Police and Criminal Evidence Bill

HL Deb 11 July 1984 vol 454 cc957-1032

House again in Committee.

Clauses 74 and 75 agreed to.

Clause 76 [Advance notice of expert evidence in Crown Court]:

On Question, Whether Clause 76 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord Mishcon

I wonder whether I may try to deal with this matter very briefly. In summary, Clause 76 provides for the Crown Court Rule Committee to make some rules by which it would be incumbent upon the defence and the prosecution to exchange expert reports in certain cases. In the view of the Law Society that is an objectionable procedure, if I may say so. I can summarise the objections in the following way.

First of all, I think that I ought to point out that of course it is not for the rule committee to decide policy. It carries out its job—and does it remarkably well—in putting the necessary policy into words and into rules. Therefore, it is not a question of this merely being a matter of policy that is left to the rule committee. It would very likely be that it would be mandatory.

There is—and we have discussed it before—a right of silence in a criminal case so far as the defence is concerned, and certainly a right not to divulge its case, because it is the prosecution's duty to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the first objection is that that valuable right of silence is breached.

The second consideration is very much a practical one. It is common knowledge that expert witnesses are not keen to give evidence which is contrary to that of other expert witnesses in the same profession. It is certainly common knowledge among those who practise in our courts that when one has expert witnesses who are meeting together to try to agree something, as a rule they will do so with both their minds on the advisability, and certainly the comfort, of avoiding cross-examination. All that is perfectly human, but from the point of view of the defence in a criminal case it can be absolutely devastating.

There is no need—and one saw that in the famous Arthur case—for the defence to have to divulge the fact that it has taken rather more trouble in regard to its expert evidence than the prosecution has, and thereby lose a very proper advantage. It is in those circumstances that we oppose Clause 76.

The Lord Chancellor

I very carefully note what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has said. I do not think this has much to do with the right of silence. The right of silence in the accused consists of an accused's right to say nothing when he is cautioned, when he is charged, or when he is tried. He need say nothing at all. He can say to the prosecution, "Prove your case and if you cannot, bad luck on you". This has been a fundamental rule of English law for a very long time.

There are of course things upon which the jury need to be enlightened, not on direct evidence of fact, to which the right of silence mainly applies—although I will come back to that in a moment—but on questions of scientific or medical opinion. In such cases the jury are being asked to enter a realm with which they are totally unfamiliar. Psychological, physical or engineering experts are called, and they give evidence of their opinion based on the best scientific view which their experience allows. I cannot see that this has much to do with the right of silence. If one regards a criminal trial as a game played by certain elaborate rules without any genuine purpose except to win so many tricks, I can see the argument that the cards are dealt and you hold them close to your chest and do not play them.

My father used to ridicule those who regarded a criminal trial as a fox hunt. That is to say, you did not chop the fox in cover because it was not sporting: he had to be properly ridden down by properly bred hounds and with a certain number of gentlemen in red coats and suitable notes blown on the horn. If the fox was killed in any other way, it was considered an offence against the traditions of English society. But my father said that that was not a true view of criminal law. He took the view that, with certain safeguards for the accused which mainly consisted in the right of silence of the accused and the right to trial by jury, the object of a criminal trial was that you really tried to arrive at the answer to the question, in the light of ultimate truth, whether the prosecution had proved their case or whether they had not. I share that view, that the ultimate object of a criminal trial is justice.

Ever since the war there have been changes in criminal law and procedure. The most obvious one is the law relating to the sprung alibi defence, which will be very familiar to noble Lords. To provide an alibi saying that on the night in question one was at the Metropole Hotel, Brighton, and then to call a lot of people with whom one was supposed to be, without giving the prosecution the opportunity of testing that, is not really a way of arriving at the truth. Since the war we have at any rate gone into the theory that notice of an alibi must be given and that in the case of a failure to give it the court has at least a discretion to exclude the evidence of an alibi. I think that was a step forward.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

Would the noble and learned Lord agree that that is the only respect in which we have broken into the disclosure of the hand of the defence, so to speak—so far, at any rate?

The Lord Chancellor

I am not absolutely sure that that is quite true, but I will not go into that. That is a clear example of where we have changed the rule by statute. I have known cases where, if you produce a number of facts of which you could have given notice at an earlier stage, it is the subject of very adverse comment from the bench, and sometimes unjustified comment from the bench. At any rate, that has been the development since the war.

Parallel to that, and in the civil jurisdiction, which I think is not irrelevant for this purpose, we have come to a rule which was bitterly contested by the conservatives in the profession—of whom I am not one!—that each side should produce its expert evidence and they should make some sort of attempt to reconcile their views, or at least to identify the points of difference between them. For the life of me I cannot see why, if you do not adopt the fox hunt or the card-playing analogy about criminal justice, you should not do that with expert evidence in a criminal trial. This is roughly what this is about.

May I refer to the terms of the clause? It says: Crown Court Rules may make provision for—

1. (a) requiring any party to proceedings before the Court to disclose to the other party or parties any expert evidence which he proposes to adduce in the proceedings; and
2. (b) prohibiting a party who fails to comply in respect of any evidence with any requirement imposed by virtue of paragraph (a) above from adducing that evidence without the leave of the court".

In other words, the court remains the judge of these things. Certainly my own view, for what it is worth—and I believe it to be the view of my colleagues—is that nothing can be lost and everything can be gained by such a procedure in a criminal trial. The burden of proof remains exactly where it was before. However, when you are dealing with a field with which probably counsel and certainly the jury will be unfamiliar, it is sensible to try to point out in advance the points of scientific interest upon which the parties differ. It is not evidence of fact; it is evidence of opinion. I think for either side to try to spring unexpected evidence upon the other side is really to darken the waters of criminal justice.

If this clause was not part of a Bill which provides for a rational way in which it can be done, subject, of course, to the control of Parliament, what would in fact happen, as I know from experience, is that, faced with a piece of scientific evidence of which they had not had prior notice, the prosecution would ask leave to call rebuttal evidence and probably ask, if they had not been given notice in advance, for an adjournment in order to be able to do so. It is far better to settle these things in advance.

The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said that the sprung alibi was the only case where, by statute, we had breached the original practice. I was prepared to accept that this was so. I think that it was a very wise provision. I believe that the noble and learned Lord, when he was Attorney-General, probably had something to do with it. As is the case with many of the things that the noble and learned Lord does, I can only heartily applaud his action.

But there is, of course, quite another field in which this development has been taking place. That is the pre-trail review. I have always tried to encourage the pre-trial review, which is an informal procedure. I do not think that there is any statute which says much about it.

I have always thought that what should take place in complicated criminal cases is that the two parties, through their legal representatives and in front of the judicial officer, should try to find out what are going to be the points of issue between them. That saves a lot of time. It aids the truth. It does not put the defence at any disadvantage against that position to which they would otherwise be entitled. Clause 76 deals only with that in relation to scientific evidence. I would plead once more for rationality in our criminal trials, as I have tried to do previously, against the obscurantism of the more conservative elements in the legal profession.

Lord Hooson

I should like to say a word or two about this clause. I am broadly in favour of the provision as stated. If one was raising the defence of automatism, and if one sprung that on the prosecution, who had no prior notice of it, it would seem to be very wrong. The chief officers of police, in their memorandum, were not really in favour of this provision. They suggested that the right to an adjournment would seem to cover it. A great deal depends upon the rules when they are drafted. Is one to be required to disclose the whole of one's evidence, or simply the outline of it? That would seem to me an important provision. It is important to make sure that the prosecution are not taken completely by surprise with a sprung defence that should be disclosed beforehand.

On the other hand, there are some misgivings. We have had disclosed the unfortunate affair of a forensic scientist employed by the Home Office for many years, whose evidence is now very suspect. What if one had exchanged full details with him? These are matters that are obviously troublesome. I only hope that careful consideration is given to the way in which the rules are drafted.

The Lord Chancellor

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, I agree absolutely that they have to be drafted with great care and scrutinised after they are published. But, subject to that, I do not think that any injustice would be incurred by this.

Lord Mishcon

I wish that I could agree with the noble and learned Lord, who has put his arguments against this succinctly and with charm, as he always does. But it goes far deeper than that. I turn immediately to what was stated by the noble Lord, Lord Hooson. The clause itself provides perfectly clearly that the Crown Court Rules may make provision for requiring any party to proceedings before the court to disclose to the other party or parties any expert evidence which he proposes to adduce. The wording of the clause is not such as to give notice of the nature of any expert evidence it is likely to call. I would have had much more sympathy with such wording, as would the Law Society. Under this rule the party has to show its expert's report, and that obviously is something that is fundamental to the objection that I put.

I should like the noble and learned Lord to realise at once that the criminal law committee of the Law Society would be the last committee in the world to want to play games in regard to criminal trials or to run them in accordance with any rules of such games. Obviously, they take these matters very much more seriously. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord appreciates that. It is not that. It is that we are possibly now going down an extremely risky path if we start this business of the defence having to disclose certain matters in relation to its defence, whether it is expert or not. This is not a question of being conservative in one's views. One can be a traditionalist in one's views, and I should have thought that a fine thing if the tradition is a very good one. The tradition is that it is for the prosecution to prove its case. There is nothing by way of duty on the defence at this stage of our law to have to give not just notice of what it intends to do, but its actual expert evidence. It seems to me that this is a very risky procedure to embark upon. Because the Law Society and its appropriate committee take a very serious view of this matter, I feel that one would want in these circumstances to test the opinion of the Committee.

8.37 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 76 shall stand part of the Bill?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 48; Not-Contents, 30.

DIVISION NO. 2
CONTENTS
Auckland, L.	Kaberry of Adel, L.
Avon, E.	Kilmany, L.
Bathurst, E.	Kinnaird, L.
Bauer, L.	Lindsey and Abingdon, E.
Brougham and Vaux, L.	Long, V. [Teller.]
Caithness, E.	Lucas of Chilworth, L.
Carnegy of Lour, B.	Macleod of Borve, B.
Carnock, L.	Margadale, L.
Cathcart, E.	Molson, L.
Chelmer, L.	Mountevans, L.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Murton of Lindisfarne, L.
Dormer, L.	Peyton of Yeovil, L.
Eccles, V.	Polwarth, L.
Elton, L.	Renwick, L.
Faithfull, B.	Skelmersdale, L.
Ferrers, E.	Stanley of Alderley, L.
Ferrier, L.	Suffield, L.
Gisborough, L.	Tranmire, L.
Glenarthur, L.	Trefgarne, L.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.	Trumpington, B.
	Vaux of Harrowden, L.
Hornsby-Smith, B.	Vickers, B.
Hylton-Foster, B.	Westbury, L.
Inglewood, L.	Wise, L.
Ingrow, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Birk, B.	McIntosh of Haringey, L.
Brooks of Tremorfa, L.	Melville, V.
Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L	Mishcon, L.
Collison, L.	Nicol, B.
David, B. [Teller.]	Plant, L.
Dean of Beswick, L.	Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller.]
Elwyn-Jones, L.
Elystan-Morgan, L.	Rea, L.
Ennals, L.	Ross of Marnock, L.
Glenamara, L.	Stoddart of Swindon, L.
Graham of Edmonton, L.	Stone, L.
Hall, V.	Strabolgi, L.
Hatch of Lusby, L.	Underhill, L.
Irving of Dartford, L.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Jeger, B.	White, B.
John-Mackie, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 76 agreed to accordingly.

8.45 p.m.

Lord Hooson moved Amendment No. 160A: After Clause 76, insert the following new clause:

("Evidence of identification

.—(1) Where at a trial on indictment the case against an accused person depends wholly or substantially on evidence of one or more visual identification of him, the judge shall, subject to subsection (2) below, either—

1. (a) warn the jury that it is not safe to convict on such evidence unless the identification is supported in some material particular by evidence, other than evidence of visual identification, implicating the accused person and indicate to the jury what evidence they may regard as so supporting the identification; or
962
2. (b) direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty if he is unable to give such an indication.

(2) Where there is, in the opinion of the judge, credible evidence—

1. (a) that the accused person is familiar to the person identifying him; or
2. (b) that the person identifying the accused person had observed him for a prolonged period or on more than one occasion;

or where the accused person admits to having been present at the place where the offence was committed but denies that he committed it, the judge shall not give the warning referred to in subsection (1) above, but shall instead warn the jury of the special need for caution before convicting the accused person in reliance only on evidence of identification.

(3) In this section 'visual identification' means identification by observation.").

The noble Lord said: The year 1976 was an important year in reviewing the evidence of identification, because in that year the noble and learned Lord, Lord Devlin, published his report on evidence of identification. He recommended that certain safeguards should be put in statutory form. That was followed immediately by a statement by the then Attorney-General, laying out guidelines that certainly were to apply in cases that were sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

In the same year, in the case of Turnbull, five Lords Justices in the Court of Appeal laid down guidelines on offences which depended largely or wholly on identification evidence. What my noble friends and I are seeking to do, through this amendment, is to go back to the Devlin position and to introduce a statutory provision which deals with the question of the dangers of conviction on identification evidence alone, or on mainly identification evidence.

The clause itself is quite simple. It is divided into three subsections. Subsection (1) deals with the evidence of what properly can be described as identification; that is, where one or more persons have sought to identify a person and have no previous knowledge of him or her. In particular, of course, one is concerned about fleeting glances. The subsection provides that the judge would be required to, warn the jury that it is not safe to convict on such evidence unless the identification is supported in some material particular". In other words, it would require some corroboration, and the learned judge would point this out to the jury. If there were no such corroboration, he would, direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty if he is unable to give such an indication", of corroborative evidence.

Subsection (2) deals with what properly can be described as recognition; that is, where the person is known to the person identifying or to the persons identifying. That is in a different category from what can be called identification. Normally, lawyers use the term, "identification", simply to indicate the person who is seeing the suspect for the first time. Subsection (2) deals with the question of recognition, where there is the basic knowledge of the recognising person, where he is familiar with the accused person, and also provides: that the person identifying the accused person had observed him for a prolonged period or on more than one occasion".

In that event, the warning that is required under subsection (1) is not required. But then the judge will, warn the jury of the special need for caution before convicting the accused person in reliance only on evidence of identification". Subsection (3) says simply: 'visual identification' means identification by observation".

Therefore, we have gone back to the initial recommendations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Devlin, who had inquired in very considerable detail into this matter before publishing his report. It is simpler than the guidelines laid down in Turnbull. It can be said that probably it is rather broader in its concept, but nevertheless much simpler. I agree very much with what Lord Devlin said on the occasion of the publication of his report; that is, that a statutory protection was required to deal with this particular matter. We have taken advantage of this Bill to try to introduce it. I beg to move.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

We on these Benches have very great sympathy for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hooson. We accept and are aware that misidentification has led to greater and more numerous miscarriages of justice than possibly any other heading in relation to the administration of our criminal law. As the Committee will be aware, it was a classic case of misidentification in the early years of this century which led to the formation—as it then was called—or the establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal. From the few years' experience that I had as a junior Minister in the Home Office, I saw numerous cases of this nature where there were people of the most genuine motivation, intelligent people, who were not only trying to be truthful but determined as well to be totally accurate, but who were wrong, wrong, wrong. Very often it was not a case of one person or three or four people, but sometimes eight or 10 people who were all falling into the same trap.

As one who practises in the criminal courts from day to day, I accept that judges go out of their way to be careful in the directions that are given to juries in this matter. But sometimes there is a tendency for the matter to be regarded as a rather formal catechism and, once the words have been spoken, for a learned judge to consider that he has gone far enough. We take the view that the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Devlin, that this is of such importance that it should be enshrined in statute, is a good point. Even if some of the detail of the amendment may be criticised, we take the view that the principle is of such supreme importance that it would be right to concede it.

The Lord Chancellor

Obviously one cannot complain that identification questions have been raised in connection with criminal evidence. I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, that one of the identifiable areas in which miscarriages of justice have taken place has been cases of misidentification. Perhaps that is not surprising since any system of criminal law depends for its effectiveness, however excellent in other respects, on getting the right man and not the wrong one. We know of a number of cases—and it would be idle for me to pretend that we did not—in which on really overwhelming evidence juries have convicted when it was proved later that the accused was innocent of the offence. I say "was proved later that he was innocent" because, having accepted that there must be some such cases, one must assume that there were others where a person could not prove his innocence. I think that it would be fair to assume that. One cannot identify them. Therefore, naturally it is a matter which causes a good deal of anxiety to those in authority which of course, for this purpose, does not include me.

One such case was that of Adolf Beck. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, was probably referring to that case when he spoke about a case in the early years of this century. Another case that I can remember off hand just after I had ceased to be Lord Chancellor in 1974 was the case of Docherty. I raised it with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones; indeed, I think that it was almost one of the first things that I did when I was on the Opposition Bench.

Docherty was a man who was convicted of shoplifting in Newcastle and eventually, after much travail and after he had been convicted and gone to the Court of Appeal and his appeal had been turned down, it was established by no less than 53 reputable witnesses that he really was in Whitley Bay at the time when the shoplifting took place.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

He was in a charabanc on the way there.

The Lord Chancellor

Oh, he was in a charabanc on the way to Whitley Bay. As one kind of common law jury advocate once said in my father's hearing, "It matters not, my Lords, the principle is the same". At any rate, he was innocent and proved himself to be innocent. This must obviously give rise to anxiety. If I have it right, the Devlin Report raised a number of other possible or actual cases. I do not think that it matters, because one knows that this is one of the areas of the law which must give rise to anxiety.

However, time has gone on and in 1976 the case of Turnbull was reported. I must say that I am convinced that Turnbull provides a better guide and that the fairly flexible approach of Turnbull is more likely to succeed to prevent injustice than the rather rigid approach—and I am not going to criticise the drafting—which inevitably a statutory approach applies. I do not think that it would be fair of me to attack the formalism of this drafting, although I think that it is inherent in the statutory approach. Whether one would adopt this particular form of words I do not think arises.

I would like to tell the Committee what Turnbull said and for that purpose I rely virtually textually, but not quite, on the headnote of the report which I think gives a fair indication of what happens nowadays. It says: Whenever the case of an accused person depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of the accused which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the judge should warn the jury of the special need for caution before convicting in reliance on the correctness of the identification". I am sure that that is right. The safegurd must lie on the judge's summing up to the jury and not on formalism or pedantry, and the first thing is to demand caution in any case of identification. To proceed with the headnote: He should instruct them as to the reason for that warning and should make reference to the possibility that a mistaken witness could be a convincing one"— that was the point which the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, made. It goes on— and that a number of witnesses could all be mistaken". That again was the case in the remarkable history of Adolf Beck. It did not rest on the evidence of a single witness of identification; there was a whole number of them and, what is more, there was ample corroborative evidence in that case, supported, among others, by a handwriting expert. It continues: Provided that the warning is in clear terms, no particular words need be used. Furthermore, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made". That is a matter of supreme importance and it varies very considerably from case to case according to the state of the lights, the opportunities for observation and so on. Then: If in any case, whether being dealt with summarily or on indictment, the prosecution have reason to believe that there is a material discrepancy between the description of the accused given to the police by the witness when first seen and his actual appearance they should supply the accused or his legal advisers with particulars of the description which the police were first given". That is very important as a statement of the duty of the prosecution in these cases. It goes on: In all these cases, if the accused asks to be given particulars of any description, the prosecution should supply them. Finally, the judge should remind the jury of any specific weaknesses which have appeared in the identification evidence. Where the quality of an identification is good, the jury can safely be left to assess the value of the identifying evidence even if there is no other evidence in support, provided always that an adequate warning has been given about the special need for caution. However, where in the opinion of the judge the quality of the identifying evidence is poor, he should withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal unless there is other evidence which supports the correctness of the identification. That other evidence may be either corroboration in the legal sense"— which, of course, is a highly technical matter— or something which convinces the jury that the identification is not mistaken; any odd coincidence, if unexplained, may be supporting evidence. The judge should identify to the jury any evidence which he adjudges capable of supporting the evidence of identification and he should tell the jury if there is any evidence or circumstances which cannot support an identification… The judge should tell the jury that the absence of the accused from the witness box cannot provide evidence of anything, although they may take into consideration the fact that identification evidence has not been contradicted by the accused. The judge should take care in directing the jury about the support for an identification which may be derived from the fact that they have rejected an alibi. False alibis may be put forward for many reasons and it is only when the jury are satisfied that the sole reason for fabrication of an alibi was to deceive them, that fabrication can support identification evidence. The judge should remind the jury that proof that the accused has lied about his whereabouts at the material time does not prove that he was where the identifying witness says he was. A failure to follow these guidelines is likely to result in a conviction being quashed and will so result if, in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, on all the evidence, the verdict is either unsatisfactory or unsafe. However, the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to retry a case; it is for the jury in each case to decide which witnesses should be believed". That is what took place in 1976. My conviction is that the very careful guidelines given by the Court of Appeal in Turnbull are better than the proposed codification in the noble Lord's amendment, not merely because there may be—I daresay there are—defects in draftsmanship, but because this is the right way of approaching a very difficult question of this kind, and not by trying to drive the court onto a bed of Procrustes.

