely to receive will probably be only a fraction of the requested amount". That address was most illuminating. It listed six barriers to European—not only British—participation in the SDI research programme. Of a total of 30 billion dollars, only 1 billion is available, with conpetition—and that point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet—leaving 29 billion not available for Euro-competition.

I believe that it is still not too late for major reflection upon the entire concept of the strategic defence initiative. It was Senator Edward Kennedy who last September said: The SDI may yet turn out to be an expensive way to make arms control reachable. To put it another way, is a trillion dollar weapons programme the best way to arrive at arms cuts? There has now been the long-awaited, successful meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. We can wonder whether the SDI research programme has not increased Russia's incentive to break out of the ABM treaty and deploy her own defence system before the Americans have theirs. I have seen the problem posed in this way. We should discourage the Soviet break-out by restraining SDI research, but a better way would be to revise and reaffirm the ABM treaty. If America allows that treaty to be eroded any further and then dicovers that the SDI is not "do-able"—that it does not work—then it could end up with the worst of all worlds: facing a Russian defence shield and strengthened Soviet attack with no arms treaty and no effective American defences.

We have to take on board not only what we ourselves think but what we are told by those in influential positions. It is less than three months ago that Robert MacFarlane, the Administration's national security adviser, announced a new interpretation of the ABM treaty. He said that not only was research into new weapons permitted by the treaty but so were testing and development. It was, however, George Shultz, the Secretary of State—a point made obliquely by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont—who was quoted in the same report as persuading President Reagan to agree that for the time being America should stick to the traditional, narrower interpretation of the treaty.

The Administration has got itself into a contradictory position. On the one hand it is denouncing the Russians for violating the treaty and, on the other, it is suggesting that the treaty is in some respects meaningless. Yet Gerard Smith, who was the chief United States negotiator of the treaty in 1972, has denounced these reinterpretations. Last October he said that it had not been the intention that technology for space-based ABM systems could be developed or tested under the ABM treaty. He said: The new version of the treaty has drastic implications for the survival of the treaty and indeed of the whole arms control process". I venture to say that even the Minister, and certainly many who have spoken earlier and who are here tonight, are genuinely agitated at the dangers that could exist arising from the opportunities for misunderstanding that exist. They have either been there all the time, from the beginning, or they are emerging and causing distress today.

My noble friend Lord Boston, speaking from the Labour Front Bench on 27th March last year, had this to say: But, my Lords, the question which has to be asked on research is: where does research end and development begin, let alone where does production, procurement or development begin? We need to be very clear indeed about this. There is no use in glossing over it or allowing ourselves to be swept beyond the point of research into something of substance. We need to be very clear about where research ends and something beyond it begins."—[Official Report, 27/3/85; col. 1132.] That is the nub of the debate tonight. My noble friend returned to that theme in the debate on the Queen's Speech on 7th November.

The Prime Minister properly raised these misgivings, which are crucial and can have such catastrophic effects on what we all surely want—progress on arms control and, eventually, the total elimination of arms expenditure. I hope the House recognises that these are very serious questions which have been raised, primarily by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and by others. It ought to include the Prime Minister. When she visited Washington a little more than 12 months ago she stressed that British support for the SDI was limited to research into its feasibility and that any SDI-related deployment would, in view of ABM treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation. Again, that point was stressed by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. I ask the Minister: what negotiations have taken place and what has been the outcome?

My noble friend Lord Jenkins referred to what at the time we all thought was a very sensible speech by the Foreign Secretary last year. In that speech he said that the first point to make was that this was a research programme, conducted in full conformity within the limits of the ABM treaty. But what should happen if and when decisions were required on moving from the research to the development stage? Therefore the noble Lord the Minister should welcome this debate, as I do, and the opportunity to review a little bit of recent history.

What I want to hear from the Minister is that we have cause for disquiet or that he can dispel our disquiet; that he shares the views we have expressed tonight; that the questions are legitimate and have to be answered. If Her Majesty's Government, over-mindful of what they fondly believe is a special relationship with the United States, are hesitant to raise these matters in critical terms with the United States Administration, he should be fortified by the tenor of our debate tonight. He should keep firmly fixed as central to our ambition the desperate need to reach agreement on arms control.

