HL Deb 21 May 1984 vol 452 cc88-100

8.30 p.m.

Baroness Faithfull

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. Before embarking upon my speech, let me say how glad we are that the noble Lord, Lord Meston, is to make his maiden speech in this debate today. We are. indeed, fortunate in that he is a barrister and therefore well versed in the law. I am glad to speak to your Lordships about a measure which is non-political and is to protect both children and adults from the acute fear and distress caused by the taking away of a child. As your Lordships may know, this Private Member's Bill was introduced and taken through the other place by Mr. Timothy Wood, the Member of Parliament for Stevenage, who is to be praised for picking up the torch of a similar Bill unexpectedly knocked out of the hand of Mr. Rhodes James, the Member for Cambridge, by the general election last June. Mr. Timothy Wood is particularly to be congratulated as he piloted the Bill through the other place in the first Session of his first Parliament.

When the Criminal Law Revision Committee, whose chairman is Lord Justice Lawton, looked at the present state of the law concerning child abduction, it exposed how vague and anomalous it was. As was stated by the Minister in another place, Lord Justice Lawton is owed a debt of gratitude for the work of his committee, both on the subject of child abduction and on this Bill.

The Bill deals with two kinds of child stealing, and while they are distinct and the motives and results relating to them are distinct, the common factor is the abduction of a child and that is what we are seeking to control by this Bill. So this measure seeks to deal with matters of the utmost gravity: the safety and welfare of our most vulnerable members of society, and the very dangers to which their vulnerability lays them open.

The history of this measure lies in the necessity under current law to show that a person who takes a child away is doing so by force or fraud and with the intention of permanently depriving the parent of possession of that child. Two kinds of cases have led the Criminal Law Revision Committee, in its report on Offences Against the Person, to conclude that the law is inadequate and to recommend changes along the lines proposed in this Bill.

The first is the "tug of love" case, in which a parent removes a child from this country's jurisdiction altogether. Under Section 56 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 it is an offence called child stealing for a person to abduct by force or fraud a child under 14 with intent to deprive any parent, guardian or other person having the lawful care or charge of the child, of the possession of that child. But a proviso to that section makes it clear that: no person who shall have claimed any right to the possession of such child, or shall be the mother or shall have claimed to be the father of an illegitimate child, shall be liable to be prosecuted for an offence under that section.

The Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended that the criminal law should be extended to parents who abduct their children with the intention of taking them out of the realm. The committee's reasoning was as follows: If the child is taken by a parent who does not intend to leave the country … this is best dealt with by, courts having family jurisdiction as a breach of a court order and not by the criminal courts. However, the law does need to be able to act quickly if a parent abducts his child with the intention of taking him out of the country without the consent of the other spouse. Such situations cause severe distress to those having lawful control and, once the child has left the jurisdiction, obtaining his return is costly, usually slow and on occasions, impossible". Debates on this Bill in another place highlighted particular cases of great sadness and distress in which one parent had taken a child abroad in circumstances such that the other parent was unlikely ever to see his or her child again. This can happen even where custody has been awarded to the parent who remains in this country. I think your Lordships can imagine the amount of fear and suffering that can be caused, both to the deprived parent and also to the child who is snatched from a loving home. We must always he careful about extending the criminal law to domestic matters or family conflicts, but we are talking here about a real evil that challenges human ties between parents and children.

The effect of Clause 1 is to make it a criminal offence for someone closely connected with a child to seek to take or send him beyond the jurisdiction of the courts without the appropriate consent of others with equal ties. It does not bring within its scope simple custodial disputes between individual parents in England and Wales; nor, as I have said, does it seek to impose criminal sanctions in cases where the child remains in this country. Perhaps your Lordships will bear with me if I go through the provisions of the main clauses with some care, as I think that although it has been heartening to see that in another place this measure united all parties—as I hope it will here—it is an important measure and we must get it right.

I have described the main effect of Clause 1. Subsection (2) of the clause sets out the persons who are connected with the child for the purpose of the clause. They are: the child's parents, his guardian, a person with custody of the child under an order made by a court in England or Wales, and, in the case of an illegitimate child, a man in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is the child's father.

