HL Deb 11 March 1985 vol 461 cc94-105

8.46 p.m.

Lord Hatch of Lusby rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will define their attitudes towards the application of United Kingdom law to British and United States servicemen in their relations with British civilians.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in rising to ask this Question, I want to make it clear from the start that my objective in tabling it is to give the spokesman for the Government an opportunity to clear up a great deal of confusion and concern on a matter of widespread public interest and worry. In the attempts I have made on three occasions to get this cleared up through Starred Questions there seems to have been a certain amount of confusion, particularly between the word "law" and the word "jurisdiction". On two occasions the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, insisted all the way through Question Time that British and American servicemen came under British law, in particular under the Criminal Justice Act 1967. He also insisted that the rules of engagement as issued by the Ministry of Defence also came under that law.

The Minister will know that widespread concern has been shown in a number of cases of American servicemen's actions in regard to civilians and in one case to a member of the RAF and the consequential jurisdiction which was carried out by the American forces under the courts martial. Since I first asked that question I have had letters and telephone calls from all over the country, from Scotland to Cornwall, about this matter. I believe this will give an opportunity to the Minister to make the situation abundantly clear.

I want the Minister to answer three questions, and I wish to try to avoid any of the legal jargon so that we talk directly to the public concerned in this grave matter. The first question concerns the publication in a number of newspapers earlier this year of what at least purported to be certain details of the rules of engagement as issued by the Ministry of Defence. The straightforward question that I should like to ask the Minister is this. Has the Ministry of Defence given authority to British forces guarding nuclear installations to use firearms against unarmed anti-nuclear demonstrators? I may say that a good deal of surprise has been expressed particularly in legal circles, at the report that not just people are concerned; it is not apparently just a question of self-defence that is being quoted in regard to this rule of engagement—which, I think, is Section 7—but also property. And I believe that it is for the first time, if these are reports are correct, that firearms are authorised to be used to protect property.

I am well aware that the Minister will have to say that the rules of engagement are classfied; yes, they are. But would he not agree with me that if there are widespread newspaper reports, such as there were in January of this year, purporting to relate the specific authority given by the Ministry of Defence, it is our task in Parliament to make quite clear not the details of those rules of engagement but at least to what extent they apply and to what extent they do not apply. It is also our task to establish the extent to which those newspaper reports were correct, and if they were correct, then, surely, it is clear that in this instance the Ministry of Defence is overriding the important Section 3 of the 1967 Act.

I think that it is worthwhile quoting that Section 3 so as to be quite sure that it is on the record what we are talking about. Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 reads: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders, or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large". According to Ministers, this law applies to British soldiers, despite whatever may be within the rules of engagement. But it cannot be held, surely, that the word "reasonable" can be applied to what is reported in the press as the authority given by the Ministry of Defence to British soldiers guarding nuclear sites to shoot demonstrators even if they are running away; in other words, to shoot unarmed demonstrators.

I hope that despite the classified nature of the rules of engagement, the Minister will be able to make it quite clear to this House and to the public that this is not the case; because there is a danger here that if the Minstry of Defence or any other ministry is issuing orders or giving authority outwith the law, this then becomes legislation by the Executive and not by Parliament. In this case, so far as the rules of engagement are concerned, the most that Parliament can do is to censure the Government for what they have done. It has no power to prevent these acts from being carried out or these orders from being issued. As we have the authority of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor on the dangers of an elective dictatorship with a Government with such a huge majority as the present Government, then this becomes even more dangerous to the whole responsibility of Parliament for the conduct of affairs in our country.

