Lords Sitting of 16 January 1985

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LoRD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Oxford.
The Earl of Eldon—Took the Oath.

NHS: Consultations on Administration
Lord Molloy: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will hold discussions with all associations representing medical staffs about the administration of the National Health Service.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security (Lord Glenarthur): My Lords, the Government already regularly discuss a wide range of administrative issues with associations representing medical staff in the National Health Service.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, in thanking the noble Minister for that reply, may I point out that what he has said is true but is he aware that, although these discussions are helpful, there is grave anxiety from surgeons right through to ancillary staff, nurses, midwives and junior doctors? Perhaps there should just be consultations, with no binding effects, between representatives of all the organisations within the NHS and DHSS representatives. That might help to allay some of the fears. These people have a right to make suggestions about how they think this great service could be improved.
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I note what the noble Lord suggests, but a forum already exists and, additionally, the Joint Consultants Committee meets quarterly with the department. I think that essentially any change in the staff representation would be a matter on which the existing staff side should formulate coherent proposals for discussion.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, perhaps I may very respectfully point out that one—
Noble Lords: Question!
Lord Molloy: My Lords, may I, with respect, ask the Minister whether he is aware that one of the reasons why I put this Question was because of discussions with the BMA, CoHSE, NUPE and other organisations relating to young doctors and ancillary staff? They point out that such discussions would be helpful to try to stop what they consider to be a threat. For example, at Westminster Hospital the ophthalmic department will be abolished and transferred to Charing Cross Hospital; the provision for cardiac surgery, which has served Parliament so well, is
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threatened; and the general emergency bed service is threatened at many other hospitals. They are afraid that the policy of the Government is in fact closing hospitals by amputation, and that this could be prevented by sensible discussion.
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I cannot accept the noble Lord's assertions, which, to some extent, are scaremongering and unnecessary. The important thing, if the noble Lord wishes to take this forward, is for him and those whom he represents to have discussions through the existing machinery, which will no doubt consider carefully what he says.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, will my noble friend confirm that the whole purpose of the reorganisation of the health service in setting up district health authorities was to enable these bodies, who work close to the ground in these areas, to make these important decisions? If the Government intervene directly on all these matters it would become a centralisation measure.
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that these matters are often best discussed locally.
Lord Kilmarnock: My Lords, can the noble Lord tell the House how many general managers selected at local level have been vetoed by the Secretary of State?
Lord Glenarthur: No, my Lords. In any case, that is another question.

Monetary Policy
2.40 p.m.
Lord Bruce-Gardyne: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. May I point out that the last word of the Question should be "policy" and not "police"?
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they now expect the broad aggregate, £M3, to grow within the target limits over the current target period for monetary policy.
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, though month to month fluctuations are difficult to predict, there are no grounds to expect at this stage that sterling M3 will be outside the target range for the target period as a whole.
Lord Bruce-Gardyne: My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend for that very reassuring Answer. Does he agree that the rise in interest rates this week, far from being a disaster in this context, could be taken as a highly desirable move?
Lord Glenarthur: Yes, my Lords, it is highly desirable, and I am grateful to my noble friend for asking that supplementary question.
Lord Molson: My Lords, since the original Question was totally incomprehensible to a great many of your

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Lordships, may I thank my noble friend for his lucid reply? In order to enlighten noble Lords who, like myself, are not familiar with the language of monetary policy and macro-economics, may I ask four supplementary questions?
What does my noble friend understand by "broad aggregate"? An aggregate is a collection of individual items. What are the individual items that are being aggregated in order to form the "broad aggregate"? What are the "target limits"; and what is the period of time referred to as the "current target period"? Anything that is current obviously is running. When did the period begin to run, and when do the Government expect it to stop running?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, my noble friend has asked me a number of questions which I shall endeavour to answer. So far as sterling M3 is concerned, that relates, as far as I am aware, to all bank deposits. I think that my noble friend will be aware that there are various other indicators which refer to different things. The actual current period is a 14-month period, as I understand it. The actual limits for sterling M3, I am afraid I cannot find in my brief at this particular moment but I shall find them and let my noble friend know.
Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, I, too, have been fascinated by the noble Lord's difficulties. One point on which perhaps I did not hear an explanation is this. Is the reference in the Question to "monetary police" a printing mistake or is it a form of Cabinet commissar to keep them in line?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, thankfully, it is a printing error.
Lord Diamond: My Lords, does the noble Lord agree with his noble friend that the recent increase in interest rates is (as I think he said) a good thing? Can we look forward to the repetition of these good things in the Government's policy and have a number of further increases in interest rates week by week?
Lord Glenarthur: No, my Lords. As the noble Lord will be aware, it was necessary to take the steps that we took for the reasons that were carefully explained by my noble friend the other day. I do not think that I shall go further than that.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that, although he tried very well to explain these esoteric matters to his noble friend Lord Molson, many people will still remain puzzled? Is it not a fact that since the broad money aggregates have been narrowed, unemployment has risen almost in exact correlation? Is it also not a fact that the Government's monetary policy, far from assisting inflation and interest rates, has done the reverse, and that we are enjoying the highest interest rates now that we have had for a long time? Would it not be far better if the Government abandoned their monetarist policy and ran the economy on a proper, planned basis which would benefit the unemployed, the rest of the economy and the rest of the community to a very great extent?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, the noble Lord can rest assured that lower inflation depends upon maintaining a firm monetary control and that is what we propose to do.
Lord Harmar-Nicholls: My Lords, is it not a fact that, on the other side of the coin, the result of the broad aggregate has been more jobs, and that the percentage per thousand of the population has provided more jobs in this country than in any other European country except Denmark? Is that not one of the results that we ought to keep in mind when offering criticism?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend is right.
Lord Bruce-Gardyne: My Lords, for the elimination of doubt, can my noble friend confirm that the currency monetary aggregates were first introduced by the then Chancellor, Mr. Healey, when he was responsible for these matters, and that the current target is from 6 per cent. to 10 per cent?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for that information. I am sure that my noble friend Lord Molson will note the figures that he gave.

Public Expenditure Figures
2.46 p.m.
Lord Dean of Beswick: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the Government financial subvention, per capita of population, to England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, subventions by the Exchequer are calculated only for Northern Ireland. However, figures are available for identifiable public expenditure in all four territories. The latest available are for the financial year 1982–83. The figures per capita are as follows: England, £1,539; Northern Ireland, £2,335; Scotland, £1,990; and, Wales, £1,726.
Lord Dean of Beswick: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord the Minister for that detailed reply because the Question is a difficult one to answer. May I ask the Minister whether he agrees that those figures indicate that the per capita spending now in Northern Ireland is 50 per cent. higher on essential social services than in the English regions? While nobody wants to demur about the necessity for high spending in Northern Ireland, in that unhappy place, is the Minister not aware that, in certain regions of England, unemployment and deprivation is now reaching the Northern Ireland dimensions? May I ask the Minister to plead with the Government to reverse the cuts that they are already implementing in those areas?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, the calculation of public expenditure per capita in the territories (if I may use that word) is based on an aggregation of expenditure on a wide range of programmes whose levels are determined by a wide variety of economic and social factors. I think that the noble Lord would be best to address questions on individual programmes direct to the spending departments concerned.
Lord Glenamara: My Lords, can the noble Lord say what the figure is for the North-East of England where unemployment has now reached crisis proportions? There in some communities up to 50 per cent. of the male population are unemployed and the unemployment figure is higher than anywhere else in Great Britain.
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, no. The figures that I gave are the figures for the territories of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales; and those are the only ones that are available.
Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, does this not boil down to the fact that the poor old English once again are paying for the peripheral provinces?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, there are special circumstances which relate to Northern Ireland of which the noble Lord will be aware.
Lord Dean of Beswick: My Lords, may I finally ask the Minister whether he is aware that the figures he produced are very similar to those that I received as a result of research in the Library? They show that the per capita figure that he gave is based on spending mainly on the broad spectrum of the social services, such as housing, education, the DHSS and the National Health Service in each area. I think that they have nothing to do with the industrial grants; and certainly these figures are not remotely concerned with the defence programme for Northern Ireland and the Army there. Comparing like with like, all that I am pleading is for the Government to reconsider the cuts they are imposing in areas of England which now have the same amount of deprivation as in Northern Ireland.
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, the subvention consists of five items: the grant-in-aid of the United Kingdom Consolidated Fund to the Northern Ireland fund; the Northern Ireland Office expenditure on law and order; expenditure by the Northern Ireland courts service; expenditure by the Ministry of Agriculture in Northern Ireland; and contribution from the GB National Insurance Fund to top up its Northern Ireland counterpart. Three of these items—the first, the second last and the last—are unique to Northern Ireland.

London Regional Transport: Information
2.50 p.m.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will direct London Regional Transport to publish all the categories of information which were previously published about London Transport by the Greater London Council.
Lord Brabazon of Tara: My Lords, such a direction would not be appropriate. The London Regional Transport Act 1984 requires London Regional Transport to make available comprehensive information about their affairs. They have a duty to prepare, consult upon and publish a three-yearly statement of strategy, the first of which is due by the end of June this year. They are required to publish an annual business plan; the plan for 1985–86 was published last December and the noble Lord has no doubt seen it.
They are also required to publish an annual report and accounts, and they must inform local authorities and the London Regional Passengers' Committee each year of their plans for fares and services.
In addition to these statutory requirements, London Regional Transport publish a great deal of information about their services for use by passengers, and they will continue to assist the London Regional Passengers' Committee in the discharge of their duties.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for that detailed reply, but I am a little disappointed with the information he has given. Is it not a fact that the GLC published a considerable amount of information, including that on the quality of service, service levels and financial performance, as well as proposals for capital projects and their monitoring? Is it not the case that of those items only the first piece of information is given to the London Regional Passengers' Committee and that they are given no information on service levels; that is, miles run on trains and buses? May I ask whether the Government will answer questions on detailed service provision in the same way as the GLC previously answered for London Transport?
Lord Brabazon of Tara: My Lords, I think that the noble Lord will find in the business plan much of the information for which he is asking, certainly that relating to passenger miles and so on.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, may I ask whether that information is supplied to the London Regional Passengers' Committee for their consideration? My information is that that is not so.
Lord Brabazon of Tara: My Lords, the annual business plan is freely available to anybody who wants to look at it.

Business
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if at this point I say a word about the arrangements for this afternoon's short debates standing in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Molloy and Lord Jenkins of Putney. It is customary in

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short debates for the mover to be allowed approximately 15 minutes and for the Minister to rise to reply not less than 20 minutes before the scheduled end of the debate.
In the case of the short debate standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, the number of speakers makes it unnecessary to propose any formal time limit on intermediate speeches, though I am sure that the House will be grateful if the speakers in that debate observe the normal conventions about brevity.
In the case of the short debate standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, I should be grateful if other speakers would limit their speeches to a maximum—I repeat, a maximum—of 12 minutes. If any noble Lord were to speak at greater length, it would be at the expense of subsequent speakers in this debate.

World Disarmament
2.52 p.m.
Lord Molloy Lord Molloy rose to call attention to the need for Her Majesty's Government to take the initiative in bringing forward new and realistic proposals for effective world disarmament; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have a degree of pleasure in opening this debate because of the new warmth of understanding which it seems was being generated between the United States and the Soviet Union at the recent discussions in Geneva, for which great credit must go to Mr. Andrei Gromyko and Mr. George Shultz. Therefore, I think it is time that there should be brand-new proposals, because what we are talking about is not a question of war and peace; it is indeed about the entire future of this globe on which we live.
As we know, the world is moving rapidly to final medical epidemic; namely, thermonuclear war. This was initiated by a few men—scientists in the United States, the USSR and Great Britain. Orders were given by the Attlee Government and later by Mr. Churchill's Government—and kept totally secret from Parliament and the nation—that this course should be embarked upon. Now, over 36 years, mankind has developed 50,000 nuclear weapons. Russia and the United States can target every town in this world with a population of 10,000 or more. We are indeed hostages on a terminally ill planet. The USSR can kill every American 20 times and America can kill every Russian 40 times and at the same time poison all mankind and practically slay and wipe out "all creatures that on earth do dwell".
Our only escape is for the peoples of the world to use their power to influence their governments. It cannot be done by one power, or one people, or one government; it has to be done by us all. We in this country have given a superb example. Under both Conservative and Labour Governments we have deplored the preparation of any form of chemical warfare and have abandoned it. It is to the pride of this nation and to the shame of the two super-powers that they have not followed suit. What we must strive for is to halt the arms race by initiating a United States and
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Soviet Union freeze on testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their systems of delivery.
Of course, the vital element has got to be verifiability. Current monitoring is almost foolproof. Verifiability is not now the threat it once was when it came to the abolition of nuclear weapons. It is possible for the United States satellites SAMOS I and SAMOS II to he able to read the licence plates on cars in Moscow streets and to inform the United States Government and military authorities. So it is not at all an impossible suggestion such as it was a few years ago. With multi-spectral photography the United States, and probably the Russians, can now penetrate all cloud mists and provide simultaneous images of what is happening in different arsenals of the world.
This is the other side of the fence, whereby the horrendous discoveries of thermonuclear weapons are now being balanced with the opportunities to try to arrive at some reduction in these horrendous arms, with acceptable verifiability. The United States maintain extensive worldwide radar which will go over horizons. They have tracking stations which keep them in touch with what is happening in every suspect area of the world, every second of every day or night. What we have to ask is: have the Russians got the same? The answer is probably, yes. Will they agree, therefore, to have examination in depth, which would provide a very good chance that verifiability will be not the menace that it was but will come to our rescue in this dreadful age?
Will our Government consider urging the start of a series of unilateral initiatives designed to reduce world tension and urge on the super-powers the need to commence graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction? I believe that that itself could then lead to a much more practical appreciation of what we all claim we want to achieve in the abolition of these terrible weapons. I suppose everybody in the world, in every political party, in one way or another supports the principle of CND; not only the multilateralists and the unilaterialists, but everybody. I have never heard of anybody who has said: "This is a wonderful thing and we ought to have these weapons because just imagine what a great, tremendous thing it would be to have a thermonuclear war and reduce this sphere to something spinning lifeless in space."
There have been proposals which we could well have examined and might well be examining again. Ever since 1979 all freeze benefits have not been fully gone into. But, going further back, in 1977 President Brezhnev proposed and urged the reduction of stockpiles. Proposals for negotiations to begin on ending production of nuclear war weapons still exist. Let Britain take the lead. Let us start talking again; instead of threatening, let us get talking.
The example was given to us by the greatest Englishman of our time, Winston Churchill, with his proposition that jaw, jaw is better than war, war. One hopes that what happened in Geneva a few weeks ago will be the restart of talking and of being frank with one another in the hope that something good will result. I hope that my nation will declare that we recognise that our security is intimately tied to the security of our opponents, and hence that mutual

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security must be mutually arrived at. There is an enemy greater than the Soviet Union and that enemy is inaction. Delay could be deadly.
In my judgment we must not countenance the doctrine of limited nuclear war either, because once begun there will be no end until life on earth has ended. There is also the terror of error via "launch on warning". I believe that we have to examine this very quickly with our great allies in the United States of America. The top nuclear scientists and technologists of the world say that with launch on warning there is a grave possibility of an error being committed. As Churchill said—and this has now been revealed—if we have United States missiles on this island and they are let off, we will become nothing but a target for the Soviet Union. I do not think that one ought to dismiss too hastily the words of Winston Churchill.
We must never equate courage with a willingness to wage nuclear war or equate cowardice with arms control, disarmament, or a reluctance to wage nuclear war. Leading British and American scientists are united in their views on the greatest danger facing mankind. Together these British and American scientists, men and women of top quality and ability, cry out to stop this truly unholy madness.
I believe that we should get back to the philosophies of great statesmen of this country; to that of Aneurin Bevan when he urged us to arrive at the frontiers of understanding before some terrible calamity overtook us; and to that of the great Churchill, with his declaration of jaw, jaw being better than war, war. We should underline and demonstrate the interdependence of all nations. Our policies should be at all times to save the world for freedom and to save freedom for the world.
I want to conclude on a personal note. I was in America not so very long ago visiting my American born and bred grandchildren. We travelled over a number of states and I watched the ceremony of my granddaughter, Miss Julia Motl, going to her first mass in America with her little sister Ann. In our family over Christmas another little human being was born, a little granddaughter, Lauren. Then I had the privilege to go to Cheltenham Junior College to listen to the carol singing there. As a Welshman, I am bound to say that I give them 10 out of 10—it was lovely. I listened to the young boys—I knew one young boy in particular, Jonathan Bullingham—singing those Christmas carols. It brought home to me the lead that I believe my country above all others can give in this terrible situation. I respect the Soviet Union and I respect the USA. However, I happen to believe that if they will be prepared to listen to our Governments—irrespective of what political colour they might be—there is always something to be gained. If what I have said this afternoon will be at least looked at by the Government, I shall indeed be most happy. I do not want a situation where there will be neither peace on earth nor indeed goodwill allowed to flourish because there will be nobody to enjoy it.
The situation is deadly. It is appallingly serious. We have talked about it for years without really trying to understand what it means. Literally within a few minutes of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war our island could be wiped out. We might be in a position in which to destroy an invading Russian Army, we
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shall—we shall probably say reluctantly—wipe out millions of Germans, Belgians and Frenchmen. One cannot have a thermonuclear bomb which will slay only Russians. That is an absurdity. These are the matters that we must understand. We should at least be prepared to consider some of the proposals that I have outlined—and they are not all mine. My desire is that the world should arrive at a sane situation, and I would feel justifiably proud if the initial steps were taken by my nation. I beg to move for Papers.
3.7 p.m.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, we are in broad agreement with the broad approach expressed with such eloquence by the noble Lord, Lord Molloy. This is good weather for disarmament and it is time that it was good weather after two or three years of very bad weather.
Just before Christmas the Prime Minister went to Washington and met President Reagan at Camp David. She succeeded in coming back with a four point declaration, the importance of which in history of course remains to be seen, but which I think we should all, in all parts of the House, welcome as a remarkable diplomatic achievement: one which can be only beneficial.
The Prime Minister came back with the agreement of the President, the explicit agreement of the President, that the United States would not procure and deploy the system known colloquially as "star wars" without having negotiations with everybody concerned (which means not only his allies but our adversaries, the Soviet Union), and various other extremely useful formulae which will serve—which have already served—to hold in check the wilder hawks in the United States, who are of course to be found within this Administration as much as they are to be found outside it.
I cannot forbear from taking some pleasure—without making party politics—in the fact that that declaration was quite close to the policy aims suggested to the Prime Minister by my right honourable friend Dr. Owen in an open personal letter—is that a contradiction?—in an open letter, a few days before the Prime Minister went to Washington. We should have liked it closer, but we are glad indeed that she was able to obtain so much of what we thought ought to have been obtained in advance of the Geneva negotiations.
I now turn to the Geneva agreement itself, which, I cannot imagine why, was simply not reproduced in the British press. It was mentioned, it was analysed, it was praised and it was damned, but as far as I can remember not a single paper just printed the wretched thing. I will not read it all, although it is short, but it is worth just reminding ourselves what it says, because the language is new language and indeed good language. It says:
"The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms both strategic and intermediate range with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."
It speaks of,
"preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth and limiting and reducing nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability"—not strategic might, but strategic stability."

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It says that each delegation—the American and the Russian—shall be a single delegation which will be divided into three groups—the three sub-committees of the delegation. It repeats that the aim of the negotiation is the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.
Those who have been around this House as long as I have—and there are many of you, my Lords—will remember the McCloy-Zorin declaration of 1960 or 1962 and will know that in two ways this agreement is better than the McCloy-Zorin declaration. To begin with, it is signed between Foreign Ministers instead of special envoys. Secondly, it is a great deal broader than the McCloy-Zorin approach. It is, I think, the broadest approach to disarmament which has appeared on the table since the grand old days (or the idealistic old days—whichever way one likes to look at it) when the noble Lord, Lord Home, was Foreign Secretary and we really had a go for general and comprehensive disarmament back in the late 1950s.
Back from Geneva, deep divisions immediately appeared in the United States Administration. The divisions were so deep that Mr Shultz had to write to Mr. Gromyko as soon as he got home, saying that the United States really did mean what they had agreed and were going to stick to their bond, it being understood that this was so whatever Mr. Weinberger might say, because the Pentagon hawks had been saying in effect that the United States did not intend to stick to the agreement. Mr. Shultz was the negotiator. He will be conducting the negotiations—he says that they will keep their word, and that can only be good.
He used in recent days more than once the phrase, "organic relationship" to describe the three baskets, the three sub-committees, of the negotiations, thereby agreeing with the Soviet Union that that is an unbreakable relationship and that progress must be made in all three at the same time. The House will not need reminding that the three sub-committees are: first, space, including "star wars" and so on; secondly, strategic nuclear weapons, the intercontinental end of the scale; and thirdly, intermediate nuclear forces, meaning typically those that are in, or which afflict, Western Europe and Eastern Europe, outside the super powers. All this is very good. The Prime Minister has ensured no nonsense about refusing to discuss the Strategic Defence Initiative in Geneva. She has ensured no nonsense about refusing to discuss even research towards the Strategic Defence Initiative. The United States has agreed to discuss research with the Russians. We on these Benches would have liked to see an agreement by both sides to suspend their research during the negotiations, and we shall be pressing the Government to try to get that agreement even now.
The Strategic Defence Initiative is going to dominate the scene in the next round of negotiations—so much has been clear now for many months. It is worth remembering that those in the United States Administration who are keenest on getting the research done without international objections are the very same people who are keenest on preventing the export of military high technology to any country outside the United States. That paradox waits to be resolved.
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The German Government is rather inclined to go along with the research programme because it hopes to get some spin-off from it. It hopes to be aided by it to keep up with Japan and the United States in the relevant high tech. But we must all remember, and the Germans must remember too, that the export of military high tech from the United States or any other country runs into severe objections from other parts of the inchoate United States Adminstration, which have perhaps not yet come into action. The Germans must also remember—and we in Europe must all remember—that if it ever came to the installation of Strategic Defence Initiative systems in Europe on the ground—and that has been proposed by the United States—that would break the ABM treaty as certainly as their installation in the United States itself.
Before leaving SDI, I should like to remind the House of one thing that everyone seems to have forgotten: it concerns anti-satellite capability—the capability to shoot down satellites. It is commonly said that the Russians started work on this long before the Americans and the Americans are running after them to catch up. What is forgotten is that before the Russians started work on it the Americans had an operational capability to shoot down satellites. It was not very good and they gave it up, but it was declared operational. It was installed on two Pacific islands called Johnston and Kwajalein in the early 1960s. There is ample evidence that that is what started the Russians off on the subject. I can give the Government, or any noble Lord who is interested, the references in the Western literature to these facts.
What are the lessons of recent weeks for our Government? At the Conservative Party conference in 1983 Mr. Heseltine was understood to say that the United Kingdom ought to join the disarmament talks, and we on these Benches agree with him. We believe that there is a role for Britain at the negotiating table. It is not immediately easy to see what that role is, but there should be one. We are encouraged by Mr. Heseltine having leaned that way in a now largely forgotten speech 18 months ago. Consultation is not enough, on the simple ground of ordinary good government in a sovereign state. The weapons which are to be discussed at the INF negotiations—that is, the third basket of the negotiations—are nuclear weapons under foreign physical control. They are on our soil, it is our people whose lives are at stake and it is our future. How can we not be present at the negotiations?
What weapons should be considered at these INF negotiations? There is a history of forgetting about things. For years and years the Soviet Union had two systems called the SS-4 and SS-5, which threatened this country but not the United States. Nobody asked them to remove them. Nobody worried about them. In this House I was on at successive Governments from 1971 to do something about the position. They did nothing; and because they did nothing we got the SS-20s. The Russians thought we did not mind. The SS-20s updated the SS-4s and SS-5s.
I see a possibility of that happening again about another Soviet missile system. It is never mentioned, has never been negotiated about, and never discussed. It is the system called Shaddock. Noble Lords will remember that a Shaddock got loose last week from

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Soviet exercises in the Arctic and flew across Norway and Finland. It is a nuclear tipped missile, although I do not know if the one that broke free was armed. It is a nuclear system with a range of many hundreds of miles. It is capable of destroying London, Birmingham, Paris, Frankfurt, or whatever. That system must be included in the negotiations. It was not included on the previous occasion, and I do not know why. Also, let us not forget that a Pershing II exploded last week in Germany and killed three men; they are not safe weapons, any more than is Shaddock.
It is difficult to see how there can be meaningful negotiations about these completely mobile weapons in Europe only. The SS-20s threaten nearly half the countries in the world. They threaten India, Egypt, Israel, China. All those countries are just as steamed up about them as we are. Any which are taken away from European Russia can be trundled along in less than 24 hours to face any of those countries. We ought to be at the negotiations on INF. There is a case for saying that the Indians, Chinese, Egyptians, Israelis, and so on all down the line, ought to be there. I formulate it this way. Any country whose security is affected by the existence of these weapon systems and who wants to be there ought to be there. Perhaps not all of them want to.
Incidentally, who is talking to the Chinese about Geneva? Is the United States briefing the Chinese? Are the Russians briefing the Chinese? The Chinese have said nothing so far. It is about the only country in the world not to have said anything. If the Government have any news, we shall he interested to hear it.
As to the strategic arms reduction negotiations, the same question arises—who should be there? It is not clear that it ought to be only the Russians and the Americans. Of course, one can go to the extreme and say that everyone must be everywhere; and that is clearly impossible. The question arises of our own independent nuclear deterrent being taken into account. Taking something into account can mean any number of things. We take the weather into account. I do not suppose that even this Government will mind our weapons being taken into account in that sense. But it could also mean, at the other extreme, absolutely and finally giving up our weapons.
There is one thing that it could not possibly mean. It could not possibly mean reducing our Polaris force or in future our Trident force. One cannot reduce a four-boat force. If one does, one does not have a deterrent, because there cannot be one boat on station all the time. We have to face the fact that if the Government go ahead and get another four-boat force in the future, with Trident—a more modern and powerful one—it still cannot be reduced. They have to face the fact that either they will have to hang onto it, however much that disrupts the negotiations, or at a given moment and by agreement get rid of it entirely. This is one of the reasons why we on this Bench oppose the acquisition of Trident as a successor to Polaris. We think that there should be a much less expensive, grand, gold-plated and provocative force, and that it should be carried on far more platforms, each carrying fewer and less powerful weapons.
There can be no question of any possiblility of this country giving up its independent nuclear deterrent force after discussion in negotiations at which we are
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not present. There can be no question of our permitting, tolerating or conniving at discussions or negotiations about the giving up of our nuclear forces in our absence. That is absolutely clear. On the other hand, we here would like the country to be in a position to reduce its weapons when the time comes, and finally to give them up when the time comes, after negotiation, in agreement. I think that it would be about right if we said that we would do that, or be prepared to consider doing it, when the super-powers have come down to about half their present level in strategic weapons. That is the express Chinese policy. They have already said that they will do that. It is compatible with the general French approach. It would be beneficial if this country were to adopt it too.
One last word on the negotiations: if anything, though they are wider than they have ever been, they should be even wider still and more organic. Difficulties can arise in the course of the negotiations, and are likely to, as a result of the military-industrial complex—or, I should now say, military-industrial-academic complex—in either super-power blarneying or tricking their own leaders into doing something which they know will cause the negotiations to fail. That has happened so often before. Difficulties can come to the negotiations from the fact that they have been artificially limited in their scope. If the security of any country, or the efficacity of any weapon system is affected by the negotiations, and that country or that system has been left outside the negotiations, those negotiations will fail, as so many have before. They must cover the right countries—those whose security may be affected—and the right weapon systems—those whose efficacity may be affected.
I fear that it is quite likely that the new negotiations will be wrecked by one or other of these familiar dangers. It would not be the first time, but let us hope, and let us above all work, for their enlargement, and to prevent silly plots by the military on either side upsetting them.
3.23 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of Oxford: My Lords, my interest in this debate is first and foremost that of any ordinary citizen of this country and, indeed, of any sane person in the whole world who prays for peace and longs for his children and grandchildren to live without the recurring threat of annihilaton by war. It is also the particular responsibility of every Christian to care deeply about this issue in virtue of the universal character of his faith.
As it happens, my own ministry has been exercised, partly at least, in the international sphere. For the past 10 years I have been one of the presidents of the Conference of European Churches. This is quite a modest organisation, with a small headquarters in Geneva, but it brings together in an unusual manner Christians from both Eastern and Western Europe of the Orthordox, Anglican and Protestant communions. It also has many close and friendly links with the Roman Catholic hierarchies of Europe from East to West. Since the Helsinki Conference on Peace and Security which aroused such hopes in 1975, representatives of the European churches have endeavoured to keep alive what may be called the Helsinki process and to remind the Governments concerned of the follow-up meetings in Belgrade and Madrid and of the

