The Strategic Defence Initiative and NATO

HL Deb 15 May 1985 vol 463 cc1186-223

5.30 p.m.

Lord Kennet rose to call attention, in the light of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's speech of 15th March, to the debate among NATO countries on the United States strategic defence initiative; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this House has a fortunate freedom to discuss large issues on which the future of humanity itself may depend. Such an issue is the strategic defence initiative taken by the President of the United States and I think there is no need for us to apologise for bringing on a debate about it three months after the last.

First of all, let us look at the opinion of the British people, because there is scarcely a Government in the world who are wiser than their own people. Governments should listen more and preach less. For years some 60 per cent. or more of our people have favoured a nuclear strategy and only about 25 per cent. have been unilateralists. The numbers supporting and opposing the presence of United States military bases in the United Kingdom have been, near enough, equal for the last year. The presence of United States nuclear cruise missiles here has been disapproved by a majority since 1981, except at the time of the election itself. The latest figures are 35 per cent. for and 56 per cent. against; and 68 per cent. think the United States would fire those cruise missiles without British consent, 18 per cent. think they would not; 94 per cent. want a physical dual key on them, and 74 per cent. would even pay Mr. Heseltine's mythical billion pounds to get it.

An interesting general question has been asked at intervals since 1977: "Has your confidence in the ability of America to deal with world problems tended to go up lately, to go down, or remain about the same?" In 1978 11 per cent. said up and 19 per cent. said down. In 1984 5 per cent. said up and 52 per cent. said down.

These figures can help us to judge the meaning of the figures on the strategic defence initiative itself. Eighty-four per cent. of the British people think the United States will do it with or without the approval of their allies and 84 per cent. also think the Russians will follow suit, leading to a continuing arms race; and a majority naturally thinks this would make our country less safe.

So much for the British people's reaction. The polls also show that the American people recognise SDI as a sure recipe for more and more arms race.

When we last debated this subject on a Question of my noble friend Lord Gladwyn, in January, the West European governments' reaction to President Reagan's proposals were still amorphous. Their outlines are now beginning to appear, and nothing has done more to hasten that process and make sure that it is carried out in a responsible way than the speech referred to in the Motion before us of the right honourable gentleman the Foreign Secretary at the Royal United Services Institute on 15th March. It is one of the founding texts around which European policy will precipitate.

The first such founding text was of course the four points agreed between the President and our own Prime Minister in December of last year. I feel sure the Government will read them out again in this debate, as they did last time, and as they should every time. They are the basis for much of the intra-Western agreement which has since been achieved.

Another such basis is the declaration of the Secretary-General of NATO, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington: It will at the very least be extraordinarily difficult to devise a system of strategic defence which meets the objectives of balance, no superiority, and enhanced deterrence. General Rogers has let us all know that SDI is not what he thinks N ATO governments should be spending money on.

The basis for East-West agreement is the Shultz-Gromyko declaration of January this year about the Geneva negotiations, which made preventing an arms race in space an inseparable part of the whole negotiations.

The guidelines for our own Government's decision are laid down in the four points of the Foreign Secretary's speech. Those adopted by our European allies individually have recently been becoming clearer. Canada has said she will not take part in any United States star wars system. As far as the research stage goes, their position is very close to ours. Mr. Trudeau probably reflects the general perception in Canada about disarmament and detente when he says: I believe President Reagan would like to make progress. I have no reason to believe the advice he will get will permit him to make progress and I don't know if he will be in a position to judge if he is getting the right advice or not".

The position of Germany is the least unfavourable to SDI of any in NATO. The German Government have stated their wish to ensure that the research carried out should lead to co-operative solutions. In the context, that means co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Genscher has called Sir Geoffrey Howe's speech "notable", and President Weizsäcker himself made his personal opposition to the concept of SDI clear at this year's Königswinter meeting. The German Government at all levels emphasise the danger of anything which would impair the "strategic unity" of the Western Alliance.

France has taken up a position of forthright scepticism, even disapproval. The President of France has described SDI in the following terms: This involves a further build-up of weaponry of which there is too much already, and that is not the right course to take. We should be heading towards disarmament, that is towards achieving a balance at the lowest level".

The Prime Minister of Italy has said that the United States should now give to the Soviet Union guarantees that it will not break the 1972 ABM treaty in the future. Greece has called for the prohibition of the development, testing and production etc., of SDI weaponry. This formulation, which was adopted at the recent Athens meeting of several heads of non-aligned and hardly aligned countries, is in fact no more than a call for the observation of the ABM treaty.

Norway broadly follows the United Kingdom and has proposed multilateral efforts towards the solution of the problem in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva; that is to say, it believes bilateral contacts between the super powers are not enough.

Denmark, where parliamentary supremacy over the executive is well established, is perhaps in the clearest position of all. The Danish Parliament has passed a resolution, against the opposition of the Government, which reads: Denmark is against placing weapons in outer space and participating in research and development for such weapons … and instructs the Government to work actively in pursuance of the above viewpoint". That was last month. In spite of being voted down, the Danish Government have not fallen. They are doing what parliamentary democracy requires; namely, getting on with the job which they have been instructed to do.

The opinion of Australia has been much clouded by the recent fracas between the United States and New Zealand about United States nuclear vessels entering New Zealand ports. But as long ago as January the Prime Minister of Australia told Mr. Shultz that his country was opposed to the development of SDI weaponry and would not contribute to it. New Zealand itself, of course, has not been invited to take part in any SDI activities because it is in disgrace.

The position of Japan is still far from clear, but the Japanese Government appear favourable to a joint research programme with the United States.

The Western European Union foreign and defence ministers last month declared their hope that the Geneva negotiations would lead on to agreement preventing an arms race in space, and agreed to achieve as far as possible a joint response to the United States invitation to participate in the SDI research programme.

Lastly, at the very recent Bonn Summit the Heads of State and Government of the developed capitalist world gave their warm backing to the present bilateral disarmament talks. They "appreciated" the American proposals at Geneva—that unusual word is presumably a translation from the French—but they were not prepared to endorse or even to mention the SDI itself.

Now that we have all made our reservations about SDI itself clear, we are tempted for economic reasons to join in the scientific and engineering research which the American Administration propose. It will of course be Congress that disposes, and military expenditure is no longer immune from Congress. Within Europe Germany is most tempted by the proposals and France least. Britain is somewhere in between. The Prime Minister was asked at a press conference in America on 22nd December last year whether Britain had any interest in or plans for participating directly in the SDI research programme. She answered: No, sir, not unless by any chance there are some of our scientists already participating in it, because they are already in the United States". On the other hand, when she went a month later to address Congress her wording was a little different. She said that she, hoped that our own scientists will share in this research". I think that the House would be grateful to her if the Minister of Slate can tell us whether there was a significant change of emphasis between her two statements or not.

What is "participating"? It could be so many things. It could be European government funding, but I do not think that it will be. It could be encouraging our firms to tender for American financed contracts. It could be merely permitting them to do so; and whatever it is it must surely be subject to some restrictions to prevent either another brain drain or a one-way ideas drain.

Of course the attractions are obvious. It looks from outside as though, if we get in on this act, we shall get an accelerated intellectual "freebie" into passive sensing; into extending the usable range of the frequency spectrum; into ultra-violet sensing; into thermo-luminescence; into the development of chips which are capable of ten-to-the-ninth operations per second and put themselves right when they go wrong; into the co-ordination of a system of sensors which will identify 100,000 objects in outer space; into high energy lasers which will shorten the stony path to controlled thermo-nuclear fusion; into rocket technology, cryogenics, measurement technology, robotics, and so on, down the line from here to Kingdom-come. Our mouths water when we think how we could be in on all that, and our heart misses several beats when we think what it would be like if the Japanese and the Americans were in on it together and we were not.

But we now know that things would not be quite like that. General Abrahamson, the director of the strategic defence initiative, said in a useful interview with a Belgian paper that the allies would be allowed to do only unclassified work. Europe would be making the tea outside the door.

But now the main point: whatever work is available would come to us not because President Reagan in his wisdom and kindness has decided that the United States should make a great new effort in research and technology for the good of mankind—no! It would be because President Reagan wants to realise his dream of an entirely new array of weapon systems to add to those which he already has. This is not pure research. This is research into definite and foreseeable weapons against other systems of weapons.

If the United States did not want the new weapon systems, it would not be doing the research. There is nothing wrong with research as such, but if there is something wrong with the reason for which it is being undertaken, then the research should not be undertaken. If the end is wrong, the means are wrong, too. There is no point in researching into how to do something that you ought not to do: it only makes it more likely that you will do it. Should an alcoholic buy a crate of whisky in order to find out if he wants to drink it?

Now this is where the Foreign Secretary's powerful and authoritative speech comes in. Ought star wars to be done? In his speech he asks 15 questions, by my count, on the answers to which the large answer to that one large question must depend.

I wish I had time to go through them all. They cover the military, political and economic fields very well: it would be a fool who endorsed the construction of an SDI system without answering all of them, and I much doubt the wisdom even of going into the research without answering all of them.

The Foreign Secretary's speech was immediately greeted with a philistine and bellicose sneer from the United States Administration and with a bit of a deathly hush from everyone else. Important questions often are greeted that way at first. But time is going by, the questions are on the table, and we in this country can be proud that it was our Foreign Minister who put them there.

They must now be answered. Who by? We have endorsed the setting up of a committee on weaponry in space by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. It can provide some answers. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of the Western European Union at their recent meeting instructed their officials to study the matter and they met in London this morning. Perhaps they can provide some answers. Institutes for strategic studies and institutes for the study of international relations throughout. Europe are at last taking the matter up systematically and they will no doubt provide more. Incidentally, may I say here how much I regret that our own normally admirable International Institute for Strategic Studies in London did not take the star wars question up when it was first pressed to do so by some of its members in 1980.

Europe's response is still, however, all over the place. What we now need is a short, sharp study, to be undertaken by qualified people appointed by their governments from all the European NATO countries, into the whole doctrine of strategic defences, including the form the United States has decided on, as it affects Western Europe's interests, those interests being defined by West Europeans themselves. There is a case for a sort of outer circle to this group, containing people from Japan, Australia and New Zealand; and it goes without saying that the study should be carried out with the full knowledge of the American Administration, although without their formal participation.

