Cyprus

HL Deb 17 December 1986 vol 483 cc220-47

6.10 p.m.

Lord Willis rose to call attention to the situation in Cyprus; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should like to begin this debate with a kind of preface. Like many of your Lordships, I have visited Cyprus on several occasions both before and after the island was divided. I have been to both the North and the South. As a result, I have developed a great affection for the people there, whether they are Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots. Sometimes when I go to that island it seems to me that something of the sun that shines so warmly over it has entered their hearts because they are such a warm and friendly people, and although they are sometimes bewildered by the attitude of the British Government, in spite of everything they still retain an affection and respect for this country which I regret is not always returned by us in full measure.

In the light of those remarks, I hope that your Lordships will understand that in this debate I shall try to speak without prejudice or bias on one side or the other, and simply put forward what I know to be the facts. Perhaps the first and most important fact to grasp is that the inhabitants of Cyprus are not, and in the whole of their history never have been, one nation. They are two separate and distinct ethnic communities. They have no common language, although they are linked by a second language called English. They have no common religion and basically they have no common culture. In fact they are two peoples: the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. We have to remember that very basic element in this puzzle.

Of course, these two peoples managed to live together quite peaceably for many years; but that was a long time ago and that fragile peace has long since been destroyed by tragic events and it will take many years before the confidence has returned that will enable them to live together again as equal, independent peoples. We may regret that, but no one should be surprised. We ourselves know only too well the problems of Ulster, where people who actually speak the same native tongue but who have different religions find it difficult if not impossible to live together. This is one of the tragedies of the modern world and it can be seen as well today in the Middle East.

When we talk about Cyprus we have to talk about history because in a sense Cyprus is history. The modern "Cyprus problem" goes back many years. I do not want to go back for 400 years, but perhaps we may go back in time to 30 years ago when we governed the island and there was a long and bitter struggle, spearheaded by mainland Greeks and Greek Cypriots, which originally began as a fight for independence but later developed into a campaign for Enosis—political union with Greece. At no point were the Turkish Cypriots consulted about such a demand, and had this struggle for union with Greece been successful, the Turkish Cypriots who were in the minority would have found themselves to be the unwilling citizens of Greece or forced to emigrate. The seeds of discord for the future were sown then.

That was only the first phase of the struggle for union with Greece. In the event that campaign was defeated and in 1960, after the British withdrawal, a new constitution was drawn up and agreed by both sides. I shall not weary the House with long details about that long-dead constitution. In brief, it provided for bi-communal republic in which the Greek Cypriots were to be the senior partners by virtue of their superior numbers but which guaranteed the rights of all. Thus there was to be a Greek Cypriot president, a Turkish Cypriot vice-president and a division of power along those lines in the Government, Civil Service, the Army, and so forth. There were also certain guarantees and rights of veto which guaranteed the minority.

It is worth noting that Article 185 of that constitution, which was negotiated by the international community in alliance with Greece and Turkey, clearly laid down that there could be no Enosis or no union with Greece. But it is a fact of history that within months of the acceptance of the constitution, the then president, the late Archbishop Makarios, had put back Enosis on the agenda. In September, 1960 he said: The cause of Enosis has not died. I cannot say that Enosis has been forgotten". It is not difficult to imagine the effect of this statement on the Turkish Cypriot community who believed that they had agreed to a constitution which guaranteed them against such an event. Was Enosis going to start all over again? Indeed it was. Within three years the Greek Cypriot majority had effectively destroyed the constitution by excluding Turkish Cypriots from their allotted positions. When the Turkish Cypriots tried to invoke the safeguards which had been written into the constitution, they were vilified, abused and worse. Again, it is a matter of fact and of history that by the end of 1963—three years after that constitution had been agreed—the Turkish Cypriots had effectively been stripped of their rights. They had effectively become stateless citizens. They were not allowed to register their children or even to apply for passports. The Greek Cypriots who only three years before had agreed to share power now began to rule Cyprus without reference to the Turkish community. At the time they were described—with good cause—by the Daily Telegraph as "double crossers".

Sadly, this was the beginning of the story and not the end because if Enosis (union with Greece) were to be achieved, first of all the minority of Turkish Cypriots had to be removed. So a wave of terrible violence was let loose against the Turkish Cypriots. The Daily Express carried a report of a massacre in the sealed off section of the Turkish Cypriot community in Nicosia in which over 200 people perished. The reporter wrote: We have seen sights too frightful to be described in print". The Observer reported a similar outrage at Limassol in February 1964 in which hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were massacred. According to the Daily Telegraph, all the Turkish Cypriots of one village were murdered. Their bodies were exhumed from a mass grave in the presence of the Red Cross. Those are facts. The Secretary General of the United Nations, reporting to the Security Council in 1967, gave details of thousands of Turkish Cypriot homes and properties which had been destroyed, damaged or looted.

I do not doubt that there were faults and excesses on both sides. We all know that action leads to reaction and terror provokes counter-terror; but in essence, in the light of these facts and in the light of history, it must be said that the Turkish Cypriots have certainly had the short end of the stick.

The effect of these events was that many Turkish Cypriots became refugees. They left their homes and went into sealed-off areas, mostly into enclaves in the North. In a sense the island effectively was divided then and the Turkish Cypriots were rendered almost powerless. At that time hundreds of Turkish Cypriots emigrated to Turkey, Great Britain, the United States or West Germany in order to escape.

Then in 1967 the Greek Cypriot Government, which were still officially recognised as the legal government although they were by no means a legal government, enacted a resolution calling for a struggle, again to achieve Enosis. The resolution spoke of "uniting the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland". This was more than a piece of paper because in 1971 Archbishop Makarios said: Cyprus is Greek—Greek and undivided. We shall deliver it to Greece.". Again one can imagine the effect that such a statement must have had on the Turkish Cypriot minority. In 1971 in order to back this up the guerrilla leader Grivas, whom the British have long cause to remember, returned to Cyprus from Greece and began a political and military campaign to achieve union with Greece. Events were now moving quickly towards an inevitable and tragic conclusion. In July 1974 the Greek junta, the colonels, decided that Makarios was not moving fast enough towards Enosis, so he was forcibly deposed and one of Grivas's henchmen, Samson, was installed as President and virtual dictator of Cyprus. Makarios fled and in a speech to the United Nations he confirmed that the coup was the work of Greek army officers, acting under orders from the Greek military government in Athens. It was in effect an invasion by Greece for the purpose of taking over Cyprus.

Samson then began the second stage. He ordered his troops to begin the systematic murder of Turkish-Cypriot people. Once again they became refugees and fled as far North as possible. They appealed to the Turkish Government for help and Turkey landed troops in the North of the island. In fact, as one of the guarantor powers they had the right to do it. That was not the point. If they had not gone there the Turkish-Cypriots would have been virtually eliminated.

What has happened since then is, I am sure, well known to your Lordships. The tragedy is that this long and bitter history has meant tragedy for so many innocent people on both sides, Greek Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. It is worth noting at this point that since the Turkish intervention, there has been peace on this troubled island of Cyprus. I think this is one of the reasons why we have not yet found a solution to the problems there. Turkey intervened to protect the lives and property of the Turkish-Cypriots and to its credit it did just that. In the 12 years since the intervention there have been no killings and no massacres. For the first time in 30 years, the Turkish-Cypriot minority feel safe. Enosis has been buried as a practical possibility, if not as an idea.

Sadly, instead of recognising the reality of the situation the Greek-Cypriot Government and the Greek Government have found other means to express their opposition to the Turkish-Cypriot minority. It is a matter of record that they have blocked all attempts by the United Nations and others to find a settlement. Each time the general secretary of the United Nations has worked out an agreed formula, the Greek-Cypriot leadership has backed down. The Turkish-Cypriots, under Denktash, have offered far reaching concessions in an effort to reach a settlement but still the prevarication goes on. Every time there is a chance of an agreement the Greek-Cypriots move the goalposts.

In September of this year, with justifiable irritation the Wall Street Journal commented: The problem of Cyprus can be summed up in two words: Andreas Papandreou. The last thing the Greek Prime Minister wants is a resolution of the island's differences. He would lose his opportunity to accuse Turkey of devious intentions which he does to distract the Greeks from their decrepit economy".

