Nuclear Armaments

HL Deb 22 October 1985 vol 467 cc1061-78

8.45 p.m.

Lord Brockway rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will take the initiative towards securing the international signature of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests as proposed in the preamble to the non-proliferation treaty, and whether they will revitalise that treaty by discussing with the nuclear arms-holding countries the substantial reduction of their nuclear armaments.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. The non-proliferation treaty is the most hopeful treaty signed in recent years. It is the world's only multilateral treaty aimed at halting both the spread and the build-up of nuclear weapons. Its provisions were, first, that the non-nuclear signatories agreed not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons; secondly, that the nuclear states: undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament—and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

Its third provision was that all signatories agreed: to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end".

The fourth provision was that all parties agreed that the object to the treaty would be realised: under appropriate international observation", thus accepting the principle of verification.

These momentous decisions were reached by 130 nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and by 124 non-nuclear states. There is no evidence that the non-nuclear states have not carried out their obligations under the treaty. Unhappily, there is abundant evidence that the nuclear powers have not done so. They agreed that they would pursue negotiations relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

In fact, the total number of strategic nuclear weapons has risen from 6,000 in 1970—the year the NPT came into force—to 20,000 this year. Acceleration has taken place not only in the numbers but in their destructive force. The Committee of World Scientists five years ago reported to the United Nations that a bomb had been created 4,000–4,000!—times as deadly as the bomb which fell on Hiroshima.

As for general and complete disarmament, the United States and the United Kingdom have sought to kill the comprehensive disarmament programme proposed by the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. The non-nuclear states are furious at this failure. I have spoken to a number of them and have been impressed by the depth of their despair. I have spoken to some of the representatives of the non-nuclear states which have not signed the treaty. They say, "Why should we join the NPT when the superpowers repudiate it by expanding their nuclear arms?"

The opposition of the non-nuclear states to accepting the NPT was expressed vigorously at the third review of the treaty held in September. Importantly, they accompanied their criticism with a call to the nuclear states to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. There was no accepted communiqué, but the final consensus document, while stating that the objective of nuclear disarmament remained unfulfilled, called emphatically for the resumption of negotiations this year on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Speech after speech emphasised this. It is not too much to say that this is the way to save the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If it is not done, the NPT will be killed at the fourth review, which would be a terrible tragedy.

My Lords, there is hope. The United States of America, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom accept in this treaty the necessity for a comprehensive test ban treaty. The Senate of the United States has called on President Reagan to negotiate. The Soviet Union has proposed a moratorium. The United States of America and the United Kingdom say that the difficulty is verification. This treaty accepts the need for international observation. Scientists say overwhelmingly that verification is now possible. The Soviet Union has gone far to accept it.

One cannot avoid the conclusion that it is political will rather than technology which is holding up verification. I beg the Government to act. Their conscience will not be easy if failure to do so destroys this treaty; this treaty of hope for ending the fear of a nuclear war.

8.55 p.m.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, there are noble Lords in all parts of the House who deeply admire Lord Brockway's indefatigable campaigning for disarmament and peace. We are grateful to him for raising this important subject tonight, especially since this subject has been ignored to an extraordinary extent in the media. The whole of the NPT conference has had hardly a mention in the newspapers or on television.

There is one point on which it may be that I differ from the noble Lord. I wonder whether he would agree with me that it is really quite surprising how few countries have actually developed nuclear weapons over the past 10 or 20 years. I confess that I remember predicting myself 20 years ago that a large number of countries would develop their own nuclear weapons, and yet in the past 20 years I think only India has had a nuclear test. What the reasons are we can argue about. I suppose that it is partly because the possession of nuclear weapons is nowadays a great deal less prestigious, and seen to be a great deal less useful, than was the case at one time. In addition, possession of nuclear weapons is still expensive and still likely to offend other countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union.

However, one reason for the failure of proliferation to proceed more rapidly is the existence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the conferences which have been held. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, was right when he stressed the importance of maintaining the treaty and maintaining the enthusiasm and the loyalty of the signatories to it.

