§ 1 p.m.
§ The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office (Lord Lyell)My Lords, I beg to move the draft Northern Ireland Act 1974 (Interim Period Extension) Order 1984, which was laid before Parliament on 12th June this year, be approved. As your Lordships will know from the speech of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in another place on 2nd July this year, in the coming months the Government will be offering and, indeed, encouraging discussions with and among the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland. Our objective will be to achieve some measure of agreement among the parties on arrangements for enabling locally-elected representatives to assume at least some responsibility for administering Northern Ireland's affairs.
We have been heartened by the indications of a readiness to talk, to examine ways round the difficulties which confront them, which were shown by Northern Ireland Members in another place during the debate on 2nd July. But the Government do not underestimate the difficulty of achieving agreement, and we have always recognised that time will be needed. Meanwhile, it is necessary to renew the direct rule provisions which provide that legislation which could be passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly after devolution can continue to be passed at Westminster by Order in Council, and that the executive responsibilities of a Northern Ireland administration should be exercised by the Secretary of State.
In commending this order to the House, the Government recognise that direct rule is not ideal. It is generally viewed throughout the community as a second best, because some aspects are remote from the close network of local politics and people cannot easily identify with them. Nonetheless, there is wide recognition that the Northern Ireland departments carry out their duties effectively and, above all, impartially. I should like to add my own warm tribute to that paid by my right honourable friend to their staff, to which, even from my short experience in the Province, I can attest, and I do so most warmly.
Despite the shortcomings of direct rule, its quality has, I believe, been greatly improved by the deliberations and advice of the Northern Ireland Assembly over the past two years. My ministerial colleagues and I are answerable to Parliament, including, as it does, Members from Northern Ireland, to whose views we attach great importance. But we have found the detailed work of the Assembly, and its committees, to be of value in focusing attention on particular as well as on general issues. This has helped the Government to be more responsive to Northern Ireland views.
Since March 1983 some 46 Assembly reports have been laid before Parliament. Each one has been examined carefully by Government, and we have replied fully to the Assembly's proposals. A number of proposals for draft Orders in Council have been changed to take account of Assembly views. My ministerial colleagues in the Northern Ireland Office 547 have met the Assembly's committees frequently. These exchanges enable my colleagues and Ministers to explore issues in depth and to hear the views of elected representatives at first hand on a wide range of matters. Indeed, it was only yesterday afternoon that I addressed the Assembly on the continuing and thorny problem of milk quotas, and I had great pleasure in listening to the debate which ensued. But all of us in the Northern Ireland Office have found the Assembly's contribution to be a useful and, above all, an informative addition to debates in Parliament, where the decisions are taken.
The Government are pleased that the Assembly report committee, which has been established to consider proposals for devolution, is under way, and we are glad that the Ulster Unionist Party, by rejoining the Assembly, is playing its part. I should like to make it clear that we welcome any constructive proposals. That is the spirit in which we approach the ideas which have been put forward recently; for example, the Ulster Unionist Party's suggestions for administrative devolution entitled The Way Forward, and the report of the New Ireland Forum. In their tone, in their attempts to recognise the validity of both traditions, and in their recognition of the need for consensus, they have helped to create a new and more positive atmosphere for dialogue.
The Government are determined not to let this opportunity pass. During the coming months we want to see practical and realistic talks between the constitutional parties. The seriousness of the security situation and the economy cannot be remedied without agreement among the constitutional parties, reached through peaceful political dialogue on durable and stable arrangements for running Northern Ireland's internal affairs. We are glad that the parties are seized of the urgency of the need to move forward and of their willingness to examine genuine attempts to accommodate each other's requirements.
None of us, and above all your Lordships today, must lose sight of the realities in Northern Ireland. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State described these on Monday of this week in another place. Although much of what he said will be familiar to those of your Lordships who live in, who have studied, or who have been associated with the Province for many years, I think it is worth spending a moment or two on these realities, and I hope that your Lordships will bear with me if I draw quite closely on what my right honourable friend the Secretary of State mentioned in another place earlier this week.
First, the majority of people in Northern Ireland are totally committed to maintaining Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, and are as firmly opposed to Northern Ireland becoming part of a united Ireland on any terms. At the same time, we recognise that there is a substantial and significant minority of people in Northern Ireland strongly committed to Northern Ireland sooner or later becoming part of a united Ireland.