Such an exercise would not be a threat to the Alliance: it would certainly be very much less of a threat than President Reagan's original bombshell in March 1983, and the subsequent classified studies about which I informed the House that same year. It would allow us and the others, if they want, to sharpen our perceptions and see what answers to Sir Geoffrey's 15 questions we can agree upon. NATO is going to outlive a good many American presidents yet.

Even now, before any systematic or agreed answers can be formulated, one fact stares us in the face: if you want sudden progress in a whole raft of scientific concerns from thermo-luminescence to cryogenics, you fund research into a whole raft of scientific concerns from thermo-luminescence to cryogenics. The weaponry is simply a distortion of what might otherwise be a wise and logical course. If you want high energy lasers for power stations, it is the purest waste of time and money to wait for the development of one light enough to be put into orbit. The way to get what we want is to go point-blank for it.

The reaction of France to all this, like so many French reactions, has been worthy of far more attention in this country than it has had. For years France has been advocating an international satellite monitoring agency, which is relevant now indeed. We have scarcely stirred a finger to help it forward. The first thing France did when it heard of the SDI was to set aside 60 million dollars for a new study of the ability of its own independent strategic deterrent to penetrate the ABM defences which the Soviet Union would in due course set up as a counterpart to the American ones. I have not heard that anybody in Britain is doing that for ours. Trident is presumably deemed talisman enough for anything.

The next thing the French did was to call in rather vague terms, first, for a European technological community and now for a project called Eureka which is still at a formative phase. But it has, or could have, or is susceptible of being made to have, some highly useful purposes. It could promote that direct R and D drive for what we do want.

What I suggest then is two things. The first is a small study group of wise persons appointed from European NATO to consider the military, political and economic desirability of what our allies propose; and the second a large co-ordinated inter-governmental programme, mobilising very large financial resources, of hardware and software research. The first would produce its own answers quite quickly: perhaps in six months. The latter would need a good deal more study before it could be launched.

At least until the first study—the, as it were, "15 questions study"—we should not rush to board General Abrahamson's bandwagon. As my right honourable friend Dr. Owen said in a recent lecture: Western Europe should not be sucked into endorsing this research and development programme". There are two great reasons for this. The first is that star wars would be destabilising if realised, destabilising if decided on, and is already destabilising now, when it is only being talked about. Oddly enough, the White House has itself twice stated this quite clearly. Once was in the President's own first speech back in 1983. He said: I clearly recognise that defensive systems have limitations … If paired with offensive systems they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy and no one wants that". That is good thinking and clear speaking.

Lord Home of the Hirsel

My Lords, will the noble Lord give way for one minute? I do not necessarily dissent from much of what he is saying. However, I am bound to say that one would not get the impression from his speech that the same kind of research has been carried on by the Russians for many years, and that they are still going on with it.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, of course I take it for granted that the same kind of research has been carried on by the Russians for many years. It has also been carried on by the United States for many years. What we are talking about is a sudden acceleration of the United States programme over what has been going on previously.

The other time the White House described the destabilising nature of SDI was in a statement on 3rd January this year. It says: the Soviets are engaged in research and development on a rapidly deployable ABM system". That meets the noble Lord's point. That raises concern about their potential ability to break out of the ABM treaty and deploy a nationwide ABM defence system in the next 10 years, should they choose to do so. Were they to do so, as they could, deterrence would collapse and we should have no choices between surrender and suicide". The White House can see that if the Soviet Union were to kick aside the ABM treaty and develop a full-scale strategic defence, that would leave the United States of America with no choices between suicide and surrender. How can the White House fail to see that if the United States were to do the same that would leave the Soviet Union with no choices between suicide and surrender? What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

At different times the United States Administration has described a full-scale strategic defence system in three different ways: as something which will lead to improved deterrence; as something which will progressively supplant deterrence; and as something which will leave the other side with no choice between surrender and suicide. We must not help our friends to develop something which they cannot describe more clearly than that.

The second reason for us not to be sucked in is that the development of ABM weapons for use in space, or stationed in space, would break the bilateral ABM treaty between American and Russia. The Prime Minister talks happily of all that being "subject to negotiations" with the Russians. However, does she think that the Russians are really going to change their spots that easily? If they do not, we will in the future have to ask who we agree with: the treaty preservers, or the treaty destroyers?

The Reagan Administration has unfortunately shown scant respect for international law, either conventional or customary law—and customary law is now developing in the arms control field. This, I believe, accounts for the diminishing confidence of the British and European peoples in its wisdom. We feel no parallel diminution of confidence in the American people, or in possible future American Administrations.

We expect the United States to observe the law, so that we may require the Soviet Union to observe the law.

My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

5.53 p.m.

The Earl of Bessborough

My Lords, I am not sure whether I should have been tempted by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, to speak in this debate, because I feel that perhaps I either know too much or, on the other hand, perhaps too little. Too much, because I was of course a member of the Select Sub-Committee, presided over by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, which was concerned, among other matters, with remote sensing by satellite. I have also read Dr. Geoffrey Pardoe's classic work on The Future of Space Technology, which was published last year and for which I wrote the foreword. In connection with this debate I suggest your Lordships should read, or should have read, the chapter on Military Space Systems and what Dr. Pardoe says about anti-missile missiles—and, indeed, anti-missile-missile missiles, to say nothing of anti-satellite-satellite satellites. Here, the mind begins to boggle.

I have also recently attended a series of meetings in London and in Washington with one of President Reagan's principal scientific advisers on SDI, as well as with Mr. James Beggs, the head of NASA, and also administrators of NOAA, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. These latter talks, of course, were not directly concerned with military space applications except in so far as it is admitted that the American Permanent Manned Space Station, to which British Aerospace will be providing an associated free-flying platform, could well have military applications.

I certainly agreed with my right honourable friend the Prime Minister when she said that Her Majesty's Government were in favour of the United States going ahead with research concerned with the strategic defence initiative, and also that she hoped that British scientists might also be associated with this research. However, the whole project is very long-term and we still do not know the extent to which defence against the latest ballistic missiles will be effective. That is why I say perhaps I know too little.

I am not only in favour of the United States going ahead with this research, but, speaking entirely personally, I consider it essential, as it has been historically, that the West should develop adequate defence measures in the event of such weapons being used. Historically, nations have always had to do this whenever new weapons have been developed. Also, I agree with President Reagan when he asked in 1983: Would it not be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability?". To this, the President replied: I think we are—and indeed we must". I agree with him that it is right to embark on a defensive programme to counter the missile threat. However, the funding of this programme, estimated to amount to some 26 billion dollars up to 1989, is nonetheless horrendous. I shall not say more about that this evening, since I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, who also has the very latest information from Washington on this matter, will say something on it.

However, I should like to ask my noble friend Lady Young what Her Majesty's Government's latest views are on this multi-layered space-based defence concept. In January of this year the Reagan Administration described the general concept which SDI research would consider as being a defence that used various technologies to deter attacking missiles during each phase of their flight. As I understand it, some missiles could be destroyed shortly after they are launched and as they burn their engines and boost their warheads into space. By destroying a missile during this boost phase it would, at the same time, destroy all the nuclear warheads which it carried. Indeed, in the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles they could probably be destroyed before leaving the territory of the aggressor.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, will the noble Earl please give way?

The Earl of Bessborough

My Lords, yes, except that we have this problem of time.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, yes, of course. Would the noble Earl favour taking it one step further and destroying the missile on the ground before even the boost phase?

The Earl of Bessborough

Yes, my Lords, if this can be done. At any rate, then there is the next phase, with which the noble Lord is also familiar, when it would be possible to destroy those nuclear warheads that survive the boost phase by attacking them during the post-boost phase. During this phase it would be possible to target the device that sits on the top of the missile, and which is used to disperse its warheads, while it is in the process of releasing its cargo. By destroying this device, the post-boost vehicle, it would be possible to destroy all the warheads which had not yet been released. All this is the doctrine of my friends in the United States.

I am repeating it, and I shall be interested to know the comments of my noble friend on it later. Those warheads that have been released and survive would travel for tens of minutes in the void of space on their ballistic trajectories towards their targets. It would then be necessary to locate, identify and destroy the individual nuclear warheads themselves. This relatively long mid-course phase of flight offers time to exploit advanced technologies to do just that. Finally, those warheads that survive the outer layers of defence could be attacked during the terminal phase as they approached the end of their ballistic flight.

I am sorry that it is not my 10-year-old grandson who is describing these possibilities. I believe that he understands them probably better than some of us in your Lordships' House. At any rate, I know that he believes that a considerable number of satellites would be needed mainly as platforms for launching but also, of course, for surveillance and tracking. Various possible weapons, also known to my grandson, have been suggested. They include different sorts of laser, particle beams, plasma guns and kinetic energy weapons. The noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, may have something to say about whether or not the Americans are proceeding with research on these weapons. I shall be interested to hear what he has to say.

An important matter from Europe's point of view seems to be that the United States Government have made clear that they think of the system as protecting their allies as well as America. As President Reagan pointed out in his speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 8th May, the Soviet Union has been engaged, as my noble friend Lord Home implied just now, in research into SDI, I believe, for the last 20 years. Again, I would be interested to hear whether my noble friend Lady Young agrees about this.

sss We know that the Russians have already in service probably the only operational ground based anti-ballistic missile system in the world. I think that my honourable friend Mr. John Stanley, our Minister of State for the Armed Forces, has said that his department broadly endorses this. Again, I should be glad to know whether my noble friend agrees that the Russians also have an operational anti-satellite system and that the Soviet Union is ahead of the West in laser research and electronic pulse beams. I think it right that the West should not aim to achieve superiority but mainly to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet defences.

On the question of our own British scientists sharing in this research—a point made by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in her speech to the United States Congress—I should be interested to know, again from my noble friend, the terms—not only the American terms, but also our own terms—under which our scientists would share in this research. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, would agree on this point.

There are, of course, many questions that need to be considered. I understand that even the most enthusiastic supporters of SDI do not claim that it could provide a 100 per cent. protective umbrella against a mass attack by such missiles. I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Home has left us because we were discussing this matter only the other day. I know that he agrees with me that you are not likely, in the shooting field, when 20 or 30 birds fly over you at the same time, to get more than two birds with one gun having two barrels; and that with two guns, you are not likely to get more than four. I should be interested to hear what my noble friend Lady Young, who may not perhaps go into the shooting field like my noble friend Lord De L'Isle has to say.

Then there is the difficult question as to what effect ballistic missile defence will have on arms control. I hope that my noble friend will have something to say about this and also on the effect that SDI will have on the ABM treaty of 1972.

