HL Deb 09 April 1986 vol 473 cc267-78

7.50 p.m.

Report received.

Clause 3 [Liability for breach of fundamental rights and freedoms]:

Lord Denning moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 2, line 28, at end insert— ("(4) This section shall be construed as covering any violation of the Convention or the Protocol by the United Kingdom and as giving a domestic remedy for any such violation.")

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is a very simple little amendment. It carries out exactly Article 13 of the convention itself, which is not appended to the statute. The article states: Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity". That is just what is done by Clause 3 already. It makes all these articles of the convention—freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and the like—all part of our law. They have the force of law in the United Kingdom. They can be enforced by our courts against any Minister of the Crown, any act by a statutory authority and so forth.

My short amendment to add subsection (4) carries out the convention and I should have thought it would be quite acceptable to everyone. But perhaps I should explain my little thought behind this and why I want it included. There is another article in the convention of which I should like to remind your Lordships: Article 26, which states: The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted". Let me envisage a case where someone in England complains that an authority has violated his human rights as laid down in the convention. He can go to our courts. If it is decided against him he can appeal to the Court of Appeal. If it is still decided against him by the House of Lords, what can he do? Let us consider it both ways. Let us suppose that our courts decide in his favour that there has been a violation of his human rights. That is the end of the matter. It is held that there is a violation. There is no need to go to the commission or to the European Court at Strasbourg. It is the end of the matter if the courts in England find that the convention has been violated.

Let us suppose that they decide to the contrary. Suppose they decide that there has been no violation of his human rights. That case goes right to the House of Lords in its judicial capacity and the House of Lords decides that there has been no violation of these human rights. What is the position? Can he then go to the commission at Strasbourg? My answer is emphatically, no; it is res judicata. It has been decided by the highest court in England that there has been no violation. It is already adjudged by a competent court and he cannot go to Strasbourg to say that it has been wrongly decided. It has already been decided. If he should dare to go to the commission and ask for the decision of the House of Lords to be reviewed, it should say emphatically "No". If he succeeds in the English courts and there is a violation, that is the end of the matter. If he does not succeed in the English courts, that too is the end of the matter because it is res judicata. That is the thought behind my little amendment.

If this Bill goes through there will be no more recourse to Strasbourg or to any of those people over there. That is my thought behind it all. I should have thought that no one could reasonably object to my little amendment with that significant outcome behind it.

Lord Broxbourne

My Lords, the House always listens with great respect to the light and learning of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning. He has, with characteristic modesty, described this amendment as a "little" amendment. It is in fact a pale ghost of an amendment. It is a pale ghost of that robust amendment which he put down for Committee stage. The proposed new subsection is the sole survivor of those new subsections which he proposed at Committee stage and which the Committee, in its unanimous wisdom, found it necessary to reject. Those two clauses which he has not sought to resuscitate today were unacceptable; they were unacceptable as putting the United Kingdom in clear breach of its international treaty obligations. I am glad that the noble and learned Lord has, on further consideration, thought that it would not be useful or appropriate to seek to resurrect those proposed subsections which the unanimous wisdom of the Committee rejected.

I fully concede that the proposed new subsection (4), the pale ghost as I ventured to call it, stands on a somewhat different footing. I made that clear at the Committee stage, where I said: The first part of the amendment, the new subsection (4) of Clause 3"— that is the one which has survived, the pale ghost of today's proceedings— appears to be declaratory. 1 have no objection to that".—[Official Report, 20.3.86; col. 1108.] I spoke, with I hope characteristic moderation, in what I then said. But I should like to make it clear to the noble and learned Lord and to the House that equally I have no enthusiasm for it. As a general principle I think your Lordships will accept that declaratory provisions are on the whole better avoided in our statute law. They should not be necessary in a properly drafted statute, as I venture to hope this will be when it reaches the statute book. Indeed, there is a danger that so-called declaratory provisions may, instead of clarifying the law, tend to complicate it. In this instance, if the Bill were amended as proposed, some ingenious if misguided person—that would not be the noble and learned Lord; I yield to none in my admiration for his ingenuity but I should never for a moment think of applying the other epithet to him (I have great respect for him, as he knows)—might seek to read into this new provision commended by the noble and learned Lord an implication that the right of petition is thereby excluded: an exclusion which your Lordships properly rejected in Committee as being contrary to our international commitments. As your Lordships know, Her Majesty's Government quite recently renewed for a further five-year period the right of petition to Strasbourg.