Thus Cyprus has become a pawn in a murkey political game. If that were all, it would be enough. But the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots have carried their bitter vendetta to almost unbeliveable lengths. Sadly, the international community has done very little to help Turkish-Cypriots. To our shame they have succeeded in pursuading us to construct an embargo on the Turkish-Cypriot community. Today it is impossible to post a letter direct to North Cyprus; it has to go to Turkey. It is impossible to fly direct to North Cyprus; one has to go via Turkey. It is impossible to send goods and passengers by sea directly to North Cyprus; it is necessary to go via Turkey. Most of the international aid earmarked for Cyprus goes to the already prosperous South.

What is the justification for this blatant discrimination? Is it because when they grew tired of Greek-Cypriot procrastination the Turkish-Cypriots declared independence and set up their own democratic state—the Turkish Cypriot Republic of North Cyprus? What is wrong with that? Surely it is the right of any people to take their future into their own hands, to be free and independent and to govern themselves? If noble Lords care to cast their minds back to our own history they will realise at once that the United States did exactly that, and in more recent times we have the examples of Eire and Bangladesh. Is it because they are a very small community of 125,000 to 130,000 people? We have given independence to West Indian islands with smaller populations than that. Iceland, with a quarter of a million people (less than the population of Southampton) does very nicely, thank you. Therefore, it cannot be because it is small. Have we then abandoned the basic principle that a people has the right to choose its own future.

The reluctance of the international community to recognise this little republic becomes inexplicable when one considers the almost indecent haste with which we recognise governments which have been established by military coups and which are controlled by dictators. Is it because the Turkish Cypriots refuse to agree to the withdrawal of Turkish troops? In view of the bloody history of Cyprus in the last three or four decades, if I were a Turkish-Cypriot, I should not wish to see those troops go.

I have been to North Cyprus and the people there look upon the Turkish army much as the Falklanders look on the British army, not as an army of occupation but as an army of liberators. "We feel safe now," was what one cab driver said to me a few months ago. That is the general feeling that one gets in North Cyprus, a feeling of peace and security and that there can be no more of the troubles that have beset them over the past 30 years.

The Republic of North Cyprus has declared itself ready to reach a settlement with the South. But such a settlement must be reached on the basis of two, free and independent peoples sitting down on terms of absolute equality. If your Lordships think about it that is the only basis on which partnerships can be achieved. If there is going to be a partnership in the governing of the island then there has to be the recognition of that basic fact. If the Greeks will accept this, then a federated Cyprus, in which the two nations collaborate together on certain issues and over certain problems which concern the whole island, is absolutely possible and could work.

However, we have to face the situation as it is today. There can be no going back to some romantic idealised notion of Turkish and Greek-Cypriots sharing the same villages, and working the same fields. That is a lovely poetic, romantic thing; but the hard facts of modern life are that it will not work. We may regret it. There can be no going back to the old constitution for that is unworkable. There can be no dissolution of the Turkish-Cypriot Republic of North Cyprus. It is legal, it was elected by the people. It is democratic and it has political parties stretching from the Left to the Right and it exists because it is the will of the people that it should exist. It will last and it will prosper because it is built on sure democratic foundations.

What is the way forward? The first step must be the recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot Republic. Only this will force the Greeks to come to the table in a serious frame of mind. If this is too great a step to take at one time, too great a mouthful, at least in the name of justice let us get rid of the international embargo. We cannot forever keep a whole people, however small, in quarantine, which is exactly what we are doing at the moment.

In Raoul Denktash, the President of the Turkish-Cypriot Republic, as many of your Lordships will know, there is an outstanding politician and statesman who has led his people for 30 years through their troubles with courage and integrity. He is a great democrat. He has declared himself willing to negotiate on most of the outstanding issues—compensation for lost property, adjustment of the land area, and mutual co-operation for the good of the Island. It is not his fault that successive attempts at agreement have broken down. He has twice agreed and twice the Greeks have moved the goal posts. The only thing that he will not negotiate is the independence and the freedom of the people he has served for so long.

The British Government, as the former ruling power in Cyprus, and as one of the three guarantor powers, have a special responsibility for Cyprus. It seems to me that they have been very silent and very slow on this issue over the years. They have failed to exercise their responsibility. They are content to allow the situation to remain as it is in the hope that some solution will emerge out of the woodwork, largely, I suspect—as I said earlier—because Cyprus is at last and at least at peace and is therefore not presenting a very great problem for our Government.

However, it is now time for our Government to act in the name of justice not against the Greek Cypriots but simply to give the Turkish Cypriots the even-handed treatment which is their rightful due. That is all they ask. They do not want treatment that is better than the Greek Cypriots. They want even-handed treatment, and the quarantine removed. To do otherwise—to allow Athens to keep calling the tune—will be an act of monstrous injustice and a stain on our conscience. I beg to move for Papers.

6.31 p.m.

Lord Newall

My Lords, I am sure that everyone, including myself, will be most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Willis, for introducing this subject. It comes at a very timely moment, when so many leading newspapers are carrying articles about this very subject and have been doing so since June. The visit of Mr. Denktash also alerted us to the situation. With his usual command of the language the noble Lord was a pleasure to listen to, and I disagreed with him not at all.

Since 1974, as we have heard and as I am sure noble Lords will hear again, there have been two sides in Cyprus. But there is no need for me to take sides; I certainly do not wish to do that. There are many facts and a lot of fiction. There is a certain amount of truth, and there are other stories which are more often called being economical with the truth these days.

I spent a week on each side of Cyprus. I went with no historical views; I had an open mind. Since I went there very little has changed, even if the economics and commercial activities have varied a little. However, we have to remember the sequence of Greek dominance over the Turks, who eventually were likely to be thrown off the island like unwilling lemmings. I am sure that the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, will have something to say about that later.

The history of the island is long and complicated, and nobody wants to go back over it. We have to look at the present situation. The position now is understandable with the knowledge of some history, but it not one that should be allowed to remain. We have to look at the future and at the way that we can help to resolve the present situation.

Although some of this has already been covered it bears repetition. We must remember that over 100,000 Turkish Cypriots have not been recognised in international circles for 12 years. They have had little or no international aid. They have had restrictions on imports, on exports and on their general development. They have luckily had a democratic internal government, but they have had a great struggle. Let us not forget that. They have been unrepresented internationally and have been denied many normal human rights. If perhaps the Greek Cypriots or even the Greek Government had made the slightest effort to co-opt them back into the government in which they were under the original agreement, or if they had given them a proper share of their international aid, to which they should rightly have been entitled, things might be very different today.

Some of the writings which I see from the Greek Cypriot side can be described ony as propaganda. It is full of half truths and one-sided views. They never mention how many Greek troops are on the island; that there are 8,000 Greek officers looking after 20,000 in the local militia with a force of 100,000 able to be called up. There is nothing wrong in that except that the only story they tell is of the Turkish troops which now number approximately 17,500. They never mention how many displaced Turkish Cypriots there are. They never mention why the Turks are so happy and calm in spite of their financial difficulties, because there is no longer the fear—the fear of being killed—that there used to be.

The Greek Cypriots never mention the settlers who have come into Greek Cyprus from Greece, Lebanon and many other places. There were many Turkish Cypriots who left the island; and there were only 15,000 new Turkish settlers, whereas 40,000 Turkish Cypriots have returned, having been turned out of the island in the past. They never mention the Turkish missing persons or the mass graves of the Turkish Cypriots killed by the Greeks. They do not mention even now the new university in Famagusta which is teaching in English, and they have nothing like that yet on the Greek Cypriot side.

However, this is history. We need to look forward. I do not necessarily blame President Kyprianou. I do not believe his health is very good. It is probably difficult for him. He is apparently a puppet of Greece. However, I blame the Greek Government who not only find the present situation highly tolerable, anything else would be worse, but also as members of NATO they fail to live up to their commitments. Until they do, they must remain a very suspect ally. They have brought it all on themselves in my view, but if they were to agree with solutions put to them by the United Nations their credibility could improve. If they do not, they will remain the victims of their own deeds.

Unless they show some signs of improvement I shall be forced to believe that they prefer Cyprus as it is if they cannot have it all their own way. The Turkish Cypriots are a very strong race and they will never go back to the oppression of former years.