In 1980 a consultation was undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the guidelines and Ministers—I think of the present administration or its immediate predecessor—concluded that the Turnbull guidelines were working satisfactorily. The problem identified by the Devlin Committee had, therefore, been dealt with by other means and legislation was not required. The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure—the Philips Commission—which we are largely legislating about now, took note of this statement and itself made no proposals of detail. However, it recommended that when the Government considered legislation in the field of pre-trial criminal procedure they should examine the possibility of making identification procedures subject to statutory control as well, and this is already done in the Bill by Clause 63 and in the proposed code of conduct on identification procedures. I should have thought that it was very much open to question that anything more is required.

The effect is that in 1980 the judiciary, the legal profession, the chief officers of police and others with an interest in the subject were consulted. While it would be wrong to pretend that there was unanimity, there was a general acceptance that the guidelines which I have read out dealt satisfactorily with the problems perceived by the Devlin Committee, and there seemed no need for legislation.

Nearly four years have passed since then. No difficulties have arisen since that conclusion was reached. With respect, I would have said that I have made out a case for the present situation to continue and for the view that the attempt to codify the procedure is probably wrong, in spite of the support given to it by the weighty evidence of the Devlin Committee some years ago. That is really what I have to say to the Committee.

Lord Hooson

I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that we are dealing with a very difficult sphere. But with the greatest respect to him, I do not think that the case of Turnbull, which sets out guidelines which have been extremely helpful in practice, deals with the problem that troubled the Devlin Committee: namely (and I think that the noble and learned Lord referred to the case of Beck), that one can have identification evidence of very good quality (which I believe was the case in Beck) which appears to the jury to be of very good quality, and therefore the judge thinks it right, although there is no corroboration, to allow the case to proceed to the jury so that they can assess that evidence.

That was the very matter that troubled the noble and learned Lord, Lord Devlin—that there can still be a mistake where the evidence appears to be of very good quality and, despite the warnings to the jury, they proceed to convict. It was against that situation that Devlin made his recommendations in the belief that, where there was no corroboration, the only safe course was to insist upon an acquittal. Having said that, we may return to this matter on Report; I do not intend to press the amendment to a Division. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

9.7 p.m.

Lord Elystan-Morgan moved Amendment No. 160AA: After Clause 76, insert the following new clause:

("Evidence of offences under s. 32 of Sexual Offences Act 1956. . The evidence of an arresting police officer shall not be admissible at the trial of an offence contrary to section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 unless corroborated by evidence that some other person other than a police officer—

1. (a) was offended by the conduct of the accused; and
2. (b) did not incite, encourage or consent to the commission of the offence.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment aims at the highly unsatisfactory situation which now exists in relation to Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. As the Committee no doubt will be aware, this is the offence of persistently importuning in a public place. The effect of the amendment would be to make it impossible for a prosecution to proceed unless there was some evidence, other than the evidence of a police officer who had entrapped the defendant; in other words, there would have to be the evidence of some innocent and detached member of the public who found that conduct to be offensive.

The logic of the situation, I am sure, is clear to everyone. Most criminal offences come to the notice of the police either because they have been committed in a public way (for example, an affray or a riot) or because there has been a complaint to the police (for example, robbery or rape), but almost universally these cases are cases where there is no complainant at all. The officers concerned act as agents provocateurs in the sense that they lie in wait for these unfortunates, knowing that they are in places which are regularly frequented by persons of homosexual proclivities, and knowing that there is the certainty that remaining purely passive, as they do, they will be a temptation to these persons as they come along to such places.

On Report stage in another place Mr. David Mellor, one of the Home Office's junior Ministers in that House, deplored the use of police officers as agents provocateurs in this connection. He gave an undertaking that new guidelines would be drafted and issued to police officers in this connection. As the Committee may be aware, guidelines were drafted in 1978, but it seems that there is every reason to believe that they have been largely ignored in various police authorities.

A study carried out by Walmsley and White on behalf of the Home Office in 1979 came to the conclusion that the vast majority of these acts were wholly consensual and were carried out in places which, although they may be public in the highly technical sense, nevertheless were well outside public notice. Various studies carried out by the NCCL have produced over 200 reported cases where it is clear that there was no complaint whatsoever and that the only witness was the police officer or the police officers concerned.

"Public place" is widely defined in the Act. It is defined as a place where the public go to whether by right or not. In my submission, the way in which this provision, Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act, is now being handled by police officers is wholly contrary to the spirit of the more liberal legislation of the 1960s in relation to these facts.

There is certainly a great deal of evidence to show that practice varies considerably from one police authority to another. Some chief officers of police pursue this matter with an incandescent fervency, while others tend to ignore the situation altogether unless, of course, there is a public complaint, which is a totally different situation. Without referring to any specific case, it seems clear that in recent months there has been a heavy concentration by police officers on "gay" clubs and other places frequented by persons of homosexual disposition in the Earls Court area.

In our submission it is in the public interest that there should be firmer rules than obtain at the present moment. The provision in the amendment would, on the one hand, make it necessary for there to be a witness from the public, and, on the other hand, safeguard the police from the accusations that are made of what amounts to very suspect policing practice in this particular connection. It is on the basis that we say that if this amendment is accepted it is a humane, practical approach to something that is elevated to far too high a level as a problem in many police authorities. I beg to move.

Lord Molson

I hope that the Government will give sympathetic consideration to this amendment which has been moved by the noble Lord opposite. When I saw that this amendment had been put down, I was reminded of a paragraph which I read in The Times some time ago. It was purported to be a report of legal proceedings. Therefore it was presumably reliable. It resulted in the conviction of a retired diplomat who had risen high in the service of his country and the prosecution told a squalid tale about themselves in the court.

Police constables, suspecting that an offence was going to be committed, went into a women's lavatory and locked the doors behind them. They then went into one of the cubicles and took down a grille. They were thus enabled to look into the corresponding cubicles in the men's lavatory next door. They saw an offence being committed and thereby were enabled to bring a prosecution.

I disapprove of the action of the police constables who carried out that action, but I totally reprobate the attitude of the senior police officers responsible. In the first place I reprobate their action because they must have encouraged the constables to go to extreme lengths to look for offences which cause offence to nobody else and then go on to take further action to obtain the evidence necessary to bring a prosecution. That is the first charge that I bring against the senior officers.

The second charge that I bring against them is that they were not ashamed to produce the evidence in open court and to disclose how it was obtained.

Without interfering unduly at the present time with the necessary discretion of chief constables to decide on prosecutions, I think Parliament and the Government might properly reprobate actions of this kind. Incidentally, this also draws attention to the importance of substituting local public prosecutors, similar to those who operate in Scotland, for the discretionary powers of the large number of chief constables in England who act, as has been indicated by the noble Lord opposite, according to entirely different principles and standards.

This story tends to confirm the belief that some senior police officers are prejudiced against homosexuals to an extent that is not justified by the law as enacted after careful consideration by Parliament.

I feel bound to draw attention to this item of news which I read in The Times. As I say, it purported to be the accurate report of legal proceedings in a magistrates' court. I am sorry to do so. I confess that I am prejudiced in relation to the police; a prejudice against which we pray every day at the beginning of our proceedings. But I am prejudiced in their favour; I admire their courtesy and courage, the combination of the two and the patience which they show in extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

But none of us is without sin and that applies to the police force just as it does to the rest of us. For those reasons I think that the Government should give careful consideration to the amendment which has been moved by the noble Lord opposite.

The Lord Chancellor

Again it falls to me to speak at this point of time. If I may I comment first on the speeches which have been delivered. I say respectfully to the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, that this has nothing to do with agents provocateurs. One must use that phrase with care. An agent provocateur is a person who encourages an offence and thereafter, if it is committed, prosecutes for the commission of it. The distasteful task which falls to the police in cases of this kind, whether in a public place, in the street or in a public lavatory is to see whether an offence is being committed. If they provoke an offence I am sure that they would provoke not only the reprobation of this House, but also the reprobation of their superiors.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

I should like to intervene to make it absolutely clear that I was in no way suggesting that there was an active intention on the part of the police officer to encourage the commission of the offence. That would be utterly reprehensible and wrong by every canon of discipline as far as his work is concerned. The point that I was making—and clearly I did not make it as succinctly as I might—was that for people who were of homosexual disposition the very presence of the police officer was in itself a provocation. It was only in that very limited sense. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for having given way.

The Lord Chancellor

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan. The reason why I ventured to say this is that the existence of agents provocateurs is admitted in certain fields. In drug offences I think it might easily be said—I do not know; I am speaking without instructions from the Home Office—that there are agents provocateurs; but not in this field as far as I know. One should use the phrase, I think, with caution and in its exact sense, because the general public is apt to think that when a couple of young police constables are ordered by their superiors to invigilate a public lavatory, or whatever, to see whether such offences are being committed, they are agents provocateurs. But they are not in any way encouraging the offence. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, for making this absolutely plain.

The second point that I should like to make is that he referred to what he called "gay" clubs. I have a private reservation about the word "gay" in this connection. "Gay" is a lovely word in the English language which I myself love to use, but I cannot use it any more because of the snigger which is always heard audibly or is seen to overspread people's faces. This amendment has nothing whatever to do with clubs: it has to do with Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, to which I will come in a moment. This has to do with public places, and a club is not a public place. I dare say that some Members of the Committee (and certainly I) have in mind a case which may or not be coming for trial; but it has nothing to do with that sort of case, which was a case of indecent assault in a private place, where different considerations apply from those which arise in this amendment.

This curious amendment provides that the evidence of an arresting police officer shall not be admissible at the trial of an offence contrary to Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 unless corroborated by evidence that some person other than a police officer was offended by the conduct of the accused and did not incite, encourage or consent to the commission of the offence. This, I think, is open to an insuperable objection. It is based, obviously, on a vague recollection of the old offence which used to apply to prostitutes in heterosexual activity who were importuning. There, the section of the statute provided that it had to be to the annoyance (or some such phrase) of the passers-by; and the unfortunate police constable had to give some absurd evidence that people turned away with a disgusted expression. It really did not do.

But that is no longer the law because that heterosexual form of prostitution has been abolished as an offence. The section of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 to which alone this amendment is directed—and I must read it out—reads as follows: It is an offence for a man persistently to solicit or importune in a public place for immoral purposes". Your Lordships will see at once that there is nothing in that section, the whole of which I have read and which occurs in a line and a half of print, about annoying other people, or other people not consenting, or whatever, or showing signs of annoyance. Therefore, the ingredients of that offence have nothing whatever to do with offence or annoyance by the conduct of the accused.

The Committee may think that that is a very bad section. It is perfectly legitimate for people to criticise that section, but this Bill is a Bill about evidence and it is not a Bill which alters the substantive nature of the offence. If you read the proposed amendment—I am sorry to put it rather bluntly—it is an amendment which causes the prosecution to prove something against the accused of which he is not accused and which does not form any part of the offence. That must be a fatal objection to this amendment.

We do not seek in this Bill in any way to alter the substantive criminal law. If we did, no doubt it would be possible to alter Section 32 of the 1956 Act. But we do seek to deal with the law of evidence and, with great respect and, using the utmost humility and, if I may say so, sympathy, you really must not, my Lords, introduce a substantive ingredient to the offence which is not there by way of making an artificial rule of evidence. It is not good enough. It is an offence against good legislation and it is outside the whole of the philosophy of this Bill.

If I may say so, the remedy proposed is not apt to the offence which happens. What is really suggested is that there should be corroboration about a matter which is no part of the offence in order to prove the offence against the defendant. The practice is I believe—I speak as one who over 50 years has had the misfortune either to appear in or listen to a number of these rather distasteful cases; I can assure whichever noble Lord it was that I am not in a mood of incandescent rage against them—for two police constables to have to give the evidence. I have never heard it done by corroboration in my experience. I think the universal practice is for evidence to be given by more than one police constable. I do not think corroboration is a test at all. I daresay—I do not know; one is old and wicked and has seen a lot of evil in one's time—that, after having fished the waters of the public lavatories of the metropolis for cottagers for a long time, it may be that some police constables become bored and feel that they have to make an arrest. I hope not, but it is conceivably possible, true. But the need for corroboration is to defeat the purpose of this section because in practice the persons who might be expected to corroborate are either non-existent or unwilling.

I shall take the obvious case, and even the unpleasant case to which my noble friend Lord Molson referred. What happens in these cases is that, if it does not occur in the stalls of the urinal, it occurs in the cubicles of the other part of the public lavatory where a hole has been drilled in the interstices of the two cubicles and various things take place, which are described in detail in the evidence. You are in fact preventing the offence being prosecuted, if what you are asking for is corroboration, because the chances of the two police constables committing perjury are relatively small, although, the world being a wicked place and I being a disgustingly old man, I recognise that it no doubt occurs sometimes. So the remedy proposed is not a satisfactory one.

The third reason I give against it—I hope that this will persuade even those who are not persuaded by my boring arguments on the merits of the appeal—is that it does pre-empt, and pre-empts piecemeal, the current work in this very area of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, which is due to report in the next few months, when I hope we may have a new light and perhaps greater wisdom on this rather unpleasant area of discussion.

So the long and the short of it is that the Government cannot support the amendment. We do not start from any prejudice which we may or may not have against homosexual offences. I think it is arguable that conduct in public lavatories and, indeed, in public places of a homosexual character is in the nature of a public nuisance. I do not think it rises much above the magistrates' court level; nor do I think it is suitable for violent denunciations about Sodom and Gomorrah. At any rate, I hope I have exhausted this painful subject without showing lubricity or undue criticism.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

I am sure we have all listened with very great care to the arguments and explanations that have been very lucidly, as always, deployed by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. We accept that the amendment is far from perfect and we certainly would not seek to press it to a Division, for a number of reasons. However, we hope that what has been said on this matter, within this Chamber and in the other place, will have the effect of much stricter guidelines being issued to police forces, or a genuine effort being made by the Home Office to bring about a more reasonable level of uniformity in relation to this matter, so that experienced officers—and they are almost invariably officers of considerable experience—have their time, in the main, better occupied when in many localities it is not necessary in relation to any feeling of public outrage for these exercises to be carried out on such a scale as they are.

We hope, too, that the Criminal Law Revision Committee will give this matter its fullest consideration, and, indeed, we are confident that that will be the case. In those circumstances, I beg the leave of the Committee to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 77 [Part VIII—Interpretation]:

Lord Hooson moved Amendment No. 160B: Page 69, line 18, leave out subsection (3) and insert— ("(3) Every criminal court shall have a power in its discretion to exclude evidence obtained by unfair, oppressive or unlawful means.").

The noble Lord said: In the context of the debate on Amendment No. 160, I am bound to say that I think there is more to commend this amendment than I thought. It has the advantage of brevity, simplicity and familiarity, because all police officers and, I think, all lawyers before the case of Sang thought that this power existed.

In the light of what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said to us during the general debate on Amendment No. 160, I wonder whether he could go so far as to say that he is in favour of an exclusion power being in the court; not to say how it is to be exercised, because, as I understand it, that is a matter he agreed to look at, but to say that there is, or should be, a residuary power in the court, wherever the onus lies, to exclude evidence in certain circumstances rather wider than was admitted in Sang. I beg to move.

Lord Airedale

I should like to support my noble friend in this amendment. One advantage of it, it seems to me, is that it gets rid of the expression "overriding interests of justice", which appears in the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, which I feel to be open to extremely wide interpretation. I believe that if you were to set down a number of hypothetical cases and circulate them to the judges, and you did not allow the judges to confer, and you said: "Kindly indicate in which cases you think that the overriding interests of justice do or do not apply", you would get an extremely wide variation in the replies.

Lord Renton

When we discussed Amendment No. 160, my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway pointed out that if something needed to be done Amendment No. 160B would be a preferable way of dealing with it. At that time I expressed doubts as to whether it was desirable that we should legislate in this way in this statute, because we have the law which has been evolved by the courts. I expressed the view that it might be better for it to continue to be evolved instead of being, so to speak, crystallised by statute. This amendment has great superficial attraction because of its simplicity. If, however, it is intended to be a statement of the present law, or a simplification of the present law, I would simply say that it is an oversimplification of the present law, as can be seen if one reads the Sang case.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

Since we approached this matter in a wider context earlier, we await with impatience the lucubrations of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor on the whole of this field of confessions and judicial control over admissions. Therefore, I shall hold whatever fire remains until we have heard the further remarks of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor on this matter.

Lord Monson

As a mere layman, I hesitate to venture on these choppy waters, but is there perhaps something to be said for adopting Amendment No. 160B, as well as some variant of Amendment No. 160, on the belt and braces principle, given that my noble and learned friend Lord Scarman made it quite clear earlier that he had no wish whatever to see the words "unfair" or "oppressive" included in whatever revised version of Amendment No. 160 he was going to move at the next stage? Is it not the case that it is desirable for the courts to have the right to exclude evidence obtained by unfair and oppressive means as well as the right to exclude evidence obtained by illegal means?

The Lord Chancellor

I do not believe that Amendment No. 160 excludes unfair and oppressive means. To some extent, as I indicated before, my hands are tied because the only instructions I have are to resist all of these amendments. However, for the reasons I gave during our earlier discussions, I do not feel that it is proper to pursue those instructions in too pedantic a way. However, what I can do is to include this amendment in my report to my right honourable and learned friend in relation to the others.

It attracts me in one way and not in another. I like its simplicity, I like its brevity and I like its absence of formality and artificiality. I ventured to say before, again expressing a purely personal opinion, that there are two elements in this matter, assuming that we have got to do something. I do not believe that the mere reference to the way in which the evidence was obtained is enough, and perhaps it is not even the right criterion. The question, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, said in Sang, must be, in whatever form one expresses it, the use to which the prosecution puts the evidence in the context of the particular trial. To take the case of Payne, to which I referred earlier, where a medical report was obtained to see whether the defendant was ill, they then proceeded to put it in to show that he was committing the offence of driving while under the influence of drink. It is the use to which the prosecution puts the evidence, which may be unfair, which is at least of equal importance and possibly of even greater importance than the way in which the evidence was obtained, which may lead to a somewhat infructuous and academic discussion.

Therefore this amendment, with the others, will be left for my right honourable and learned friend the Home Secretary. I shall make my own recommendations to him. I have probably been more candid with the Committee than I ought to have been. I hope the Committee is under no misapprehension as to what I shall really be trying to do.

Lord Hooson

With that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 77 agreed to.

Clause 78 [Establishment of the Police Complaints Authority]:

9.41 p.m.

Lord Plant moved Amendment No. 161: Page 69, line 25, leave out subsection (2) and insert— ("(2) The Police Complaints Authority (in this Part of this Act referred to as "the Authority") shall have the functions conferred under or by virtue of this Act in relation to the investigation and the supervision of investigations of allegations against police officers and related disciplinary charges against such officers.").

The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 161 and 163 are all part of the same problem: Amendment No. 163: leave out clause 79 and insert:

("Complaints to Authority. .—(1) Where a complaint such as is mentioned in subsection (2) below is submitted to the Authority in respect of a police area it shall be the duty of the Authority—

1. (a) to take such steps as appear to the Authority to be necessary for the purpose of obtaining or preserving evidence relating to the matter complained of; and
2. (b) to cause to be recorded the making of the complaint and its nature.

(2) The complaints to which subsection (1) above refers are any complaint against a member of the police force for the appropriate police area which is submitted—

1. (a) by a member of the public; or
2. (b) on behalf of a member of the public and with his consent.").

These amendments both relate to the question of independent investigation, and later amendments deal with the restoration of the full role of the Director of Public Prosecutions. They aim to remove the discretion of the chief constable to prefer disciplinary charges against a police officer where the facts disclose a criminal offence.