Even though, as the noble Lord said, the treaty has been breached by the nuclear signatories to it, the loyalty of the non-nuclear signatories to the treaty has been admirable and, so far as I remember, not a single one has resigned or withdrawn from the treaty. It is important to maintain it. The way to maintain it is to ban all nuclear testing. This would freeze new developments in nuclear weapons by the nuclear states, which itself would help the progress of disarmament and arms control. A ban on all tests would also deter the so-called threshold countries from crossing the threshold, and it would confirm the 127 non-nuclear signatories to the treaty in their resolution not to develop nuclear weapons themselves. Therefore, this is a matter of great importance, and it is surprising and shameful that the United States and the United Kingdom should refuse to resume negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Such a treaty would simply build on the foundations of the partial test ban treaty which has been useful and successful. The comprehensive treaty was 90 per cent. agreed when it was abandoned in 1980. This refusal to negotiate on the treaty isolates the United States and the United Kingdom from virtually the entire world. Not only from the 127 non-nuclear signatories to the treaty but from overwhelming opinion at the United Nations, in the European Parliament—which has urged the United Kingdom and the United States to resume negotiations—and I have no doubt from public opinion in this country.

Why do the United States and the United Kingdom take this view? At the end of this conference of the non-proliferation signatories they declared that they could not accept early resumption of negotiations because of verification. That was the reason they gave. I think most noble Lords would agree that verification is essential to a worthwhile treaty, not perhaps 100 per cent. verification and I think the Government accept this, but verification to ensure that no testing of military significance can take place undetected. Without going into all the scientific arguments I think I would agree that at present the state of the art of detection cannot give watertight verification without stationing seismograph stations in the Soviet Union and without the Soviet Union's agreement to on-site inspection.

The Government accept the assurances of the Soviet Union that they will grant this. Their granting of it was a most remarkable and encouraging new development in the Soviet attitude on arms control and disarmament. But as I read the statement of the United Kingdom Government they accept that this is not a trick by the Soviet Union, as it might have been. Heaven knows! often in the past the Soviet Union has put forward tempting proposals on disarmament and arms control with a view to isolating the United States and the United Kingdom and other Western governments. But this is not the view of the British Government.

Therefore we ask why do they reject a resumption of negotiation? I cannot believe that with seismograph stations positioned in the Soviet Union, with the Soviet Union granting on-site inspection of suspicious explosions and having looked at the opinions of distinguished scientists and experts in this field, that verification is impracticable. Why do the Government not wish to start negotiation? Why do they argue that before negotiations start there must be more technical studies, and so on? I find myself driven to the conclusion that the Government are temporising and that the United Kingdom and United States Governments do not wish to cease nuclear testing—or at least the United States do not wish to cease nuclear testing and that the United Kingdom is tagging along behind.

It is true that a test ban would impede the United States programme of nuclear arms development. I am led to conclude that the United States and the United Kindom believe that if tests are allowed to proceed they can gain a military advantage over the Soviet Union and that this advantage is large enough to justify them in obstructing a test ban treaty, undermining the non-proliferation treaty, isolating themselves from world opinion and presenting the Soviet Union with a diplomatic and propaganda triumph.

I am sure that when the Minister replies she will assure us that the British Government want a test ban treaty. Will she also assure us that when the subject comes up at the United Nations next month in committee I of the General Assembly, and when it comes up in December at the plenary session, the British Government will not vote against the resumption of negotiations on the treaty? If she cannot give this assurance to the House, we must draw our own conclusions about the motivation of the United States and British Governments on this matter.

9.5 p.m.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, I, too, should like to congratulate my noble friend on asking this question. If I am in a position to ask anyone anything should I reach anything like his venerable but extremely active age, I shall be very surprised and pleased indeed. We are all the beneficiaries of his action this evening. I should like to say that I think he deserves better attention than he has received from the Government Benches. I should like to suggest a possible new rule and that is that the more important the subject the fewer the number of Conservative noble Lords will be present to take part in it. Of course, the reverse applies equally.

The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, has been moving closer towards my view of these matters for a long time. He probably believes that the reverse is taking place, but from here it seems that he is gradually moving full circle and will perhaps conclude a not undistinguished political career on the Benches from which he started.

