Immigration Policy: Court of Human Rights

HL Deb 14 June 1985 vol 464 cc1538-50

3.13 p.m.

Lord Harris of Greenwich rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what changes they propose to make in their immigration policy following the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Mrs. Cabales, Mrs. Balkandali and Mrs. Abdulaziz.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Unstarred Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. I wish to raise today the question of how the Government propose to respond to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of these three women. For the twelfth time, the court has judged the British Government to be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, thus ensuring that this country continues to have the worst record of any government that has subscribed to the convention. Whatever may have been the defence of previous British Governments over past adverse judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, this time there was, I believe, no conceivable excuse.

The background to the matter can be stated fairly briefly. On 27th June 1974 the then Home Secretary Mr. Roy Jenkins announced in a Written Answer that he had reached the conclusion that in future husbands and wives should each have the right to admission to the United Kingdom, and he added: The principle on which I believe I should act is that where one spouse is settled in this country, a husband and wife should have freedom of choice whether to live here or elsewhere unless there are compelling reasons why this facility should not be allowed".—[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/74; col. 535.] That policy was changed in 1979 by the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, who was by then Home Secretary. Under new immigration rules, which came into force on 1st March 1980, a ban was imposed on the entry of foreign husbands of women settled in Britain unless the woman concerned was a United Kingdom citizen born here, or with a parent born here.

Then after the first adverse judgment on their policy by the European Commission of Human Rights which had ruled that there was a breach of the convention, and to coincide with the commencement order of the British Nationality Act 1981, new immigration rules were published in 1982. These new rules provided that before being allowed to enter the United Kingdom the husband would have to demonstrate that the primary purpose of the marriage was not immigration, and of course the onus of proof was placed upon the husband. In contrast, a husband settled in this country and wanting to bring a foreign wife into the United Kingdom had an absolute right to be joined by her. It was, in short, a blatant case of sexual discrimination, and that is exactly what the European Court of Human Rights found it to be.

At the outset the present Government were challenged on the question as to whether the new policy did not in fact represent a clear breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. My noble friend Lord Avebury put this precise point to the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, on 7th November 1979. Indeed he mentioned Article 8, which was one of the issues on which the Government were subsequently adjudged to be guilty. At col. 817 of Hansard, the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, then a Home Office Minister, said: So far as the European Convention is concerned, I repeat that the Government do not believe that we shall contravene the convention". We now know of course that the Home Office Ministers concerned were hopelessly entirely wrong.

But it was worse than this because before the Government changed the immigration rules again in 1982 they had been given further warnings on this matter. In evidence given before the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons in the 1979–80 Session, they had been specifically told by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, and by Mr. Anthony Lester, QC, who, as the Minister will be aware, is a leading authority on this question of law, and I quote paragraph 15 of the Home Affairs Committee's report—that: any differential treatment amounted to discrimination".

That being so, why did the Government behave as they did? No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, who admittedly has only fairly recently arrived in the Home Office, will do his best to tell us. Did they, for instance, receive departmental legal advice that their new policy was consistent with their obligations under the convention? Did they get that advice, or did they not? Or did they go further and obtain an opinion from the Attorney-General, as of course departments can do if they are seriously troubled about any question of law? Did they get the Attorney-General's view? Did they, in those circumstances, prefer the opinion that they received to that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman? It would be a bold Minister who would disregard the opinion of one of the most respected Members of this House on a question as fundamental as this.

In any event, as we now know, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, was right and the Government were entirely wrong. I would have thought in these circumstances that the Government owe some apology not only to Parliament but also to the many wives whose lives have been damaged by these immigration rules which we now know to be entirely inconsistent with this country's international obligations. I hope that we are going to receive some indication that an apology is going to be given for the way in which this whole business has been handled.

I turn if I may to two specific questions that I want to put to the Government. First, are they now prepared to say in clear unqualified terms that the sex discrimination rules will be eliminated by giving women in Britain the same rights as settled men to be joined by their spouses? I hope that the hints we have been reading in the press that the Government will respond to the judgment of the Court by reducing the rights of men to bring their wives into the United Kingdom are entirely unjustified.