The second reality is that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and is recognised internationally as such. It is right, therefore, both in principle and in practice, that the costitutional position of Northern Ireland should only be amended by the freely-given 548 consent of the people of Northern Ireland. That has been recognised by successive Irish Governments.
The third reality is that as long as Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom, its Government and administration must ultimately remain a matter for this Parliament. Parliament has to take account of the wishes and the strongly-held principles, not only of the majority in Northern Ireland, but also those of the minority. It must be satisfied that there is the necessary degree of acceptance, for without that no democracy will operate efficiently.
Fourthly the Government and administration of Northern Ireland must be undertaken in the light of the needs and the responses of the people there, and the resources available to the United Kingdom as a whole. We believe these needs are best met in a devolved administration which has the support of both sides of the community. Arrangements should be directed at recognising the Irish identity and at developing the minority's participation and confidence in all the structures and processes of Northern Ireland. Some aspects of our practices and administration are not sensitive enough to these requirements. We are ready to talk with the constitutional representatives of the minority to identify what these are, and to see what we can do to help.
Finally—and we regard this as the fifth reality—geography, as well as the fact that many people in Northern Ireland feel an allegiance to Dublin, calls for a close relationship between the Government of the United Kingdom and that of the Republic.
As I have said, the Government's preferred way ahead is a devolved administration which has much to offer both unionists and nationalists, and it would complement well the development of normal Anglo-Irish relations. But there are other possibilities. The important point here is that any arrangements should, so as far as possible—for we have to accept that neither side will achieve its ideal—meet the different needs and requirements of both traditions. The Government will be looking to see what both are prepared to accept. Against the background of the realities which I have just described, agreement will need the utmost flexibility, imagination, and generosity of spirit.
We hope that the political parties will talk to each other in the next months without preconditions for the sake of the peace and prosperity of all the people of Northern Ireland. For our part, we shall want to have talks with each of the parties involved and with the government of the Irish Republic. These discussions should be a quiet, patient and steady process. But, meanwhile, direct rule must continue to enable the Government to administer Northern Ireland properly, and for that reason I commend the order before your Lordships.
§ Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 12th June be approved.—(Lord Lyell.)
§ 1.11 p.m.
§ Lord UnderhillMy Lords, I think in general we welcome the spirit in which the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, has introduced this order. We recognise that the continuing circumstances in Northern Ireland necessitate 549 the approval of the order for the renewal of direct rule, although, as I have done on previous occasions, I must emphasise that we agree with some reluctance because it is now 10 years since the interim provisions Act 1974 was introduced.
The statements which the noble Lord the Minister has made on the realities of the situation almost tempt one to go into a discussion on the whole constitutional position and possible future developments. But I recall that when we last discussed the extension order it was the last day of Parliament before the general election, and I said on that occasion that that was hardly a fitting time for a discussion upon possible developments.
I do not think that this is the occasion for a long discussion upon that in view of the helpful debate we had on 20th June on the whole question of the New Ireland Forum introduced by my noble friend Lord Hatch. Therefore, I do not intend to open a discussion on the general constitutional position and possible development, except to say that I welcome the reiteration in the noble Lord's statement of discussions that will take place with the constitutional parties of Nothern Ireland and his emphasis on the need for discussion with the Dublin government. This is important, and I am glad that the noble Lord has reiterated that statement.
I must make one further comment. When the Act of 1974 was passed no one envisaged that we might, 10 years afterwards, still be in a position of an "interim period". On previous occasions I have complained about what this has meant. We have a system of Orders in Council. Often the order is one which, but for direct rule, would be the subject of primary legislation in the form of a parliamentary Bill. This is particularly emphasised by an order coming before your Lordships on 16th July. It is an education order of 66 pages; 38 articles and 10 schedules. It can only be accepted or rejected. There is no opportunity for amendment. But for the position of direct rule, if this House were still directly responsible for legislation it would be a parliamentary Bill.
We have a system where substantial numbers of orders are issued without any effective parliamentary scrutiny. It has been said—it was said in the other place in the debate on this order the other day—that this is an injustice to the people of Northern Ireland. It is also an injustice to those of us in Parliament because we have the position of considering large orders which would normally be parliamentary Bills capable of amendment, and yet we are unable to amend because of direct rule.