The unilateral action of the Soviet Union in declaring a moratorium of nuclear weapon testing demonstrated to the world that in this respect they are not the villains of humanity's bedtime story. If, as I have been saying for some time, our civilisation is threatened, in my view the threat comes from Washington nowadays rather than from Moscow. If the nuclear guillotine falls, the name of the executioner might be Reagan with Madam La Thatcher as his accomplice. The Americans have put up all sorts of explanations for their failure to accept the chance presented to them to halt the steady climb to nuclear extinction. First, they said, the Russians had just completed "a flurry of tests": those were their words. This was quickly exposed as a typical product of the Reaganite lie factory. In reality the Soviets had only had seven tests up to August last when the moratorium was declared, which was well below both their own average of previous years and also below the American total, which continues to be well ahead of the Russian figure. Then the Americans said that if the Soviets were to resume testing no one would know and the whole thing might be a ploy—claiming, in short, that tests cannot be verified. This is also the product of the Washington fiction works. Verification, as the noble Lord has suggested, is now very little problem, especially since, as he pointed out, the Soviet Union has agreed to accept on-site, seismic monitoring. Quite apart from that, satellite observation is now quite fantastically accurate, so accurate that I am reliably informed that they do not like to tell us precisely how accurate it is; it is completely staggering.

Every year regularly since 1963 the United Nations has called for an end to nuclear testing. A comprehensive test ban treaty was on the verge of completion in 1982 when nuclear Reagan withdrew from the negotiations. Neither of the present governments, the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of the United States of America, is eager to resume negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Yet if they do not do so, it becomes clear that the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be in peril, as my noble friend has made clear, for the nuclear powers are already in breach of it. They are in breach of Article VI of the treaty. This article provides, indeed makes it a condition, that the non-nuclear powers will remain non-nuclear and the Treaty in effect will continue to exist only providing the nuclear signatories move towards nuclear disarmament. This they have singularly failed to do.

They have not only failed to do so but they also show every sign of continuing to move in the opposite direction. Even Star Wars, or the so-called strategic defence initiative, proves to be a form of nuclear escalation after all. According to the Daily Telegraph, no less, American research is now proceeding into an X-ray laser which would require the explosion of a hydrogen bomb in space as its trigger. So much for the President's announcement of a non-nuclear strategic defence initiative. It is unlikely to be non-nuclear. However, it was sold by the President as a non-nuclear device—yet another product of the Washington disinformation machine. The question of whether the President himself is a dupe, a villain or a little of both becomes academic.

The draft report of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Third Review makes it clear that the non-nuclear nations are disillusioned with the nuclear powers. This is inevitable. If nuclear powers not only hang on to their weapons but continually increase them, the incentive for the non-nuclear powers to remain so disappears. By its moratorium on testing, which expires at the end of this year, the Soviet Union has provided what may be the last opportunity we shall have to draw back from the abyss which Lord Mountbatten perceived so long ago. If Britain and America do not seize what may be this last chance and agree to renew serious negotiations for a test ban treaty, the chance may be lost with consequences which perhaps defy description. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the few agreements which have held the world as a whole back from going hell for leather for a nuclear arms race in which all countries able to do so take part. The noble Lord has drawn attention to this and I think perhaps he would agree with me that this treaty played a considerable part in ensuring that we did not have so heady a nuclear arms race, or, rather, so much proliferation as might have been expected.

However, what has taken place instead of horizontal proliferation is vertical proliferation by the superpowers themselves, so that we have more and more nuclear weapons confined to relatively few nations. Needless to say, this is completely upsetting those nations which have agreed to a nuclear non-proliferation treaty on the assumption that by so doing they would assist the nuclear powers to reduce rather than to continue to increase the preponderance and the exclusiveness of their own nuclear armaments. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is one of the few agreements which I think have remained effective. The USSR has recognised that in practice by its present action. This Government is the only one capable of persuading the United States Government to do the same. I think that they have the power and the ability to do that. If they were to decide to exercise that power, they might well go down in history as the saviours of the world. Are they going to exercise the opportunity? Dare they take the possible chance on this one issue to be seen, as they would be seen, and accused, as they would be accused, of changing sides? But they would not really be doing so; they would simply be coming down on the side of humanity. And that is what they should decide to do.

I hope that the Government will do that; that they will not respond in either a complacent or a joking fashion; and I am not going to suggest that the noble Baroness is accustomed to do that. But we shall know then, if the Government do not say that they are going to take this action, if they do not that they are going to join in with the non-nuclear powers and say, "This has got to stop", that, if it was any good taking to the hills, the time would now be to make plans to do so.