May I remind the Minister that his noble friend the present Leader of the House said in the House of Commons on 11th November 1982 (at col. 695 of the Official Report): The right for men was established in the 1971 Act. That is the position and I believe it should remain". The same day the then Minister of State at the Home Office, Mr. Timothy Raison, said at col. 753: We have always accepted that this guarantee should apply to men settled here since then. That, in my view, is the humane decision". In this House the noble Lord, Lord Elton, said on 18th November 1983 at col. 705 that, it would in any case mean breaking pledges which have been given by Governments of both complexions". That sounds very clear, very precise and entirely unambiguous. But do those promises given to Parliament still represent the Government's position? I hope we shall hear that they do from the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, this afternoon.

I turn now to my second question. The European Court of Human Rights held in judgment that Article 13 of the convention had been breached. It stated that the discrimination to which these women were subjected: was the result of norms that were in this respect incompatible with the Convention. In this regard, since the UK has not incorporated the Convention into its domestic law, there could be no 'effective remedy' as required by Article 13". As is known, we on these Benches favour the incorporation of the convention into domestic law and there is a great deal of support for that proposal in many parts of the House. Indeed we believe that it should be done as soon as possible.

But the question today is entirely different. What action do the Government propose to take immediately in view of the court's judgment on this particular aspect of its judgment? The appropriate action to be taken is fairly straightforward. The convention should be incorporated into the Immigration Rules. That is what is clearly required, I believe at that the very least, by the court's judgment. There is already a precedent for such a course of action because the United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees is incorporated in the Immigration Rules. I am sure other Members of the House hope as I do to hear an unqualified assurance from the Minister that this will now be done in respect of the European Convention.

The Prime Minister and other Ministers have told us repeatedly that one of their central objectives of policy is to enhance the quality of family life in this country. If that is their aim, their treatment of these three women and the hundreds of others who have been affected is even more incomprehensible. I hope today that we shall be given some assurance that the Government are now belatedly prepared to take action to live up to their own lofty objectives.

3.25 p.m.

Viscount Buckmaster

My Lords, I think that all of us in your Lordships' House this afternoon will be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, for ventilating this very important issue. Speaking on the basis of my own experience as a diplomat in several parts of the third world over the last 30 years, I can say that I have come into contact with many cases broadly similar to those of the three ladies mentioned. I shall give the noble Lord my wholehearted support in the various points that he has made.

If your Lordships will permit me I will not speak directly on that issue. I should like if I may to stretch the terms of the Unstarred Question slightly to deal with the problem of immigration in the context of Uganda, an area about which, as your Lordships probably know, I am very worried. I have spoken about Uganda on several occasions in the past, the most recent having been on 6th March when I spoke to an Unstarred Question asked by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, about immigration procedures in the context of the Commission for Racial Equality Report. I do not intend to repeat what I have said on that or other occasions; neither will I anticipate what I hope to say when, with the leave of your Lordships, I ask an Unstarrred Question on Uganda, I hope before the end of this Session. I should like to make four brief points which I think can be considered as coming within the sphere of this Unstarred Question.

The first point that I should like to make is that I realise that the Home Office has been pursuing a sympathetic and considerate policy towards Ugandans who come to this country applying for asylum. They do that on the basis of the situation in Uganda which I am afraid still gives cause for great concern. Several Ugandans have told me that they appreciate the attitude of the Home Office and I have had helpful letters from the Minister of State, Home Office, in the context of various cases that I have raised.

But—and this is my second point—I hope very much the Home Office will not be lulled into a feeling that the situation in Uganda is improving. I have heard hints of that made by Ministers on various occasions. To a large extent, we are of course groping in the dark. We cannot tell exactly what is going on in Uganda; but recent information that I have received from such bodies as Amnesty International, the Minority Rights Group and, more recently, the Church Missionary Society, indicates that at any rate in the rural areas—and I am not talking about Kampala; there may have been some slight improvement there—and particularly in the so-called Lowero Triangle, north of Kampala, the situation shows no sign of improvement.

Perhaps I may very briefly paraphrase a report by Amnesty International which is due to be published soon. Its main findings relate to the fact that the unlawful arrest and systematic torture of large numbers of civilians by the Ugandan army is continuing; the disappearance of many detained by the army who are believed to have died as a result of torture or who have been deliberately killed in detention; and the killing of unarmed civilians by the military and the detention without charge or trial of several real or alleged politician opponents. All this is going on; so that I think we can say that that picture presents "naught for your comfort".