In summary, therefore, I am bound to say with great regret because of the genuine regard and respect I have for the noble and learned Lord that his amendment is at best unnecessary and may possibly even be injurious. I therefore hope that, having made his contribution and voiced his sentiments, he will think it proper not further to press the amendment.

8 p.m.

Lord Hooson

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, said that this was a pale ghost of the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, in Committee, but, like many pale ghosts, it is nevertheless potentially dangerous. I entirely agree with the noble Lord. I think that the proposed amendment could be construed as removing the right of petition eventually to Strasbourg. In fact, the latter comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, although charmingly made and calculated to stir the blood, nevertheless imply that he did not approve, as it were, when the House of Lords declared that there had been no fundamental breach of human rights and that thereafter there should be a right of petition to Strasbourg. Clearly that is his view, but I do not think that it is the view of the House. I think that the amendments should be rejected.

Lord Silkin of Dulwich

My Lords, I agree with both the speeches which the House has just heard. I would not wish to take up the time of the House by elaborating upon them.

Lord Denning

My Lords, as I have no support. I shall withdraw my amendment, but my argument will be jolly good later on.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The Deputy Speaker (Lord Hayter)

My Lords, before calling Amendment No. 2, I should point out that Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 are alternatives and presumably will be debated together.

Clause 4 [Effect on enactments]:

Lord Lloyd of Hampstead moved Amendment No. 2:

Page 2, line 35, leave out subsection (2) and insert— ("(2) No provision of an Act passed after the passing of this Act shall be construed as authorising or requiring the doing of an act that infringes any of the fundamental rights and freedoms, or as conferring power to make any subordinate instrument authorising or requiring the doing of any such act, unless such a construction is unavoidable if effect is to be given to that provision and to the other provisions of the Act.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in presenting this amendment perhaps I may begin by reminding your Lordships that it repeats in precise terms an amendment I moved in Committee, an amendment which I venture to think received a good deal of support. At the end of the discussion, however, the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, indicated to me that if I would withdraw the amendment, he would give the matter further consideration and he might himself reintroduce the amendment, possibly in a modified form. On that basis, I withdrew the amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, at a somewhat late stage—though I make no complaint about that—has introduced an alternative amendment, which I have of course carefully studied. Although I would concede that this substantially reproduces the main thrust of my previous amendment, nevertheless I submit to your Lordships that from the point of view of the wording my own amendment I say—I hope with due modesty—is to be preferred. I therefore commend my amendment again to your Lordships.

The matter was fully discussed on the last occasion and therefore I need deal with the gist of the amendment in very brief terms only. What it amounts to is this. Clause 4(2) as presently drafted, which both my amendment and the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, seek to replace with a new subsection, really involves an attempt to invalidate subsequent legislation which is in conflict with this Bill unless the new Act in question expressly directs that Clause 4(2) shall not apply. As I pointed out on the previous occasion, this raises a serious constitutional issue. As I submitted then—and I repeat—it flies in the teeth of a well-established constitutional doctrine that one Parliament cannot bind a subsequent Parliament. That principle is intrinsic to the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament in this country and has prevailed for many centuries.

Under the established constitutional position a later Act must prevail over an earlier Act if the conclusion is unavoidable that the later Act is inconsistent with the previous Act; so it cannot depend simply upon express direction. All that my amendment does—as I explained on a previous occasion, it is not intended in any way to be a wrecking amendment, but simply an attempt to improve the Bill—is to affirm the constitutional position. As I have made clear on a number of occasions, my opposition to the Bill as such is very positive, and I do not in any way resile from that. However, this amendment is not in any way concerned with any fundamental objection to the principle of the Bill.