Finally, the draft report of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be published in a day or two. In the coded language of such documents—and I have a copy of the draft here—the report calls on the nuclear weapon states which are parties to the treaty, (that is to say, the USSR, the USA and the UK) to resume negotiations this year; that is to say, before the Soviet moratorium expires this year. That means that the USA and ourselves are asked to stop testing nuclear weapons in agreement with the USSR.

Now, finally, I have been accused of playing Cassandra but, unhappily, Cassandra was right: her world was destroyed. Tonight, the Government can prove this Cassandra wrong by saying that they will urge the USA to accept this proposal to conclude a test ban treaty with the USSR. I hope with all my heart that they will do so.

9.17 p.m.

Lord Rea

My Lords, in this short but important debate which has been initiated by my noble friend Lord Brockway's Unstarred Question, I should like to be thought of as speaking as a doctor and talking about preventive medicine. The malady that concerns us is too disastrous and overwhelming to respond to treatment, even palliative measures after a nuclear explosion would be pitifully inadequate. Most physicians who have really considered this problem and have not just defensively avoided thinking it through, realise that the only ethical stance is to back every possible move to defuse or reverse the nuclear arms race. Political activity may not be part of normal medical practice but we may be forced into it sometimes by matters of conscience; and, in parenthesis, I may say that that does not apply only to nuclear issues.

Therefore, I was very pleased indeed that the work of an organisation that I support, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear Wars (IPPNW, for short) was recognised early this month by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize. Ever since this body was founded in 1980 through the collaboration of the Soviet and American cardiologists, Professor Lown and Professor Shazor, who first met during numerous international scientific conferences over a period of years, the organisation has tried to build bridges to increase understanding and reduce tension; for instance, by organising open debates between American and Soviet doctors, one of which was actually broadcast live on Soviet television.

The prize money will be used to further this work rather than to go into individual pockets, and of course the organisation, the IPPNW, has been attacked as being pro-Soviet or naively playing the Soviet game, by people who really know nothing about its real work. The Nobel Prize assessors themselves are very hard headed Swedes who take great care with their vetting process and give prizes only on the strength of solid achievements. I wonder whether the noble Baroness who is to reply will join me in congratulating the IPPNW on being awarded this prize.

We are now at an important stage in nuclear negotiations. The summit meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev is not far off, the Geneva disarmament talks are still in being and the Soviet Union's two initiatives—a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, that has been mentioned, and the offer to reduce strategic weaponry—are still "on the table". Those of us who are suspicious of Soviet motives, and also many realists, may say that these Soviet initiatives are because the Russians are thoroughly scared by present American moves, particularly the destabilising effect of the "Star Wars" or SDI initiative.

In order to match this, the Soviet Union will either have to spend enormous extra sums on space defence—and their technical prowess in this field is acknowledged to be inferior to that of the United States—or they will have to manufacture and deploy a far greater number of missiles even, in order to swamp the ABM defences of the United States. Either of these two alternatives would stretch the Soviet economy almost to breaking point.

A cynic, who might also be a realist, would say that this is perhaps one of the aims of the United States in suggesting the strategic defence initiative. At the same time, if this were to take place, the dangers of war launched by either side would escalate enormously. Many of us fear that, unless checked by outside voices, the United States' nuclear defence programme is locked into an unstoppable expansion. It certainly seems that equality with the USSR is not enough. Superiority is the aim. This seems to be a highly dangerous situation considering the degree of overkill already possessed by both sides.

Luckily, there are strong voices in the United States and in Europe who recognise the dangers and who want to cry "Halt!" The "freeze" movement has a very strong popular backing in the United States, and if a freeze were achieved it would still leave the "overkill" capacity intact. But, at least, it would provide a breathing space to work out a fair, balanced and verifiable mutual reduction in nuclear weapons.

But heralding the freeze, the comprehensive test ban treaty is the logical first step. We need not be very far away from that agreement. As has been mentioned by all speakers, the non-nuclear signatories to the non-proliferation treaty have called for the resumption of negotiations on the test ban treaty by the end of the year. My noble friend Lord Jenkins spoke of this. The USSR has already declared its moratorium for the rest of this year. I think that the United Kingdom is in a very strong position to take the initiative and exert its influence on the USA to change its stance.