Subsection (3) of the clause defines "the appropriate consent" as being: the consent of each person—,

  1. (i) who is a parent or guardian of the child; or
  2. (ii) to whom custody of the child has been awarded … by an order of a court in England or Wales:"
or the consent of the court which made the custody order in respect of the child; or, the leave of the court granted on an application". under either of the Acts mentioned in paragraph (c). These provisions enable a child's parent or guardians who are unable to agree on any question affecting the child's welfare to apply to the courts for a direction about the matter in dispute.

Subsection (5) of this Bill has been the subject of much sincere and informed debate. It is important that Clause 1 should bite on those who intend to abduct their children abroad: but it is also very important that innocent travel arrangements between parents and children should not be unduly hindered by the need to protect the minority of children from parental abduction. Accordingly, the Bill makes it clear that the burden falls on the prosecution to show that the defendant did not come within subsection (5). However, it will be for the defendant to adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the applicability of the subsection.

Subsections (5) and (6), taken together with the requirement of the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for a prosecution for an offence under Clause 1 should ensure that a parent will not have to go to inordinate lengths to contact an estranged spouse before, for example, taking a child on a trip to France. But, although it is right that a parent who stands charged with a criminal offence in respect of his own child should have proper safeguards in respect of where the burden of proof lies, it is also right that the offence, as formulated in the Bill, should exist and be enforced to catch abductors in "tug of love" cases.

Subsection (7) merely defines relevant terms, but subsection (8) is of considerable interest, as it protects a child who is in the care of a local authority or a voluntary organisation from abduction, subject to the provisions of the schedule to this Bill. Perhaps detailed consideration of the schedule should await this Bill's Committee stage. I am sure that none of your Lordships would dissent from the general principle of extending the protection of the criminal law to these children as to others.

Perhaps I may invite your Lordships to look at Part II of the Bill as it relates to Clause 1. It has been important to ensure that there should be a similar offence of abduction by a parent of a child under Scots law. This effect is achieved by Part II of the Bill and means that it would not be possible, for example, for a parent to abduct a child in England and go to ground for some time in Scotland before taking the child abroad.

The second risk to children which the Bill addresses is the one against which every wise parent warns his child—that of staying or going away with a stranger. I urge noble Lords to note that there is at present no offence with which a stranger who keeps a child away from those who should be looking after him can be charged, unless the abduction involved force or fraud or there is further dreadful assault whose intention can be proved. But there is intrinsic harm in the abduction iself, both because it is morally wrong and because of the grave emotional consequences to the child victims and to the adults from whom the children are taken, who are themselves victims of a grievous loss.

The fact that a stranger entices a child away with promises and bribes rather than fear or force makes the activity no less dangerous and is wrong. It is to this activity that Clause 2 relates. Under Clause 2, it will be an offence for a person not connected with the child in the way defined in Clause I to remove him from or keep out of the lawful control of any person who should be looking after him. There is. of course, a defence of "reasonable excuse", so that no one looking after a lost child or rescuing a child from danger should run the risk of prosecution.

In addition, there are further defences relating to the person's belief as to the age of the child or his relationship to the child. Where a man believes that he is the father of an illegitimate child a successful defence against a charge under Clause 2 would probably place him well within the ambit of Clause 1, where he commits an offence if he intends to take the child out of the country. Clause 3 of the Bill amplifies the reference to taking, sending and detaining in Clauses 1 and 2 to include those responsible for causing a child to be abducted. It is obviously right that, where a parent or a stranger has employed or threatened others to do the dirty work, these people should also be liable to prosecution for abduction.

Clause 4 gives the penalties for an offence under Clauses 1 or 2 of the Bill. The maximum is a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years. There will, of course, be many cases with mitigating circumstances where the courts will impose much less severe penalties; but maximum penalties must be adequate for the worst cases, and I believe that these are about right. In addition, Clause 4 provides that no prosecution for an offence under Clause 1 shall be instituted without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and I have already mentioned the desirability of treading lightly in relation to prosecutions about activities within families.