I should like to hear something about Trident and whether it might become ineffective as a deterrent. As I understand it, we shall still need Trident, which will be in service long before any effective Soviet defence could be in place. As I have already implied, no one knows how long it will take the Americans to develop this strategic defence capability. I think, therefore, that Trident should be in service long before—my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Heseltine, agrees, I think—the star wars programme could be implemented.

As to Eureka, I am insufficiently briefed to make a judgment having only read a press report in the Daily Telegraph of 1st May and, of course, the references in The Times today. As I understand it, Eureka is a French proposal that the European Community should develop an independent space defence initiative of its own and that this would involve research into laser technology, micro-electronics and robotics. On the face of it and due to the very considerable cost, I am doubtful whether the Community should attempt to duplicate research done by the Americans and it would be better within the NATO context to co-operate with the United States rather than promoting a purely Common Market defence capability. In this case, however, I think that the funding is so vast that as many NATO countries as possible should co-operate together even if Denmark and Canada do not—perhaps Japan will join—and I shall be interested to hear what my noble friend has to say on Eureka.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that study groups should be set up. That is obviously essential. I have no doubt that they are already being set up. I am grateful to the noble Lord for having raised this matter, hesitant as I was about taking part in a debate on such a complex issue. I look forward to hearing what the Government have to say.

6.7 p.m.

Lord Rea

My Lords, the reason why I, as an amateur in this complex area of defence strategy, have ventured into the debate is my belief, which I have stated on at least one previous occasion, that war and its prevention can and should be regarded as part of the concern of those such as myself working in the health field. Nevertheless, I feel somewhat humbled to be speaking in the presence of such experts, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, who is to follow me. Most of us are very unhappy about MAD, mutually assured deterrence or destruction, which is the basis apparently for the modus vivendi between East and West. It is a remarkably dangerous way of keeping the peace with too many possibilities of accidental, unintentional or impetuous unleashing of disaster. However, many believe that it has been the main reason For 40 years of peace in Europe. I do not agree with that view, but that is for another debate.

All of us, I think, regret that the many long, drawn-out discussions on arms limitation that have taken place have been so unsuccessful. Again, this is not the time to hand out blame for this. Nuclear arsenals and delivery systems on both sides have reached a prodigious proportion of overkill with far more destructive power than could ever be needed. However, the anti-ballistic missile treaty which was part of the SALT I Treaty of 1972 has been largely adhered to because it suited both sides then, and has continued to do so until now.

As the Foreign Secretary said in the speech on which this debate is based: It represents a political and military keystone in the still shaky arch of security we have constructed with the East in the past decade and a half". Now however the strategic defence initiative concept threatens this precarious balance, however idealistic the thoughts in the mind of President Reagan when he launched it two years ago. His words then were: Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope … let us turn to the very strength in technology that spawned our great industrial base, that has given us the quality of life that we enjoy today". But however much his enthusiasm may have impressed some Americans, others, such as Dr. Harold Brown the much respected ex-Secretary of Defence quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, in this House on 30th January this year, have been sceptical about the possibility of an effective anti-ballistic missile shield. To quote him, he says: American political and military leaders should publicly acknowledge that there is no realistic prospect for a successful population defence, certainly for many decades and probably never". One wonders why, in view of such authoritative and critical statements, the idea was launched with such a fanfare. At present, it is only research into possible ABM systems that is proposed, and in which we are invited to join. But as Sir Geoffrey says: Research may acquire an unstoppable momentum of its own, even though the case for stopping may strengthen with the passage of years". I think the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, indicated that we may already be going along that line now.

Research may not in itself be contrary to the ABM Treaty, but the march of events started by research will certainly threaten to do so. Matching research in the USSR, which the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, pointed out has already started, will probably gain the same momentum, and the joint Camp David declaration that, SDI deployment would in view of treaty obligations have to be a matter of negotiation", would, I suggest, go by the board.

The cost implications of the strategic defence initiative are quite prodigious. One estimate is 25 billion dollars for research and 200 billion dollars for the actual programme. These figures have been suggested, but they are really "guesstimates" with little that is definite to go on. In addition, though, there would be an extra boost to nuclear weapon manufacture since more would be needed to saturate and penetrate any ABM system. It was suggested by Paul Nitze in his Alistair Buchan memorial lecture in March of this year that it could be that the United States economic giant could stand this military expenditure while maintaining something like the present standard of living, although I am sure the welfare provision and overseas aid would suffer severely.

It is doubtful whether the less developed and efficient Soviet economy could handle this—a fact which I think was doubtless taken into account by the backers of the strategic defence initiative. However, to push the USSR down this road might have extremely dangerous consequences. Certainly it would not allow Mr. Gorbachev to liberalise the regime in ways we might hope for and expect if a further detente could be achieved. It could even push the "hawks" in the Soviet leadership into ascendency and they may be driven to desperate measures before the anti-ballistic missile cover was fully achieved. In all probability, Europe would be taking the brunt in the middle of it.

So, faced with considerations of this kind, the approach of the Foreign Secretary is statemanlike, cautious and diplomatic. Perhaps I myself would have gone further than him, but I am a realist. His approach is the kind which is most likely to influence the United States and perhaps dissuade them from rushing precipitously into this dangerous territory. But it is always difficult to restrain an excited horse which is rearing to gallop off down a track even when there is a precipice around the corner. It is even more difficult when the rider seems unaware of the precipice and can only see the beautiful country on the other side of the canyon.

I very much hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Young, can reassure us that the views of Sir Geoffrey are fully backed by the Government as a whole and that the answers to his 15 questions will be sought assiduously.

6.15 p.m.

Lord Zuckerman

My Lords, when the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, introduced the debate on this subject in January of this year I knew it would come back again to your Lordships' House, but I did not realise it would come back so soon. On the other hand, I have been impressed by the force of the introductory remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. I do realise that this is a subject on which we should focus a lot of our attention.

However, perhaps I may begin by saying that I am sorry that on this occasion the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, is not in your Lordships' Chamber. I disagreed with some of the things he said in the debate in January and exchanged some letters with him afterwards. We reached some measure of agreement, and even in his absence, I am sure he would like me to put one or two matters right for the record.

The noble Lord referred to a report which he thought had been written—and I am quoting now from Hansard— by a body called the Union of Concerned Scientists"— a report which he understood was, conspicuous largely for its extraordinary number of inaccuracies, tendentious statements and false assumptions".—[Official Report, 30/1/85; col. 704.] As a result of our exchanges, the noble Lord now knows that in fact the report was based on the work of a group of fourteen scholars, including four highly distinguished American physicists, one of them a Nobel laureate and at least three of whom have had as continuous an experience of defence research and engineering as almost any of the American scientists moving in and out of Washington.

What the noble Lord was really referring to was what I would describe as a tendentious and intemperate criticism of the report, in which reference was made to only two errors: those two errors had been corrected publicly well before our debate in January. I think that matter ought to be put right, because the correction was made before a Senate Committee. It is on record there, and we should not have the record wrong in our Hansard. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, would have wished me to take the opportunity of correcting what would otherwise have been regarded as a slight on the reputation of some very distinguished men.

Since our last debate there have been several new technological reports on the whole of this issue. They are continuing to appear, together with critiques of what had been intended strategically in the first instance. I do not know if it was the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, or the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, who said that SDI had taken several shapes since its launching by the President in March 1983. It has also taken numerous technological shapes. There is a great deal of uncertainty now surrounding the whole concept of SDI, which, certainly from the R & D point of view, has been transformed in direction.

One of the points the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, made related to the number of space platforms necessary for the laser beam apparatus. I am sure your Lordships all know what a laser beam is. Consider that if all these television lights were concentrated in a single beam of energy, that beam could burn through the desk over there. Your Lordships also know how a magnifying glass operates. You will have some idea of what a laser beam is. Laser beams, which are spoken about in the context of SDI, are extraordinarily powerful beams of energy within the electromagnetic spectrum which can be focussed over thousands of miles, given it is known how to focus them. The number of orbiting space platforms that are necessary, with the necessary apparatus mounted on those platforms, depends upon the number which at any given moment are in position to survey the Russian mainland. These are very complicated calculations. Indeed, when the noble Earl referred to equations about the number of birds that can be knocked down by what number of guns, he ought to see some of the equations which appear in some of the latest papers to which I have referred.

The fact of the matter is that what is demanded technologically when we talk about the SDI laser beam—and I will get away from that in a moment—is an apparatus which can be retargeted—and this is the goal of the R & D programme—from one missile rising from its silo within a tenth of a second to another missile. It depends upon the extent to which that goal can be achieved how many laser platforms would be necessary in space.

A special panel, set up by the President under Mr. Hoffman, made it quite clear that any space defence which could withstand a small attack but which would collapse under a larger onslaught, would be highly provocative. Therefore, if we are conceiving of any space defence system, whether operating with particle beams or laser beams, which have to destroy missiles as they rise from their silos, which have to be directed through infra-red sensors on other space platforms through a computer system, and if we are to get the whole system right, you must realise that we are up against a major technological challenge.

Strangely enough, and by accident, I happen to know that all that is likely to be academic. The day before yesterday I was sent a copy of the Washington Post of three days ago. I have informed the noble Baroness the Minister of State that I have it and I shall hand it to her afterwards. It is not an official document, but it is an extremely well-informed article by a Washington reporter based upon a talk that he had just had with General Abrahamson and four of his chief officials. They are quoted verbatim and therefore I must assume that they would immediately have corrected what is said here had it been false.

The picture which this document gives is not very dissimilar from the contents list of the document on the Strategic Defence Initiative sent to Congress by the DoD three weeks ago. It is a lengthy report. The R & D goals are properly set out in the first set of chapters. Then we have the R & D projects necessary to achieve them. Only four relate to directed energy weapons technology. The rest relate to surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment, and then there is an enormous list on kinetic energy weapons technology, to which the noble Earl referred.

To summarise, it would appear that there is a growing conviction among top officials in General Abrahamson's organisation that the use of lasers will remain beyond United States' technological reach for many years. Instead, the emphasis is now being placed on kinetic energy weapons, or what they are brightly calling "smart rock" technology. By "smart rock" technology they mean what we used to talk about in the ABM debate at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. If you can put a ballistic missile into a path which is predetermined through a knowledge of Newtonian laws of motion, you can put in its path a load of gravel travelling in a contrary direction which will hit the warhead. I am talking about the warhead on its middle course, and on the assumption that all this can be done, which I doubt. General Abrahamson is talking about the use of railguns to shoot small projectiles, small rocks, (and I am told that the General has a sample of rock on his desk) into space at a sufficient velocity to destroy ballistic missiles in mid-course.