We have at various points since 1957, when negotiations started on this test ban treaty, come close to agreement and the partial test ban treaty of 1963 has been honoured. When comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations were abandoned in 1980, the draft was really on the verge of being in an acceptable form. As my noble friend Lord Jenkins said, the United States Senate voted 77 to 22 in 1984 to resume negotiations, but the US Government has failed to do so.

We have heard about the difficulties with verification of underground tests, but, as all noble Lords have said so far, scientists now feel that the technical problems have been largely overcome. I think that any that remain could be the subject of an intensive international collaboration in reseach—a possible topic of any resumed talks on the treaty.

There is every reason for restarting these negotiations now and urgently. Moves towards this resumption could be started before the summit meeting, while the Geneva talks are still in progress and before a new and dangerous lap of the nuclear arms race starts. I hope very much that the noble Baroness will tell us that the Government will do all that they can to get going again the negotiations on this achievable and vitally important treaty.

9.25 p.m.

Lord Boston of Faversham

My Lords, I should like to join my noble friend Lord Rea and all other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate in congratulating my noble friend Lord Brockway on initiating it. Few people inside or outside this House are more steeped in the policies of disarmament or more vigorous in the cause of disarmament and peace, and over such a prolonged period. As we shall not be sitting on 1st November, perhaps we may be forgiven for anticipating that day and expressing the hope that my noble friend Lord Brockway will have a very happy 97th birthday.

My noble friend could hardly have chosen a better moment for this debate. Since he tabled his Unstarred Question before we rose for the Summer Recess, the third review conference on the treaty has taken place. Not only that, but my noble friend must have been somewhat more encouraged by the outcome of the conference than perhaps he expected to be when he put down his Question. The predictions about this conference from many commentators and experts, right up to the time it was taking place, were very gloomy. The failure of the previous five-yearly review conference in 1980, which ended without agreement, was recalled and a similar outcome was predicted for this one. As we know, and as has been said to your Lordships tonight, agreement was reached at last month's conference. It is a commendable achievement but it provides no grounds for euphoria or for undue congratulations.

The treaty itself, which came into force in 1970, has been one of the very few great achievements to come out of arms control negotiations. It is true that the conference last month reaffirmed its importance and the continuing need for it, and the outcome was largely a positive one; but the conference also produced, as the final declaration seems to have shown, some salutary warnings for ourselves and for the United States and the Soviet Union. I should mention that any references I make to the final declaration are to the draft, for that is all I have seen; and I am informed that the final authorised text has not yet been made available in Geneva.

I say "warnings", for the final declaration by implication criticised the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, the depository states of the treaty, for the failure to fulfil the pledge contained in Article VI of the treaty: to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". It is fair to say that we and the other two countries, in supporting the declaration, conceded that we had not succeeded in fulfilling the pledge in Article VI of the treaty and also agreed that we should make greater efforts to ensure effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for those other aims in Article VI. As noble Lords have mentioned tonight, the conference, in its final declaration, also called on the nuclear weapon states to resume negotiations this year for ending all test explosions for all time; in other words, for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

My noble friend's Question embraces those very subjects and his request to the Government is very much in line with both the contents of the treaty itself and the calls made by the conference in its final declaration. As Her Majesty's Government are a party to that declaration it is hard to see how the noble Baroness the Minister can make anything other than a positive response to my noble friend's Question. I readily acknowledge that we, Britain, supported the United States in making a reservation, which was noted in the final declaration and which said that while there was a commitment to the goal of an effectively verifiable ban, the first priority was deep reductions in existing arsenals, which after all is an aim in the present negotiations in Geneva with the Russians.

That need not cause the Government any great difficulty in responding to my noble friend Lord Brockway. He simply calls for discussions with the nuclear powers on, the substantial reduction of their nuclear armaments". It is true the first part of my noble friend's Question asks the Government, whether they will take the initiative towards securing the international signature of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests", but since such a treaty is the aim of the Government, we hope that they will not shrink from taking a leading part in getting those negotiations going again. I look forward to hearing what the noble Baroness has to say. I hope very much that she will be positive and forthcoming. As this is the first chance we have to discuss the conference since it took place, I hope that the Minister will be able to give the House a report on it as well.