If the initiatives of the United States with the SDI are seen to jeopardise that goal, he will be serving the best interests of the peoples of the world, who yearn for world peace, and the special relationship by telling America to tread with the greatest possible care, to take Britain with it and above all to take the Soviet Union with it; for unless that happens we are condemned to many more sterile years of senseless arms expenditure while millions in the world starve.

10.15 p.m.

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is right to return to this important question. We have debated the strategic defence initiative and its implications a number of times in this House, and I dare say we shall do so on many occasions in the future.

It is now almost three years since President Reagan's famous speech of March 1983 which launched the strategic defence initiative, and the research programme is now well established. SDI research is inquiring into a wide range of technologies and a number of different concepts. The US Administration has made it clear that its purpose is to identify ways to exploit recent advances in ballistic missile technologies that have potential for strengthening deterrence and thereby increasing US and Allied security. The programme is designed to answer a number of fundamental scientific and engineering questions that must be addressed before the potential of these technologies can be fully assessed. It is designed to provide to future leaders the technical knowledge necessary to support a decision in the 1990s on whether to develop and deploy advanced defensive systems.

There are a number of reasons why it is entirely right that the US should be conducting such a research programme. Not the least of them is the enormous extent of Soviet activities in these areas. As your Lordships may recall from the starred Question on this subject by my noble friend Lord Orr-Ewing on the 21st January, the Soviet Union has mature research programmes under way in most of the fields relevant to a defence capability against ballistic missiles. They have had an extensive R & D programme into high energy lasers for over 20 years, employing more than 10,000 scientists and engineers. They have tested lasers which could have anti-satellite applications. There is a vigorous R & D programme into particle-beam weapons which could lead to a prototype space-based system in the 'nineties. They have research programmes into radio-frequency weapons, and kinetic energy weapons, including electro-magnetic rail-guns. They possess a launch detection system for US ICBMs and are improving their capabilities in this area; and they have eight space launch systems, with two more, including a heavy lift vehicle, in development.

It is also relevant that the Soviet Union has the only deployed ABM system in the world around Moscow, and it is currently being upgraded. When these are completed the Soviet system will consist of 100 static launchers sited around Moscow, which is the maximum permitted under the 1972 ABM treaty. These will provide a limited two-layer ABM defence capable of discriminating against all but the most elaborate penetration aids and capable of intercepting ballistic missiles both within the atmosphere and outside the atmosphere, the latter with nuclear tipped Galosh missiles. All this is supported by a chain of early warning, surveillance, target acquisition, tracking and missile control radars.

Your Lordships will be aware that I placed a fuller statement of the extent of Soviet activities in the Library of the House last December, but I think it is clear even from this brief account that the extent of Soviet activities in this area is massive by any standards. It would be folly indeed for the West to ignore them.

The Question of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked about the relationship of SDI research to SDI procurement and deployment.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, the noble Lord has given an extremely full and helpful account of the state of Soviet research into these matters. He is as well aware as other Members of your Lordships' House that in the Pentagon's publications it has committed itself to the view that in the great majority of the relevant fields for SDI development the United States was ahead in 1983. Is he willing to make a judgment about the relative state of Soviet and American research in 1983 before the great new American programme started?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I cannot give the sort of judgment that the noble Lord asks for, but clearly, if the Soviet programme was proceeding on the scale that I have indicated, it was right for the West to respond.

Lord Kennet

The noble Lord is patient, my Lords; but he has missed my point. Why was it right for the West to do any more if, as the Pentagon maintains, it was already ahead in 1983 or 1984?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, the fact that one is ahead at a particular moment does not mean that one will stay ahead if the other side is conducting a research programme of the scale to which I have referred.

Lord Chalfont

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but I feel that this exchange should not go on the record without at least a comment. What the Pentagon said in 1984 was that the United States was ahead in some technologies of space defence and that the Soviet Union was ahead in others. I think that we should be quite clear and quite accurate about these things.

Lord Kennet

I said "most", my Lords.

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords.

The Question of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked about the relationship of SDI research to SDI procurement and deployment. The SDI is a research programme. Decisions on possible moves at later stages of development and procurement will not arise for many years.