The Police Federation regard this Bill and its clauses on complaints as a lost opportunity. I understand that the Home Office are submitting new procedures on complaints to the Police Federation and other organisations, and there may be in this latest document some slight improvement. It will certainly be the subject of a good deal of hard bargaining in negotiation over the next few weeks.

For 50 years the Police Federation has been trying to obtain a system of discipline which is totally fair to the needs of the service and to the individual. For a number of years it had the active assistance of the right honourable Member for Cardiff South, Mr. James Callaghan. The Leader of this House the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, said at the Police Federation Conference in 1982 that in the new Bill he would not budge on the principle that, justice for the policeman was just as important as justice for the complainant". I support that sentiment completely. However, I am worried by the number of cases in which the careers of young police officers have ended with a kind of informality which really amounts to, "Resign or be sacked". I will refer here to the case in North Wales where the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor had the most scathing remarks to make about the behaviour of the chief constable for that area at the time.

Too often, young officers find themselves being forced to make statements or to submit their resignations when they are confronted by officers of much higher rank and of longer service. Earlier today, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, spoke about fair trials. Fair trials are what I am speaking about at this moment. We must insist that no man goes to judgment with his case already decided. I hold no brief for the corrupt officer, the brutal bully or the bigot; they must go.

These amendments have the full support of the Law Society, the National Council for Civil Liberties, and Justice, among others. The Police Federation feels strongly that complaints against the police should be investigated by a wholly independent body. Prior to 1981, the federation had supported the present system whereby complaints against the police have always been investigated by the police themselves. The main reason for the change of policy on the part of the federation was that the long-standing argument over police complaints will never be resolved so long as the police are seen as judges in their own courts.

That this is not the case with the present system is not the point; the public believe it to be so and no amount of alteration to the system changes that public perception. This is the fourth major change since 1964. It is essential that the policeman under question should at the outset have the active support of his federation. I am glad that the Government did give way in another place on the question of legal representation. This is all to the good. I shall be returning to that when I speak of legal costs in a later amendment, but that is a different story.

Amendments Nos. 161 and 163 make the Police Complaints Authority the body responsible for the investigation of complaints against the police, and they should employ their own investigators, find out the facts for themselves and make the report. On an earlier amendment I asked the noble Lord, Lord Elton, whether the clause then under discussion would apply to Northern Ireland. I think I ought again to ask whether he has any information about the application to Northern Ireland and, indeed, Scotland of some of the clauses that we are discussing and in particular this one. I move the amendment.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

I rise to support this amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Plant. Independent investigation of all complaints is, we believe, the basic principle on which not only the Police Federation—as my noble friend has said—but also the Law Society and the National Council for Civil Liberties are all agreed. They are bodies which are not always notorious for agreeing together on a point of principle. But this is an important matter; it is an important matter from the point of view of the police force itself. It is intended to inspire their confidence when complaints against them are being examined. Secondly, I think it will also increase the confidence of the public in a system of independent investigation, and I hope accordingly that we shall get an approving reception to this amendment from the noble Lord the Minister.

Lord Gifford

There is a crisis of confidence in the police complaints system as it now operates, and the central reason why people feel that there is no point in complaining about the police is because they do not feel there is any independence in the investigation. I welcome the fact that the Police Federation as well feel that their interests would be better protected if there were a fully independent investigative system.

When one looks at the provisions of the Bill on which we are now about to embark—even with the copious amendments which are to be put forward by the Government—I fail to see anything that will really improve the present arrangements so far as complaints are concerned. The new Police Complaints Authority is not to investigate at all; it is merely, in a limited number of cases, to supervise the investigation of the complaint, and this will be done by police officers. What capacity will the Police Complaints Authority have to interfere in any significant way in that investigation? What does "supervising" mean? It means only that some kind of imprimatur is expected to be given to the investigation of complaints by a body which really will have no capacity for judging whether that investigation has got to the truth of the complaint, whether the truth is in favour of the police or whether the truth is in favour of the complainant.

I do not know whether the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Plant, goes comprehensively enough to the root of the problem, and it may well be that if the principle were accepted a lot of other amendments would be needed to this part of the Bill, but I do hope that the Government will take on board the disquiet which is felt about the police complaints system and the feeling that their present proposals do not go anywhere near to meeting that disquiet.

Lord Elton

Making a somewhat belated debut in the proceedings today, I shall try to be as brief as I can. The police exercise a very sensitive power over the rest of us and it is necessary to the confidence of the public in them that they should see that the use of those powers is properly regulated and overseen. The police are, in a sense, the overseers of society and these amendments bring us straight up against one of the ancient conumdrums of civilised society: quis custodiet ipsos custodes?—who will oversee the overseers?

The noble Lord's amendments do not give a complete answer because they are themselves incomplete, but they would pave the way to an answer, and that answer would be different from the answer in the Bill. It would set up a system of investigation of complaints that was entirely independent of the police, such as the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, and others have espoused. I readily acknowledge the attractions of that solution.

It is essential that we establish a system in which the public and the police have confidence. What better reassurance could there be, one might ask, than taking the investigation of police conduct out of the hands of the police altogether and giving it to someone else? It is also of very great importance that the police themselves should have confidence in the system. What could be more reassuring than taking these procedures out of the hands of those who are already responsible for the very fabric and discipline of their service?

I accept the importance of public confidence and of the confidence of the service. I shall go further. I would say that that public confidence in a system for the investigation of complaints and for the correction of abuses of police powers is indispensable to the main purpose of the Bill—the establishment of a proper confidence between the communities of this country and the police forces which work for, and among, them. We must have an organisation to check whether policemen are keeping the rules.

However, before we set out, let us consider for a moment what those rules actually comprise. They embrace the whole of the criminal law and they include every provision of the police discipline code. There will be four more codes of conduct once this Bill reaches the statute book. It really requires a very rare combination of skills and experience, does it not, to oversee such an enormous range of provisions and to investigate alleged breaches of them. It is more than a rare combination; it is unique; unique, that is to say, to the police service itself.

To oversee is to supervise, and that is exactly what the Police Complaints Authority is designed and equipped to do. So here we are, back at that conundrum. Who are best at this job? The answer is the overseers themselves—the police. Any other body could come only second best to the police, and only the best will do. A decline in the effectiveness of these investigations, as even noble Lords opposite would agree, would he a disaster which we could not afford. However, if we leave investigation of complaints against the police to the police themselves, we already know that it will not suffice to quieten public fears. Therefore, an independent body must be set up with powers to oversee the professional investigation of complaints by the police, and with powers to intervene, to criticise and to report. That is why the Bill sets up the Police Complaints Authority. It will have a crucial role and I am very glad indeed that Sir Cecil Clothier has agreed to become its first chairman. Sir Cecil's record, and the status of his present office, speak for themselves. Indeed, the Home Office itself has on all too many occasions been the target of trenchant criticisms from Sir Cecil in his current post. He is due to retire as Ombudsman at the end of this year and the loss to the Parliamentary Commission's Office will be very much the gain of the authority.

Sir Cecil is being appointed to a body capable of great effect. The powers being proposed for the new authority are considerable. It will be able to approve or disapprove the choice of the investigating officer in each case, and it will stay close to the investigation throughout its course. It will wish to know how it is intended to conduct the investigation and what has been achieved at each stage. It will, where necessary, be able to order a change of direction, or a more thorough examination of points already considered.

At the end of the day it will be required to state to the complainant whether or not the investigation has been carried out to its satisfaction. I hope that the decisions of noble Lords opposite will have some relation to what I am saying to them, but it is not certain to me that they will be aware of what they are until tomorrow morning. That requirement will be a very powerful tool in ensuring that investigations are properly conducted and in reassuring the public to that effect.

The Police Complaints Authority will, I believe, come to be seen both by the public and by the police as an impartial and objective organisation, with no axe to grind; and a certificate issued by the authority at the end of an investigation to the effect that it was carried out fairly and properly will be a document of real value and reassurance to all concerned.

Those who do not want to follow that path have not established what is the organisation which can assemble the wide range of experience and skills that exist in the police for doing the work that they have to do. I cannot advise your Lordships to accept the amendment.

9.55 p.m.

Lord Renton

Although for various reasons I am strongly in favour of the attitudes of the Police Federation and have been glad to support the noble Lord, Lord Plant, in several of the amendments that he has put forward, I find it rather difficult to accept these two amendments, mainly because I do not think that they are really necessary to achieve the laudable objects that he has in mind. I say that mainly for the reason given by my noble friend Lord Elton.

As to Amendment No. 163, I feel bound to point out that it is unthinkable that the authority would not be following the administrative procedure which is envisaged in the amendment. I think that there should be some limit to the extent to which we write into a statute matters which are purely matters of administrative procedure and are unlikely to have penal or judicial effects. On this occasion, at any rate, it is with great regret that I feel bound to say that I do not quite go along with the noble Lord, Lord Plant.

Lord Plant

I greatly regret that the noble Lord, Lord Renton, cannot go along with me because he feels that there may be some lack of skill in the drafting of the amendments. All I can say is that I have been advised by eminent barristers that these two amendments are acceptable.

The noble Lord, Lord Elton, said that some of what was said was attractive to him, but at the end of his speech he was contemplating disaster. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, said exactly what I am saying in his report on the Brixton riots. I greatly regret that I cannot have his active support at the moment.

I have the greatest possible confidence in Sir Cecil Clothier. He was an eminent member of my commission on human rights in Northern Ireland for a short time. I know what a wonderful job he will do. I am sure that everyone will have complete confidence in him.

Lord Elton

I am so sorry. The noble Lord mentioned Northern Ireland, and I recall that he has twice asked me whether the provision will extend to Northern Ireland. Through forgetfulness rather than discourtesy, I did not reply. The answer is, no; it applies to England and Wales.

Lord Plant

I thank the Minister. That is helpful in one way, but not in another. However, I feel that this is such an important issue for the police that I ought to divide the House on it.

9.59 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 161) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 34; Not-Contents, 41.

DIVISION NO. 3
CONTENTS
Airedale, L.	McIntosh of Haringey, L.
Attlee, E.	Mishcon, L.
Birk, B.	Mountevans, L.
Brockway, L.	Nicol, B.
David, B. [Teller.]	Pitt of Hampstead, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.	Plant, L. [Teller.]
Elwyn-Jones, L.	Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
Elystan-Morgan, L.	Raglan, L.
Ennals, L.	Rochester, L.
Ewart-Biggs, B.	Stone, L.
Foot, L.	Taylor of Gryfe, L.
Gifford, L.	Tordoff, L.
Graham of Edmonton, L.	Underhill, L.
Hanworth, V.	White, B.
Hatch of Lusby, L.	Wilson of Langside, L.
Hooson, L.	Winchilsea and Nottingham, E.
Kilmarnock, L.
McCarthy, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Auckland, L.	Ingrow, L.
Avon, E.	Kaberry of Adel, L.
Bathurst, E.	Kinnaird, L.
Broxbourne, L.	Kinnoull, E.
Caithness, E.	Lindsey and Abingdon, E.
Carnock, L.	Long, V. [Teller.]
Cathcart, E.	Lucas of Chilworth, L.
Chelmer, L.	Macleod of Borve, B.
Cockfield, L.	Mottistone, L.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Murton of Lindisfarne, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Peyton of Yeovil, L.
Eccles, V.	Polwarth, L.
Elton, L.	Renton, L.
Ferrers, E.	Shannon, E.
Ferrier, L.	Skelmersdale, L.
Glenarthur, L.	Stanley of Alderley, L.
Greenway, L.	Trefgarne, L.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.	Trumpington, B.
	Vaux of Harrowden, L.
Hornsby-Smith, B.	Vickers, B.
Inglewood, L.	Wise, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

10.7 p.m.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 161A: Page 69, line 28, leave out ("of allegations against") and insert ("under this Part of this Act relating to the conduct of").

The noble Lord said: This is a drafting change consequential on a significant shift in the way that Part IX of the Bill is constructed. As it foreshadows many of the later Government amendments to this part, I shall explain briefly the purpose and significance of the changes.

The purpose of Clause 82 of the Bill is to enable the Police Complaints Authority, at the request of the chief constable, to supervise the investigation of cases which are not formally complaints against the police. For this purpose, it refers to "allegation". But the effect of this is that matters may be passed to the authority only if something has actually been alleged against a police officer. Since the purpose of the provision is to reassure the public that a matter of public concern is being investigated under independent supervision, it is clearly important that this supervision can begin at the earliest stage. Accordingly, the amendment which I shall move to Clause 82—that is, Amendment No. 163AM—provides that any matter may be referred to the Police Complaints Authority which appears to indicate that a police officer may have committed a criminal or disciplinary offence. An allegation will no longer be necessary. This change will significantly extend and improve the authority's area of operation. To achieve it, the term "allegations", used in Clause 78 and elsewhere in this Bill, must be changed.

What the Police Complaints Authority is concerned with is investigations into the conduct of police officers, and related disciplinary charges. Amendment No. 161B provides for the first time a proper definition of complaint, and that definition is in terms of conduct. Thus the language of much of this part of the Bill has shifted from "complaint" and "allegation" to "conduct". In addition, since "complaint" is adequately defined at the start, it has proved possible to do away with the term "Section 79 complaint". Your Lordships will see a number of amendments standing in my name which will do just that.

I think that the change will improve the Bill and make it easier to understand. There are a number of minor amendments consequential on this one. I shall refer to them as we reach them as being consequential upon the loss of the concept of "allegations". That will, I think, be more helpful than giving a little lecture each time or reciting a number of which I think your Lordships will have lost the significance by the time we reach it. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 78, as amended, agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 161B: After Clause 78, insert the following new Clause:

("Preliminary.

(1) Where a complaint is submitted to the chief officer of police for a poice area, it shall be his duty to take any steps that appear to him to be desirable for the purpose of obtaining or preserving evidence relating to the conduct complained of.

(2) After performing the duties imposed on him by subsection

(1) above the chief officer shall determine whether he is the appropriate authority in relation to the officer against whom the complaint was made.

(3) If he determines that he is not the appropriate authority, it shall be his duty—

1. (a) to send the complaint or, if it was made orally, particulars of it, to the appropriate authority; and
2. (b) to give notice that he has done so to the person by or on whose behalf the complaint was made.

(4) In this Part of this Act— complaint" means any complaint about the conduct of a police officer which is submitted—

1. (a) by a member of the public; or
2. (b) on behalf of a member of the public and with his written consent;

the appropriate authority" means—

1. (a) in relation to an officer of the metropolitan police, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; and—
2. (b) in relation to an officer of any other police force—
1. (i) if he is a senior officer, the police authority for the force's area; and
2. (ii) if he is not a senior officer, the chief officer of the force;

senior officer" means an officer holding a rank above the rank of chief superintendent.

(5) Nothing in this Part of this Act has effect in relation to a complaint in so far as it relates to the direction or control of a police force by the chief officer or the person performing the functions of the chief officer.

(6) If any conduct to which a complaint wholly or partly relates is or has been the subject of criminal or disciplinary proceedings, nothing in this Part of this Act has effect in relation to the complaint in so far as it relates to that conduct.").

The noble Lord said: The purpose of this new clause is to replace the present Clause 79. It is intended to improve on it in several significant respects. The effect of subsections (1) and (2) is that the duty on a police officer to record a complaint is distinguished from that of taking necessary preliminary investigative steps. By subsection (1) the chief officer receiving a complaint is required to take such steps, and only then, by subsection (2), to consider whether the complaint actually falls to him to investigate.

Subsection (3) provides that where he determines that the complaint does not fall to him—that is, where it is wrongly directed to him—he has two further duties placed on him: first, to ensure that the complaint gets to the right destination; and, secondly, to inform the complainant that he has sent it there.

Subsection (4), for the first time, brings the concept of conduct into the definition of "complaint". I referred to this on the last amendment. Subsection (4) also introduces the concept of the "appropriate authority"—the chief officer or police authority with responsibility for handling the complaint in question. This is the source of other amendments tabled to later clauses.

Subsection (5) excludes from the system complaints about the way in which the chief officer or acting chief officer exercises his functions of direction and control. Where the complaint is that a chief officer acted from a corrupt or unlawful motive, then this, quite properly, will come within the complaints system, but where it is a pure direction and control matter the proper method of dealing with it is for the police authority to call for a report from the chief officer, under Section 12(2) of the Police Act 1964, rather than to mount a complaint investigation.

Subsection (6) repeats, in a refined form, the existing exclusion from the system of complaints alleging conduct which is already, or has been, the subject of formal criminal or disciplinary proceedings. Clearly, if the matter has already been investigated and has resulted in a criminal or disciplinary charge, there will be no advantage in recording and investigating it as a formal complaint. That completes the changes. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 4 [The Police Complaints Authority]:

[Amendment No. 162 not moved.]

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 162A: Page 107, line 19, after ("affected") insert ("(a)").

The noble Lord said: These amendments make good a gap in paragraph 11 of Schedule 4. I hesitate, but did not the noble Earl put the Question, That the clause stand part of the Bill?, so quickly that I did not notice?

The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Earl Cathcart)

I have not yet got rid of Schedule 4.

Lord Elton

Very good; I stand corrected.

This paragraph protects the validity of the authority's proceedings where there is a defect in the appointment of a member, or a vacancy among the members, or in the office of deputy chairman; but, as drafted, it does not refer to any defect or vacancy in the office of the chairman. This amendment makes good that omission. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 162B: Page 107, line 19, leave out ("of a") and insert—

1. (i) of the chairman; or
2. (ii) of any other").

The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment I give notice that I shall move Amendments Nos. 162C and 162D en bloc, as consequential to No. 162A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendments Nos. 162C and 162D: Page 107, line 19, after ("or") insert ("(b)"); Page 107, line 20, leave out ("among the members or") and insert—

1. "(i) in the office of chairman;
2. (ii) among the other members; or
3. (iii) ").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 162E: Page 108, line 14, at end insert—

("Property, rights and liabilities

15.—(1) On the day on which section 78 above comes into operation all property, rights and liabilities which immediately before that day were property, rights and liabilities of the Police Complaints Board shall vest in the Authority by virtue of this paragraph and without further assurance.

(2) Section 12 of the Finance Act 1895 (which requires Acts to be stamped as conveyances on sale in certain cases) shall not apply to any transfer of property effected by this paragraph.

Proceedings

16. Proceedings in any court to which the Police Complaints Board is a party and which are pending immediately before the date on which section 78 above comes into operation may be continued on and after that day by the Authority.

Payments to former members of Police Complaints Board

17. Where a person—

1. (a) ceases to be a member of the Police Complaints Board by reason of its abolition; and
2. (b) does not become a member of the Authority.

the Secretary of State may, with the consent of the Treasury, make to the person a payment of such amount as, with the consent of the Treasury, the Secretary of State may determine.

General

18. Paragraphs 14 to 17 above are without prejudice to the generality of section 114(4) above.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment adds to Schedule 4 four paragraphs whose effect is to vest in the Police Complaints Authority all the property, rights, liabilities and obligations, including pending court proceedings, of the Police Complaints Board, on the day when the authority comes into being, and to enable payments to be made to persons who, because of its abolition, are no longer members of the board and who do not become members of the authority. These are transitional matters. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 79 [Complaints against police officers]:

The Deputy Chairman of Committees

The next amendment is Amendment No. 163.

Lord Plant

This amendment has already been dealt with.

[Amendment No. 163 not moved.]

The Deputy Chairman of Committees

The Question is, Whether the existing Clause 79 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord Elton

This clause has been replaced by a previous amendment and therefore I hope that your Lordships will not allow it to stand part of the Bill.

On Question, Clause 79, disagreed to.

Clause 80 (Investigation of complaints]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163ZA: Page 70, line 9, leave out from beginning to ("is") in line 11 and insert— ("(1) If a chief officer determines that he is the appropriate authority in relation to an officer, about whose conduct a complaint has been made and who is not a senior officer, he shall record it. (1A) After doing so he shall consider whether the complaint").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 163ZA and I should like also to speak to Amendments Nos. 163AC, 163AH, 163AK, 163AS, 163BA, 163BB and 163BC.

Amendment No. 163AC: Clause 81, page 71, line 8, leave out ("A chief officer of police—") and insert ("The appropriate authority—").

Amendment No. 163AH: Page 71, line 19, leave out from beginning to ("to") in line 22 and insert— ("(2) The Authority may require the submission to them for consideration of any complaint not referred to them by the appropriate authority's duty").

Amendment No. 163AK: Page 71, line 24, leave out ("chief officer's") and insert ("appropriate authority's").