The second question I should like to ask the Minister relates to the powers of United States forces in this country. I should like to ask him, again directly, this question. Can United States forces use firearms when guarding either nuclear or non-nuclear bases without being brought to trial for murder or manslaughter under British law if somebody is killed? Certainly, the American forces believe that they have the right to protect property. But, as far as I am able to discover, the American forces have the authority to shoot demonstrators without, as our forces might well have, and, indeed, have had on a number of occasions in Northern Ireland, having to account to a court on charges of murder or manslaughter. When the Visiting Forces Act is put into operation, as it has been, could it apply to the case of an American serviceman on any kind of military base, nuclear or non-nuclear, who had killed a demonstrator? Would the Visiting Forces Act come into operation, could it come into operation, and would it then be possible, as would seem to be the logic, that the American court would accept the plea of justification and therefore would override Section 3 of the 1967 Act?

This is not a matter which is simply a figment of my imagination. The House of Commons defence committee, in its report published last July, stated specifically as one of its recommendations, Recommendation No. 8, on page 17: we recommend that the rules of engagement issued to armed Servicemen at nuclear bases, and the manner in which they are issued, should be made identical for British and American Servicemen". Then it went on to deal with the question of the differences in English and Scottish law into which I shall not go tonight.

In their response to that report, published in January of this year, the Government had this to say. They first admitted that there are detailed differences in the orders and procedures of British and American guards at nuclear sites. Then at the end of that paragraph (which is paragraph 17 of their response) they said: following the Committee's recommendation [the Government] will discuss further what more might be done to align procedures".

I should like to ask the noble Lord who is to reply what further action the Government have taken so far. The concern that was shown by the defence committee over the anomalies between the rules of engagement for British forces and those for American forces based in this country was made quite plain in that report. We should like to know what action the Government have taken. But, as I say, it must not be forgotten that it is not simply a question of the anomalies between the rules of engagement on nuclear sites, because, so far as my information goes, the Americans are entitled under their own regulations to use firearms in non-nuclear bases as well as in nuclear bases.

My third question concerns the relationship between the American forces and British civilians, and I should like to ask: can United States forces based in this country escape the penalties of British law for civilian crimes? I would instance as a civilian crime one that has been termed in American courts-martial "negligent homicide", which I take to be, under British law, manslaughter.

I have two instances out of many to cite tonight, to point up the issue that I am raising and the natural concern that has been, and is being, felt in many parts of the country. The first I would briefly refer to goes back to 1965 when in the town of Dunoon in Scotland an American naval man ran into a mother pushing a baby in a pram. The baby was killed and the mother maimed, and the American serviceman was fined $100 by an American court. That hardly seems to me to equate with British jurisdiction or the application of British law as it would have been applied in a British court.

The second case is much more recent and it has raised a great deal more publicity. I thank the noble Lord who is to reply for the letter that he has written to me following my Question to him last month. His letter I received only today, but that letter does differ in a number of material details from the press report, and I should like the noble Lord to have this opportunity of putting the record straight if the press was incorrect, because it was the Western Morning Herald and the evening paper (both published in Plymouth) which reported this case in January 1980 and gave some details which conflict materially with the account given to me by the Minister.

I do not know whether his letter to me is covered by provisions under which it will be placed in the Library, but we can talk about it here. For example, the press report states that the American serviceman concerned went in a jeep to look for his sweetheart when the false alarm was given, and he drove round the base. The noble Lord's letter says there were some children at large in the base. The press report says that it was the then Home Secretary (now the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw) who stopped the inquest. According to the noble Lord, the inquest had to be stopped by the coroner under the Visiting Forces Act. The noble Lord will remember that, when I asked him about this at Question Time, the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, was sitting next to him and obviously he knows all about the case. But these are important details, in the sense that a great deal of concern has been shown in the West Country about this case and that has been brought to my attention very forcibly over the last few weeks, both in the press and by private individuals.

It does show—does it not?—that when an American serviceman injures or kills a British citizen, that case can then be taken—indeed, it may have to be taken—into an American court; and in this case the killing of the 17-year-old RAF youth was penalised by a letter of admonition and a fine of $1. Surely no one would argue that that is the application of Section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1967.