Part III of the Bill embodies the consequential amendments and repeals with which I shall not trouble your Lordships in today's debate. I should. however, make it clear that both offences under the Bill will be extraditable under the Extradition Act 1870 and that those convicted will also be returnable to Commonwealth countries under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967. This should assist in some cases where the parent has abducted a child abroad, but I should stress that our hope is that attempts to commit a criminal offence of this kind will be frustrated by the criminal law before the child is actually removed.

This Bill is necessary. The increase in the divorce rate, the greater freedom of international movement, the growing number of international marriages, the increasing number of separations, and the greater number of cases involving the snatching of children are important reasons demonstrating the urgent need for this measure.

To conclude, perhaps I should commend to your Lordships a spirit of cautious optimism in taking forward this measure. There is no question about the need for such a measure or about the inadequacy and antiquity of the present law. Nor is there any question about its importance or its contribution to the strands of the criminal, civil and international law which must be woven together fully to protect our children. I am confident that the measure will control some of the worst attempts at child abduction.

But a note of caution should not be omitted. This Bill is but one strand in the net that I have mentioned, which must be closely woven in order to protect our children. Work is being taken forward with the Law Commissions on reciprocal enforcement of custody orders, and international agreements relating to kidnapping and abduction must be pursued with vigour. I do not think that it would be right to say that if this Bill is passed, there will be no sad cases of child abduction, but I do think that the Bill is an important part of the armoury of legisaltion, enforcement and agreement which we need. I hope that, as in another place, your Lordships will feel able to support this Bill without any political reservations, so that its smooth progress through this House will ensure that it becomes law without delay. My Lords, I beg to move.

Moved, That the Bill he now read a second time.—(Baroness Faithfull.)

8.49 p.m.

Lord Meston

My Lords, in addressing your Lordships' House for the first time, it is my hope that I shall be as brief and uncontroversial as is this Bill. This Bill is welcome. Clearly, considerable thought has gone into its drafting and it fulfils two objects. First, it fills the gap which may have been exposed in the law relating to kidnapping. Secondly, it replaces the prolixity of Section 56 of the Offences Against the Person Act, which requires proof of fraud or force.

It covers a wide range of abductions from the angry, thwarted parent to the sexual pervert to the mentally unbalanced. It covers the long-term abduction through to the short-term snatch. It may even cover the distresssing case of the demented or deranged person who may remove a pram from outside a shop. The main reason why this Bill is so welcome is that any legislation which inhibits unilateral action of this sort by parents or by other people must be valuable.

If I concentrate on Clause 1—that is, abduction by parents out of the United Kingdom—I hope that I shall be forgiven. It is a mischief of which I have some knowledge as a practitioner in this area of the law. If I may agree with the noble Baroness, not only is the Bill welcome, it is necessary. There is an increasing problem because of the speed and mobility provided by international transport, and also because of the growing rate of marital breakdown. The problem of course is most acute where the breakdown of the marriage involved is between parents of different cultures and different nationalities.

It is hard to describe the anguish of a mother—and it is usually a mother but not invariably—when she realises that her child has gone, and gone to a foreign country whose legal systems may have no respect, or no great respect, for a British custody order, and whose society has no respect for a mother—at least as against a father. It has been described as rather like bereavement without the certainty of death.

It is hard to convey the fear of parents who believe that their child, or children, may be abducted. It is a fear which can linger for years undiminished by the passage of time. undiminished by expedients such as changing names, moving home, changing schools. Above all, it is hard to assess the impact on the children themselves. It is not always a great adventure to be taken away; it is often traumatic. One must remember that these children are children whose parents have already done them the great disservice of separating, often acrimoniously, and sometimes violently. For those children therefore the fixed points in their lives become of greater importance, the home and the school, and of course an abduction deprives them of those fixed points. Any measure which diminishes those cruelties must be welcomed.

The second main reason why this Bill is welcome is that it takes the sole responsibility of bringing the matter before a court from the aggrieved parent, and now that responsibility is to be shared by the prosecuting authorities. If I may echo the noble Baroness, one hesitates before any extension of the criminal law into the sensitive area of family law, and I venture to suggest that few parents who snatch children are being consciously vindictive or deliberately using children as pawns, which is often an unhelpful phrase. They are often motivated by more complex emotional responses.