The third point—and this I think is the most important—is that whereas I am aware that the Home Office in its wisdom realises that many Ugandans coming to this country are in danger of their lives if they are sent home, and if not in danger of their lives they are in danger of imprisonment and torture, that danger applies almost equally to Ugandans deported from Kenya and Zaire. In the last few days I have heard of several cases of Ugandans who have been refused admission by the Kenyan and Zairean Governments because they do not want them. They have been sent back. Some have been murdered, some have been imprisoned and some have disappeared.

Only today I heard of a Ugandan who had committed suicide in Belgium rather than risk the danger of going back to Uganda. Indeed, this very afternoon I was approached by a Ugandan in a very distressed state who had arrived at Heathrow this morning. He was due to be deported to Kenya—this is the point, not to Uganda—this very afternoon at half past six. He wondered what I could do about it. There is in my view a grave danger to such people if they are sent from here to Kenya or Zaire.

The last point I want to make—I do not want to dwell on this at all because I have made it before, and it can be made very briefly—is on the very long waiting time which applicants for political asylum in this country have to endure. I know that the Home Office is aware of this. I know that it takes a very long time to investigate these cases. But it is very frustrating for such applicants to wait for months and months—in some cases well over a year—before they get any decision. Then they may get a decision which is what is described as "exceptional leave to remain", which means they stay here for a year and then get their visas renewed every year. But they may not work and they have no knowledge of what the ultimate decision will be.

I would ask the noble Lord the Minister whether he can at least give me an assurance that the sympathetic policy towards Ugandans applying for asylum in this country will continue; and I would ask him particularly to bear in mind the point I have made about the danger of returning Ugandans to Kenya and Zaire.

3.32 p.m.

Baroness Ewart-Biggs

My Lords, this is a very important question which is being put before us this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, and one which concerns the lives of very many people. It is a pity that it is arising late on a Friday afternoon. Nevertheless it is attracting very serious consideration on this side of the House and I hope that it will also be attracting similar attention from the Minister.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, has very clearly explained the whole background to this case and has made it very plain that there is a need for the Government to take some action immediately. Therefore before making one or two points which I have in mind, I should like first to stress the importance of an immediate response from the Government. Surely before they announce changes in the immigration rules, the Government should not delay in announcing at least interim arrangements for dealing with applications from men on the grounds of marriage. There can be no doubt that there is considerable concern, particularly within the ethnic minority communities, about both the immediate and the long-term effects of the judgment. Why should men women, and indeed children, be left in a state of very great anxiety?

My first task is simply to implore the Government not to prevaricate and avoid giving an answer, even if at this stage it is only to announce an interim arrangement. After all, it is now over two weeks since the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. The Government therefore cannot go on giving as their excuse for silence that they need more time to consider and study the judgment. Moreover, it is not enough for the Minister to tell us today that the Government will comply with the ruling. We need to know what changes they plan to make both, as I say, in the short-term arrangements and in our immigration rules generally in order to avoid further court actions.

With regard to me fundamental changes, let us consider first the different options which face the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, has already touched on them. First, the Government could decide that the more flexible rules which at present apply to wives should also equally apply to husbands. That would mean that men and women would enjoy exactly the same rights. In that way the European Court would be satisfied that its convention was not being breached by sex discrimination and that our Immigration Rules were true to the spirit of the convention. That surely would be a change in the right direction.

On the other hand, the opposite course could be pursued. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has said, this is the one which has been rumoured in the press; that is, that the present rules which allow a wife to bring her spouse into the country could be made to govern the cases of husbands bringing in their wives. That, of course, would avoid a breach of the convention on the grounds of sex discrimination but, nevertheless, by creating an equality of misery, would be contrary to the spirit and intentions of the Convention on Human Rights, which in its preamble refers to the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. For that reason, such a decision would be both dishonourable and unsatisfactory. The third option before the Government could be to alter the rules applying to both husbands and wives, making them no longer distinct. Finally, the European Convention as a whole could be incorporated into British law.

Which of these options will the Government choose? There is no doubt that at a time of high unemployment they would like to protect the labour market by excluding additional Asian labour. That would make the second option I have mentioned very attractive; namely, to get round the court's ruling by toughening up the laws respecting resident husbands bringing in their wives.