The constitutional position to which I have referred is really a matter beyond controversy. The Select Committee of your Lordships' House was unanimous as to the constitutional position. The Law Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, himself, who in other respects is a supporter of the Bill, have expressed themselves as supporting this constitutional position. In addition, as I mentioned last time, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, wrote to the Committee indicating his adherence to this view and, indeed, he has authorised me to repeat his continuing adherence on this occasion. Therefore, not only does it have such broad and deep authority, but I am happy to see that the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, now apparently accepts the basic principle by putting forward an amendment which in substance makes a similar point to the one made in my amendment.

The only remaining point—and to this extent I think it is fairly clear that we have to discuss these alternative amendments together—is why one form of wording shall be preferred to another. Perhaps your Lordships will be good enough to look at the wording of the two amendments. In the amendment standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Allen of Abbeydale you will see that down to line 6, where there appears the words "unless such a construction is", the whole of the amendment as worded by us is followed in the ipsissima verba. There is clearly no dispute as to those basic lines.

The difference emerges in the final two lines. Our amendment states: unless such a construction is unavoidable if effect is to be given to that provision and to the other provisions of the Act". The noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, desires to substitute: unless such a construction is required to give effect to that provision or other provision of the Act and the same is established to the satisfaction of the court". Clearly there is not a great deal between us in relation to this wording. What I venture to urge upon your Lordships is that the form of words adopted in our amendment; namely, is unavoidable if effect is to be given is in some way stronger and clearer than the words deployed by the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne. Indeed, I am a little puzzled as to why he should not find that wording more acceptable than his own. I would argue, too, that the word "unavoidable" expresses rather more accurately the constitutional doctrine as I have ventured to expound it than the rather less positive expression, "is required to give effect". So on that part of the wording I would suggest that ours is to be preferred.

Then there comes the further and perhaps yet more significant point that the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, adds at the end words which, of course, do not appear in our amendment: and the same is established to the satisfaction of the court". What I would argue is that those words are really quite unnecessary. It is quite unnecessary to assert positively that the court should be satisfied, because clearly in order to reach any decision on construction a court has to be satisfied before it reaches that conclusion. Therefore, these words are really superfluous and can only cause some measure of confusion; because when a court is faced with a set of words in a statute, naturally the court seeks to give some particular meaning to them on the footing that Parliament would not put in a set of words unless it had some specific objective in mind. Therefore, this could create some degree of uncertainty.

My submission to your Lordships therefore is, firstly, that your Lordships should accept our amendment because in substance it is now accepted on all sides, as I understand it, including the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, himself; and that the changes that are suggested should be introduced by the noble Lord are really not advantageous and indeed diminish the value of the amendment rather than improve it. In those circumstances, I beg to move.

Lord Denning

My Lords, there is very little in it between these two amendments, but on the whole I would hope that your Lordships would accept that just spoken to by my noble friend Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, Amendment No. 2. On the whole, it is just preferable.

Lord Broxbourne

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, has just said, his amendment is in the same terms as that put down in Committee. I then expressed appreciation of its purpose: the preservation of the sovereignty of Parliament and the avoidance of entrenchment. Certainly, I yield to no noble Lord or to the noble Lord in particular in my enthusiasm for the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament. After all, I was an elected Member of Parliament for many years and I do not think that either the noble Lord or his noble friend and co-sponsor, among their many and varied distinctions and excellencies, have ever been an elected member of a legislature—and, come to think of it, neither has my noble and learned friend Lord Denning been an elected member of the legislature. So as far as the principle is concerned, I am wholly in support of anything which effectively enshrines and promotes the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament.