The Greek Cypriots must surely know this. They must also know that public opinion has changed over the years and is still changing. People now believe that there are two sides of the coin and the story is possibly not one that they knew before. What the Turkish Cypriots have to say is increasingly more believable. I fear that very soon the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots will have fewer and fewer friends.

I find this very sad. I have many Greek and Greek Cypriot friends. They are often worried about the present situation and the way the Greek government are influencing the Greek Cypriots. We need a practical solution in 1987 and not later. I should very much like to think that this Government could partake as an intermediary in some way under the United Nations. I am sure that both sides would listen very hard. It is therefore my plea, and a very genuine one, from a neutral standpoint, that the Greek Cypriots look at the present situation as it is and stop trying to do what is no longer possible. Enosis is dead, and so let us take it off the life support system now and start proper talks about accepting United Nations proposals and recognising the fact that the Turkish Republic of Cyprus will not go away in a hurry.

6.39 p.m.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, we have heard the Turkish Cypriot case ably pressed in the first two speeches in this debate. My original intention was to be as evenhanded as possible in this sad affair. However, after listening to the last two speakers I admit to the temptation to take some time presenting the Greek Cypriot case; that is, the case of the legal government of the island of Cyprus. But I shall not do that. I shall continue to be as evenhanded as possible.

I have visited Cyprus at the invitation of the Government of that country. I have talked with Ministers of that Government and Members of the Parliament of Cyprus. During that visit I was also able to travel in the Turkish occupied zone in the north of the country and to talk with representatives of the occupying power and with Turkish Cypriot separatist politicians.

We must have a little bit of history and we must start somewhere. I do not propose that we should start 1,200 years ago when Greeks and Turks first met and started to quarrel. Nor do I propose that we start in the nineteenth century when Cyprus moved from Turkish rule to British rule, or at the end of British rule in the post-Second World War period.

In 1974 the then Greek Government, being a military junta, took a ridiculous action. They staged a coup d 'état in Cyprus, and on seeing that action most of European opinion thought that if that did not destroy them what on earth would destroy them? Of course it did destroy the Greek military Right-wing dictatorship, to the great relief of all democrats and all civilised people. They managed to destroy themselves by that action in Cyprus. However, that was not before the Turkish invasion fleet had sailed and within a couple of weeks occupied the northern third of the island.

I do not want to enter into legalities, but I think it is clear to anyone with an understanding of politics and human motivation that the Turkish Government had a pretty good justification for their action. I do not believe it is possible to say yet whether the Greek Government would have fallen without it. I think that it probably would have fallen, but this is hindsight and who can say? However, Turkey did that and was one of the three guarantors of the Cyprus Treaty of Independence and the Cyprus constitution; the guarantors were Turkey, Greece and ourselves.

The Greek fascist government having been destroyed, what should Turkey have done next? In my submission, it should have gone away again. The justification for the enormous Turkish army there was the Greek coup d 'état. Once that threat had receded there was no justification for an invading army. However, it did not, and the Greeks were driven out of northern Cyprus. With the Turkish army at their back, the Turkish Cypriots, who constituted one-fifth of the people in Cyprus, were at the end of the day left in control of 36 per cent. of the territory. There have been minor adjustments since then.

The age since has been a sad one. In 1978 this country, together with the United States of America and Canada, put forward a plan. That plan did not get anywhere. In 1983 the last threads of dialogue between Greek and Turk in Cyprus broke down and the matter was referred to the UN in due form and order. Later that year the Turkish Cypriot Assembly (the body purporting to govern northern Cyprus) took a decision to call itself the independent state of northern Cyprus.

There were UN initiatives in 1984, 1985 and 1986, all of which our Government very rightly worked for and with. Our Government drafted Resolution 541, which is still the leading UN text in the field and is binding. The noble Baroness will correct me if I have that wrong. That was all to no avail.

We can stand for as long as we like before the fact that Greek and Turk in Cyprus do not agree and say that it must be somebody's fault. We can say that it must be the fault of the Greek Cypriots, as we heard in the first two speeches in this debate, or that it must be the fault of the Turkish Cypriots, as one can hear throughout most of the world. I think we should be more usefully employed if we considered what could best be done now, but not by Greek and Turk. There is no point in sitting there advising them; they have been quarrelling for 1,200 years all over Asia Minor and South-Eastern Europe, and the quarrel is now confined, thank God, to one small island. Long may it stay confined to that one small island, but roll on the day when it is not confined anywhere and when the quarrel at last comes to an end.

What can we do to help? We are in the face of a phenomenon of fear. As is usually the case in a deadlock like this, the two sides are afraid of each other. Perhaps we may look for a moment at the objective basis of this fear. It is fear of armed men. The original founding treaty of the Republic of Cyprus allows Greece and Turkey each to keep a certain military contingent on the island. I want to take the military facts in order. The treaty allows Turkey 450 armed men on the island and it allows Greece 650 armed men on the island.

Let us begin with the country which has a common language with the larger part of the Cypriot population; namely, Greece. Athens Greece is allowed 650 men on the island. According to the best information I have been able to glean, they have between 2,000 and 3,000 armed men on the island. That of course is in breach of the treaty but everybody in Cyprus is in breach of the treaty with every breath they draw.

Turkey, with a smaller population related by language and culture, would have a right to 450. Here the estimates of the true number of Turkish troops on the island differ. British sources in general are inclined to say that it is between 25,000 and 30,000. The Cyprus High Commission in London puts it a little higher at 35,000. We are comparing the presence of 2,000 or 3,000 Greek troops with 25,000 Turkish troops—ten times as many. Let us remember that the Greek population is five times as many as the Turkish.

I turn now to the native levies, as one might call them. The Republic of Cyprus, the legal government, has a national guard, and once again the figures differ. The Institute of Strategic Studies puts that national guard at 13,000, while the Cyprus High Commission in London puts it at 10,000. The difference is not very wide. That national guard contains a contingent of Greeks from Greece—officers and NCOs. Here the estimates differ widely. Perhaps the noble Baroness can confirm that the Foreign Office's best information is that it now stands at about 600. The Cypriot High Commission in London says that there has recently been a rapid decline and it stands at only around 150. On the Turkish Cypriot side there is a levy of Turkish Cypriots which stands somewhere between 4,500, which is the ISS figure, and 8,000, which is the Cypriot High Commission figure.

These are big discrepancies but, doing a rough sum, British-based sources will give a ratio of two to one in favour of Turks for armed men on the island: two Turkish armed men for one Greek or Greek-Cypriot armed man on the island. Cypriot Government sources give a ratio of four to one.

But the populations are far from equal, and if we scale these figures to the fact that the Turkish Cypriot population is one-fifth and the Greek Cypriot population four-fifths, we find that the preponderance of Turkish armed men over Greek and Greek Cypriot armed men is, on British figures, eight to one, more or less, and on Cyprus Government figures fifteen to one, more or less. We must ask ourselves who has the better right to be afraid.

We must also look at why the two sides do not sign up on Mr. Perez de Cuellar's dotted line. It looks an excellent text from the outside. The reason is military fear. We should not be far out if we were to say that the greater military fear exists among the Greek majority. On the figures I have just given that is bound to be so. The Greek Cypriot majority is afraid to sign up for a new constitution, a new basic statute for the island regulating Graeco-Turkish relationships, unless and until the military dispositions are agreed and put into effect in advance.

They are invited to sign up for a constitution which would give the Turkish Cypriots a veto over all the important matters. That is quite a reasonable thing to have if you have two absolutely separate cultures, languages, religions, as the noble Lord, Lord Willis, pointed out at the beginning. They are not going to live together in every village, as the noble Lord, Lord Newall, pointed out. They are going to be separated into two regions or constituent parts, or whatever it is. But if the minority part has an absolute veto over the majority you cannot expect the majority to go on facing a military superiority of at least eight to one on the other side. A veto backed by that military superiority is something that would indeed be hard for any people to accept.

The role of this country has to be to do whatever is helpful. We have to recognise that it is a matter of fear and mistrust. We have to discount the horror stories on both sides, or else count them equal. Whichever side of Cyprus you go to you find horror stories. Some of them are true on both sides, and some of them are untrue on both sides. You will even on one side—and I am not going to say which—find a museum of horrors dedicated to perpetuating hatred of the other side.