Furthermore, there are existing legal and administrative safeguards and procedures. I shall not list them all; they are quite well known. But the reason why the criminal law needs to be introduced into this area is, first of all, despite all the existing safeguards, the problem of abduction continues. It still happens and it is still all too easy to get a child out of the United Kingdom. Indeed, it is not always safe to mention in public the means by which that is done. Secondly, it is welcome because it is not just a private matter between a mother and a father. The public interest should intervene to prevent and punish this kind of misbehaviour. A welcome side effect may well be that the police will become more willing to get involved in what hitherto they would have regarded as domestic disputes.

Thirdly, it covers what is sometimes called the prelitigation snatch. Fourthly, hitherto bringing the matter before the court, or a court—which means the civil court—has depended upon the resolve and the funds of the aggrieved parent. Not only did the parents face the expense of proceedings but may also in many cases have faced the emotional constraint. There must have been many a mother, advised of her right to apply to the civil court to commit the father to prison for contempt, who has felt the fear that she would come to be seen by the child as having been responsible for having had the father sent to prison.

Despite the desirability of criminal sanctions, it is certainly my hope that the abducting parent will still be first and foremost answerable to the court whose order has been flouted. No doubt where the parent has been dealt with for contempt of the order the Director of Public Prosecutions will not expose him, or her, to the double penalty of a prosecution under this legislation. I hope also that a warning of the criminal offence hereby created under Clause I will appear with some prominence on all custody orders.

Unfortunately in the last analysis a determined parent will not worry about criminal sanctions if he feels that he can get away with it. Prevention and detection must always be better than punishment. Extradition can be a cumbersome and protracted procedure; but this Bill is nevertheless welcome, in the noble Baroness's phrase as one strand in the net. The way ahead, however, lies with international conventions directed to the speedy return of children to the countries of residence.

There already are in existence the Council of Europe Convention and the Hague Convention, yet to be ratified by this country. There is clearly a pressing need to consider whether the advantages of such conventions in their present form outweigh the disadvantages, and there are disadvantages in particular with relation to the wrongfully imported child. That particular disadvantage which has troubled many people is the obligation imposed on this country to return, without any due inquiry, a child to countries where the welfare of that child is not the paramount legal consideration.

I venture to suggest that the advantages of ratification nevertheless outweigh those disadvantages, particularly if it is one more means of achieving the speedy return of children to this country, being the country of origin. Meanwhile, the sooner this Bill becomes law the better.

8.58 p.m.

Lord Mishcon

My Lords, in the course of what many of us thought was a most creditable first performance from the Dispatch Box, the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, asked us to envisage at least the possibility that the scaffolding in this roof might fall upon us. If that is a fate that has to befall your Lordships' House, I am so glad that it did not occur before the noble Lord, Lord Meston, made his notable maiden speech. It is a pleasure for a professional colleague to congratulate upon his maiden speech someone who is a barrister, and. if I may say so, the son of a very reputed and notable lawyer whose publications, indeed, included commentaries upon many Acts of Parliament which have helped fellow practitioners understand them all the better. To hear a son follow in his father's footsteps and speak from his own experience at the Bar for the benefit of your Lordships' House on this Bill was a pleasure that we look forward to being repeated many times in the future.

We are also very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull. Not for the first time is she coming forward with measures of humanity. The Bill which she is introducing into this House commends, as she rightly said, support from all sides of your Lordships' House. There are no politics in this, and if there were I should like to believe that it would be a political unity in any event that welcomed this Bill—which is necessary, if I may summarise it, for three main reasons.

First, there was a case in the Court of Appeal, Regina v. Daily, which made it abundantly clear that no criminal offence was committed if a parent took away his own child under 16 in any circumstances, and between the ages of 16 and 18 if the child was unmarried. In those circumstances no criminal offence at all was committed; and that is the present state of the law. Secondly, in regard to any third party, not a parent, we have to go back, as your Lordships have already been told, to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, Section 56 of which makes it a necessary ingredient to have either fraud or force before a criminal act is committed. The third reason for the necessity of this Bill, quite apart from your Lordships having been reminded of the present unfortunate state of the multiplication of divided families, separation and divorces—not a matter of which society and our country can be proud—is that nevertheless, in that atmosphere, one has to admit that where any one of these offences occurs in regard to a parent who has run off with a child and taken that child abroad, extradition is impossible but will be made possible by this Bill. That means an effective way of dealing with a situation where no such way exists at the moment.