There appears to be some confusion as to whether or not such guns would have to be mounted on space platforms. This is a point which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, made in the question which he asked the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough: whether or not he would disapprove of weapons on the ground. The question is whether or not these railguns could be directed from Earth or whether they too would have to be on space platforms. That is a point which is most important, and to which I shall briefly return at the end of my contribution to this debate. Either way, of course, it would be necessary for the railguns, as they are called, to be aimed and directed by means of proper sensor devices in space, and those would have to be guided through the necessary computer systems.

While this appears to be the preferred focus of present technological efforts, we must realise that General Abrahamson himself, to quote this newspaper article of two days ago: believes that even this technology will not be there until the early 1990s before the next administration could go ahead with what would be the development phase of a first generation system". Therefore, for the first time we are now talking about first-generation systems in the SDI as opposed to later systems. The present system is based upon known technologies which are properly listed.

There is just one further point to which I should refer. In that same article General Abrahamson is quoted as saying that he is not certain whether the amount of energy which can be provided by conventional energy sources—electrical energy sources—would be sufficient for those guns. What he is hinting at is what two new reports are also saying: it might be necessary to conceive of minor nuclear explosions in the system to provide the necessary energy. I do not want to say any more about that. Clearly, the whole of this programme about which we are talking is so vague that I at least do not know what it is we are talking about.

However, we do know that the United States Government has invited its allies, together with Japan and Israel (which have been referred to a great deal), to co-operate in the R & D programmes for an SDI. We have been invited both directly and indirectly, through NATO. The problem which we now have to face is whether, given that it is decided to co-operate in this R & D programme—which may be funded at a very high figure; it may not be the $3.7 billion which is spoken about for this current year; it may just be $3 billion—we do this unilaterally or in concert with our allies, and in particular our European partners. It is a very difficult decision.

I know that the Minister of State is fully aware of the advantages in unilateral co-operation. It is extremely difficult to arrange multilateral co-operation but, worse than that, were the 1958 agreement on the exchange of nuclear information to apply, there would be no hindrance to real technology transfer in a bilateral arrangement. There would most certainly be a hindrance to any such transfer given a multilateral arrangement.

This is a political matter. Given that the decision was taken that in some way or other we should co-operate in this R & D programme, the question that needs to be answered is whether the greater benefit we derive from doing so unilaterally counterbalances the benefits we lose by cutting ourselves off from our NATO partners. This is a matter for our political masters to decide.

In the particular programme which was laid before Congress, there were any number of matters with which we might well concern ourselves which do not in themselves affect the arms race as such. Many of these things will go on anyhow. They have been going on for years. They have been going on to a limited extent in this country, and they have certainly been going on in the United States, on the Continent, and without question in the USSR, and these are matters relating to information technology in general, matters relating to radar discrimination, and so on.

What we should be clear about is this: if we do become partners in any part of the research programme, it should be a partnership which helps us in our own technological future. Many of the technologies involved, particularly in the general field of information technology, can—and we must remember this—be applied both in the field of conventional arms and in the consumer electronics industry. It would be pretty awful for us if we were to contribute in a joint research programme and find ourselves barred, by the usual obligations, from using any of the new technology we might learn—given that there is new technology that we could learn—where we wanted to, or where our industry thought it would be wise to use it.

In other words, I would say that it is a necessary condition of our co-operation that it brings us benefit, and that it does not damage our own prospects. This means that there should be no limitations—and the Government should not agree to any limitations—on technology transfer, at any rate so far as we are concerned. We should be aware of any such restrictions which may occur if we engage in any multilateral arrangement with the United States.

The noble Earl asked which way co-operation can take place. As I see it, there are three ways. One is through companies, and then the companies would have to decide whether they bid for contracts on their own or in concert with American partners, and how much of their own resources they are likely to put into the kitty in order to find themselves in the front row of those chosen. Whether there are many companies, I do not know. My hunch is that there will not prove to be many.

Secondly, the Government might decide to help some of our research establishments co-operate directly with in-house research establishments of the Department of Defence. That would mean more money. If that were done I would again impose the condition that there be no bar to the use of any technology which might be learnt.

The third one is the dangerous one to which the noble Earl referred; namely, another brain drain. Here I should like to give some figures. The sums we are talking about now, or the sum which was originally talked about, was 3.7 billion dollars. Calculations have been made—and I know of three lots, two of them official—about the number of new, trained professional engineers and scientists who would be called for if this money were to be spent, and the first figure I had was 42,000, and that was an official figure. The figure I had this morning was 30,000 professional scientists and engineers additional to those who are already employed in the United States. I ask your Lordships, where are they coming from?

When the Apollo programme was launched in the 1960s and when the United States went hard on its civil nuclear power programme—and my friend the noble Lord, Lord Aldington, knows more about this than I do—they would never have got off as fast as they did in their civil nuclear programme had it not been for British nuclear engineers. I should like to know how our own average salaries for professional scientists and engineers compare with those which would be offered in the SDI programme. The rough figure which is being used to equate the money that is going to be available, or may be voted, per man is 100,000 dollars.

The figures I have been given for average salaries for professional scientists and engineers in this country are far lower. There will be an inducement. But I am quite sure that this matter will be kept under close review and scrutiny by Her Majesty's Government, and I am sure that the noble Baroness will see that attention is drawn to this particular problem in the right quarters.

Finally, I refer to one point, but it is a major point, and that is the ABM treaty. The Prime Minister was assured by the President that the ABM treaty would not be contravened. I myself had the good fortune to have a lengthy conversation with Mr. Weinberger and he said the same thing. On the other hand, the annexe to the report presented to Congress is highly disquieting because it refers there to a new category which can be tested; namely, sub-components. That I do not understand.

As the treaty reads at the present moment it is impossible to test or deploy ABM systems and components which are "space based, air based, sea based or mobile land based". Now we have a new category put in, sub-components. I have no doubt whatever that this is a matter which should be looked at closely. I am also impressed by the fact that the whole of the SDI programme, in the light of that annexe, has been described in a recent issue of Nature in this country and in the American newspapers as a sham and a fraud.

Just one last word about the Russians. The President has said that if his SDI succeeds he will provide them with the technology that comes out of the R & D programme. It is possible that the R & D programme would not succeed even if the Russians co-operated. But one thing I am quite certain of is that the Russians know as much about space—even though they may not know about fifth generation computers—as we do. They were there first, they were in the field long before the United States and they are there now. If the present situation of stand-off deterrence were in danger of being disturbed, I am certain that the Russians would take every possible step to see that it was not.

6.38 p.m.

Viscount Mersey

My Lords, as they say, "follow that". I am positively dazzled by the expertise of the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman. Like the noble Lord, Lord Rea, I am indeed an amateur. My arguments will by comparison be primitive and broad, and I shall happily give way to the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, on his great expertise if any of them are wrong.

I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for initiating this so far fascinating debate. I agreed with a lot of what he said. I only felt that he gave a slightly too precise definition of what the strategic defence initiative might turn out to be, particularly in view of what we have later heard from the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman.

The odd thing to me is that the deployment of what one might call strategic defence initiative weapons could well be dangerous, but conversely I do not think that there is anything new in the broad concept of strategic defence. It was towards the end of the Second World War that Werner von Braun announced that he had invented a weapon against which there could be no defence. This was the ballistic missile, the V2, which fell on us. Just before that, as noble Lords will remember, we had a cruise missile, the doodlebug, or V 1, which also fell on us. We learned how to down the doodlebugs, but we never learned how to down the V2s. Is not that possibly the root, and the historic, problem?

I do not think anyone can be stopped from looking at methods by which we might try to destroy a ballistic missile. Surely that is what the West has been doing ever since the first V2 hit London. In a way President Reagan's SDI is not much more than a large grant towards V2 defence. Yet it could be a dangerous grant because the warheads have changed completely from high explosive to nuclear, and that changes not just our attitude to strategic defence; it alters the theory of war.

Clausewitz wrote: War is a continuation of diplomacy by other means". That used to be the first commandment of military theory, but now nuclear weapons make a nonsense of all that. Nuclear war is not a continuation of diplomacy, or of anything. It is Armageddon: it is the end of everything. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary was fully aware of that when he said in his speech to RUSI that the nature of warfare between major powers was irrevocably altered 40 years ago, and he quoted Bernard Brodie, who said: Thus far the chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them". My right honourable friend expressed the view that the "D" of MAD (mutually assured destruction) should stand not for destruction but for deterrence. I think that is preferable, though I noted what the noble Lord, Lord Rea, said about that.

Therein lies the 64,000 dollar question about the stragetic defence initiative. What might it achieve? Might it increase deterrence, or might it make destruction more likely? The main conclusion that my right honourable friend draws is that we must wait and see. We must consider the implications of each development in research and, if deterrence seems more likely, we should pursue it; but if destruction seems more likely, we should stop.

Much of my right honourable friend's speech was not a speech so much as a series of questions, 15 of them. For example, he asked whether the process of moving towards a greater emphasis on active defence could be managed without generating dangerous uncertainty? He asked: Uncertainty apart, would the establishment of limited defences increase the threat to the civilian populations by stimulating a return to the targeting policies of the 1950s? and: Most fundamental of all, would the supposed technology actually work? We have just heard a great deal about that from the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary does not himself answer those questions. He says simply that they are key questions to be answered by the research that is being undertaken on both sides. It is both sides, indeed, for, as has already been said, the United States of America has no monopoly of strategic defence.

Noble Lords will know that Moscow is encircled by an ABM screen called GALOSH. This is in order under the ABM treaty of 1972. The Americans could similarly encircle New York or Washington, but they have not done so, presumably because they think it simply would not work.

I should be grateful if my noble friend Lady Young could tell us more of the nature of GALOSH; yet I shall be surprised if she does, because any intelligence she may have is presumably secret. I wonder whether she could tell us what this curious acronym stands for, at least. If I illustrate the various forms GALOSH might take, the benefits and dangers of any form of SDI become apparent.

As has been said already, the easiest way to stop an enemy missile attack is to destroy the missiles in their silos, submarines or aircraft. My noble friend Lord Bessborough was in favour of this. Particularly in view of what the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, has said, I regard that as incredibly dangerous. I regard it very nearly as a pre-emptive strike and I should think that there would be a strong chance that Word War III would break out if we tried to destroy these things in their silos. However, that is the easiest way to do it.