It is obvious that the United Nations has to carry on with its present efforts. It is obvious that we have to back the United Nations. We are not going to go against either Turkey or Greece in any big way. Both are members of NATO; NATO needs them both. It is obvious that the United States is not going to go against them in any big way either.

What we have to do—and let us remember that we have a better historical knowledge of Cyprus than any other country except Turkey and Greece, the warring partners—is to be alert every day, by all means, for any possible action that we can take either alone or together with the other guarantors of the old treaty, Greece and Turkey themselves, to help a solution forward. I cannot stand up and say that I know what that ought to be. I do not suppose that the Government can either.

Alertness is necessary—to be staffed for alertness and to have instructions out for alertness. In the meantime it appears to me quite clear in international law that our Government must continue to apply such policies towards the Turkish occupied zone of northern Cyprus as must, under international law, be applied to invaders who divide an existing state and plant a large army on it over the decades, and purport to set up a new state on part of that old one.

We in this country, as a leading member of NATO, should also remember that the Turkish invasion and occupation of part of Cyprus has been, except for Vietnam, by far the largest out-of-area military operation ever undertaken by any NATO government. Its effects on the counsels and plans of NATO itself cannot be helpful.

6.54 p.m.

Lord Caradon

My Lords, I am happy that I can follow a speech so thoughtful and so careful as the one we have just listened to. I want to explain my position in this matter. I was for five years or more in the island of Cyprus, first as colonial secretary and then as the governor. I have a devotion for that beautiful island and an affection and admiration for its people of all categories. I know them well. I have worked with them well, and I trust them.

From the time when I first went to Cyprus 15 years ago I have had one overwhelming anxiety, and that is to work with all the people of Cyprus to find a solution in which all categories can make their contribution. I felt it strongly at the time I was there as governor. I worked with both sides, and I was proud and glad when I left that the leaders of both the Greeks and the Turks came to see me at the wharf and to thank me for the work I had done.

At that time, when I left and when Cyprus became independent under arrangements which had been worked out with both sides, I had confidence that the people of Cyprus, Greek and Turk, could work together. That was the only solution that seemed to me possible or acceptable for the island. To divide it in two would be grossly unfair and would make real progress towards a peaceful and satisfactory solution impossible.

I am glad that when I left, the representative of the Greeks, Archbishop Makarios, and the representative of the Turks, with whom I had worked very closely, both came to see me off. They reinforced my passionate devotion for a united Cyprus. Indeed the arrangements that we had made in consultation together at that time would have worked. Since then both sides have stated their own positions and have attempted to get their own advantage.

When I heard that this short debate was to take place here this evening I was sad, because I felt that we should do no good by giving encouragement to one side or the other that they could get their own way. I am afraid that that is what has happened this evening. We have had some speeches already and some still to be made which take a strong line on one side or the other. They say that a substantial and prosperous part of the island should be under complete Turkish control. The Greeks, on the other hand, say that they want an island with the Turks having some powers within their area but being subject, certainly in international affairs, to a joint government.

My mind went back, I must admit, to the time that I was there when we did get agreement and when the leaders of both sides came together and accepted an arrangement that I believe could have worked perfectly well. That was a time when it was agreed that there should be an international Cyprus, with both sides working together and with the minority side, the Turkish side, exercising a wide control within the areas in which the Turks were in the greater number.

At that time I felt an intense desire to see a united island. I felt it more strongly as I listened to the reports of what happened subsequently. Now when I hear speeches such as those we heard at the beginning of our debate this evening, which of course are replicas of what the Turkish community has been saying, I am filled with an intense desire that we in this country should give a lead for equality and a sharing of responsibility rather than that we should come down on one side or the other and ensure bitter conflict for another generation in an island which in the past has been so beautifully peaceful.

I am happy to be here this evening to speak for all the people of Cyprus. I hope and pray that we in this Parliament will not do anything which will make that purpose any more difficult. I hope we can make a contribution similar to that made 10 years ago when both sides came together and there was agreement. An agreement was signed in Switzerland and then in London setting out a practical plan which could have been satisfactorily carried out, and can still be carried out, if we the British take a lead as I think we should and must.

I hope that in the final settlement Greeks and Turks will come together as they came together when I was there 10 years ago and will make the island an example to the world of how people of different origins may work effectively together. I pray that that will happen and I pray that in this House we shall not give ourselves to arguments and bitternesses between two peoples with whom we worked before.

I was there in the war and we had the happiest, most effective relations with Greeks and Turks on the island. It can be so, I have seen it so and I hope we do nothing in this House to make a settlement on that equal basis more difficult.

7.2 p.m.

Lord Broxbourne

My Lords, I feel a double sense of privilege in following the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, in debate: first, because of his eminent service in Cyprus but also because he is a member of a family for whom over many decades I have entertained high regard and warm friendship.

I speak as a friend of Cyprus: when I say "friend of Cyprus", I mean a friend of all Cyprus. I, like other noble Lords, have friends in both parts of that lovely but troubled island. As I said to your Lordships in February last, there are nice people in both parts, only with the difficulty of seeing each other's point of view—rather like Parliament, your Lordships may think.

I seek to follow the maxim of my calling: audi alteram partem—hear the other side. It is for us to assess the evidence and evaluate the facts in a spirit of objectivity and good will. Of course problems are always easier to solve the more remote they are. If one is tempted in Cyprus to say, "Is it not remarkable that you here with long centuries of coexistence and common history cannot live together in peace and amity?" may not they reasonably call attention to Ireland, much nearer to us here, and say "Is it not remarkable that the people of that small island, speaking the same language and professing the Christian religion, cannot live together in peace and amity?"

Clearly there is a basis of comparison not only in the existence of the problems but in the fact that so far it has not been found possible to solve them. But of late there is a further common factor, a more welcome one, in that recent efforts and ingenuity have given fresh hope for the future. It is to the future that I want to address myself today.

As to the past I say only this. Cyprus, like Ireland, is to some extent a prisoner of its past. In the long history of Cyprus with Byzantine, Ottoman and Venetian rule the period of British suzerainty stands out well. The much-maligned British colonial rule bestowed the great benefits of security and the rule of law, benefits which in many parts of the Commonwealth have failed to survive the end of colonial rule.

In 1960 Britain devised for Cyprus a constitution guaranteed by Greece and Turkey as well as Britain which could and should have given Cyprus the stable and peaceful future for which we hoped. It did not. Instead there were the sad events of 1964 and 1974, a period of partition and recrimination. Now, however, the opportunity lost in 1960 presents itself again, thanks to the devoted labours of the Secretary General of the United Nations and his staff, in the form of the draft framework agreement of March this year.

If accepted by both sides it would, in the words of the Secretary General: Allow for the very first time, all the outstanding issues to be tackled in earnest as an integrated whole". Though Mr. Denktash, in his letter of 21st April, expressed his willingness, Mr. Kyprianou withheld his consent and requested an international conference to deal with defined issues. A study of the agreement makes it difficult to understand why it should not be accepted and indeed welcomed as the basis of a just and lasting settlement for Cyprus. It proposes the establishment of a federal republic, independent and non-aligned, bicommunal and bizonal. There is nothing inherently unsuitable about a federal constitution for Cyprus. It is indeed the obvious and perhaps the only viable mechanism for a united Cyprus.

Your Lordships will appreciate that there is no rigid single pattern for a federation. It is a form of government which provides for the allotment of functions between prescribed federal powers, to be exercised by the central government, and residual powers to be exercised by the federated states. The precise appointment is a matter for the proposed constitution to be made in accordance with what is required by the parties. This procedure is meticulously followed in the framework agreement. Article 2 specifies the federal powers and also the residual powers. There is provision in Article 3 for a two-chamber legislature with a balanced membership. Article 4 provides for a Greek Cypriot president, a Turkish Cypriot vice-president, with appropriate rights of veto, and for a council of ministers. Article 5 provides for a constitutional court to adjudicate on disputes between the federal government and the two federated states.