But I ventured at Committee stage to query its drafting, and I said on 25th March last, at col. 1113: I find the words in the amendment, 'unless such a construction is unavoidable' to be difficult of interpretation. They would certainly impose a considerable burden on the judges and give very wide scope for judicial interpretation—which is, perhaps, a little ironic, because one of the main criticisms voiced of the Bill on Second Reading was that it would tend to increase the power of the judges.". I do not claim any exhaustive knowledge of the statute law of this country, but I have come across it a good deal both in helping to frame it in my parliamentary and ministerial capacity and in seeking to help to interpret it in my forensic capacity. I know of no precedent for the phraseology of this amendment: unless such a construction is unavoidable". The noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, spoke for our edification and instruction for 10 minutes in moving this amendment, but he did not identify precedent or provenance for it. Of course, if he wants to do so, I shall give way. The noble Lord remains seated, so I think your Lordships can assume that there is no precedent for this phraseology which he seeks to introduce on to the statute book. Ah!—the noble Lord has one.

8.15 p.m.

Lord Lloyd of Hampstead

My Lords, I do not think that my silence and failure to reply to that question is an indication that there is no precedent. All that my silence indicated was that I had not applied my mind or my research to the possible existence of such a phrase. It may be that there is such a phrase and it may be that there is not. I do not think that one can infer merely from my silence that I have scrutinised the whole of the statute book and can say resolutely that such a phrase does or does not appear. It would not surprise me if there are examples.

Lord Broxbourne

My Lords, it would not surprise the noble Lord if this language is to be found in the statute book but he has not thought fit to effect any sufficient researches to establish such a proposition. Clearly, had there been such a precedent the noble Lord would surely have put it before your Lordships. He would have put it before your Lordships to reinforce his case.

Baroness Seear

My Lords, has the noble Lord a precedent for his phraseology?

Lord Broxbourne

My Lords, not in the precise terms in which my amendment is phrased. But, then, the noble Baroness, who I do not think has practised the law, among many other things, will appreciate that the language of my amendment is not cast in this generalised, imprecise, novel form in which the noble Lord has put his amendment. I am coming to my own amendment. The noble Baroness need not fear that any sudden accretion of modesty or tongue-tiedness will prevent me from doing so. I am coming to it and will explain it, I hope, to her satisfaction and to that of the House.

As the noble Lord has said, I undertook at the Committee stage, because I accepted and agreed with the purpose of his amendment, to see if I could devise what I thought might be a better draft—and when I say "a better draft" I mean a tighter draft; a draft easier for the courts to put into effect. This amendment is a result of my efforts in that regard. Instead of the somewhat loose and general criterion proposed by the noble Lord with its difficult role for the judiciary, my amendment provides a precise and practical test which the courts will have no difficulty in applying. I hope, therefore, that my amendment will commend itself to your Lordships. We are united in a common purpose although divided on drafting.

This difference between us does not go in any way to the heart of the Bill. As the noble Lord rightly said, there is no question of a wrecking amendment. I repeat that for myself I have no obstinate pride in my draftsmanship. Obviously this is not a matter for dividing the House, and I am quite content to take such a view as your Lordships may wish to express on the comparative merits of these two amendments.

I am a little discouraged because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, has expressed his preference—somewhat marginally, it is fair to say—for the noble Lord's amendment; but certainly I would say that if and in so far as the noble Lord's amendment is considered preferable to my own by your Lordships, I will not press my amendment. As I said a moment ago, it does not go to the heart of the Bill, and as a practical person I want to see my Bill on the statute book. Although I think it would be better with my amendment, if the majority view of your Lordships is to the contrary, then I shall not press it. But it may be that the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, is not held unanimously on this matter, and indeed there have been a great many occasions on this Bill when his view has not been followed by your Lordships. So when we have heard perhaps one or two other expressions of opinion we can decide on the best course to take.