And what of compensation? The noble Lord will know that there was a great deal of anger about the attitude of the American authorities to the parents of this boy; but that is perhaps another issue. However, in this case, can a civil case be taken out for negligence, because the American serviceman had admitted negligent homicide? Can a civil case be taken out for negligence and can compensation be claimed? If so, against whom and by whom? I believe the noble Lord will agree with me that the public are entitled to have these answers, because it is the public in this country who are at risk so far as the activities of American servicemen, in their conduct with civilians, are concerned.

The public are also entitled to know the answers to these three questions when we have a long and honourable history of peaceful protest. The public are entitled to know what authority has been given to British soldiers guarding nuclear bases, what authority is given to American soldiers guarding nuclear and non-nuclear bases, and what is the position of members of the British public if they are damaged, injured or killed by visiting forces based in this country.

9.7 p.m.

Lord Prys-Davies

My Lords, let me say at once that I am grateful, and I am sure that many people outside the House will also feel grateful, to my noble friend Lord Hatch of Lusby for asking this Question tonight on an important subject—a subject which could flare up overnight, and one which is a cause of concern for many people. If I may say so, I thought that his speech showed not only his background knowledge of the subject and his grasp of detailed evidence, but also his deep concern that there should be in the country a body of persons who are not subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts. This concern of my noble friend has emerged in three questions which he has addressed to Ministers during the past two months. My noble friend is saying that the position is unsatisfactory and he therefore calls on the Government to: define their attitudes towards the application of United Kingdom law to British and American servicemen in their relations with British civilians". It is correct to say—here I am measuring my words—that British servicemen and United States servicemen in the United Kingdom are governed by our law. But that statement could be very misleading, as my noble friend Lord Hatch has already illustrated, because, as I understand the law, the law of the United Kindom in certain circumstances draws a huge distinction between the British serviceman and the United States serviceman in this country. I wish to be as constructive as I can and I shall ask a number of questions. It is possible that my noble friend Lord Hatch has already asked two of them, but I have in mind to ask about half a dozen questions and then, in the light of the Minister's replies to those questions, we can see whether there is a mischief lurking behind the 1952 Act, a mischief which should be removed.

My first question is this: will the Minister confirm that the British serviceman is answerable in our criminal courts for his conduct in the United Kingdom towards a civilian or the property of a civilian? I have always understood that the old conflict in our country between the civil and the military authorities ended just over 250 years ago in a complete victory for the civil courts. So will the Minister confirm that the British serviceman in the United Kingdom, at least in times of peace, has not only his purely military duties to perform but an overriding civil obligation also?

There is a suggestion, or a suspicion, or a fear, that the pink card issued by the Minister of Defence and officially designated Joint Services Publication 386, breaches or is intended to breach the principle which I have just mentioned. We are therefore asking the Minister for this assurance: again, that at least in times of peace, the criminal law always accompanies the British serviceman in the United Kingdom.

I turn to the position of the United States serviceman. I understand that his position is different in a material respect because he may plead successfully that the jurisdiction of our criminal courts be excluded. Where appropriate he may plead ouster of jurisdiction under the provisions of the Visiting Forces Act 1952. This Act, building on the precedent established by the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act 1933 and ratifying an agreement among the parties to NATO signed in 1951, was of course a departure from the traditional principle which ordained that all persons, nationals and aliens, who committed a crime against the laws of this country are triable by our courts.

The real kernel of the 1952 Act is to be found in Section 3 which lays down the conditions which, if proved by a member of a visiting force who is charged in one of our courts with an offence against our law, entitles the visiting servicemen to plead successfully that the jurisdiction of the court is excluded. The first ouster of jurisdiction—that is the one with which we are materially concerned tonight—concerns offences committed in the course of duty, and this is established by the production of a certificate to that effect by the appropriate military authority. As I understand it, that certificate cannot be challenged.