It is difficult to see how the generality of these provisions can be faulted. Indeed, there is no direct challenge to them, though Mr. Kyprianou makes a number of detailed comments and criticisms in his long letter of 10th June. His basic response is to withhold acceptance until prior agreement is achieved by way of international conference or high-level meeting on three basic issues: that is, withdrawal of the Turkish forces and settlers; effective international guarantees; and the application of the three freedoms—of movement, of settlement, and the right to property. But all these matters are in fact catered for in the draft agreement. The provision for the withdrawal of troops is clear and specific in Article 8. There is provision for territorial adjustment in Article 7; and Article 6 provides for a working group to discuss these matters.

I hope in regard to the three freedoms that your Lordships will accept my interest in human rights in view of the fact that your Lordships kindly agreed to the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Bill which it was my privilege to present to your Lordships in the last Session. There is no doubt that the sad events of the post-1960 period have imposed much human hardship in the form of forced removal, expropriation and the like—hardship on both sides which all will wish to mitigate and, where possible, to remove.

There is in the draft agreement provision for a compensation fund to facilitate resettlement. This could be extended in the proposed discussions so as to allay the suffering and make good the loss of those unfortunates who have lost houses and possessions in the continuing troubles. The advantages of federation in terms of peace, security and the solution of the problems of Cyprus are clear and conclusive. In addition, great economic benefit is likely to acrrue from the removal of the so-called green line restrictions, the opening up of Nicosia airport, the easing of controls and of passport procedures and the withdrawal of troops, with the financial savings consequent thereon. Such steps will remove inhibition on foreign investment and greatly improve the prospects of tourism, with its much needed contribution to the economy of the island as a whole.

In any reasonable assessment of the situation, clearly it is desirable to institute a federal government on the lines adumbrated by the draft agreement. But supposing the general proposition is in the event accepted by both sides but that there are nevertheless genuine points of difference on some of its provisions—a not unlikely situation in so complex and comprehensive a document. There need be no difficulty in resolving such differences within the context of an agreed acceptance of a federal constitution. Article 16 of the draft agreement provides for the assistance of the Secretary General in the interpretation of the agreement if so required. Points of difference could be referred to him in an arbitral capacity or possibly in the wider and less formal jurisdiction of what Continental lawyers call an aimable compositeur; and his decision would bind the parties without jeopardising the federal constitution.

There is, however, one other, if unwelcome, possibility: that in spite of the unremitting efforts of the Secretary General there might be a refusal in the event to enter into an agreement for a federal constitution. As things stand, and as Mr. Denktash has expressed his willingness to accept the draft agreement, such eventuality can only come about by the refusal of the Greek Cypriots, possibly encouraged by the Government in Athens. What then would be the position? We could not properly envisage a continuance in those circumstances indefinitely of the status quo, with Greek Cyprus alone having international recognition and all the advantages deriving therefrom, although patently not representing the substantial minority of Turkish Cypriots. If a federal solution unhappily proves impossible, and, a fortiori, if it proves impossible because of Greek Cypriot intransigence, then the anomaly of exclusive recognition must be removed and Her Majesty's Government must recognise the Administration of Northern Cyprus.

I know of no reason in constitutional law or international law why such recognition should not be accorded. It is our British practice to accord recognition on a pragmatic basis. It is a de facto recognition of the exercise of sovereignty rather than a certificate of legitimacy or moral propriety. Indeed, were it otherwise it would be difficult to envisage recognition of some régimes which in fact we recognise today. There is no doubt that Mr. Denktash's government exercises de facto sovereignty. But, more than that, it does so by the expressed and unfettered will of the people and it would indeed be entitled to recognition even on more exacting standards than those which actually apply. Therefore, if the proposals for federation are relegated to the Greek Kalends—a singularly apposite metaphor perhaps in this context—then Her Majesty's Government must take the course which principle and reality alike require, and afford recognition.

But recognition without federation is a pis aller, a last resort, necessary only if federation unhappily proves unobtainable. A federation by mutual agreement with joint participation is surely the best solution. It is the goal to be pursued, with conciliation in place of conflict and common striving in place of divisive strife. It is thus and thus alone that we can hope to realise for Cyprus that better future which its people so sorely need and the world so devoutly desires.

7.18 p.m.

Viscount Hanworth

My Lords, at the outset, I wish to make it quite clear that the views I express are mine and that in some areas they are not so far indicated to be the views of our leader, Dr. Owen. First, I pay tribute to the late Lord Spens, who at a time when it was very unpopular to do so, put forward the Turkish point of view with the intention of counteracting some of the extreme Greek propaganda. I have visited northern Cyprus three times with him and twice since. I was also a member of the CPA delegation which visited Greek Cyprus, but my concern goes far deeper than that.

Before turning to the immediate problem I feel that I too must look at history, because some of the things which I am going to say depend upon it. I apologise for the fact that I shall be at least the third speaker tonight to do so. Between 1963 and 1974, when Turkey intervened, the Greek Cypriots pushed their Turkish neighbours (representing something like a quarter of the population) into enclaves and murdered many of them in the villages and also in Nicosia. They denied them building material and these people suffered near starvation. Finally, when the Greek colonels obtained control they decided to adopt Hitler-type liquidation methods to get rid of the awkward Turkish Cypriot minority by evicting them from the island and also by killing them.

All these facts are documented but we do not hear much about that these days. We have a bad conscience. We did not live up to our idealised self-image as defenders of the rights and freedoms of the people of our former empire. It was at that point that the Turkish army intervened. The interesting fact is that before doing so Turkey asked Britain, as a fellow guarantor power, to take action jointly with her. It is to our shame that we did not do so. Although we had drawn heavily on the loyalty of the Turkish minority a few years back, as upholders of law and order, Britain abrogated responsibility for the Turkish Cypriots who were still British citizens. This matter was raised in our House not so long ago but no satisfactory answer was given by the Government. The reason probably was that we were then preoccupied with the Aden situation.

During the period I have mentioned, in the 1960s, Archbishop Makarios was doing his best to move towards Enosis. As we have heard, that would have been quite intolerable to the Turkish minority and in fact a breach of the convention. What seems to me so strange today is that after all this has happened some jurists, though by no means all, and our Government still maintain that the Cyprus constitution, where the Turkish minority had no power whatsoever, still remains today. This seems to me an extraordinary view, which is neither moral nor practical in today's context.

I believe that an understanding of and forgiveness for past mistakes are important elements in reaching an acceptable solution in Cyprus. In my view it is therefore unfortunate that the Greek Cypriots have complete amnesia—loss of memory—over what they did to the Turkish minority between 1963 and 1974. They should accept, as the Germans have done in the case of Nazism, that they brought the Turkish invasion on themselves.

I would be the last person not to have the greatest sympathy over the appalling refugee problem that resulted for the Greek Cypriots after the Turkish intervention and over the loss of their properties in a part which many consider to be the most beautiful part of that beautiful island. But I am afraid that, however much we may wish now and in the future that all this could be put behind us, it cannot. There is no possibility within the immediate future, or so far as I can see, of the Greeks being able to return to their houses or anything else in the north. It is absolutely idle to suppose that that is possible so far as we can see the situation today.

Equally, I am afraid I must castigate some of our own people who just do not want to know about the facts of life. Bitterness can so easily grow by what it feeds upon and in the short term there will be a younger generation brought up only to hate. In a war-torn Middle Eastern situation these two territories, each of which at present enjoys peace and security, are in danger of becoming pawns of major outside powers, whose political interests have nothing to do with the peoples of Cyprus.

Enough of the past: Today we still have a very efficient, massive and ruthless Greek propaganda machine, determined to promote any issue which may suit its cause, regardless of morality or accuracy. That is nothing new. It exists in all societies. But the Turkish Cypriots cannot afford the money to combat it.

What worries me about this is the effect it is having in preventing a solution in Cyprus. I give your Lordships only one or two examples. I have been exposed to the Greek missing persons act, and it is just an act. It is merely turning the knife in the wounds of bitterness—and both sides have these wounds. The number missing on both sides, for Turks and Greeks alike, is roughly the same. This is the sort of thing which happens in a war, and the Turks have done their best to supply the information. I say no more about that except that the Greeks have continued on every possible occasion to make political propaganda out of it.