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undertakings that were given and the expectations aroused at Helsinki.
It may be said that our efforts in that direction have been crowned with very little success. Of course, if we are inviting governments to be self-critical, we ought to expect churches to be self-critical as well. If we consider the universal character and vocation of the church (if I may use that word in the broadest sense possible), it has proved itself to be a less effective agent in the realm of peace and disarmament than both its members and its non-members may have had a right to expect. Indeed, when one engages in international meetings of churchmen, one realises the difficulties of a Christian's exercising proper independence of judgment and not simply being regarded as a mouthpiece for the interests of his country and its government. I think that we are all familiar with that criticism when it is applied to church leaders in many of the countries under Communist rule, but we are perhaps less apt to consider whether, even in our democratic societies, there may be a beam in our own eyes which becomes quite apparent as soon as we go outside our borders.
I begin in this way because it is not the object of this speech to heap detailed advice upon Her Majesty's Government but rather to speak about the necessary infrastructure (if I may so call it) of disarmament. No doubt we all have our own pet theories and remedies in the realm of disarmament, but we do not all have the responsibility of Government when trying to put policy into practice. Nevertheless, the interest of the churches in disarmament is not simply that of any old non-governmental organisation. It arises from the fact that the churches contain a great many people, some of whom are politicians, and of many different persuasions, but most of whom are without any special expertise; but all alike are subject to a divine imperative which they may not refuse—namely, to seek the peace and welfare of all humanity.
It was for this reason that a few years ago many Christians besides myself supported a petition by the World Disarmament Movement which was to be laid before a special session of the United Nations. Cynics could, and no doubt did, say that this was a rather futile gesture of pious hope, especially as the citizens of a number of countries would not be free to sign such a petition even if they were aware of its existence. But the worthwhile value of a petition like that seemed to be that it signified the passionate concern of ordinary men and women of different nationalities for a fresh approach to disarmament. It was a welcome sign that peace is always a matter of too great importance to be left to experts of any kind, or indeed to governments, and that public pressure against war, violence and destruction has always to be maintained.
It seems to me, therefore, that the first word of this House to Her Majesty's Government ought to be one of encouragement not to be afraid to persevere, and persevere vigorously, in the face of that kind of fatalism which so easily overtakes our contemporaries when the subject of world disarmament is discussed. The late Lord Noel-Baker who devoted so much of his life to a campaign against the arms race wrote these words 30 years ago:
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"No one who has closely followed disarmament negotiations since 1919 is likely to be guilty of facile optimism about the prospect of success. But no one who understands the present arms race should be guilty of facile pessimism, which is by far the graver fault. Defeatism about the feasibility of plans for disarmament and ordered peace has been the most calamitous of all the errors made by democratic governments in modern times".
In what ways then could we try to escape the paralysis of what Lord Noel-Baker called "facile pessimism"? In the first place we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, that we surely ought not to sit back and leave everything to the outcome of negotiations between the United States of America and the USSR, as if any nation less than a super-power had little or nothing of significance to contribute to the cause of world disarmament. That is surely a great fallacy and our Government should be prominent in exposing it as such.
We have recently had a welcome moment of hope in Geneva, where the encounter of Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko was at least several degrees warmer than the weather. But already hesitations and reservations are beginning to be expressed about the future of their negotiations—and one may venture to guess that the mentality of those two great powers is generally so different and the spirit of competition between them is so keen, that they are not always the most hopeful runners in the race of détente. The fact that very heavily armoured creatures are apt to be lacking in mobility is illustrated by the life history of the dinosaur and it is not the duty of the Christian, in particular, when he surveys the origins of his own faith, to think that human history is always governed by colossal power.
It is therefore my own conviction that just as the smallest nation is capable of being a serious trouble-maker, as we know, and of setting a match to the conflagration, in the same way there is no nation so small that it could not, by a wise and pacific policy, make some contribution to disarmament in its own region. We are not a small nation and we still retain some credit in the world for being capable now and again of disinterested action in international affairs. That is why this Motion is justified in asking the Government to take an initiative in bringing forward new proposals and in indicating that these proposals should not consist of mere rhetoric or utopian generalisations but should be realistic in character.
Why should we not begin, for example, by working for the creation of quite a narrow zone in central Europe, free of nuclear and chemical weapons, the zone to be extended in depth as confidence grows? The idea that peace and disarmament begin on a global scale and move inwards seems inherently improbable and quite unsupported by history. On the contrary—if we may go a little into history—the initiatives that have been most successful in the past, such as the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 between Britain and the United States demilitarising the Canadian border or the Karlstad Convention of 1905, confirming the demilitarisation of the border between Norway and Sweden, have been comparatively small, good-neighbour agreements. Yet who shall say that they have not made their useful contribution to peace and prosperity in later generations?
By the same token, in our own day, European powers like ourselves who have a common interest in

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avoiding the turning of Europe again into a battle ground may be the right ones to take initiatives for world disarmament, first by setting a regional example rather than just waiting passively for the two super-powers to reach an agreement on behalf of everybody.
I make one last observation: a recent survey of all armed conflicts since 1945 (of which there have been about 150) has shown that the most frequent cause was the allegation that human rights were being denied in one way or another. We know quite well that nothing can arouse public indignation so much as the gross violation of human rights—say, in the persecution of some individual or group—by the government of another nation. And we may be sure that the same indignation sometimes applies in our own case, however blameless we may suppose ourselves to be. The acquisition of more and more military hardware—which is sometimes supposed to be our only guarantee of peace and security—hardly touches this matter of human rights at all. It cannot be shown that our world is a better, more just, more merciful place because powerful nations keep improving their weapons systems, and still less because small nations feel compelled to spend money on armaments which they ought to be spending on feeding and educating their people.
One of the curses of the present deadlock between powers with the capacity for overkill is that it makes what may be called chivalrous action almost impossible. As we witnessed in the cases of Lebanon and Afghanistan (to mention two), the fear of massive destruction on a world scale has made it that much harder to prevent anarchy and cruelty on a small scale.
My conclusion is that any proposals brought forward by the Government should not simply be concerned with the well-worn subjects of the calculation of numbers of weapons and the possibilities for their inspection, as if we believed the path to disarmament to be a largely impersonal business governed by monstrous inventions that have reached beyond human control. To anybody, religious or not, who cares about human dignity, such a view ought to he anathema. In spite of the scorn that was being poured on the expression "peace-building" in this House yesterday, it is a plain fact, without the steady building up of mutual confidence between the parties, disarmament negotiations are likely to go on being unfruitful—unless there is an easing of the suspicion with which they are so often poisoned.
It is in the opening of hearts and minds, and the abandonment of national caricatures (which are usually out of date anyway), that any hopeful process has to begin. Included somewhere in that process should he work for human rights on the basis of international agreements, and especially for the better implementation of those agreements which already exist. It is all too easy to use that phrase "human rights" only as a stick to beat other regimes of which we disapprove, but it is much more valuable to work patiently for the recognition of common standards by which governments will abide—and not only when it happens to suit their book. This is surely a crucial part of any multiple strategy for the prevention of war today
3.38 p.m.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, my first words must be to congratulate my noble friend Lord Molloy on his fortune in winning the ballot for this debate, on his selection of subject and in the moving speech with which he initiated it. Whatever our views, I think we all appreciated it very much.
On the last occasion when we discussed disarmament I said that over the past few months I had met representatives from six governments—three Western and three non-aligned—and felt that there was a warmer climate in international affairs. I think that view has been justified by the climax of the agreement between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko for further discussions.
The Motion asks for new and effective proposals. I want to begin by referring to measures which I believe are on the agenda of political reality, and to urge the Government to support those measures. The first is the discussion at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament of an international convention banning chemical weapons. I was disturbed by recent rumours that in this country we were to start manufacturing them again. I welcome the denial of that. The proposals at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament are progressing promisingly. The Soviet Union has agreed to verification measures, and I earnestly hope that the Government will give full support to the conclusion in a satisfactory way of those negotiations.
The second measure which I believe is within political reality is the banning of weapons in outer space. I am glad that that subject is to be discussed between the USA and the USSR. Last month, at the United Nations, when this ban was discussed, a resolution in its favour was carried by 150 to none. The United States alone abstained. I congratulate the British representative for voting in favour of that resolution. That, again, is a proposal—an effective proposal—on the agenda of realities.
I wish that I could say the same about the attitude of the Government to the third proposal which I believe is realistic: the proposal to ban all nuclear weapons tests. We ban tests in the air and we ban them on the earth; they now take place only underneath the ground. All over the world there is overwhelming support for this proposal. At the United Nations discussion the proposal was carried by 123 Governments to 2. I urge the British Government to change their attitude to that proposal.
The fourth realistic measure is a new weapons freeze—a proposal which came from America and which has swept the world. Why are the British Government opposed to this proposal—a freeze not only on the manufacture of nuclear weapons but also on research, on development, on deployment, on travel facilities and on anything else which would contribute to ending the danger of a nuclear war?
The next great measure of hope is the support for nuclear weapon-free zones in Northern Europe, in Central Europe and in South-Eastern Europe. They are already in operation in Latin America. Such zones are now proposed by the Governments for the South Pacific, and there is a proposal for the Middle East. In this world, which is surrounded by efforts for devastating nuclear war, these popular proposals for

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zones which are free from danger of nuclear war certainly should be supported by our Government.
Lastly, I want to urge very earnestly upon the Government that they should support a treaty against the first use, not only of nuclear weapons but of conventional weapons as well. The Government themselves said in reply to the Soviet proposal for a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons that they were in favour of banning the first use of conventional weapons as well. NATO has endorsed that idea, and the Warsaw Pact has supported it. There are all the conditions in the world now for a treaty banning the first use, not only of nuclear weapons but also of conventional weapons—indeed, of all kinds of weapons. When we speak of effective proposals, surely those six proposals are within the bounds of realistic achievement. I beg the Government to support them.
The Government say that they are in favour of multilateral disarmament. I wonder whether the Government realise that over the greater part of the world they are regarded as being opposed to multilateral disarmament. That view rests on the fact that both in the United Nations and in the conference on disarmament at Geneva the British Government are constantly opposing measures for disarmament. The Quaker Peace and Service Headquarters at Friends' House have issued a detailed examination the votes cast at the United Nations last month on the subject of disarmament—the votes cast by China, France, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. No one can study that analysis of the votes given by the British representative without understanding the widely-held view that instead of supporting multilateral disarmament we are opposing it.
At the United Nations last month we opposed the abolition of tests for nuclear weapons. We opposed the conclusion of an international convention on strengthening the security of non-nuclear weapon states. We opposed a motion calling upon all states and institutions to terminate nuclear and military collaboration with South Africa. We opposed a motion for a nuclear weapons arms freeze. We opposed a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We opposed a motion calling for efforts to intensify multilateral negotiations to reverse the nuclear arms race. We opposed a motion for international co-operation on disarmament by implementing United Nations recommendations. We opposed an invitation to all Governments to submit reports on steps to expedite action to prevent nuclear war.
We opposed a motion calling for a report on contributions of United Nations special agencies towards arms limitation and disarmament. We opposed a motion calling on the Geneva Committee to proceed without delay for nuclear disarmament. We opposed a motion in favour of no first use of nuclear weapons. We opposed a motion for the prohibition of neutron weapons. We opposed a motion urging the United States and the Soviet Union to find a way out of the impasse in negotiations. We opposed a motion for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We opposed a motion for multilateral talks to curb the naval arms race. In view of that record, how can it be otherwise that over such a large part of the world, the
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Government, despite their declaration, are opposing every kind of move towards multilateral disarmament.
In addition—I shall not delay the House by reading the list—we abstained on a whole series of issues that were moderate in character, much more moderate than those that I have read. At the Geneva conference, which has been asked by the United Nations to prepare proposals for a comprehensive policy of disarmament, and where the subject has been divided into workshops, the British Government are in a minority on the majority of those committees because they are balking the efforts towards multilateral disarmament. My appeal to members of the Government is this—that they reverse their policies in the world upon those issues, reverse them where they are opposed even on the separate measures that I have indicated, but far more deeply, reverse their general attitude towards multilateral disarmament in the world. Otherwise, we are just going forward to disaster. I should not like to have the responsibility of being a member of a Government who have so abysmally failed to prevent this process from going to disaster.
3.52 p.m.
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, I speak with some feeling and indeed with some experience of these matters, having been a Minister in the Foreign Office responsible for arms control and disarmament matters and having followed this subject very closely ever since I left government. When I saw the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, I thought that I would be very sharply at odds with him because of the phrase which refers to effective world disarmament. However, I found that, in his speech, the noble Lord did not seem to be calling for world disarmament but for some more modest measures of arms control. I should like, therefore, simply to take up one or two of the points that he made in what I hope will be a constructive manner.
In the first place, I would earnestly counsel the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, the noble Lord, Lord Brockway and, indeed, any other Members of your Lordships' House not to become too euphroic about the results of the meeting in Geneva. This was only a first step, a very hesitant first step. Already, since the talks, almost within 24 hours, we have the Soviet Government announcing their conditions for the success of further talks, one of those conditions being the abandonment by the United States of America of its strategic defence initiative. The President of the United States has no intention of abandoning that initiative. If, therefore, the Soviet Union is saying that it will not arrive at any agreements except as a result of that abandonment, then there will be no agreements. I have to tell those who now feel a sense of warmth—that word has been used twice in today's debate—as a result of what happened in Geneva, that, in my view, it is a sensation that might turn out to be tragically false.
The noble Lord, Lord Molloy, spoke about chemical warfare. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, also, I think, referred to it. Yes, indeed, it would be an excellent idea if we could arrive at a universal agreement or convention on the banning of chemical warfare, the production and deployment of chemical weapons. I would, however, remind your Lordships that in the confrontation that exists in central Europe

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at the moment the Soviet Union has virtually a monopoly of chemical weapons. We have none. There are none deployed in the British Army of the Rhine. The Soviet Union threatens, in the event of war, to use those weapons. I would suggest that those who are so anxious to arrive at an agreement on chemical warfare should direct their pleas not to Her Majesty's Government, who have already abandoned their right to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe, but to the Soviet Union.
Lord Molloy: My Lords. I should like to defend myself. If the noble Lord reads Hansard tomorrow, he will note that I congratulated this country and deplored the fact that the super-powers did not have the courage to follow our example.
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, I apologise if I gave the noble Lord the wrong impression. I understand what he said and sympathise with his view. I am pointing out that it is not the super-powers—that is a phrase used often too loosely in the debate—but it is the Soviet Union that has the monopoly of chemical weapons in Europe. I wish people would understand that this is not a kind of symmetrical competiton between two equals. We talk about the super-powers as if able to say, "A plague on both their houses". That is a false and dangerous road to take.
Verifiability is another matter to which the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, referred. The noble Lord said that the question of verifying arms control agreements was no longer a problem because of such things as satellite reconnaissance and other national means of intelligence and inspection. This, again, is a very dangerous assumption to arrive at. Yes, it is possible by the use of satellites to determine certain things and to acquire certain intelligence. We can, as the noble Lord said, read the number plates of vehicles in the streets of Moscow. What we cannot do, with existing means of national verification, is a whole range of very important things. We cannot, for example, determine by our own means how many warheads there are in a missile when it is being tested by telemetry. We cannot, by national means of verification, determine what kind of research is taking place in the Soviet Union, what kind of development of weapons is taking place on the ground in factories.
It is true that satellite reconnaissance has given us an enormous weapon of intelligence, but we are not yet in a position where we can totally verify arms control agreements without international inspection. I do ask the noble Lord to accept that, because it should affect a good deal of our attitude towards certain proposed arms control agreements of the kind proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, to whose speech I shall refer in a moment.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, will the noble Lord not agree that the way to put that right is by on-site inspection, and that it is a hopeful development within the last year that the Soviet Union has for the first time, in a limited context, agreed to the principle of on-site inspection?
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, yes, I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. The answer to arms
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control verification is on-site inspection. One of the major obstacles to arms control agreements for the last 25 years has been the Soviet Union's refusal to accept on-site inspection. Again, it is a unilateral refusal. It is the Soviet Union that has refused. The noble Lord says that there are encouraging signs that the Russians may now be prepared to accept a measure of on-site inspection. If they do so, this will indeed be an encouraging development.
Finally, on the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, I should like to say that the noble Lord hinted, unless I misheard him, that there could be, among intelligent people, very little disagreement about the aims of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Let me assure him that there are in some quarters grave reservations about the aims of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. In the first place, I totally reject the concept of unilateral disarmament measures. They are dangerous and destabilising. But I would go further; and this may not please the noble Lord or some of his friends. I believe that nuclear disarmament, even if it were multilateral, in isolation from other forms of disarmament, is equally dangerous.
We must not address ourselves to the problem of nuclear weapons as though they existed in a strategic vacuum. They are part of a whole complex of confrontation, and if we were to remove nuclear weapons without doing anything about so-called conventional weapons or chemical weapons, we would find ourselves then in a position of serious vulnerability and inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. So I ask the noble Lord to understand that there are some people with modest claims to intelligence who strongly reject the views of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
I now come, if I may, very briefly—I hope something has gone wrong with the clock, because I do not think I have been speaking for 23 minutes—to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. I must say to him, with deep respect and affection, that his characterisation of the position on the Strategic Defence Initiative—the star wars problem—is a parody of the true situation. It is true that the Americans have assured the Prime Minister that they will not deploy any strategic defence systems without consulting their allies; but they never intended to, anyway. The Strategic Defence Initiative is a research programme, as he well knows. It has nothing to do with the deployment of the weapons. As any member of the United States Administration will tell the noble Lord, if he cares to ask, there is no plan whatsoever to deploy strategic defence weapons; there is only a research programme.
The noble Lord spoke of the wilder hawks in the Administration. Well, yes, there are some hawks there. There are here in Western Europe some doves who I fear are doing our cause in the Alliance some damage in their attitudes to the Strategic Defence Initiative. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, suggested that what the Prime Minister had achieved in her talks with President Reagan in some way was a result of, or was consonant with, the letter addressed to her by Dr. David Owen. That is of course not so. Dr. David Owen's letter, which ran to something like four pages, invited the Prime Minister categorically to oppose

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their Strategic Defence Initiative. Happily, the Prime Minister did not do so. What the Prime Minister said, if the reports in the press may be relied upon, was, "We are at one with the United States on the matter of Strategic Defence Initiative".
If she said that—and I believe that she did—I for one am very happy, because I think that at this moment we do not know enough about the Strategic Defence Initiative to condemn it. The noble Lord's suggestion that the United States should suspend its research programme during the negotiations would, it seems to me, be playing exactly the game that the Soviet Union wants us to play. The Strategic Defence Initiative was what brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. It would not be there if it were not for that. It said, with a great flourish of trumpets, "We shall not come to the negotiating table while you continue to deploy your cruise and your Pershing missiles". We continued to deploy them, with courage and resolution. The Soviet Union came to the negotiating table. Why?—because of the star wars initiative. If we were now to encourage the United States to abandon that research, then there would be no incentive whatsoever for the Soviet Union to continue with these negotiations.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, I should like to take up the point about the motivation both of the Prime Minister and of the Soviet leadership. May I point out that I did not say that the United States should abandon its research, and correct the noble Lord on this? My suggestion was that the United States and the Soviet Union should both suspend their research while negotiations lasted. I think it might help to put the matter into proportion—I do not think custom would permit me to do it myself—if the noble Lord were to read to the House the Prime Minister's four-point agreement with Mr. Reagan, which is extremely brief.
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, I have read the agreement, and I have read Dr. Owen's letter to the Prime Minister. All I am at pains to point out to the House at the moment is that the Prime Minister did not oppose the President's Strategic Defence Initiative. I am making that clear and I am seeking to commend her for taking that point of view with the President.
The noble Lord, again, sought to make a point about anti-satellite weapons by saying that the United States had been the first to go into the anti-satellite weapon business. The fact of the matter—and he will know this as well as anybody—is that the only fully tested ground-based anti-satellite system in the world today belongs to the Soviet Union. The United States followed that research, and in my view followed it wisely. If I may say so, again with great respect, I find it difficult to understand why the noble Lord, and others of his friends, should continue, in everything he does, to try to vindicate the Soviet Union and to heap excoriation and blame upon the United States of America. I do not want to pre-empt the debate which will come next, but I ask noble Lords to understand one simple fact. The Soviet Union is our potential enemy, and shows itself to be so in almost everything it does and says. The United States of America is our great, valued and trusted ally; and there is no way in
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which we can create any symmetry between those two—
Lord Kennet: My Lords, will the noble Lord give way again?
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, I really am being interrupted.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord once more, but he is implying that I said that which I did not say. Does the noble Lord differ from my statement of the following succession of events? In the early 1960s, the United States had two operational anti-satellite systems. It cancelled them because they are not very good; that is to say, it dismantled them because they are not very good. The Soviet Union then proceeds to develop its own, later, and, presumably, as a result.
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, yes; I contest that version of events, but this is something which obviously we must not continue in the Chamber of your Lordships' House. Perhaps we can continue it at some other time.
If I may, I want to refer briefly to the speech by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, on only one point; that is, his desire to see the establishment of nuclear-free zones. I ask him to understand that a nuclear-free zone is really a meaningless concept. It may mean that you do not have in that zone nuclear weapons stationed, nuclear weapons developed or nuclear weapons manufactured, but it does not prevent that place being a target for nuclear weapons. I understand that there are certain boroughs and municipalities in this country which have declared themselves to be nuclear-free zones. If this makes them feel any better, then I do not mind awfully about that, but I hope they do not think that in the event of a war they are going to be secure from the nuclear weapons of the enemy. I beg the right reverend Prelate to believe that the nuclear-free zone, ever since the days of Adam Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, has been a virtually meaningless concept.
I now come. finally—I see that. according to the clock, I have been speaking for 31 minutes—to the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. I should like, if I may, to go through very briefly the six proposals which he made for arms control and disarmament.
First, he proposed an international convention on chemical weapons. Yes, we should all love that, but, as I have said, we must understand that at the moment the only country that deploys and threatens to use chemical weapons is the Soviet Union. Secondly, he proposed the banning of weapons in outer space. There is already an outer space treaty which deals with the demilitarisation of outer space.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, I rise on a matter of correction of fact. It might be interesting for the House to know that the outer space treaty bans the positioning of "weapons of mass destruction" in outer space, not, as the noble Lord stated, "weapons".
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, it bans the stationing of what are virtually nuclear weapons in outer

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space—weapons of mass destruction. I am sorry if I misunderstood the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, but I thought it was that to which he was referring. If he was referring to banning in outer space weapons other than weapons of mass destruction, then that, of course is a different matter.
Next, there is the proposal of a comprehensive test ban—the banning of underground testing. Yes, we should all love that, too; but, again, it is a matter for adequate verification. I do not think that we can have a comprehensive test ban when there is the possibility that one or the other side might cheat in their adherence to that test ban.
It is also proposed that there should be a weapons freeze. I am afraid that this, again, is a virtually meaningless concept. A weapons freeze means what—ceasing to research, develop or deploy? If it means ceasing to research, how is it to be verified? There is virtually no way in which to verify research, and I personally would not want to take part in a treaty which could be so comprehensively circumvented by one side or the other.
Next there is the proposal of nuclear-free zones. I have already spoken of those. This is a concept without any meaning at all; as is, indeed, a treaty banning the first use of weapons. The noble Lord said nuclear weapons and all other weapons. If we were to ban the first use of nuclear weapons in war it would be a meaningless treaty because if war broke out no one would take the slightest notice of it. When they are at war, people do not take note of treaties signed in peacetime. If we are talking about the banning of the first use of all weapons, if we are talking about a nonaggression pact of some kind, then I see no reason why we should not have that. However, we are already in a situation where we, the NATO Alliance, have no intention whatever of being the first to use a weapon of any kind at all. It is a defensive alliance, and it is to the Soviet Union that the noble Lord should address his pleas.
I should like to continue speaking on this subject but I cannot do so because there is not enough time. I should like, if I may, to wind up with just one or two brief comments. As I have said, I thought that I was going to be sharply at odds with the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, because I thought that he was going to be talking about general and complete disarmement, which, from the experience of six years in Geneva, I can confidently say I think is an interesting, perhaps desirable, but totally unattainable end. What we should be looking for is arms control, but arms control as an aspect of defence and security. Arms control is not a concept in a vacuum. It is not necessarily a good thing to have arms control. It is only a good thing to have arms control if it improves security. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will continue to use that as a criterion in all their international negotiations.
The noble Lord, Lord Molloy, said something in his speech with which I can totally and unequivocally agree. He said that our aim must be to save the world for freedom. I go along with that 100 per cent. But we shall only do that if we recognise that there is a threat to that freedom, a real and continuing threat from a political and ideological system which is irreconcilable with our own—I repeat, irreconcilable. There is no
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way in which liberal democrats, who believe in freedom, can live with totalitarians, for whom the individual exists only to serve the state. There is no way in which we can co-exist with such people, and I ask the noble Lord to understand that.
I should like to conclude, if I may, with a comment which I may have made in your Lordships' House before but which I think bears making again. At one time in the 1960s, when in the United States there was a great uprising of anti- war and peace movements, there was a young man seen on a university campus bearing a banner on which was inscribed the words, "Nothing is worth dying for". It seems to me that that is something that we must reject wholeheartedly and passionately, because if nothing is worth dying for then nothing is worth living for. I reject both those propositions.
The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, read out a list of resolutions of the United Nations that Her Majesty's Government had opposed, and he begged Her Majesty's Government to change their ways. I beg them not to do so. I beg them to continue to oppose these impractical, half-baked, half-digested ideas that come out of that place, and to continue a realistic search for arms control based on the strength and security of the Western alliance.
4.16 p.m.
Lord Renton: My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, in this debate, for he speaks with such great knowledge of these matters and, indeed, with experience. As he has covered some of the ground that I was intending to cover, and as I agree with nearly all that he said, I am sure that your Lordships will be glad to know that I have been able to shorten my remarks somewhat. But there is one point that he mentioned on which I should like to expand in a moment. The noble Lord said that nuclear disarmament is not enough and that we must apply our minds also to the reduction of conventional armed forces. I was pleased, and if I may say so surprised, to hear the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, for the first time within my knowledge, make the same point. I hope that your Lordships will feel that the time has come in this debate for a contribution to be made by somebody from these Conservative Benches and that your Lordships will think that it is better later than never. I am relieved to find that already I have been speaking for only one minute!
The Motion which has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, is well-intended and worthy. Indeed, all of us must agree that it was right for successive Governments of this country to do what they could to achieve world disarmament, however difficult were the circumstances. I have a strong suspicion that the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, chose the subject of this debate before it was known that the Soviet Union and the United States were going to get together at Geneva. But that does not reduce the value of the debate: indeed, it enables us to take stock, as we should now be doing, of the situation which has been reached.
The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said that the meeting in Geneva would never have taken place but for the decision of the United States to carry out