Lord Silkin of Dulwich

My Lords, I find myself in a little difficulty over this matter because it seems to me, having heard the debate today and also the earlier one at the Committee stage, that the existing subsection (2), the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, and that put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, are all intended to have precisely the same effect, which is to declare what the existing constitutional law is. I listened only a few moments ago to the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, saying (and I wholly agreed with him) that declaratory provisions are better avoided in our law and should not be needed in properly drafted legislation. However, in this case, I think that there should be a firm affirmation, which nobody can doubt, that the purpose of this Bill is not to affect in any way our constitutional law. The question really is which of these alternatives best gives effect to that.

I have really no doubt, having heard the arguments, that the amendment which is now before the House is the preferable one. I think the word "unavoidable" is a better word than "required". It makes absolutely clear what is intended. The noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, made merry to some extent at the expense of my noble friend by asking whether he had studied the statutes to see whether such a word was used elsewhere. I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, has studied the statutes and can tell us whether, from his studies, it has not been used elsewhere—

Lord Broxbourne

The noble Lord does not have to look at the negative!

Lord Silkin of Dulwich

But, my Lords, if one is looking at the two words, I think "unavoidable" is a better word. Also, I personally prefer the word "and" in the context to the substituted word "or", which is in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, where it says, to that provision or other provision of the Act". I think "and" is more appropriate.

Finally, it seems to me that the last few words to which my noble friend Lord Lloyd drew attention, the same is established to the satisfaction of the court", are really declaratory within a declaratory provision. For the reasons so well advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, on the last amendment, I would therefore regard them as otiose, unnecessary and to be avoided.

Lord Allen of Abbeydale

My Lords, at the risk of intervening as a non-lawyer in this discussion, perhaps I may begin by saying I much regretted not being able to be present at the Committee stage. I entirely agree with the points made by my noble friend Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, and it is gratifying that the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, has accepted in principle the point that was then made and that we are now just arguing about words and not about principle.

From my point of view it does not seem to me to matter very much whether or not we are dealing with a precedent. We are dealing with a new circumstance. No one seems instantly to be able to point to the use of the phrase in either of these alternatives, but I do not think it matters. What I find puzzling is the argument that the first provision is imprecise and the second is precise. I would have thought it was the other way round and that in particular in the provision the reference to "unavoidable" goes much nearer to dealing with the point which the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, is anxious to make.

The only other comment I would make is that it seems to me, as has just been said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Silkin, that the last words really are otiose and they have a slight flavour as though, if they were not there, the court could not be trusted to do their job. If they were necessary here, I think they would have to be found in a great many other statutory provisions. Therefore I very much hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to accept the first of the alternatives, although I could not say that the heavens would fall if we came to a different conclusion.

Lord Hooson

My Lords, is this not a case of much ado about nothing? It seems to me that neither of these two amendments nor the existing subsection is necessary in the Bill at all. Surely when a statute is being interpreted it is presumed that Parliament does not abrogate its own sovereignty, and Parliament is also presumed to be always consistent. These presumptions are made, and I do not think that either of these two amendments is necessary: nor is the existing subsection. It is in fact declaratory, and I always thought that the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, was against a declaratory section. Having said that, if I had to choose between the two proposed amendments—which I think are there for decorative purposes only—I would prefer the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Broxbourne, because it seems to me to be more direct and clear.

Lord Broxbourne

My Lords, with the leave of the House, perhaps I may make a brief comment on what has fallen from your Lordships. In regard to what the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, has just said, I very much sympathise with the proposition he has just made, because that is a proposition to which I was inclined at Committee stage. I then said that in my view the Bill was all right as it stood: but, anxious to please, and anxious that noble Lords opposite should feel that full attention was being given—does the noble Lord wish to intervene?

Lord Allen of Abbeydale

My Lords, may I do so for a moment? I think I am right in believing that the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, was not suggesting that we should revert to the clause as printed in the Bill.

8.30 p.m.

Lord Broxbourne

My Lords, I think he was; and there is a great deal to be said for it.