So this is a necessary, humane and sensible Bill. But that does not mean that there are not matters dealt with in this Bill which will merit your Lordships' concentrated concern. If I may, I am merely going to mention three of them, and I shall do that very shortly. Reference was made to your Lordships of the fact that this Bill is really the product of the Fourteenth Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee in respect of Offences Against the Person. As the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, rightly said, we owe a great debt of gratitude to that committee and to the chairman of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, Lord Justice Lawton.

When the committee considered the aspect with which we have been dealing under Part I of the Bill—namely, in regard to parents and in regard to third parties abducting children—the committee came to the conclusion that the upper age limit ought to be 14, and not 16 as in the Bill. I am going, if I may, to quote just a few sentences from paragraph 239 of the committee's report, where they say: We consider that an age limit of 14 is appropriate for these offences. If a person unlawfully detains a child above that age without the child's consent he may of course be charged with unlawful detention. If, however, a child over 14 consents to be taken away from his or her parents, we do not consider that any offence should be committed, unless the taking is for unlawful sexual purposes. Practical reasons have led us to fix the age at 14 since parental control after that age may be difficult or non-existent". The age under Part I of the Bill is 16, and not 14. That, therefore, has gone against the recommendation of the committee. When one looks at the age of 16, one wonders whether at least it ought not to be debated with great anxiety by your Lordships in due course, as to whether the age of 16 is right and convenient; because of course, as we all know, in the Family Division orders are made in respect of children until the age of 18 and there is also the question of local authority care and orders in that respect, too, which are made up to the age of 18. So when we come to further stages of the Bill I think we shall have to consider very carefully, hearing in mind especially that we are going against the recommendation of the Criminal Law Revision Committee in this respect, the question of age.

There is another respect in which, in this Bill, we vary the recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee. It may look as though it is a very minor matter, but when we are dealing with a parent who has taken a child out of the United Kingdom and who commits a criminal offence under this Bill—and previous speakers have stressed how necessary it is to be very careful before one starts making criminal offences relating to purely family matters, as between parents and children and wife and husband—there is a defence under Clause 1 of the Bill. I am looking at subsection (5)(c) of that clause, which reads: the other person has unreasonably refused to consent. That means that this Bill does not merely apply to people who have been before the Family Division for any reason at all, or who, indeed, have gone to any court in respect of the custody of children, or access to the children. That means that this Bill—and I appreciate that the Director of Public Prosecutions would have to sanction a prosecution—can relate to where a husband and wife living perfectly peacefully together; where the husband is offered a job in France, let us say, and wants to take his son aged 15 with him: and where the wife says, "I am not leaving England because you have a job in France. I love England. And you are not taking the boy with you!" The father, in respect of a family which, as I have said, has never been before any court at all, and where no matrimo- nial proceedings have been necessary or have been brought, thereupon takes the son, feeling he is quite entitled to do it, to France, where he is going to be employed for a number of years.

We are suddenly bringing into a criminal act a situation where the Director of Public Procecutions, upon the complaint of a mother and a wife, in those circumstances, has to adjudicate, presumably as to whether or not the wife was reasonable in her refusal; and, furthermore, if he does authorise a prosecution, that is a matter which comes before a criminal court. At the moment, I do not see where, in those circumstances, a father can go for guidance, because there is no civil proceding in respect of the family differences at all: there is nothing by way of a divorce or a judicial separation which has occurred or, indeed, is wanted by either party. So that is another matter that we shall have to look at with some concern, anxiety and care in the future stages of this Bill.