To take a more homely example, it is put about that a holiday visit to north Cyprus would be dangerous. Actually there is very little crime there and you are much safer than in London. It is said that there are no good hotels and that the Turkish army is present everywhere. Both are lies and derogatory; and they have the effect of discouraging tourism. However, I wonder whether your Lordships realise that if a firm in England were to advertise such a tour the opposing side would see to it that that firm lost its franchises in all Greek-speaking countries—an even more effective discouragement.

Turning to political negotiations, one must make the point that on the last two occasions the Greeks have refused to accept the proposals put forward by Mr. Perez de Cuellar on behalf of the United Nations, when Mr. Denktash, for the northern Cypriots, has been willing to do so. I know the Greek Cypriots' point of view, which briefly is, "We have been robbed of a large part of our island and we have a real (though completely irrational) fear of the Turks taking over the whole island". That is of course the last thing the Turks would want to do.

In this context it is strange for the Greeks to say that the Turks should remove their army, which is roughly about 18,000 or so men, before—and I repeat before—negotiations begin. The Turkish Cypriots, judging from previous experience, would view this as an act amounting to suicide. If the Greek side seriously wanted negotiations they would not ask the impossible, and of course they know it.

What sort of settlement is possible sometime in the future? It cannot be in terms of a federation as most of us understand the word, with analogy to the United States or to Germany. It might be more aptly called a commonwealth of Cyprus, where matters of mutual concern and benefit could be discussed and agreed. Only after the passage of time would a closer association be possible, and even then there must remain two communities, territorially separate. It is very important that for some time the United Nations peace-keeping force should remain on the border. In existing circumstances it would be only too easy for hot-heads to cross over and kill some villagers, with possibly appalling consequences. In saying this, I would not necessarily blame the Greek Cypriots as much as I would blame their propaganda. It is inflammatory and, as I have said before, potentially very dangerous.

It is long past the time for us to come to terms with the reality of the situation which I have tried to describe. The Greeks must realise that whatever they do they will not get back the north of Cyprus on the terms they would like. Equally, it is time that our Government faced the issue. Sometimes one would like to hope that we in Britain just might be more sensibly and morally inspired, instead of sitting back and doing precisely nothing.

7.29 p.m.

Lord Stallard

My Lords, it is with some trepidation that I rise from the Back-Benches to speak briefly in the short debate this evening, because I recognise only too well the amount of knowledge and experience of the problems of Cyprus that exist in your Lordships' House; and the debate has already shown that.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Willis for introducing this debate on a part of the Commonwealth about which most of us in this country know very little. I first became interested and involved in the problems of Cyprus in the early 1950s when I was a local elected representative for a part of London where many Cypriots of both communities had settled. They had settled there before the war, they had served in our armed forces during the war and they had resettled there after the war. There were many more who came during the 1950s and 1960s because of many different circumstances, and there were many who came shortly after 1974 who were also able to settle here. They came from both communities and we had excellent relations then. Those excellent relations still exist in that part of London, as they do in most parts of London, between the two communities and at many levels.

I became interested and very much involved in that period. I have maintained my interest and have tried since then to keep up-to-date, although it is very difficult because of the scant attention that the problems of Cyprus receive in much of the press and certainly in our media. We can understand that there are a variety of reasons for that.

Much has been said about the history of Cyprus. I never object to that because I have always maintained that a knowledge of the history of any region under discussion is essential to the understanding of its present situation. If we think of the Middle East, we must understand the history of that region if we are ever to arrive at a solution. To come nearer to home, if we do not understand the history of the Irish situation, we shall never get near to a solution of those terrible problems.

Although there is no shortage of literature on the history of this beautiful island, it is the interpretation of the history of all the situations that creates many of the problems. I am probably as guilty as most in this connection. I find it very difficult to understand those who say, "I do not intend to take sides and I shall try to be neutral". They then leave us in no doubt, within a few minutes, as to which side they are on. That might even happen to me; but I shall try to confess before I get into that position! However, I do not intend to get into that position because I genuinely believe that my noble friend Lord Caradon made the most telling comment this evening. If we could only follow his example, perhaps we should get nearer to a solution. I do not aspire to reach this great depth of understanding, but I can try.

I shall not go back further than 1974, because that would both take too long and be far too controversial, as we have seen. I imagine that there is general agreement that Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20th July 1974 and occupied approximately 40 per cent. of the Republic's territory. I hope that we agree that that happened and that it is a part of history. The pretext for the invasion was the coup against the legitimate government of Cyprus by the Greek military junta which had taken place only a few days before 20th July. I hope that these are accepted facts.

The territory that was captured by force in 1974 is still under Turkish military occupation. The search for an acceptable solution has gone on ever since. In the area under occupation and prior to the occupation, there were some 162 Greek and mixed villages accounting for about one third of all the inhabited localities of the old Republic. Before the invasion, the total Turkish population of the whole of Cyprus amounted to 18.4 per cent. of the total population. They owned just under 17 per cent. of the total land in private ownership. Most of that land was devoted to agriculture. However, the occupied area contained some of the best farmland in Cyprus, which constituted 65 per cent. of all cultivated land in the Republic. Before 1974, that part of the Republic had housed 32.6 per cent. of the total population of the Republic, most of whom were Greek.

I apologise for mentioning statistics such as these. But they come from official British and international sources and I hope that they cannot be disputed. The population in that northern part of the Republic, Greek and Turk alike, was uprooted in 1974 and forced to flee in all directions, but mainly to the south. They became refugees in their own country. Some of them made their way to this country and to other Commonwealth countries. However, the vast majority of the Greek Cypriots—almost 200,000 of them—are still prevented from returning to their land and homes where their people had lived for many generations.

There was also a problem of course with about 40,000 Turkish refugees. However, there was a completely different approach to the Turkish refugee problem. That was inevitable. They did not have the same problems of housing and resettlement; they had an entirely different outlook in that they were encouraged to have the outlook of victors and to look forward to the fruits of victory. There was a different outlook and approach both on their part and on the part of their authorities. It is significant that in the intercommunal negotiations which have taken place so far since 1974, the refugee problem has only been raised by the Greek Cypriots and never by the Turkish Cypriots. That is significant because I think they have virtually solved that particular problem, so far as they are concerned.

We all know that in 1974 a Prime Minister of the Labour Government of the time—I think it was Mr. Callaghan—went to Limassol and personally organised or assisted in the airlifting of some 8,000 to 10,000 Turkish Cypriots from Limassol to the Turkish mainland. Many of those people were brought back again after the occupation of the North. It was therefore not exactly the same problem. It is certainly not the same problem as that of the 200,000 people who are still refugees in their own country.

Although it has been mentioned almost in passing, there is a very serious problem concerning the fate of the 1,619 Greek Cypriot refugees who have been missing since the Turkish invasion. We do not know where they have gone; we have asked many times but the problem still remains undetermined and I understand that it is difficult to get any co-operation in resolving this problem. Perhaps the noble Baroness, in replying in this debate, will be able to update us on what steps may have been taken or are being taken on behalf of the many relatives who contact some of us to try to trace these refugees.

There was certainly genuine political progress being made before 1974 in the Republic to try to bring both sides together, as I have discussed many times with representatives of both communities. There was an attempt and a willingness on the part of many people (although not enough people) to try to bring the communities together before 1974. The situation now is that there is a demarcation line guarded by the military artificially separating both communities, despite the wishes of many members of those communities to be allowed to co-exist, as they had done before, in reasonable peace.

It has been mentioned that during the past 12 years efforts have been made to resolve the tragic situation in Cyprus. In 1974 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution No. 3212, formally endorsed by Turkey, calling for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus. So far, Turkey has failed to comply with that resolution. It begins to appear, even from some speeches tonight, that the Turkish authorities both in Cyprus and in Turkey have been trying ever since to achieve permanent partition of the island and indeed have brought over an estimated 60,000 settlers from the mainland in what would appear to be an attempt to alter the demographic character of Cyprus. It has also been mentioned that in 1983 the area of Cyprus occupied by Turkish troops was illegally declared independent. Far from being democratically based, that part of Cyprus was illegally declared independent by the people there. This secessionist move was strongly condemned by the United Nations Security Council. That also was not mentioned, but it is a fact. The entire international community supported the United Nations on that resolution, including Her Majesty's Government, so it was an almost universal condemnation of this attempt to secede that part of Cyprus from the Republic. Most of us in the international community, and certainly in this country, had been striving for a re-united Republic of Cyprus, so were bound to take that attitude. So far as I can ascertain, no country other than Turkey recognises this pseudo-state that apparently exists in northern Cyprus. All calls from the United Nations and resolutions on the matter have been ignored.