The hardest way is to wait until the missiles get to the other end, to the point where they become MIRVED. At the start of the trip only one ABM would be needed to destroy one ICBM, but by the end of the trip 10 or 20 would be needed, and there are only a few seconds in which to hit them.

I should imagine that the strategic defence initiative is concerned with the middle ground, with an area between these two extremes: one very dangerous and the other very difficult. The enemy missile could be attacked high in the sky before it had released its warheads and that would probably be over the North Pole for either side, for either America or Russia. In the case of Russia I doubt that Moscow would be the best point of departure for such an attack. Rather the ABMs or, much later, the lasers, would best be deployed along the Kola peninsula; and in the case of the United States of America they would best be deployed in Northern Alaska. Either of those deployments would break the 1972 ABM treaty. I suspect that GALOSH is Moscow based. If so, I do not see how it could stop more than a minute fraction of incoming missiles.

But the oddity about SDI is that it is not really about warheads but about missiles. A cruise missile is outside the ABM treaty and is therefore fair game for either side to attack. But a ballistic missile is within the treaty. It cannot be attacked and presumably if one comes over, we are meant to shout "Pax" or some such thing as: "Don't shoot it, you'll break the treaty", for all the world as if the ICBM was like a hen pheasant out of season. But that particular brand of hen pheasant could destroy a million of us. That is why it seems so logical to erect defences against it; defences, moreover, which are non-unclear and would kill no one.

The whole difficulty about the strategic defence initiative is that that argument, which is logical and seductive, could so easily increase the danger of a nuclear exchange. That is why it must be right to research it by all means but on no account deploy it unless NATO can agree with the Warsaw Pact that such a deployment would lessen the nuclear threat. Then both sides could negotiate a deployment, both would agree that the ABM treaty was obsolete and, very hopefully, both sides could make massive reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

But all that, as the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, has said, could be 10 or 20 years away. SDI is at the moment little more than a nebulous concept. It is hard to attack it, as we cannot know exactly what we are attacking. I was surprised to read in the paper this morning, as will have many noble Lords, that Denmark has dissociated itself from what is no more than a concept. I am also alarmed by Eureka, the French European system. I also read that the Germans were considering another system. The reason for that alarm is that there is an unfortunate precedent in the diversity of systems; that is, in radar that we have defending the NATO airfields. The radars are American, French, British and German systems which are incompatible. They have different IFFs. It is reckoned that in a conventional war we would lose three-quarters of our aircraft to our own surface-to-air missiles as they came back to land at the airfields.

If NATO is to have a strategic defence initiative, it must be uniform. That much is certain, but not much else is. Should NATO have strategic defence? We do not know. Let us see if it will work. Let us examine its psychological impact. Let us at every stage ask ourselves whether this is a contribution to deterrence or to destruction. Let us do so in consultation with our opponents in the Warsaw Pact. As the various SALT and START talks have shown, it is next to impossible to reduce weapons already deployed. But is is possible to agree on a weapons limitation, or even a ban, if the weapon is not yet deployed or developed. I feel that therein lies hope, and that is the way to look at the strategic defence initiative. Both sides should research it, then discuss its implications round a conference table in Geneva.

6.50 p.m.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, if I may, in a moment I shall follow the noble Viscount, Lord Mersey, on one of the points that he raised in his interesting speech, but first of all I should like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, on introducing this subject again. I do so for two main reasons. The first is because of the intrinsic importance of the subject itself. There is no other subject which we could discuss which has greater impact on the future of humanity. The second is because of the rapidity of movement in the subject itself—not merely the rapidity of technological movement, but the rapidity of opinion. For this reason it is appropriate, I think, to discuss this matter at fairly frequent intervals, as it is quite easy to find oneself out of date because of changes in position taken up by people who hitherto have seemed to take up rather different positions.

The speech to which reference has been made throughout the debate—an important speech made by the Foreign Secretary—is a case in point. As the noble Viscount, Lord Mersey, has said, the speech was a number of questions. The nature of the questions themselves, the fact that they were asked, the qualifications and the points at which the Foreign Secretary occasionally seemed to indicate an answer to some of his questions was all indicative, I think, of a very great deal of concern. The consequence of this concern has been a moving together of opinions. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, pointed to a movement together of opinion in Europe. He pointed out some differences, but I think that he would agree with me when i say that there is, as it were, a coagulation of concern among European nations about the position in which they find themselves at the moment.

Equally, I think that, inside our own country, those of us who used to argue on such questions as unilateral and multilateral can now see, I think, in the light of present developments, that these matters are no longer questions which should occupy our minds. We are in a different ball game. We are in a ball game in which we are, if I may mix the metaphors a bit, all in the same boat. It is this, I think, which is bringing us together in what one might call a gathering together of concern. I think it is also the case that opinion in political parties is beginning to move together a little. The Alliance and the Labour Party, and, I think, substantial elements in the Conservative Party and in the Government as well, are no longer concentrating as much as they used to on differences of emphasis. I think it is realised on all sides, or at least on many sides, that the issue is no longer anything short of survival or extinction. This is the question that we face.

In these circumstances, I think it is rather unfortunate that American Presidents seem to get themselves advised by such unfortunate people. Take the case of Mr. Richard Perle, for example, who devoted much of a long speech to an attack upon the Foreign Secretary—one which verged upon a personal attack. This issue is far too important to be dealt with in terms as to whether or not the people on both sides are off their heads. We are beginning to move into the situation in which the debate is starting to degenerate to that level. There is no point in discussion taking place at that level—"You are mad", or, "I am mad". Once you get down to that level, you have ceased to make any valuable contribution to the discussion whatsoever. This is why I was very glad to hear the distinguished contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, although so far as I understood it I do not think I agreed with all of it. Nonetheless, I recognised it as a valuable and intellectually distinguished contribution to this discussion.

I said just now that the questions were important. As the noble Viscount, Lord Mersey, said, one of the questions that the Foreign Secretary asked is whether the supposed technology would actually work. But the noble Viscount did not mention that the Foreign Secretary went on to say—and I quote: If the technology does work, what will be its psychological impact on the other side? This is an extremely important question. One always ought to ask oneself, "What are the consequences of my action upon my supposed opponent?" If one does not ask oneself that question, one avoids the consequences which may flow from one's own actions. That is why I think it is important that the Foreign Secretary went on to say: President Reagan has repeatedly made it clear that he does not seek superiority". In parenthesis, I may say that it does not seem to me to be consistently made clear, certainly by a large number of President Reagan's advisers, that they are not seeking superiority. But the Foreign Secretary continued with these words: But we would have to ensure that the perceptions of others were not different". There can be no doubt at all, I think, that whatever President Reagan has to say about it, the perception of many people is that President Reagan and his advisers are seeking just that superiority which the Foreign Secretary says that President Reagan himself denies seeking.

Of course, if it is the perception that this superiority is being sought, the consequences inevitably are (as has been made clear hundreds of times by various Soviet leaders over the position) that it will be responded to; that they will match weapon with weapon, system with system. This has been the record over the period.

Therefore, I think that the views expressed by such Americans as McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara deserve consideration in this context. This is something that they said in a recent joint article published in Foreign Affairs. I say "recent", but it was not that recent; it was published just before the death of President Andropov, I think. They said: When the President launches a defensive program openly aimed at making Soviet missiles 'impotent' while at the same time our own hard-target killers multiply, we cannot be surprised that a man like Andropov saw a threat 'to disarm the Soviet Union'. Given Andropov's assessment, the Soviet response to Star Wars is certain to be an intensification of both its offensive and defensive strategic efforts". I think that this must inevitably follow, and I think that it is obviously the argument, perhaps the chief argument, against the whole star wars concept.

Perhaps I may refer to a couple of the other questions put by Sir Geoffrey in that important speech. He said: if the ballistic missile indeed showed signs of becoming"— and the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, touched on this— in President Reagan's words, impotent and obsolete, how would protection be extended against the non-ballistic nuclear threat, the threat posed by aircraft or cruise missiles, battlefield weapons or, in the last resort, by covert action? Fundamentally, why star wars is out of the question, I think, is that you cannot shelter under a canopy because your canopy can always be got under. If you cannot get under it by any other means, you can send your agents there; and the situation is now arising—and I am told that it is not very far away—in which the nuclear weapon will be available at a level at which it can be conveyed by an individual into a different country. If that is so, then, however you cover yourselves (and even if it works, which most people do not seem to think it will) you will not be getting the protection that you imagine you are getting. If that is the case, we are embarked upon a very sad and serious course of events.

That brings me to one other point raised by the Foreign Secretary. He said: If it initially proved feasible to construct only limited defences, these would be bound to be more vulnerable than a comprehensive system to counter-measures. Would these holes in the dyke produce and even encourage a nuclear flood? 'The fact that the Foreign Secretary asked that question indicates that he must realise—I am sure he does; otherwise, he would not have touched on it—that there is a grave danger here that, if it is seen that here is a situation which will never recur, the temptation to pre-empt will become very great. For this reason I believe, as I have long believed, that the direction in which the safety of the world can be maintained is not by the proliferation of weaponry but by the reduction of weaponry. We must return to the conference table. We must seek to reduce, not to increase.

The description of weapons as defensive and offensive is often very unreal. One's defensive weapon is nearly always seen by one's opponents as an offensive weapon. Consequently, the notion that we can, as it were, protect ourselves and, as a result of that, create a safe position which everybody will recognise to be a safe position is an illusion. For that reason, President Reagan's star wars programme is one that is increasingly likely to be resisted in Europe, irrespective of political party, and it is one over which I hope the growing body of opinion in the United States, which has grave doubts about this whole proposition, will eventually prevail.

I have one final quotation from the Foreign Secretary. He says: Finally on the technology side, could we be certain that the new systems would permit adequate political control over both nuclear weapons and defensive systems, or might we find ourselves in a situation where the peace of the world rested solely upon computers and automatic decision-making? There is a very grave danger here. It is possible that, without even initiative on either side, a situation may develop in which we find that our ingenuity has taken the decision-making process out of our own hands. We may find, having become so clever, that we have succeeded in destroying ourselves. I suspect that the position is becoming urgent, and for this reason I think it right that this Chamber should discuss the matter again tonight.