I should like to endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, said about the work of the Assembly. I am able to see the reports of the Assembly. Naturally I read them only when I have to read them, or parts of them, but the parts that I am able to read indicate the usefulness of the discussions in the Assembly. I am grateful to the Northern Ireland Office for the amount of information that they supply. Not just the Assembly reports but all manner of documents are supplied automatically, and I find them extremely useful. I have also noticed that on many occasions the Government have accepted the advice and recommendations coming from the Assembly and 550 have varied orders which have been discussed in draft by the meetings of the Assembly.
Naturally, I should like to see all the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland taking part in the work of the Assembly, but we should be foolish if we did not recognise the problems and difficulties which confront the SDLP in taking part in the Assembly. There are other things that must be done in order to encourage them to take part. I welcome the reiteration by the Minister that there will be no question of devolvement of any responsibilities to the Assembly unless there is a wide measure of cross-community agreement. That is important.
I am also pleased to note the emphasis that the noble Lord laid on the points put forward not only by the New Ireland Forum Report but also in The Way Forward. He expressed the hope that in these documents there is a basis for future discussion. I want to leave this afternoon in the belief that there is a basis there, it needs to be worked on patiently, but a move must be made. We cannot continually have direct rule in its present form. On the other hand, we cannot have devolvement which in no way meets the needs of the minority community. I think we have a chance. I echo what the noble Lord said about patient work. Again, with reluctance, we recognise the need for this order and will give it approval.
§ 1.17 p.m.
§ Lord HamptonMy Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, for introducing this order with an interesting survey of today's position and reference to the report of the New Ireland Forum. As we have been reminded, this order is necessary for direct rule to continue for a further 12 months, and while so much thought is being given to the whole future of Ireland, I imagine that none in the House today would wish it otherwise at present. It is often pointed out that the Act was passed 10 years ago, and I quote,
to make temporary provision for the government of Northern Ireland;".The tragedy is that it is still necessary, and that the problem has proved much more intractable than it seemed at that time.The Northern Ireland Assembly has been set up with the task of scrutinising the activities of the Northern Ireland departments, but overall responsibility still remains with Parliament at Westminster. I need not remind your Lordships that much time is spent in both Houses in considering relevant Orders in Council. This would be better handled—and the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, touched on this—by those often more intimately involved, but such an arrangement is not at present possible, and some Members of Parliament from the province play a valuable part in the other place. I believe that it is our duty here at present to carry on as before, and we support this extension order.
§ 1.19 p.m.
§ Lord FittMy Lords, with my noble friend Lord Underhill last Monday evening I sat in the gallery in the other place when the debate on the New Ireland Forum took place. I was left with the impression—and I am certain that it was the impression left with other 551 people who were listening—that there was not a great deal of unity to be found in the speeches that were made during the course of that debate. We had three sets of trenches on the Floor of the House of Commons, and there are three sets of trenches in Northern Ireland.
There is the set of trenches commanded by the right honourable gentleman, the Member for Down, South. He leads the Official Unionist Party. His belief is that there should not be any institutions in Northern Ireland at all. No political institutions should be created, but Northern Ireland should be governed from this House by way of total integration. That is his belief, and over a number of years he has marshalled a good deal of unionist opinion behind that belief. I remember that in the early 1970s there were very few unionists who would have given any support to the idea of total integration. But now it would appear that that is the policy of the party as enunciated and promulgated by the right honourable gentleman for Down, South.
On the other side, in the other set of trenches, we have the party led by the honourable gentleman for North Antrim, the Leader of the DUP. I think that there are some variations in their policy; but, in the main, it is to bring about a restoration of majority Unionist Government at Stormont as it was before the abolition of Stormont in 1972.
Then we have the Leader of the SDLP, my successor as leader of that party. I believe that they would settle for something approaching the agreement which we found at Sunningdale in 1974; that there would be power sharing in Northern Ireland with an Irish dimension. Each one of those three policies, as they are at present constituted, makes it totally unlikely that there will ever be any constitutional agreement found between the three main parties in Northern Ireland—and they are the constitutional nationalists! There are 91,000 people who voted for the unconstitutional nationalists; in other words, the provisional Sinn Fein, the party which supports violent means to be taken.
So, leaving them aside, you have the three main constitutional parties, and, I would hope, it would be the will of this House that they would find some agreement to the constitutional problems. We must remember that it was a Labour Government that put on the statute book the Act that we are discussing today. And I say this as a supporter of the Labour Party: I do not believe that if the Labour Party had been in power since 1974 they would have been any nearer to a solution than this present Government; because this Government, the Government of the United Kingdom, be it Labour or Conservative, cannot impose solutions on the Northern Ireland problem.