Lastly, I ought to point out to your Lordships, because it may not be apparent, that this Bill differs from the report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee in one other respect; and that is in the penalties which are to be imposed under this Bill. They are in fact greater than the Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended. I think that your Lordships will find that I am right, and that the Criminal Law Revision Committee had in mind, in one case, a maximum sentence of three years if the matter went on indictment, whereas this Bill recommends seven years, and in the other case they had in mind two years and, again, this Bill recommends a greater sentence than that. These arc matters to which we shall have to give some amount of care in the future stages of the Bill. But on Second Reading, without any hesitation from these Benches, I commend it to your Lordships' approval.

9.11 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone)

My Lords, if she will allow me to say so, my noble friend Lady Faithfull has done a real service by bringing this Bill before your Lordships' House and has done it so well that it will render my task in expressing the view (which I am about to do) that the Government consider it an admirable Bill, much easier and, I hope, my speech much more succinct than it might otherwise have been. I must next congratulate the maiden speaker—on an unusual topic, if he will allow me to say so, for a maiden speech. He showed us a command of the technical considerations which make this Bill necessary and desirable which did him credit. I hope that on other matters, both in this field and in others, he will enlighten us again. I should like to take the opportunity of wishing him a long and happy membership of this House.

To the noble Lord, Lord Meston (who raised, very properly, the question of the Hague Convention) I think I am in a position to say that it is my intention to introduce legislation to enable the Hague and European Conventions to be ratified so soon as a legislative opportunity occurs. To that extent I thank him for giving me the opportunity of saying that.

The problems connected with child abduction have had a rather curious and chequered legal history into which I shall not go in any detail. But I think that perhaps, in view of the fact that the ground elsewhere has been fairly well cultivated, I should like to say a word or two about it. There was the Offences against the Person Act of 1861 which, in Section 56, limits the offence to cases where there is force or fraud and provides that parents should not be liable to prosecution under it. The latter seems to me to he an odd exclusion. My own view, for what it is worth, is that children are just as much deserving of the protection of the criminal law in this field as in any other. Experience has—at least in my judgment —established that parents ought to be liable to criminal penalties in serious cases no less than any other class of person because there is a growing field of case in which the child needs protection against the unilateral action of a parent. Incidentally—although it has not been explicitly said in this discussion, it has been implied throughout—the other parent has feelings and rights to be protected against the spouse who takes unilateral action.

I feel therefore that it is right that we should legislate in this field. It is also right to make the consent of the custodial person in question the criterion, rather than force or fraud, and rather than the other more esoteric criteria which might otherwise be introduced. As regards a stranger, I think it is right to make the absence of lawful excuse the right criterion under Clause 2.

Going on with my discussion of the existing law, the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, referred to the case of Daily in the Court of Appeal. As he rightly said, the Court of Appeal after a rather unusual hearing decided two things: first, that the law of kidnapping, to which I shall come in a moment, did not apply to children under a certain age; and, secondly, that parents could not be guilty of it under the age of 18, with a minor exception, even if the children were otherwise protected. That case is, in fact, under discussion in your Lordships' House. It was heard two or three weeks ago and I presided at the Appellate Committee. It is expected that the report of the Appellate Committee will give rise to a judgment fairly soon.

I can tell the House—because these hearings are held in public and the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, will be able to infer what I mean—that their Lordships of the Appellate Committee did not think it necessary to call upon the appellant to reply to the respondent's argument. So that the law of kidnapping is another parameter—if I may borrow a phrase that is popular nowadays—in the calculation which we must make.

The law of kidnapping is a very old common law offence indeed. It can be punished by imprisonment for life; that is to say, there is no limit to the sentence of imprisonment which can be imposed. Everybody agrees that this offence exists, from the earliest textbooks to the most modern, but it has this peculiar history, that between about 1680 and the 20th century there were no prosecutions at all. Since about 1970, prosecutions have been fairly frequent, usually, but not always, at the instance of the Director of Public Prosecutions. But it has had this curious result: that the long abeyance into which the offence fell in practice has led to a certain imprecision and doubt about the necessary ingredients of the offence.