Unless the appropriate authority of the visiting forces waives its jurisdiction, our courts in the cases which fall within the 1952 Act cannot proceed to try the individual concerned. So the 1952 Act, although it was building on the precedent of the 1933 Act, is therefore far reaching. Indeed, this was appreciated in 1952. During the Bill's passage through Parliament it was subjected to much opposition in both Houses and in the letters columns of the press.

My noble friend has drawn the attention of the House to the case in Cornwall in 1979 when an American marine killed a British youth and the inquest was stopped under the provisions of the 1952 Act. I confess that I do not know the details of that particular case, but it has occurred to me that the coroner may have stopped that inquest in accordance with the power in the 1952 Act which originally derived from the 1933 Act. I look forward to hearing the Minister's explanation of the coroner's action in Cornwall in 1979.

An innovation without precedent is contained in Section 7 of the Act, and this has not been touched upon. Section 7 forbids a coroner, unless he is directed by the Home Secretary, from holding or continuing an inquest if he is satisfied that the deceased person was a member or a civilian component of a visiting force. There is no precedent in the 1933 Act or in any other legislation for Section 7.

Political expediency has often been held responsible for the fathering of undesirable legislative offspring. The Visiting Forces Act 1952 may well be said to be the offspring of international expediency. The 1952 Act introduced fundamental changes in the law. There can be only one possible justification for such changes and that is summed up in one word "reciprocity".

I should now like to ask the Minister four additional questions. First, how often have American servicemen successfully pleaded ouster of jurisdiction since 1952? Secondly, in respect of how many deaths have coroners—under Section 7 of the Act or any other section of that Act—refused to hold or continue an inquest? Thirdly—and my noble friend has touched on this question—how many British citizens have failed to recover compensation in respect of damage to property or personal injury because United States servicemen have pleaded the 1952 Act or have been removed from the jurisdiction of the court?

Fourthly, and bearing in mind my submission that there can be only one justification for the 1952 Act—and that is reciprocity—can the Minister confirm that the immunity granted to United States servicemen under the 1952 Act is no greater than that allowed under reciprocal arrangements operating in other NATO states? Finally, if the law relating to United States servicemen and British servicemen is to be harmonised, will the Minister confirm that there is only one basis for harmonisation—and that is that both be answerable in our criminal courts?

I am grateful to my noble friend for asking his Question, and I shall listen with great interest to the Minister's response.

9.18 p.m.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Elton)

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, has asked Her Majesty's Government to define their attitude to the application of United Kingdom law to British and United States servicemen stationed in this country. I can answer his substantive question briefly. First, both United States and British servicemen must obey our law. Secondly, so far as possible they should be answerable for breaches of the law in our courts. Thirdly, if a United States serviceman commits an offence in the performance of duty or solely against persons or property of the United States forces, it is appropriate for the offender to be answerable primarily to his own authorities. This is the effect of the 1952 Act, which has been running for 33 years, and these principles are accepted by ourselves and our allies in NATO. The arrangement is based on the notion that it is the responsibility of the authorities of the visiting force to establish their own discipline over their service personnel.

As noble Lords will be aware, the 1952 Act was introduced to enable the United Kingdom to ratify the 1951 agreement regarding the status of forces of parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. As has been pointed out before, the arrangement has an impeccably bipartisan record in Parliament and replaced legislation dating from World War II. The 1951 NATO agreement was concluded in London by a Labour Government. The 1952 Act was introduced by the incoming Conservative Government. It gave effect to the provisions of that agreement in United Kingdom law and allowed the Government to go on to ratify in 1954 the agreement made by their predecessors. The arrangements are bipartisan also—and I think this is one of the substantive questions put by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies—in that they apply with equal force to legislation covering our forces when they are in other countries which have ratified the agreement. That includes not only West Germany and the British Army of the Rhine, but also the United States and our servicemen on detached duty there. Apart from minor amendments to deal with newly created offences, Part I has been untouched for the past 30 years and has served our country well throughout that period. In our view, it is right that the Act should have remained untouched and, despite the views of some commentators on the subject, I believe that there are very good reasons why we should not disturb the arrangement now.