There are several other points I should like to raise. I said just now that the conference declaration contained a salutary warning to the nuclear powers. What I meant was simply this. The treaty is plainly of great importance. It has had great influence in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, as we know. But its adherents and the treaty itself expect progress on those other spheres of disarmament. We cannot expect the non-nuclear weapons states to prolong their patience and exercise restraint indefinitely, waiting for the rest of us to act. If we want to safeguard this treaty then we must deliver something substantial long before the next review in 1990—if we are to save it before it comes up for renewal in 1995. Here I agree with all noble Lords who have spoken tonight and who made that point.

I should like the Minister to state how she sees the prospects for resuming the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Can she give the House any idea of the timescale and what sort of date the Government regard as being realistic to aim at? Given the will, it should not take long to get negotiations going again. We know how speedily talks can be concluded. We have the experience of the partial test ban treaty in 1963—the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Negotiations on that treaty began between the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia on 15th July 1963 and ended on 25th July. The treaty was signed on 5th August and it entered into force on 10th October that same year. This shows what can be done. My noble friend Lord Rea made reference to that treaty in his speech tonight.

The terms of a comprehensive test ban treaty were close to being settled and finalised in 1980 but the negotiations lapsed in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. If the talks foundered because of the deterioration in East-West relations at that time, then that cannot possibly apply now, because major talks are now taking place, as we know, on other matters. There is the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in about four weeks' time. If it was right to negotiate before and possible to get close to an agreement then, why is it not right to negotiate now, and to try to bring those negotiations to a successful conclusion?

It is said that one of the problems is verification. Why was it possible to negotiate in 1980 when verification was something that had to be dealt with then, and what has changed to make it impossible to negotiate now and to seek a solution on verification—especially as, at the very least, verification is much less of a problem now than it was then? Here again, I agree with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, in his speech on this particular topic, and with what my noble friends Lord Jenkins of Putney and Lord Rea also had to say on the subject.

Indeed, there is a growing body of influential, informed and expert opinion which is convinced that verification is no longer a problem. If such a claim can be countered, it would be interesting to hear the reasons; but certainly it is claimed that developments in detection techniques, seismic monitoring and satellite surveillance are making verification easier all the time and make it possible to meet our needs in this respect. My noble friend Lord Rea was one noble Lord who referred to this. Perhaps I should also say that I very much welcome as well his reference to the Nobel Prize.

We are told that seismologists from East and West agree that explosions of more than one kiloton can be detected. We are also told that most seismologists accept—some are said to be more pessimistic—the judgment of the head of the Institute of Earth Physics at the Soviet Academy of Sciences (Academician Mikhail Sadovsky) that the United States' system of seismic stations guarantees in practice, with a high degree of probability, the detection of underground nuclear explosions of substantially less than one kiloton in Soviet territory. If that judgment is suspect we ought to be told.

There is a further point. We are also told that with seismic monitoring stations on site on Soviet territory—this has also been referred to tonight; and the Russians agreed to this, let us remember, in 1978—the assurance would be even greater. Only the very smallest nuclear explosions could escape detection and they would not be of military significance.

Perhaps the Minister will tell us, therefore, what, if any, are the Government's remaining worries about verification, and whether or not she would agree that there are at least grounds for believing that they could be overcome through negotiations and, at the very least, that there are most compelling grounds for trying to resolve them through negotiations.

Several noble Lords have referred to the question of the moratorium, including my noble friend Lord Jenkins of Putney and, I think, my noble friend Lord Rea, so I shall not go further into that now. Earlier this year we heard that China is willing to join the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia in an ad hoc committee to produce a ban on nuclear tests. That was heralded as a major reversal in Chinese policy Not only are there compelling reasons for the urgent resumption of talks, but the moment could hardly be more propitious. We very much hope that Her Majesty's Government will feel able to respond accordingly.

9.37 p.m.

Baroness Young

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, for asking this Question, and I too add my congratulations on his birthday, which I gather he is about to celebrate. We all wish him many happy returns.

I welcome the opportunity provided by the Question to put the Government's views on record soon after the end of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva and while the United Nations General Assembly First Committee is meeting in New York.