The United States view on this was made clear in a policy statement issued by the State Department in June last year. This stated that: The US is pursuing the broadly based SDI research programme in an objective manner. We have no preconceived notions about the outcome of the research programme. We do not anticipate that we will be in a position to approach any decision to proceed with development or deployment based on the results of this research for a number of years". There has been a wide-ranging debate on both sides of the Atlantic about the technical feasibility of ballistic missile defences and their huge cost. A major technical challenge of this sort is not a new departure for the United States. Noble Lords will recall that in the 1960s the Americans responded with outstanding success to President Kennedy's challenge to land a man on the moon. The potential is therefore great, although it is readily acknowledged in the United States that the technical difficulties are formidable. We have been forcefully reminded of the problems and risks associated with these great projects by the tragic loss of the "Challenger" only the other day. The right reverend Prelate said that that was a blessing in disguise. I suggest that he says that to the relatives of those who died.

I turn now to the possible—

The Lord Bishop of Birmingham

My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord and others who have spoken will read carefully what I said. I described this as tragic and terrible. I said that it could be a blessing in disguise if certain results flowed from it. I did not say that it was a good thing in itself. I described it as terrible and tragic. But the fact remains that certain results could flow from it which in my judgment (which may be wrong) could be a blessing in disguise.

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I dare say that the "blessing in disguise", as the right reverend Prelate refers to it, will be heavily disguised for the relatives of those concerned.

I turn now to possible deployment. This too raises numerous questions. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs set out a number of those questions in a speech last year which has been referred to on several occasions this evening, while emphasising that the answers to many of them would not be known for many years. One of the main aims of the SDI is to try to help find out some of the answers. But whether it will proceed from the research phase to development and deployment is simply an open question.

The Question of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, also referred to the relationship of the programme to the ABM treaty. President Reagan has made it clear on a number of occasions that the SDI research programme will be carried out in a manner fully consistent with United States obligations under the ABM treaty. Furthermore, he recently confirmed that it would continue to be conducted within a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations. The United States has also made it clear that if SDI research yields positive results, they would, after consulting the allies, consult and negotiate with the Soviet Union, in accordance with the terms of the ABM treaty, on how deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both sides on defensive systems.

The Government's position on these issues, as your Lordships well know, is based on the four points agreed between the Prime Minister and President Reagan in December 1984, and since reaffirmed by both sides. They are so central to the issues that we have debated today that I hope your Lordships will bear with me if I repeat them again. First, the United States and Western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments. Secondly, SDI-related deployments would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation. Thirdly, the overall aim is to enhance deterrence. Fourthly, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

The SDI has certainly been an important question in East-West negotiations. It played a major role in bringing the Soviets back to the negotiating table at Geneva last year. Both sides agreed that the aim of these negotiations should be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The United States has made clear its concern to address the relationship of offensive and defensive systems in these talks. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union's approach has been to propose a ban on the creation of so-called "space strike" weapons which ignores comparable Soviet activities and the problems of verifying a ban on research. They are also refusing point blank to agree reductions in strategic weapons unless the United States agree in advance to abandon the SDI.

Nonetheless, I am glad to say that there have been some positive signs in these negotiations. Both sides tabled detailed proposals for substantial reductions in the level of nuclear weapons last autumn, though the Soviet proposals were one-sided in many respects. In addition, President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev agreed at their summit meeting on the principle of 50 per cent. reductions in the nuclear arms of the US and USSR appropriately applied, and on the idea of an interim INF agreement. Last month, as the new round of the Geneva negotiations began, the Soviet Union announced a further set of proposals. Many of these proposals are a repetition of existing Soviet ideas, but they are wide ranging and also contain new elements. We are studying them fully and carefully. I am sure your Lordships will join me in hoping that they will lead to rapid progress in the Geneva negotiations.