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research on what he called and what is sometimes referred to as the Strategic Defence Initiative. It is also miscalled, in my opinion, the star wars, because, of course, it is intended to be a purely defensive system. However, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, I think that there are two other strong reasons why the Russians decided that it would be worth getting together with the United States. One reason, of course, is surely the deployment of the cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe. That, after all, does something to restore the nuclear balance, and must have done a bit to bring the Russians to their senses.
But there is a further reason (is there not?) in that the Soviet Union are already spending at least 15 per cent. of their national income on arms and the men that use them, compared with the spending of the United States, which is 7 per cent. To the extent that it is relevant, I would mention that we spend 5·4 per cent. of our gross domestic product on defence expenditure. So the Russians are presumably worried about the vast financial and economic burden of their aggressive policies and the threats which they constitute.
I feel strongly that those factors have had a most beneficial result in changing Russian attitudes, and in spite of what they have been trying to do to fetter the discretion of the Americans in these negotiations, I hope that this change of attitude, perhaps with some help and persuasion from our own Government, may last.
Of course, we now know that the negotiations have, I think rather strangely, been divided into three parts and are to be considered quite separately. The first part concerns intercontinental nuclear missiles; the second will be about medium-range nuclear weapons; and the third concerns the so-called star wars weapons, although they are purely defensive. The next stage will be for United States and Soviet officials to discuss how, when and where the three separate negotiations are to be held. I think that this may give our own Government an opportunity to make some helpful suggestions, I hope to both sides, as part of our continuing dialogue with both sides at diplomatic level, which is sometimes forgotten. But I hasten to say that I would not ask or expect my noble friend to reveal much about that in this debate.
Although we must obviously hope that those two great powers will reach agreement on reduction, control and supervision of nuclear weapons with beneficial results for the whole world, I suggest that it is even more necessary and important for them, for us, and indeed for the whole world, to reach agreement on the reduction of conventional forces. I hope that that does not sound too unorthodox to noble Lords or appear to raise a paradox. I say it for two main and, I believe, powerful reasons. The first is that since the end of World War II all the wars that have taken place—and there have been some pretty horrible ones, and there still are—have been conventional wars outside Europe. Each of the great powers, including ourselves, has been involved in some of those wars. At least two of those horrible wars continue—the one in Afghanistan and the one between Iran and Iraq. But there has been no war in Europe; there has been no
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direct confrontation between the United States and Russia; there has been no World War III—and that is because of the nuclear deterrence, and we know it.
The second reason why conventional disarmament is even more important than nuclear disarmament is that the Russians have such a great proponderance of conventional forces on land, in the air and at sea. If all nuclear weapons were abolished, the Russians could hold Europe to ransom and cause even more misery than they have done in various parts of the world, and just as they are still doing in Afghanistan. Let me give some examples, at not too great length, of Russian conventional strength, and here I am attempting to amplify what the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said. However, in considering that one must remember that the scene is complex and changes easily because of transfer of forces from one area to another.
For example, a new precedent was set, a new logistic dimension was given to our strategic thinking by the successful diversion of our forces in order to resist the conflict in the Falklands. I suppose that it was something which had been thought of by someone within the Ministry of Defence who was doing strategic planning but which the great mass of us never contemplated was possible. I mention that simply to illustrate that it is dangerous to ignore the complexities of this matter.
Having said that, let me draw attention to several outstanding facts. First, in the Eastern Atlantic Russia has 83 submarines and NATO has only 36. The figures I give are quoted from Government sources and are available in your Lordships' Printed Paper Office. On the central front, which includes Europe, Russia and her allies have 2,700 fixed-wing aircraft, which is more than twice as many as NATO. Of course, one must remember that the numbers of troops in Europe is not a full test of the strength of armies. We must remember that General Wavell's 30,000 men captured 480,000 Italians in the western desert in 1941. But, in fact, the Warsaw Pact countries have nearly three-quarters of a million soldiers in fighting units—not support units—on the central front compared with NATO's smaller figure of 590,000.
However, perhaps more to the point than the numbers of troops is the fact that the Warsaw Pact countries have 18,000 main battle tanks in Europe compared with NATO's 7,800. The Warsaw Pact countries have well over twice as many main battle tanks. Of course, one could greatly amplify these figures, but I hope that I have given enough information to show that nuclear disarmament is not enough. When my noble friend Lady Young replies to the debate perhaps she could give me some help with regard to a particular negotiation which started in Vienna in 1973. It is called the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiation, the purpose of which is for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reach agreement on conventional force reductions in central Europe. Are those negotiations still continuing, as Government sources seem to imply, or have they ground to a standstill? What is the position?
Therefore, I say this, and I say it in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, who is not himself obsessed with the nuclear scene, although many of his friends are—I do not even say his noble friends; but many of

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his friends in politics, inside and outside Parliament, are so obsessed with the nuclear scene that they forget the terrible destructive power of conventional weapons. There are now far more conventional weapons assembled in Europe than were ever assembled at the start of World War I or World War II. Indeed, if we eliminate the Russian front, it may well be that there are as many as there were at the end of World War II.
Therefore, I hope that negotiations on this subject will not be confined to the matters on which the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to negotiate at present. When they are enlarged, of course, they will have to go far beyond discussions between those two super powers. I say that in particular as far as Europe is concerned, because within NATO it is the European countries which provide 90 per cent. of the ground forces and 80 per cent. of NATO's tanks and air combat strength.
I conclude by saying that we must not delude ourselves that the world can be made safe merely by getting a partial reduction of nuclear weapons, merely by getting a degree of control, although it would be satisfactory to get the nuclear terror into balance again; that would be some achievement. It would be a good beginning, just to do that, but it would not be the end.
4.31 p.m.
Lord Graham of Edmonton: My Lords, it is little more than two months since these matters were last debated in the House, during the debate on the Queen's Speech, and yet so much has happened in those last two months. On that occasion my noble friend Lord Boston of Faversham, followed by my noble friend Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, both raised a number of serious and searching questions of the spokesman at the time. None of us needs reminding of the text that eternal vigilance is the price of freedom, nor that there are always many fronts to watch, many balls to be kept in the air at once.
We on these Benches want to pay tribute to the diligence of the Government over the past two months; in particular we note the productive visit of Mr. Gorbachev last month. We note the discussions by the West European Defence Ministers. I remind the noble Baroness that those have yet to be debated in this House. We note the initiatives played by the Prime Minister in her travels to China and to the United States. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is wise in reminding us that the China dimension is there, cannot be ignored, will not go away and must always be taken into account. Above all, we see much to lift our spirits arising from the Geneva talks. All these subjects have been referred to, and will again be referred to, in this debate.
These are times of great movement in defence and disarmament matters that call for flexibility in approach, a willingness to consider others' initiatives, and a time for patience. It is against that background that my noble friend Lord Molloy has rendered us a great service in initiating this debate. His deep commitment to world peace is beyond dispute.
My noble friend Lord Brockway raises, and pre-empts for many of us, many questions which were
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proper to be raised in this debate. We shall listen with attention to the way in which the noble Baroness responds to the challenging reminder given to her by my noble friend to defend the record of Her Majesty's Government in the United Nations.
After 40 years of glaring and staring at each other there is little wonder that there has been mutual suspicion. We have had our ups and downs. The dreadful days of the Berlin wall era are remembered with horror. It is a time-worn ploy, not exclusively employed by the East, to seek to sow dissension among an opposing alliance. Even the visit to this country of Mr. Gorbachev, and Mrs. Thatcher the Prime Minister saying that she could do business with him, was used mischievously in the United States. It is a tenet of sound defence strategy to exploit the cracks in the opposing forces.
Labour is fully committed to Britain's NATO membership and we in the West have a difficult task in seeking and maintaining a united front. How could Labour look upon NATO as a cornerstone of our defence other than with appreciation, when we recall that it was formed in the days of a Labour Government and was so ably inspired by one of the great Foreign Secretaries of this country, Ernest Bevin?
The decision to launch a programme of research—the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, was right to remind us that it is research—into the creation of a defence system not based on revenge, on the retaliatory principle, is a positive change in global strategy, and is welcomed. There are dangers, as has been pointed out. I implore the Government to urge America to take Russia with it, as far as it can, every step of the way.
Time and time again in debates concerning disarmament, world peace, reduced tension and peaceful co-existence we consider the question of national security, and rightly so. I certainly endorse the professions made by Government speakers that a prime duty of the Government of this country is to ensure the defence and the security of this realm. Security from attack and security within our borders is fundamental to peace of mind for all people, but I wonder whether sufficient time and thought is being given by the Government and our allies to striving for our peace of mind by giving others their peace of mind. Why do we burden our economy and deny our people billions of pounds-worth of social needs? It is because we do not accept that Russia's claims to want peace are sincere. So we seek a balance or parity, or mutually assured destruction.
At the same time, the Russians do likewise. They listen to our declarations that we have no intention of starting a war, that we want to live in peace, that we will de-escalate the arms race. Yet the Russians see those sincere declarations—and I accept that they are sincere—against the background of the astronomical, horrific costs of ever-new weapons of mass destruction. If we are entitled to be less than sanguine about Russian protestations, are they not at least as entitled to be suspicious of ours? In other words, can we not accept that both East and West have erred in the past when assessing the intentions of the other? If we can make progress from this moment on in the belief that there is a mutual intention to avoid war and secure peace, will that not be a major step forward?

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Reference has been made to chemical warfare. My noble friend Lord Boston asked many anxious questions on this matter in our November debate. Much progress has been made by this Government in this respect. Tribute to the Government's unilateral initiatives were paid by my noble friend Lord Molloy in his opening address. That is much to the credit of the Government, in the way they have persisted in the subsequent talks to try to secure that which we want. However, I do not get too excited at the current situation. The Prime Minister has reminded us that the Soviet Union has a massive chemical warfare capability. I do not doubt that. She also reminded us that Britain abandoned her capability 25 years ago. I do not doubt that, either. But to contemplate restarting the production of weapons of mass destruction, which chemical warfare could turn out to be, would be viewed with horror by the people of this country, and might have grave consequences.
Of course the Prime Minister has gone on, goaded by the revelations in a newspaper recently, to assert that she has a duty to keep that policy of abandonment under constant review. I do not doubt that, either, but I draw this conclusion: there are elements of our defence policy which are capable of being unilaterally radically altered. I also conclude that it is perfectly possible for this Government to take initiatives of a substantial nature across the whole gamut of defence and still remain within the parameters of a sound alliance. We want to see the authority and influence of Her Majesty's Government used more often to urge America to conciliate rather than to prevaricate in world disarmament talks.
"So far so good" could well sum up the sense and the mood in the first few days after Geneva. I certainly re-echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, who counselled us and cautioned us against too much euphoria in the early days following Geneva. If there is a danger of lurching from peaks of euphoria into the troughs of despondency, we need not be ashamed of hailing the new beginnings with more optimism than events may eventually justify.
As the words of Geneva begin to be translated into specific agreements, or not, we shall adjust. We need to be flexible and patient but always to be looking for the bright side and the right side in negotiations. A sober assessment, post-Geneva, of what is held out as an aim and objective of future talks may seem unreal but we must be prepared to give both Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz the benefit of any doubt. The intentions of both appear to be sincere. I am prepared to leave it at that. There can be few, if any, in your Lordships' House who did not rejoice and feel exceeding glad at the outcome of the discussions that were held in Geneva—such a tiny step out of the darkness towards the light. But, my Lords, it will be with such tiny steps, to talk about talks, that we shall make progress.
What has happened, I asked dramatically last week, to give us hope and confidence, or more hope and confidence, for the future arising from Geneva? First, there has been accommodation. Both parties are too big to be seen domestically or internationally to have given in or have given way to the other side. Yet both America and Russia were able to leave the negotiating table having satisfied not only themselves but the other
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side that a genuine intention to reach agreement under varying heads is in prospect. Only a starry-eyed idealist divorced from reality could have hoped for more, or have expected positive agreements too soon or too much in accord with everything that we want. Secondly, by keeping the future agenda as wide as it is the objectives can be capable of satisfying the most reasonable of men.
Those objectives, although stated, can bear repeating again and again; and we were grateful to be reminded by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that inexplicably a full copy of the text has yet to be seen and widely circulated. I for my part rely on much that I read in the newspapers. We read, for instance, that one of the objectives of those talks is to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space; secondly, to work out effective agreements to terminate the arms race on earth; and thirdly, to reach an effective agreement designed to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere. Those are the words which appear in the communiqué. I think that we can all rejoice that they are there. But, in respect of the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere, I wonder whether the noble Baroness would tell the House how that objective differs from the zero option which surfaced about two years ago in these discussions and negotiations.
What do we do after Geneva? This indeed has been Question Time for the noble Baroness and I want to put a number of questions to her. Where does Britain come in? What happens to Britain's nuclear weapons? What part will Britain play in the discussions? The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, raised, I think quite properly, the question of whether we were going to be consulted or advised or whether our views are going to be sought. Will the Minister tell us whether there are plans for Britain to be consulted before or during the talks? Will those consultations enable a British input? If so, can the Minister tell the House what we are likely to say? For instance, if we can have our finger on the nuclear trigger now—no launch without our approval at this time—will that agreement be up for grabs in the subsequent discussions? The House is entitled to know whether at the very least we are to be properly consulted, and I believe that the Minister can help us here tonight.
Time does not permit it and neither is it prudent or wise to reflect too long on the sad, bad history of mutual suspicion during the past 40 years. I accept without qualification that this Government, by their own lights, pour billions and billions of pounds into a defence budget when they would much prefer not to have to do so. My noble friend Lord Molloy, in bringing us today the opportunity of this debate, raises the possibility in new and changing circumstances of a whole new world. He puts to the Government the worthy consideration of dramatically reducing expenditure on arms and spending our nation's wealth on supplying a range of much more worthy needs. The ultimate desire of all peoples should be to live in peace. Alas! such simple propositions are challenged constantly by the aggression and the violence which breaks out in the world these days.
Not very often do we hear the aggressor declare that his imperialistic actions are motiviated by a naked bid

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for conquest, for subjugation, for slavery. More often they are justified by allusions to threats to national security, to subversion, to world plans to dominate or, as the right reverend Prelate has said, are claimed to be in response to a crime against human rights. Central to our national defence imperatives is our alliance with others as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation—and Labour is committed to that. But, as a national entity, Britain is not wholly devoid of initiatives.
This debate serves the purpose of allowing us to reflect on the role that Britain can play within our alliance and with our allies. Unless the view is held that there can be no initiatives, no proposals, no questioning of the lead given by America, we must serve our allies best by exercising some independence of thought and action. But, just as my noble friend Lord Molloy is without equal in his passionate denunciation of arms expenditure, he has few equals in his desire for that to be translated into social expenditure. He has asked searching questions, He is not alone. The noble Baroness can assist us all by taking us into her confidence on matters which she understands are of vital interest to the whole House.
4.47 p.m.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Young): My Lords, I welcome the opportunity which the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, has provided for us to debate the subject of disarmament. The Government take this vitally important subject very seriously, and welcome the sort of well-informed debate that we have had today. The debate is timely, coming as it does a week after the important meeting in Geneva between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko.
The Motion refers to,
"the need for Her Majesty's Government to take the initiative in bringing forward new … proposals for effective world disarmament".
Such a call must be addressed not in isolation, but against the background of international security as it exists today. Her Majesty's Government are wholly committed to the search for balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament. Like successive British Governments, we have accepted our responsibility to work for peace and security at the lowest possible levels of arms, while always maintaining adequate defences. The record shows that British Governments have played a significant role in negotiating and achieving multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. But history should also warn that no British Government can achieve "effective world disarmament" on their own. However willing we are, it takes more than one party to achieve disarmament.
In common with our NATO allies and all British Governments since 1945, the Government seek arms controls agreements based on the fundamental principles of balance and verification. Agreements must be fair to all sides if they are to stick. Hence the need for balance. Each party must also be confident that the others cannot successfully cheat. Hence the need for proper verification. As my right honourable and learned friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has said:
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"In arms control, as in politics generally, we must not allow the best to be the enemy of the good".
Without diluting these principles of balance and verification, we must apply them in ways which encourage, rather than inhibit, progress towards agreement. Balance does not have to mean matching man for man or weapon for weapon: that has never been NATO's defence policy either.
Equally, while perfect verification is an illusion, we will continue to insist on adequate verification. We need agreements which ensure that, if the other side does cheat or break the rules in a way that threatens Western security, we know this early enough to bring the offenders to book and to take appropriate remedies. Because of the open nature of Western societies, the East has less need of verification than we do. I hope that answers one of the points which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Graham. Nevertheless, all Western proposals have envisaged the same verification regime for East and West. We do not ask the East for anything we would not accept ourselves. But some measures of arms control will demand particularly stringent verification if we are to create the necessary confidence that agreements are being observed.
Several noble Lords raised a number of particular points in the course of the debate. Many of them were in fact answered by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, but, if I may, I will just refer to the point that was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Molloy and Lord Brockway, on the suggestion of a nuclear freeze. A nuclear freeze would perpetuate some important imbalances between East and West in favour of the Soviet Union. It would also remove the incentive for the Russians to reach agreements on major reductions in nuclear armaments. Verification of a freeze would be more difficult to negotiate than reductions, which indeed are preferable.
The right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Oxford raised the question of a nuclear weapon-free zone. We believe that a nuclear weapon-free zone in Europe would in fact undermine, and not increase, security. We would be in favour of the principle of nuclear weapon-free zones in areas where nuclear weapons are not yet a factor in the security balance, and provided of course that all the regional states in that part of the world would agree.
The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, suggested that we should commit ourselves to no-first-use of force. Commitments on this matter already exist in the United Nations Charter and in the Helsinki Final Act. No NATO weapons, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used except in response to attack. The priority is to give practical expression to existing commitments by agreement on concrete measures providing for greater openness about military activities in Europe. Real progress along these lines might create the conditions for an appropriate reaffirmation of the principle of non-use of force.
I will now briefly review the current position, and may I say at the beginning that I was very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Graham of Edmonton, acknowledged the work of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. On 22nd December my right honourable friend the Prime Minister met President Reagan and Vice-President Bush at Camp David. This

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was a valuable opportunity—the first since President Reagan's re-election—for the Prime Minister to discuss at the highest level how arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union might now develop. They naturally touched upon the United States Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) research programme in the course of discussions which were thorough and extensive.
Not surprisingly, they saw the prospects for the future in very much the same light. The Prime Minister was able to tell the President, as she had earlier made clear to Mr. Gorbachev, that we would not allow others to create divisions between ourselves and the United States on these important questions. During the discussions the Prime Minister and the President agreed on four specific points: first, the United States' and Western, aim is not to achieve superiority, but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments; secondly, SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation; thirdly, the overall aim is to enhance, not to undermine, deterrence; and, fourthly, East-West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides. This will be the purpose of the resumed United States-Soviet negotiations on arms control, which we warmly welcome.
We have welcomed wholeheartedly the outcome of last week's meeting in Geneva between United States Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. The United States and the Soviet Union will agree through diplomatic channels within one month on the date and venue of the forthcoming United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms. They agreed that the subject of the negotiations would be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and intermediate-range—with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.
The objective of the negotiations, which the British Government fully share, will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side, divided into three groups. The two sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.
The fact that negotiations will now re-open demonstrates that the firmness and political self-confidence of the Atlantic Alliance over the last four years has paid off. Pre-emptive concessions were not made to bring the Russians back to the negotiating table, and it would have been wrong and contrary to our interests to do this. The West has consistently stated its willingness to negotiate in good faith and without preconditions. I am glad that the Soviet side has responded.
Nonetheless, we all know that Geneva was only the first step on a long and difficult road. That was a point that was made very well, if I may say so, by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, and I think it was agreed and
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accepted by the noble Lord, Lord Graham of Edmonton. Patience and realism will be required. The key to success will be to find the right blend of imagination, commonsense and respect for the legitimate security interests of both East and West.
The Government have already been closely involved in consultations about these talks with our American allies, both bilaterally and through NATO. On 9th January my right honourable friend the Prime Minister assured President Reagan's national security adviser of Britain's continued support for the United States in the negotiations, and looked forward to maintaining the closest contacts during them. We will follow the negotiations with great attention and ensure that the Americans know of our views. That was a point, I think, on which the noble Lord, Lord Graham, wanted assurance. This is the way in which we can maximise our influence in this vital field. It has taken a long time to get even this far, and making progress on such complex matters is bound to be a long haul. Plenty of persistence and perseverence will be required.
Pending progress in the United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear arms in accordance with the agreement reached in Geneva last week, the Government believe that NATO's INF deployment programme should proceed as planned. To do otherwise would be to make unilateral concessions outside the negotiating framework. The alliance has repeatedly made clear its readiness to halt, reverse, or modify these deployments in accordance with the terms of a balanced and verifiable agreement.
In view of recent suggestions that Britain's nuclear deterrent should be included in the negotiations, it may be helpful if I remind noble Lords of the Government's view. It would be absurd, as things stand, for us to seek to trade reductions with a superpower. But, as the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary told the United Nations in September 1983, we have never said "never". My right honourable and learned friend continued on that occasion (and I quote):
"On the contrary, we have made it clear that, if Soviet and United States strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced, and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review her position and to consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat".
This is clear and logical. It remains the Government's position. Nothing that has happened recently has given us any cause to believe that it requires amendment.
Despite the current focus on nuclear and outer space arms control, we should not lose sight of other opportunities for progress, nor forget that conventional war is horrifyingly destructive—a point which has been made by many noble Lords during the course of this debate. As events in the Gulf War have reminded us. chemical warfare is particularly odious. The Government are deeply concerned at the growing threat to ourselves and our allies which is posed by the Soviet capability in this field. The answer is a negotiated worldwide ban. There is no truth in last week's allegation that the Government are considering manufacturing chemical weapons. I hope that that answers the noble Lord, Lord Graham.

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As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said in another place on 10th January, we abandoned our chemical weapon capability in the late 1950s; there has been no change in Government policy since then, nor is any change proposed. We shall continue to keep our defence policy under review. But at the same time we shall go on playing a leading part in the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, and shall follow up our previous initiatives in this forum. Acceptance of the need for comprehensive on-site inspection presents a difficult new challenge. But that is what arms control is now about. Although complex, the problem of chemical weapons is not insoluble. Indeed, it offers a unique opportunity to advance the cause of arms control and disarmament by reaching agreement on a treaty which will deter the covert production of such weapons.
My noble friend Lord Renton referred to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks which began in Vienna in 1973, with the aim of trying to reduce the level of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in Central Europe—the greatest concentration of conventional forces in the world—to a common agreed goal of 900,000 ground and air forces on each side. I am glad to tell him that some progress has been made. But agreement has been bedevilled by the East's refusal to acknowledge their superiority in manpower. A force reductions agreement without reliable figures is clearly a nonsense.
Last April Britain and the other Western participants tabled a major new initiative, which offers a real opportunity to resolve the dispute over the size of the Eastern forces in the reductions area. The initiative offered flexibility on the initial data requirement in return for enhanced measures of verification. It built on various aspects of the Eastern position, particularly on the form and timing of reductions. So far the Eastern reaction has been disappointingly negative; we hope the East will take a more positive attitude this year. For our part, we will continue to try and find a way out of the current impasse.
Despite the popular title Conference on Disarmament in Europe, the Stockholm Conference is not at present about reductions in arms, but about confidence and security building measures. It is part of the broader CSCE process stemming from the Helsinki Final Act, something to which the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford referred, which is 10 years old this year. At the start of the Stockholm Conference the United Kingdom and our allies took the initiative, tabling a set of concrete measures designed to reduce the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities in Europe, through greater openness about normal peacetime military behaviour. This would make the preparation of a surprise attack difficult if not impossible, and thus diminish the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities in Europe by accident, design or misunderstanding.
The Soviet Union has called this spying. But we are prepared to offer them the same opportunity to observe Western military activities. We remain convinced that confidence and security must be based on such concrete manifestations of goodwill, and not merely on further declarations of good intent. Ours are practical proposals which, if implemented, could have
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a major and beneficial effect on confidence and security in Europe.
Every autumn the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly deliberates on disarmament and international security questions. The First Committee is not a negotiating forum, but it provides an annual opportunity to involve all member states of the United Nations in discussion of these key topics. The United Nations recognises that all states must participate in the search for effective world disarmament. Virtually all states have armed forces and armaments, and some 90 per cent. of world military expenditure is spent on non-nuclear forces.
But in such a forum there is an obvious temptation to play to the gallery. As in previous years, last autumn's session considered a record number of resolutions. Some of these were polemical and ideological. For our part, as my honourable friend the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office made clear in the First Committee last November, Her Majesty's Government continue to take the work of the committee seriously. I am afraid that I cannot accept the view which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, expressed when he commented on these debates.
We consider with great care the texts of every resolution tabled. We support all resolutions which in our view will make a real contribution to furthering progress on balanced and verifiable arms control. Last autumn we voted for or joined consensus on 35 resolutions. We played a major role in helping to co-ordinate and promote positive, balanced resolutions covering subjects of key importance including bilateral nuclear arms negotiations, outer space, and the prevention of nuclear war. We shall play a similar constructive role at the 1985 session.
Finally, I should mention the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is to be held in September in Geneva. The Government are preparing for it, in co-operation with many others among the more than 120 parties. We will work with determination for its success. Twenty years ago, there were fears that by the early 1980s there would be at least 20 countries in possession of nuclear weapons. In fact, since the treaty came into force in 1970, those forecasts have proved wrong, although there is no room for complacency.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty makes a major positive contribution to international security. It represents a security gain for all nations, whether or not they are parties; but clearly, the more parties the greater the gain. The treaty also helps the development of international trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, by ensuring that such trade may take place with the minimum risk of proliferation. In short, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is worth a great deal. It would be folly to jeopardise the treaty by tying its future to progress on particular measures of disarmament and by ignoring at the same time the Non-Proliferation Treaty's intrinsic value.
This review of the position in the various arms control and disarmament negotiations shows that Her Majesty's Government have been active in taking the initiative in bringing forward new proposals. May I say that I welcomed the note of encouragement that the

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right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford gave to the Government. There is now no shortage of such proposals. In the course of 1984, with our allies or individually, we tabled new proposals in every current negotiating forum. My right honourable and learned friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary attended the opening of the Stockholm Conference, where the NATO countries soon took the initiative. At Geneva in February my honourable friend Mr. Richard Luce presented a new British proposal for challenge inspection under a chemical weapons ban, which was followed by another British verification proposal in July. At the Vienna talks, which he had visited a few months before, the Western participants tabled a major new initiative in April. My honourable friend completed his year of visits to every disarmament forum at which Britain is represented with his address in November to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.
We will continue to take the initiative in bringing forward new proposals. We are closely involved in consultations with our American allies about the new negotiations on space and nuclear arms control. We will not be participants in these negotiations, but we are taking every opportunity to share our views with our American allies. What we want to see now is a constructive and positive attitude from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. We will maintain our guard, but we will always be ready to talk about ways of making this world safer.
Lord Molloy: My Lords. I wish to make one or two brief remarks about the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, but first I wish to congratulate him. Whereas I am given, I admit, to changing my stances on developments in world politics, the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has been for years, particularly, on this subject, absolutely consistent.
Consistency, as we all know, is the last refuge of the unimaginative. I have on a number of occasions in this House emphasised how vital it is that we have on-site verification. Indeed, I have said that I would be happy if there were Russians on our television screens being shown coming here to make their inspections, and our top flight technologists and scientists going to all their sites. Added to that is what I had to say earlier this afternoon.
I firmly believe that there must be some way between the British people, the American people and the Russian people. There must still be something left of the great alliance in which I participated between 1939 and 1945, when the Russian nation lost 20 million of her people. I am afraid that the tragedy at the moment is that all of us are lying in the gutter of despair. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, and to paraphrase Oscar Wilde, that some of us are looking at the stars.
I wish to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Young, for the research that has obviously gone into her speech, for which I am grateful. I thank my noble friend Lord Graham, and all noble Lords who have spoken and listened. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

National Heritage (Scotland) Bill
Brought from the Commons; read a first time, and to be printed.