Amendment No. 163AS: Clause 83, page 72, line 18, leave out ("chief officer of police") and insert ("appropriate authority").

Amendment No. 163BA: Page 73, line 15, leave out ("chief officer") and insert ("appropriate authority").

Amendment No. 163BB: Page 73, line 16, leave out ("chief officer") and insert ("appropriate authority").

Amendment No. 163BC: Page 73, line 19, leave out ("chief officer") and insert ("appropriate authority").

These amendments are all consequential upon the introduction of the concept of the "appropriate authority". I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163ZB: Page 70, line 38, leave out from first ("made") to end of line 39.

The noble Lord said: This amendment deletes some words from subsection (7)(ii) of Clause 80 because they are superfluous. I do not think that I can condense that reason further. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

10.17 p.m.

Lord Hooson moved Amendment No. 163A: Page 70, line 42, at end insert— ("() Where—

1. (a) a report submitted under subsection (8) above relates to a complaint arising out of an investigation into the commission of an offence with which a person has been charged;
2. (b) at the time the report is submitted that person has not vet been tried on that charge, or has been convicted on it; and
3. (c) the report contains any material which may be relevant to the guilt or innocence of that person on that charge;

the chief officer shall supply a copy of such material to that person and to the solicitor acting for him or who acted for him on his defence to the charge.").

The noble Lord said: I have undertaken to move this amendment on behalf of my noble friends, and with it I should like to speak also to Amendment No. 163B: Amendment No. 163B: Page 73, line 2, at end insert— ("() Where—

1. (a) a report submitted under subsection (8) above relates to a complaint arising out of an investigation into the commission of an offence with which a person has been charged;
2. (b) at the time the report is submitted that person has not yet been tried on that charge, or has been convicted on it; and
3. (c) the report contains any material which may be relevant to the guilt or innocence of that person on that charge;

the Authority shall supply a copy of such material to that person and to the solicitor acting for him or who acted for him on his defence to the charge."). Both amendments are designed to fill the notorious "hole in the middle", which was described in a letter from the Chairman of the Executive Committee of Justice to the Clerk to the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on 3rd February 1982. Perhaps I can illustrate the point that is at issue here quite simply.

An inspector, whom we call "A", is investigating a criminal offence. He investigates the matter and he arrests "B", who is charged with that offence. During the course of the investigation something happens which results in "B" making a complaint to the police authority about the behaviour of "A". Thereafter there are two inquiries: there is the inquiry in relation to the criminal offence conducted against "B" through the normal procedures of the courts, and there is the inquiry that will be subsequently conducted into the conduct of "A", the officer inquiring. Let us assume that the matter has gone to the courts against "B" and he has been convicted. Thereafter, there is the inquiry into "A's" conduct: it has been suggested that he has done something improper during the course of the investigation.

Let us assume that it is not disclosed that he has committed a criminal offence, and the investigating officer in the first instance or the police complaints authority in the second instance have, as it were, decided not to proceed any further. What has been disclosed is not revealed at all to "B's" solicitor, but it may well be that the investigation into the conduct of the police officer has unearthed evidence which would, had it been disclosed, have shown that "B" was not guilty of the offence. In other words, when this matter comes before the Home Office, they rely on the tradition that any matters revealed as a result of investigation into police misconduct are never disclosed. What we suggest is not that the report should be disclosed but that any material evidence which has a relevant bearing on the question of whether "B" ought to have been convicted should be disclosed.

I have taken a little time, even at this late hour, because clearly this is a very important matter of principle and, despite the lateness of the hour, I do not think that we should allow a matter of this importance to be passed over quite simply. This is a matter of great importance. I am sorry that I have had to resort to this means of explaining it, but it seems to me to be quite clear that a matter of principle is involved here. I cannot believe that the Home Office is right in sheltering behind the tradition that has been established over the years, that matters which are revealed by an investigation of this kind are never disclosed. I think that if material evidence is found that affects the man who has been arrested and the question of his guilt or innocence, that evidence should be disclosed.

Let me remind your Lordships that the Home Affairs Committee of the other place, following the receipt of the letter and an investigation of the matter, said in its Fourth Report for the Session 1981–82 that where a complainant is the subject of prosecution or has been convicted: all statements taken during the course of the investigation [of his complaint], appropriately edited on grounds of security, should be forwarded to the complainant's legal adviser". That appeared in House of Commons Paper 98–1 at paragraph 16, Recommendation 3. I do not suggest that in this Bill we should go as far as that. I do not think that every statement should be disclosed. All I suggest is that those matters that are relevant to the question of guilt or innocence should be disclosed. I beg to move.

Lord Elton

If I have managed to follow the noble Lord's argument, I think that I have the answer: if I have not, he will tell me. The effect of these amendments would be to require that where the subject matter of a complaint is also the subject of criminal proceedings, and where the question of guilt in those proceedings has not yet been settled, or where a person has been convicted, then any material in the report of the investigation into the complaint which is relevant to the person's guilt or innocence should be supplied to the defence.

The first point to make about this amendment is that it is most unusual for a complaint to be investigated while related criminal proceedings are in progress. The existing guidance to chief officers suggests that, save in exceptional circumstances, where a complaint and allegations involved in it are directly or closely associated with criminal proceedings which are pending, then the investigation of the complaint should be deferred. This is because the criminal proceedings take priority over the complaint and their outcome may well overtake the complaint. I think that the complications which would arise were the complaint investigation to go ahead in advance of the criminal trial will be clear to your Lordships, and I shall not dwell on them. But that is not to say that there might not be exceptional circumstances in which the investigation of the complaint goes ahead in advance of associated criminal proceedings. This could, of course, only be done where the complainant fully appreciates the possible prejudice which could result and might happen, for example, where the complaint appears so cogent that it appears doubtful whether the criminal proceedings should be continued. I shall have to refer to that again.

The context in which these amendments must be seen is the law on public interest privilege. The Court of Appeal, in the case of Neilson v. Laugharne, held that statements taken in the course of an investigation into a complaint against the police under Section 49 of the Police Act 1964 are subject to public interest immunity and could not be disclosed. Such statements are immune from disclosure not merely on the basis of their content, but as a class. The purpose of this immunity is to free those who make statements in the course of a complaints investigation from the fear that at some future time what they have said may be used against them. It might, as a result, be argued that the present amendments are necessary in case significant evidence is uncovered in the course of a complaint investigation and is accordingly not disclosed, with the result that there is a miscarriage of justice. But the Government do not believe that that would happen. In the first place, the majority of cases would not be investigated until the case had been disposed of by the courts. In the exceptional case where the investigation does precede the criminal trial, the normal obligation on the prosecution to disclose information to the defendant should suffice. As we understand the position, where the prosecution has taken a statement from the person who they know can give material evidence but decide not to call that person as a witness, they are under a duty to make that person a witness for the defence. It is our understanding that while disclosure of such material is generally prohibited on public policy grounds, the courts would not take that prohibition as applying where the disclosure would serve to establish innocence in criminal proceedings and, indeed, prosecuting authorities would not allow a person to be prejudiced by the need to protect material from disclosure in such circumstances. As Lord Justice Oliver stated in Neilson: Where disclosure is prohibited on public policy grounds, then that prohibition applies in all circumstances except to establish innocence in criminal proceedings. The term "any material" is very broad. It is right that public interest immunity should not result in the possible conviction of an innocent person, but to express this as a duty to allow disclosure where the material was relevant to a person's guilt represents a somewhat awkwardly expressed version of the principle of pre-trial disclosure of the prosecution case. The debate has shown me that this is a complex matter, but I believe it will also have shown that the amendments are superfluous and might finish up by being confusing.

Lord Hooson

The noble Lord has provided not the answer but an answer to the debate. He has not dealt with the material point. I take the point that most investigations into police conduct occur after the trial of the person who is charged with the offence, but it is surely relevant to the question of appeals out of time. If there is evidence that a miscarriage of justice has taken place, surely the matter should be disclosed. I did not follow him on the point as to whether there is machinery by which anything revealed in a police investigation that is relevant, or which could be relevant, to an appeal out of time is given to the defence so that the point can be taken up later. There may be some procedure in the Home Office by which, when this kind of information is disclosed, they take an initiative, as they sometimes do, and bring the case before the appeal courts.

But if there is not, then surely there should be some kind of provision on the matter. I do not intend to press this to a Division, but it is important.

Lord Elton

I do not think that the question of the appeal being out of time affects what I have said. I take the point that we are looking not at the majority of cases but at the hole in the middle. I recall saying that, as Lord Justice Oliver stated in Neilson: Where disclosure is prohibited on public policy grounds, then that prohibition applies in all circumstances except to establish innocence in criminal proceedings". I thought the noble Lord's anxiety was that the disclosure would not be allowed. As we understand it, and as this judgment bears out, it would be, in which case the noble Lord has what he wants to obtain.

Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge

If I was accused of carrying cannabis and was sentenced, and if I had complained that a policeman had placed it on me and after I had been sentenced it was agreed by the complaints authority that he had, surely there would be an obligation for that information to be sent to my solicitor and for my complaint to be looked at again. It seems to me perfectly clear. I do not understand this.

Lord Elton

We are talking about two different things. I have been seeking to propose that where the evidence is available then it would not be prohibited because of the public interest considerations. What the noble Lord is saying is: how would anybody know?

Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge

That is the point of the amendment.

Lord Elton

That is a different question.

Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge

It is not. It is what the amendment is about.

Lord Elton

It would be quicker if I were to take this away and consider it, but perhaps I may leave it on the record that my anxiety is that if the noble Lord is saying that there should be a computer which will throw out at the touch of a button by the clerk of the court any evidence which has been gone through in a complaints system which may be relevant to that case, that is not what I thought the amendment was aimed at. I thought it was aimed at the fact that where the evidence was known to be in existence it should not be kept out of court. I will read the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, with even more interest and rapidity than he will read me tomorrow.

Lord Hooson

I wonder whether the noble Lord would deal with it in this way? Would he be good enough to write to my noble friends Lord Donaldson and Lord Hunt, whose amendment it really was originally, well before the Report stage, so that they can reconsider the position?

Lord Elton

I will even enclose a copy with my "get well" card to Lord Hutchinson of Lullington.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

10.31 p.m.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AA: Page 71, line 1, leave out ("section 79").

The noble Lord said: With this amendment, it may be for your Lordships' convenience and delight if I speak also to Amendments Nos. 163AD, 163AF, 163AG, 163AJ, 163AN, 163A0 and 163AP.

Amendment No. 163AD: Clause 81, page 71, line 10, leave out ("section 79").

Amendment No. 163AF: Page 71, line 14, leave out ("section 79").

Amendment No. 163AG: Page 71, line 17, leave out from ("any") to second ("to") in line 18 and insert ("complaint which is not required to be referred").

Amendment No. 163AJ: Page 71, line 23, leave out ("section 79"). Amendment No. 163AN: Clause 83, page 71, line 38, leave out ("section 79").

Amendment No. 163AO: Page 72, line 1, leave out ("section 79").

Amendment No. 163AP: Page 72, line 5, leave out ("section 79").

As I said in connection with the new clause to replace Clause 79, it has been proved possible to alter the language and approach of this part of the Bill to do away with the concept of the Clause 79 complaint. This is what these amendments will do. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 80, as amended, agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AB: After Clause 80, insert the following new clause:

("Investigation of complaints against senior officers.

.—(1) Where a complaint about the conduct of a senior officer—

1. (a) is submitted to the appropriate authority; or
2. (b) is sent to the appropriate authority under section [Preliminary] (3) above,

it shall be the appropriate authority's duty to record it and, subject to subsection (2) below, to investigate it.

(2) The appropriate authority may deal with the complaint according to the appropriate authority's discretion, if satisfied that the conduct complained of, even if proved, would not justify a criminal or disciplinary charge.

(3) In any other case the appropriate authority shall appoint an officer from the appropriate authority's force or from some other force to investigate the complaint.

(4) A chief officer shall provide an officer to be appointed, if a request is made to him for one to be appointed under subsection (3) above.

(5) No officer may be appointed unless he is of at least the rank of the officer against whom the complaint is made.

(6) Unless an investigation under this section is supervised by the Authority under section 83 below, the investigating officer shall submit his report on it to the appropriate authority.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment will take a fraction longer. This new clause deals with complaints against senior officers, those above chief superintendent rank. It is intended to replace the present Clause 84 and I am also, therefore, speaking to the Motion whether that clause shall stand part of the Bill.

That clause operates by substituting "police authority" for "chief officer" in the relevant earlier provisions and, accordingly, was placed after them. This clause, on the other hand, makes substantive provision for the recording and investigation of complaints against senior officers. The clause is again based on the concept of the "appropriate authority" which was established in earlier amendments. For complaints against senior officers the appropriate authority in the Metropolitan Police will be the commissioner and in any other force it will be the police authority.

Subsection (1) provides that it is the duty of the appropriate authority to record and investigate a complaint against one of its senior officers. The duty to investigate, however, is subject to a restriction in subsection (2). The effect of this subsection is to modify the system of informal resolution of minor complaints as it affects senior officers.

Under Clause 80 a complaint is not suitable for informal resolution unless the complainant gives his consent and the chief officer is satisfied that the conduct complained of, even if proved, would not justify a criminal or disciplinary charge. The purpose of requiring the complainant's consent is to ensure that he has a veto over the complaint being dealt with informally, since in such cases there will be no independent outside check; and I know how much importance your Lordships attach to that.

For complaints against senior officers there will, except in formal terms in the Metropolitan Police, be such an outside body since the police authority will automatically be involved. In our view it is both unnecessary and undesirable to give the complainant a right of veto on such cases being handled informally, particularly because any formal investigation will have to be conducted by an officer of assistant chief constable rank or above. The effect of subsection (2), therefore, is to give this discretion to the appropriate authority.

The remaining subsections deal with the process of investigation of complaints against senior officers. Under subsection (3) the authority is required to appoint an officer either from within or from outside the force to investigate the complaint. Under subsection (4) the chief officer requested to provide an officer for this purpose is required to do so. Under subsection (5) the investigating officer is required to be of at least the rank of the officer against whom the complaint is made. This is a condition which also applies to complaints against junior officers, and under subsection (6) the investigating officer is required to submit his report to the appropriate authority unless the investigation has been supervised by the Police Complaints Authority. This clause places the arrangements for dealing with complaints against senior officers on a simpler and more logical footing. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 81 [References of complaints to Authority]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AC:

[Printed earlier: col. 984.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this with Amendment No. 163ZA. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AD:

[Printed earlier: col. 989.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this with Amendment No. 163AA. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AE: Page 71, line 11, leave out ("of a member of the police force for his area") and insert ("complained or).

The noble Lord said: This is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendments Nos. 163AF and 163AG:

[Printed earlier: col. 989.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to both Amendment No. 163AF and 163AG with Amendment No. 163AA. I beg leave to move the two amendments en bloc.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AH:

[Printed earlier: col. 984.]

The noble Lord said: This amendment was spoken to with Amendment No. 163ZA. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AI: Page 71, line 22, at end insert ("not later than the end of a period specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.").

The noble Lord said: I beg leave to speak also to Amendment No. 163AL.

Amendment No. 163AL: Page 71, line 26, leave out ("regulations made by the Secretary of State") and insert ("such regulations").

These amendments are intended to fill a slight gap in the powers of the Police Complaints Authority. Under Clause 81(3), the Secretary of State is by regulations to place a time limit on reference by the "appropriate authority" to the Police Complaints Authority of those complaints which it is required to refer. There is at present no such time limit provision on the reference of cases at the request of the Police Complaints Authority. The first of these amendments makes good the gap and the other is consequential. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AJ:

[Printed earlier: col. 989.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this with Amendment No. 163AA. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AK:

[Printed earlier: col. 984.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this with Amendment No. 163ZA. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AL.

[Printed earlier: col. 991.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this with Amendment No. 163AI. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 81, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 82 [References of other allegations to Authority]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AM: Page 71, line 30, leave out from beginning to ("by") in line 34 and insert— ("The appropriate authority may refer to the Authority any matter which—

1. (a) appears to the appropriate authority to indicate that an officer may have committed a criminal offence or an offence against discipline: and
2. (b) is not the subject of a complaint,

if it appears to the appropriate authority that it ought to be referred").

The noble Lord said: This amendment is consequential upon the loss of the concept of allegations to which I spoke in moving Amendment No. 161A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 82, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 83 [Supervision of investigations by Authority]:

Lord Elton moved Amendments Nos. 163AN, 163AO and 163AP:

[Printed earlier: col. 989.]

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendments Nos. 163AN to No. 163AP inclusive. All are consequential. I spoke to them on Amendment No. 163AA. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AQ: Page 72, line 8, leave out ("allegation") and insert ("matter").

The noble Lord said: This is consequential upon the loss of the allegation principle. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AR: Page 72, line 12, leave out subsection (3).

The noble Lord said: As your Lordships will know, Clause 82 enables the Police Complaints Authority to supervise the investigation of matters which are not strictly speaking complaints. The effect of Clause 83(3) was to enable the Authority to exercise it disciplinary powers in any such non-complaint case whose investigation it had supervised. Due to the loss of the concept of an "allegation", and the change in language from "complaint" to "conduct", this provision is no longer necessary: the Police Complaints Authority will automatically exercise its disciplinary oversight whenever it has supervised the investigation in question, whether or not it was a complaint. Accordingly, this subsection is now redundant and this amendment removes it.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AS:

[Printed earlier: col. 984.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment with Amendment No. 163ZA. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AT: Page 72, line 20, leave out subsection (5).

The noble Lord said: Clause 83(5) deals with the delegation of supervision casework by the chairman or deputy chairmen of the Police Complaints Authority to members of it. But the draftsman has advised us that the matter is already adequately covered by paragraph 10 of Schedule 4. This provision is a needless complication, and I beg to move its removal.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AU: Page 72, line 25, leave out ("investigate a complaint or other allegation the investigation or) and insert ("conduct and investigation")

The noble Lord said: This amendment is consequential on the loss of the allegation principle. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AV: Page 72, line 27, at end insert— ("(6A) If the authority impose a requirement under sub-section (6) above, it shall be the duty of the appropirate authority—

1. (a) to submit to the Authority the name of the officer proposed for appointment; and
2. (b) not to make the appointment unless the Authority give notice that they approve of it.").

The noble Lord said: I should like also to speak to Amendments Nos. 163AW and 163AY:

Amendment No. 163AW: Page 72, line 31, leave out ("the conduct of").

Amendment No. 163AY: Page 72, line 33, at end insert ("and it shall be the duty of a police officer to comply with any requirement imposed on him by virtue of the regulations.").

These amendments are designed to clarify the powers to be given to the Police Complaints Authority to supervise complaint investigations. Their main effect is to make it clear that where the authority imposes a requirement as to the choice of investigating officer or as to any other matter in relation to the investigation, there is clear duty of compliance on the chief officer or other police officer to whom this requirement applies. This is something on which I rested my case earlier, if your Lordships recall, in the debate on which we had a Division.

In addition, the first of these three amendments provides the authority's powers to approve the appointment of a particular investigating officer. The second of the amendments, by deleting reference to the conduct of the investigation in describing the authority's power to impose requirements, makes it clear that such requirements made by regulations relate also to the resources given to a particular investigation, and not simply to the manner in which it is conducted. The Government's intention is, however, that the power to be given to the authority to impose requirements as to resources shall in the regulations be subject to a duty on its part to consult fully with the chief officer. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AW:

[Printed above.]

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AY:

[Printed above.]

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AZ: Page 72, line 35, after ("officer") insert (" (a)")

The noble Lord said: I wish to speak also to Amendment No. 163AZA:

Amendment No. 163AZA: Page 72, line 36, leave out from ("and") to end of page 73 line 2 and insert—

("(b) shall send a copy to the appropriate authority.

(8A) After considering a report submitted to them under subsection (8) above the Authority shall submit an appropriate statement to the appropriate authority.

(8B) If it is practicable to do so, the Authority, when submitting the appropriate statement under subsection (8A) above, shall send a copy to the officer whose conduct has been investigated.

(8C) If—

1. (a) the investigation related to a complaint; and
2. (b) it is practicable to do so.

the Authority shall also send a copy of the the appropriate statement to the person by or on behalf of whom the complaint was made.")