The 1951 NATO agreement dealt with matters which have to be regulated when service personnel from one country are stationed in the territory of another. Thus, the agreement covers not only matters of jurisdiction but also the settlement of civil claims, entry procedures and customs and revenue facilities. It was necessary to legislate in all these matters and also on the appropriate principles for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, which is what we are concerned about in this debate. It may, therefore, be helpful if I explain to your Lordships the purposes of Sections 2 and 3 of the 1952 Act and the way they work, as these are the provisions with which we are primarily concerned this evening.

Section 2 enables the courts and authorities of a visiting force to exercise in the United Kingdom the ordinary powers of discipline and administration necessary to preserve the good order of that force. Without it, a member of a visiting force could not, for example, be put in the guard room or even be confined to barracks. I doubt very much whether any noble Lord would dispute the need for a military force to be able to maintain discipline if it is to be in any way effective or, indeed, to conduct itself in a way acceptable to our own community. It is clearly sensible for foreign servicemen visiting a country to serve under their own code of discipline rather than under that of the receiving state. I remind your Lordships again that we maintain forces abroad as well as being hosts to other forces here. The 1951 agreement provides the basis on which we can maintain discipline in our forces serving in other NATO countries.

Section 2 of the Act empowers the service courts and the service authorities of a visiting force to exercise in our territory the jurisdiction which their own law gives them over persons who are subject to their jurisdiction. This jurisdiction will be exclusive when a visiting serviceman commits an act which is an offence only against the service law of his own country and not against our law. The section is silent on the jurisdiction of British courts. It does not, therefore, disturb existing arrangements and it follows that if he commits an act which is an offence against the law of this country but not against the law of his own, the United Kingdom courts have exclusive jurisdiction. It follows also that, if a visiting serviceman commits an act which is an offence against the law both of his own country and of the United Kingdom, the jurisdiction of the courts of the visiting force is normally exercised concurrently with that of the United Kingdom courts. In such cases jurisdiction will be dealt with by arrangements outside the Act, according to the status of forces agreement; but it is also necessary to take account of the special provisions made by Section 3.

It is Section 3, of course, which attracts the least friendly attention of the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby. This may be surprising since the effect of that section is that in most cases United Kingdom courts will have jurisdiction to deal with offences committed by visiting servicement which infringe United Kingdom laws. As I have tried to explain, this jurisdiction is regularly exercised under the arrangements to which I have referred. The only exceptions to this general rule (which are specified in Section 3) occur where the offence arises out of, or in the course of, duty or if it is committed solely against persons or property associated with the visiting force. In such cases the primary jurisdiction is given, by Section 3, to the authorities of the visiting force, but the United Kingdom courts retain a secondary right of jurisdiction. This they may exercise if the authorities of the visiting force decide not to exercise their primary right of jurisdiction and deal with the case under their own law.

From this summary it will be fairly clear to your Lordships what happens when an offence is committed by a visiting serviceman. If, for example, he commits a theft, this will invariably be an offence for which there is concurrent jurisdiction, because it is an offence against his own service law and the law of the United Kingdom. It may therefore be dealt with by the United Kingdom courts unless the property in question has been stolen from the authorities of the visiting force itself or from another member of the visiting force.

The Act therefore seeks to balance the needs of the sending state with our proper concern to ensure that United Kingdom law is observed by all persons within the jurisdiction of our courts. No person is given immunity from prosecution: quite the reverse. The arrangements set out in the Visiting Forces Act are designed to ensure that a person answers to the most appropriate authority for his acts or omissions. The effective operation of the Act clearly depends to a large extent on close co-operation between the police and the appropriate authority of any visiting force stationed in their area. If any matter cannot be determined locally, the police will consult the Home Office or the Director of Public Prosecutions.