United Kingdom-United States Relationship
5.11 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney Lord Jenkins of Putney rose to call attention to the relationship of Her Majesty's Government to the Government of the United States of America; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Motion calls attention to inter-governmental relationships, not to the relationship between our two countries, and still less to the relationships between our two peoples. In a way, it is perhaps a postcript to the previous debate, I regret that I was not present for the whole of that debate, but I was able to listen to the winding-up speeches from both sides, when I was struck by the detailed way in which the problem was attacked.
In this debate I wish to refer to one particular aspect of our relationship. This relationship is less satisfactory than that between our two peoples, which seems to me to be admirable. The relationship between our two Governments is too near those of occupying power and satellite, and it is to that relationship that I wish to draw attention.
It must be said for the Prime Minister and her Government that the position of an ex-colonial empire such as our own, reduced, as we are now, to something approaching the status of Dr. Frankenstein in the face of a monstrous super-power, is not an easy one. Nevertheless, previous Prime Ministers have faced that situation with dignity. One thinks of Mr. Attlee, as he then was. He did not feel that a reduction in our military status entailed any forfeiture of the right to criticise, to advise and to influence. Mr. Heath was equally uncowed.
But consider what has happened under the present Government. The Queen's territory of Grenada was invaded by our great ally. There was no formal protest. The Government said (and I quote):
"no such action was called for".
They said that the invasion was,
"a matter of regret".
The Government said that they were "irritated". The Prime Minister said that the Americans should not
"use force to walk into other people's countries".
The United States would not have dreamt of taking such action before the present Government came into office. Can one imagine such a thing happening to a Britain led by Churchill, by Attlee, by Macmillan (as the noble Earl, Lord Stockton, then was), or even by Mr. Heath? Can one imagine what Churchill would have said if such a thing had happened?
This Government complained of a lack of consultation: no invasion without consultation was the extent of their protest. Even today such action would not have been taken by the United States against French territory, Dutch territory or Portuguese territory—one hopes, not even against Nicaragua. So our special relationship has it seems degenerated into a right to be treated with special ignominy. What did

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our Government do in return for that American action? They gave the right to American soldiers to shoot British citizens in our country. The present Government's stance seems to be that President Reagan can do no wrong. It was not always so.
We have now learned, because of the declassification of Cabinet papers under the 30-year rule, that the then Marquess of Salisbury, who was Lord President of the Council in Sir Winston Churchill's Government in 1954, said in Cabinet that the Americans were a greater threat to the peace of the world than were the Russians. So they are today, my Lords; so they are today. Lord Salisbury was supported in his view by Sir Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, who refused point-blank an American request for joint Anglo-American intervention in Vietnam on the side of the French.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble Lord, is he really saying that Sir Anthony Eden, later Lord Avon, commented that the Americans were a greater threat to the peace of the world than were the Russians? If so, what is his source of that quotation?
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I was saying that Sir Anthony Eden followed up the debate in which Lord Salisbury made that statement with a refusal to meet an American request for joint Anglo-American intervention in Vietnam. I did not state that Sir Anthony Eden made the comment which was made by Lord Salisbury. I believe that my noble friend is taking the two statements together. One is one, and one is the other.
The Earl of Longford: They were made together, my Lords.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, certainly they were made together, but they succeed each other; they are not simultaneous.
In those days it was possible to argue that the West was an association of free nations combining in mutual defence. The French recognised at that time that it would be impossible to sustain that concept if American forces were stationed on their soil. They saw that the relationship would degenerate. They saw that, instead of an association of equals, NATO would tend to become a group of satellites circling round a super-power. It was inevitable that it should be so, for the Soviet Union is a European power and until recently all its land-based nuclear weapons were located within the Soviet Union.
So if the lunatic concept was to be pursued of matching not merely total nuclear fire power but each particular type of nuclear weapon, the only way for the West's super-power to match its counterpart in the East in respect of land-based missiles was to locate those missiles in their territory. And if the subject-status of Western Germany was not to be rubbed in, then some of those missiles had to be located in the minor powers—especially in Britain, whose Government's finger is always at the forelock in NATO matters.
My wife and I marched years ago in an anti-nuclear demonstration—in fact, more than one of them—in
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Federal Germany. We did so because it was already becoming clear that the Americans perceived Europe as a whole as the potential nuclear battleground of the future—a battleground which included the main parts of the territory of their major opponent but included no American soil, with the United States thousands of miles away from the scene of any possible nuclear disaster. That is why in some respects this country's relationship to the United States is more dangerous for us than is the relationship of the Eastern European states to the Soviet Union. They know that they are all in it together.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one question on the interesting point that he has just made? How can he possibly say what he has said in the light of the use of Soviet military power in the streets of East Berlin, in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary? How can he seriously maintain such an argument?
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I did not say anything about the size of conventional power nor the location of Soviet conventional forces. I said that until recently—it may no longer be the case now—all Soviet nuclear power was contained within the Soviet Union. That was the case and has been the case until very recently.
I was going on to say that there are important, powerful figures in the United States who sustain the illusion, and they see it, that a European holocaust would not engulf America. So to that extent the United States is less frightened, more nuclear trigger-happy than is the Soviet Union.
Those of us who have visited both countries and who have met people in the peace movements on both sides, and people in or near government on both sides, know this to be the case. The culture of the Soviet Union is peace-orientated in its official manifestations to an extraordinary degree. The United States has no such obsession. Indeed, the old individualist ideas of the lone man with his gun survive to an extraordinary degree. These make themselves felt in the violence of the American screen, the high murder rates in American cities, in the widespread American mania for gun-toting and, finally, for nuclear weapons.
We must all welcome the Geneva discussions but, as I gather has been said during the debate, we should do well to remind ourselves that previous discussions led to very little and that while they were going on the nuclear weapons piled up on all sides.
Meanwhile, the present relationship of this Government to that of the United States has all the disadvantages of a semi-colonial status in reverse, with none of the advantages. The President of the United States can decide to launch missiles from this country through the means of his own servicemen on our soil and through his own means of communication, from which we are excluded. The launching of these missiles would bring about the destruction of our entire nation by Soviet retaliation and yet we have no say in the matter. That is a colonial status. The Prime Minister of such a country is not master or mistress in her own house. The relationship is sadly near that of a satrap. The idea of having our own nuclear system was sold to us on the promise that it would assure us a seat at the

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conference table. It has done no such thing. We have no more position at Geneva than has Japan, Cuba or Finland, and perhaps less than Switzerland, on whose soil the negotiations take place. As for the consideration given by the United States to our financial problems, perhaps enough was said about that by Mr. Heath yesterday in another place.
We exist in the worst possible of all worlds; having no say whatever in the choice of a government which is taking all the vital decisions which affect the lives of every one of us. It is an intolerable situation from which we must break free: but how can we do so? There are only two possible ways. Either we must opt out or we must apply to join the club. We must either tell the Americans to take their troops and their missiles out of our country or we must seek a way, and a say, in determining the decisions of the American Government—and not only the decisions of that Government but its nature. We can only do that by seeking to become the 51st State of the Union. That will seem to be an outrageous suggestion but we are no farther from Washington than is Hawaii or Alaska. In return we could seek to admit the United States of America and Britain to the Commonwealth of Nations.
The benefits would be considerable, and not only to us. We are a voting people and we would introduce a much-needed socialist element into the American scene. We would greatly strengthen the growing American peace movement. We would be rid of the pound sterling and its problems and we could withdraw from the Common Market—an action which would greatly benefit both ourselves and the Market. There would be some resistance to the idea in the United States. Not all Americans would see the benefit of one of the States having a Royal Family, let alone a House of Lords. On the other hand, others might want to adopt the institutions on a federal level. We should, of course, have to rid ourselves of the hereditary principle.
The present American Government would resist on the understandable ground that there might never be another Republican Administration in the United States, but that would be regarded as a blessing elsewhere. However, these things do not happen quickly and by the time the proposal had moved from the stage of an idea in the mind of a Back-Bench Peer into practical politics there might well be a Democratic President who would see the benefits of a change which might keep his party in power for a generation.
Of course, it may be that we shall have to move in the opposite direction and instead establish a more independent relationship with the United States. One thing is sure: we cannot stay in our present position, for if we do we are in danger of us all being dead before children now born leave school. We cannot leave it to the two super-powers to reach agreement while we in Europe represent, as we do, the first victims of their nuclear arsenals if they fail to reach agreement or, having agreed, fail to honour the agreement. On past form both things are likely to happen on both sides.
I have suggested that we must either detach ourselves from the United States or fully integrate
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ourselves into its decision-making processes—processess which are obscure, even Byzantine. Such well-placed and objective observers as the Medvedev Brothers have suggested that the monolithic nature of Soviet decision-making can be an advantage. When one is dealing with civilisation-eliminating weaponry it is desirable to know what is going to happen next. The United States has a complex power distribution moving from the Defense Department to the State Department and back, from the industrial to the political and the military complexes. The President sometimes seems to be more of a shuttlecock than a decision-maker. It is clear that Mr. Gromyko is a more certain deliverer than Mr. Shultz can ever hope to be.
Finally, it may be more satisfactory to propose to President Reagan that the United States should join the Commonwealth than either of the two suggestions I have made. But whichever solution we go for we must move towards a control system—one in which nuclear weapons cannot be fired without the collective assent of the representatives of all those millions whose lives would be terminated if restraint fails. The present situation in which the fate of the world is left to the fallible men in charge in the Kremlin and in the Pentagon is grossly irresponsible. Ideally, the power to fire a nuclear weapon should be reserved for unanimous decison by the United Nations—which means that there would never be a nuclear war. Until we begin to move in that direction we must regard the relations now existing between the United States and ourselves as an example of the need for urgent change if mankind is to survive. I beg to move for Papers.
5.29 p.m.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, we are all grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, for the extremely stimulating and original debate that he has introduced. As I understand it, we are faced with the fearful prospect of becoming annihilated before our children have left school unless we take one of three courses. The first is to become a member of the United States, as the 52nd state. The second is for the United States to join the Commonwealth. The third I forget temporarily but it will come to me in the course of my speech. What I wish to draw the attention of the House to is that the noble Lord overlooked the obvious solution to our problems, which is to become one of the federated states of the USSR. From here we could surely influence the Kremlin a great deal more effectively than speaking in this noble Chamber, for all the influence that we have as it is.
There is a further point that worries me about the speech of the noble Lord. I have heard him speak often in this House with great interest. Always he has supported Britain's membership of NATO. Today he has plainly changed his mind. He is no longer believing in Britain remaining a member of NATO. The basic difference, I think, between my noble friends and myself on the one hand and the noble Lord is that, though we, too, have reservations and criticisms of United States foreign and defence policy, we believe that it is of overriding interest for the United Kingdom to remain a loyal and effective member of the Atlantic Alliance. That is the point.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, may I disillusion the noble Lord on that point? My proposal does not imply any suggestion that we should immediately secede from NATO at all.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, it was a strange kind of NATO speech! I have heard a lot of NATO speeches in a long career in this field. I have to say with great regret to the noble Lord that the content and tone of his language was not that of any ally of the United States. One could listen carefully without detecting any sense of obligation, loyalty or affection for the major participant in the NATO Alliance—the United States.
I say again that we on these Benches are critical of many aspects of United States policy. The list of examples is quite formidable. If I may mention one or two, we have doubted both the skill and the degree of commitment of the United States Administration in arms control and disarmament. We dislike very much the one-way nature of the arms trade across the Atlantic. We oppose its ruthless attempts to destabilise Nicaragua. In the Middle East, as supporters of the Venice Declaration, we deplore the unconditional nature of the huge aid from the United States to Israel which enables her to oppose the Venice Declaration, and indeed all other international peace-keeping initiatives. In general, I think that I speak for my noble friends when I say that we are worried that its perception of the Soviet threat is simplistic.
I am reminded here of the speech that we heard in the previous debate (I hope that I am in order in referring to it) of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. In his interesting and pertinent speech, his concept of the Soviet threat had some of the failings that my noble friends and I see in the concept of the Soviet threat in the United States—namely, it is too simplistic. The noble Lord said (and I checked with him) that the Russians are our enemies and do not behave otherwise; we cannot co-exist with them. That is a common attitude in the United States.
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, before the noble Lord goes on, may I set the record straight? I said that the Soviet Union was a potential enemy and not an enemy. We are not at war with it. Secondly, I think that the expression I used was that our two systems are irreconcilable. My views on co-existence with the Soviet Union may or may not be of interest; but to set the record straight, what I said was that totalitarian Communism is irreconcilable with liberal democracy.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, I am sorry if I misquoted the noble Lord, especially after I went to the trouble of consulting him about his words. But let us take it then that we agree that the two systems are irreconcilable. Of course that is a different matter. I would though very strongly urge on the House that to say that we cannot co-exist with the Soviet Union is a dangerous and unconstructive point of view. It is in fact classical Marxism. It is Marxism itself which says that the world is divided into two opposite social systems, and that these social systems are inevitably destined to conflict and one will supersede the other.
There is the mirror image of the Marxists in the United States who say that the other ideology is one
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with which they cannot co-exist: it is evil, it is their enemy and they cannot co-exist with it. Apart from anything else, that lacks historical perspective. It is quite absurd to equate the Soviet Union of Chernenko with that of Stalin. In terms of human rights the Soviet Union is still a tyranny, but compared with the Stalinist era it has changed. It is still to some extent isolated in international affairs; but compared with the Stalinist era it has changed. When one puts these things into historical perspective, one sees the possibility of peaceful co-existence, and that I believe to be a major feature of a constructive policy.
However, having said that my noble friends and I disagree with a great deal of United States foreign and defence policy, we are primarily interested in the overriding duty that we have to maintain the Alliance and an effective NATO. The question for us is: how can the disagreements between the British Government and the United States best be handled and diminished? The first thing that I think we would say is that we have to recognise that our worries are not unique. Almost without exception they are shared by the other European members of the NATO Alliance. The problem is not Anglo-American. It is a problem between the United States on the one hand and her European allies in NATO on the other. The balance of power between those two groups is not satisfactory and needs to be changed.
The United States undoubtedly has a disproportionate influence on strategy, in arms control and disarmament, and on questions of East-West relations. That balance was acceptable and realistic after the war when Europe was so weak and when the United States was far more dominant economically, politically and militarily than she is now; and—I must say this—when she was better led than she is now and when her world leadership was more widely respected than it is now. Now the balance must be changed. I think it is the unanimous view of my noble friends and myself that it should be changed, first, by increasing Europe's military contribution to the Alliance and making it a contribution that is respected in the United States; and, secondly, by increasing Europe's influence over decision-making. The two matters are of course interconnected and both are pretty difficult.
What it seems to us is needed is to ensure that European foreign and defence Ministers meet regularly, without the Americans, to consider and to concert their views on Europe's security needs within the NATO Alliance. They should discuss, for example, the consequences for Europe of the strategic defence initiative; the nature of the Soviet threat in Europe; the balance between detente and deterrence and between nuclear and conventional defence; Europe's interest in arms control and disarmament; and arms procurement. They should produce their own intelligence analyses without too much reliance on American sources. It is tempting to suggest a new European institution for this, but it may well be wiser simply to upgrade existing institutions such as the WEU, the European Political Consultation, Eurogroup and the European Programme Group and share the work between them.
In conclusion, I feel that we would all agree that if it can be done safely, of course we would be happy to see the American forces returning home across the

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Atlantic, and they themselves would be only too happy to do so if it could be done safely. But they are there because in 1945 and subsequently the Soviet Union kept their armies in position and subjugated Eastern Europe. That is why the American troops are needed in Europe; that is why they are here today.
It is true that in the 1950s the Russians offered to take their forces home if the Americans did the same. We sometimes forget this and sometimes I think it is worth looking at this idea again. However, meanwhile we have no alternative but to remain loyal allies, welcoming the American presence and reforming NATO by methods which are legitimate and acceptable between allies.
5.41 p.m.
Lord Beloff: My Lords, the subject which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, has proposed for our debate this afternoon is an important and serious one. Relations between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States, which have had a varied interest since the United States cut loose from us some 200 years ago, are always worth looking at. Indeed, we are fortunate that two noble Lords who have held the important post of Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington are to take part.
However, I cannot say that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins' speech, lived up to the importance or interest of this subject. He did not to any significant degree discuss the relations between the two governments: the way in which one might need to influence the other, or be able to influence the other, or wish to influence the other. Instead, we were treated to the fantasy, which has so often marked the noble Lord's speeches in your Lordships' House, that in some sense this country is a satellite, a colonial territory, of the United States of America because, of its own free will, it has decided that the common interest is best served, for the time being, by the presence of American armed forces on its soil. That is a decision freely arrived at. It is a decision which a future Government could, if they wished, remove—and the latest remarks of Mr. Denis Healey suggest that even a Labour Government might not wish to do this very soon.
I feel one can only explain this extravagant outburst by dwelling on the fact that, as so often, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, who talked about his acquaintance with leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, was reflecting a Soviet point of view and Soviet policy. I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, that Soviet policy has changed and may change in the future. But what can he said about Soviet policy is that one element of consistency ever since the end of the second world war has been an attempt to divide European members of what became the North Atlantic Alliance from their friends in the United States, either through diplomatic activity or, as in this case, through appealing to or trying to raise popular prejudice.
After all, it is slightly absurd to talk about the peace-oriented culture of the Russians as compared with the warlike United States when on every anniversary of the Revolution we can see on our own television
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martial parades in Red Square to which there is nothing comparable either in the United States or in Europe. There may be Latin American countries which go in for this kind of activity but Russia is the only major power in the world which still regards the public display of military strength as important in presenting its own conception of itself. To compare this with the gun-toting habits of people in Dallas seems to me to be asking your Lordships to swallow rather too much.
I would venture the point that it is very important for us, for reasons many of which have already been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, to keep in very close touch with the United States on a whole range of issues. The nuclear issue is only one. At the moment, from the point of view of Her Majesty's Government, there may be economic issues where agreement is even more urgent. It is important to do this. The question is: how best can we do it?
It is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, said, that a more independent position could, in some respects, be taken by Her Majesty's Government—His Majesty's Government, as it was then, many years ago. But the differences in scale and power, in military preparedness and in economic strength, have grown over that period. We cannot now think of ourselves, and do no longer think of ourselves, as sitting at the top table, as the centre of a Commonwealth which was the Empire under a new name. We are a moderately-sized power which has a specific series of interests, some of them overlapping with those of the United States (the Middle East, for instance), some of them much less (in parts of the world like the Pacific basin, to which the United States now attaches very great importance).
Having studied this from an academic point of view, if you like, over a very long period of time—over 40 years—what strikes me, looking back, is that on the whole the Americans listen to us more than one might have expected. Despite everything, despite these differences, despite the fact that "special relationship" is now only referred to in quotes, it is nevertheless true that the United States, for a number of reasons—and no doubt the noble Lords who are former Ambassadors can enlighten us on this—are prepared to enter into a dialogue with us on the most vital national interests of their own in a way I do not think they do even with countries to which they attach the greatest importance: Japan or the Federal Republic of Germany.
Being able to talk to the United States in a frank and friendly fashion, as the Prime Minister clearly has managed to do with President Reagan, must be an asset. But, to be able to do this, one has to bear in mind certain conditions. I would think that one of them is that. though we may differ from the United States and criticise the United States, it must be done in such a way as to make it clear that it is done within the framework, as the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew said, of an unshakeable alliance.
I think it is important that this is not only what the Government of the day do but it also places some burden, if you like, upon the ways of speech of people in public life who are not members or supporters of the present Government, such as, for instance, the Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition. I think that it is

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weakening for this country, whoever is right about Nicaragua (and different views are possible) for the Leader of the Opposition to make speeches outside this country indicating that he criticises Her Majesty's Government at home—which he is perfectly entitled to do—and indicating that he is wholeheartedly opposed to United States policy in that region. If—and I regard it as a big "if"—Mr. Kinnock were one day to be Prime Minister, he would himself have to establish the kind of intimate relations with whatever American administration might then be in power. A record of criticising the United States on its actions in an area with which he can claim only the most limited and passing acquaintance is perhaps not a great commendation.
It is therefore necessary to be even more wary of using the kind of exaggerated language with which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, opened our debate. It is, after all, I should have thought, likely to be counter-productive. The organisation to which the noble Lord frequently proclaims his adherence, as he did again this afternoon—the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament—has attempted, by demonstrations and by propaganda in a variety of ways, to prevent the implementation of an agreed military and disarmament strategy by the NATO Alliance. That having failed, what one must see now as the current thrust of Soviet diplomacy is in other ways to create suspicion—to talk about giving American soldiers free rein to shoot down British civilians and things of that kind.
We are not in the position of a satellite. We are not in the position, as the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew pointed out, which has been the position of Czechoslovakia and Hungary and which is, although the force is still in reserve, the position of the unfortunate inhabitants of Poland. We are not in the position of a satellite which is trying to get away. I do not think that if we were to break our relations with the United States we should, like the villagers of Afghanistan, be suffering under a hail of bullets from helicopters. We are not in that kind of position. The issues between the United States and Britain are serious and will be serious. And it would be your Lordships' pleasure today, I should have thought, to ignore that aspect of things and to look at what can be done to improve the intimacy of those relations.
5.52 p.m.
Lord Caccia: My Lords, like the two previous speakers, I had thought that this would be an occasion for what might be called a serious review of our relations with the United States. At least one possibility advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, he has himself, I think, already destroyed. That is to make us an alluring partner as the 51st state of the union. So that, at least, can be put aside.
To go on to the more serious questions at issue, the noble Lord raised the subject of Grenada and Nicaragua and the situation on the southern border of the United States. We should do well to remind ourselves, first, that this is an area of special interest to the United States; and, secondly, that when it came to an area in Latin America or near Latin America that was of prime importance to us—namely the Falkland Islands—we had great support from the Americans at
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vital points. It would have indeed been difficult, I imagine, to conduct our military operation as successfully as we did without that understanding and support despite the fact that the Americans thereby got into serious trouble in their relations with other Latin American countries. This does not mean—I do not intend it to mean—that we should refrain from any comment or criticism about what the Americans may do over Grenada or Nicaragua or over the situation in Central America. It does suggest, however, that the tone of voice in which we offer our criticisms and our suggestions should be much more those proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, than those put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins.
The noble Lord then turned to the American preponderance in NATO and its rights, as he claimed—although I hope that this will be challenged by the noble Baroness who is to answer the debate—in this country to launch nuclear weapons without any consultation with or reference to Her Majesty's Government. If the situation in NATO was different, if really NATO had become a second pillar to a combined defence system—one pillar being the United States and an equal pillar being that of the European members of NATO—then perhaps we would be able to claim as of right a voice greater than we now can enjoy. But, for good or ill, although great sacrifices have been made by European countries, they have not, despite their economic success and financial advantage, so far agreed to build up a system that could be called an equal pillar. We should therefore also remind ourselves that if the Americans coined the phrase "no taxation without representation" there is a converse to it. That converse is "no full representation without taxation". It is a question rather whether NATO really has allowed itself too much latitude to claim such a position. The fact of the matter is that our safety depends on the United States umbrella and on the presence of United States forces in Europe. And, in Europe, I count the United Kingdom.
To continue from there, questions have also been raised about our financial and economic relations with the United States. Looked at from a European point of view—this is where I wish to join with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew—there is an advantage in looking at this not simply as a British-American issue. It is more widely a European-American issue. Indeed, so far as exchange rates are concerned, it is Japanese as well. Here, perhaps I should sound one word of caution. It is essential to bear in mind always that for the Americans, for any American administration, the prosperity and welfare of the United States is the prime consideration. What conduces to that in their opinion conduces to the better prosperity of the western world. What does not so contribute they will be liable to eschew, thinking that their interests in the longer term are also the interests of the West.
Of course there is something in this, The prosperity of the United States in the past two or three years has been of immense benefit to the western world. But it has brought with it complications for the European economies and the economy of Japan. Still, a balance has to be struck and perhaps, and with any luck, this year it may be possible to persuade the Americans that their interests coincide more closely with ours in that their expansion is showing some signs of weakening

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and that they may themselves therefore see an advantage in lowering interest rates and various other measures that would be, to put it mildly, convenient to other western powers.
I hesitate to continue in this vein. If there is one aspect that has to be continually borne in mind it is that if someone like myself, who has not been in any way personally involved or responsible for our relations with the United States for 20 years, starts to pontificate, it may be certain that he is out of date and that others, who are more up to the present situation, should take his place. I hope to be able to stay to the end of the debate. If, however, owing to a previous engagement, I cannot do so, I hope that the noble Baroness will forgive me. I shall learn what I should learn when I come to read what is written in Hansard.
6 p.m.
Lord Beaumont of Whitley: My Lords, I suspect that, in spite of what has been said so far, the country as a whole is fairly unanimous in its attitude to the United States. This attitude consists, on the one hand, of affection and admiration and, on the other, of that complex mixture of envy, resentment and even fear which is felt by a client state to its protector—a complex of emotions which we must be well aware of since we ourselves, as one of the great nations of the world in the past, must have been—or should have been—infinitely aware of how it was borne to us by our colonies and our client states. Such a relationship is a perfectly understandable one, but because it is complex I think it can often lead to the wrong estimation of what is happening and to actions which are guided often (or sometimes, anyway) more by emotion than by common sense, not always as well thought out as they should be.
Dearly as I should like to leap into the fray which has been started this afternoon, really I want to talk about a minor but not unimportant part of the subject which has not yet been mentioned. I do so the more readily since I was full of admiration and full of support for the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, from my Front Bench. I entirely agreed with them and I thought that his affirmations and his reservations were most fairly put. What I should like to mention very briefly is the attitude that we and the United States have to a number of institutions, among them the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
I believe that the attitude or the present political masters of America to the World Bank is unfortunate to say the least. They combine a hard-nosed approach to economics with a general attitude, in dealing with smaller countries, that, "He who is not with me is against me". The effect of this is that they cultivate an attitude towards the World Bank and its cognate institutions which is remarkably suspicious and which, as a result, has impeded the efforts of the bank to expand and, indeed, is causing it to contract. I deplore this attitude because I believe it is not what the world economy as a whole needs, particularly at a time when the approach of the World Bank to the third world and its problems is much more constructive and much more intelligent than it has been in the past.
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Whether I or indeed your Lordships should deplore the attitude of the United States to these institutions is neither here nor there. Undoubtedly, the United States will continue to do what appears to it—possibly wrongly—to be right, and what appears to it—possibly rightly—to suit its book. However, it is a different matter if the United Kingdom follows suit; and this is where the subject I raise is at the heart of this particular debate. Here again I may differ from our present Government as to what is the right course of action for the bank to take for the benefit of the third world; and, again, my view might be one which they reject, in which case I have to live with it.
Where I think I can challenge them is in their largely unspoken assumption that if the US takes an economic view we should necessarily take the same one, because our basic economic positions are extremely different. Many of us get the impression that the Government's judgment on this is unduly swayed by the basic economic attitudes that the two Governments have in common; that because they are both monetarists and supply "siders" they should therefore agree. But it does not follow. The USA is a largely self-sufficient nation. Its economy does not rely very much on trade. Its share of world trade has been falling steadily for the past 10 years and it has not taken any serious steps to reverse this. It does not really matter to it.
Ours, for better or worse, does, and as we are a small, over-populated country, it will continue to do so. As a result, our self-interest should cause us to back all efforts to expand the world economy. I say "all efforts" because in dealing with the World Bank and the IMF I do not think that I have to add many riders. No one, or virtually no one, accuses the World Bank of profligacy. It is not subject to the same kind of criticism that UNESCO, for instance, rightly or wrongly, encounters. It is thought, even by its critics, to be economically basically sound. It is both right and in our own interest to see that these international financial institutions are not unduly hampered and that they are indeed helped to do their job. I think that the present American Administration is hampering them in this way and I urge our Government at least to appreciate the necessity for detaching ourselves and trying to do our best to see that the World Bank in fact is able to operate more efficiently.
I do not ask for a reply today from the Government on this particular subject. This is an aspect of today's debate that they had no reason to expect, and I have not given them warning that I was going to raise it. As a result, given even the encyclopaedic knowledge of the noble Baroness and the resources of the Civil Service Box, I would get only the standard response; and I know the standard response. What I do hope, though, is that the Foreign Office and the ODA, who I think have little emotional capital invested in the economic views which seem to motivate the Government, will take note that there are many more people than I think they believe who care about these matters and will redouble any efforts they may be making to change our approach in this field.
We are not making friends in the world by our present attitude, and that is a pity. If we are wrong in the beliefs that form this attitude, it is a double pity. If we are not making friends, and we are wrong, and we

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are cutting our own throats commercially, it is a treble pity; and I think that we should do something about it.
6.10 p.m.
Lord Sheffield: My Lords, like other noble Lords I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, for raising this matter, but perhaps he will forgive me if I do not follow him in what I venture to call his more tongue in cheek flights of fancy. Like my noble friend Lord Caccia, I have no first-hand knowledge of the recent dealings and negotiations between the two governments, but as far as I can tell the relationship has been very well managed on our side in the last three or four years with one exception to which I shall return. Therefore, I do not propose to say much about current issues except perhaps that, far from being afraid that the Americans will get us involved in another war, my concern is rather that they might become disenchanted with their European allies and begin to weaken the links which at present guarantee the security of ourselves and our European friends. Therefore, if your Lordships can bear a few glimpses of the obvious, I shall briefly sketch part of the changed and changing background in the United States which inevitably shapes and conditions the relationship between our two Governments.
Many people have talked for many years about our special relationship with the United States. That is not an expression which I myself use. Certainly there is a special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. It is based on a common language, on the common law—particularly on the common law—on a common political heritage, on a common literary heritage and on a partnership in two world wars, particularly the Second World War. Those are ties of fundamental strength and importance.
But the United States has a special relationship with many other countries—for example, France. I remember once meeting my French colleague in Washington at the airport. He had just returned from a very special occasion in Franco-American relations: the anniversary of the British surrender at Yorktown. He said to me, "We had the same menu which was served to Lafayette after the British surrender". I asked, "What was that?" He said, rather crestfallen, "Well, mostly beans". I said, "Well, Henri, that served you right".
Take Japan. Two years ago I listened to a discourse by the American Ambassador in Tokyo, the distinguished former senator, Mike Mansfield. His theme was that the future prosperity, indeed the future centre of the world, lay in the Pacific basin, and the only relationship which was really important to the United States was their relationship with Japan.
China used to have a very special relationship with the United States due mainly to missionary involvement. That could now be revived. Take Latin America. It was easy to see the pull that this special relationship had for the United States during the Falklands affair.
There are other examples. However, I think that those are enough to say that the implication that there is a special—in the sense of exclusive—relationship between Britain and the United States is demonstrably inaccurate.
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On the ethnic front, the pattern has been changing significantly, if not dramatically, in the last two or three decades. It is now some 30 years since I called on the Automobile Workers of America in Detroit. A senior official was complaining then of the influx of immigrant and black workers into the area. "In a few years," he said sadly, "I shall be the last of the Monroneys". Since then Miami has become a Spanish city, and the whole of the border from Texas to California is becoming Spanish speaking, and similar ethnic changes are taking place in other areas.
Politically, the eastern establishment (the white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants) have, relative to other groups, lost influence. The centre of political power has been moving to California. The Irish and Jewish political influence has not diminished, while the influence of the blacks has increased. Nor is there all that amount of interest in things British. Not long ago I spent 10 days in San Francisco during which the only reference to Great Britain in the local press was an account of the collapse of a giraffe in the London Zoo. That made the front page.
Economically, in 1983 for the first time the volume of United States trade across the Pacific area overtook the volume of trade across the Atlantic. There is one area which has historically been a source of friction between the two governments and that is the area of trade and commercial policy and the attempts made by the United States Government, or rather its agencies, to extend their jurisdiction beyond the confines of the United States.
When I first went to Washington in 1931 the main controversy in that field was the assertion by the United States of the right of pursuit of bootlegging vessels on to the high seas. There have always been these issues. Recent examples have been the chicken war, exports to the eastern bloc, and the attempt to exercise jurisdiction over foreign airlines. I think it is one of the advantages of our membership of the European Communities that these are now dealt with on a European-American basis, which not only makes for a much stronger negotiating hand, but which also lessens the strain on the bilateral relations between the two Governments. Happily none of these issues over the years has been of fundamental importance, or had more than a transient effect upon our relationship.
All these factors are obvious and well-known. Taken together they have a significant bearing on this Motion. What it adds up to is that a close relationship is more important for the United Kingdom than it is for the United States. So the dialogues between our two countries must be carried on. I am sure that we, the British, are still listened to in Washington. We can, and I believe on occasions we do, have an influence out of proportion to our resources. Indeed, on that point I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, said. But we cannot expect to call the tune, especially in matters affecting national security—in fact, we have never done so.
Reference was made to Mr. Attlee, as he then was. I accompanied Mr. Attlee when he went to Washington for discussions with President Truman on the rumours that the Americans might use the nuclear bomb in the Korean War. As many of your Lordships will remember, those rumours caused a good deal of