Finally, I should like to quote something from Dr. Dahlitz, who has written an interesting book on this subject and who has studied the whole question of the growth of nuclear weaponry at close hand in the United Nations and in Geneva. She said: The adverse consequences of the SDI programme will not be limited to the superpowers. The strategy being adopted by the United States is just as relevant to the future of every nation, perhaps even more so to some. Two alternatives are sharply drawn: an accelerated arms race in the unattainable quest for superiority under the guise of SDI; or more arms control and mutual restraint in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter". I am encouraged by the thought that it is that thinking which informed the Foreign Secretary's speech, and it is that thinking which I hope will inform the reply which we are eager to receive from the noble Baroness, Lady Young, tonight.

7.3 p.m.

Lord Kagan

My Lords, I believe that the Foreign Secretary's speech has been misrepresented. One cannot read into it that he is presuming to advise the Americans whether it is right or wrong to pursue the SDI. I think he pointed out the difficulties for Europe; but there is no indication there that it was unwelcome. When one reads the European press—the German press in particular—one finds that their point of view is that the Americans are right in pursuing it but that Europe is not strong enough either technically or financially to take part in it. That is the conclusion and it is right, because the whole concept of a defensive system depends on the distance and on the time it takes for a missile to travel from its origin to its target.

To reach Western Europe from Russia is half the distance, and to reach Western Europe from the Warsaw Pact countries, like Czechoslovakia or Poland, is only one-third of the distance. You have only seconds to deal with it and the expense is enormously increased because of the short time that is left to deal with an incoming missile. So that, in the long run, the SDI system is a possibility for the Jnited States, but it would certainly not produce a shield for Western Europe. Furthermore, as has been pointed out so much more competently by previous speakers, one can get through with small aeroplanes, bombers and so on. This is one reason why the French have rejected outright anything to do with it, and why the Germans have reservations. It was Manfred WOrner, who is the Minister for Defence in the present German Government, who has stated that it would not help Europe to associate with it.

The Americans know that the Soviet Union is now over-concerned with China, and the Americans can always take the easy course of out-spending the Soviet Union. America's most cost-effective way of neutralising any danger from Europe is to support China because maintaining the balance of power between Russia and China will make America secure. All of my other points have already been made so ably by other noble Lords that I shall not detain your Lordships any longer.

7.7 p.m.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, the strategic defence initiative has found very few friends indeed in the course of this debate. Indeed, after listening carefully, I can recall only one substantial argument against the very powerful and well-informed case put by my noble friend who introduced the debate. This is a point which the noble Lord, Lord Home, raised in an intervention which was followed up by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough; namely, that the Russians are going ahead with their research and the West cannot be left behind.

I would ask the noble Baroness whether, when she replies, she can tell us what is the Government's assessment of the Soviet capability in space ABM. We all know that the Russians are way ahead in ground-based anti-ballistic missile defence, but that is not the point. That is permitted by the ABM treaty. It was tried by the Americans and discarded because it was not cost-effective. There is no question here that the Russians are ahead in that form of research and development. But my question is: what evidence is there that they are ahead in space-based anti-ballistic missile defence? To be honest, I should be surprised if they were. I have never seen any evidence that they are.

What I have noticed over the years is that there is one common factor in all Soviet proposals for arms control and disarmament. The one common factor is that, if carried out, those proposals would tilt the balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union and against the West. I challenge anyone to find an exception to that rule. Therefore, when the Soviet Union propose a ban on the development of space-based ABM, I believe it is common sense to assume that they are not ahead and that they would consider it to be in their interests to have an agreement to ban the development and production of these weapons. I would add this. If they are ahead or are catching up, is that not a further argument for the West and the Soviet Union reaching agreement about the development and testing of these weapons? That was really the only substantive argument I heard during the debate in favour of the strategic defence initiative.

A very interesting point was made by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, to whom we are all so particularly grateful for his simple illustration of the basic defect of the strategic defence initiative. Suppose, he said, 30 birds come over and you have one gun. You can kill only two birds. This is of course a profound remark and goes to the heart of the problem of the SDI. One can no longer doubt the capability in due course of the United States to produce the means of knocking down a missile in flight. We know they can do it. The question is: what proportion of missiles can they knock down? The noble Earl put his finger on it in a very homely illustration, or, perhaps I should say, in an illustration which a noble Earl might be expected to find homely.

The Earl of Bessborough

My Lords, perhaps I may intervene for one moment and go back to the earlier point of the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, about whether or not the Russians are ahead of us. The noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, has returned, fortunately, because it would be better if he intervened now. The noble Lord said that in space he thought the Soviet Union were ahead of us and that they had started earlier, though they might not be ahead in the fifth generation of computers, which of course will be very important in space. But I think that it was not only the noble Lord, Lord Home, or myself who made the point that the Soviet Union were ahead; the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, himself, said that they were ahead.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, I hesitate to speak for the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, and so I shall simply say this. Whoever is right, even if it is right that the Soviet Union are ahead, it is all the greater reason for reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union to stop the development and testing of these weapons.

One argument which we have not heard today but about which we heard a good deal in the last debate was that this is only research, that it may well come to nothing and that it may well be abandoned. We have not heard it this time. I think that we would agree on both sides of the House and in all quarters that, if in fact this research fails, if the project peters out, the decision to launch this initiative will have done a great deal more harm than good to the West.

At the very least it has diverted resources which could have been used in developing the advanced technology which could strengthen the conventional forces of NATO. It has diverted attention from other paths to peace. It has complicated and undermined the arms control discussions at Geneva, because the Americans decline to discuss and negotiate about SDI. There is no question that if the research fails, it will have done a great deal of harm. It has divided the NATO countries; not only the European NATO allies from the United States, but to some extent one NATO ally from another in Europe. Finally, if it fails, it will have further weakened the reputation of the United States as a world leader. If the research fails, it may prove to have been much better not to have launched the initiative.

But let us now suppose that it succeeds. What then? Two predictions at least can be made with complete confidence. First, if the research succeeds, testing and development will follow almost immediately. Of course there will be negotiations—I know that the noble Baroness is ready to talk to us about the assurances that the Prime Minister received about negotiations—but what will these negotiations mean? Will they really mean that President Reagan will agree with the Russians to stop development and testing? Will he turn to Congress and to the huge military, industrial and research interests that will have built up and say, "Thank you, the research has been successful. It will work now. We know that SDI will work technologically. We know that a lot of public money has been sunk into it but I have decided to scrap it"? Do we really think that President Reagan will ever say, "I have changed my mind. I said that SDI would be a great blessing to civilisation and to the United States, and I said there was great moral purpose behind SDI, but I have changed my mind. Admittedly, the research has succeeded, but I have decided not to do it"? Of course that is nonsense. If the research succeeds, almost immediately—

Lord Zuckerman

My Lords, will the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, repeat what he said about President Reagan? Is he assuming that President Reagan will be taking the decision about deployment? Do I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, thinks that President Reagan will be in office and will take the decision about deployment?

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, the noble Lord has corrected me quite properly. President Reagan cannot have a third term. Some will be disappointed at this and some will be perhaps reassured. He cannot have a third term and therefore I should have said the United States President. No United States President in these circumstances will turn and change his mind and abandon the project if the research has succeeded.

Lord Gladwyn

My Lords, I do not think President Reagan ever said that he would scrap it. He said that he would give the secret to the Russians.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, I wish to create a precedent in keeping to my time in this debate—a very valuable precedent which has not been observed by every previous speaker. Therefore I do not propose to give way again.

The first thing that can be predicted is that testing and development will go ahead if the research succeeds and the negotiations will be quite meaningless. The United States will go through the motions of negotiating and go on to test and develop.

The second prediction that can be made if the research succeeds is that there will be a long transitional period, 20 years at least, while the United States is developing, producing and deploying this huge, enormous and expensive weapon system and achieving the capability to intercept and knock down a proportion of ballistic missiles—the two birds out of 30 to which the noble Earl referred.

During this 20 years, we ask ourselves, what will the Soviet Union be doing? That is what we ought to ask ourselves. First, they will be increasing the number of their offensive ballistic missiles. They will be able to increase their number probably more quickly and certainly more cheaply than the Americans can produce the means of knocking them down. They will specially produce the air breathing weapons. I have not seen any technology with any promise of knocking down cruise missiles. They will be improving their decoys, their jamming and all their counter-measures to the new ABMs. They will also be developing an anti-satellite capability to knock down the command and information structure and also the actual space-based weapons of the United States. If the research succeeds, theses two predictions are quite inevitable.

How much safer will the world be at the end of it? How will this vast escalation of nuclear capability benefit the people of the world, either in the East or in the West? Many of these weapons will have to be designed to fire automatically. The noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, mentioned knocking down ballistic missiles in the boost phase. It can be done in theory and in principle, but of course it has to be done within three minutes because that is as long as the boost phase lasts. So the weapon has to be capable of targeting itself, firing itself and hitting the target in the boost phase within three minutes. It must be automatic. It is a fine prospect to have these weapons trigger happy at three minutes notice and automatic.

Noble Lords on both sides of the House have paid tribute to the statement made by the Foreign Secretary on this subject. The Foreign Secretary said in coded diplomatic language exactly what I myself have been saying. I would beg the noble Baroness the Minister, when she answers this debate, to assure the House that Sir Geoffrey Howe will show the courage of his convictions; that he will have the support of his Cabinet colleagues; and that the United Kingdom Government will distance themselves from this dangerous and ill-considered project.

7.21 p.m.

Lord Graham of Edmonton

My Lords, I begin by confessing that when we last debated these matters my first optimistic reactions to them, arising from their announcement as part of a package, had begun to wane. I reminded the House then that in an earlier debate the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, had contrasted his views with mine and had stated that he took a more jaundiced view of the SDI than I did. I said then that his jaundice was contagious; but in view of developments since, I venture to suggest that we have a raging contagion.

That is no bad thing. Even within tight time-scales or with pleas for early decisions, it is healthy for our democracy and for our relationships to encourage scepticism, especially on a matter so fundamental to the future of mankind. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that we have no need to apologise to the House for returning to this subject. He deserves our thanks, and he has mine, for a very good opening speech. His proposals for British action struck a very sympathetic chord here. I put the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, in the same category.