As drafted, the Bill places an absolute duty on the Police Complaints Authority to send a copy of its "appropriate statement" on an investigation which it has supervised to the complainant and to the police officer concerned. To do so, however, will not always be practicable: complainants may move away and not be traceable; the investigation may fail to identify a particular officer; indeed, investigation might reveal that the person concerned was not a police officer at all. In such circumstances, it may be impracticable for the authority to comply with the requirement. In addition, where the authority has supervised the investigation of a non-complaint matter, there will be no complainant at all.

Accordingly, the effect of these amendments is that the obligation on the authority to supply a copy of its statement to both the officer complained of and the complainant apply only where it is practicable to do so. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163AZA:

[Printed above.]

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 163B not moved.]

Lord Elton moved Amendments Nos. 163BA, 163BB and 163BC:

[Printed earlier: col. 984.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to Amendments Nos. 163BA, 163BB and 163BC with Amendment No. 163ZA. I beg to move these three amendments.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 83, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 84 [Senior officers]:

Clause negatived.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163BD: After Clause 84, insert the following new Clause:

("Steps to he taken after investigation—general.

.—(1) It shall be the duty of the appropriate authority, on receiving—

1. (a) a report concerning the conduct of a senior officer which is submitted to them under section [Investigation of complaints against senior officers] (6) above; or
2. (b) a copy of a report concerning the conduct of a senior officer which is sent to them under section 83(8) above,

to send a copy of the report to the Director of Public Prosecutions unless the report satisfies them that no criminal offence has been committed.

(2) Nothing in the following provisions of this section or in sections [Steps to he taken where accused has admitted charges] to 88 below has effect in relation to senior officers.

(3) It shall be the duty of a chief officer of police, on receiving—

1. (a) a report concerning the conduct of an officer who is not a senior officer which is submitted to him under section 80(8) above; or
2. (b) a copy of a report concerning the conduct of such an officer which is sent to him under section 83(8) above—
1. (i) to determine whether the report indicates that a criminal offence may have been committed by a member of the police force for his area: and
2. (ii) if he determines that it does, to determine whether the offence indicated is such that the officer ought to be charged with it.

(4) If the chief officer determines—

1. (a) that the report does indicate that a criminal offence may have been committed by a member of the police force for his area; and
2. (b) that the offence indicated is such that the officer ought to be charged with it,

he shall send a copy of the report to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

(5) Subject to section [Steps to be taken where accused has admitted charges] (1) below, after the Director has dealt with the question of criminal proceedings, the chief officer shall send the Authority a memorandum, signed by him and stating whether he has preferred disciplinary charges in respect of the conduct which was the subject of the investigation and, if not, his reasons for not doing so.

(6) If the chief officer considers—

1. (a) that the report does indicate that a criminal offence may have been committed by a member of the police force for his area: and
2. (b) that the offence indicated is not such that the officer ought to be charged with it,

he shall sent the Authority a memorandum to that effect, signed by him and stating whether he proposes to prefer disciplinary charges in respect of the conduct which was the subject of the investigation and, if not, his reasons for not proposing to do so.

(7) Subject to section [Steps to be taken where accused has admitted charges] (1) below, if the chief officer considers that the report does not indicate that a criminal offence may have been committed by a member of the police force for his area, he shall send the Authority a memorandum to that effect, signed by him and stating whether he has preferred disciplinary charges in respect of the conduct which was the subject of the investigation and, if not, his reasons for not doing so.

(8) A memorandum under this section—

1. (a) shall give particulars—
1. (i) of any disciplinary charges which a chief officer has preferred or proposes to prefer in respect of the conduct which was the subject of the investigation; and
2. (ii) of any exceptional circumstances affecting the case by reason of which he considers that section 88 below should apply to the hearing; and
2. (b) shall state his opinion of the complaint or other matter to which it relates.

(9) Where the investigation—

1. (a) related to conduct which was the subject of a complaint; and
996
2. (b) was not supervised by the Authority, the chief officer shall send the Authority—
1. (i) a copy of the complaint or of the record of the complaint; and
2. (ii) a copy of the report of the investigation, at the same time as he sends them the memorandum.

(10) Subject to section 87(4A) below—

1. (a) if a chief officer's memorandum states that he proposes to prefer disciplinary charges, it shall be his duty to prefer and proceed with them; and
2. (b) if such a memorandum states that he has preferred such charges, it shall be his duty to proceed with them.").

The noble Lord said: In this case I hope to speak also to Amendments Nos. 163BE, I 66B, 166F, 166L, 164, 165 and 166.

Amendment No. 163BE: After Clause 84, insert the following new Clause—

("Steps to be taken where accused has admitted charges.

(1) No memorandum need be sent to the Authority under section [Steps to be taken after investigation—general] if disciplinary charges have been preferred in respect of the conduct which was the subject of the investigation and the accused has admitted the charges and has not withdrawn his admission.

(2) In any such case the chief officer shall send to the Authority, after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings (including any appeal to the Secretary of State), particulars of the disciplinary charges preferred and of any punishment imposed.

(3) If—

1. (a) the charges related to conduct which was the subject of a complaint; and
2. (b) the investigation of the complaint was not supervised by the Authority,

the chief officer shall also send the Authority—

1. (i) a copy of the complaint or of the record of the complaint; and
2. (ii) a copy of the report of the investigation.")

Amendment No. 166B: Clause 87, page 75, line 38, leave out ("85") and insert ("[Steps to be taken after investigation—general]").

Amendment No. 166F: Clause 88, page 76, line 22, leave out ("85") and insert ("[Steps to be taken after investigation—general]").

Amendment No. 166L: Clause 93, page 80, line 40, leave out ("85") and insert ("[Steps to be taken after investigation—general]").

Amendment No. 164: Clause 85, page 74, leave out lines 9 to 12.

Amendment No. 165: Page 74, line 16, leave out from ("area") to end of line 18.

Amendment No. 166: Page 74, line 27, leave out subsections (4) and (5).

This will take a little longer. In moving Amendment No. 163BD, I have given the list of what I shall speak to and that shortens matters a bit. These new clauses replacing the present clause 85 are the result of a number of significant changes in relation to the steps which must be taken following receipt of a complaint investigation report. The intention in recasting Clause 85 and dividing it in two is to present these complicated matters with greater clarity and precision.

Although, as I say, the principal purpose of the clauses is to replace Clause 85, subsections (1) and (2) in fact replace Clause 84(2). This deals with the duty to pass complaints investigation reports concerning senior officers to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Other provisions concerning complaints against senior officers are of course dealt with in the new clause which your Lordships have already approved. Subsection (1) of the present new clause repeats the duty of the appropriate authority to send the complaint investigation report to the director unless the report satisfies them that no criminal offence has been committed. Subsection (2) simply provides that the existing provisions from the rest of this clause to the end of Clause 88 have no application to complaints against senior officers. This is because the Police Complaints Authority does not have a disciplinary role in relation to complaints against senior officers. It will, of course, exercise its supervisory role over the investigation of such complaints.

Subsections (3) to (5) replace subsections (1) to (3) of Clause 85—a significant change. It concerns the handling of investigation reports which show that a police officer may have committed a minor criminal offence. The scheme embodied in Clause 85 was criticised in another place on the basis that it implied that criminal matters could be dealt with by means of internal discipline. It was argued that this was unjust and put police officers in a worse position than other members of the public. After a great deal of careful thought and discussion, we decided that the answer is to make a clear separation between the stages of criminal and disciplinary consideration.

The provisions of the new clause do this by producing a new and different test for reference to the DPP. Instead of considering whether a matter is too serious to be dealt with by disciplinary means, chief officers will he required to consider whether an investigation report discloses a criminal offence with which the officer concerned ought to be charged. It will therefore only be where a decision has been taken that the officer ought not to be charged with a criminal offence that the chief officer will be free to consider the disciplinary aspects. This makes it clear that police officers in this situation must be dealt with as any other citizen. If any offence disclosed would, in the chief officer's view, merit prosecution, then he must send it to the DPP: he cannot deal with it by way of discipline.

The great advantage of this solution is that it preserves the purpose of the original Bill's scheme, which was to relieve the DPP of a mass of cases in respect of which, in practice, there was no real prospect of a prosecution being justified at all, while removing from police officers the possibility of their being dealt with by disciplinary means for matters which should be prosecuted in court. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Plant, will agree that this new approach has advantages over that which he is proposing in his amendments, which would in effect retain the present position under the 1964 Police Act.

Subsections (6) and (7) of the clause replace subsections (5) and (6) of Clause 85. They incorporate the new test which I have described for reference of reports to the DPP: they make no other significant change to it. Subsections (8) and (9) of the clause replace subsections (8) and (9) of Clause 85. Subsection (10) is new and is designed to remedy a defect in Clause 87. Clause 87(5) is intended to ensure that disciplinary charges in which the Police Complaints Authority has a legitimate interest may be withdrawn only with its permission. The drafting was defective in not including charges that have only been proposed, as well as charges that have been both proposed and preferred. Two further amendments to Clause 87 will make equivalent changes in respect of disciplinary charges specified in a recommendation or direction from the Police Complaints Authority.

The second of the new clauses replaces subsections (4) and (7) of Clause 85. These subsections provide that the chief officer's duty to pass to the Police Complaints Authority a memorandum specifying the disciplinary charges which he has preferred does not apply where the accused officer has admitted the charges and has not withdrawn his admission. This is because the powers of the authority, like those of the present Police Complaints Board, are to recommend or direct that charges be brought where the chief officer does not propose to do so. It has no power to recommend or direct that charges should not be brought where the chief officer is minded to bring them. But the authority also has a role at this stage in requiring investigation reports to be passed to the Director of Public Prosecutions. This is the substance of the present Clause 86 and of the new clause which stands in my name to replace it.

The problem with this part of Clause 85, as drafted, is that, by imposing the duty to send the authority a memorandum, it would also have prevented the authority from being able to consider whether the report should be sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Accordingly, subsection (1) of this new clause provides that no such memorandum need be sent under those circumstances. However, subsections (2) and (3) go on to provide that in such a case the chief officer shall send to the Police Complaints Authority at the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings particulars of the charges and of any punishment and also a copy of the investigation report, if the authority did not have this already. This will enable it fully to exercise its powers of directing a reference to the DPP. The other three amendments are purely consequential.

I took the precaution of sending a note on the effects of this rather large collection of amendments to noble Lords opposite. They would have been just as complicated at half past two or three o'clock this afternoon. I hope they will be a good deal easier to understand when they are printed in the Report stage print of the Bill and that your Lordships will then be able to refer to what I have thought it right to say in extensor on the subject as an explanation of what we have done. I beg to move.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

We have, of course, read them with fascination.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 163BE:

[Printed earlier: col. 996.]

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 85 [Steps to he taken by chief officer after investigation of section 79 complaint]:

Lord Plant had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 164:

[Printed earlier: col. 996.]

The noble Lord said: This amendment is designed to bring cases more quickly before the Director of Public Prosecutions. However, in view of what the noble Lord, Lord Elton, has said about the new clause which comes after Clause 84, where there is some easement, I do not intend to move either this amendment or Amendments Nos. 165 and 166.

[Amendments Nos. 164, 165 and 166 not moved.]

On Question, Whether Clause 85 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord Mishcon

For the purpose of the record, I wonder whether the noble Lord the Minister could indicate what Bill of any Government has had the pleasure of hearing the noble Lord the Minister in charge of it state on so many occasions that he has every intention of opposing the Question, whether clauses in the Bill, as originally drawn by the Government, shall in fact stand part?

Lord Elton

I think that this is my personal best.

Clause 85 negatived.

10.55 p.m.

Lord Trefgarne moved Amendment No. 166A: After Clause 85, insert the following new clause:

("Powers of Authority to direct reference of reports etc. to Director of Public Prosecutions.

.—(1) When a chief officer of police has performed all duties imposed on him by sections [Steps to be taken after investigation—general] and [Steps to be taken where accused has admitted charges] above in relation to the report of an investigation concerning the conduct of an officer who is not a senior officer, it shall be the duty of the Authority to determine whether—

1. (a) the report indicates that a criminal offence may have been committed by that officer; and
2. (b) if so, the offence is such that the officer ought to be charged with it.

(2) If the Authority determine that the officer ought to be charged, it shall be their duty to direct the chief officer to send the Director of Public Prosecutions a copy of the report.

(3) When the Authority give a direction under subsection (2) above, they may also direct the chief officer to send the Director the information contained in the memorandum under section 85 above.

(4) If the investigation was an investigation of a complaint, the Authority shall direct the chief officer to send the Director a copy of the complaint or of the record of the complaint.

(5) It shall be the duty of a chief officer to comply with any direction under this section.

(6) Sections [Steps to be taken after investigation—general] and [Steps to be taken where accused has admitted charges] above shall apply where a copy of a report is sent to the Director under this section as they apply where a copy is sent to him under section [Steps to be taken after investigation—general] (4) above.")

The noble Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend I rise to move amendment No. 166A. This new clause replaces Clause 86, which deals with the powers of the Police Complaints Authority to direct a chief constable to pass a complaint investigation report to the DPP if he has not already done so.

It differs from Clause 86 essentially by incorporating a revised test for reference to the DPP of minor criminal allegations and by spelling out in more detail what it is that may or must be passed to him. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 86 [Powers of Authority to refer to Director of Public Prosecutions]:

Clause negatived.

Clause 87 [Powers of Authority as to disciplinary charges]:

Lord Trefgarne moved Amendment No. 166B: Page 75, line 38, leave out ("85") and insert ("[Steps taken after investigation—general]")

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Trefgarne moved Amendment Nos. 166C and 166D:

Page 75, line 42, at end insert— ("(1A) Subject to subsection (4A) below, a chief officer may not withdraw charges which he has preferred in accordance with a recommendation under subsection (1) above.")

Page 76, line 8, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert— ("(4) Subject to subsection (4A) below, it shall be the duty of a chief officer to prefer and proceed with charges specified in such a direction.

(4A) The Authority may give a chief officer leave—

1. (a) not to prefer charges which section [Steps to be taken after investigation—general] (10) above or subsection (4) above would otherwise oblige him to prefer; or
2. (b) not to proceed with charges with which section [Steps to be taken after investigation—general] (10) above or subsection (1A) or (4) above would otherwise oblige him to proceed.")

The noble Lord said: With your Lordships permission I shall speak to these two amendments together. These amendments replace Clause 87(5), which is intended to ensure that disciplinary charges in which the Police Complaints Authority has a legitimate interest may be withdrawn only with its permission. I beg to move these amendments en bloc.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

[Amendment No. 166E had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]

Clause 87, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 88 [Disciplinary tribunals]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 166F:

[Printed earlier: col. 996.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment with Amendment No. 163BD. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 88, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 89 [Information as the manner of dealing with complaints]:

Lord Trefgarne moved Amendment No.166G: Page 78, line 7, leave out from ("the") to end of line 8 and insert ("working of sections [Preliminary] to 87 above in relation to the force.")

The noble Lord said: This is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 89, as amended, agreed to

Clause 90 agreed to.

Clause 91 [Reports]:

Lord Trefgarne moved Amendment No. 166F: Page 78, line 36, leave out ("complaints against police officers") and insert ("their functions").

The noble Lord said: This is another drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Trefgarne moved Amendment No. 1661: Page 79, line 10, leave out from ("of") to ("and") in line 12 and insert ("sections [Preliminary] to 90 above").

The noble Lord said: This is a consequential amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 91, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 92 [Restrictions on disclosure of information]:

Lord Trefgarne moved Amendment No. 166J: Page 79, line 28, after ("complaint") insert ("or any matter referred to them under section 82 above").

The noble Lord said: This amendment reflects the fact that as the Police Complaints Authority is interested in cases arising other than as formal complaints, so the restrictions on the disclosure of information by its members and staff must go wider also. It prevents the improper disclosure of information about "non-complaint" matters referred under Clause 82. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 92, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 93 [Complaints regulations]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 166K: Page 80, line 31, leave out ("allegations") and insert ("matters").

The noble Lord said: This is a drafting change consequential on the loss of the concept of "allegation". I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 166L:

[Printed earlier: col. 996.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment with Amendment No. 163BD. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 93, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 94 agreed to.

Clause 95 [Discipline regulations]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 166M: Page 83, line 6, after ("under") insert ("section 1 of").

The noble Lord said: With your Lordships' permission, may I also speak to Amendments 166N, 166P and 166Q, and move them en bloc.

Amendment No. 166N: Page 83, line 8, leave out from beginning to ("to") in line 9 and insert— (" (a) subject to paragraph (aa) below, for references to a deputy chief constable or an assistant chief constable of references").

Amendment No. 166P: Page 83, line 13, leave out ("and").

Amendment No. 166Q: Page 83, line 13, at end insert— ("(aa) for the reference in subsection (5) to a deputy chief constable of a reference to an officer of the City of London police force holding a rank such as is mentioned in paragraph (a) above but who is not the officer who has taken the decision mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection; and").

The first of these amendments corrects a drafting slip and the others clarify matters relating to the delegation of discipline functions in the City of London Police. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 95, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 96 [Representation at disciplinary proceedings.]:

Lord Plant moved Amendment No. 167: Page 83, line 22, at end insert ("such legal costs to be paid from public funds.").

The noble Lord said: I shall be brief. The Police Federation are, very naturally, glad that the Government conceded legal representation but, of course, legal representation in certain circumstances can be a very heavy penalty financially, especially if the officer happens to be completely innocent.

This amendment seeks to ensure that legal costs be paid from public funds. The Association of Chief Police Officers obtains payment from public funds in many cases in which they are involved. Prisoners, incidentally, have assistance before prison boards from public funds. All the police in Europe, the United States, Canada and many parts of the Commonwealth have legal assistance paid for from public funds. I feel that it would be wrong for this country, having conceded the right of legal representation to members of police forces, to deny payment from public funds. If my amendment does not succeed, I should very naturally support the one put down by the noble Lord, Lord Renton. I beg to move Amendment No. 167.

Lord Renton

I should like strongly to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Plant. One must bear in mind that a police officer who finds himself in this position may, long before disciplinary proceedings take place, have found himself suspended, and he may of course be deprived of promotion. Although it may not happen at that stage, his expectation of promotion may have faded somewhat into the background.

Before the stage of disciplinary proceedings is reached, he is almost certain to have incurred personally considerable expense for legal advice and representation. It would seem to be right that he should at least have equal treatment with an accused person in a criminal court; and on many occasions—in fact, for most cases tried on indictment—the court would have ordered legal representation at public expense for the accused person. I think it would be quite wrong, therefore, to deprive a police officer of the same opportunity.

It is tempting to say that Amendment No. 168 should be considered at the same time as this one in order to save your Lordships' time, but quite frankly it deals with a quite different point.

Lord Hooson

I am bound to say that the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Plant, and the noble Lord, Lord Renton, appear to me to be absolutely right, and we support them.

Lord Elton

When my right honourable friend introduced this clause in another place it was in recognition of the genuine concern felt by many police officers that they should not be at risk of losing either job or rank without having had the opportunity of a lawyer to present their cases for them. It was certainly not because police officers facing disciplinary charges were in any sense disadvantaged compared with the majority of the working population. Legal representation at an internal disciplinary hearing before an employer is still the exception rather than the rule and the effect of these amendments would be to turn a perfectly justifiable position into one of privilege for members of the police service.

Your Lordships will remember that in practice police officers appealing against disciplinary findings or punishments have their legal and other costs paid from public funds. That, in itself, is an unusual advantage. But which group of workers has the cost of a first hearing paid for from public funds, whether or not they are successful? In virtually all fields of employment it is for the employee himself, or for his trade union or staff association, to pay the costs. I am afraid we are not persuaded that police officers should be particularly picked out for advantage in this respect. The Bill provides a right for them to elect for legal representation. They are not required to do so, but if they choose to, it should be for them or their staff association to foot the bill. Therefore, I am not persuaded by the arguments of my noble friend.

Lord Renton

I find this very surprising indeed. In effect, my noble friend is saying that the Police Federation should pay these costs. The police officer concerned may not have any kind of service contract with the Police Federation requiring the federation to pay. Frankly, I am not sure of the position and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Plant, can help on what is the contractual position between a police officer and the Police Federation.

With respect to the argument put forward by my noble friend, I do not consider that it is relevant. The point is that this is a disciplinary charge brought against a police officer which may or may not succeed. Very much is at stake. The allegations against him might be quite serious, as we have known from our discussions on earlier parts of this Bill. As I said earlier, it seems to be wrong that he should be at a disadvantage compared with other members of the public. My noble friend is saying that we are giving him a privilege compared with other members of the public. That I am unable to understand.