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agitation in Parliament and Mr. Attlee went to Washington to discuss the matter with President Truman. Of course, the Americans were not prepared to give any public assurance in these discussions. They could not do so for constitutional reasons. But Mr. Attlee and Mr. Truman had 15 minutes' private conversation and as a result of that conversation—and, of course, the Americans had no intention of using a nuclear weapon in Korea—Mr. Attlee felt able to come back and reassure the House of Commons. I am sure that the relationship between the present Prime Minister and President Reagan is as close and as intimate as that between Mr. Attlee and Mr. Truman and allows that sort of exchange to take place.
Reference has also been made to a remark by Lord Salisbury, or, as I think he was at the time, Viscount Cranborne. It so happens that I was Ambassador in Washington in 1954, the year in which this remark appears to have been made. I accompanied Viscount Cranborne to a great number of conversations in Washington at that time, and if he really thought what he is supposed to have said, all I can say is that he concealed it extremely well.
The dialogue with the United States Government, the cultivation of our relationship, and the effort to keep it in good repair need more understanding, sensitivity and skill than ever before, and this of course is particularly true at the highest levels. As I said earlier, I believe that it has been well exercised recently. It was certainly well exercised in the Falklands affair. But the subsequent Grenada episode was a severe setback. I hope that this fence is now repaired at Government level, but I fear that that is scarcely the case at the level of popular feeling. It is true enough that the Americans acted precipitately and without proper regard to our constitutional position and rights, though, because I do not have enough knowledge of the subject, I could not endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, said about it. Nevertheless, it was a setback. In our dealings with the United States Government in the future we cannot afford any more Grenadas.
6.23 p.m.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, my qualifications for taking part in this debate are small indeed compared with those of the noble Lord who has just addressed us, and, for that matter, compared with those of the noble Lord, Lord Caccia. My great-uncle led the last British troops to engage in battle against the Americans. It is true that his forces were defeated and that he was slain, but the Americans acted very generously and set up what are now called the Pakenham Oaks in New Orleans in memory of him—they seemed to be proud of their victim. That is a past connection, and the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, who has generated such a gifted tribe of Anglo-Americans, will be pleased to hear that I have just heard that I have a second Anglo-American grandchild. That is small fry compared with his achievements, but it will give him pleasure.
I shall use up my few minutes stating what I would call the obvious, but what is obvious to me is really no more obvious than the remarks of the noble Lord,
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Lord Sherfield, which were extremely sophisticated. My remarks are banalities compared with the noble Lord's refinements. I entirely agree with what the noble Lords. Lord Mayhew, Lord Beloff and others, said, that since the war the whole defence and foreign policy of this country has rested on the alliance with the United States. Of course, I am very pleased that we are now members of the EEC; there are, of course, a good many other countries which are members of NATO; and the Commonwealth is a wonderful institution presided over with unique skill by Her Majesty the Queen. But when all is said and done, our survival has depended upon the Anglo-American alliance—as it seems to me, the ponsasinorum of the whole subject: the beginning of wisdom.
That alliance did not exist before the war. During the war there was a very intimate alliance. We did not have such an intimate alliance with the Russians during the war. In fact, that came into existence slightly before the alliance with the United States, because the Germans attacked the Russians a little sooner than the Japanese attacked the Americans. That was the wartime alliance. But what has been such a tremendous feat since the war has been the establishment of a peacetime alliance, which is something unique in the history of the United States and, to some extent, of this country.
We on these Benches can certainly take pride in the fact that that alliance was established by a Labour Government, of which the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, and I were members. However, the noble Lord was rather closer to events at some of the moments in question than I was. At any rate, it was established by a Labour Government. Thererfore, I hope that no one will think that there is something rather remote from Labour policy in this alliance: that is not the case at all. The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, does not use quite the same language as I do about all this now, but the fact is that he was a very ardent socialist for many years. In fact, if it comes to it, he was my pupil!
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, if the noble Earl will give way, I must reply that when I belonged to the Labour Party it was a loyal supporter of the NATO alliance.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, it still is. My Leader will explain that later. At any rate, in so far as this country is concerned the Atlantic Alliance was created and established by the Labour Party, and supported by the other parties. This attitude towards America was not shared by everyone in all the parties. The Conservatives were sound on the NATO alliance, but they were not at all sound on the American loan. In the House of Commons Sir Winston Churchill had difficulty persuading his party not to vote against the American loan, but quite a few Members did vote against it. That is just one aspect of their activities at that time.
In this House (although it was not in this particular Chamber but in another part of this House) I can well remember Lord Salisbury doing his best to defend the American loan with Lord Beaverbrook, his old wartime colleague, sitting beside him. Lord Beaverbrook gave Lord Salisbury a very rough time. At one point Lord Salisbury, speaking about Lord Beaverbrook, said rather incautiously:

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"Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Beaverbrook, can afford to take a dispassionate view. He is well endowed with this world's goods".
Lord Beaverbrook then said in a Canadian accent, which I cannot imitate,
"I thought the House of Salisbury was pretty well off?"
That was the nature of the argument that was taking place in the Conservative Party at that time about the American loan.
In the House of Commons, it is true that a dear old friend of some of us, Mr. Dick Crossman, a young MP at that time, brought forward a resolution which was a vote of censure on the whole Anglo-American policy of the Government. He persuaded 58 Labour MPs to sign his Motion. In the end, it was defeated by 353 votes to none. However, 130 Labour MPs abstained out of a party strength of 352. So we must realise that throughout this period there have been times when groups in the Conservative or Labour Parties—if there had been an Alliance Party I have no doubt that it would have had its own problems—have opposed the policy being pursued by the Government of the day. However, throughout the whole of that time, which is nearly 40 years, whether the Conservative or the Labour Party has been in power the policy of the Anglo-American alliance has been firmly supported.
In my own case, this policy was supported by Lord Attlee—to whom the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, referred in such an interesting way—by Mr. Harold Wilson and Mr. Callaghan as Prime Minister, and by Hugh Gaitskell when he was Leader of the Opposition. When he made his great speech, which some of us heard, in which he said, "Fight, fight and fight again", he denounced some of his opponents as neutralists, pacifists and communists. That is how he felt about the minority at that time. In a healthy democracy there are minorities on both sides. We went through all these periods; but those who have been in power, whether Labour or Conservative, have consistently supported this policy of the Anglo-American alliance. For my part, in all humility, what was good enough for Lord Attlee, Lord Wilson (as he now is), Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Gaitskell—and, I am sure, for our leader tonight—is good enough for me, so I have no qualms about that.
Of course, there will always he differences. In the days to which Lord Sherfield referred, the days of Mr. Attlee (as he then was) and Mr. Bevin, there was a great struggle with the Americans over Palestine. There was a deep division of opinion. There will always be these divisions of opinion. I will not cite any particular divisions tonight.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, wrote an important letter which appeared in The Times last Friday. I am not sure that I was quite clear about the implications of that letter. If I were clear, I might not agree with them.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, may I—
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, before the noble Lord had even heard what I had to say—
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, I will elucidate a little on that letter in the remarks I shall make in five minutes' time.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, I know the noble Lord is quick to rise to counter anything that might be said by way of criticism, but I thought he was rather faster than usual this evening to rise to his feet, even before I had made a criticism. I did not intend to criticise him. Perhaps that was what he was objecting to.
I was intending to quote favourably two sentences that appeared in the noble Lord's letter. If he wishes to correct this he will remind me of the late Lord Fisher, who never would allow any sentence to pass without correction. The sentences read:
"No doubt Europeans are in a weak position to insist that the SDI should be traded away in the forthcoming negotiations, if the Americans decline to do anything of the sort … So there seems to be no reason why the Europeans should not at least be allowed their say".
I agree with those two sentences.
I promised to stay within my time. I feel that what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has said provides in itself a good reason why this debate should have been brought forward. I am glad, as always, to listen to my noble friend Lord Jenkins. In a way, he is the Dick Crossman of today. I hope that remark will be understood as a compliment. There is just this difference, that I usually have a pretty good idea of what the noble Lord intends to say, although tonight he surprised me. I never had any idea of what Dick Crossman would say, because if he said something yesterday it was certain that he would say the opposite the next day. I think Lord Jenkins is far more consistent. However, I must give place to more qualified speakers.
6.35 p.m.
Lord Reay: My Lords, the freedom and prosperity of every man, woman and child in this country and in every other Western European country depends on the strength of the Western Alliance. In turn the strength of this alliance depends on a cohesion between its members, particularly on the cohesion between the United States and Europe.
Given the antagonism which has to exist—I shall return to this point in a minute—between Russia's repressive empire in the East and the Western liberal democracies, it follows that the Soviet Union will always be alert for opportunities to damage Western cohesion, as my noble friend Lord Beloff reminded us. We experienced a protracted attempt to do exactly that with the Soviet campaign to prevent the installation of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe.
It also follows that it is our vital need and duty to strengthen this cohesion; the more so since the United States would survive the shattering of the alliance into its component parts, but it is much less plain that Europe would. Expecting, therefore, deliberate attempts to damage the alliance, what should we be considering doing ourselves which would, on the contrary, help to strengthen it?
The Soviet Union's campaign to cause disarray in the alliance over the installation of cruise and Pershing missiles was not entirely fruitless. The German defence consensus was broken. Holland has still not deployed. Belgium has just distressed the United States by using the resumption of the super-power talks as a reason for once again postponing

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deployment. Much political aggravation has been caused and the number of missiles kept very low in relation to what the Soviet counterpart has grown to. Many further opportunities for dividing the allies will present themselves in the course of the new talks. It may even be that the possibility of causing disarray in the alliance is more attractive to the Soviets than any likely arms treaty. After all, the strategic defence to which the Soviets object is a distant and speculative target and arms control talks have produced very little in the way of arms control in the last 15 years.
I said earlier that there was bound to be antagonism between the liberal democratic West and the Soviet empire. The fact is that Communist societies can only be held together by repression. As an ideology Communism can carry out a revolution. However, once the masses have had their revolution, Communism loses its raison d'etre. The ideology attracts lip service but not adherence. On top of that, the Soviet empire contains many different nationalities and even countries, which fact exacerbates the internal tensions and pressures.
Added to that, it is an expanding empire, as Afghanistan proves. Indeed it has to expand where it can, if only to help protect what it has. Let no one doubt for one second that the Soviet Union would take the opportunity to quench the liberties of Western Europe. Is it not plain what beacons of hope these Western freedoms are to the subject people of the East, whenever they can be glimpsed flickering through the curtain with which the Soviet leadership tries to veil them from their sight? Would it not be much more convenient if they could be made to disappear over the Atlantic horizon?
What constructive countervailing energies should Europe dedicate to try to preserve this alliance? It has been well argued recently in a reprinted essay by a third former ambassador to the United States, Peter Jay, entitled "Europe's Ostrich and America's Eagle", that Europe is in a transition stage where she resents being an American protectorate, but refuses the responsibilities of becoming a partner even in her own defence, let alone in a more global defence of her interests, as, for example, in the Gulf.
We should therefore do something to shed the image of being America's constant ringside critic, someone who wants America to do everything for us—reach an accommodation with Russia on our behalf, for example—but who waits to criticise whatever arrangement America makes. The noble Lord, Lord Caccia, may be right. It may be politically impossible for European countries to make the effort required for them to become treated as equal partners with the United States. Undoubtedly we fear what may be asked of us—and this applies to Germany and to Japan also, who are tempted to hide behind arguments based on the past to avoid present realities. We fear the effort, we fear the impossible cost, of entering into a proper partnership.
Meanwhile, there is a danger that we slide into unreality. We have in the past been dilatory on civil defence, although civil defence would add credibility to our nuclear deterrent by indicating to any potential aggressor a willingness to live with the consequence of the failure of deterrence. Ostrich-like, we place
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excessive hopes on arms control talks, despite all the evidence of the past. There are some who put their faith in nuclear-free zones and corridors. We allow an absurd situation to build up in Europe over chemical weapons because everyone concerned knows that the Soviets would make massive use of chemicals in any conventional attack, at least if they need not fear the use of chemicals against them. Yet NATO has no credible chemical deterrent so that we put our own fighting forces at a great disadvantage and. incidentally, lower the nuclear threshold.
But do we have to leave the United States to decide this question on its own? Why could not a European country for once take an initiative in a matter relating to Europe's defence? We react with alarm when President Reagan attaches himself more determinedly and more publicly to his Strategic Defence Initiative even though the doctrine that it would display, or partially display—mutual assured destruction—appears to be attracting greater public censure. A doctrine based partially on defensive rather than exclusively on offensive nuclear weapons might prove less unpalatable to the general public, albeit as a long-term goal. Certainly, the American public welcomes President Reagan's initiative. Rather than assume that President Reagan is wrong and since no one knows the outcome of future research, might it not be better if we proposed instead to put some of our own scientific resources into such research?
In order to avoid leaving—and I think that this is a point similar to that which the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, made—the initiative to consultation, always on an ad hoc basis and usually with the United States, could we not propose regular meetings between Europeans and the United States, and perhaps Japan, at Foreign Minister and other ministerial levels? The point that I wish to make is that the alliance cannot be left to look after itself. To maintain it requires constant labour and attention. Incidentally, the goal of a strong and united Europe is not at all incompatible with the goal of a strong Atlantic alliance. On the contrary, it is a condition of it; provided always that it is an outward-looking and not a protectionist Europe that we help to build. That again is a policy for this country to pursue for the sake of the West as a whole.
Since 1941, the forces of isolationism in the United States have never been dominant. In 1941, the United States committed itself to the rescue of democracy in Europe from Nazi Germany and it has committed itself ever since to its defence against the threat of Soviet Russia. But woe betide the Europeans if its leaders allow its populations to feel that, come what may, the freedom of Western Europe is of such a vital interest to the United States that we need do nothing more ourselves to defend it. For America, impatient with the complacency and irresponsibility of Europe, could then indeed revert to isolationism—and Europe, as Peter Jay has said, would find itself free at last to choose to be "Red or dead". Surely that is a destiny that we should try to avoid.
6.44 p.m.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, our relationship with the United States is now necessarily a very close one. It was not always so. Right up to 1939 there was, I think, always a certain rivalry, if not jealousy, as between our

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two states if not between our two peoples. The Americans never liked the British Empire and they entirely failed to appreciate what would be likely to happen if it ever disappeared—as it duly did, with their help, after the last world war. Even now it is possible that they do not think that—in the famous words of Dean Acheson—we have really "found a role". As they see it, no doubt quite unfairly, the Head of the Commonwealth, to paraphrase Thomas Hobbes, is "the ghost of the Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof".
To be frank, I feel that we are now regarded by the Americans—when they think of us at all, as the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, seemed to doubt—as a rather quaint, if lovable, old associate, happily sharing the same language and the same sort of democratic principles; useful, indeed essential, as part of the Western defensive system designed to put a check on Soviet ambitions (although Western Germany of course is more important still); not expected to pursue any very individual line in foreign policy, but rather in the long run to give effect to American policy, whatever, from time to time, that may turn out to be.
More particularly in NATO we are expected to be the chief associate of the United States, more conscious perhaps than most of the absolute necessity of not undermining the alliance on the maintenance of which, as so many noble Lords have pointed out this evening, our independence manifestly depends. We may not feel very comfortable in such a role, but I think that we tend to accept it, if a little grudgingly.
But, my Lords, what happens if the American Administration pursues a line which in the considered opinion of Her Majesty's Government—to say nothing of our European associates—is quite misguided? How far, if at all, can we resist such a line without endangering the alliance, on which our whole future rests? This is the question which presumably must underlie the whole of the debate this afternoon, for which we are so indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, for initiating. For let us not deceive ourselves, there are now—apart from economic issues and "aid", very properly referred to by my noble friend Lord Beaumont, in regard to which we may well agree to differ—at least three broad political areas in which the bulk of informed public opinion, in this country at any rate, does seem to diverge from the policy of the Reagan Administration, if not from that of the Democratic opposition in the United States.
I refer to Central America and the Caribbean; the Middle East and East-West relations, with which is associated the whole question of arms control, in regard to just one point about which I propose to refer in a moment's time—although perhaps I should more properly have intervened in the debate which preceded this one this afternoon, the first part of which, unfortunately, I was unable to attend.
I take Central America first because it is perhaps the least dangerous. For even though we might greatly dislike and deplore any action which the Americans might conceivably take—for example, the actual invasion of Nicaragua—we must at least consider that Central America is just as much the "back yard", so to speak, of the United States as Northern Ireland is ours. And we should surely resent any official American
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interference in the affairs of that distressful province. Whatever the United States may choose to do in their back yard—and, of course, American opinion itself is much divided on Central American issues—this is consequently something as regards which, although we may well criticise, we can hardly take a strong opposing line. In any case, whatever American policy may be, it is not as if the maintenance of the vital alliance would be likely to come into question as a result.
The Middle East is quite another thing. Here we have, politically speaking, an atmosphere in which a spark really might cause an explosion. The tension created by what many on this side of the ocean, at any rate, feel is perhaps excessive preoccupation with Israeli security, might one day produce such a spark. And the resulting explosion would presumably result in a clash between the super powers. Hence, United States policy in the Middle East directly affects the vital interests of ourselves and our European partners. That is undeniable.
What presumably we would like—and I am sure that the noble Baroness, when she comes to reply, will not contradict me on this—is for the Americans to get back to something like the old "Reagan plan" and stick to it. I see no reason why the European Community should not strongly urge this on our ally. But supposing the Americans take no notice? In the last resort they are the dominant partner and we cannot oblige them to change their policy, even if we would. Nor can it be proved to be disastrous until disaster occurs, in which case we shall just have to face the consequences.
But there might possibly be means of persuasion other than mere pressure. This is the point that I really want to make, and I am sure that the noble Baroness will appreciate it. I will come to it in a moment after dwelling on the third and perhaps the most important area in which real disagreement may eventually emerge. I refer to East-West relations, more especially as they are reflected in nuclear matters and in arms control. Happily, I think I may take it that, pace the CND and possibly the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, most people in this country are solidly behind the maintenance of some Western defence system, both nuclear and non-nuclear, which, with the United States in the lead, may—pending disarmament of course—be regarded by the Soviet Union as "credible" and hence as a deterrent to any action on their part that might precipitate a war.
And it is in the light of what we may probably call a general consensus that I turn, not so much to ASAT (Anti-Satellite Action), in respect of which there is still some slight hope that the two super powers will eventually agree to scrap all further preparations, as to President Reagan's favourite plan—namely, the construction at colossal expense before the end of the century of some anti-ballistic space system that could shoot down all Soviet nuclear missiles shortly after they leave the ground.
We had originally imagined that any divergent ideas on "star wars" could be put on one side for the moment as a result of the Prime Minister's agreement, in her recent talks with President Reagan, not to object, as I understand it, to the expenditure by the United States on "research" for this project of no less

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than $26 billion over the next five years in return for an American assurance that no definite decision to go ahead with it would be taken pending its consideration, along with other nuclear matters, in negotiations with the Russians.
This was satisfactory in so far as it seemed at least to postpone any decision on a very contentious matter. However, the trouble still is that, if over so long a period such very large sums are to be devoted to research, the chances are that, whatever the Russians, the United States Congress or the Europeans may say or do, it will be very difficult in practice to abandon the project in 1990 or 1991.
However, immediately after this welcome agreement, various high United States authorities, including the Secretary for Defense himself, declared that "star wars" was simply not negotiable in any circumstances whatever. And although Mr. Shultz seems now in effect to have overruled Mr. Weinberger and thus in principle upheld the agreement, it remains to be seen whether in the coming negotiations the United States will ever agree to abandon, or even to modify, the SDI project, whatever concession the Russians may be prepared to offer in return. If so, it will mean that what might be called the Weinberger thesis will have prevailed and the whole future of arms control will thereby be gravely imperilled.
What is the Weinberger thesis? It has just been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Reay. Although I may be unduly suspicious, I feel that the real, if undeclared, purpose of SDI is to prevent any return to a much abused and distrusted "detente" resting on the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which has been at least tacitly accepted in all arms control negotiations up till now. The intention would rather be to replace this concept of MAD by some settlement based not so much on equality as on overwhelming American strength, and notably by an attempt to achieve virtual immunity against Soviet nuclear attack; thus either placing the Russians at the mercy of the Americans or, perhaps more probably, wrecking the Russian economy as a result of Soviet efforts to keep up in some space war race. However much we may dislike and distrust the Soviet Government, it is hard to imagine anything more inherently destabilising than that.
I have no time to dwell further on the dangers of this unfortunate and, according to many qualified scientists, unrealisable project, which I have good reason to suppose are well appreciated by the majority of informed persons in this country and across the Channel, if not in America. At one time there was good reason to suppose that they were also appreciated by our own Prime Minister.
So, in conclusion, my Lords, I would say only this. It may well be that, whatever our views, we shall eventually find it very difficult by simple opposition to persuade the Americans to abandon a scheme which, however impracticable and undesirable, at least promises enormous advantages to its promoters, if only from the financial point of view. But suppose—just suppose—that we and our friends were to hint that if there were ever a chance of its being abandoned during negotiations we should be
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prepared, in order to clinch a deal, to shoulder the financial obligations necessary for strengthening our conventional defences and to this end to cut down on our own expenditures on nuclear weapons. What then? At the very least, would not such an offer encourage those in Congress who are opposed to the whole "star wars" exercise?
I would not suggest that any démarche should be made at once or in so many words. But if in diplomacy one can see a possible means of reaching an end, there are surely more ways than one, however devious, of resorting to it. For the rest, I can only trust that we shall have an opportunity of discussing star wars at greater length in the light of any progress or absence of progress in the forthcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union. It is really not a question of being, as some suggest, beguiled on this issue by Mr. Gorbachev: it is a question of discovering where our true interests lie.
6.57 p.m.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, we have had a debate of great interest and importance, and we are indebted to my noble friend Lord Jenkins for initiating it. In his speech my noble friend drew attention to one aspect, as he sees it, of our relationship with the United States of America; namely, the relations between the two governments in the field of defence. I propose to go somewhat wider than that, and many of the excellent speeches we have heard have also ranged more widely.
In general, I have no doubt in my mind that we do have a special relationship. Geography and history have made that inevitable; and we have only to look at the list of signatories to the Declaration of Independence to appreciate that, whether we like it or not. There is an historic bond which it is impossible to deny. As the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, said, there have been great changes in 200 years; but I think a bond still remains, although there are arguments on both sides as to whether it still exists, and things are said (as they have been said in this debate) which cast doubt upon it. I think that Mark Twain summed it up when he said of Thomas Carlyle's view of Americans that,
"At bottom he was probably fond of them, but he was always able to conceal it".
The mistake many people on both sides of the Atlantic make is to interpret the special relationship in purely political terms: that is to say, if we are close politically, then there is a special relationship; if not, there is no such relationship. But whatever the political climate, there are always close personal and cultural links, and these are not absent among the Americans who are not of British extraction. The political relationship is bound to vary as leaders and policies change in both countries. The fact that they do change is significant in itself for we are discussing relations between two democratic countries. But the other links remain.
I have the privilege of being the president of the Association of Welsh Societies Overseas, and the largest of these by far are the combined American Welsh societies. In August of every year they send representatives to the National Eisteddfod, and when we meet, there is no barrier between us. We are linked

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by the English language—and in most cases by the Welsh language as well! No doubt if we began to discuss political issues, we would find things to disagree about, but there is nothing odd about that, any more than there is about disagreement in this House. I think therefore that it is important to get this in the right perspective at the very outset.
Then there are other links of a more material kind which must be taken into careful account, notwithstanding what the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, said about trade. For example, our investment—these are perhaps not the very latest figures—in the United States is of the order of $23 billion and United States investment here is of the order of $30 billion. Our trade with the United States is worth some £16 billion. This is not only immensely valuable to us and to our economy but implies the constant interchange of views and personal relations on the commercial and industrial level.
This trading relationshp is not new. It has been going on for a very long time; and the more it thrives, the better it is for our economy, provided it is balanced and fair. I do not overlook the current economic problems or the serious disagreements which have occurred between our two countries, for example, about the Siberian pipeline two years ago, about trade restrictions which are of acute concern to this country, and about growing concern about a possible American shift towards protectionism. Disagreements on trade matters can have bitter repercussions, I agree, and this must be understood on both sides. The row over the Soviet gas pipeline showed how easily the United States and the EEC could fall out very seriously. The subsequent accommodation showed the strength of the relationship at the end of the day.
On the political side—here I include defence which has been extensively covered in the previous debate—there appear to be two schools of thought. One school takes the view that the political relationship between the United States of America and Britain has never been healthier, and that this is partly due to President Reagan's regard for the Prime Minister, a regard which is warmly reciprocated. On 22nd December, for example, the Economist said:
"Measured in personal terms, the partnerhip now seems to be at the kind of high point reached between Roosevelt and Churchill, the pair who launched it, and later between Kennedy and Harold Macmillan".
Senator John Tower, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said a few days ago:
"Most Americans regard Britain as our closest and most reliable ally".
This view is also shared by Mr. Caspar Weinberger and others. The Economist finds evidence of affinity with Britain in travel statistics. It points out that, apart from Mexico, which is on the doorstep of the United States, Britain is by far the most popular destination for travelling Americans.
Three tangible advantages, it is argued, flow to Britain from the special relationship. The first is the one dealt with and sharply criticised by my noble friend Lord Jenkins; namely, nuclear defence cooperation. Trident missiles are, it is said, a natural offspring of Polaris, although the full price is being paid for Trident which was not the case with Polaris. Secondly, the navies of the two countries co-operate
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very closely at Northwood, as we know; and, thirdly, intelligence—a valuable advantage not shared with any other country. It is difficult of course to reconcile the latter advantage with the United States invasion of Grenada without any forewarning to the Government.
This therefore is one view: that the political relationship between Britain and the United States is sound and flourishing. There is, however, a contrary opinion that some fairly fundamental differences exist between our two countries. For example, on 6th May The Times referred to the dangerous threat of the,
"creeping anti-Americanism that is evident in Britain and Western Europe".
This is of course true, and it is in my view unfortunate. It is due to many factors; to the fact that a generation has grown up which does not remember the war or the Marshall Plan and the immense efforts of the American people to help Europe on to its feet again; something no one in Western Europe should ever forget.
Then there was the establishment of NATO (which this party supports as it has always done, as my noble friend Lord Longford has said) one of whose founders was the late Ernest Bevin. The doubt about the relationship is due to the matters graphically described by noble friend Lord Jenkins in his opening speech, the apprehension about the spread of nuclear weapons and the lively awareness that Western Europe is in the front line. It is due to the more aggressive posture of President Reagan in the first years of his Administration, especially compared with his predecessor, and his speeches over a period when he spoke in terms of the empire of evil, the powers of darkness and so on. The actions of the United States Government in Grenada and in Central America have also created an atmosphere of doubt. May I say in parentheses that the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, about my right honourable friend Mr. Neil Kinnock were exaggerated, in bad taste and not entirely accurate. There has of course been a welcome change over the past nine months or so and we warmly endorse the recent meetings between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko in Geneva, and of course President Reagan's positive reactions to them. But the anti-Americanism of which The Times wrote still remains a worrying aspect of our present relations.
I concede that our own position is not always an easy one. On the one hand, we are members of the European Community with interests, loyalties and a clear commitment to our partners there. On the other hand, we have the special relationship. After her meeting with President Reagan in Camp David the Prime Minister is reported as saying:
"She and the President saw matters in very much the same light".
She was of course talking about armaments and defence and the United States' new proposals for the development of the so-called star wars system. Is this absolutely correct? I would value the comments of the noble Baroness on this matter. Does she confirm that the Government are at one with President Reagan on this issue of star wars. Is there not a deep strategic division between our two countries in that, beyond all our allies in NATO, we, Britain, hold that strategic defence is not worth the effort except in so far as it can be achieved by the possession of an ultimate retaliatory weapon, that is the nuclear weapon?