Whatever one may think of many other aspects of the Government's foreign and defence policy, the speech made by the Foreign Secretary on 15th March deserves not only our attention and appreciation but also our thanks. I do not seek to drive in wedges, or to reveal cracks in the Government or divisions between the Foreign Office and No. 10. Nor do I seek to underline apparent contradictions with previous positions. I simply read the Foreign Secretary's speech and concluded that it was made by an honest man with honest doubts—and with the honesty and wisdom to state those doubts openly and publicly, with profit to the debate and to our country. I assume that his speech must be taken as an authoritative statement by the Government; I take it to be just that.

I do not view the recent and current signs of unease or questioning by the European Western allies as a matter of either high drama or deep depression. The search for a joint response to the United States invitation to participate in the star wars research programmes is a public sign that all is not well—or, at least, that all is not unified—within the relationships with the United States. Let the debate continue. Yes, it may turn into an open dispute and there may be consequences for the Atlantic alliance. So be it.

Recent history shows a clear relationship between the now more vocal public scepticism of the SDI and the lack of enthusiasm for the progress of the Geneva arms talk. The acceleration of the SDI was sprung upon us at the same time as the parameters for the Geneva talks were revealed. I suspect that first natural questions on the SDI were stifled—not least due to a desire to ensure that the Geneva talks got off to a good start.

Our own Prime Minister received much credit for the balanced package she agreed with President Reagan last December. It was designed to straddle the twin objectives of alliance loyalty and implicit reservations about the SDI. While we have seen the Geneva talks getting bogged down in arguments over procedure, we have watched the whole SDI initiatives come alight by the speeches of our own Foreign Secretary and West Germany's Foreign Secretary. I, for my part, applaud them both for their candour and political wisdom.

However we may view the present open debate, there is little doubt that the reaction of the United States has been swift. I make no complaint about that. In fact, provided the debate is conducted in a comradely spirit, without rancour or an accusing tone of disloyalty, it will do the alliance no harm at all. I put the recent visit to London by Mr. Paul Nitze in the bracket of indicating that the United States sensed immediately that there was a rift in the lute.

Mr. Nitze took the opportunity, when delivering the Alasdair Buchanan Memorial Lecture in late March, of trying to smooth ruffled feathers. In essence he told his audience that the SDI was not an attempt to achieve strategic superiority; that it would provide an incentive for arms control; that it would involve a co-operative relationship with the Soviet Union; and that it would assist the management of the transition towards a more defence-based balance.

In any case, said Mr. Nitze, the present structure of mutual deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation would necessarily obtain "for many, many years". It was Ian Davidson, writing in the Financial Times on 1st April, who described the speech by Mr. Nitze as depending too much on faith, hope and charity: Faith in the can-do of American technology, hope that the Russians will play along, and charity from the sceptical Europeans". It is well understood but not universally agreed that hitherto there have been powerful supporters of the view—based on real evidence—that for the past 40 years the peace has been kept by what is sometimes called the balance of terror or mutual assured destruction; it is sometimes rephrased as mutual assured security or deterrence. There is nothing wrong—a great deal that is right—in the view that before moving positively away from that premise one needs to be very certain of the new alternative defence policy.

We are still little further forward in understanding, let alone agreeing, where research ends and development begins—never mind where production, procurement or deployment begin. Hanging over every move must be a constant assessment of shifts in policy by one side or another which threatens stability. The destabilisation of regimes or of world peace should not be either an option or a consequence of pursuing with vigour the star wars initiative. Let us not lose too much sleep if we fear damage arising from genuine doubt. It is not only Britain, or the British Government or British political parties, or the British people, who are concerned so far as star wars are concerned. They are all at it. In the United States we noted the comments of Mr. Slesinger of the Republican Party, of Mr. McNamara and of Mr. Brown of the Democratic Party, and of the former President Ford.

Let us examine what is happening in Western Germany. In a recent debate in the Bundestag, Chancellor Kohl praised President Reagan literally to the skies—justifying the SDI as politically necessary and in the security interests of the West as a whole. Chancellor Kohl said that President Reagan would go down in history as a great figure. The House may not be surprised to learn that in the same debate the West German SDP accused the Chancellor of ignoring the strategic and political complexities of the strategic defence initiative and of spreading the na¼ve or cynical illusion that existing defence strategy could be overcome by technological innovation rather than by political negotiation.

Yet it was Hans Dietrich Genscher, West Germany's Foreign Secretary, who said at the same time as that debate, less than a week before the statement by our Foreign Secretary which we are debating today, that the ties which bind the United States with Western Europe should be developed through close and trusting consultation, and that the two partners should not be decoupled through technological innovation". It was in that statement that Herr Genscher gave the clear signal to Moscow that the deployment of the SDI must not be taken as a foregone conclusion. According to a report in the Financial Times of 19th March, Herr Genscher said: As long as there is no better strategy for deterring war, the strategy of flexible nuclear response must remain. Nothing, but nothing, must be allowed to happen that endangers this highly moralistic goal. Every new development must therefore be examined to see whether it brings us closer to the goal of preventing war or not". In an editorial, the Financial Times commented that Herr Genscher's statement marked probably his most public expression of, if not open opposition then at least suspicion about the efficacy of the American space weapons plans. But it is not only those who may be viewed as natural critics who have raised questions. The shifting nuances of the commitment of the United States in recent months has caused worries ever since the talks in January between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz.

My right honourable friend Mr. Dennis Healey told the House of Commons in the foreign affairs debate on 25th April that the real trouble is that the American Administration's position has changed in worrying ways since the SDI was announced. In December the National Security Adviser, General McFarlane, said that America would be prepared in negotiations to bargain about research as well as deployment. In January, President Reagan said that America would not bargain about research but would bargain about deployment, yet in recent months Mr. Weinberger, and many other American spokesmen, have said that America will not bargain even about deployment if deployment appears to be feasible.

Uncertainty about the future is being fostered by such vacillation. It was also my right honourable friend Mr. Dennis Healey who made the undoubtedly strong, but true, assessment of what such vacillation can mean when he said that there is little argument in the United States that the euphoria engendered by the strategic defence initiative is rapidly subsiding; no longer being seen as capable of making nuclear weapons obsolete as President Reagan initially suggested.

We can do without the remarks of the American Defence Secretary, Mr. Weinberger, if he is quoted correctly, when he said: If we can get a system which is effective and which we know can render their weapons impotent we would be back in a situation we were in, for example, when we were the only nation with a nuclear weapon". We have to see the current debate, in which the remarks of Mr. Weinberger are a contribution, as one in which the Foreign Secretary's speech is seen by me as a helpful, not detrimental, force. If we are to be taken seriously as Europeans and as allies of America we have to conduct such debate in public so far as this is prudent or possible.

I am glad that the speech by the Foreign Secretary has stimulated noble Lords into returning once more to this matter. My noble friend Lord Rea described that speech as cautious and diplomatic. It was all that, but we have to ask ourselves—and no doubt the Minister who replies will answer—what was its purpose? What did it seek to achieve? For my part, the way in which, one after the other, speakers returned time after time to the 15 questions it contained is indicative of the effect it has had. Clearly, by design, the speech was long on questions but short on solutions. I make no complaint about that, but such questions by such a senior British politician assume a significance that we cannot ignore.

The questions Sir Geoffrey raises are of some considerable importance. They are: what should happen if and when decisions are required on moving from the research to the development stage? How best do we curb rather than stimulate a new arms race? Will the supposed technology actually work? At what stage will the judgments be made which will depend upon technical assessments about the feasibility of defence? What weight will be given to the wider strategic implications of the switch in defence strategy? Can we afford, even now, to wait for the scientists and military experts to deliver their results at some later stage? He also said: Research into new weapons and study of their strategic implications must go hand in hand otherwise research may acquire an unstoppable momentum of its own". There was much more that I wanted to say but time is not on my side. I simply conclude by saying that a growing convinction exists, as Sir Geoffrey referred to in his speech, that there are ample grounds to justify the SDI research programme; if only on the ground that Russia has been pursuing similar studies for many years. That the hostility towards the American initiatives from Russia have been so sharp clearly indicates Russia's appreciation that, in this particular field, a gap once pronounced may—I stress "may"—be in the process of being closed.

We just do not know, as the Foreign Secretary told the House of Commons on 20th March. He said: As members of the American Administration have made clear, we cannot know what the research programme that the President and Secretary Weinberger have directed will uncover". We can but blanch at the enormous costs to be borne by taxpayers everywhere on that journey of discovery. We should have no such reservations in thanking both the Foreign Secretary and the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for creating the opportunity for holding this debate tonight.

7.35 p.m.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Young)

My Lords, we are all grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for introducing today's debate. The implications for alliance security and the future of arms control of the strategic defence initiative are clearly worthy of the fullest possible examination. While I do not find myself in agreement with everything that has been said I am confident that today's debate has been an important contribution to that process.

I believe that it is necessary to keep firmly at the forefront of our minds just what the strategic defence initiative is. It is first and foremost a programme of research designed to establish whether technological advances will make it possible to create non-nuclear defences against the threat of nuclear ballistic missiles. As President Reagan said in his speech of March 1983 which originally launched the initiative—and he repeated this only last week in Strasbourg—such an ambitious undertaking will take time. Indeed, it is certain that many years of effort will be required on many fronts before clear results can be expected, far less achieved. It is also important to bear in mind the long established and wide-ranging space research programme being conducted by the Soviet Union. Indeed, I am sure we all appreciate the point made by my noble friend Lord Home in his interjection earlier in the debate. Given the considerable scale of this activity, I find it inconceivable that we should allow them a potential advantage in this area.

A number of noble Lords in the course of this debate—in particular my noble friends Lord Bessborough and Lord Mersey and the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew—asked about Soviet research on ballistic missile defences. I confirm that the Soviet research programme has been in operation since the 1960s. ABM defences around Moscow are the only type in existence in the world. There is an extensive programme on ballistic missile defence relevant technologies and these include high powered lasers, electric pulse beams and heavy lift capability. I refer to what the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, said about space. The Soviets were the first to put a satellite into space, to deploy ICBMs, a fractional orbital bombardment system, and have the only operational ASAT in existence. Since the mid-1970s they have conducted more than twice as many space launches as the rest of the world.

We need to remember also that existing treaty obligations permit research activity by both sides: indeed, it is impossible to conceive of an arms control agreement which would enable the parties to monitor the diverse research activities under way in the institutes and laboratories on both sides.

At this point I respond to the question asked by my noble friend Lord Bessborough about the Government's view on the multi-layered defence concept. My noble friend outlined the major elements of the defence system currently envisaged by the United States Administration. Many of these are at the limits of existing technology. The whole point of the SDI research programme is to establish whether advances are possible which would make reliance on defence systems a feasible option. It will be a formidable undertaking, to overcome the technical obstacles involved and to circumvent the likely countermeasures.