I should now like to turn to some of the points raised during the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, in his opening speech, asked particularly about the position of the Fylingdales radar and its consistency with the ABM treaty. There has, of course, been an early warning radar at Fylingdales since long before the ABM treaty was signed in 1972. The Government are confident that the existence of this radar and its proposed modernisation are in full conformity with United States obligations under the ABM treaty.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, is it to be phased array radar?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, that is, I am afraid, a technical question to which I do not know the answer. Perhaps I can find out and let the noble Lord know.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, can the noble Lord possibly say that it is not going to be against the ABM treaty without even knowing whether it is going to be a phased array radar?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I have given the noble Lord the view of the Government in this matter. I shall ascertain and let him have the additional information which he requires.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, also asked about the transfer of ABM technology to the United Kingdom and how this was provided for, if it was, under the ABM treaty. Under the ABM treaty the parties are prohibited from transferring to other states or deploying outside their own national territory ABM systems limited by the treaty. This prohibition has been agreed to include the obligation not to provide to other states technical descriptions or blueprints worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the treaty. United Kingdom participation in the SDI will of course be conducted within these constraints.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, made a number of points about the SDI Memorandum of Understanding. This provides in a satisfactory way for the protection of the existing data in the United Kingdom as well as for research data generated in this country with the help of US dollars. This MOU did not replace the 1975 MOU on defence equipment cooperation, but is a quite separate document. Incidentally, the 1975 MOU was replaced towards the end of 1985, but by an updated version of the same document.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, referred also to the SDI participation office. This office has been established in the Ministry of Defence to promote and assist the process of United Kingdom participation in US-funded research work. This includes guidance to industry. I expect to see the successful conclusion of contracts with industry and arrangements with Government research establishments on an increasingly substantial scale in coming months.

Lord Graham of Edmonton

My Lords, will the Minister say anything about the comment I made on the difficulty of British firms receiving contracts from America in the light of American law, and in the light of the comments made by John Pike to the Congressional committee?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord recalls the occasion on which I repeated the Statement in your Lordships' House about this matter? That problem was gone into at some length on that occasion. Perhaps the noble Lord would like to refresh his memory of what was said then.

May I turn now to the remarks of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Birmingham. I have referred to some of them already. The right reverend Prelate asked, in addition, about the definition in the ABM treaty of where permitted research ends and prohibited development begins. The United States have stated that the SDI research programme will be compatible with a restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty. The United States Administration has set out its views on the meaning of the terms "research", "development" and "testing" on a number of occasions; for example, in Appendix B of the Pentagon Report to Congress in April last year, a copy of which is in the Library of your Lordships' House. I dare say that document was in the mind of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, during the course of his remarks also.

The right reverend Prelate made much of the morality of the SDI programme. But the United States has made it clear that the purpose of this research is to investigate the contributions which new technologies might make to security, stability and peace, as we go into the next century. These aims are encapsulated in the four points agreed between the President and my right honourable friend the Prime Minister What objective could be more moral than that?

My noble friend Lord Bessborough asked me about the EUREKA programme. EUREKA is not of course a strategic defence research programme. Its objective is to stimulate European civil industrial capabilities in advance technologies. I understand that 26 such projects have so far been announced, six involving British firms, and a further 25 projects are at a less advanced stage. I hope that my noble friend will be reassured by that.

The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, referred in some detail to the speech of my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. My right honourable friend was of course raising important questions that are very much for the longer term and are not capable of, nor indeed were intended for, easy or early answers.

The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, referred to the technical problems which confront the research programme. They are indeed formidable. We do not of course know of the solutions, but I believe it would be a brave noble Lord who says that these problems are insoluble for all time.

It was perhaps a pity that the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, was interrupted so often. I was very largely in agreement with what the noble Lord said. He recited in some detail his interpretation of the provisions of the ABM treaty and he displayed a profound understanding of these matters. The House will be grateful to him.

This has been an interesting and valuable debate. A wide range of views has been expressed about the SDI, its feasibility, its cost, and the implications of moving towards a system based on greater reliance on defences. I think the wide range of views illustrates well the fact that we cannot know the answers to many of these questions for many years to come, though we will doubtless continue to debate them in this House. What is clear is the need for US research to continue, particularly in the light of related Soviet activities, and the need for progress in reaching agreement at the Geneva negotiation. The agreed objective of these negotiations reflects a vision of a world with fewer nuclear weapons and greater strategic stability, a vision we would all share. I can assure your Lordships that Her Majesty's Government will do all they can to support US efforts to achieve this.

House adjourned at twenty-three minutes before eleven o'clock.