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At some stage this has to be explained in full by our Government. The star wars system is of central interest. Is it for example the Government's view that to proceed with this would provoke an enormously costly and destabilising escalation of the race to develop both defensive and improved offensive weapons, thus frustrating once again the possibility of disarmament. It would be helpful if the Government made their position abundantly clear on this issue at this time. This is important in relation to the projected new arms negotiations. We are extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for the full explanation which she gave of the conduct of the talks when she wound up the last debate. But the extent to which the United States are prepared to put this great issue on the table in the forthcoming talks is of the utmost importance.
Finally, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, about the three areas of divergence to which he has just referred. But these are all negotiable between us, and I believe that they can be negotiated successfully. However, there is also a longer term aspect of our relationship. I was much impressed by a leading article in The Times on 22nd December. Discussing the development of international affairs, it stated:
"In 'second term' Washington, it is certainly possible to detect a feeling that the United States is opening up a gap between itself and the rest of the world, friends, potential friends, and potential enemies. The full implications of this gap in philosophy and achievement are only slowly dawning on American public opinion and will take some time to be absorbed elsewhere. The significance of the 'gap' should not he over-valued but its existence and its political implications should clearly not be ignored".
Later the article states:
"Not since the days of Roosevelt has there been such a sense of a nation on the move, of a new strength in the United States, coming from all classes and all age groups making their own contribution to the country's emerging predominance in the world".
Those are very significant words. The observer who wrote them obviously comments with great knowledge and intelligence, and note should be taken of what he said. There is a change, without question. President Reagan is a symptom of it—not its philosopher. There is a change here and in Western Europe as well. It is not taking place in America alone. Some people seem to believe that Europe is static and that it no longer counts. But Europe is still the greatest continent in the world and its potential for good is immense, if its resources and talents are properly organised.
There is therefore change here and in Western Europe generally and there will be a change in the Soviet Union—especially when younger leaders take over. We must anticipate the change there imaginatively. We are also extremely conscious of the fundamental changes taking place in China today, and these which will come in the sub-continent of India as well. We live in a world of immense changes and we are probably too close to them to appreciate their full implications.
My Lords, what is necessary is leadership well equipped with common sense, good judgment, and a commitment to liberty and the rule of law. These have been and must remain the basis of this special relationship.
7.12 p.m.
Baroness Young: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, for choosing to
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debate this important subject this evening. That said, the noble Lord will not be surprised to hear me say that there was no part of his speech with which I found myself in agreement. In the course of my remarks, I will of course try to answer some of the points he raised. I am bound to say to the noble Lord that his speech stood in marked contrast to that of his noble friend Lord Cledwyn, with whose remarks I agreed in very large part.
Many of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, were well answered by my noble friend Lord Beloff. However, this debate gives me an opportunity to place on record this Government's firm belief in the importance of our relationship with the Government of the United States for the future wellbeing and security of this country. I am told that a senior Foreign Office official once told his colleagues that he wanted to hear less of our relations with other countries and more of our interests. That is sound thinking, so I shall start by considering our relationship with the United States Government in the light of both English and American interests. What is in it for us, and what do we think is in it for them?
Security is the cornerstone of the relationship between the United States Government and ourselves. The United States continues to play a fundamental role in guaranteeing the security of Britain and our other NATO allies. United States servicemen stationed in Europe constitute the largest American force posted outside the United States. We acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the United States Government and the American people for their support. We are well aware that without this support we could not maintain the level of forces necessary to deter aggression.
It is important that the extent of the United States commitment to our defence is not taken for granted, particularly by the generations which have grown up with the Atlantic Alliance as an established institution. History in ancient times, as well as more recently, can point to many examples of a powerful country involving itself militarily in the affairs of another continent. However, it is without precedent that a preeminent military power should agree to undertake the defence of another continent in free association with countries of that continent. That is what the United States did at the foundation of NATO.
It is not a one-sided arrangement. The United States supports the alliance because it has learned from bitter experience that the defence of Europe and the defence of the United States is indivisible. The United States commitment to our defence is matched by Europe's own contribution to NATO. I listened with particular interest to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, in that respect. It is a common endeavour and an endeavour in which Britian plays a major role.
We spend more on defence in absolute and in per capita terms than any member of NATO apart from the United States. Out of our total defence budget the proportion devoted directly or indirectly to alliance tasks continues to amount to some 95 per cent. We are the only European power to contribute to the alliance's strategic nuclear, theatre nuclear, and conventional forces (the three legs of what is known as NATO's triad of forces) and we provide facilities

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which enable the United States to play her role in the alliance more effectively.
Whenever there are reasons to believe that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in the reduction of tension in armaments, Britain works closely with the United States and our other allies to find common ground and to secure agreement. The alliance has proved itself over nearly 40 years as a remarkably adaptable and effective peace-keeping institution.
We have just concluded a debate on disarmament, and many of the issues which have been raised in this debate were raised in the preceding debate. However, there are some points I shall try to answer which were not raised in the first debate.
The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, asked once again whether we are not being subservient to the United State and had no control over United States nuclear weapons. It is as well to re-state the position of Her Majesty's Government as stated by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in answer to a parliamentary Question on 12th May, 1983:
"The existing understandings between the United Kingdom and the United States governing the use by the United States of nuclear weapons and bases in this country have been jointly reviewed in the light of the planned deployment of cruise missiles. We are satisfied that they are effective. The arrangements will apply to United States cruise missiles based in the United Kingdom whether on or off bases. The effect of the understandings and the arrangements for implementing them is that no nuclear weapon would be fired or launched from British territory without the agreement of the British Prime Minister".—[Official Report. Commons, col. 433.]
Having mentioned that, I was very interested to hear the account of the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, of the relationship enjoyed by the late Mr. Attlee when he visited Washington and had discussions with President Truman over the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean war. And I am sure we were all very interested in the story told by the noble Earl, Lord Longford, concerning the discussions between Conservative Members—Sir Winston Churchill and Mr. Beaverbrook—about the American relationship. It does illustrate that, over a long period of time, it is very important that British Prime Ministers and British Governments should have a very close and intimate relationship with the American Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, raised the question of the Western European Union. The United States position is that they have supported publicly efforts to revitalise the WEU as an initiative aimed at enhancing European defence efforts and building public support for them, thus strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. Our own view is that we fully support the revitalisation of the WEU in order to promote increased European defence co-operation and to enhance the European contribution to the alliance.
My noble friend Lord Reay raised a number of points. I was most interested when he spoke of the importance of the cohesion of the relationship between the United States and Europe. He referred to East-West relations. I hope that 1985 will be remembered as the year of realism. There are signs that the Russians have recognised that their attempts to obtain concessions from the West by refusing to move on arms control and other issues were not succeeding. The West has made clear for some time its desire for a wide-ranging dialogue with the Soviet Union, and we hope that the process of contact, not
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just between the super-powers, will continue. We must temper this welcome with realistic expectations about progress. There are unlikely to be dramatic break-throughs, and we will need patience and persistence.
My noble friend Lord Reay also asked about chemical weapons, and I confirm to him that the United Kingdom has tabled at the Geneva negotiations a series of verification proposals. The recent ones include our proposals in 1983 for verifying the non-production of chemical weapons upon entry into force of the convention; a proposal in February 1984 for challenge inspection in cases of suspected non-compliance; and in July 1984 further proposals on non-production. We intend to table a further proposal on verification in March this year.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, raised a series of issues. The first was on American policy in Central America. I should like to say to him that the United States has repeatedly stated that it wishes to see political reform in Central America through peaceful means. We, too, support that objective. The United States support for the Contadora process was reiterated at the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly. We welcome the continuing discussions between the United States special representative, Mr. Schlaudeman, and the Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister, Tinoco, and hope that these will assist the Contadora process.
On the Middle East, I confirm to the noble Lord that we believe that the United States is indispensable to the peace process. We still believe that the Reagan plan of September 1982 is the best available starting point for negotiations. We welcome President Reagan's reaffirmation of this commitment to the plan which he gave at the United Nations General Assembly in 1984.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, referred to the whole issue of star wars. Indeed, it was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, and referred to by other noble Lords. I have no doubt that we shall have much discussion and debate on this matter over the coming months and years. Perhaps this evening I can confine myself to saying that the Government have made clear that an arms race in space would benefit no one. We are glad that post-Geneva talks will focus on preventing an arms race. Negotiation and mutual restraint will be needed to meet the urgent challenge posed by costly new space technologies.
The SDI, and parallel Soviet research, are permitted under existing agreements, but there is a clear need for the United States to match Soviet efforts. However, the implications for the future are far-reaching. As was agreed at Camp David, any deployments would have to be a matter for negotiations. The United Kingdom is concerned that neither side should misinterpret the other's intentions and that current activities should aim to strengthen peace and not increase tension; to enhance and not to undermine deterrence. President Reagan and my right honourable friend the Prime Minister agreed at Camp David that the United States and the Western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain a balance, taking account of Soviet deployment. Soviet strategic defence programmes are extensive and well established.
The concept of security goes wider, however, than purely military or defence considerations. It reflects

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the community of economic interest between America and Britain. The United States is our largest supplier and remains our largest export market, both for goods and invisibles. It is also the main overseas investor in this country and the main recipient of our own overseas investment. In 1982, the last year for which figures are available, the United States provided 35 per cent. of direct non-oil investment in the United Kingdom from overseas. In the same year the United States received nearly 60 per cent. of all United Kingdom direct non-oil investment overseas, or some £1.5 billion: the United Kingdom accounted for close to 40 per cent. of foreign investment in the United States.
Given this community of interest, and the size of the United States economy, American policies, of course, have an impact on us. For example, the exchange rate for sterling reflects concern about monetary conditions, the level of borrowing and public expenditure, and uncertainty over oil prices; but is influenced also by the strength of the dollar. To the extent that sterling has depreciated further against the dollar than against other major currencies, this is due in part to the demand for foreign capital to finance the continuing high American budget deficit. We welcome the recent lowering in United States interest rates, but renewed upward pressure in 1985 cannot be ruled out in the face of the deficit and a continued pick-up in activity.
The economic problems of Europe receive more than their fair share of coverage: the good news does not. Performance last year in Europe was the best for many years. In the United Kingdom, growth will continue this year and inflation is under 5 per cent. Exports were up in volume in 1984. The recovery here has been slower than in the United States. However, we are increasingly competitive. Europe is rising to the challenge of new technologies and structural adjustment. A new drive to liberalise further the internal Community market is under way.
The United States and Britain stand together in many important endeavours. We share a deep and abiding attachment to the fundamental values of our societies and to the democratic principles on which our systems and institutions of government are based. These points were made first by my noble friend Lord Beloff, particularly comparing them with the system of government in the Soviet Union, and were reiterated by the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield. Outlook, shared values and principles are enhanced by ties of language, history, common heritage and the rule of law.
We are both concerned and have a practical compassion for the less well-off countries in the world. For example, only recently we in this country contributed in full measure to relief of the Ethiopian famine, and the United States has announced that it will be providing l½ million tonnes of food aid for countries in need in Africa. This was reported to constitute half the continent's requirements in 1985. For many people there is also the memory of so many dangers and sacrifices faced together in the course of this century. It is this breadth of shared history and community of interest which gives the relationship between the British and American Governments its depth and particular character.
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Winston Churchill told members of the United States Congress on 17th January 1952:
"Bismarck once said that the supreme fact of the 19th century was that Britain and the United States spoke the same language. Let us make sure that the supreme fact of the 20th century is that they tread the same path".
I believe that we have successfully trodden the same path in the 30 years since then. It is indeed a special relationship. As the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, pointed out, this does not make it unique, but it undoubtedly does make it special.
Just before Christmas my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, at President Reagan's invitation, stopped in Washington on her way back from China and Hong Kong for a wide-ranging exchange of views with President Reagan, Vice-President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz and senior members of the United States Administration. Discussion focused on East-West relations and arms control talks. It also covered the Middle East, Lebanon, Central America, the United States economy, the Prime Minister's visit to China and her recent talks with Mr. Gorbachev and Dr. FitzGerald. The Prime Minister and President Reagan expressed their grave concern at the current famine in Africa, to which I have just referred.
On 9th January, at President Reagan's request, his National Security Adviser, Mr. McFarlane, reported to my right honourable friend the Prime Minister on the outcome of the United States-Soviet talks in Geneva on 7th–8th January on arms control. The Prime Minister said that the British Government warmly welcomed the agreement which had been reached to hold negotiations on nuclear and space weapons. She assured Mr. McFarlane of Britain's continued support for the United States in the negotiations, and looked forward to maintaining the closest contacts during them.
The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, in his opening speech asked whether we are not now subservient to the Americans and in a semi-colonial relationship with them. Of course we do not always see eye to eye on all issues with the United States Administration. A community of interest is not the same as an identity of interest. The United States has strategic, political and economic interests in areas where our concerns are less direct, or marginal. We are part of Europe and have European perceptions. We also play an important part in bringing European perceptions into the affairs of the alliance and the broader transatlantic relationship.
It is particularly important that we work together to resolve problems that have arisen in the area of trade. I am happy that agreement has been reached between the European Community and the United States over Community exports of steel pipes and tubes, which had been a source of friction: I hope that differences in other areas, especially agricultural trade, may be resolved by discussion and consultation. We have a common commitment to resisting protectionism, which is set out in the declaration of the Economic Summit at Williamsburg. Nothing is more important, as we make progress towards a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, than that we should continue this resistance. We are particularly concerned at United States efforts to enforce American jurisdiction beyond American shores and at the system of unitary taxation applied in certain American states

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(though no longer, I am happy to say, in Florida). There are thus differing perceptions of the global impact of United States economic management.
The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, raised the question of the World Bank and the IMF. Although he said that he did not insist on a reaction tonight, I should just like to say this to him. It is not at all the case that British policy merely follows American policy in the IMF and at the IBRD. Often there is a coincidence of American and British views on how matters should be handled in the bank and the fund. It would clearly be wrong to try to generate differences in our approach where none existed in reality in order to meet the noble Lord's point, but, where there are differences, we do not hesitate to make them clear. I need only remind him of the controversy over the replenishment of IDA 7.
The mark of a mature and stable relationship is to be able to acknowledge that there are differences of perception and, on occasion, differences of interest. It is the mark of a dynamic relationship that both sides put time and effort into finding ways of solving problems or minimising unavoidable differences. Thus, Ministers and officials from this Government and the United States Administration have devoted considerable resources to seeking to resolve our differences over certain aviation issues in a way compatible with both our interests. I am happy to say that we have made some progress and discussions continue.
I should like to end by reminding noble Lords of a statement by the Prime Minister in her speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on 19th November 1983 which encapsulates this Government's views of our relationship with the United States:
"Friends, like families, differ at times, but nothing alters these basic principles—that the United States is our ultimate defensive shield, the guarantor of Western freedom and the best hope for the world's oppressed. To that conviction we hold. We are confident that any differences that may occur will always be infinitely less important than the purposes and loyalties which bind us together".
7.33 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her reply to this debate which has been an interesting one. I am also grateful to her for leaving me two or three minutes to clear up one or two points, though it is, of course, not our custom to reply to these short debates in any full sense of that word. On the question of clarification, the noble Baroness is, I think, aware that what she told us about the Prime Minister's response on cruise is not regarded by many of us as being a satisfactory answer to the question; but I shall not pursue the matter tonight. There will be other opportunities on another occasion.
I must raise one point. I think perhaps there was a misunderstanding by the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, who seemed to take the view that a proposal that this country should consider a closer relationship with the United States constituted a statement of Soviet policy. As on another occasion the noble Lord was unable to distinguish between the letters CND and KGB, perhaps we may expect a certain myopia from that quarter. I should like to assure him that everything that I have said tonight has been said much more cogently in the United States. There are people there
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who are unhappy about the relationship between their great country and this one of ours.
Finally, I think that I must give the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, the opportunity to refer to the Cabinet minute that I mentioned. If I briefly read an extract, he will be able to pick it up from Hansard. What was said in the Cabinet minute of July 1954 was this:
"Some believed that the greatest threat to world peace came from Russians. He (Salisbury) himself believed that the greater risk was that the United States might decide to bring the East-West issue to a head while they still had overwhelming superiority in atomic weapons and were comparatively immune from atomic attack by Russia".
That was Lord Salisbury's statement at that time. Whether it was in keeping with his general views, the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, will know better than I.
I think that it has been a useful debate. I still take the view that our present relationship with the United States is a bad one, that it is too subservient, that it is getting worse and that it needs drastically to be improved. Having said that, I believe that this debate itself may conceivably contribute just a mite in that direction. I beg your Lordships' leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

Cross-Channel Fixed Link
7.36 p.m.
The Earl of Bessborough The Earl of Bessborough rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made in discussions with the French Government regarding the building of a cross-channel fixed link.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. As I told my noble friend Lord Brabazon, I should also like to ask him whether the Government have had discussions with other member states in the European Community and the European Commission on this subject; and also whether the European Commission itself has produced any proposals or communications to the Council of Ministers. I know that there has been Community involvement.
At the outset I should perhaps declare an interest—not a financial one—in as much as I am half French and for 65 years, ever since the end of the First World War, have constantly been crossing the Channel. As a child when visiting my French grandparents and other relations, I may say that I was frequently seasick in front of my parents and other distinguished personages crossing the Channel. Then in the late 1930s my first job was in the League of Nations secretariat, which involved frequent visits through France to Geneva and elsewhere on the continent. If your Lordships will allow me this little autobiographical note, in 1940, during the Second World War, I was in France, coming out via Dunkirk. Later I was a military liaison officer with the French forces of both Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. After the liberation of Paris, I was five and a half years in the embassy there.
As a Minister in the mid-1960s I was in close touch with my science and technology counterparts in the French Government. Finally, more recently as a Member of the European Parliament, I was, like the

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noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and other noble friends in your Lordships' House, crossing the Channel often twice a week, and even now still visit France regularly. I feel virtually as at home there as in Britain. They are my two countries.
I have at all events had to cross the Channel so many hundreds of times—nay, perhaps a thousand times—that I have always been concerned at having to chafe at seaports and airports before crossing to the other side. Sometimes, indeed, like the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, I have found that these British offshore islands seemed, especially at this time of the year, cut off by weather from the contintent, with which, after all, we are now so closely associated in the EC. It has always seemed to me, therefore, that if we are truly to belong to the European Community and pledged, as we are, to remove technical barriers to travel and trade, there should be a fixed link across the water.
I was therefore particularly glad to read the joint statement by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and President Mitterrand on 30th November 1984, recognising the importance of a fixed link as technically feasible and financially viable and announcing the setting up of a Franco-British working group to advise on requirements as a matter of real urgency—and I underline the word "real".
Then I have also noted the press notice which was issued on 10th January by the Department of Transport after the first meeting of this group on that day. In that press notice are given the terms of reference which were defined as follows: to advise Ministers on—
"the way in which the two Governments should be ready to facilitate the construction of one or other form of fixed link between the UK and France, it being understood that there will be no support from public funds and no Government guarantees against commercial risks either in relation to construction or exploitation".
Secondly, to advise on:
"the undertakings which would be given by the two Governments against political risk".
Thirdly, to advise Ministers on:
"the guidelines to be defined by the two Governments, for example, on safety, the environment and any constraints affecting commercial exploitation on the basis of which groups interested in promoting, financing, constructing and operating a fixed link can submit proposals to the two Governments".
Finally, to advise Ministers on:
"Information required from these groups to enable the two Governments to make a choice between proposals".
I understand also that the group have agreed on an intensive programme of work covering all areas on which promoters need guidance. I also note that the group will be meeting again next week and that their advice would be submitted by the end of next month. This speed is very encouraging.
I have of course read the report of the other UK-French study group which was presented to Parliament by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport in June 1982. I have also studied the proposals of the British Tunnel Group itself and the Inland Transport Council. I am indebted to both of these bodies for very useful briefing. From these it is clear that our French friends strongly favour a link and the Inland Transport Council state that a rail tunnel should be built now—and they put "now"
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in capital letters, underlined. In the view of the Tunnel Group, a twin bored 7-metre rail tunnel would be the type of fixed link likely to meet the necessary criteria.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, seems unfortunately to have left us at the moment, but I hope he will return. Like him and the former French Minister, M. Jules Moch, I have never been very enthusiastic about a tunnel which, as I understand it, would only be able to cater for a two-way railway link. I believe this would result in delays and bottle-necks getting road transport on to trains.
Also experience with other tunnels has not greatly reassured me. I understand that the road tunnel under Mont Banc has not been altogether satisfactory due to problems of ventilation and gradients—to say nothing of the Dartford Tunnel bottlenecks and the recent grave accident in the Todmorden rail tunnel in Yorkshire.
I have indeed always been in favour of at least some bridging element in the fixed link and was much more interested in the Detweiler Project proposed, I think, some 12 years ago, for a bridge with an island on the sandbanks in the middle of the Channel, which would have provided various services. I have also been interested in the Euro Route Project which your Lordships know would combine both bridging and tunnelling and is supported by British Steel with Sir Nigel Broackes of Trafalgar House as chairman. I was told yesterday that it is also supported by my noble friend Lord Soames, who particularly asked me to say how much he regretted that he was unable to be present this evening for he was certainly in favour of the link.
The Euro Route proposals have received considerable press coverage and appear, according to the media, to be the front runners. I am also grateful to this group for reasoned and comprehensive briefing which I hope is available to all your Lordships. However, I have also looked carefully at, and am even more attracted by, the proposals of the Eurobridge Study Group, which I must confess at present I favour. I am very happy that my noble friend Lord Layton, who is associated with this group, and who I am glad to see sitting on our Benches, is to speak on this project this evening. I shall listen to him intently, and especially his answers to the bridge problems summarised in Annexe B, page 31, of the Report of the UK/French Study Group which I have already mentioned and which was presented to Parliament in June 1982.
As I understand it, the Eurobridge Study Group scheme, which I believe might employ some 60,000 to 70,000 workers, would consist of a bridge with seven spans and six piers, the spans being built of new fibre materials which would be much lighter than steel and enable each span to be of some 5,000 metres in length. I read with great interest the summary of the Eurobridge Study Group proposals, which is, I believe, available in the Printed Paper Office and the Library. I hope that this evening my noble friend Lord Layton will elaborate on that project, because frankly I think it is most imaginative and should provide a link which will meet the needs of cross-channel traffic more effectively and in a longer term than other proposals that have been put forward.
When your Lordships note that four-fifths, that is to say 80 per cent., of all traffic in Europe now goes by road, it seems to me essential to cater for this by some kind of road bridge using these new fibre materials such as Parafil made from Kevlar. Use of these very light materials in the Atlantic and in North Sea oil exploration seems to have proved their strength and durability for suspension bridges with such very long spans.
If it is thought that these materials have been adequately tested and proven, as I am told they have been, then I think what is proposed by the Eurobridge Study Group—a seven-span, four-level motorway bridge, with two four-lane decks and two two-lane decks in sheathed spans—is the most interesting. I believe too that such a group could well afford to build a rail tunnel as well, to satisfy British and French railway requirements and accommodate the French Train de Grande Vitesse, that is to say, the "very high speed train". I recognise that the Government require the scheme to be financed by private enterprise and I should hope that the bridge scheme would prove attractive to banks, investors generally and even Governments.
Certainly one noble Lord, who is chairman of a well-known bank, the noble Lord, Lord Catto, of Morgan Grenfell (who also regrets not being present this evening), confirmed to me over the weekend that he believes it would be financially viable and that it should not be impossible to raise on the world market the necessary £4·7 billion sterling for the bridge and the tunnel. Sums larger than this have been raised for other projects. In this respect, the financial section of the Eurobridge Study Group report is of interest inasmuch as the group's proposals avoid reliance on any form of Government involvement in finance unless, as I say, Governments choose to invest. As I see it, this group's only request would be confirmation by Government that were the project to be cancelled for purely political reasons, outlays already incurred would be reimbursed. I believe that Governments might accept this.
I accept that tonight my noble friend Lord Brabazon may not be able to give very positive replies other than to say that both governments are in principle certainly very well disposed to such a link. I recognise that we must wait for the Anglo-French working party report at the end of February. Nonetheless, I would be glad to hear from my noble friend the Government's preliminary views in the hope that this very long-running Anglo-French fairy tale may now become a reality and bring our two beloved neighbour countries, not always in agreement about certain things, closer together and thus able to understand each other better. I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name.
7.51 p.m.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: My Lords, we must all be grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, for raising this Question. He has chosen a most appropriate time. When something is happening on the whole question of a Channel link, it is well worth having a look at the problem. The fact that the French and British governments are getting together again is a great encouragement to those of us who have always felt the need for a Channel link.
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I can perhaps give, as the noble Earl did, a little reminiscence about my experience of the Channel link. Ten years ago this month—the coming Sunday is, I believe, the anniversary—the late Anthony Crosland, then Secretary of State for the Environment, announced the Government's formal withdrawal from the treaty with the French government and the arrangements with the private consortia to proceed with plans to construct a tunnel giving a fixed link between Britain and the European mainland. The reasons for the decision, very reluctantly taken, were many and very complicated. Perhaps we were all too starry-eyed and euphoric. We expected too much. There was talk of a London-Paris journey time of 2 hours 43 minutes which would itself be reduced when new, very fast high-speed trains, already under experimental test in both Britain and France, were brought on stream.
However, it entailed on the British side a special link between London and Cheriton near Folkstone for which British Rail gave a first estimate of £120 million. On re-examination, following various demands made upon it. British Rail had to revise this estimate up to £373 million. I do not blame British Rail too much for this. No major rail link had been built in Britain since the turn of the century. Certainly, no rail link had been built, or contemplated, through densely populated and extremely valuable areas in the stockbroker belt. It reached the point where we felt that the only way in which people in that area could be satisfied was to build a tunnel from London to Dover and then continue from Dover across the Channel. There were other costs that were not apparent. And the Secretary of State had no alternative but to ask for time to look at the phasing of the project with a view still to saving it. All of us wanted to save it. I was involved in many of the discussions.
Another difficulty was that during that period there were two general elections in one year. It was 1974. While the other place and this House act very well, we sometimes grind rather slowly. To get the necessary permission for the project through both Houses would have taken a great deal longer, than, at a time of two elections, it was possible to give. In an adjournment debate following the decision officially to cancel the project announced by Anthony Crosland on 20th January 1975, many Members took part. Some of them now sit in this House. I know that I speak on behalf of my noble friend, Lord Mulley, with whom I was closely involved on the tunnel project, when I say that we were anxious to find a way of continuing the scheme.
It will perhaps mean something to many Members, who have been involved for a long time in the whole project, when I say that during the Christmas recess I was rereading some of the many debates, answers to Questions and statements on the subject of a fixed link across the Channel. To anyone like myself—a number of noble Lords have even more experience than I have—it requires not just a few hours during a recess but perhaps the whole of a very long recess just to scratch the surface of the literature that has built up.
As well as being Parliamentary Secretary with some responsibility for the Channel link, I also had the good fortune to serve on the Select Committee when, again, schemes old and new were submitted by powerful, and