When the Appellate Committee delivers its judgment—which, as I say. I trust will not be long—we hope that some of the imprecisions and doubts will have been removed. But there are some points, at any rate, which will not be available to the House in its legal jurisdiction to make certain, owing to the nature of the facts which were then before it. For instance, the question of the desirability or otherwise of having the director's consent necessary in a prosecution for kidnapping, as well as child abduction under this Bill, would not be open to the Appellate Committee or to this House in its appellate jurisdiction to entertain one way or the other. This is a matter which we may have to consider.

My noble friend Lady Faithfull has covered the ground so fully that I can, I think, say very little more about the content of the Bill. I shall say a word or two to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, though the three points which he raised can probably more usefully be dilated upon at the Committee stage.

In passing, I should like to say—this bears on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Meston—that I am one of the many who hold the view, which I believe the Criminal Law Revision Committee share, and probably the Court of Appeal in Daily, that in ordinary cases of not very great seriousness the family jurisdication of the civil courts is probably adequate to deal with child snatching. But there are very many cases one knows of, both of kidnapping and of child abduction, which are clearly within the field of public law, with criminal sanctions being absolutely imperative.

If I may trespass upon the time of the House in relation to the facts in Daily, the father in that case, who subsequently got off free, had committed two (not one) abductions—one in 1978, so far as I remember, and one in 1981. On the first occasion he came upon the mother, when the child was only two, with three hired bullies (who subsequently got three years for their pains) armed with knives and other weapons of offence, dragged the child away and took it to New Zealand. The mother, with persistence, followed the child to New Zealand and got it hack by the process of law. But after another three years, in 1981, the child then being five, the man came back again—this time alone—and took the child, kicking and screaming in its pyjamas, away from its mother's arms to Dublin. Any of your Lordships would, I believe, say that if that is not against the law, it ought to be. This is a matter which will be against our law, if the Bill is passed.

Part II of the Bill deals with the situation in Scotland. Clause 2 deals with strangers. Let me give an example of where Clause 2 might be of importance. In 1972 the defendant in a case had the well-known name of Jones. He was aged 40. He met two girls aged 10 at the local swimming baths. He travelled with them on the same bus and paid their fares. The girls bought sweets with their bus fare money. The man then suggested to the girls that they should go for a walk with him. They agreed. He told the girls to go home and change and to hurry up, and that he would give them some sweets when they returned. They returned to the house of one of the girls and her mother, because she noticed that the girls were eating sweets, asked them where they had been. They told her the truth. The police were informed and went to the rendezvous where the defendant was waiting. The defendant admitted that he had intended to commit an indecent assault. He was charged with an attempt to commit an offence under Section 20 of the Sexual Offences Act. The judge rightly had to direct the jury that they would have to acquit the defendant because of the rules relating to proximity.

This kind of case illustrates the point that one is trying to make; namely, that a revision of the law, more or less on the lines recommended by the Criminal Law Revision Committee and Lord Justice Lawton, is overdue. Conduct which is socially criminal and connected with an evil intention shows I believe that we should seize this opportunity to enact this piece of legislation.

I would say this to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, on one of his three points, which he might care to ponder before the Committee stage. He gave the example of a father finding employment in France and being the father of a boy of 15 whom he, unilaterally, intends to take away against the will of the mother and who asks what he can do to protect himself. It is very clear that in such a case the child ought to be warded, and that the courts ought to decide the matter under the family jurisdiction. If after that the father unilaterally took the child away, the necessary consequences would follow.

I am not wholly convinced that 16 is a worse age than 14, but we can go into that matter later. I am very glad indeed that all noble Lords have taken such a friendly view of the Bill. I hope that it will now be given a Second Reading.

Baroness Faithfull

My Lords, I will first congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Meston, on his clear knowledgeable, thoughtful and compassionate speech. It was the kind of speech which Members of this House welcome, and we hope that he will speak often in your Lordships' House.

I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, for all the points he has made. I concur with him that. although we agree on the basic principles of this Bill, there are points to be discussed at Committee stage. I am most grateful to him for having brought forward these points.

To the noble and learned Lord, may I offer my thanks for the fascinating history he has given us in respect of abduction, kidnapping and child-snatching. I could have done with even longer, to hear all that he has to say on both the past and the present. I thank all noble Lords, and the noble and learned Lord, for taking part in this debate.

On Question, Bill read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.