I repeat that my anxiety is to get the Bill on the statute book even if it is not in a perfect form. Noble Lords, especially those who practise in the law, know that many statutes reach the statute book in an imperfect state. We can take consolation from that because, after all, part of our personal revenues have derived from that very circumstance—from arguing various possibilities and facets of the interpretation of our statute law.

If we take a head count, which is rather what I invited, I shall not count the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Abbeydale, not because I do not have a high regard for him, as he knows, and for all the good work that he does for Mencap and in many other ways, but because he is co-author of Amendment No. 2. I see that he is good enough to acquiesce in that proposition, and so I shall not count him. I shall not count the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, and I shall not count myself. That leaves, of those who have commented from a neutral and detached position—I notice the noble and learned Lord, Lord Silkin, smiles at the thought that he can be detached when sitting on the Opposition Front Bench. That obviously strikes him as a novel and improbable proposition.

Lord Silkin of Dulwich

My Lords, I am smiling simply because it seems to leave the Court of Appeal admittedly in the minority but nonetheless with the decision in the majority.

Lord Broxbourne

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord refers to the Court of Appeal. I think that I have told your Lordships once before of an experience which cured me of any tendency that I might have had to regard law as an exact science. We succeeded by three judges to none in the divisional court. We were reversed by three Lord Justices to none in the Court of Appeal and we succeeded in the Appellate Committee of this House by three to two; a head count of six to five.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, may conceivably remember the case. He presided over the decision of the Court of Appeal which their Lordships subsequently reversed. No apology is needed for ever being wrong on questions of construction, interpretation or drafting. I repeat that I have no obstinate pride of draftsmanship in this matter.

On a head count, it would appear that the majority is marginally in favour of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead. I do not grudge him that decision. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, will listen, because I am going to refer to him. I console myself with having had the support of the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, and so I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, victrix causa deis placuit sed victa Catoni. Thank you, Cato, for your support on this occasion. In those circumstances, I shall not move my amendment. I hope that your Lordships will give a fair wind to the noble Lord's amendment.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Broxbourne had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 3:

Page 2, line 35, leave out subsection (2) and insert— (" (2) No provision of an Act passed after the passing of this Act shall be construed as authorising or requiring the doing of an act that infringes any of the fundamental rights and freedoms, or as conferring power to make any subordinate instrument authorising or requiring the doing of any such act, unless such a construction is required to give effect to that provision or other provision of the Act and the same is established to the satisfaction of the court.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I do not intend to move the amendment.

[Amendment No. 3 not moved.]

Clause 6 [Proof of Convention instruments, etc.]:

Lord Broxbourne moved Amendment No. 4: Page 3, line 12, after ("Protocols") insert ("thereto to which the United Kingdom is signatory.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment arises out of Amendment No. 9 in Committee which was tabled but not moved by my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway in circumstances that I then mentioned to the Committee.

That amendment would have restricted the obligation to take judicial notice of Protocol No. 1 as specified in Clause 1(2). The purpose of the amendment was to avoid the obligation to take judicial notice of any protocol not ratified by Her Majesty's Government. My noble friend was correct when he indicated that the Bill as drafted was defective in that it would produce that paradoxical result. Although my noble friend did not move the amendment, I undertook to look at the point and to move any necessary amendment myself.

Although my noble friend was correct in discerning a defect in the drafting of the Bill and although his purpose was a proper one, his proposed remedy exceeded the requirements for curing the defect and, indeed, created a new defect in that it would have excluded judicial notice being taken not only of Protocol No. 4, which is the one that he had in mind and which had not been ratified by the United Kingdom, but of protocols other than Protocol No. 1 which have in fact been ratified by the United Kingdom.

I have therefore sought a form of words which cures the defect in an acceptable way without creating a further defect. This amendment is the result. I have sent a copy of it to my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway and he has been good enough to say that it meets the point that he had in mind. He reserves his position with regard to the Bill as a whole, on which his views are known, but in regard to this particular point my amendment meets the purpose he had in mind. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.