One government deliberately (and I think with great courage) did so. It was the Conservative Government which abolished Stormont in 1972. That was certainly a very traumatic and dramatic experience for the Unionist population in Northern Ireland. Then the succeeding Labour Government in 1974 were met with the total opposition of almost all brands of Unionist opinion, from moderates to extremists. They 552 were not going to accept the type of Executive that we had found at Sunningdale. They brought that Executive to an end. And there was nothing that the Labour Government could have done about it. The gut reaction in the Catholic minority population in Northern Ireland, the gut reaction among all sections of nationalist opinion, the gut reaction of all the political parties in the Republic of Ireland, is that had the Labour Government decided to do so in 1974 they could have used the Army to quell what was in fact a mini-modern rebellion against the Government of the United Kingdom, and it would have stopped that rebellion from taking place.
Looking back on it now in retrospect after 10 years, I am not certain that they would have been successful. The Army in those circumstances, had they been used for any long period of time, would have had to have been prepared to use force, to use killing, in an attempt to prevent that rebellion from succeeding. The gut reaction of Catholics and nationalists in the island of Ireland is that the Labour Government ran away from that problem when they were faced with it.
I do not think that the Labour Government ran away. I think that they had great difficulty at that time, and I wonder about any other government. I know that a former Prime Minister, the right honourable Mr. Heath, gave the impression in broadcasts that, had he still been Prime Minister in the elections of 1974, the Army would have been used to stop that rebellion by the Protestant population of Northern Ireland. I am not sure whether he would have done so or not. There are questions that can never be answered; so that, 10 years after, I ask whether we have advanced politically in any direction which would allow us to vote this order out of existence.
One has only to look at the debate which took place in the other place. There were 119 to 9 voting against this order. All sections of the Northern Ireland community represented in another place voted against the extension of this order. But they all voted against the extension of this order for their own reasons. The right honourable gentleman for Down, South led his supporters into the Lobby because he does not believe in this order, because he wants total integration. There was only one DUP Member there. He allied himself with the official unionists. I have no doubt that had the Member for Foyle been in attendance when the vote was called on Monday night he would have voted against this order as well because he said that the 1974 Act contains within it a guarantee given to the Unionists that there will be no change in the Constitution.
So here you have the three leaders of the three different parties all voting against this order, and all voting against this order for their own reasons. Let us say, for example, that this Government were to take some action which was not acceptable to the Unionists in the North; or say that the next Government was going to be a Labour Government and that they were going to take some action. The one precedent that we have had has been the abolition of Stormont. That was the one thing which a United Kingdom Government was able to abolish—because they had created Stormont; so that that was the one thing that we were able to abolish. I have no doubt that if any government, be it Conservative or Labour, were to try 553 and impose conditions in the Northern Ireland political arena without the support of the whole of that population, it would be doomed to failure.
We have to face the realities. The right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State, speaking on this order (in column 108 of Hansard) said, almost at the conclusion of his speech:
The practical and psychological benefits across the community of a measure of agreement would be considerable if the parties were to get together. But as I said in our earlier debate today, progress requires recognition of the realities rather than repeat them. I would simply appeal to the constitutional parties to build on what they have in common, in particular, their shared desire for peace and concern about the economy".And his final sentence is:and to show that their own proposals for constitutional development holds no threat to others".That sentence defeats all the words and all the sentiments which he expressed in the previous sentences.I know that everyone in all the political parties is concerned about the economy. They are all concerned about unemployment; they are all concerned about the social deprivation that exists in Northern Ireland. They are concerned about bad housing. But, after expressing their concern and showing unanimity on these very important facets of life, then comes the crunch, the constitutional question. And that is something which is behind the whole Northern Ireland problem. The Official Unionists do not accept this Act because they do not trust whatever Government is implementing it. The Official Unionists believe that, whatever protestations are given at the Dispatch Box that the Government are in support of them, in some way or another they will do a deal which will isolate Northern Ireland and lead to steps being taken which could lead them into a Northern Ireland republic.
The same fear is held by the other section—it is one more extreme; or I would think so—that is, the DUP section of the Protestant community. I know and repeat it—and I do so with a great deal of sadness and regret—and without having any answers. But, having admitted that I do not have any answers, I think that it poses to this House the problem which is continuing and ongoing.