At the same time I believe it is clearly understood in the United States as in Europe that the possible deployment of new systems of defence against ballistic missiles would be a matter for negotiation under the ABM treaty. This is a point to which the Prime Minister drew attention in her address to the United States Congress on 20th February and it is a view fully shared by President Reagan. In the speech before the European Parliament to which I referred earlier, the President said: When the time for decisions on the possible production and deployment of such systems comes we must and will discuss and negotiate these issues with the Soviet Union". In this connection the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked a question about the US attitude to international law and, if I understood him correctly, he suggested that the United States Administration are adopting a somewhat cavalier attitude towards the observance of international agreements. That, I suppose, is a matter of opinion but I would only observe that, as far as concerns the arms control agreements, which are relevant to our debate today, the United States Administration have consistently made clear their intention of abiding within existing agreements.

It is against this background that the Government are giving our full support to the United States research programme. The basis of our position is clearly and succinctly set out in the statement agreed between my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and President Reagan in December last year. The Camp David four points, as they have come to be known, remain fully valid today; and, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennet suggested, I will repeat them. They are, first, that the United States and Western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments; secondly, that the deployment of active defences would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation; thirdly, that the overall aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence; and, finally, that the East-West negotiations should seek to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive weapons on both sides.

I should now like to say a few words on the current United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva, the first round of which ended on 23rd April, a matter to which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney referred. I have already had occasion to tell the House of the Government's warm welcome for the opening of these talks and of our strong support for their primary objectives—terminating the arms race on earth and preventing one in space.

The first round of talks confirmed predictions that they will be long and difficult. This should not surprise anyone, given the nature and complexities of the issues being addressed, but in many respects I am bound to say that the Soviet performance in the first round fell short of what we might have hoped for. The proposals referred to recently in public by Mr. Gorbachev were in essence a restatement of previous Soviet positions, and would merely enshrine existing imbalances in favour of the Soviet Union. That is not acceptable to the West, any more than is the Soviet position that progress in the reduction of nuclear weapons is dependent upon US acceptance of an unverifiable agreement restraining defensive research.

The Government very much hope that during the next round of talks, which begins on 30th May, the Soviet representatives will be prepared to get down to serious negotiations, conducted around the table, and not through an exchange of public statements. There is no doubt in my mind that such an approach would be clearly welcomed by the West and would receive an equally constructive response.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, drew attention to the speech delivered at the Royal United Services Institute on 15th March by my right honourable and learned friend the Foreign Secretary. I am most grateful for the constructive comments on this speech made by, I believe all noble Lords taking part in the debate this evening; and perhaps I may confirm right away to the noble Lord, Lord Rea, who asked about the support of the Government for this that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made it clear that the speech was made in pursuance of the policy set out in the four points which she had agreed with President Reagan at Camp David in December. As the speech made clear, the questions raised were not a priori judgments. All agreed that these questions need addressing as research proceeds.

From what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and other noble Lords, I am confirmed in the impression that my right honourable and learned friend's speech was a valuable stimulus to the debate on the implications for the NATO Alliance of the SDI. Given the nature of some of the views expressed by some commentators immediately after the speech was made, it is important to be clear what it was that my right honourable and learned friend was trying to do. First of all, he was not trying, as some have suggested, to point up differences of approach between the United States and its allies. On the contrary, the overall approach was firmly anchored in the Camp David four points to which I have already referred. Lest there be any doubt about this, I remind the House that at the time the State Department spokesman said that there was no divergence between British and American views.

Secondly, my right honourable and learned friend did not set out to propose cut and dried answers to the questions raised by the SDI; far from it. As he was careful to point out, the questions he raised about the future were questions and in no sense a priori judgments. Moreover, the questions raised by my right honourable and learned friend are those which the American Administration have been addressing over recent weeks and months. Current research may eventually produce an answer to the question whether it will be possible to enhance security through increased reliance on defensive systems, but for the foreseeable future we shall have to continue to rely on deterrence based on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation. While research continues, we need to study a range of complex issues: the effectiveness, survivability and cost of defences; the impact of the introduction of new defence systems both on the Soviet Union and on the alliance as a whole and the implications for arms control.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, also referred to the debate among the NATO countries and this was referred to also by the noble Lord, Lord Graham of Edmonton. The speech of my right honourable and learned friend on 15th March was intended as a balanced contribution to that debate. The Government attach the fullest importance to NATO cohesion. This is not possible save on the basis of thorough consultation among allies. We therefore welcome the assurances of American spokesmen, most recently from the President himself in Strasbourg, that the United States will continue to consult in the closest possible fashion with the allies as the SDI research programme proceeds.

For our part, we shall continue to contribute actively to this process of consultation. That process is now firmly launched. In addition to extensive bilateral exchanges, noble Lords will be aware that the SDI research programme was discussed at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 27th March. It will, I am sure, again be discussed when the North Atlantic Council meets in Lisbon later this month. Indeed, one might wish that there had been evidence of as much debate in the capitals of Eastern Europe on the implications of the Soviet research programme as there has been in the capitals of North America and Western Europe about the SDI. I believe the debate hitherto has shown a common determination to maintain alliance security while working for arms control agreements which would preserve that security at lower levels of weapons.

Within the consultative process one issue of particular topicality is the possible participation of the United Kingdom and of other countries in SDI research. I am sure we all listened with great interest to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, on this matter and I think we shall all read what he said in Hansard tomorrow for better understanding of it. During her visit to Washington in February my right honourable friend the Prime Minister told the United States Congress of her hope that British scientists could be associated with SDI research. Since then of course we, in common with a number of other countries, have received a formal invitation from the US Secretary for Defense to participate in the programme.

As noble Lords will readily appreciate, response to this invitation raises a large number of practical questions covering a wide range of interested parties which deserve proper study; and noble Lords this evening have raised a number of questions about them, but the Government intend to reply to the United States invitation soon and to reply positively.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, in the course of his remarks asked a question about what we meant by participation in SDI research. I can only respond to him by saying that participation can obviously assume a number of forms. For instance, it might simply involve British and American institutes getting together to tackle a particular theoretical problem, or it could entail a British company tendering either on its own or in association with other companies to undertake a discrete element of the research programme. British scientists and engineers have a wide range of talent and experience. We shall want to ensure that whatever form participation takes those skills are utilised in the most advantageous way possible.

The noble Lord went on to make two proposals about how this discussion might be carried forward and what Europe might do. The first proposal was to establish a study by a group of what perhaps might be known as "wise men" appointed by NATO governments. I hope from what I have just said on the amount of consultation taking place that the noble Lord will understand that we believe that adequate forums already exist within the alliance for the discussion of questions such as those which were raised by my right honourable and learned friend in his speech.

On the second point that the noble Lord raised, which was also raised by my noble friend Lord Bessborough, on what has been known as the Eureka project, there is common ground among the leading technological nations in Europe that means must be found to close the technological gap between Europe and the Japanese and the United States. We believe that the weakness is not so much in the quality of European research but in shortcomings in its exploitation which progress towards the establishment of common European standards and the completion of the internal market will help to remedy. But we are also interested in ideas for increased research collaboration, particularly if the initiative for that comes from the firms and research institutes involved, and we are in close touch with the French on their Eureka proposal. Discussions on that are continuing and the United Kingdom will remain fully involved in those.

The noble Viscount, Lord Mersey, and the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, asked whether SDI was negotiable with the Soviet Union and pressed that point. I can only confirm that we have consistently welcomed the readiness of the United States to discuss with the Russians research programmes on strategic defence and the whole offensive-defensive relationship. There are problems in constraining research, but any SDI-related deployment would in view of treaty obligations have to be a matter for negotiation. I repeat again that President Reagan and my right honourable friend the Prime Minister are in full agreement on that. The President has said that SDI will be on the table in the negotiations along with everything else. He has confirmed the readiness of the United States to negotiate any BMD deployment so that it might reduce the nuclear threat without giving the United States any unilateral advantage.

Perhaps I may answer one further question put to me by my noble friend Lord Bessborough about British scientists taking part in the SDI programme. As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said, we support SDI research and hope that British scientists will share in it. We welcome the invitation of the United States to participate. Some British companies have already engaged in preliminary studies which are relevant to SDI, but there is no question of unconditionally endorsing activities beyond research. It is also important that any participation should be based on fair access to United States research and markets, which is a point that was made by the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman.

Finally, I should like to return to the central theme of our discussion this afternoon—the debate within NATO on the SDI programme. To those noble Lords who have expressed doubts about the wisdom of proceeding down this road—and there have been some this evening—I feel that I cannot do better than refer to recent remarks by someone who is no stranger to your Lordships' House—the Secretary-General of NATO. My noble friend Lord Carrington gave it as his view that: It would be very imprudent of the United States not to be conducting research of its own in the light of what we know of Soviet capabilities and interests in this field; and that America's Allies would have reason to be critical if they woke up one morning to find that the Soviet Union had made a strategically significant breakthrough for which the United States was unprepared That is the point of departure for the Camp David four points on which Her Majesty's Government's approach to SDI has been and will continue to be based. The need for research, not to achieve superiority but to maintain balance in the light of Soviet activity, the requirement to respect treaty obligations should research lead to the possibility of deployment, and the agreed aim of enhancing and not undercutting deterrence will continue to inform both our contribution to the NATO debate and our own approach to participation in SDI research.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, may I first put one fact very briefly on the record? Both the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, and the Minister of State drew attention to the fact that the Soviet Union alone had an operational anti-satellite capability. In judging the significance of that fact we must never forget that the United States had an operational anti-satellite capability 20 years ago, which it discontinued because it was not cost effective. One has to think why things are done the way that they are done.

I think that it has been a remarkably satisfying debate. The House is grateful to the noble Baroness for the gloss that she was able to put on the speech of Sir Geoffrey Howe, which said in effect that it was what we thought it was; that he meant it, and it said neither more nor less than it said.

I think that it is seldom that a speech by a British Cabinet Minister completely unites either House of Parliament. This one did. It completely united this House. Perhaps it would not be out of place at this moment if we were to remind ourselves that for the first time in its history this House is now more representative of the political opinions of the British people than the House of Commons is. It is therefore of more importance that a given statesman should unite this House than it would have been if he had succeeded in uniting this House five years ago. My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.