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in some cases hopeful, groups. It will, I am sure, be the experience of many noble Lords that a point is reached, no matter how much new information is given, when the intellectual process has acute indigestion. One finds oneself reverting to an originial hunch or "gut" decision using, however unscientifically or irrationally, the new facts to support this perhaps inelegant reasoning. It always seemed to me—I am speaking here particularly about a tunnel—that a big hole in the ground, while expensive to dig, was thereafter a reasonably cheap permanence. But the most important single factor for myself coming from the northern part of these islands, was the linking of the rail systems of Britain and those of Continental Europe. This was my principal reason for wanting a Channel link.
Despite my belief that there can be no end to submissions on the subject from all sorts of sources and the certainty that, even if nothing is done for another 10 years, there will be still greater amounts of paper to read through, there is one submission in all that I have read that cannot be easily pushed aside. It is the, I consider, masterly analysis of all the options by Professor Sir Alec Cairncross in his report commissioned by Anthony Crosland and my right honourable friend, now Lord Mulley. Sir Alec's evidence to the Select Committee was most powerful. It clarified for all Members of the Committee the crucial points and arguments in the 100-odd years of debate that have taken place on this matter.
The Select Committee had the opportunity to visit the site at Cheriton and saw the progress that had been made on the service tunnel. They watched the boring machine at work. We also visited the French end of the proposed tunnel and noted that the French government had put their machine in mothballs—I do not know whether it is still there but for many years it was on the hill just outside Calais—with a view to using it on the project at a later date. The British machine was dismantled and, I believe, sold for scrap. The belief was that we had learned enough from digging the two miles of the service tunnel and that, if required, a new machine that was more efficient could be built. That seems to me reasonable.
Your Lordships will perhaps think from the tenor of my remarks that I have dismissed the idea with little thought of any link other than a tunnel. That is really not so. The noble Earl mentioned one of the designs that really fascinated me for a period. I can think of few things more exciting than to drive across the Straits of Dover, perhaps particularly at holiday time—not if you are going on an official job to the Council of Europe, or to Geneva—and to stop, as one design that was mentioned in the noble Earl's speech suggested, in a tunnel in the centre, with a restaurant there. That sounded very attractive and it was one possibility to which I gave great thought.
The major and obvious difference between a tunnel scheme and any of the surface links is as I have tried to indicate earlier. We know the type of machine required to build a tunnel. We know the type of strata in which we should be working and we know even what we should do with the chalk spoil from the borings. All the test borings on the line of the tunnel are, I believe, still available, at either Dover or Calais.
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The records have been preserved—I think they were bought by the two Governments—so that the preliminary work on a tunnel would be minimal though it would still be a major feat of organisation and logistics.
I should like to spend a few minutes on a brief look at some of the other schemes. None of the other schemes is anything like so advanced. No matter how expert the people who have put forward the various schemes—and I have met many of them—none is really so well advanced. The viaducts, the islands in the immersed tubes, plus the rail-only tunnel in the submerged tube—I think that is the Euro Route suggestion—leave a great deal to be desired. I am sure that noble Lords who have been looking at the subject will realise that the type of dredging required for the submerged tube in such a busy waterway raises problems that it is not possible to skip over and leave without a great deal of thought.
The question of ventilation is another very important point which to my mind has not been answered satisfactorily except by the two seven-metre diameter tunnels plus the four-and-a-half-metre service-tunnel-cum-ventilating-tunnel. So many new techniques are involved that I believe that, when we began to think in terms of starting dates, building schedules and trying to get contracts let, a great deal of time would have been lost. Perhaps we have got both Governments in a position where we may get something done now if we are ready to start relatively soon. If we have to wait much longer, and if we wait for answers to all the questions raised by the Euro Route, it may not be possible to get a start.
The suspension bridge is another wonderful idea and I was fascinated reading material on it in regard to the new techniques, the new materials and the new types of suspension. However, I still feel, as the Select Committee said, that it would be a major project at the limit of the state of the art. Particularly in aeronautics and defence contracts, all governments have had their fingers very badly burnt by going to the limit of the state of the art and then half a step beyond it. Again, I feel that there are a number of questions that have to be answered here. For instance, if it was an open bridge you would have the problem of high-sided vehicles that we have on the Severn Bridge. If it was not an open bridge, you get back perhaps less to a problem of ventilation than to the one of driver fatigue in driving all the way through a tunnel like that.
We are talking also of a bridge with spans two or perhaps even three times the size of those of the Humber Bridge, which at present are the longest spans we have. Even with new materials, I think you are going rather far. Therefore, with reluctance, I have come to the conclusion that if I want to see a cross-Channel link in my lifetime I have little option but to say that a tunnel could start within a very short time and the others could not do it nearly as quickly.
The only other point I wish to comment on in this regard is the suggestion for a drive-through tunnel instead of a rail tunnel. For me, a drive-through tunnel raises again much more sharply the questions of driver fatigue, fire hazard and breakdown in the tunnel, particularly if you have heavy lorries—40-tonne lorries—mixed with light cars, caravans, et cetera. Of

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course you also have the question of ventilation. When I was involved in it, I understood that if you had a drive-through tunnel, unless you had very special methods of ventilation the ventilating tunnel would need to be about twice the diameter of the running tunnels in order to get decent, clean air in the tunnels.
Having looked, I think with a fair amount of dispassionate enthusiasm, at all the schemes for the link, these are the reasons why I came down on the side of the tunnel, as of course did the Select Committee, which went into the matter with great thoroughness. There are only two other brief, though not small, points that I should like to make. I am referring to the problems which have been dealt with very fully both in Sir Alec Cairncross's submission and in the Select Committee submission of 1980. These relate to the danger of monopoly pricing in the early days, if a tunnel or a bridge were built, to ruin the ferry service and the over-dependence we could have on one mode of crossing once the ferries disappeared completely. This needs to be looked at very carefully, but perhaps now is not the time to do it. I have been speaking for too long. The evidence given by the Dover Harbour Board and the powerful case put by Sir William Harris need to be examined carefully.
The last point I should like to make—the Select Committee dealt with this at some length—is that there is the other option which we on the Select Committee called the do-nothing option; that is, just leave things as they are and allow the ports and the ships to take this ever-growing traffic that is building up on either side of the Channel. The growth has been quite phenomenal over the last 10 to 15 years.
I should like to finish on this point by quoting from the Select Committee Report. As I said, I was a member of the committee and on this particular point I agreed wholeheartedly with it. We said at paragraph 47:
"we have no reason to question the view that existing modes could, if necessary, be expanded to a capacity sufficient to cope with all forecast increases in the demand for cross-Channel traffic. There seems to us, however, to be no reason to reject the possibility of a fixed link on these grounds alone, particularly if in so doing we, or the Government, were to prevent the introduction of alternative services which would be profitable in themselves and would offer more convenient and comfortable services to passengers and freight hauliers".
This is the view I take: that the cross-Channel link would be a boon to people on this side of the Channel and on the other side of the Channel and that the most likely way to get something done would be to go for a tunnel.
8.9 p.m.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, I intervene just for a moment in this discussion. I feel I shall not be able to remain until the end of the debate, for personal reasons; I apologise. The noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, said that I was, in association with that great Frenchman and great European, the late M. Jules Moch, one of the promoters, as far back as 1962, of a scheme for a bridge-tunnel-bridge on the broad lines of that already existing in Chesapeake Bay. It was then the intention to construct cantilever bridges with comparatively short spans leading gradually down to two artificial islands in the Channel between which immersed tubes would carry both the
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road and the rail traffic involved. That was the general idea.
I still believe that this would, in theory, be a very good solution and a practicable one. But it failed to obtain approval nearly a quarter of a century ago—and I expect that a similar effort may well fail to obtain approval now—owing to the violent opposition of the shipping interests who maintained that the six or seven mile wide unimpeded channel between the two islands would not be sufficient for all the shipping traffic, and that in any case ships proceeding on either side of the channel would risk collision with the inevitably rather numerous piers. It may also be remembered by some that eventually General de Gaulle himself informed the unfortunate M. Moch that after profound study he himself was, as he said, "plutôt tunneliste"! That finished it.
So there may well only remain the alternative of first, a double rail tunnel which could handle most of the goods and passenger traffic and also provide for a shuttle service for cars and lorries; and, secondly, a bridge capable of handling all road traffic with, in addition, a broad single tunnel for railway passengers' use running below it or beside it. The first solution—that is, the tunnel—seems, if I read its report rightly, to be that favoured in principle by the United Kingdom-French study group in 1981, which however did not rule out the possibility of a bridge for all road traffic, provided that some pretty stringent provisions were met. But as the group also indicated, there is much to be said for a tunnel solution, provided always that it can be shown to be profitable—that is an important consideration—even though its disadvantage clearly would be that it would not permit the free flow of all traffic which other solutions provide. So we come down to the bridge plus an accompanying tunnel which is probably more likely to be financially viable in the sense of being sufficiently profitable to attract the necessary private capital, even granted the huge estimated total cost of nearly £5,000 million.
I am told that great progress has been made recently—and certainly since 1962—in protecting the piers against possible collision, even with giant supertankers; in contemplating spans of something like five kilometres, which of course—as I think someone has already said—is more than double the present record for suspension bridges; in strengthening all the materials to be used; and in protection against even the most powerful winds. I understand that research has more or less demonstrated that all these difficulties can be successfully overcome, and provided this really is so then it only remains to accept the forecast that the whole project will pay for itself in five to seven years for a decision to be taken to go ahead and thus to achieve the undoubtedly enormous political and eventually economic benefits resulting from a physical link between these islands and the rest of Western Europe. I consequently very much hope that the project will eventually be given the go-ahead in the comparatively near future.
Only two lingering doubts remain in my mind. In the first place, can suspension bridges with spans of five kilometres—although they dispose of the objections of the shipping interests—really be thought to be absolutely stable and proof against the possible collapse of any one of them? If so, all is well but we

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must take it that all the engineers and construction companies involved have absolutely no doubt that such expectation is justified.
And then there is, after all, in this wicked world still the danger of sabotage. For if once constructed the bridge was partially destroyed, repairs would presumably take a very long time and all during such a period the United Kingdom—save or course, in the air—would be virtually cut off from the mainland, seeing that other facilities for tranferring goods and passengers across the Channel could have, in the nature of things, by that time, almost totally disappeared. I do not say that this is an insuperabale objection; but much thought will have to be devoted to the problem of how to meet it before approval is given for the construction to begin.
In sum, and speaking as a completely non-expert, I can only express my hope that the remaining difficulties in the way of the establishment, at any rate, of some fixed link will shortly be overcome. If one takes the view that our future depends on the successful development of a new form of Western European Union, capable of being a real "partner" for America in a well-functioning Atlantic alliance, there is no doubt that a fixed link of some kind would greatly contribute towards this admirable and very desirable end.
8.16 p.m.
The Earl of Limerick: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Bessborough has initiated a very timely discussion which might usefully have the effect of eliciting whether the political will is really emerging on both sides of the Channel to enable real work to start on a Channel crossing.
I have long been interested in the topic both in a general way and specifically—an interest which I declare—on behalf of a bank which has worked with contractors to make proposals for the twin-bore rail tunnel scheme. The tunnelling groups, as they are known, have now merged their interests. Like my noble friend Lord Bessborough I firmly believe that a fixed Channel link is both politically and economically desirable. Studies have shown that at least one of the proposals can also be economically viable. The question is: will political conditions be defined such as to make it possible?
I should like in this brief intervention to focus attention on some of the practical issues which will I believe determine whether this great concept can actually get off—or in a certain case perhaps get into—the ground. What is needed to enable contractual commitments finally to be given? The first requirement is that the role of the two sponsoring governments shall be defined as to the risks which they assume. This will require a protocol to be defined in fairly precise terms.
Specifically, we should look to the Anglo-French working group to do two things even if it does not come down firmly in favour of one proposal or another. The first requirement is to propose a negotiating mandate sufficiently firm to enable the rival consortia to commit real resources to researching and presenting firm proposals.
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The second requirement from the working group is that it shall define for acceptance by the two governments the minimum political conditions for the commitment of private equity investment funds to the project, this being a condition of both the sponsor governments. I stress the word "equity" because unless and until such assurances are given in adequately defined terms, it follows that any funds put up—whether described as loans or by any other label—will lack the necessary backing to rank otherwise than as equity.
The second practical point is that a joint Anglo-French owning company will have to be set up. That will require its own regime which will be complex and will need to be precise. Consequently, it will need quite a time to establish. The third issue is the role of the EEC, and that likewise will require definition and will need the commitment of funds to back it. The EEC could be the ultimate guarantor for the debt, or perhaps a co-guarantor with the two sponsoring governments.
I should now like to mention one or two fundamental structural problems. The main structural difficulty with this particular project is that in the real sense it has no customer. If the two sponsoring governments were prepared to play a more active role, then they or their appointed agents could be the customer. However, they have consistently insisted upon it being a private sector project. and this means that the customer would have to be synthesised out of a group of interested parties—that is, initially the banks and the construction companies—with other investors being brought in subsequently. This is far from satisfactory, because all these parties have vested interests in the business opportunities arising from the project rather than in the commercial viability of the project itself.
Such an arrangement, therefore, is liable to give rise to severe conflicts of interest, and I believe that in consequence it is this fundamental difficulty which has given rise to the position that we have seen unfolding over the years. There has been a tendency for everyone concerned to pass the buck to someone else. The British have tended to criticise the French for their hesitancy; the French have tended to criticise the British for having aborted the last scheme; the British Government criticise the private sector for being unwilling to take a commercial risk; while the project promoters criticise the Government for failing to see that the Channel link is a classic mixed economy project. The Department of Transport reacts by passing the buck to a series of advisers, calling for reports and more study groups. So much for the structural difficulties.
I should like to dwell for a moment on one or two subjective or personal points. Considering the relative attractions or merits of a bridge or a tunnel, or something which is a hybrid, I can think of few things more delightful than to be driving across the Channel on a tine day with views of the two shores and a general feeling that it is nice to arrive at one's destination in such an agreeable manner. But we know—we have recently been reminded of it daily—that our climate is not always like that. Try to imagine how it would be driving across a bridge in thick fog or in a high wind. I would not find that a very nice experience. On the

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other hand, if we were to suffer the constant closing of a bridge or part-bridge link because the conditions were deemed too adverse, naturally we would also find that a very frustrating experience.
My noble friend Lord Bessborough referred to the Mont Blanc tunnel and the fact that that was not free of problems. Imagine a tunnel one, two or three times as long, and what would happen if there were a breakdown, if a car simply ran out of petrol at the wrong time, or if there were a spillage of a load from a large truck in the middle of the tunnel. Again, that is not a nice thought. and it must make one pause in considering the practicability of a drive-through tunnel. Such considerations, of course, are different for a rail tunnel.
Then there are politically sensitive questions. The effect on long-term employment in ports and ferries has to be set against the undoubted short-term employment benefits during the construction period, whatever scheme is used. There is the sensitive point of the nature of control of the approaches to the crossing (the bridge, the tunnel or the 50/50 arrangement) and the operation of those facilities—a contemplation of conditions in which they might be obstructed.
To conclude, I think that the time for decision on this project, so long delayed, is now fast approaching. A Channel fixed link is within the scope of current engineering technology. Given the political will and impetus, a rail tunnel at least—and I confess my not totally uninformed prejudice on the economics of that proposal—is a viable proposition. It is politically desirable; it is economically desirable. Perhaps we may hope that the response from my noble friend Lord Brabazon of Tara on the Front Bench this evening will bring it a distinct step closer.
8.25 p.m.
Viscount Sidmouth: My Lords, it is timely that we should be debating this Unstarred Question put down by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, a colleague on Sub-Committee F of the Select Committee of your Lordships' House on the European Communities. The chairman of that sub-committee, the noble Viscount, Lord Torrington, has, with regret, been prevented from putting his name down to speak. That is all the more regrettable since his great-great-uncle, the then Lord Torrington, actually went out to sea, in the tunnel then being built under the Channel, with the chairman of the South Eastern Railway on 7th September 1884. I cannot, of course, speak for him, but I believe he is sorry that it has not yet reached the other side. Even at that time the idea had been around for 50 years; but in all that period the factors involved—political, financial and technical—have never been so favourable at one and the same time. So there is a feeling that it is now or never, both here and among our partners on the other side of the Channel.
It is my purpose to touch on two aspects out of several which lead me to believe that the answer should be to proceed as soon as possible. The first concerns rail transport, which, for technical reasons, has an indispensable role to play in any scheme involving a tunnel. This is because electric traction generates no fumes, and the trains themselves provide the air changes which are required for ventilation. But
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in addition to that there are sound reasons for affirming that rail is the transport mode best suited to take advantage of a fixed link. This is a route which will carry a considerable proportion of our export-import traffic with the other countries in the European Community, which already amounts to 50 per cent. of our total, increasing by 4 per cent. per annum. Such traffic is mostly long haul and over distances for which rail is the most economical mode of transport. This is because it tends to have higher terminal costs than road but is much cheaper for the actual movement.
Most of us tend to think of transport in terms of passengers, mainly because we encounter it most often in that capacity. There will certainly be important gains from a fixed link in terms of passenger services and transit times, but I believe that the improvement in the movement of freight will be equally impressive. To a degree this arises from a natural difference in the two types of traffic. Passengers have legs, and, with suitable signposting, they can transfer themselves between plane and plane or from one mode of transport to another. Moreover, they carry their essential documentation with them. A similar operation with freight involves complex transfer facilities which always add to the cost and lead to delays. The present situation on the Channel, for all the best efforts of the sea ferries, is an acute example of this. Apart from the costly alternative of air transport, the demand is met largely at present by roll-on roll-off road vehicles with a transfer at each end to and from sea transport.
Largely for this reason the present British Rail share of our export-import traffic is 2 per cent. In 1976—the latest date for which I have been able to obtain figures—this compared with 65·2 per cent. and 62·8 per cent. respectively for the Dutch and Italian railways, while the German railways' share was 22·3 per cent. and the French was 20·9 per cent. I submit that these comparisons confirm that a fixed link would provide British Rail with the opportunity to win new train and wagon-load traffic strictly on competitive lines without taking into account the environmental and other factors which make that a desirable result in itself.
I am aware that two of the three schemes for a fixed link currently being canvassed provide for a direct link by road as well. That would undoubtedly be an advantage worth having, bearing in mind the door-to-door facility so efficiently provided by road transport. But both schemes would be enormously costly, and I believe—and we have heard this confirmed tonight—that they face technical problems to which the answers have yet to be researched.
By comparison, the problems posed by the scheme for a twin seven-metre tunnel were mostly researched in the 1960s, before the 1973–74 scheme was agreed, and have recently been re-assessed and found satisfactory by the Anglo-French study group. I merely make the point that the scheme put forward by the Channel Tunnel group for rail tunnels does not rule it out from being practical and desirable, while also providing, in competition with the sea ferries, a fast and reliable crossing for road vehicles.
My second point is that the Channel fixed link is an important factor in the whole context of the European

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Community. No doubt there are those to whom that is a point against the scheme, but, after all, we are members of the Community and it is the declared aim of our Government to improve our relations with it. For their part, both the Commission and the European Parliament have indicated their interest in and support for the scheme, recognising it as a missing link in the pattern of European transport.
It is not generally realised that the Treaty of Rome identified transport as a suitable subject for a common policy in the same way as agriculture, and Article 74 and following articles spell out the need for such a policy to be developed. For historical reasons the continental railway systems of the European Community have a good record of collaboration in matters such as timetabling, compatibility of rolling stock, through booking and loading gauges. In recent years similar progress has been made with road vehicles. For obvious reasons British Rail has so far been rather isolated, but already a useful pool of rolling stock exists which is suitable for through train working and there should be no difficulty in building this up while the fixed link itself is being constructed.
It is difficult to quantify the effect on men's minds of a physical separation such as that presented by the Channel, but the common connotations of the word "insular" will illustrate that it is great. It is no light matter, therefore, that with a fixed link it will be possible to go down to Waterloo and buy a day return ticket to Paris. After all these years, that is still only an idea, but I believe it is an idea whose time has at last come.
8.35 p.m.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, like others who have spoken. I very much welcome the fact that the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, has put this Question down this evening. The noble Earl has made a notable contribution to the European cause and, that being so, it is particularly appropriate that he has initiated this debate tonight.
This issue of some form of Channel link has been debated in this country and in France for well over a century and a half. That is a fair amount of time, even by our own not particularly exacting standards. At last there appears to be a serious prospect that some form of link will be constructed. I do not propose to get involved in the discussion about which of the alternative projects is best. Speaking entirely for myself, and, I suspect, for others, what most of us are keenest about is that from some form of link, should be agreed between the British and French Governments and proceeded with as speedily as possible.
Having said that, on the basis of the evidence I have seen, I lean, rather like the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, and the noble Earl. Lord Limerick, marginally in favour of the Channel tunnel, but it is, as I have said, only a marginal preference. I should make that clear at the outset.
There are three powerful arguments which justify urgent action by the Government. First, like the noble Viscount. Lord Sidmouth, I cannot believe that it is sensible for this country, which sends over 50 per cent. of its exports to other countries in the European
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Economic Community, to rely any longer exclusively on sea and air links with the Continent. I dislike intensely the degree of monopoly power exercised by the owners of the sea ferry routes. The Channel tunnel, or one of the other alternatives to it, would introduce a welcome element of competition. For that reason alone, I believe it deserves our support.
Secondly, the Channel tunnel—I take that again simply as an example—would undoubtedly be a great deal more efficient. It would take a mere 25 minutes to get commercial vehicles and private motorists across the Channel, compared with the endless delays which are sometimes experienced, particularly at the height of the summer holiday season.
Thirdly, and by no means least importantly, a Channel link would generate a great deal of employment not only in Kent but in many of the key sectors of British industry elsewhere which have been so grievously affected by the economic recession. I do not think we can any longer afford to stand idly by and watch our manufacturing base in this country continue to wither away. This massive project would by itself make a major contribution to the improvement of employment prospects in this country.
However, I should enter one qualification. It is the only point which I propose to put to the noble Lord who is winding up for the Government this evening. The Government have said—I do not propose to open a debate about whether what they have said is sensible—that this scheme has to be financed exclusively by private capital. We accept that as a decision. but one or two questions arise in relation to any form of Government guarantee which I suspect will be demanded by those responsible for whichever project is finally selected by the British and French Governments. For instance, those who are trying to raise private capital of the order of £5 billion will want some form of guarantee as to what will happen if either the British or the French Government have a change of heart at some time subsequent to the moment at which they have to devote substantial resources to this project. In such circumstances, what form of guarantee will the Government be prepared to give?
Secondly, this group will ask for some degree of comfort from the Government that there will not be unreasonable interventionist policy on the pricing. Again, these are matters of central importance to this project. If we want to proceed—I am quite sure that the Government do now want to proceed—some clear guarantee will have to be given to those who have the responsibility for raising these substantial sums of money.
Lastly, I think there is an even more powerful argument than any I have so far adduced in favour of proceeding with this project. It now appears that at last the issue of whether Britain should remain a member of the European Economic Community has been settled. At the next election there will be no political party claiming that, if elected, it will take Britain out. For that at least we should be thankful. I believe our country has paid a high price for the debilitating quarrel over the last 20 years about whether or not we should remain a member of the European Community. Politicians of different political

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persuasions have, with wearisome regularity, played, or attempted to play, the nationalistic card at general elections. Sometimes there have been suggestions that there should be yet more negotiations or re-negotiatons or re-re-negotiations about our terms of entry. At other times, there has been competitive mud-slinging directed at our Community partners, combined with shrill claims that one group of politicians rather than another can be relied upon rigorously to defend British national interests. This, I believe, has been deeply damaging to the position of Britain within the Community. It has also, I believe, made its contribution to weakening the capacity of the Community to respond sensibly to the serious economic problems caused by the recent economic recession.
The immense value of this project is not only that it can be of considerable economic benefit to this country but that it can also be seen as of the greatest value to France and our other partners in the Community. If it is vigorously supported by the Government, it could, I believe, symbolise in the most direct fashion our country's desire to make a fresh beginning in its relations with the rest of the Community. I hope that the Government will recognise this opportunity and give it their uninhibited support.
8.42 p.m.
Lord Molson: My Lords, I am sorry to strike a somewhat discordant note in a debate which has expressed general sympathy (with which I, certainly emotionally, sympathise) about a fixed link with the Continent of Europe. During the more than a century long debate about the Channel tunnel or bridge, the discussion has been concerned almost exclusively with strategic, geological, commercial and financial arguments for and against it. I want to put an argument against the fixed link which would not have been substantial a century ago, and indeed it would not have been raised. I believe the point to be so serious now as to be almost conclusive against the whole project. The reality is the threat of terrorism.
I need spend no time drawing attention to the widening practice of violence and terrorist activities and the increased destructive power of modern bombs. Knowledge of how to make or how to obtain nuclear bombs has not yet reached the terrorist world, but I fear that it will do so in time. While terrorism a century ago was confined to extreme nationalist movements such as the Fenians in Britain and the Macedonians in Turkey, there is now hardly a country in the world which has not been the scene of acts of terrorism. In many cases, those responsible—or sometimes others who were not responsible—have telephoned to the media claiming proudly to have been guilty of these crimes. In other cases, the motive is quite unknown, as in the recent case of a bomb which exploded in an Italian railway train travelling through a tunnel north of Florence. That is an example of what could be done in a Channel tunnel or on a bridge of any size or design.
There is now also an increasing willingness to make victims of innocent people in no way responsible for any alleged political grievance. Most, if not all, of the 19th century terrorists killed rulers or statesmen or
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other persons whom they alleged to be responsible for some kind of oppression or to be their political opponents. Now the terrorists strike quite indiscriminately—against the passengers in a train, as have referred to, in Italy; going to ski in the Alps; or the crowd waiting in Bologna Station to take a train. A Channel tunnel or bridge would be an obvious target for such people.
My Lords, nor is that all. We are now familiar with hoaxes. Exactly what is their purpose, nobody knows; but they occur. Perhaps some irresponsible people think it funny to telephone a threat to dislocate traffic and cause widespread alarm. They telephone that a bomb has been concealed in some vehicle, with a time fuse which will detonate it. No such warning could be disregarded. Consider the complete dislocation and delay while traffic through the Channel tunnel was held up by any hoax telephone call of that kind by a malicious or irresponsible individual. The profitability of any Channel tunnel must depend upon its giving a reliable service not liable to sudden interruptions. That cannot be guaranteed in these days of irresponsible terrorism.
There is no certain method of combating terrorism. The best way of reducing its efficacy is by dispersal in all its forms. In transport, dispersal can best be achieved by numerous alternative routes—aeroplanes, ships and trains. The certain way to facilitate terrorism and increase its effect would be to concentrate traffic on a single route and, above all, in a tunnel. Terrorism, unfortunately, is not a passing phenomenon nor a transient fashion. It is, I fear, endemic, widening its range and its scope. We shall provide it with a simple target if we build a fixed Channel crossing, and, my Lords, we shall do so at our peril.
8.48 p.m.
Lord Ardwick: My Lords, I must thank the noble Earl for initiating this debate. He and I shared many voyages across the Channel together when we were members of the European Parliament and he knows well that I share his hope that a fixed link in the near future will be accomplished. I must also express my pleasure that my noble friend has expressed himself warmly in favour of a tunnel or some fixed link. Too rarely from this side of the House do we hear anything warm about any European project.
The noble Lord, Lord Molson has made a most important point. I am sure that all of us taking part in this debate have thought of the risk of a terrorist blowing up a Channel tunnel or a Channel bridge either for some political motive or just for the hell of it. The Channel tunnel is a subject that we have all been debating, I should think, since we were in the fourth form; and the people who were against the tunnel in those days used to argue that one night we might find somebody like Napoleon Bonaparte popping up at the Dover end of the tunnel with the Grande Armée behind him. The one schoolboy answer to that was that some English Horatius would guard the exit just as the Romans held the bridge over the Tiber. But that risk of an invasion via the Channel tunnel could be taken fairly lightly because it was never a real risk. But the terrorist threat of today, as the noble Lord, Lord Molson, has said, is a real one. However, I cannot think that it has been entirely

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overlooked by those people who are willing to put so much skill and so many millions of pounds into the building of a bridge or tunnel. Surely they must have considered the risk and decided that there could be effective safeguards against it.
I have been a supporter of a channel link all my life. I have always wanted Britain to be joined or rejoined to the Continent. This, I felt, would be a liberation from our insular fastness. It would not be simply a question of linking Dover with Calais but of Britain with the entire continent. I remember, the first time I crossed the Channel, thinking that there was no barrier to me on the road that led through Omsk and Tomsk to Vladivostok. That was of course a sentimental reason, and it was—and is—a very strong one. The other day I went to the Anglo-Saxon exhibition in the British Museum and learned of the frequent crossings of the Channel in the 10th century which enabled the Anglo-Saxon architects, craftsmen and artists to learn from and to influence their Christian brothers across the Channel.
We have always been a part of Europe, but a handicapped part—handicapped by high winds and low lying fogs. I want to make it as easy and as cheap to go to Brussels and Paris and beyond as it is to go to Manchester and Edinburgh: and so I support any scheme that will bring that about. But of course it is not only a matter of sentiment: it is also a matter of commerce. Our trade with Europe is great and is growing, and neither air freight nor the seaborne container—remarkably efficient though they are—are anything like so efficient as a direct link, whether it be a tunnel under the sea or a bridge over the sea.
To come back to sentiment, I recall that ten or a dozen years ago a party from this House went, as did my noble friend, to explore the mile or so of tunnel built on this side of the Channel, and then we flew over to France to see their end of the tunnel. Then we sat down over luncheon with the English and French engineers and we toasted the day when they would meet and shake hands in the tunnel, as they broke the last barrier between England and France.
But it was not to be. For Mr. Crosland—and I was very grateful for the explanation that we have had tonight from my noble friend—it was not simply "a touch of the Lawsons", a premature "touch of the Nigels" as it were: there were other reasons. I remember that at the time there was a lot of opposition among Members in the north of England against all that money being spent in the south. There was objection from all the MPs in the ports in the south of England and on the east coast. Then there were the environmentalists in the south of England, who feared that the south would be made ugly and industrial.
But today the project is alive again and I fervently hope that one of the three schemes will win approval. Perhaps the Eurobridge project, with its accompanying tunnel, will be built, and built in my lifetime, and I shall be able to drive or be driven over the suspension bridge through the oblate, ellipsoid tube and past the six towers that will soar, each of them over 250 feet high—they will be half as high as Blackpool Tower—and be able to travel to the Continent.
8.54 p.m.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: My Lords. I cannot quite agree with the noble Lord who has just sat down. Of course he is entitled to his own opinion, but he said that he would have liked Britain to have been joined to Europe for hundreds and hundreds of years: that is what he said in so many words. But I am quite sure that our insularity, though now out of date, gave us in those centuries our character and our determination to form the greatest empire in the world.
Those days are over now and as regards trade we had no need then to have a fixed link. In any case, that would have been quite impossible because we did not have the know-how. Today it is quite different. We have the know-how; we are an offshore island and we do not want to be an offshore island any longer. That is the reason for my great interest in the fixed link.
I must declare an interest here—I think I am the only speaker so far who has declared an interest. Over the past four or five years I have been associated with the Eurobridge Group studies, and we have in that period done an immense amount of research on a bridge, from every angle. I do not wish to decry a tunnel. All I would say is that a tunnel would be quite incapable of handling the load of traffic that we now have in Europe and the EEC. We have heard from my noble friend Lord Bessborough, that 80 per cent. of all traffic on the Continent goes by road. If we had a twin tunnel, I understand that such a tunnel would not be able to handle more than one-fifth of that traffic.
There is also another point concerning a tunnel, which is that you have to load and offload, and therefore you would not get such a fast and free flow of traffic as with a bridge. I am not decrying a tunnel, but I am saying that the two should be complementary. I personally think that the bridge is by far the most important because, knowing the history of the railways over the past few years, they never make a profit and therefore I doubt whether the tunnel under the Channel would make a profit for British Rail. I imagine that the structuring of the tolls on the bridge would have to cover any loss made by the rail tunnel, but in this Channel fixed link there will obviously have to be a vast consortium, and the tunnel and the bridge presumably would come under more or less the same control.
I have taken down quite a few notes from what noble Lords have said, although I do not want to detain the House for long. From the point of view of trade, I am also interested in the question of tourists. We now have a vast number of tourists coming to this country but the bridge would bring an even greater number. The majority of tourists come either by bus or in their own cars. Obviously cars or buses cannot drive through a tunnel, but they can drive through a tube which is above the sea because ventilation is extremely easy in a tube above the sea. One could not have people driving vehicles through a tunnel under the sea because they would all be poisoned, for such a tunnel would be impossible to ventilate. This would not be the case with a train because the train's coaches could presumably have their own ventilation and their own oxygen supply.