I was a member of the Sunningdale Executive. I was the deputy chief of that Executive. I believed that that was one of the most hopeful political developments that had taken place since the creation of the Northern Ireland state. A great deal of good will, integrity, sincerity and sheer guts from all concerned went into the creation of that Executive: from the leader of the Unionist Party, the late Lord Faulkner; from the leader of the then Government, Mr. Heath; and from myself as leader of the Catholic population and the then leader of the Catholic political party, the SDLP. We all did our damnedest to ensure that we created something out of the chaos that had been the political consensus in Northern Ireland since the creation of that state.
I know (this is where I differ from the SDLP; this is why I am not the leader of the SDLP) that power sharing would have been accepted, and was being accepted, very reluctantly, and with a lot of ill grace, by the vast majority of Protestants in Northern Ireland. They were accepting it, though they did not 554 like it. They regarded it to some extent as an imposition because they themselves had had total control of all power and privilege in Northern Ireland since the setting up of the Stormont Government in 1920. It was understandable that, having had power from 1920 until 1972, they were not going to give that up very easily, or without some form of protest.
But I do know that on the very day we were leaving the Sunningdale conference the late Lord Faulkner and myself spoke privately about our hopes of what we had done and about our hopes of achievement. We recognised how difficult it was going to be to try to construct those political institutions in Northern Ireland that would last for a considerable period of time. Lord Faulkner said to me, "Gerry, I believe it will be with a great deal of difficulty, but I think I can succeed in selling power sharing to the Unionist population in Northern Ireland". Despite all the opposition that we were then seeing on our streets from a former Minister of Home Affairs, William Craig, as he then was, ably aided and abetted by the now honourable Member for Antrim, North, Brian Faulkner was confident that he could sell power sharing.
Power sharing meant co-operation in all those everyday issues that affected the everyday lives of every man, woman and child in Northern Ireland. It was a power sharing Executive: that is what it meant. We were going to sit there and deliberate and reach consensus on all those issues which were so important to the lives of people in Northern Ireland. Brian Faulkner said to me—and how right he was!—"Under no circumstances, Gerry, can I sell an Irish dimension. It will scare the living daylights out of the Unionists. They will see things written into that Council of Ireland which are actually not there at all". When one analyses the agreement that was reached at Sunningdale, there was no danger to the Unionist community at all. There was a power of veto which would have been held by each and every member who sat on the Council of Ireland. I certainly would not have appended my name to any document which would have scared or frightened away that Unionist population when I was trying to find agreement with them on the power sharing plane.
I say again, with sadness and regret, that it was the Council of Ireland proposals which killed the Sunningdale Executive. There was absolutely no doubt about that, because those who were opposed to it were able to mobilise opinion on the streets of Northern Ireland—and it was not against power sharing. When one looks back at the speeches that were made then by the opponents of Sunningdale, they were not about power sharing. Certainly they did not like the fact that members of the Roman Catholic minority community were now holding ministerial positions in the Executive—and, indeed, some of the most important ministerial positions in relation to commerce, health and social services and housing. But I say this at a distance of a number of years, and I say it now that I am no longer a member of the SDLP. Of the Ministers who were members of the SDLP, each and every one of them—there were five of them including me: John Hume, Austin Currie, Paddy Devlin, myself and Ivan Cooper—not one of those gentlemen was in any way motivated by emnity or 555 one-upmanship against the Protestant community. They were all there desperately trying to do what they could to bring together the two communities. But it was on the Council of Ireland that the Executive failed. Now we are back in exactly that position.
I listened to the debates in another place. The Unionist document, The Way Forward was discussed. There were even very friendly talks being promised by the leader of the Democratic Unionist party. They are all in the business of extending the hand of friendship, but if the SDLP goes into those talks saying, "Yes, we need power sharing. We will not accept anything less than power sharing. We will not accept second-class citizenship. We are an artificial minority in our own country and we demand, and will accept nothing less than, equality", I believe that those demands would be acceded to. But then the leader of the Official Unionist Party and the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party will say to the SDLP, "Yes, but you have appended your names to a document which is the report of the New Ireland Forum, and however you may say that it does not really matter and disregard it, one of the main proposals—in fact the only proposal, as has been said by the leader of Fianna Fail is, 'We want to bring about a unitary state.'".