Given that recent background, is it any wonder that the United Nations Secretary-General's initiative in Janary 1985, which resulted in a high level meeting in New York between President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash, ended in failure, yet it is this breakdown that has given Turkey and the Turkish leadership in Cyprus the opportunity to proceed even further with attempts to consolidate partition. In my view, these attempts to partition the island run contrary to UN resolutions backed by the international community in the search for progress towards the solution of the problems of Cyprus.

The most recent in March 1986 was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, from the depth of his tremendous experience in this matter of international agreements. He mentioned the United Nations Secretary-General's draft framework for an agreement on Cyprus. The Cyprus government, I understand, have responded to those proposals. They have offered to initiate negotiations on three basic issues. These were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, and I had a copy typed out so that I would not make a mistake.

The three proposals are, first, the withdrawal of all foreign occupation troops and colonists. As I said, that is an accepted policy. The second is effective international guarantees for the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus. The third is a guarantee of implementation of the three fundamental freedoms—the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and free ownership of property throughout the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

I should say that the Government of Cyprus have offered a solution that could be the basis of discussion and negotiations. I should hope that it would be seen in view of all that has gone on before—the United Nations situation and the stance of the international community on such matters—that these proposals provide a comprehenisve mechanism for a just resolution of the Cyprus problem.

Partition has never resolved any other serious, thorny, problem, and there are many examples. I can think of Vietnam, of Korea and of India; and certainly, nearer home, of Ireland. Other noble Lords could probably add to the list. Partition has never been a permanent solution, nor would it be in this island. It would probably create more serious problems than it would resolve in a very sensitive area of the world.

Those of us who genuinely wish to see a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem must continue in the face of all difficulties to work towards achieving an independent, sovereign, territorial, integral federal Republic of Cyprus, as outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne—perhaps not in exactly those words but in similar terms—and to be free from occupation, troops and sectors, to the benefit of all the citizens, both Greek and Turkish loyalists alike.

7.44 p.m.

Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos

My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Willis, for enabling us to have this debate on the current position in Cyprus and for his interesting speech and historical analysis.

We have had several knowledgeable speeches. Many of them reflected a partisan viewpoint on the one side or the other. We must not complain about that in the mother of Parliament. But there are times, I think, when it is wise to be muted in our views, especially when there is a possibility of a settlement.

It is just over three years since we last debated this issue. Our discussion then took place in an atmosphere of crisis, because the Turkish Cypriot community had just made a declaration of independence. I listened carefully to what my noble friend Lord Willis said about past history in Cyprus. I have no doubt that it was accurate. But nobody so far has pointed out that the declaration was universally condemned because it went completely against the United Nations resolution and against the treaty of 1960.

It also seemed at the time to almost everyone who took part in the debate that it stultified the efforts then being made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Senor Perez de Cuellar, to find a solution to the island's intractable problems.

This debate is again timely. It takes place against the background of a number of developments. The first is the continuing admirable persistence of Senor Perez de Cuellar to achieve agreement between the two sides. I shall return to this in a moment.

The second is the Turkish Prime Minister's visit to Cyprus in July, which angered the Greeks because he said he would like Turkish northern Cyprus—and I quote him—"to live for ever". Thirdly there is the visit of Mr. Denktash to this country, during which he was critical of Her Majesty's Government's current stance on Cyprus—criticisms that have been repeated in several of the speeches tonight. The fourth is the meeting in this country of leaders of the two communities, the first informal meeting of its kind since the invasion of 1974. Mr. Denktash had said that he wanted this country to try harder to promote the UN resolution.

Here I return to the Secretary-General's efforts. Senor Perez de Cuellar certainly deserves support and encouragement. Repeated failures that would have daunted many men have not deterred him. He knows the problems, because he served in Cyprus as a special representative several years ago. Britain also has special interests and responsibilities because of our former occupation, our obligations under the treaties, our large bases on the island—which have not been mentioned in the debate so far—and our membership of NATO with Turkey and with Greece.

It is very much in the interests of the West to see a settlement. In passing, we also recognise that the Soviet Union has interests too. One of them would be the removal of the bases that we have in Cyprus.

Over the last two years the Secretary-General has placed three sets of proposals on the negotiating table, and we must note the reaction to these. The first in January 1985 failed because President Kyprianou refused to accept it as it was drafted. The second produced later last year was rejected by Mr. Denktash, although Mr. Kyprianou was favourable to it. The third attempt, which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, and others, was made earlier this year and sought a compromise between the first two. Here it is Mr. Denktash who says yes but Mr. Kyprianou is indecisive. All this demonstrates the appalling difficulties of the negotiator, with whom we sympathise.

What, therefore, are the snags, what are the sticking points that make agreement appear to unachievable? The principle of a federal solution appears to be accepted by both parties. It is a solution that I fully support. It seems that the withdrawal of the Turkish troops is the essential Greek Cypriot condition that stands in the way of agreement. This is understandable.

How many Turkish troops are there in northern Cyprus? The Turks say there are 17,000 and the Greeks say there are between 25,000 and 35,000 and that the number is increasing. I noted the claim in The Times of 10th December that there are 35,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus. Can the noble Baroness tell us what is the Government's estimate? Mr. Denktash says that the troops are there as a result of the Greek Cypriot coup of 1974. But the short point that emerges from all this is that neither side trusts the other. As a settlement is delayed, so things get worse. The lack of trust increases. The regime of Mr. Denktash becomes more entrenched, with growing dependence on mainland Turkey, with all that that implies.

The number of immigrant Turks in Cyprus is now substantial—I think some 50,000—although Mr. Denktash claims that there are 300,000 Cypriot Turks overseas who have the right to return to Cyprus. The closer one views the scene, the more one sees the seeds of destabilisation multiplying on the ground; and that is what worries me most of all. Furthermore it is certainly not healthy or in anyone's interests that the tension which exists should grow between Greece and Turkey, both countries over-armed and both very nervous. There are plenty of dangerous spots in the world without this part of the near East becoming a flash point.

There is a case for our intervention and for more positive action towards a settlement. The Secretary-General is still probing towards an understanding. One possible step which has been suggested is the reduction of Turkish troops to, say, 5,000 as a preliminary stage. This would be enough, or should be enough, to give confidence to the Turkish community and should be a concrete token of good faith to the Greek Cypriots.

Here again we need the co-operative understanding of the United States Government. Here we are, the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the United States, all members of the alliance. It should be possible to reach an agreement with the help of the United States Administration. Their tendency, for defence and security reasons, is to lean slightly towards the Turks and the Turkish Government. This may not be a formal Washington Administration view but the mood can be gauged from reading the American newspapers. It seems clear from them that there is a tendency towards Turkey as against Greece. There are reasons, which I shall not discuss now, why that should be so, but I believe that here again it would be prudent for the United States to be even-handed in the treatment of the two countries.

The point has been made that people are suffering and that human rights are transgressed in Cyprus today. This is an additional essential reason why urgent steps should be taken towards a settlement. It is in the interests of the people of Cyprus of both communities that there should be an early accommodation. It is a choice between a workable federal solution, which could bring economic, social and political benefits to all Cypriots and which could be guaranteed by the United Nations and by NATO, or the increasing enmity and destabilisation described by my noble friend Lord Willis.

In consultation with the Secretary-General and President Reagan, the Government should take an initiative very soon. We are the only country involved in the 1960 guarantees which could take this decisive step. Someone has said, and I quote: As a former colonial power and as a guarantor, this nation owes both communities in Cyprus something more than tea and sympathy". This was the sense of the very moving speech made by my noble friend Lord Caradon, who knows more, I believe, about Cyprus and its problems than any other Member of this House. We are all delighted that in spite of his recent illness he has been able to join us this evening to make what was a notable contribution.

It is also the fact, and it is an encouraging one, that, although he has not yet succeeded, the Secretary-General has come very close to success. There was enough promise in his third attempt to turn the proposals into success with support and effective negotiation. It is here that I should like to see Her Majesty's Government, with the special position that this country occupies, taking a lead at this crucial time. We have everything to gain and very little to lose by doing that.