Lord Elton

I cannot understand my noble friend, but perhaps we can between us understand each other's position. A police constable in court on a criminal charge is not what we are discussing. We are talking about disciplinary charges internal to his service. I do not know of any other service which provides the privilege which the noble Lord seeks to give to policemen. Perhaps he can tell me which service he has in mind.

Lord Renton

I can, and very quickly. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, with his long experience, will be able to support me in this. We both were in the Army. I think my noble friend Lord Elton was, too. When there was a court martial the officer or soldier concerned was always represented free of expense to himself by lawyers within the Army's legal service, and very distinguished lawyers they sometimes were. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, had great experience and distinction in that field during the war.

With great respect to my noble friend, I do not think that this has been thought through by the Home Office. I feel that the noble Lord, Lord Plant, would be fully entitled to ask my noble friend to take back the amendment and have another look at it. I am not impressed by the arguments used.

Lord Elton

I shall add only one thin, reedy, sentence or two to what I have already said to my noble friend. I am not sure that the Army is a good comparison.

Lord Renton

It is a disciplined service.

Lord Elton

So are the fire brigade and the prison service. There are many others. It seems to us that these amendments would put the police in a position different from members of almost any other service.

As to courts martial, they are a quasi-criminal jurisdiction, with powers to impose criminal penalties. It is therefore quite right that soldiers exposed to criminal prosecution in a quasi-criminal court should have the same privileges as policemen would have if they were in a civil court.

Lord Renton

There are many disciplinary cases in which the line between a disciplinary charge and a criminal charge is very blurred.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

I, too, share the sense of disappointment of the noble Lord, Lord Renton: and may I say what a pleasure it is every now and again to be able to agree with a point made by the noble Lord, although we disagree on certain matters?

As I see it, the argument is this. The position of a police officer vis-à-vis his controlling authority can in no way be equated to the position of an ordinary employee in relation to his employer. It is because of the fact that the police officer is in constant contact with the public that he is in a wholly unique situation. Although what he is charged with may not be a criminal offence, what he has to face is in many respects a public accusation. I venture to suggest, with great respect to the noble Lord the Minister, that that distinguishes the police officer from all the other instances that he has given.

It may be said of the amendment that it is slightly too generous in that it goes beyond the position that is enjoyed by a successful defendant. Under the Crown Court rules, all that the successful defendant has on indictment is the discretion of the court, which would always be exercised in his favour unless he had been the architect of his own misfortune. I am sure that neither the noble Lord, Lord Plant, nor the noble Lord, Lord Renton, would disagree if an additional proviso were to be placed side by side with the amendment.

I beg the Minister to reconsider very carefully the arguments that have been put forward and to regard the police officer as occupying a unique position in a situation where he is vulnerable to a public accusation. That is very different from the ordinary situation of employee and employer.

Lord Wilson of Langside

Surely the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, has put his finger on the point when he says that the police officer is in a unique position, which is surely Lord Renton's point. I hope, too, that the noble Lord the Minister will have another look at this.

11.13 p.m.

Lord Elton

I cannot say that I see tremendous compulsion or force in the argument that a police constable is special in that way. I thought I heard the noble Lord, Lord Plant, say that prison officers had their legal costs paid, but they do not actually have legal representation in disputes.

Lord Plant

Prisoners.

Lord Elton

I think we would all agree that prisoners are in a special category. Their resources are rather less than those of either policemen or the Police Federation. I do not think that that is a good example. Certainly anybody in any walk of life who is accused of misconduct, if that accusation becomes public, is subject to some embarrassment. But what we are talking about is not paying for embarrassment. We are talking about costs. The expenses of legal representation which have been granted to the police for their own election, at their own request, seem to me to be no different in kind or quantity from the costs of firemen, prisoner officers or members of any other disciplined and uniformed service, or indeed many other services which are not uniformed.

I think that the noble Lord, Lord Plant, may wish to consider between now and Report whether he can discover other ways in which he can distinguish between policemen and the rest of the community, who have to bear these costs and who wish to regard themselves as being the equals of policemen before the law.

Lord Renton

I do apologise for coming in yet again but I think the crux of this matter was hit upon by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, when he referred to the police force as being vulnerable. The police force are unique in that they are the only general law enforcement body in this country. We all rely upon them. We pass laws week after week in Parliament but it is the police who are going to have to enforce them and very frequently that requires great courage, strength of character and ability. Of course they are bound to fall foul of members of the public who are unwilling to co-operate with Parliament in the carrying out of the law or the enforcement of the law by the police.

That being so, the police are for that reason in a special position. It could be said that customs officers—

Lord Elton

As we want to move this on, will the noble Lord be kind enough to tell me why the fact that a member of the public may not co-operate with the police should render a policeman liable to disciplinary proceedings?

Lord Renton

With deep respect, I have not said that at all. What I have said is that the police are responsible for law enforcement. In carrying out their responsibilities they may find that members of the public are unwilling to co-operate and, not only that, are prepared to make complaints against them which may or may not be justified. I can tell my noble friend from experience just as he knows from Home Office experience—my experience is much older than his but just as fresh in my mind—and the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan can bear me out, that it came to our knowledge that complaints against the police are exceedingly numerous. A very large number of them are frivolous. Others appear on the face of it to have some substance and have to be investigated. Still others will lead to disciplinary proceedings which may or may not result in the police officer having been found guilty of—whatever we care to call it—misconduct.

However, the truth is, as the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan said, that for this reason the police are vulnerable. Perhaps the better they do their duty the more vulnerable they are. Perhaps my noble friend would bear that in mind. I think this is a matter which we should not decide at this late hour. We, and I hope my noble friend, will want to consider carefully what has been said by other noble Lords on this matter. My advice to the noble Lord, Lord Plant, would be, whether or not be gets an undertaking from my noble friend Lord Elton—and I hope he will give an undertaking—to withdraw his amendment tonight so that we may come back to it in the hope that the Home Office will see the matter in a different light by Report stage.

Lord Hooson

If I can be of assistance, I was just wondering whether the noble Lord, Lord Elton, would regard the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Renton, as a compromise on this matter and an acceptable one, because on that particular amendment it seems to me that the police officer has not been distinguished from members of other forces. He has the right to be represented in certain circumstances. I notice that that amendment says, and has been acquitted of the charge or charges". It states not that he has not been dismissed or that he has not been reduced in rank, which are the qualifying conditions for legal representation, but that he has actually been acquitted of the charges. If that is so, and therefore the charge is found to be completely unjustified—not as reflected in the punishment but simply in the charges being dismissed—it seems to me as a matter of common justice that he should—

Lord Elton

Is my noble friend prepared to speak to his other amendment or are we covering the ground sufficiently closely to take it?

Lord Renton

I was very much hoping that we might receive a clear indication of the Government's view of this first amendment. I really feel that that does stand on its own. As the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, has mentioned, I have regarded my amendment not so much as a compromise amendment as a fall-back amendment, if that is not too subtle a distinction.

Lord Elton

We must obviously draw this discussion to a conclusion. I want to put my cards on the table and start by saying that I should not want it thought that I believed the police any less splendid and admirable people than my noble friend does. We vie with each other in our regard for the police. But, in a case like this, we must view the matter impartially. I look at it impartially, and I see that the police already have the protection of a stringent discipline code that protects them from summary dismissal and unfair dismisssal to an extent far beyond anything in most other forms of employment.

I find that most other employees in similar conditions have no such privilege as access to the public purse to defend them from charges, that may or may not be justified, of improper conduct within the force. I then look at the question of scale. I see that there are about 16,000 complaints a year at present. Of these, about 250 lead to disciplinary proceedings and of all disciplinary hearings, less than one-tenth lead to loss of job or rank. That gives a picture of the scale. I would be absolutely astonished beyond measure if I were to learn that the Police Federation, which is not destitute, refused to do what other trade unions and associations do for their members and pay the legal expenses of its members when they are incurred in this way.

I do not honestly think that my heart is wrung by the appeal that has been made. I do not think that it makes one look very hard hearted to ask your Lordships to look at policemen as you look at other people. Having said all that, I shall, of course, read the debate, as will my right honourable friend, with close interest. I hope, however, that noble Lords opposite and all around me will do the same because I think that the initiative may lie with them if they want to pursue it further.

Lord Plant

I am very disappointed at the attitude taken by the noble Lord, Lord Elton. Of course, the Police Federation will back its members. There is no question about that at all. It has fought for a long time to get legal representation, and the Government conceded this in another place. They would not concede the payment of legal expenses. Now, in the final court, we are making a further appeal to the Government.

The noble Lord asks about the difference between the policeman and anyone else. I thought that the noble Lord. Lord Renton, put this firmly. Of course, it is a disciplined force. They have no right to strike. They are vulnerable. The public do make complaints—frivolous complaints—that have no foundation in fact. Then, when it comes to disciplinary proceedures, the policeman himself has to pay for legal representation. That is wrong. The chief police officers do not pay: the state pays. I do not think that there is any difference, and unless—

Lord Elton

The noble Lord adduces the case of the senior officers. But the regulations in that case provide for disciplinary charges to be drawn up by an independent solicitor. So the person facing the charges is already up against legal advice. It is right that the balance should be kept.

Lord Plant

That is splitting hairs. All that I can say is that the policeman who is pounding the pavement will think that you are leaning towards the chief constable and not to the man in the lower ranks. I do not want to divide the House. Yet I can see that if the noble Lord is let off the hook at 11.30 p.m., he will recover his composure tomorrow and be just as difficult at Report stage. I think therefore that I must ask the Committee to vote on this.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

I wonder whether I might ask my noble friend Lord Plant to reconsider the question of having a Division now, and to keep his powder dry for another occasion. I make the same appeal to the noble Lord, Lord Renton.

Lord Renton

If the matter is voted upon now, in effect it will be closed, and very possibly closed against this amendment; whereas, if we take the advice of my noble friend Lord Elton that he and we should study what has been said and come back to it at Report stage, the matter will remain open and there may be some advantage in that. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Plant, will not press this matter to a Division now, though I am on his side in this.

Lord Plant

I am steadfastly on the side of the police in this matter, but I am persuaded that perhaps the correct thing for me to do is to withdraw the amendment, to enter into these discussions and come back at Report stage, I hope with something very satisfactory. If not, I will have to fall back on the other amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Renton. I would hope it would have a much easier ride than mine has had.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Renton moved Amendment No. 168:

Page 83, line 22, at end insert— ("Where an officer has so elected and has been acquitted of the charge or charges, he shall be reimbursed the cost of his legal representation from Public Funds.")

The noble Lord said: In view of the discussion we have just had, I can move this amendment very briefly. As I said, this is really a fall-back amendment, but surely it is one which should commend itself to your Lordships, because, in common justice, in circumstances in which an officer has elected to be tried, as he may so elect under this clause, and has then been acquitted, it would seem wrong that he himself, or, indeed, the Police Federation, should have to bear the brunt of paying the costs of a disciplinary charge which was found to be unfounded. It seems to be so plain that I do not think I need say more than that I beg to move.

Lord Elton

I think that perhaps I do not need to say more than that I shall look at this at the same time as I look at the other matter. The noble Lord will recognise that it has certain advantages over the other matter, though they may not altogether commend it to me.

Lord Renton

May I thank my noble friend Lord Elton for his immediate proposition, which I accept gladly, and congratulate him on it? I beg leave to withdraw the amendment

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 96 agreed to.

Clause 97 [Disciplinary appeals]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 168A: Page 86, line 6, leave out ("or") and insert ("on").

The noble Lord said: This amendment is to correct a printer's error. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 168B: Page 87, line 6, after second ("the") insert ("person or").

The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 168C.

Amendment No. 168C: Page 87, line 40, after ("the") insert ("person or").

These amendments are made to reflect the fact that under paragraph 3(5) the Secretary of State may appoint a single person to hold an inquiry into a disciplinary appeal by a senior officer. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 168C:

[Printed above.]

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 97, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 98 agreed to.

Clause 99 [Guidelines concerning discipline, complaints etc.]:

11.29 p.m.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 168D: Page 88, line 19, leave out from ("functions") to end of line 22 and insert—

1. ("(a) under this Part of this Act; and
2. (b) otherwise in connection with discipline.")

The noble Lord said: With your Lordships' permission, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 168E.

Amendment No. 168E: Page 88, line 24, at end insert— ("(1A) Guidance may not be issued under subsection (1) above in relation to the handling of a particular case.")

The first of these amendments is consequential on the change in language which other amendments have made to this part of the Bill. It enables the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police on any matter arising under Part IX, rather than in relation only to complaints and allegations. The other amendment, however, places a necessary limitation on the power to issue guidance by making it clear that it may not relate to the handling of a particular complaint or discipline case. This is to ensure that this provision cannot be used as a means of ministerial interference in individual cases, and I expect it to be welcomed warmly from the Benches opposite.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 168E:

[Printed above.]

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 99, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 100 [Arrangements for obtaining the views of the community on policing]:

Lord Elystan-Morgan moved Amendment No. 168F:

Page 89, line 10, at end insert— (" () Such arrangements shall include the establishment and operation of a Consultative Committee for each police area, and Schedule [Police/Community Consultative Committees] shall have effect in relation to such Consultative Committees.")

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 168F and I should like also to speak to Amendment No. 176B.

Amendment No. 176B: Before Schedule 6, insert the following new Schedule—

("SCHEDULE POLICE/COMMUNITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEES

1. The Committee may consider any matter directly or indirectly connected with the policing of its area and make recommendations thereon to the chief police officer for that area, to the police authority and any local authority. Any such recommendations shall be given in writing to the chief police officer or local authority and to the police authority for that area.

2. The chief police officer for the area shall consult the committee on the policing policies, priorities and methods of his force.

3. The chief officer of police will, except in exceptional circumstances, inform the Committee in advance of any significant change in the policies, priorities or methods of his force or of any planned major police operation, unless to do so would impair the effectiveness of that operation.

4. The Committee shall meet not less than four times in each year.

5. All meetings of the Committee shall be open to the public. Members of the public may, at the discretion of the chairperson, be allowed to address the meeting.

6. Any ten members of the Committee may call a special meeting of the Committee in response to, or in anticipation of, an exceptional policing matter of concern to the parties.

7. The Committee may ask for reports from any chief officer of police and any local authority represented on it.

8. The Committee may, with the consent of the chief officer of police, request the attendance of, and put questions to, any other police officer in the area.")

The purpose of this amendment is to make it incumbent upon police authorities to establish consultative committees for each police area. Amendment No. 176B sets out in schedule form the parameters within which such bodies will operate and what their main functions will be.

Following the recommendation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, in his report on the Brixton disorders, that consultative committees should be established throughout the country, the Home Secretary issued a circular in June 1982 asking all police authorities, and the Metropolitan Commissioner as far as London is concerned, to establish such committees in their area. The circular made certain recommendations—for example, who should be the members of such committees and what they might discuss—but stated that decisions on such matters should reflect local conditions. The circular made clear, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, had done, that consultative committees would not have any control over the chief constables and nor would they be in any way accountable to the committees.

As far as Clause 100 of the Bill is concerned, it certainly goes some part of the way towards achieving that purpose. Subsection (1) says: Arrangements shall he made in each police area for obtaining the views of people in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area and for obtaining their co-operation with the police in preventing crime in the area". That is extremely wide. It can vary in the same way as the length of the foot of each chief constable varies. It might mean a body exactly the same as is proposed in this amendment; it might mean nothing more than the occasional opinion poll. The purpose of the amendment is to see to it that the Scarman proposals, and indeed the recommendations of the Home Secretary in 1982, are carried out throughout the police authorities of England and Wales. I beg to move.

Lord Inglewood

I should like to ask just one question as regards the size of these committees. There is reference to an "area" in the clauses, but there is no reference to sub-committees or sub-areas. It seems to me that a police area—the area for which an authority is responsible—could be a very large area. If there is only one committee, such as I see in the Bill, the distances will be so great that there will be very little personal contact between the committees and the people who are interested in the policing of their area. Could it be made clear that it is possible to have sub-committees as well as single committees?

Lord Elystan-Morgan

Although the schedule sets out the parameters, there is complete flexibility; there is no reason why such a body should not, amoeba-like, split itself up into various parts to meet the needs of each locality.

Lord Gifford

Clause 100 deals with a very important topic: the need for the police to consult with people in a community. But it deals with it in a way which is so vague, so generalised, that I fear that it will only count as a token gesture towards consultation and will really make very little difference at all.

All that is said in the clause as printed is that there should be "arrangements". I hope that the noble Lord the Minister, in replying to this amendment, will give us some idea how the Government expect these arrangements to work and how they can be sure that they will work effectively. Nothing is said in the clause about the responsibility of the chief constable or his officers towards these arrangements. The chief constable is not even obliged to attend the meetings or to send an officer to them. Indeed, the meetings themselves are not mentioned in the clause.

As for the information which the police are to give to the public when these arrangements are worked out, the clause is absolutely silent as to what information, if any, the public will be vouchsafed. A chief constable who does not believe in consultation will be able to get away with saying nothing and the merest gesture towards arrangements, even though the police authority may set up some system.

As regards London, the position is even more bizarre because the person who is to make the arrange- ments is the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, after having received guidance from the Secretary of State. No attempt is made to give the metropolis some kind of body—and one is not here necessarily entering into the whole question of the need for a London police authority—which can independently take responsibility for consultation processes in London.

Therefore, unless something is added to this Bill whereby these arrangements can have some teeth and can work, I fear that this clause is only a pious hope, and for that reason I support the amendment which has been moved to put some teeth, some terms of reference and some kind of framework into this new proposal.

Lord Elton

The reply of the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, to my noble friend Lord Inglewood gave me a little reassurance, but I still have grave doubts about what the noble Lord proposes, compellingly attractive though it is at first blush. The amendment proposes the establishment of a consultative committee for the whole force area which, under the new schedule, would have extensive powers and responsibilities. The area is the police area, and is defined by Section 62 of and Schedule 8 to the Police Act 1964 to mean the area for which a police force is maintained. It is the whole area. As the essence of consultation consists of local consultation and people getting to know the local police—and, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, not necessarily the chief constable or the commissioner, because he cannot spend his time going round to village meetings—it depends on the size of the area.

Our philosophy—and I recall its early stages, and the time we have spent discussing it—is that it is quite wrong to set out a single pattern for every part of the country, because the rural differs from the urban and the depressed and deprived differs from the affluent. There will be a need for different arrangements in different places. That is why the guidelines which were issued by the previous Home Secretary in 1982 suggested that there might be separate arrangements in each police division or subdivision, or that they might be based on a district or even a parish council.

This arrangement seems to be an extension of the principles on which Clause 100 is based. Effective policing depends on the support of the public. Such support can only be sustained by a regular exchange of views and concerns between the police and the local community. It may seem logical to extend local arrangements for ensuring that police priorities and objectives are in line with local needs to the force area as a whole, but in practice there are difficulties in a consultative committee which may have to cover an area as large as the three counties of the Thames Valley Police. The subcommittees would form a very big committee indeed when they came together.

Again, I wonder whether the noble Lord is right to address his plan to the single unit of construction. It cannot properly consider the policing problems of particular localities with the same knowledge, experience and degree of interest as would emerge from a consultative committee which covers a part of a large city, a small town or an even smaller area. I have already said that it is the "localness" of the consultation which gives it its greatest value.

This is where practical steps can be taken to combat vandalism, to reduce street parking or to combat burglary. These are the problems which concern people in their daily lives. That is not to say that there will not be need for larger committees to cover larger areas at a higher rank. We wish to leave that option open. That is why the clause has the flexibility which the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, has labelled as vagueness. That vagueness—if that is what it is—may be a strength. There are safeguards built into it.

I cannot remember which noble Lord suggested that there might be an occasional public opinion poll as a kind of nod towards the consultative process, but let us look at the power that the Secretary of State has under subsection (10). If it appears to the Secretary of State that arrangements in a police area are not adequate for the purposes set out in sub-section (1) above, he may require the body or person whose duty it is to make arrangements in that area to submit a report to him concerning the arrangements. Subsection (11) states: After considering the report the Secretary of State may require the body or person who submitted it to review the arrangements and submit a further report to him concerning them. We are anxious not to have a dirigiste system. I think noble Lords opposite would not want the Home Secretary to write to a police authority and say, "These are the arrangements you shall have", because the Home Secretary cannot have the necessary level of local knowledge always to get it right. But he should be able to say, "These are arrangements which are not satisfactory". Clearly the kind of arrangements which the noble Lord suggested might arise.