The United Kingdom has played and will continue to play its full part in all these discussions commensurate with its international standing. May I say to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, right away, because he asked whether or not the United Kingdom and America had killed the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the conference on disarmament in Geneva, that this question is not borne out by the facts, which are that the united Kingdom has continued to take part in the discussions on the comprehensive programme in Geneva. However, these discussions have revealed that there is no consensus as yet on the content of a comprehensive programme of disarmament; for whatever the noble Lord may argue, it is not possible for the British Government to force others to take up initiatives if they are not willing to respond. This is a general point which is of particular relevance to the proposals for negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty. In accordance with its international obligations the Government remain committed to the pursuit of a verifiable comprehensive test ban.

Perhaps I may answer a question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, in his speech in which he suggested that Britain and the United States might be seeking advantage over the Soviet Union and say that I really do not think that even he can take this suggestion seriously.

The British Government's aim in arms control negotiations is not to seek advantage but balance, and at a greatly reduced level of forces. We accept that a ban would be a significant step forward toward arms control and disarmament in the context of substantial reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons which we and our allies are trying to achieve in other fora. For these reasons the United Kingdom has presented to the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva a total of three important working papers designed to contribute to resolving the problems which continue to stand in the way of concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty. In 1983 we tabled papers on "Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in Relation to a Nuclear Test Ban" and "Verification Aspects of a CTBT." Earlier this year, in July 1985, we tabled a third paper, "Seismic Monitoring for a Comprehensive Test Ban".

It is disappointing that the technical issues raised by the first two papers have not received the attention which they deserve. This is because—and this is even more disappointing—the detailed work taking place in Geneva in 1982 and 1983 was interrupted by the refusal of some non-aligned and Warsaw Pact delegations to agree this year to a renewed mandate for an ad hoc committee on a test ban. I hope this information answers some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Boston, raised about where we are on this important question of verification.

Despite a further attempt by Western delegations to secure agreement to a broader mandate in 1984, and in spite of the fact that a large number of states voted at the United Nations last year to resume work on the basis of the broader mandate, it has still not been possible to reach agreement on how to take matters forward because of the attitude of a minority of countries. The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, asked how Britain will vote on the comprehensive test ban resolutions at the United Nations and I can tell him that we shall of course need to study the text of any resolutions put forward but we shall support resolutions which seem likely to offer the prospect of concrete progress and not other resolutions.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, does that mean that the noble Baroness will vote for resolutions which promise a resumption of negotiations?

Baroness Young

My Lords, I do not think that I can add anything further to the answer that I have given the noble Lord. We shall clearly vote for those resolutions on which we think there will be progress, but not others. I hope I have said enough to indicate that we should like to see progress on this matter. As my remarks continue I think that the noble Lord will appreciate what we have to say on that.

The British Government deeply regret that, with the voting in the United Nations last year, it has not been possible to reach agreement on how to take matters forward because of the attitude of a minority of countries. We believe that discussion in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva can make a substantial contribution to the resolution of these issues. Negotiations on an effective and verifiable comprehensive test ban would have no realistic prospects of success while these problems remain unresolved.

Perhaps at this point I may answer the question which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, asked, which was about the United States proposing to test nuclear explosions in space as part of the SDL I think that the noble Lord is referring to press reports to this effect. I should like to remind him and the House that only last week the American Secretary of State reaffirmed to the North Atlantic Assembly in San Francisco that the SDI research programme would be conducted in accordance with treaty obligations.

While the British Government have difficulty in accepting that agreement cannot be found on the terms of how to make progress at Geneva, we recognise that there are real problems to be resolved. What we had hoped, and still hope, to achieve at Geneva was agreement on method of working towards their resolution.

In many respects these problems are familiar. During the trilateral negotiations of 1977 to 1980 it did not prove possible to resolve a number of important compliance questions. Some may be inclined to assert that technical advances in detecting and identifying nuclear tests can now give the necessary degree of confidence that any comprehensive test ban treaty would not easily be circumvented—a point which noble Lords opposite have put. The Government place great store on a serious and detailed assessment of this issue, for it is at the very heart of the prospects for a comprehensive test ban treaty. If we cannot achieve that necessary degree of confidence there would be no point in concluding the treaty in the first place; indeed, it would be dangerous to do so.