The means of bringing this about would be by applying the primary purpose rule to wives joining husbands, as well as the other way round. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has already explained, this primary purpose rule is a totally iniquitous one because it means that couples have to perform the impossible task of proving to the satisfaction of any entry clearance officer that the primary purpose of their marriage is not immigration: and to prove a negative is always extremely difficult, and often impossible, especially when the officer concerned starts off with an assumption about the social and cultural background of a society which is false or prejudicial to the applicant concerned. The proof that this is so is that, in 1984, of the 46 per cent. of husbands and fiancés from the Indian sub-continent who were refused entry clearance, as high a ratio as 88 per cent. were refused on primary purpose grounds.

This rule was never intended to be used against marriages of convenience. There are already perfectly adequate rules against that. But it is obviously used to keep genuine couples apart and to keep Asian men out of Britain. One can imagine the misery that this causes to couples whose marriages are entirely genuine, who may have children in the family, and yet who cannot satisfy this test. I have been told of some heartrending cases of young women, even with British citizenship, who have been unable to meet the primary purpose rule and have spent years separated from their husbands, and who have been left to bring up their children alone. If it were not late on a Friday afternoon, I would have quoted to your Lordships details of some of these cases because I think they have the most heartrending quality.

Surely there is only one way for the Government to deal with the present injustice, and that is to eliminate the sex discrimination in the Immigration Rules by giving women in Britain the same rights to be joined by their spouses as are presently held by men settled here. Not only is this a fair and compassionate solution in the true spirit of the European Convention on Human Rights, but any other decision would lead not only to further battles in the European Court but, most importantly, to further suffering of innocent members of families who have been kept separated.

May I say to the Minister most sincerely that I hope he will first state what interim arrangements are being made to end further uncertainty, and following upon that, that he will state that changes in our immigration policy will be based on fair action and not be merely an attempt to find the most restrictive available form of compliance with the European Court's decision. It would seem to be vitally important to reinstate our international reputation in this regard—a reputation which is beginning to look a little tarnished. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has said, this judgment marks the twelfth occasion on which the United Kingdom has been in breach of the European Convention, whereas the other 17 member states—those who permit individual petitions—have recorded only 39 violations between them all. So unless the Minister is today going to say something to put our record straight, I can only end by saying that, in this country, the cradle of democracy is really beginning to look a bit rocky.

3.40 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Glenarthur)

My Lords, in asking this Question today, the noble Lord, Lord Harris has challenged me, as indeed has the noble Baroness opposite, to indicate our immigration policy following the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Mrs. Cabales, Mrs. Abdulaziz and Mrs. Balkandali.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris started off by indicating that possibly some forewarning of the risk at Strasbourg and the need for legal advice should have been obvious to us. Perhaps I may start by saying that it is true that the 1980 rules were said by some authorities, such as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, and Mr. Lester, to risk breaching the European Convention, but, as I shall develop in a moment, not all the opinions were borne out by the judgment of the European Court. The Government's belief that the rules complied with our obligations under the convention were vindicated except on the question of sex.

Let me say first that the judgment of the European Court in these test cases, which concerned the right of settled women to be joined by their husbands in this country, was delivered barely two weeks ago. It is a substantial document of over 40 pages and one that requires careful study. I propose to deal later in more detail with the terms of the judgment. I would, however, say at the outset that while the court found that there had been two violations of articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, as I indicated just now, the judgment also contained several endorsements of this Government's immigration policies. Let me make that clear straight away. The judgment is binding and we shall of course abide by it.

My right honourable friend the Home Secretary has already made clear that the Government will make changes in the Immigration Rules necessary to meet our obligations under the convention. Urgent consideration is now being given to what those changes might be. It is a complicated matter, and your Lordships will not expect me to be in a position to announce today the changes that the Government intend to make.

The cases in question concern the provisions of the Immigration Rules made in 1980 under which women who have settled in this country are not entitled to be joined here by their husbands. The application of Mrs. Abdulaziz was lodged with the European Commission in December 1980 and those of Mrs. Cabales and Mrs. Balkandali in August the following year. In May 1982, the commission declared the three applications admissible. In its advisory report adopted in May 1983, the commission expressed the opinion that the application of the rules in these cases constituted discrimination contrary to Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, which protects the right to respect for private and family life, on the grounds of sex and birth. The commission also found, as a violation of Article 13, that no effective remedy before a national authority was available to the applicants. It took the view that it was not necessary to pursue a further examination of the cases in the context of Article 8 alone. Both parties then made written representations to the court, and there was a hearing last September.