If that is the main proposal in the New Ireland Forum, there can never be any hope of agreement between the political parties in Northern Ireland. That is a fact of life. That is exactly what happened in 1974, and 10 years later the same mental attitude prevails. In saying that, there will be people in Belfast today—if they read of my remarks in this House or hear of them by way of radio—who will say "Gerry Fitt is a traitor; he has sold out and he does not believe in a united Ireland." "Gerry Fitt is a Brit. He might as well be a Unionist with either a big 'U' or a small `U'." Those are the tribal attitudes which prevail in Northern Ireland. You are either on one side or the other. Well, I am not on one side or the other in the constitutional senses. I am—as I always have been—on the side of the ordinary people in Northern Ireland, no matter from what tribe they may come. I am on the side of the ordinary, under-privileged people. But should I now say, as it would appear the Labour Party is going to say, "the SDLP will not take part in your Stormont, in your Assembly, unless you give them an Irish dimension".
What form is that Irish dimension going to take? What does it mean? What does consent mean? What does agreement mean? All sorts of words are contained in these documents—"a United Ireland by consent"—but I have yet to have it explained to me what "consent" means. Do you coerce the Unionists into consenting to a united Ireland or do you coerce the SDLP into consenting to go to an Assembly and to forget about an Irish dimension? Everyone has their own bottom line in this, and I do not think that the British Government are in the business of coercing anybody into doing anything.
With regard to the New Ireland Forum, I feel that it was a genuine attempt—I say this advisedly—by most of the parties who were involved. I do not think that every individual or every representative who was taking part in those deliberations on the New Ireland 556 Forum wanted to find agreement. I think there have been some of them who were staking their own claim on civil war attitudes, and I think that was the attitude particularly of Charlie Haughey, the leader of Fianna Fail. I believe that if his demand, repeated day after day, is going to be part of the deliberations that take place in a search for a formula, then there will be no agreement.
I remember very well, in one of the elections which took place about two years ago—there were three elections which took place in the Republic within a period of three years—I was in the Belfast City Council and was talking to one of Paisley's acolytes about the possible result of the election in the Republic. I voiced the opinion that I would be happy if Garret FitzGerald was to become the next Taoiseach. Paisley's acolyte expressed disappointment. He said that he wanted Charlie Haughey to continue as Taoiseach. When I explained that I thought Haughey was hard-line and that he would not want to reach any agreement with the Protestant population in Northern Ireland, the chap to whom I was speaking said, "That is exactly why we want him." And that is exactly why they wanted him—because they feed on each other. That was the position then and that is the position now.
So I say that the Forum document was certainly something to be considered by the Government. It was an agenda. I do not think that the Government could say "Yes, we are going to accept that, or one or the other of the proposals", because if they did they would be immediately putting themselves on one side or the other. It is a document which is unlikely ever to be repeated. It has put down for the first time the attitudes of the Irish nationalist political parties. But, having said that, one has only got to look at the response it has generated from even the most moderate—I repeat, "the most moderate"—opinion in Northern Ireland. They have said they do not want anything to do with the Forum document.
So, can institutions be set up between the two sovereign powers, between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic? I think they can and I believe this Government have the right to do it. I do not think the Government can say: "We are afraid of frightening off Unionist opinion", because the Unionists can say: "We do not want to be driven into a united Ireland". But they cannot say. "We refuse power sharing and we refuse to give our support to actions which are likely to be taken by the United Kingdom Government".
So it may be that the actions which are taken in that way will lead discussions to take place between the two governments which will allow the SDLP to say, "Our Irish identity has been recognised by the United Kingdom Government and in such circumstances we are prepared to go back to the Assembly."
A Unionist said during the course of a debate in the other place—and I said it before him; I said it in 1974 and have been saying it ever since—that there is no answer to the Northern Ireland problem which is going to be found in Dublin, London, Brussels, Strasbourg or Washington. The only hope for Northern Ireland is that people in Northern Ireland—those who live in the streets, towns and villages of Northern Ireland—may 557 go out to search for and find agreement. This Government, or whichever government are in power, must do everything they can to help them.
§ 1.43 p.m.