If a country could evade the provisions of the treaty it could gain a significant military advantage. Not only would this defeat the purposes of the treaty but it would also confront the governments which were complying with the treaty with some difficult choices. Had the evasion of the treaty been detected in time to allow counter-measures? Was the evidence of the evasion convincing enough to justify such counter-measures, particularly in the eyes of public opinion? And, if we were confident in the answers given to these questions, would we be able to uphold the treaty by ensuring that the other party could be deterred from evading the treaty?

These are real concerns which the British Government ignore at the peril of their responsibilities to the British people and, indeed, to the world as a whole. The judgment of the Government is that the detection and measuring capabilities available to us at the moment are not adequate to provide the degree of confidence we require. The papers I have referred to earlier are contributions to the debate on resolving the outstanding issues with a view to achieving this degree of confidence. The July 1985 paper, for example, points to the areas where further work is needed. It concludes that it might be possible to design a monitoring network which would be able to detect a seismic event of about four on the Richter scale against the background level of seismic noise. It might also be possible to identify a seismic event as a nuclear explosion where it had a yield above a few tens of kilotons.

But the paper also makes clear that these results must be treated with caution. They are based on data which are incomplete and involve a good deal of extrapolation. More work needs to be done to confirm that these detection and identification thresholds are indeed achievable. More work also needs to be done to make sure we understand the full range of evasion techniques which might be used. Finally, even if work on these issues was successfully concluded there would still be the problem that militarily significant testing could take place below these possible inspection and identification thresholds.

As I have said, these are real concerns, but the British Government are working to try to resolve them. We shall continue to do so. But beyond this I do not believe it would be prudent to go at this stage.

9.49 p.m.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, since it is believed, in some quarters at any rate, that the reasons that the noble Baroness has been putting forward for doubting the viability of verification are not in accordance with scientific opinion, would it not be possible, as it is in the case of the SALT II treaty, to continue and to match the Soviet moratorium so that the whole thing can go along while the tests are being put in? If there was a violation it would immediately become apparent. In those circumstances, would it not be possible to avoid the deadline which we face at the end of the year by going along with the Soviet Union in practice, even if our Government and the American Government are not yet ready to put their names to a document?

Baroness Young

My Lords, I hope the answer that I gave to the House will be sufficient to answer the question the noble Lord has just asked. I have indicated that there are real doubts, which have been expressed by those who are competent to judge these matters, that it would be very difficult to get the kind of verification we require. These are concerns which the British Government cannot ignore because they have a responsibility to the British people and to the whole of the world. So far as the recent Soviet proposal for a moratorium on testing is concerned, this contains no new ideas and, indeed, ignores the problems of verification and of peaceful nuclear explosions, so there are real difficulties there.

Your Lordships will be aware that the third conference to review the non-proliferation treaty was held in Geneva during September. Her Majesty's Government played an active role at that conference, and were delighted that, in contrast to the previous review conference, held in 1980, it reached a successful conclusion on 21st September with the adoption by consensus of a final document strongly endorsing the treaty. That final document included a solemn declaration by the parties expressing their conviction that the treaty is essential to international peace and security, their support for the treaty's objectives and their determination to enhance the implementation of the treaty and strengthen its authority.

This is not to say, of course, that there were not differences of approach, or that the general feeling at the conference was that enough had been done to further the cause of arms control and disarmament.

Indeed, all states' parties expressed disappointment that there had not been greater progress towards the implementation of Article VI of the treaty, which calls on the parties to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control. At the conference the Government made it clear that the United Kingdom remains committed to progress towards a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons in all environments and reminded delegates that, as I have already explained, the West have proposed that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament should examine all relevant test ban issues, including verification, with a view to negotiation of a treat y. But it would be premature for substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban to be resumed while the outstanding technical problems remain unresolved.

The satisfactory outcome of the review conference is at variance with the predictions of some observers that it would be a disaster unless new and very far-reaching steps were taken. The substantive final document resulting from the conference, and the fact that there are now 130 parties to the treaty (making it the most widely-supported arms control treaty in existence) I hope will reassure those who had doubts about its vitality. It is alive and well. What remains is for us to continue to work in a balanced and organised way towards the complete realisation of its aims, and to convince those countries which have so far not signed that they should now join the vast majority of states who have already done so.

House adjourned at seven minutes before ten o'clock.