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My noble friend Lord Bessborough gave a short resumé of the type of bridge envisaged. I do not want to repeat what he said. I have sitting beside me an extremely distinguished civil engineer, my noble friend Lord Layton, who will presumably go deeply into that aspect. I do not intend to venture into places where angels fear to tread—I have done that perhaps once or twice in my life but I do not embark on that any more.
My noble friend Lord Molson brought up the question of terrorism. This can apply to anything. One cannot hold up all progress because of terrorism. One has to go ahead. There are obviously risks; but around the towers one could use this wonderful new material called Parafil, which is made by ICI-Dupont. One could have extremely strong nets made of that material, which would presumably stop any underwater sabotage. One would have to have some surface protection for the bridge which presumably would be provided by the Navies of both France and Britain.
I am a firm supporter of the bridge. We have never asked the Government for any money; we do not want Government money. Before the bridge can be started we shall have to have another two years of various deliberations by experts, but we have already done a great amount of that. Some people are very scared about the question of navigation. We have gone into that thoroughly, and of course the towers will act as extremely up-to-date lighthouses. They will have every modern form of electronic warning devices for ships. I think that the bridge will help navigation in the Channel. I know a little about navigation because at one time I took a course in that as a yachtsman.
I am quite sure that the bridge will not mar the seascape and landscape but will, with the modem technology we now have, be a thing of beauty. One should not compare the Forth Bridge—which was built in 1880 and was a marvellous achievement of that age but completely mars the landscape—with a Channel bridge, which I am perfectly sure will one day come to be built, because that would be like comparing a dinosaur with something elegant like a gazelle.
I support the Eurobridge to a great extent, but I do not decry the tunnel as something complementary to it. Here the question of employment is extremely important. I think that this point has already been mentioned; however, I should like to say that the attraction of employment by private capital is that it does not increase inflation, but employment by public expenditure does so. The employment figure would be about 80,000. The people—some of whom would be bound to be French—would be employed for a considerable number of years. One would also have all the ancillaries. I do not know how much employment that will amount to, but it will certainly amount to a lot. That must be borne in mind.
I do not know what my noble friend on the Front Bench will say, but I hope that it will be encouraging. My noble friend Lord Bessborough spoke on how far the Government have progressed with the French side. I have said enough, but I should like to see this bridge come into existence. I do not expect that I shall see it. I suppose that the preliminary work will take two years and that it will take another five or six years to build
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the bridge. I should like to see this bridge with the flags of all the EEC nations fluttering on it. It will be a great achievement, rather like the Suez Canal. I am absolutely sure that this project is something that will come to pass.
9.8 p.m.
Lord Ezra: My Lords, virtually all noble Lords who have spoken in this important debate, so effectively initiated by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, have judged that the time is right for a fixed link to be constructed across the Channel. There is no doubt that the need is there. There is no doubt that the technical capability is there. There is no doubt that the resources to construct such a fixed link could be made available, both in human and material terms.
What has so far inhibited progress has been the uncertain attitude of government. It now appears that both the British and French governments have concluded in principle that such a link would be desirable. I personally had the opportunity recently, at a meeting of the Franco-British Council in Avignon, of hearing both Prime Ministers speak to that effect. What is now necessary is to know the basis on which the two governments consider that work should proceed. It is satisfactory to know that the joint working party has got down to its task, and we have been assured that they will be reporting by the end of February.
However, I should like to draw attention to and underline some of the points raised by the noble Earl, Lord Limerick, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris. I feel that, if the Government are adamant, as the press notice of 10th January makes clear, that they will not support this project from public funds or provide any guarantee of a commercial nature for the construction of this link, then the other terms of their undertakings should be very clearly stated.
These conditions must surely be such as to enable projects validly to be put forward and the political assurances would have to be extremely precise in view of past experience. There is also a form of words in the press notice which does disturb me slightly. It is that, apparently, the guidelines are to include any constraints affecting commercial exploitation. I am not quite sure what those words mean and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, can enlighten us. But, if the Government are on the one hand not to provide any financial commitment, and on the other hand are to impose certain constraints on commercial operation, it is difficult to see how this project can get off the ground. So it is very important that these points are fully clarified in the document that will finally be published.
As to the sort of scheme that should be undertaken, there has been much discussion and noble Lords have expressed their various preferences. My own opinion is that three very imaginative schemes have been put forward and a great deal of valuable work has already been done. We are now presented effectively with a project for the twin rail tunnel, the Euro-bridge, and the Euro-route. So far as I am concerned, like other noble Lords who have participated in this debate, I have spent some time briefing myself. I have met with representatives of the tunnel group and have received

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briefs from those who have put forward ideas on the Euro-bridge and the Euro-route.
I personally veer towards the tunnel concept because a great deal of work has already been done on that. I believe it is a project which can probably be completed sooner than the others, with less capital expenditure. If a road link were later to be required, that could be constructed subsequently. It is indeed noticeable that in the case of both the Euro-bridge and the Euro-route schemes, they envisage the accompaniment of a rail tunnel. That seems to be the common element among these three schemes.
The noble Lord, Lord Molson, with his customary eloquence, has drawn our attention to the risk of terrorism. Indeed, that is a very serious point. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Ardwick, commented, surely those who have prepared these projects have taken that aspect fully into account. I do not believe that the ever-present and possibly growing risk of terrorism in the world should put us off going ahead with important and major projects of this sort. We must defeat terrorism and one way is to say that we are going ahead with technological development in spite of all the risks that the terrorists would like to put in our way.
Therefore, I conclude by saying that I think this has been a memorable and timely debate. I very much hope that the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, in replying, will make it clear to us that there is no longer any ambivalance on the part of the Government as to the principle of a link and that, in drawing up the criteria, the two governments will ensure that they are of such a nature that valid proposals can be put forward.
9.15 p.m.
Earl Attlee: My Lords, I feel rather guilty, having heard what my noble friend Lord Ezra said about noble Lords doing their homework; and certainly hearing that the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, had studied the papers, and so on. I have to admit that the only briefing I have had is one I received from British Rail which was sent to me because I am an ex-employee. My experience over a period of years is on Monday mornings, after the general manager's conference at Waterloo, spending hours discussing the Channel tunnel and the rail links between Waterloo and the entrance to the tunnel. For a long time it was very real to me and I was sure it was going ahead. I would even say that it was. It was, therefore, a shock when I found out that I did not know what I was talking about—that is not unusual!
I should like to take up one or two aspects. The noble Lord, Lord Molson, referred to terrorism and noble Lords have rightly said that we cannot give in to terrorism. My own view is that if terrorists want to blow up things they can blow up any number of tunnels in this country. They could blow up the Mont Blanc tunnel. It has not stopped us in the past. We cannot give in to terrorism, ever.
What worries me far more, and is not connected with terrorism, is that when we have the bridge or the tunnel there will no longer be any cross-Channel ferries. During the recent exercise "Lionheart"—which I should have attended but could not as I was
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ill—we relied on the cross-Channel ferries to transport troops, armour and supplies. If we do not have these cross-Channel ferries because they will no longer be required, how in times of emergency are we to get these items across? I suppose we could take over the bridge or the tunnel but commercially that does not sound a very good idea. That would worry me, unless we put the ferries in mothballs in case they are needed.
I am against the bridge-only concept. One noble Lord said that to build such a bridge we would be at the very extremities of our technical knowledge. I think that there are too many problems. We know that we can build a tunnel. To me the obvious answer is to have a train going right through from one end to the other carrying freight, and alongside it another which British Rail call a road-vehicle shuttle. The vehicles would be put on the shuttle and taken to a large island in the middle of the Channel. The island would have a hotel and restaurant where people could also walk around and obtain fresh air. There could also be a duty free bonanza. The place would be so huge that even if it was hit by a super-tanker it would not matter. One can imagine that driving 23 miles in a straight line in a tunnel or on a bridge one would soon get dizzy with all the posts going by and many accidents could occur. There must be a break, and if so, have one or even two islands. Those who want a bridge could have two islands. The island on the French side could have a hotel serving pommes frites and on the English island could be a hotel serving fish and chips. Everyone would then be happy.
I forget whether I said this, but if one thinks about it, there has been talk about a Channel tunnel or something like it since the end of the Napoleonic wars. That is so long ago that even the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, probably was not born then. I really think that we should get on and do something.
9.20 p.m.
Lord Layton: My Lords, like my colleague, I, too, must declare an interest, as I have been closely concerned with the Eurobridge Study Group. It is a very active group and has included a wide range of consultants in every aspect of a Channel link. It has dealt closely with and examined thoroughly all the problems of traffic both across and up and down the Channel. I believe that it has worked very much more than most other projects so far on the problems of engineering, navigation, ecology, surveying, insurance and many other technnical factors. It has also dealt with those companies which have produced and are producing these new and, some people feel, very advanced materials and which have experience in their construction.
I think that I should also declare that, as chairman at one time of a well-known international bridge and tunnel building company, I speak with a certain amount of expertise. I must say that I am very grateful indeed to the Government for advancing, as they are today, and pushing forward with efforts to get a Channel link begun and on the road—and rail, perhaps. I feel that it is essential that a decision should be made as early as possible. I hope that this debate will help the Government to reach that decision.

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As I said, I have been closely concerned with the Eurobridge proposals. As your Lordships will see, the Eurobridge Study Group was set up to study all the problems involved. I ought perhaps to give a slightly better picture of the scheme that we are talking about, but before I do that I must say that we have examined closely all the other schemes as far as we have been able to and discussed among ourselves the possibilities of their being effectively advanced. I still feel that the answer to the double rail tunnel is given pretty well in both the report of the Anglo-French working group of 1982 and the bankers' report two years later in which it was said quite categorically that the proposal could not really be carried out without some Government guarantees, either on the repayment of loans or on the amount of traffic, and therefore, if necessary, a subsidy.
We worked on the suggested idea of the bridge, which I support, and it comes out very happily. The bridge is so profitable by all calculations that we could well afford to build the single rail tunnel, even if it only broke even. It is this project that we put forward. We can meet the requirements of the railway people by having a single tunnel, as was originally suggested by British Rail and the French railways. It is our feeling that the best way to get a rail tunnel is for us to build the bridge.
As the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said, the Euro Route proposal was put forward in 1962. As a concept it is very interesting but it has enormous technical disadvantages with which I shall not bother your Lordships tonight but which I think will push it out. As was shown in the Economist, it is difficult to see how the project can be made to pay well enough to be commercially viable on private capital. I am interested, too, that they have radically changed their ideas (I think it was mentioned by one speaker) on the problem of a rail tunnel of sunken tubes, which was part of the Chesapeake Bay project. That has now changed, and they are going to a bored tunnel. So all the tunnels for rail are now of the bored variety.
I have been asked on numerous occasions about the viability of the materials of which we would make such a bridge, and the degree to which they have been tested. I think it is only fair to say that the cable material which we are proposing has been in use for over 20 years under very stringent conditions. It is now used as guy ropes for most television masts. It has been used for deep sea moorings, and it has been used to deal with all kinds of problems in the North Sea. It has not been used in a suspension bridge because it only really comes into its own as a great advantage in the case of a suspension bridge when you have the longer spans. It makes the longer spans feasible and practical, because it weighs one-sixth of the weight of the equivalent steel. Furthermore, with the type of cable structure that we use it is possible to put up the cable much faster than one can the old-fashioned steel cable. I speak as a steel man who has at one time helped build the cables for some of the steel suspension bridges. This material also has great advantages from the point of view of maintenance.
Another speaker made the point about it being easier to maintain a tunnel once you have dug the hole than possibly to maintain bridges. I think perhaps Annexe B of the Blue Book, which reported so
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unfavourably on bridges, was very much influenced by the troubles we have been having with bridges. The Severn Bridge has an appalling picture to paint in terms of suspension bridges. There are several others where the maintenance has perhaps become lax and where corrosion has had a very serious effect.
The materials we are talking about are largely corrosion-free. The cables, in particular, are corrosion-free. They have been used in marine applications, and there is no corrosion. They are neutral to all the types of gases, liquids, etc., with which they may come into contact. So we have here a very important factor. I refer not only to the cables but also to the structure of the tube in which the traffic will travel. This is also made of a material which is very largely corrosion-resistant, and therefore free of maintenance problems.
One of the great features of the technique that we are now proposing to use is that the maintenance cost of the whole structure will be very low throughout its life. We are also dealing with a new material for the deck on which the traffic runs. This material has been used in a very dense traffic area at Hangar Lane for the last 15 years, and has shown its durability, wearability and effectiveness. What is equally important is that the weight of these materials is only a fraction of the normal road material weight. This also helps us in our building of these long-span bridges.
It is getting late, my Lords. I could go on in detail about the way in which the bridge is to be built and structured, but I think from what I have said your Lordships will see that as far as the materials are concerned we should be using modern, advanced materials—materials which have already been used in many applications but not specifically in this one. We are using these materials to their best advantage and within known technology.
I come therefore to the other problems that face such a bridge. We, at an early stage, went to all the authorities on navigation because we realised the problem faced by navigation in the Channel. Obviously, as some speakers have mentioned, there will be a cutting down of the ferries crossing the Channel. The short-link ferries will, I think, disappear. I believe that that is inevitable. I am sure, however, that there will remain quite a lot of the longer route ferries such as Southampton to Cherbourg, Harwich to The Hague and places like that. I do not think therefore, that there will be a total disappearance of ferry traffic. Some people will take the ferries just for the pleasure of a sea trip. What is, however, very clear is that, as we are putting in both a bridge and a rail tunnel, there will be at least two short route crossings of the Channel. So the competitive problem, the availability problem, should be dealt with.
So far as navigation is concerned, we had talks with Trinity House, with the shipping section of the Department of Transport and with various other maritime authorities to find out the best answers that could be given. We should be clear that 50 per cent. or more of all traffic travels not down the centre of the Channel but along the coastal fringes, which means that it is as essential to keep those clear as it is to keep the centre clear. After full examination, the navigation authorities have come up with the comment really that

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they are very content with our proposals for 5,000 metre spans. We are, in fact, in discussion with them on the exact location of the six towers that will stand in the Channel in order to mark most precisely the deep channels and the shallows. As a result, we can achieve, I believe, a far better guide for ships travelling up and down the Channel as to exactly where they should be. Far from representing a danger, the bridge will, in fact, improve navigation in the Channel.
Mention has been made of protection. We also have designs to provide adequate gear to be able to stop a major tanker from hitting the bridge at any point. This will be done without damage to the tanker. We have gone into the matter in great detail.
Several questions have been raised in relation to the various schemes. It is important to recognise that our scheme is, we believe, very financially viable. I agree with several speakers who have mentioned the terms of reference of the group that it is very important to clarify the conditions under which we are to raise the cash. It is important because we shall not get adequate support if there is an unknown risk of government interference in the commercial activity of the company that builds the bridge or of their stopping the operation when it is partially carried out. So those sort of guarantees we do need. If they are there, there is no doubt whatever, in respect of the bridge and rail tunnel that Eurobridge has put forward, that the entire capital could be repaid after about seven years or, at the most, nine years. Even that, I believe, is a little on the conservative side from experience gained in various major road development projects on the Continent and also on bridges such as that over the Bosphorus, where the future long-term development of traffic expected over quite a considerable period turned up after the second year. These are the sort of figures that we have.
With the M20 and the M23 bringing down 10 or 12 lanes of traffic to the Kent area, we believe that, if those are really justified—and I believe they are—then it is quite wrong to put that traffic onto a rail ferry or to put it onto a four-lane highway. We are therefore putting 12 lanes—that is, four lanes on the two main decks and two lanes on each on the two lesser decks—within the elipse that we are putting round the whole bridge. We believe that this is the right way to do it, and of course it gives us great flexibility. It gives us tremendous defence against serious accidents on the road, because we can divert traffic onto different decks, and it is a great help in meeting the peak loads.
I have already dealt with the maintenance figure, but it is of considerable interest. It produces an important effect on the cost of running the whole operation. Another point made by one speaker—I think it was the noble Lord. Lord Gladwyn—was that there was a problem if one of the sectors of the bridge was damaged. Our design is such that should sabotage wreck one span of the bridge the remaining spans will remain intact and in place. That is part of the back-up that we have done. Somebody else mentioned the height of the towers. I would point out that they are roughly the height of the Eiffel Tower; perhaps a little higher. It gives you the scale of the bridge in terms of looks as well as in terms of the engineering required. I would add that, in dealing with towers of that nature,
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a most important factor is that we have the experience of putting very large structures into the North Sea in regard to the finding of oil and bringing it to the surface.
There are many other technical points that I could mention, and there are at least two more that I should like to deal with. One is the matter of employment, and particularly the employment problem at Dover. It has been pointed out that we shall probably create jobs for 65,000 to 70,000 with the building of the bridge. However, further studies show that the effect of bringing such a flow of traffic down into that area of the country and also through the Pas de Calais will create enormous servicing areas, back-up industries and the like which will probably double or treble that number of permanent jobs in the areas; so I believe that it will be a great adjunct to employment in the South of England as well as in the Pas de Calais.
I still think that the right answer is. "Yes, give us the bridge and we will build the tunnel". I should like to say that I hope the Government are going to see their way to push ahead very strongly and very firmly and to insist that, in studying the three projects, they ask the real technical questions necessary to ensure they get the right answer.
9.39 p.m.
Lord Brabazon of Tara: My Lords, I should like to thank my noble friend Lord Bessborough for initiating this most interesting debate this evening. As he has said, he is half English and half French, so he has a unique interest in this matter, having, so to speak. a foot on both sides of the Channel. I have listened with enormous interest to the wide range of comment and opinion expressed this evening. There is also considerable public interest in the question of a cross-Channel link. I am sure that the many and varied points of view we have heard today reflect something of that wider interest throughout the country. With the exception of my noble friend Lord Molson, all those who have spoken have been in favour of some kind of link.
My noble friend Lord Bessborough has asked Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made in discussions with the French Government regarding the construction of a Channel link. The question of a link has been raised at two recent meetings with members of the French Government. On 14th November, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport met the French Minister of Town Planning, Housing and Transport and the French State Secretary for Transport. And at the end of November my right honourable friend the Prime Minister discussed the matter with the French President at the Anglo-French summit meeting.
At the first of those meetings my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport and the two French Ministers discussed the basis on which their two Governments could agree to facilitate the construction of a fixed link. The crucial question was finance. Her Majesty's Government have consistently made it clear that any scheme for a Channel link would have to be privately financed, with no support from public funds or guarantees from Government against technical or commercial risks. This principle was endorsed by both sides at the meeting on 14th

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November, and it was agreed that, if a scheme acceptable to the two Governments can be financed on this basis, then the two Governments will play their part in making a project possible, by negotiating a treaty and promoting the necessary national legislation. At the Anglo-French summit, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and the French President welcomed and endorsed these conclusions.
In the course of these discussions, the two Governments have stated unequivocally their willingness to give a fair wind to an acceptable Channel link scheme which can be privately developed and privately financed. Both Governments recognise that some form of political undertaking will be necessary to protect promoters against the possibility that action or inaction by either or both Governments might cause the project to be aborted. This was a point which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, the noble Lord, Lord Ezra, and, I think, my noble friend Lord Layton touched upon. But the terms of the political guarantee will need careful definition. There is certainly no question of any other form of Government guarantee being given, for example, to protect a scheme against normal commercial risk, or to ensure completion of a scheme which ran into technical or financial
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, I should like to ask a question as regards the guarantees because I am sure that the noble Lord will appreciate that this is a matter of central importance. He has dealt with one aspect of the matter which I put to him, but perhaps I may remind him of the second: that is, are the Government prepared to give any type of undertaking to the promoters of whichever project they finally select, that there will not be unduly interventionist policies so far as pricing is concerned? This is a matter of great importance.
Lord Brabazon of Tara: My Lords, I am coming to that in due course. Any scheme accepted will have to be a fully private sector enterprise, and before we accept it we shall need to be convinced that it is financially robust and commercially sound.
The initiatives must come from the market. The opportunities for British industry, in partnership with French firms, are considerable. A number of private sector consortia are already putting a great deal of effort into developing possible schemes. We have heard this evening of the proposals for a twin rail tunnel with a roll-on roll-off vehicle shuttle. There are the EuroBridge proposals for a seven-span suspension bridge, of which my noble friend Lord Layton has spoken so enthusiastically. And there are the EuroRoute proposals for a combined scheme with bridges across the inshore zones and an immersed tube beneath the central shipping lanes. All these undoubtedly offer exciting possibilities for innovative design and the creative use of new materials. It is now up to prospective promoting groups, including financial institutions and potential owner/operators, as well as design and construction companies, to convince the two Governments that their schemes are both technically feasible and financially sound.
Of course, before these promoting groups can submit firm proposals, including designs, financing
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plans and operating arrangements, there is a certain amount of guidance they will require from the two Governments.
I have already mentioned the need to define precisely what political undertakings the two governments will give. Promoters will also need a clear indication of the financial and commercial framework within which a link would be constructed and operated. I believe that that is the point which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, was making, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Ezra. This, of course, will mean sorting out with the French Government such matters as the taxation regime and the application of competition law. In addition, promoters will need guidance on the governments' requirements on safety standards, on arrangements for frontier controls, and on the protection of the environment. Obviously it will be essential to ensure there is adequate opportunity for the public and any organisations with an interest to contribute their views on whatever proposals are put forward. It is only fair to let promoters know, in general terms at least, what consultation and planning procedures are envisaged.
For schemes other than bored tunnels—which do not involve structures in the Channel—there are also maritime and marine questions. The governments will want to spell out the safeguards they would require to ensure the safety of shipping and minimum disturbance to the marine environment. All of these are important questions, for which the Government have a clear responsibility. And obviously, prospective promoters will want to know where they stand on these matters, and what the governments require of them. That is why, after their meeting on 14th November, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport and the French Transport Ministers announced the setting up of an official working group, with representatives from both administrations to prepare guidance on these various aspects for prospective promoters.
At the Anglo/French Summit meeting, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and the French President indicated that the group should complete its work within three months, that is, by the end of February. Much preparatory work has already been done and at its meeting on 10th January the group agreed the scope of the guidance to be given and made arrangements for the further joint studies necessary to define its content.
Once this guidance is available, it will be up to interested private sector groups to respond to the challenge and opportunity a fixed Channel link scheme offers. In the light of the guidance given, it is up to prospective promoting groups to develop and submit firm proposals jointly to the two governments. Whether a Channel link scheme goes ahead will depend on the ability of these groups to come forward with robust and convincing proposals to demonstrate that they have the capacity and resources to complete their scheme, and that they can meet the two governments' safety and other requirements.
It is impossible to speculate what the final outcome will be. It would be improper for the Government to back any one scheme against the others at this stage, and indeed it would be foolish to do so before the firms have submitted their proposals in response to the

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governments' guidelines. A number of noble Lords have stressed the apparent advantages of drive-through schemes, in which vehicles can be driven directly across the link without the need to use a rail shuttle service. Clearly such schemes may be an attractive proposition to many individual car drivers and road hauliers. But it is up to the promoters of these more costly drive-through schemes to demonstrate that they can attract adequate financial backing for their proposals and that the presence of bridge piers or structures in the Channel will not endanger shipping or the marine or coastal environment.
On the other hand, some noble Lords have argued that a tunnel scheme, even though it would depend on a rail shuttle to ferry vehicles across, would be simpler and safer to build, using well tried and proven technology, and avoiding any danger of interference with shipping and minimising damage to the environment. In due course each promoting group will no doubt put forward the merits and advantages of its own scheme. But neither we nor the French Government have imposed any preconditions on the form or type of link. At this stage, all options remain open.
My noble friend Lord Bessborough asked about contacts with other member states of the European Community and with the European Commission. The Government consider it essential at this stage to concentrate on discussions between the two governments directly involved, that is ourselves and the French Government. Unless and until there is an agreement in principle between our two governments on which scheme, if any, we are ready to facilitate, there is little we can usefully discuss with our other Community partners. Reflecting a very positive interest shown by the European Parliament, the Commission has in the past undertaken studies of the Community interest in the construction of a fixed link across the Channel. Most recently they commissioned from the group of French and British banks which carried out a study, published last May, of the financing of a fixed link, a supplement to their report dealing with possible Community involvement.
In response to the invitation from the council, the Commission have just put forward proposals on the broad outlines of a policy on development of Community infrastructure. I have not yet seen these proposals, and as far as I know they have not yet been translated from the French. It is in this context that a possible Community role in relation to a fixed Channel link would have to be examined. It is too early for me to say anything on this tonight, but the relevant documents will be submitted to your Lordships' Committee for consideration.
The noble Lords, Lord Harris of Greenwich and Lord Layton, particularly mentioned the employment prospects of this project. There can be no doubt that a major project on this scale would create a large number of jobs during construction. The net effect, once the link was in operation, would depend both on its nature and on the rate of traffic growth. I do not wish to comment now on any figures mentioned by the promoters of the various schemes. This is something that the Government will look at very closely, but we must see their proposals first.
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My noble friend Lord Molson mentioned terrorism. I assure him that the risks of sabotage are well in the minds of both Governments. They will not be overlooked by the Anglo-French study group in advising Ministers. I must agree with the words of Lord Ezra, particularly, that we should not give in to terrorism, but should try to go ahead with schemes like this.
The idea of a cross-Channel link has been under discussion now for close on a couple of centuries. Many ingenious plans have been devised, some of them fanciful, some of them realistic. My noble friend Lord Bessborough has already referred to the first road tunnel proposal, made in 1802.That tunnel, for horse-drawn carriages, would have been lit by oil lamps and needed an artificial island half-way across so that the horses could be changed. Perhaps this would have been somewhat similar to the island which the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. mentioned. Technology and transport have both come a long way since then.
Opposition in the 19th century was mainly on military grounds. In 1882, the South Eastern Railway Company had already constructed the first 2,000 yards of a Channel tunnel near Dover when the government of the day put a stop to the work for fear that a tunnel would encourage the French to invade. There has been a long history of doubt and hesitation. As recently as 10 years ago, another tunnel scheme, which the noble Lord. Lord Carmichael, described very well, was started and abandoned. Next time it must be a case of "I've started, so I'll finish".
The Government have made their position clear: if the private sector can come up with a scheme acceptable to the French Government and ourselves, and robust enough to ensure that it is completed, we shall play our part in making that project possible. We must take one step at a time. When we have received and assessed all the promoters' proposals, we shall have a clearer idea of what is feasible and what is financeable. Only then, in close consultation with the French Government, can we come to a final decision.

Associated British Ports (Hull Fish Docks)Bill [H.L.]
Bath City Council Bill [H.L.]
Berkshire Bill [H.L.]
British Railways (Trowse Bridge) Bill [H.L.]
Clywd County Council Bill [H.L.]
Durham City Council Bill [H.L.]
Essex Bill [H.L.]
Greater Manchester Bill [H.L.]
Greater Manchester (Light Rapid Transit System) Bill [H.L.]
King's College London Bill [H.L.]
Luton Borough Council Bill [H.L.]
Nottinghamshire County Council (Superannuation) Bill [H.L.]
Poole Borough Council Bill [H.L.]
Royal Holloway and Bedford New College Bill [H.L.]
Swansea City Council (Tawe Barrage) Bill [H.L.]
West Glamorgan Bill [H.L.]
Presented and read a first time.
House adjourned at seven minutes before ten o'clock.