The court has come to a different view from the commission in a number of important respects. In the court's judgment there was no lack of respect for family life and hence no violation of Article 8 alone. The court stated that: The duty imposed by Article 8 can not be considered as extending to a general obligation on the part of a Contracting State to respect the choice by married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence, and to accept the non-national spouses for settlement in that country". The court noted that in the present cases the couples married after the wives had settled in the United Kingdom as single persons, and that they had not shown that there were obstacles to establishing family life in their own or their husband's home countries or that there were special reasons why they could not be expected to live there.

Moreover, the court did not share the commission's opinion on the claimed discrimination on the ground of birth. There are, in the court's view, persuasive social reasons for giving special treatment to those whose link with a country stems from birth within it. The difference of treatment must therefore be regarded as having an objective and reasonable justification for the purposes of Article 14. On Article 3, the court rejected the applicants' complaint that they had been subjected to degrading treatment. It therefore found no violation.

The court also found that there was no discrimination on the ground of race. The court accepted the purpose of the Immigration Rules to curtail primary immigration. It concluded that the rules made no distinction on grounds of race and were therefore not racially discriminatory. It rejected the contention that the rules could be adjudged racially discriminatory in terms of the ethnic groups affected by the rules. If some are more affected than others, that reflects the fact that more people seek to come here from some parts of the world than from others. The court also said that in this context the requirement that the parties to an intended marriage must have met, which was introduced in the 1980 rules, could not be taken as an indication of racial discrimination. The court noted that its main purpose was to prevent evasion of the rules.

The court did, however, find that the fact that the immigration rules allowing wives to join settled men were more favourable amounted to sex discrimination in breach of Article 14 with Article 8. The court stated the clear premise that the advancement of the equality of the sexes was today a major goal in the member states of the Council of Europe. This meant that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the convention. The court specifically accepted that the 1980 rules had the aim of protecting the domestic labour market. It specifically acknowledged that this aim was without doubt legitimate.

The court did not however accept that the case the Government advanced in justification for the distinction in the 1980 rules was sufficiently weighty to measure up to the importance the court attaches to the objective of sex equality. The fact that the Government have allowed wives to be admitted on more generous provisions than the European Convention requires does not, in the court's view, make the distinction between the sexes justifiable. Finally, the court found that in regard to the discrimination on grounds of sex there was no effective remedy to the provisions of the Immigration Rules. The court found this to be in violation of Article 13 of the convention.

It is only right to defer decision in cases affected by the judgment while the Government urgently consider their response. Accordingly, immigration staff here and overseas have been instructed not to refuse applications or enforce departure in cases which do not qualify under the existing rules but which might under rules to give effect to the court's judgment. We cannot go further until decisions have been made about just what changes should be made to the rules. I may add that all three husbands in the test cases qualify under the current rules through their wives' British citizenship. They are already living in this country with their wives.

The 1980 rules gave effect to this Government's commitment to reduce primary immigration to the minimum. We tightened the provisions for admission for employment. And complementary to that we tightened the provisions relating to the admission of men for marriage. At the same time we honoured the commitment to admit wives and children to join heads of households who had come here earlier. Under the 1980 rules only women who were citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies and who were themselves born in the United Kingdom, or had one of their parents born here, qualified to be joined by their husband or fiancé. The rules also extended the safeguards designed to prevent the use of marriage by men as a means of securing admission to this country by those who would not otherwise qualify. These rules were changed in 1983 in consequence of the implementation of the British Nationality Act 1981. Under the 1983 rules—the rules now in force—women who are British citizens may being their husbands into this country.

The rules concerning the admission of men for marriage are a necessary part of firm immigration control. The need for firm immigration control has of course been accepted by successive Governments. At a time of high unemployment—to which the noble Baroness particularly referred—and economic recession firm immigration control is essential to protect the domestic labour market. It would make no sense to tighten the provisions for admission for employment but to continue to allow men to use marriage to gain admission. The European court specifically acknowledged that the main and essential purpose of the 1980 rules was to curtail primary immigration.

Whatever changes are made, the overall policy of firm immigration control will continue to be the Government's objective. The finding of the court concerns the specific issue of the different provisions for the admission of husbands joining women and wives joining men. Successive Governments have taken the view that there have to be some differences in the provisions for men and women in the Immigration Rules. It is in the area of provision for the admission of dependants where the provisions have differed between the sexes. The rules have always treated wives and children as dependants to be admitted to join husbands whom we have allowed to settle here. We have been less ready to allow husbands to be admitted. The reason is obvious. As a general rule, husbands cannot be regarded as dependants.