It has been suggested that the practical operation of these arrangements means that United States servicemen are able to regard themselves as somehow above the law and can, or do, act irresponsibly and get away with it. This is not the case: on average, more than 2,000 United States servicemen a year are convicted in the United Kingdom courts, most of them for traffic offences. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, will take that statistic as a satisfactory one, although it is approximate, because the specific statistics he asked for are not centrally collected.

It is also alleged that there are serious offences which have been committed by United States servicemen which have gone unpunished or have been punished only in nominal terms by United States authorities who have unfairly claimed primary jurisdiction to deal with them. The noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, referred to a case in Scotland with which I am not familiar, but which I believe relates to a United States serviceman driving to duty. I may be mistaken in that, so I think I had better leave it and reply to him on that matter in writing. I can assure him that that reply will be placed in the Library of this House, as was the reply which I sent him on 6th March and which he saw only today.

The noble Lord next referred to the case of Matthew Chesher, which was a tragic accident which took place in July 1979 during a bomb alert at RAF St. Mawgan in Cornwall, in which Leading Aircraftsmen Matthew Chesher was killed by a motor vehicle driven by a United States serviceman. As the United States serviceman was on duty at the time, the United States authorities were entitled to exercise primary jurisidiction. Two points of particular concern have been made with regard to the outcome of this incident. First, it has been argued that the United States authorities interrupted the inquest on Matthew Chesher. Secondly, it is argued that the outcome of the United States court which dealt with the serviceman was quite inappropriate in view of the gravity of the incident.

In fact, of course, United States authorities did not, and could not, halt the inquest into Matthew Chesher's death. The noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, has already referred to the section of the Visiting Forces Act 1952—Section 7—which made it mandatory on the coroner to stop the inquest into his death, or to adjourn it, as he did, unless he was specifically instructed not so to do by the Home Secretary. The only way in which the local paper could have made that a decision of the Home Secretary is by the fact that the Home Secretary aid not intervene.

The serviceman was tried by a jury, who found him guilty of the offence of negligent homicide and decided that the sentence was for him to be reprimanded, given a letter of admonition and fined one dollar. Before noble Lords form a view of that sentence, I think they should recall that there is, and there was, no suggestion that the serviceman involved was reckless in his actions; he appeared inadvertently to have driven on the wrong side of the road, which, of course, in his home country would have been the right side of the road, in the excitement engendered by the security alert. My information is also that he was going to find some girls (in the plural) who had taken a short cut across the base. That is my reply to the next point that the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, raised.

We are, moreover, assured that a reprimand is a very serious penalty in its effects on a serviceman's career, especially with regard to future promotion. Mr. and Mrs. Chesher were upset—and this goes beyond what the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, has said, but he might well have said it and I think I should reply—at the way they were treated by the United States Navy during the court hearing and at the fact that there was no United States presence at their son's funeral. I mention this only to say that I know that the United States Navy expressed its deep regret directly to the Chesher family at the way that the case was handled and the distress which that caused.

We next turn to the question of the use of firearms by United States servicemen and the claim of those who criticise the jurisdictional arrangements set out in the Visiting Forces Act. I am sorry; I have expressed that badly. It is sometimes claimed by those critics that the arrangements set out in that Act in some way allow the United States servicemen to act with impunity in the event of an intrusion into a United States base in this country. In particular, it is suggested that a United States serviceman might be able to open fire on an obviously harmless British demonstrator without incurring any risk of proceedings in United Kingdom courts. It is right that your Lordships' House should be concerned at the prospect of such an eventuality. If it were ever the case that United States servicemen were in a position to shoot such people, this would certainly be a matter of the utmost gravity. But I must remind your Lordships that this is first of all a purely hypothetical proposition. In considering what is the legal position governing the use of firearms by members of a visiting force, we must recall that personnel of the United States forces in the United Kingdom are bound by Article 2 of the NATO Agreement, to respect the laws of the receiving state. and have a duty to, take necessary measures to that end". For United States as for British servicemen, for both kinds of servicemen, the use of firearms is governed both by rules of engagement which are designed to ensure that fire is only opened, as a last resort, in accordance with the law of the land; and by the doctrine that only the minimum force may be used that is necessary and reasonable to protect life or vital installations. Firearms could thus be used only as a last resort if all other preventive measures had failed and if there was no other way to prevent someone from taking another's life or to protect vital defence installations or a nuclear weapon.

The noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, had a phrase which I noted down. I think he asked me whether the criminal law always accompanies the British serviceman in the United Kingdom. I give him the answer, in the context of that point in my speech, and say that the answer is, yes. I cannot, therefore, give a categorical assurance that shots would never be fired. But I must stress that we are not concerned here with what may happen in the course of a peaceful and lawful demonstration, which is the concern of noble Lords this evening.

The lawfulness of the use of force by United Kingdom servicemen is the same as that for any other citizen—and I return now to our own troops. It depends upon whether the force used is of a kind and degree which is reasonable in all the circumstances in order to prevent crime or make a lawful arrest. This obviously depends upon the circumstances at the time and is a matter for the serviceman's own judgment, for which he is responsible, like any other citizen, under the law. Rules of engagement only give guidance to the serviceman. They are not what I think the noble Lord termed an ouster of jurisdiction.

The noble Lord, Lord Hatch, raised the question of compensation. Claims against members of visiting forces are dealt with by the United Kingdom Claims Commission. If the claim is admitted and damages are agreed, they are paid by the Secretary of State for Defence under the authority of Section 9 of the Visiting Forces Act 1952. If the claim is not admitted, the claimant has the right to bring proceedings in the courts of the country against the member of the visiting force concerned. Any judgment obtained will be discharged by the Secretary of State for Defence. If a settlement is arrived at without proceeding to trial, payment will also be made by the Secretary of State. Seventy-five per cent. of any award is recovered from the sending state.

The noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, asked about a specific aspect of the United States rules of engagement. There are, it is true, procedural differences on which the Committee of the House of Commons commented and which the Government have undertaken to discuss with the United States authorities. I should say first that there is fundamental agreement between the rules of engagement used by the United States and those used by the United Kingdom forces. Indeed, in the case of the joint United Kingdom-United States defence force at Greenham Common, they are identical. However, the Ministry of Defence has entered into discussion with the United States authorities about the Committee's recommendations. That is what the noble Lord asked me.

I do not wish to give answers to questions that your Lordships have not asked because the hour is rather late. I well understand the concern that some noble Lords have expressed about the 1952 Act. I do not want to give the impression that we are complacent about its potential abuse. But I must sum up the position that I have outlined by saying that no member of a visiting force is immune from prosecution for any offence that he may be alleged to have committed. He is required to observe the law and may be called to answer for any act before either the United Kingdom courts or the service courts of the sending country. In this respect, he is in a position no different from that of British servicemen whether they are stationed in this country or abroad. The Act provides a workable and satisfactory basis for foreign forces in this country. In passing it over 30 years ago, this House participated in nothing that was not fully reciprocated by the other states that were party to the 1951 agreement.

The United States forces are our allies. If there were the least doubt about any aspect of the administration of the arrangements for jurisdiction under the Act, I can assure your Lordships that we should examine the matter very carefully indeed and, if appropriate, take up the matter with the United States authorities—indeed I have said we have on the narrow point that the noble Lord brought to my attention. We have made them well aware of our intention to take the matter up if a case arose in which we considered that they were adopting an unreasonably extensive interpretation of what constituted official duty.

So let me conclude by confirming that it is and will continue to be the policy of this Government, if circumstances so demand, to make the most strenuous representations to ensure that the spirit as well as the letter of the NATO agreement is fully respected. Nothing that I have heard this evening leads me to doubt that this intention is fully shared by the United States authorities or that such representations are now required. Nonetheless, I welcome the interest of the House in ensuring that that remains the case.

House adjourned at twenty-one minutes before ten o'clock.