§ Lord LyellMy Lords, any of your Lordships who have sat and listened to the debates which we have had on Northern Ireland—there have been many over the years—will agree that the contribution just made by the noble Lord, Lord Fitt, has been well worth the wait. I personally believe that it has been an outstanding contribution and I say straight away that I shall make sure that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State is aware of all the interesting things the noble Lord has said and, above all, that he is aware of the points of wisdom which are of great interest to comparative newcomers to the Province like myself. I hasten to add that I have been a student of the affairs of Northern Ireland certainly over 15 or 16 years.
The Government are most grateful for the constructive way in which this order has been examined today by your Lordships: of course it is typical of the way in which we do things in this House. I should like, first, to thank the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, for his guarded welcome but, above all, for the nice things that he said.
The noble Lord raised one point, possibly justifiably, about the use of Orders in Council. He will have noted from my preliminary coments that we too, believe that direct rule is not a perfect solution. We would wish for improvements, but it is a compromise for the moment. I would stress to the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, and indeed to your Lordships generally, that the use of Orders in Council is reasonable. We think that it is also reasonable to point out that there is what we call a proposal stage which gives the Assembly—and the noble Lord drew attention to the Assembly and its good works, for which we are grateful to him, and I am sure that members of the Assembly who read the debates of your Lordships' House will note the praise bestowed on them by the noble Lord—the opportunity to make detailed scrutiny and, above all, to offer detailed comments on the proposed order. This, as the noble Lord pointed out, will be discussed by your Lordships later during this Session. I would stress to him and to the House that these direct rule arrangements are not ideal, but that is why there is a pressing need for some kind of agreement on a scheme of government which is acceptable across the community in Northern Ireland.
I also want to thank the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, for his tribute to the Northern Ireland Office here in London. I shall certainly see that his tributes are passed on. I would agree with the noble Lord regarding the report of the Assembly—I think I understood him to say that we can call it the Official Report—that we read in our House. It was the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, at an earlier stage who chided me gently about reading the reports of the Assembly as "light reading". But any of your Lordships who take the trouble to read these reports will certainly find them interesting. To say that they are merely lively would be almost libellous: they are exciting, lively and very amusing. Above all, they are interesting, and we believe that they are very, very useful.
558 I would thank the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, for his continuing interest and support on Northern Irish matters, and I would of course reiterate what he said, that once again we come to the renewal of direct rule. We shall just have to see what will happen within the next year.
The noble Lord, Lord Fitt, made an outstanding contribution to our debate today. I was fascinated by his break-down of the three positions, as he saw them, during the debate in another place. I noted what he said about the imposing of a solution—I think that "imposing" was the word he used—and that took me back to the notable speech which he made during the earlier debate that we had on 20th June this year in response to the Forum report. The noble Lord used then a word that he used again today. He said that no acceptable solution would be found in Northern Ireland where a Government in the United Kingdom used "coercion". The noble Lord used that very strongly in the previous debate. I do follow his comments and I find them most interesting.
I am sure that those of your Lordships who have studied the affairs of Northern Ireland over so many years were most interested by what the noble Lord had to say about the proceedings at Sunningdale, and following Sunningdale; and, above all, by the noble Lord's very clear thinking on what might be acceptable to bring together the main strands of constitutional politicians in Northern Ireland and on what should be avoided. For that reason, I shall read and note his remarks very carefully.
The noble Lord raised one particular point about the constitutional guarantee and the workings of political institutions and of government in Northern Ireland. I would stress that the Government in the United Kingdom remain firmly committed to the principle that Northern Ireland's constitutional position as part of the United Kingdom can be changed only with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland. This principle has been accepted by successive Irish Governments and it was reaffirmed in the Forum report. To alter the constitutional position of Northern Ireland against the firmly held opinions of the majority in Northern Ireland would be indefensible, undemocratic and—as the noble Lord went so far as to say; I think that we would agree with him—unworkable.
But—and this is important—that does not mean that the majority in Northern Ireland have the final say in the way that Northern Ireland is to be governed as part of the United Kingdom. That last sentence, which I stress, bridges a major measure of agreement between what the noble Lord, Lord Fitt, said and what this Government are trying slowly and, I hope, surely to achieve. I may have harped slightly on the debate in another place earlier this week, but your Lordships and the noble Lord, Lord Fitt, have, quite justifiably, raised the point in discussing the order which is before us today. We have had a good debate and I am very grateful for the thought which has gone into the remarks of your Lordships. Without further ado, I wish to commend the order to your Lordships.
§ On Question, Motion agreed to.
§ House adjourned at eight minutes before two o'clock.