Therefore I ask your Lordships to consider whether what is in Clause 100 is not rather better than what is in the amendment, though I recognise the considerable thought that has gone into the amendment itself. I wonder whether what is intended in the clause is not close to what is intended in the amendment? Perhaps the noble Lord would care to reflect further on that. I think I have given him grounds to consider whether he might not at least improve his amendment.

Lord Hooson

We on these Benches are convinced that the Government are right in their approach on this matter. The clause as drafted presents much more scope for flexibility than does the amendment. For London the clause contains what is an indication of the thinking of the Government on the matter which might form a model for other areas, though in a police area such as my own, which is extensive, but has a sparse population, any arrangements should surely be different from those for London. The indications in regard to London are a sign that the Government have in mind what noble Lords on the Opposition Front Bench want to achieve and they present a greater hope of achieving it.

Lord Pitt of Hampstead

The Bill as drafted is a little too lax. What is needed is a coming together between the flexibility that Clause 100 gives and the tighter approach of the amendment. I recognise that the chances are that my noble friend will withdraw the amendment, but I should like the Government to give a little thought as to whether Clause 100 could be drawn a little more tightly than it is at the moment. It is a little too flexible.

Lord Elton

The noble Lord, Lord Pitt, is fairly familiar with an area of London I know fairly well, Brixton and Lambeth. Does he not think that the consultative arrangements there, without any rigid direction or statutory base at all, have led to the most remarkable task being performed in terms of improving police and public relations? Is this not a good indication of what may happen?

Lord Pitt of Hampstead

Yes, Lambeth is good. What we want are more Lambeths. Merely leaving things as they are will not give us more Lambeths. It is because of that that I said there is a need for a meeting between the flexibility that the Government are advocating and the tighter approach of the amendment. Rather than merely be so happy that Lambeth has worked, the noble Lord should try to consider whether we can get more Lambeths.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

I have listened with great respect and interest to what the noble Lord the Minister has said. I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, that Clause 100 is not to be dismissed lightly. It tries to set out a broad pattern for the whole of England and Wales. I suspect also that, as far as the pattern in the London boroughs is concerned, it may be possible, within the provisions of Clause 100 and with the determination of the Home Secretary of the day, to have that interlocking agglomeration of bodies operating in the metropolitan police district. But I suspect, too, that for the rest of England and Wales there may be many bald patches where the provisions of Clause 100(1) will be only very scantily applied. It is in the hope that it might be possible to set up some structure for every police area that would be responsible within that structure for constructing some sort of seamless web of different bodies, differing according to the needs of each locality, that we have put forward this amendment. I hope very much that the Minister will reflect upon that aspect as well.

Lord Elton

We are all trying to be as quick as we can, but I do not want to let a point go by. The noble Lord has suggested, using very relevant terms, that the purposes of subsection (1) might sometimes be very thinly met—in other words, inadequately met. Those are exactly the words that give the Secretary of State power to intervene under subsection (10). So we have not overlooked this. What the noble Lord is saying, and perhaps he should say it more openly, is that he does not trust the Secretary of State in the future.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

No.

Lord Elton

It is a reasonable position: it is not mine. He would not trust some future Secretary of State to carry out his function under the Bill properly to see that there are not bald patches. This is surely the area of Clause 100 at which he should look most closely.

Lord Pitt of Hampstead

What is required is that the final action of the Secretary of State should be firmer than is brought out in Clause 100. This is what I was trying to say in the midst of my remarks. There is the power to say, "Give me a report. I am not satisfied with this report, give me another report". We want something else after that—at least, I think I do.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

It is much too late to go into any considerable detail, though it is tempting to turn to. The matter is one that we might return to on another appropriate occasion, but tonight I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 168G not moved.]

Clause 100 agreed to.

11.48 p.m.

Lord Inglewood moved Amendment No. 169: After Clause 100, insert the following new clause:

("Special Constables.

.—(1) In section 16(1) of the Police Act 1964 for the words from "may" to "area" there shall be substituted the words "shall appoint special constables for that area subject to the approval of the police authority for that area".

(2) After section 16(2) of the Police Act 1964 the following subsection shall be inserted— (2A) The establishment of special constables for a police area shall not fall below one quarter or exceed one half of the establishment of the police force for that area the number appointed within such limits being subject to the discretion of the chief constable.

(3) In section 46(2) of the Police Act 1964 after the word "members" there shall be inserted the words "including special constables" and after the words "police cadets" there shall be inserted the words "each of the Police Advisory Boards shall have power to co-opt members who have special qualifications".").

The noble Lord said: This is the first time while we have been debating this Bill in great detail over five days that the Special Constabulary has been mentioned. To me it is quite astonishing. The special constabulary needs support and we have overlooked that. It has had hardly a mention. It is a most valuable branch of our police and there is nothing that I know that is comparable, no similar volunteer police service, in any country in Western Europe. Today's need is for more than volunteers who come forward according to our history for special disasters. What we want now is a practical back-up for our regular police.

Over the last few years, taking the country as a whole, the numbers have been dropping by about 1,000 a year, year by year, until two years ago when there was a not very convincing working party report from the Home Office about the recruiting and the strength of the Special Constabulary.

I should like to suggest that we have the word "shall" rather than the word "may" in the 1964 Act, which puts quite unnecessary power into the hands of chief constables, who alone have the power not only to decide on having a greater or a smaller body of Special Constabulary in any area, but can have none if they like to make such a decision. Across the country one will find that the enthusiasm and the standard of the training varies tremendously from one part to another, even though I could say that over the last few years much trouble has been taken in trying to make this branch of our police more efficient.

My second point which comes out in the new clause is that we should have an establishment which is real. At the present time, if one looks at the numbers which stand against the establishment in every county area in this country, one finds that in some cases it is 40 per cent. or 20 per cent. of the establishment. It appears to bear no relation whatever to the population of some areas. I have suggested, therefore, for guidance, that we should have a number falling between 25 per cent. and 50 per cent. of the strength of the regular police in their area. That would be support for the police authority and could give the area a sense of whether there was use for a larger number or for a smaller number.

The last point is that we should have representation of the Special Constabulary on the various advisory boards, the police advisory boards, which are familiar to my noble friend. They are a Home Office committee. The Special Constabulary never has any regular representation on these bodies. I should not like to delay the Committee at this time by going over the same ground. I have made it as simple as I possibly can. There may be an occasion when we shall have to come back to this topic again, because it is quite impossible to deny the support which to my mind the Special Constabulary deserve. I should not like to go on any longer this evening. If this very simple point was going to be met by the Government, I would only have to sit down.

Lord Elton

I share the admiration of my noble friend for the Special Constabulary, although I cannot possibly equal his knowledge of it or, indeed, the regard in which he stands, I am sure, with them. I just wonder whether the new clause which he has suggested will have the practical benefits for the Special Constabulary which he would hope. The object of subsections (1) and (2) are to make sure that every chief officer appoints special constables and does so in substantial numbers. All chief constables already make use of special constables. Many have a set force establishment figure which would meet the requirement which the noble Lord wishes to impose on them, but establishments do not necessarily impose recruits.

If I may illustrate this, Lancashire has a force establishment of 3,158, a special constable establishment of 1,020, which is about what my noble friend suggests, and they have only managed to enrol 376. Thames Valley, with an establishment of 3,267 and a specials establishment of 1,008, has 544 enrolled; and Warwickshire, much closer to their target, have 925 established constables and 374 specials, with 341 enrolled at 31st December last year. The first two figures that I have given prove, I think, that merely setting an establishment at an agreeable level does not actually produce the people to fill it, and an empty establishment does not produce any results.

I am glad to recognise (as has my noble friend) that in each of the last two years there has been a small but encouraging increase in the total number of special constables. I am sure that all forces would like to be enabled to appoint many more; but I do not think that this device will secure it. At present, chief officers have a discretion to appoint specials and the Home Office encourages them to enrol as many as they can usefully train and deploy. There are no substantial financial consequences involved. Decisions on whether to appoint special constables and how many to appoint are therefore simply operational matters properly left to be determined locally. We do not see a Home Office role in such decisions, which must depend on local needs and local circumstances. Therefore, there is no need for further statutory provision for that.

Subsection (3) of the new clause deals with the police advisory boards for England, Wales and Scotland. The first part of this provision is intended, I think, to ensure that the Special Constabulary is represented on these boards. There are two problems raised by the subsection as drafted: one technical, one practical. First, special constables are not "members of the police force" in the terms of the Police Act 1964. My noble friend may wish to look at Section 19 of that Act, but that is purely a matter of how he drafts his amendment. Secondly, the amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult an organisation representing the Special Constabulary, and, unfortunately, I do not know of any such organisation. Perhaps my noble friend does. At present, it would lay upon the Secretary of State a duty which is incapable of performance.

If I may turn to the substance of what the amendment intends, we doubt whether the Special Constabulary representatives could be expected to contribute to the work of the police advisory boards on any aspect of policing beyond their own interests. At present, when the boards are to discuss issues touching on the Special Constabulary, representatives can be co-opted for the discussion of these issues. This was done, for example, when the Board for England and Wales decided to set up working parties on the Special Constabulary in 1976 and 1979. This seems to us an effective way of ensuring that the interests of the special constables are taken into account and more effective than permanent representation on the boards, particularly given the difficulty—

Lord Inglewood

Could my noble friend say how one chooses these representatives, at least in a reasonable hurry, because they are chosen from between 40 and 50 forces in the country? There is no organisation and there was really great difficulty in getting special constables to work for the working parties a few years ago. There is no national organisation.

Lord Elton

That is precisely what makes the duty my noble friend would lay on my right honourable friend impossible to perform: because there is no national body for him to consult. It may be that the remedy lies in the hands of the Special Constabulary.

As to the second part of subsection (3), I can assure my noble friend that, since the Secretary of State determines the constitutions of the police advisory boards, he already has power without amending legislation to alter the constitution to provide for the co-option of members with special qualifications. Indeed, I understand that the Board for Scotland includes five members who have no other connection with the police service. I might add that an obvious route for consultation when looking for special constables would be with the Association of Chief Police Officers.

I do not want to detain your Lordships. I hope that I have put before my noble friend considerations of value. I should like to leave on record the fact that we believe that the Special Constabulary is a necessary and valuable help to police forces throughout the country. I wish we could see the numbers increased. We do not think that this is the way to do it but they are an admirable body of men. I should like that to be on the record.

Baroness Hornsby-Smith

Before my noble friend sits down, may I say that I was blessed with an extremely good unit of special constables in my old constituency in Kent. In view of the enormous demands made upon the London police with the endless demonstrations and with the other problems they face, could my noble friend say to what extent there is a strength of Special Constabulary to help out with the normal duties within the various boroughs of London when our London police are devolved to other duties? What is the strength of the Special Constabulary in London?

Lord Inglewood

Two thousand, roughly.

Lord Elton

My noble friend has answered the question sotto voce but not sotto voce enough for me not to hear it. It is about 2,000. My noble friend has accurately stated the prime role of the Special Constabulary, which is to take on the normal duties of the police when the regular constabulary is fully deployed elsewhere. She is right to point to the very great value of that service.

Lord Inglewood

I was not very impressed by the reply of my noble friend. I did not think that his reply amounted to very much help, given that the Special Constabulary is giving such valuable help in the country. He did not even agree to change the word "may" for "shall" in the first part of my amendment. It is quite clear that it is very difficult for a Back-Bench Member to draft a new clause like this, which has to make reference to an Act of Parliament which is now a few years old. I was hoping—

12 midnight

Lord Elton

Would my noble friend forgive me? I was not criticising his drafting in that respect. I was merely showing that all the chief constables already recruit, and therefore changing "may" to "shall" will not make any difference to that. Then I went on to say that increasing the size of the establishment for the Special Constabulary would not produce the recruits to fill that establishment. I quoted three establishments, of which two were gapingly empty as to about two-thirds of the ranks: so that is no solution.

The fact that we do not look with favour on my noble friend's amendment does not reflect his inability to draft it. In fact, if I may say so, I think it is rather well drafted for a non-parliamentary draftsman. It reflects the fact that we do not honestly think that the way he seeks to do it would have the effect which we, as well as he, wish it to have, and that the way of strengthening the Special Constabulary lies along different routes, which we are exploring.

Lord Inglewood

That is a more enthusiastic reply, and I can only say "thank you" for it. But I do not think my noble friend is really correct in saying that all chief constables are enthusiastic about the Special Constabulary, because most people seem to feel that some are enthusiastic and others less so.

He also mentioned duties that regulars think they can take over, and I think it is something we might put on record at the moment, when every week we have reserves moving from forces all over the country, leaving the areas badly denuded of police cover and special constables putting in very long hours, helping policing at times when otherwise there would be extremely short numbers.

I do not know whether I can go any further tonight. I do not want to take up time, but I am certainly not entirely satisfied with the reply and should like to go into all this with my noble friend on another occasion, because I am sure that between us we ought to have greater success than has been achieved this evening. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 169A: After Clause 100, insert the following new Clause—

("Police authority to monitor powers.

.—(1) It shall be the duty of the police authority to monitor the exercise of powers given to the police under this Act.

(2) In the proper exercise of its duty under section 1 the authority shall call for regular reports from the chief constable about the use of the powers by the members of his force and the number of complaints arising from their actions.

(3) Where the committee consider it appropriate they shall refer any disputed use of the powers to a sub-committee to investigate.

(4) If the sub-committee is of the view that any officer has abused the powers granted under this Act it may refer the case to the chief constable to consider disciplinary action against the officer.").

The noble and learned Lord said: This new clause confers the duty on the police authority of monitoring the exercise of powers given to the police under the Act, and in the exercise of that duty under Section 1 the authority is to call for, regular reports from the chief constable about the use of the powers by the members of his force and the number of complaints arising from their actions". It also says that where the committee think it appropriate, they shall refer any disputed use of the powers to a sub-committee", and if that sub-committee, is of the view that any officer has abused the powers granted under this Act it may refer the case to the chief constable to consider disciplinary action against the officer". I beg to move.

Lord Elton

The new clause seeks to place a specific duty on the police authority to monitor the use of the powers contained in the Bill and tells the authority how to set about doing it, but the authority is already under a general statutory duty to maintain an adequate and efficient police force. It already also has statutory power under Section 12(2) of the Police Act 1964 to call for reports from the chief constable on any matter connected with the policing of its area. It already has a statutory duty under Section 50 of the Police Act, continued under Clause 89 of the Bill, to keep itself informed as to the manner in which complaints against members of the force are dealt with, and in the absence of a complaint, the authority can already, at any time, draw evidence of abuse of police powers to the chief constable's attention.

The new clause would thus give the police authority no new powers. What it would do would be to limit the discretion of the authority to carry out its general statutory duty in this one area of police activity in the way in which it considers most appropriate and which, in the light of experience, it found most efficient.

I do not doubt that police authorities will continue to keep themselves informed of the way the police use their powers and of the views of the public about how they do so. They will decide also how to keep themselves informed. In view of the fact that the powers which the noble and learned Lord has here cogently brought together in one place are in fact already available to the authority and that they urge the police to discharge the functions which they are required and empowered to pursue, I wonder whether he would feel that this amendment might perhaps not be so helpful as he had hoped.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

In the light of the assurances which the noble Lord has given, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 101 agreed to.

Lord Inglewood moved Amendment No. 170: After Clause 101, insert the following new clause:

("Chief Constables.

. Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (6) of section 5 and the provisions of section 29 of the Police Act 1964 Chief Constables shall be appointed for a term of seven years, with power to extend such period, provided that all Chief Constables shall retire on reaching the age of 60.")

The noble Lord said: I beg to move the new clause, Amendment No. 170 on the Marshalled List. It is a very simple amendment. I need not take up anything like so much time as I did on the last amendment that I moved. I am, however, hoping for more luck!

The amendment contains one very simple point. This new clause requires all newly appointed chief constables to retire at 60, rather than at 65, which is the present age of retirement. The appointment, too, could be made preferably for terms of, say, seven years, with the power to extend, rather than making the normal system of appointment run from the age when the man is successful in obtaining the job until he reaches the age limit. In other words, the present system has all the disadvantages of the parson's freehold. It happens all too frequently that chief constables hold their last job for too long a period of time. Most of us would, I believe, consider seven years to be a reasonable period of time, not a term nearer to 20 years.

If I may ask noble Lords to look at the age limit for senior civil servants, ambassadors and servants of the Crown of all kinds, they will find that 60 is the normal age limit, not the age of 65 which at the moment is the retirement limit for chief constables. If we look at the nature of their appointment, it will probably be agreed by many that because of the circumstances of their operational responsibilities, which go round the 24 hours of the day, there should be a younger rather than an older retirement age. It is an anomaly that has been left behind in the pattern of the salaries of those in the higher ranks.

I do not wish to dwell on this point. I cannot believe that there is any sound reason for maintaining the age of 65 rather than 60. My last point, upon which I am sure every younger police officer will support me, is that if the retirement age were a little earlier, there would be slightly better promotion prospects. Unfortunately, promotion prospects are at present small enough. The new clause could bring about an improvement in that direction, and that should be considered together with the points I made earlier. I beg to move.

Baroness Trumpington

My noble friend Lord Inglewood has enormous experience of the police. I join my noble friend Lord Elton in paying tribute to his great work over a long period of time for the Special Constabulary. I am rather surprised that in this amendment he is adopting such an inflexible attitude. Therefore I am slightly embarrassed at having to set out the present position relating to the appointment and retirement of chief constables.

The police authority appoints the chief constable, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. He may retire before the age of 60 with the consent of his police authority. He may retire at any time thereafter at his own wish, and, as my noble friend said, he must retire when he reaches the age of 65. If necessary the police authority, with the approval of the Secretary of State, may call upon him to retire in the interests of efficiency, or the Secretary of State may require the authority so to call upon him. Both these powers are retained by the new clause. The police authority may also dismiss the chief constable, or require him to resign, for disciplinary reasons. What the new clause will add is a fixed period of appointment of seven years and a requirement to resign at the age of 60.

To take the term of appointment first, the new clause makes no provision as to the grounds on which the chief constable's period of office may be extended or terminated. While it does not specify who shall have the power to extend the seven-year term, I assume that my noble friend has in mind the police authority which is the appointing body. I remind the Committee that the chief constable is not a local authority employee subject to the direction of the police authority. He cannot be removed by the police authority except in the circumstances I have described; and then there is a role for the Home Secretary in preventing arbitrary dismissal. But the proposed new clause would allow the police authority to retire a chief constable without explanation and for whatever reason, by simply deciding not to reappoint him.

Our system of policing depends on a very delicate balance of duties and powers shared between a police authority, the chief constable and the Secretary of State. The arrangements were established by the Police Act 1964 and were designed to combine safeguards for the operational independence for chief constables, particularly in enforcing the criminal law, with a measure of local accountability and provisions for accountability in Parliament. That is why my right honourable and learned friend the Secretary of State can call for reports from chief constables on policing matters.

A limited seven-year appointment for chief constables would in our view alter those arrangements significantly. We expect chief constables to take account of the view of their police authorities in operational decisions, but a chief constable who wished to be reappointed at the end of seven years might be over-influenced by his police authority's views. This could undermine the independence of chief constables in enforcing the criminal law and make it easier for policing to be influenced (and this is a very important point) by political considerations.

Besides these wider considerations, I should make it clear that we do not in any case see any justification for setting a limit to the term of office of chief constables which is not related to a chief constable's ability to perform his duties efficiently. This brings me to the question of retirement. We keep this issue under review but we are not at present convinced that there is any reason to reduce the compulsory retirement age for chief constables to 60. In fact, most chief constables do retire when they are 60 or shortly thereafter.

My noble friend may be interested to know that there are at present only three serving chief constables who have passed their sixtieth birthday. We have no evidence that an earlier compulsory retirement age would be in the interest of the service as a whole. To return to a point made by my noble friend, the present arrangements have not resulted in the blockage of promotions of junior officers.

It may be argued that a long period under the same chief constable may lead a force to become stale; indeed it may, but there is no reason why it should. Once again, it is a matter of efficiency and not of age or length of appointment. I hope that my noble friend will not feel that I am being absolutely horrible, and that he will withdraw his amendment.

Lord Inglewood

I will have to return to this matter on another occasion. I do not want to be rude, but I thought that most of us knew that argument, which we have heard in detail from the Home Office and which has been made to me before in correspondence and in conversation.