Our commitment to the admission of dependants is clear. Over the past 10 years we have accepted about a third of a million wives and children to join men settled in this country. Two-thirds of these dependants have come from the new Commonwealth and Pakistan. Allowing young men to join young women in marriage in this country is quite a different matter from allowing dependants to join heads of household. The husbands and fiancés are coming to set up new families.

Our existing policy does allow men to come here to join girls if they are British citizens, provided that the men meet the requirements of the immigration rules designed to ensure that marriage is not being used for immigration purposes. The rules we introduced in 1980 strengthen those introduced by the previous Labour Government in 1977, to which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, did not, I think refer. That is to say, they were not the first rules to introduce safeguards to prevent the use of marriage to gain admission to this country.

Before I turn to the options, perhaps I may take up the particular question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, concerning incorporation of the European Court of Human Rights into domestic law. The possibility of incorporating the ECHR as part of the domestic law of this country has been canvassed for a number of years, as the noble Lord will be aware. The issues are complex, raising matters of basic constitutional importance, and they cannot quickly be resolved. I have to tell the noble Lord that the Government have no plans at present for legislation in this direction.

The noble Viscount, Lord Buckmaster, asked particularly about the situation in Uganda, and I am grateful to him for giving me notice of that question. I can tell the noble Viscount that in conjunction with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office we monitor the situation in Uganda closely. Press reports and information submitted by Amnesty International and other refugee organisations indicate considerable instability in Uganda. Dr. Obote's presidency has been compared unfavourably with earlier rules. There are reports of large numbers of people being killed or detained, or disappearing. We are very conscious of this disturbed situation and very much have it in mind when considering Ugandan nationals' applications for asylum. All such applications are considered carefully in accordance with normal asylum procedures. In addition, where Ugandans do not qualify for asylum but can show good reason for not returning to Uganda for the time being, they may be granted leave to remain on an exceptional basis. In 1984 decisions were reached on some 75 applications for asylum from Ugandans. Asylum was granted in 37 cases: exceptional leave to remain in 28 cases and 10 applications were refused. As the noble Lord himself indicated, that goes wide of the immediate Question before us, but I hope that may give him some reassurance.

Returning to the European Court of Human Rights' judgment, and the options, the difficult question which now faces the Government is how to modify the present rules in order to take account of the principles of sex equality which the European court has enjoined. I fear that I cannot go further today in answering the noble Lord's Question than making some rather general points. As I have already made clear, we shall comply with the court's judgment; and we shall continue to maintain a firm immigration policy.

There are of course various options for changes to the rules following the court's judgment. The noble Baroness Lady Ewart-Biggs enumerated some of them and what she believed to be some of her own as well. Sex discrimination between the rules applying to the admission of husbands and wives could be removed by extending provisions applying to the wives of settled men to the husbands of settled women—I think that was the way round that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, put it—or the provisions applying to the admission of men now could be extended to women. That would mean removing the right of men settled here to bring in their wives. That would be a major change. I have emphasised our commitment to wives and children. On the other hand to allow husbands to join women settled in this country as well as women who are British citizens would mean allowing 2,000 or so additional men to settle here each year.

In addition, consideration has to be given to the implications of the judgment for the requirements which husbands and fiancés must meet before being allowed to join women who are British citizens. I must emphasise that the cases and court's judgment were not directly concerned with these other requirements which husbands must meet under the Immigration Rules. In particular, the application of the primary purpose test was not at issue. All I can do now is to emphasise, as my right honourable friend the Minister of State has in another place, that the primary purpose and other tests are a necessary safeguard against the use of marriage for immigration purposes.

As I have made clear, the Government are most carefully considering the judgment to determine the range of changes in the rules that will be appropriate. The Government will take due note of the court's observations on the importance to be attached to the advancement of equality between the sexes. We are studying the judgment with the due urgency which your Lordships have asked for. I cannot say when there will be an announcement about the action the Government consider appropriate. I can, however, say that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary is well aware of the concern that there should be an early announcement, and that, in formulating his proposals, he will note the remarks made in this debate.

House adjourned at one minute before four o'clock.