7.55 p.m.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Young)

My Lords, this debate has again demonstrated the very real concern your Lordships feel for the situation in the beautiful but tragically divided island of Cyprus. I welcome the opportunity which has been provided by the noble Lord, Lord Willis, to debate the situation in Cyprus today.

Her Majesty's Government fully share the concern that has been expressed. My own visit to Cyprus in 1983 is still fresh in my mind. I recall with particular vividness my visit to the United Nations "green line" in Nicosia, which underlined the danger and the futility of the present situation. It benefits nobody and brings enormous distress to many. Certainly the present situation is not in Britain's interests. We want a stable Cyprus. We know and respect its people and wish them well. In purely national terms we should recall that we have important bases there. And we wish to see the maximum stability on NATO's southern flank.

For all these reasons we want to see an early peaceful, just and lasting settlement. Our commitment to the search for peace is demonstrated by, among other things, our major contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping force, UNFICYP. If I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Willis, I was surprised that he did not mention this point in the course of his remarks. We contribute by far the largest number of men—760 out of a total of 2,350; and we contribute by far the largest amount of money—more than £21 million annually, more than a third of the total cost.

That, if I may say so to those who are tempted to think along those lines, is more than tea and sympathy. Indeed, this is an enormous financial commitment which critics—for example, the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, who seemed to favour a long-term presence—should bear in mind. There is a very real cost. This is an enormous financial commitment which critics who feel we should be doing more in Cyprus should remember. But the Secretary-General has said that UNFICYP currently remains indispensable in creating the conditions necessary for constructive negotiations between the parties. We agree.

We regret that one side could not accept the United Nations Secretary-General's March proposals for a unified federal Cyprus. This was a serious setback to the search for peace. But the UN initiative is still very much alive. The Secretary-General is determined to carry on. Perhaps I may say how grateful I was for the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, in support of the Secretary-General's initiative. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Broxbourne and others who have spoken in the same vein.

In his six-monthly report on his mission of good offices produced this month, the Secretary-General has restated his conviction that with good will and determination on all sides it should be possible for negotiations to proceed. Your Lordships will recall that he met President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash in New York in September to discuss a way forward, and that the United Nations Under-Secretary-General Goulding followed up these meetings with visits to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in November. We understand that the results of his visits are currently being assessed in the United Nations.

I can confidently say that no other country has done more than the United Kingdom in support of the United Nations Secretary-General's efforts. He has repeatedly told us how much he values our contribution. We are of course prepared to continue to offer him all the help we can. We all listened with great interest to the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, and I hope he will accept the importance of what I have said about British support to the UN Secretary-General.

In the course of this debate a number of noble Lords have said that we should do more. We are certainly not complacent about the future. We are working closely with the UN Secretary-General. We take every possible opportunity to remind the parties of their responsibilities to the Cyprus people as a whole. We point to the extreme danger of actions liable to provoke the other side, and we discuss these dangers and the opportunities offered by the Secretary-General with both the Turkish and the Greek governments.

However, an independent British initiative would not be helpful. We are convinced that only direct talks between the leaders of the two communities will lead to agreement. The UN Secretary-General's office and its international standing make this, in our view, the best place to secure this. We would not wish to cut across his efforts. The most helpful contribution we can make is to continue to support those efforts. Perhaps I may say again that we take every possible opportunity to remind both parties of the dangers of actions liable to provoke the other side. We speak frankly and frequently to both Turkish and Greek governments about these dangers.

It is for those reasons that we are not enthusiastic about the Soviet Union's idea of an international conference, for which the Greek Cypriots have shown some support. We do not like it. Such a conference would provide a forum for debate, but it would do little else. It would not address the constitutional and territorial issues on the island which still have to be agreed. We understand there is very little support for the idea in the Security Council. This accurately reflects the council's view that we should not be distracted from the current UN initiative.

There are those inside and outside Parliament who believe that the British Government should be doing more to put pressure on Turkey to withdraw her troops from northern Cyprus. We are obviously concerned about the number of Turkish troops in northern Cyprus. We have told the Turkish Government that we believe their withdrawal, along with that of other foreign troops from the republic, must form part of a compehensive settlement. This we believe they accept. If the UN March documentation had been accepted by both sides, negotiation on this and other outstanding issues could now be underway. We wish it were.

The trouble is that both sides, deeply scarred by recent history, see the problem as one of security. The Turks keep large numbers of troops in northern Cyprus to reassure the Turkish Cypriot minority. The Greek Cypriots, aware of Aegean geography, live in fear that the turkish troops will spill over into the rest of Cyprus. There is no point in urging people simply to stop being fearful. The people need convincing. That is the role of the respective political leaders. Only when we have a political settlement agreeable to all parties can these fears be put at rest. This is what we should be aiming for.

I have been asked a number of questions about the figures for the number of troops on the island. The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, in particular asked about this, and my noble friend Lord Newall also quoted numbers. The figures for the number of Turkish troops in northern Cyprus are, unsurprisingly, a matter of dispute between the two communities, but our estimate is that there are between 25,000 and 30,000 such troops. As regards Greek troops, we understand that in Cyprus there has been no significant change in numbers, which we estimate remain at between 2,000 and 3,000. There are about 650 Greek officers and NCOs seconded to the national guard.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, raised a number of detailed points about the numbers. We think that we must be cautious about concluding too much from the figures and the numbers that have been given. It was Disraeli who spoke about lies, damned lies and statistics. Perhaps that is particularly apt of the situation in Cyprus.

Others in your Lordships' House, and outside, say to me equally vehemently that our present policy is unfair towards the Turkish Cypriot community. The noble Lord, Lord Willis, used the word "quarantine" several times. I do not accept that. It is true that we do not recognise the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. We took a very serious view of the Turkish Cypriot declaration of UDI in 1983, and continue to do so. However, this does not affect our acknowledgement of the interests or aspirations of the Turkish Cypriot community. We maintain contact with their leaders in northern Cyprus. We continue to trade normally with them. They both benefit from aid that we give to Cyprus.

We took some trouble to make sure that the Turkish Cypriot community was being consulted informally by the European Commission on negotiations for a European Community-Cyprus Customs union which they will apply throughout the republic. To answer some of the points concerning aid, raised by my noble friend Lord Newall, may I add that, as regards European Community aid, under the second financial protocol to the association agreement Cyprus was offered 44 million ecus. The protocol expires in December 1988 but projects under the protocol must benefit both communities. As regards bilateral aid, we have a small ODA-financed co-operation programme of £250,000 per annum. This includes scholarships and technical aid which goes both to the Turkish Cypriot and to the Greek Cypriot communities.

The noble Lord, Lord Stallard, asked about missing persons in Cyprus. The position is that the UN intercommunal committee on missing persons resumed its work under its new Swiss chairman about 18 months ago. We understand that it is making progress. Certainly it is the best vehicle for this problem. We believe that a separate intervention by Her Majesty's Government with any party would risk cutting across the committee's work; though if the Secretary-General and the whole committee asked for our help we would of course be ready to do what we could. The problems are formidable. As in so many other areas, progress essentially depends on the will of both parties to achieve it.

I think we all agree that the situation in Cyprus is tragic and wasteful. There is an undesirable and unnecessary division of the island. This complicates the political situation in the eastern Mediterranean. It fuels Greek/Turkish disagreements; it runs counter to British interests and those of our NATO allies. All parties say they want a settlement; so does the international community in the United Nations. With sufficient political will on both sides, we believe a settlement is attainable. The present situation has gone on for far too long. The UN Secretary-General is working hard with the parties to achieve a settlement. We are doing all that we can to help. I am sure your Lordships will continue to support that objective.

8.9 p.m.

Lord Willis

My Lords, it is not the custom in these debates for the mover of the Motion to reply to speeches, much as I should like to reply to some of them. However, I want to thank all noble Lords for participating in what I think has been a very useful debate. In particular I thank the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, for his very moving and sincere speech. Nothing that I or other speakers said earlier detracts from his vision, which we all share, of a united and peaceful Cyprus at some time. We may differ about how that may come about but we share the dream. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion for Papers.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.