There were two points which the department ought to have made but which it left out. First, there was no reference to the commissioner of police for the metropolis. I believe that I am right in saying that he is appointed for a term. There can be one or two other forces in the country where that is possible; so the impossible is in fact possible, I think.

Secondly, there was no comparison with any other grade, such as that of ambassadors, who are persons with the same kind of responsibility, are paid, and all of whom retire at 60—on their sixtieth birthday. Yet all the arguments produced this evening are apparently made to apply to the chief officers of police but leave out all the others who one thought were in this together.

It is too late to go over this again. We might have an Unstarred Question on the subject or a more powerful Motion, a little earlier, another evening. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 102 and 103 agreed to.

12.15 a.m.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 171: After Clause 103, insert the following new clause:

("Functions of special constables in Scotland

. Subsection (6) of section 17 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (restriction on functions of special constables) is hereby repealed.").

The noble Earl said: On behalf of my noble friend Lord Gray of Contin, I beg to move this amendment, and with the leave of the Committee I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 180 and 181.

Amendment No. 180: Schedule 7, page 123, line 24, column 3, at end insert ("and section I 7(6).")

Amendment No. 181: Clause 113, page 97, line 2, at end insert— ("section (Functions of special constables in Scotland);").

This is a simple, but important, group of amendments. The new clause (Amendment No. 171) repeals Section 17(6) of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, and Amendments Nos. 180 and 181 are purely drafting consequentials. Section 17(6) specifies that, in Scotland, special constables may be used only in emergencies, for the prevention or supression of riots, or for the purpose of gaining "practical experience of police work". There are no comparable restrictions in the Police Act 1964 relating to the Special Constabulary in England and Wales, and we see an urgent need to repeal the restrictions which apply to Scotland. The three police associations in Scotland and the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities have been consulted and are unanimous in their agreement that this small, but useful, change should be effected. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clauses 104 to 106 agreed to.

Clause 107 [Application of Act to Customs and Excise]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 172.

[Printed earlier: col. 112.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this with Amendment No. 60—if your Lordships can remember it. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 107, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 108 to 110 agreed to.

Clause 111 [General interpretation]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 173. Page 96, line 15, leave out ("(1)").

The noble Lord said: At present "arrestable offence" is defined by reference to Clause 23(1). However, your Lordships will recall that I explained that that clause was amended in another place to ensure that certain inchoate offences are arrestable offences. As a consequence, the definition in this clause needs to be amended to refer to the whole of Clause 23, rather than to just its first subsection. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 174.

[Printed earlier: col. 568.]

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this with Amendment No. 92. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 175 not moved.]

[Amendment No. 176 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 176ZA. Page 96, line 28, leave out ("for an offence") and insert ("either for an offence or under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983")

The noble and learned Lord said: Clause 111(2) of the Bill defines a person in police custody as being someone who. has been taken to a police station after being arrested for an offence". I assume that it is from the basis of that definition that there flow such rights as those contained in Clause 54 (the right to have someone informed when arrested) and Clause 56 (access to legal advice). It would therefore seem that Clause 111 excludes, among others, those who are detained by the police under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983. That power enables a police officer to detain in a place of safety for up to 72 hours any person who, in a public place, appears to be mentally disordered. The Mental Health Act 1983 gives such people no safeguards, and it would seem that they ought to be entitled to at least the same safeguards as those offered in this Police and Criminal Evidence Bill.

The section has to be used, alas, extensively in different parts of the country. There is some concern among members of black and ethnic minority communities and women's groups that the power is disproportionately used on members of those groups. The hope therefore is that the special position of those who are presently left out of the existing arrangements will be catered for. It is for that reason that I move this amendment—and, if I may, Amendment No. 176ZB—which would bring those concerned within the protection of the clauses I referred to earlier. I beg to move these two amendments. Amendment No. 176ZB: Page 96, line 28, leave out ("for an offence") and insert ("either for an offence or under the Mental Health Act 1983")

Lord Elton

These amendments are directed at an entirely laudable aim. I cannot advise your Lordships to accept them as they stand simply because the persons to whom they refer are not detained for an offence. Therefore, the grounds for detention set out in Clauses 35 and 36 would not really apply.

However, I fully agree that we should make quite sure that a person detained on the grounds of mental disorder is, for example, entitled to legal advice and to have his family and friends informed of his detention. In the short time available to consider this amendment I am not able to say precisely how this should be achieved. It may mean that parts of the Bill should be amended or that parts of the code should be altered—or it may mean a judicious mixture of both—but I am happy to undertake to give this matter further consideration so as to ensure that the principle of the amendments is met and, if necessary, to bring forward amendments for this purpose at a later stage.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

I am most grateful and comforted, as will be those concerned, by this belated move in the right direction from the Government Benches. In the circumstances, I ask leave to withdraw these two amendments.

Amendments, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 111, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 112 [Amendments and repeals]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 176A: Page 96, line 37, leave out ("III") and insert ("IV")

The noble Lord said: This amendment simply corrects an erroneous reference to Schedule 7. This subsection of Clause 112 should provide that the repeals in Parts II and IV of Schedule 7 have effect only in relation to criminal proceedings. The present version wrongly refers to Parts II and III, and the amendment corrects this. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 112, as amended, agreed to.

[Amendment No. 176B not moved.]

Schedule 6 [Consequential Amendments]:

Lord Stanley of Alderley moved Amendment No. 177: Page 110, line 17, at end insert—

("Dogs (Protection of Livestock) Act 1953 (c. 28)

. In the Dogs (Protection of Livestock) Act 1953 the following section shall be inserted after section 2—

"2A.—{1) If on an application made by a constable a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing—

1. (a) that a dog has worried livestock within the meaning of section 1 above; and
2. (b) that that dog is on the premises specified in the application; and
3. (c) that any of the conditions specified in subsection (2) below applies,

he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose of examining the dog in question.

(2) The conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(c) above are—

1. (a) that the purpose of a search may be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless a constable arriving at the premises can secure immediate entry to them;
2. (b) that entry to the premises will not be granted unless a warrant is produced.".")

The noble Lord said: The purpose of this amendment is to close a loophole in the law, this particular loophole being that a police officer cannot gain entry to a house to search for and identify a dog that has molested livestock. I remind your Lordships that every year over 10,000 livestock deaths, most of them sheep, are caused by dogs. That figure does not include abortions and difficult lambings caused by Fido having a little chase after those sheep. This very simple amendment would help to reduce that number. It will not stop it, but it will help.

Your Lordships may say that a farmer already has the right to shoot a dog that has chased sheep, but in practice, and despite rumours to the contrary, farmers do not in fact shepherd their sheep with a six-shooter or even a shotgun in the back of a van. Most are reluctant in the extreme to shoot a dog. Believe it or not, it is still a fact that most farmers love their dogs as much as Frenchmen love their women. Certainly that must be the case so far as your Lordships are concerned.

The result is that more often than not the dog is followed to its home. Sometimes, and more often than not, its home is with a tinker in a gypsy encampment. It is therefore, I suggest, essential, should the occupant object—and I am sorry to say they often do; and I can give examples—for the police to be able to come in to identify the dog. Under the present law the police have no right of entry whatsoever. They cannot even ask a magistrate for a warrant—though of course should the police think that there was the egg of a barn owl, a dead badger or even a budgerigar in a small cage, they could go to the magistrate and get a warrant to enter. I have seen some stupidity in the law, but this about takes the cat, the candle, or whatever one likes.

I will reinforce my point by saying that if Fido bites granny the police cannot even go in to search for him, which is crazy. I am sure that my noble friend Lord Elton will have much personal sympathy for the amendment. He was once a shepherd. Dare I say it?—he was a rather more aggressive shepherd than I was and he was prepared to shoot dogs. I am not. I am looking forward to hearing what set of reasons his department has given him for not accepting my amendment. One reason I will not accept is the promise of future legislation delegating responsibility for dogs to local authorities. The idea—if that is in my noble friend's mind—is so stupid and half baked that it does not even warrant my time, his time or the Committee's time in discussing it. Anyway, such legislation would not be the proper place to correct this anomaly in the law. I beg to move.

12.27 a.m.

Lord Elton

I in no way belittle the problem to which my noble friend has referred. I know what a very horrible feeling it is to have one's flock of lambing ewes worried by a stray dog. I have had that happen. My noble friend says that I am more brutal than him. In the end I had to do something to protect the ewes and the lambs, and it seemed to me that the dog should go. The dog went. That of course was something that I was empowered to do under the existing law, and that is something your Lordships will wish to note in considering my noble friend's proposed amendment.

The other matters your Lordships will wish to note are the existing provisions of the Dogs (Protection of Livestock) Act 1953. as amended by the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, which make it an offence either to be the owner or to be in charge of a dog which worries sheep. They do more than that. They make it an offence even if the dog is merely at large in a field where there are sheep and taking no notice. The maximum penalty for that offence is now £400; and there are also civil remedies available to the farmer.

It is indeed true that the offence under the 1981 Act is not covered by a power of search, but I take leave to wonder to what extent it would assist in tackling the problem—whether the loss and suffering caused by the negligence of dog owners would be reduced—if the specific entry powers set out in my noble friend's amendment were available to the police. What it does is to have the police apply to a justice for a warrant when they expect the owner of the dog not to cooperate with the search.

What are the grounds for which the warrant could be issued? They are the grounds that it is reasonable to believe that a dog has worried livestock and that it is on the premises to be searched, and the warrant would authorise the police to search the premises, for the purpose of examining the dog in question". Would this enable the police to bring more cases to court or to prosecute cases which did come to court more effectively? Presumably, the purpose is to establish an evidential link between the dog and a specific instance of livestock worrying.

But how would the examination of a dog by a police officer establish such a link or otherwise add to the evidence already available? Because the power is not a power to seize the dog; it is a power to examine the dog—that is what my noble friend has asked for. It is not clear to us that the proposed power would be useful in any large number of cases or very directly.

It is true—and I know my noble friend is expecting me to say this and was perhaps expecting me to advance it as the principal reason for resisting his amendment—that the Government pay the closest attention to any proposal to grant additional powers of entry. I think that is right. We would not shy away from the creation of a power which would make a significant difference to effective enforcement, but we should have to be persuaded that such a power would make a significant difference to police effectiveness. At our present state of knowledge, I am not convinced of that and I do not believe that the National Farmers' Union has produced a body of evidence for the likely beneficial results if this power was granted. If my noble friend was able to convince me or my honourable friend between now and Report stage that there was such compelling evidence, no doubt he would wish very much to consider it before the Report stage, but without it I cannot give a more friendly answer.

Lord Gibson-Watt

I wonder whether my noble friend would go a little further than that. I think the amendment which my noble friend Lord Stanley has tabled is a very worthwhile one and, as I understand it, it has the full support of the National Farmers' Union, who of course have great experience in this matter. With respect, the Minister's answer did not quite cover the point. We all know that you can shoot a dog that is worrying your sheep, but, as my noble friend said, we do not normally stalk about with shotguns when we are looking after our sheep. In any case, we do not very much like shooting dogs.

What happens if the dog heads for home, leaving the lambs dead and bleeding on the field, and gets into Mrs. So-and-so's house? What does the farmer do? The farmer cannot very well do much about it. If the Minister is saying that there must be no-go areas—because that is what it amounts to: the police are not allowed to go in, even with a warrant, as they could under the provisions of this amendment—then over and over again a dog which harasses and worries sheep is going to be undetected and not brought to book.

My noble friend made what I thought were some quite sympathetic noises about Report, but between now and then I would ask him and his noble friends in the Ministry to realise what the situation is in certain parts of the country. I see plenty of Welshmen in the Chamber tonight. In Wales there are more sheep than people. This is a matter on which I, for one, would support what my noble friend has said. My noble friend the Minister has shown infinite patience through the discussions on this Bill, and I would urge him to take this matter on board.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

The noble Lord, Lord Stanley, raises the fascinating question of whether farmers in England love their dogs more than their wives. I am sure that that is a topic which could well occupy the time of this Chamber, but I trust on another occasion. The noble Lord the Minister asks the question what purpose would be served by having the dog examined by a police officer. I believe that there is every practical purpose. If a dog has been worrying sheep, unless that dog has been very, very carefully washed I would have thought that for a matter of a day or two a swab of blood from the mouth area or a tuft of wool would facilitate a forensic examination that would link a dog with a killing, if the dog was the dog that had killed.

As a countryman with strong farming connections, much as I personally dislike to see any power of entry extended, I take the view that this power is far more necessary and far more meritorious than many powers that have already been granted to police officers by this particular Bill. I know the damage that dogs can do, and I well know the distress that can be caused on that account.

I know, too, of the suspicion that can be like a poisonous cloud over a farming community for a long time after a substantial case of killing has taken place. Few things are more disruptive of that confidence that is so essential to a rural community than a bad case of sheep killing. In these circumstances, so far as the Queen's peace in that community is concerned, the power to enter and search is at least as important as the power to enter and search for a stolen vehicle. On that basis, with great sincerity, I ask the Minister to consider the matter again.

Lord Hooson

I would like to support the noble Lord, Lord Stanley. This seems to me a very practical and sensible amendment. Of course, it will not often be used because its use will not often be necessary. But it is important in certain cases. The fact that the power exists can have an influence on people who otherwise would resort to shutting their dogs away. In the close vicinity of towns, many people keep sheep. There is a great deal of dog-worrying of sheep, not necessarily the killing directly of sheep but the worrying of them.

I know of one or two cases where people have identified dogs, or thought they have done so, and have given a good description to the sergeant of police, who has been unable to do anything about it. He probably knows where the dog is kept but he cannot search for it. The power to examine is most important. If he can examine and has had a detailed description of the dog, the very examination may lead to the solution of the problem. I hope that on Report the Government might find it possible to accept this amendment.

Lord Elton

I had always supposed that my noble friend Lord Gibson-Watt was himself a Welshman because it was in Wales, I believe, that I first encountered him. I understand now that he speaks of them as though he was not. He asks me what would happen if a dog retired into a private home and the policeman had no power to search. I should have added to the list of the powers available the Dogs Act 1906, which provides that where a dog is proved to have injured cattle or chased sheep, it may be treated as a dangerous dog under Section 1 of the Dogs Act 1871, which means that the court may order it to be kept under proper control or to be destroyed.

So there is a way forward, although I am not saying that it is the way forward that possibly my noble friend Lord Stanley of Alderley is recommending. I have only one other thought because I shall obviously take these concerns to my right honourable friend. I am sure that I shall also hear further from my noble friend in the interim. If the object of the search is to find flecks of blood or tufts of wool, two things occur to me. One is that the search, if a constable has to go to a magistrate to get a warrant before it takes place, may be too late. The other is that, in my experience, much the greatest damage is not done by dogs that eat sheep but by dogs that run yapping after sheep and have a lovely time. The sheep abort the next day or the day after that, and the damage is done. Fido goes home and pants happily at his mistress, who thinks that he has been chasing rabbits.

It is late. We have talked enough. My noble friend is talking to someone who at least understands sheep, dogs and sheep worrying. I undertake to do what I can to consider the matter further but without any commitment.

Lord Stanley of Alderley

I must thank all noble Lords for their great contribution. They did much better than I could have done. I shall not delay the Committee except to say that I shall bring this back at Report stage. I would make one or two comments in so far as my noble friend says that he wonders whether the amendment would help. I shall send him between now and Report examples of difficulties that the police have experienced through not being able to enter. My objective is the same as that of other noble Lords. A point made by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, brought home to me a case that occurred in my own village, where the enmity, not between dogs but between individuals, became very unpleasant indeed. Therefore, I think this would have helped. In regard to the reply which my noble friend gave to my noble friend Lord Gibson-Watt, I would say, "Okay. The Act works, but first find the dog". I am trying to get the police officer to come in and make a positive identification.

I will not delay the Committee, but I want to ask my noble friend to think about one point when he goes away. At the moment police do enter and find these dogs. They think up—and great credit to the police, I say—an excuse to go in, but the whole purpose of this Bill, if I may say so—I am not an expert in the law like noble Lords opposite—is to make sure that the police do not push their luck, as I, as a farmer, would put it. They should act within the law, and here would be a case where they could act within the law. Within the philosophy of the Bill, the police can go so far, but no further.

I will now leave the matter to my noble friend. I beg him to consider it seriously. I know he does regard it seriously. In fact, at this time of night I could say that I know he is with me, because he has been a shepherd. It is not a Welsh trick tonight, because every single person who has spoken on this amendment has come from Wales. That includes my noble friend Lord Elton, who, as your Lordships will remember, during the devolution Bill, according to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, became a naturalised Welshman. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

Perhaps the Lord who is also our Shepherd will think well of this.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 178: Page 110, line 17, at end insert—

(" Sexual Offences- Act 1956 (c. 69) . At the end of section 41 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (power to arrest in cases of soliciting by men) there shall be added the words "but a constable may only do so in accordance with section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.".").

The noble Lord said: Your Lordships will know that at present the police have power to arrest a man for the offence of soliciting or importuning, under Section 41 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. It has always been our intention that, in future, the power of arrest for this offence, in common with other offences of a relatively minor character, should arise under Clause 24; that is to say, that the normal means of prosecution should be by way of summons and that the power to arrest should arise only when service of a summons is impracticable or inappropriate.

This amendment ensures that that is so. The terms of Section 41 of the 1956 Act are cast widely, and without the addition of the words proposed in the amendment there would be doubt over whether a constable could or could not arrest under that Act. In our view the powers bestowed on constables by Clause 24 are more than adequate to deal with this offence. The amendment will ensure that arrests by constables are under the Bill and not the 1956 Act. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. I78ZA had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 178A: Page 116, line 25, leave out ("and 66") and insert ("to 67").

The noble Lord said: This amendment corrects a consequential amendment to the Value Added Tax Act 1983. The 1983 Act is being amended to take account of the documentary and computer evidence provisions in the Bill, and the amendment ensures simply that the reference in that Act to the provisions of this Bill is an accurate one. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 7 [Repeals]:

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 178B: Page 122, leave out lines 6 and 7.

The noble Lord said: When this Bill was considered in Committee in the other place the discussion about the competence and compellability of spouses led to agreement that this Act, which in 1972 the Criminal Law Revision Committee described as obsolete and serving no useful purpose, should not be on the statute book. When I say, "this Act", I am referring to the Evidence Act 1877. This provision met that concern, but the repeal itself is unnecessary as the 1877 Act was repealed by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1981. This amendment deletes that repeal. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 179: Page 123, line 21, at end insert—

("34 & 35 Vict. c. 96.

Pedlars Act 1871.

In section 18, the words from "or" where secondly occurring to "Act," and the words from "and forthwith" to the end of the section.")

The noble Earl said: On behalf of my noble friend Lord Gray of Contin, I beg to move Amendment No. 179. At the same time, and with the leave of the Committee, I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 182, 183, 184 and 185.

Amendment No. 182: Page 97, line 3, leave out ("and")

Amendment No. 183: Page 97, line 4, at end insert— (", and section 112(2), so far as it relates to the provisions of the Pedlars Act 1871 repealed by Part VI of Schedule 7.")

Amendment No. 184: Page 97, line 14, leave out ("and")

Amendment No. 185: Page 97, line 15, at end insert— (", and section 112(2), so far as it relates to section 19 of the Pedlars Act 1871.")

These amendments to the extant clause, that is, Clause 113, make it clear that the repeal of Section 19 of the Pedlars Act 1871, provided for in Clause 7 of, and Schedule 7 to, the Bill, applies to Scotland as well as to England and Wales, and makes minor consequential and other adjustments to Section 18 of the 1871 Act. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 180:

[Printed earlier: col. 1023.]

The noble Earl said: I have already spoken to this amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 7, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 113 [Extent.]:

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendment No. 181:

[Printed earlier: col. 1023.]

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Earl of Caithness moved Amendments Nos. 182 to 185:

[Printed above.]

The noble Earl said: It might be helpful if I move Amendments Nos. 182 to 185 en bloc. I beg to move.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Elton moved Amendment No. 186: Page 98, line 4, at end insert ("in section 111, the definition of "document";").

The noble Lord said: This amendment is a tidying up measure and as the next amendment will not, I understand, be moved, I think that we shall all shortly be tidied up. I do not think that I need dilate upon it further. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 113, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 114, [Commencement]:

[Amendment No. 187 not moved.]

Clause 114 agreed to.

Clause 115 agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported with the amendments.