Foreign Secretary's Visit to Moscow (Hansard, 4 July 1984)

§ The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Young)
My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement on the Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow on 1st to 3rd July which is being made in another place by my right honourable and learned friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The Statement is as follows:
"With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement about my visit to Moscow. On 2nd and 3rd July I had five hours of talks with Mr. Gromyko and a substantial discussion with Mr. Chernenko.
"I looked upon the visit as one step in our long-term policy of promoting a better understanding between East and West, with the aim of increasing security at a lower level of arms.
"I wanted first to give the Soviet leadership a clear account of our views and to hear a direct explanation of theirs. I wished, too, to explore possible areas of common interest which might provide opportunities for co-operation and negotiation.
"I have to tell the House that I detected no significant change in the Soviet position on the resumption of nuclear arms talks. The Russians displayed continuing scepticism about the West's commitment to an improvement in East-West relations, and to progress in the arms control negotiations in Vienna, Geneva and Stockholm.
"On the basis of recent extensive consultations within NATO, at the London Summit and at the European Council, I made it plain to the Soviet leaders that Western governments were sincere in their desire for a better understanding between East and West and for agreements on arms control.
"I told them that people in the West could not understand the Soviet refusal to resume nuclear negotiations. Sooner or later these problems would have to be settled by negotiation. The longer the Soviet Union stayed away from the negotiating table, the more difficult the problems would become and the more the dangers and the costs would rise.
297 "The recent Soviet proposal for talks on arms control in outer space, and the American response, naturally featured in the talks. The Russians described the American response as negative and hedged about with preconditions. After specific confirmation from the White House, I was able to tell the Soviet leader that this description was mistaken. The United States position was that there were no preconditions. I urged them to set the matter beyond any doubt through confidential discussions with the Americans and to do what was necessary to ensure that the talks opened in September.
"I emphasised to Mr. Gromyko the widespread and deep concern in the West that the Soviet Union was failing to honour its human rights commitments under the Helsinki and Madrid agreements. This represented a real obstacle to the creation of lasting trust between East and West.
"I raised the cases of Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. Mr. Anatoly Shcharansky, Father Gleb Yakunin and Mr. Anatoly Koryagin as important examples of the Soviet Union's failure in that respect. I urged the Soviet Union to deal positively with these and other cases.
"I also referred to a number of cases of particular interest to Britain. These were mostly concerned with family reunification. We looked to the Soviet Union to respond much more positively to requests for exit visas.
"I raised a number of other bilateral questions. I stressed in particular the importance we attached to increasing trade. British exporters should be given a good opportunity to bid for contracts. I also raised the question of better telephone and other facilities for our businessmen and journalists in Moscow. I extended an invitation to Mr. Gromyko to visit Britain in 1985.
"Mr. Gromyko and I were able to discuss a number of international questions, which included the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Poland and Afghanistan. I stressed in particular the need for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a peaceful settlement as called for in five successive resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.
"In my call on Mr. Chernenko I concentrated on East-West relations and arms control. I told him that we found it impossible to understand the almost automatic rejection by the Soviet Union of Western proposals. I urged him to recognise that all Western Governments were earnest in their desire to see a resumption of negotiations on nuclear arms questions and to see the Soviet Union return to the negotiating table without delay.
"The visit provided a useful opportunity to expound and carry forward our long-term policy towards the Soviet Union and on East-West relations generally.
"I did not go to Moscow with any expectations of rapid results. I was not therefore surprised by the disappointingly negative nature of the Soviet response. They remain apparently unwilling to make a fresh appraisal of the seriousness of the West's approach.
298 "I hope that my visit will lead to more discussions and exchanges with the Soviet Union. It is important to sustain the search for improved relations between East and West on a realistic and long-term basis and for real progress on arms control. Neither we nor our allies intend to take 'no' for an answer".
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

§ Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos
My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Baroness for repeating the Statement. I am sure that all of us were glad that the Foreign Secretary visited Moscow and that he had substantial talks with President Chernenko and Mr. Gromyko. We must also regret the fact that so very few positive advances seem to have been made, especially since a progress towards détente is as much in the interests of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries as it is of ourselves and our allies. We hope that when he was there the Foreign Secretary made it plain that he was speaking for Britain as an independent country and not merely as a go-between.
Is it not the position that the Soviet Union has made an offer of talks on a limited objective and that the United States has sought to widen the agenda? Can the noble Baroness indicate whether she thinks that those limited talks will proceed and are still on the table or whether the United States will accept the Soviet invitation only if additional matters, such as the nuclear arms talks, are added to the agenda?
Can the noble Baroness say what discussions, if any, took place about the possibility of a resumption of the two Geneva talks from which the Russians walked out a few months ago? While we are glad that the talks which the Foreign Secretary had were conducted in a courteous atmosphere, can she say whether he felt that there was any indication in Moscow of a desire to break the present deadlock? Does she regard the initial Soviet offer on arms control in outer space as a step in that direction? Is it not best to take advantage of it and then see whether it opens the door to other possibilities? Did the Soviet leaders recognise that there are no preconditions, or are they still sceptical about that?
We warmly support the Foreign Secretary's recomendations on the human rights issue, and welcome the references that were made to Mr. Sakharov and the other people mentioned in the Statement, as well as the point that Sir Geoffrey Howe made about family reunificaton. Can the noble Baroness say how the Russians responded to that appeal? How did they respond also to the practical questions which were raised about increased trade and improving telephone and other facilities? Did they say anything to make the Foreign Secretary believe that there might be a favourable response? I have just read the Statement in full, and what it seems to me to lack is an indication of any practical and positive response to the quite proper representations which the right honourable gentleman made.
Finally, can the noble Baroness say whether definite arrangements have been made for a return visit to London by Mr. Gromyko? I think that it is known that Mr. Gromyko was considering that possibility, and we 299 must welcome that small ray of light in the present darkness of East-West relations.

§ Lord Gladwyn
My Lords, we, too, are obliged to the noble Baroness for repeating the Statement. It is true that the Secretary of State's failure to make progress at the meeting was not unexpected, however regrettable. First of all, may I associate myself with the question asked by the noble Lord in regard to human rights? We know from the Statement the questions put to the Russians by the Foreign Secretary, but we have no indication of their reply. Perhaps the noble Baroness will be able to give us some indication on that rather important point.
On the even more important nuclear question, why did the Secretary of State not explain to the indignant Mr. Gromyko that the star wars project—namely, the theoretical ability to knock out in space all incoming nuclear warheads—is, as has recently been pointed out by acknowledged experts, a very great nonsense? We understand that it could at the most be 90 per cent. successful, the remaining 10 per cent. of warheads being quite powerful enough to destroy the United States or the Soviet Union, whether or not they had installed the new system. Why did he not also point out to the Soviet Government that any attempt by either side to achieve nuclear predominance—as originally suggested, I believe, by President Reagan last year—or even, for that matter, parity, is also nonsense?
Provided that each side retains the capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary, nobody, however powerful, could possibly win a nuclear war, and, once it is initiated, everybody loses. In other words, cannot the Government at last see the necessity for a general nuclear freeze, even if it should be only partially verifiable?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, I should like to thank both the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, for their response to this Statement. I say right away in response to the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, that my right honourable and learned friend the Secretary of State went as the British Foreign Secretary and was speaking for Britain.
Both the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, raised the question of the Soviet Government's proposal on arms control in outer space and the American reaction to it. I want to make it quite plain at the beginning that in no sense in this matter was the Secretary of State conveying to the Soviet some kind of United States message. I would not wish it to be thought in any sense that this is what he was doing. The fact was that the Soviet reaction to the United States' response to their proposals seemed so illogical and potentially self-defeating on a crucial issue that my right honourable friend thought that it was right to check with the White House his own interpretation of what in fact the United States Government had said. My right honourable friend received confirmation that there were no United States preconditions.
300 I hope that that will answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, when he asked if the United States wanted to widen the talks and whether this was a reason why they might not take place. I should like to confirm that we did receive confirmation that the United States has no preconditions for engaging in these negotiations.
On the question of the resumption of both the INF and START nuclear arms talks, what my right honourable friend said was that it is essential that the Soviet Union should return to the negotiating table. We hope indeed that that will be possible.
Both noble Lords raised questions about human rights. I can confirm that, as the Statement says, my right honourable friend raised the particular cases which will be well known to your Lordships. He urged positive consideration of a long list of cases, mainly cases of family reunification and those wanting exit visas. Under these circumstances, I do not think that one can expect, in the course of an exchange such as this or indeed in the discussions, to go into the detail of these matters. However, I think what is very important is that the concern which has been expressed in this House and in another place on many occasions, and which is felt in the country at large, should have been put to Mr. Gromyko when an opportunity presented itself in this important visit to Moscow.
Finally, the noble Lord asked about the visit by Mr. Gromyko. As I have said, an invitation has been extended to Mr. Gromyko to make a visit to this country in 1985, but the timing has been left over.
On the last point which was raised, which was the general point about a nuclear freeze, as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, will know, the view that we have taken on this matter is this. A freeze would freeze the nuclear balance in the position in which it is now, with a superiority of Soviet weapons. We do believe we are working for both mutually balanced and verifiable reductions.

§ Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos
My Lords, I hope the House will forgive me for rising again, but I must press the noble Baroness on the substance of the points which she has elaborated. What she has done is to repeat, courteously and well, what the Statement itself says. However, she has not responded to the point which I made and which was reinforced by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. This was as to whether or not there was any positive response at any stage to any of the very important points which the right honourable gentleman put to Mr. Chernenko and Mr. Gromyko.
Is it the case that the meetings were a greater failure than we think? Or was there some hope that they would respond to any of the points made about the resumption of talks about human rights or about any of the other crucial matters which were raised?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, I think what the noble Lord is really asking is, at the end of these talks, where are we left; where is the next step? What is important in the talks is that they should be seen as a step in a very long process. We have always said that it is going to take time but that we do want to see better East-West relations. We see this meeting as one step in that direction.

§ Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran
My Lords, I realise I have not given notice of this question, but can the noble Baroness the Minister, either now or hereafter, amplify the statement she has made that there were discussions relating to international trade? Can she tell the House what was the scope of the discussions in relation to trade? What kind of trade was considered? And were there any discussions in relation to trade involving companies engaging in research and development activities?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, on the question of trade, we looked for an expansion of trade. We should like to see a doubling of the trade between Britain and the Soviet Union. At the same time, my right honourable friend raised the point about certain improvements for the business community and journalists now living in Moscow. But on the general point that the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, has raised, we do see possibilities for increased trade between the two countries.

§ Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran
My Lords, I am sorry to rise to my feet again, but I was not concerned with general matters. I tried to raise a question on more specific aspects of the trade. What was the kind of trade that it was considered useful to discuss at that meeting?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Lord has some specific case in mind, but if he would care to let me know I will let him have a response on that matter.

§ Lord Mayhew
My Lords, would the noble Baroness please explain this a little further? The Foreign Secretary checked back with the White House as to whether there were preconditions on the holding of the conference in September. Is the American position therefore now that they are not insisting on broadening the agenda for the conference but are willing to go to the conference on the basis of the agenda suggested by the Soviet Union?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, the United States have said that they have accepted the Soviet proposal to meet; that is to say, the Soviet proposal made on arms control in outer space. They have indicated a willingness to discuss any subject that the Russians want to bring up.

§ Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos
My Lords, I apologise to the House, but may I press the noble Baroness still further on this? Is it really the case that there was no response to the matters which were put by the Foreign Secretary to the Russians? Is that really the position, or is the noble Baroness being diplomatically discreet about it?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, I hope that I am always diplomatically discreet. I am sure that is a very wise posture to adopt. However, I think that, as is indicated in the Statement, it was a meeting in which my right honourable friend was able to put our view on East-West relations, arms control and a number of other important world problems. He was able to hear what both Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Chernenko said. I think 302 he would take the view that it is important, as a first step, to try to understand each other's point of view, and that this must be a first step in a long process. We should have liked to say that there was more progress than that. However, an invitation has been extended to Mr. Gromyko. There will obviously be another opportunity to discuss these matters.
As I said, I think that if we ask the question, "Where does this visit leave us?" the answer is that after two days of talks we have heard again the Soviet Union position, and we have explained our position. We see this as just one step on the road to greater understanding.

§ Lord Harmar-Nicholls
My Lords, it is clear from the Statement, and from the answers to questions, that it was indicated that we would welcome a visit from Mr. Gromyko, it was stated, in 1985. Did his reaction give the impression that we are likely to have a visit?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, as I have said, Mr. Gromyko left the timing of the visit open. He did not indicate that he was not prepared to come.

§ Lord Jenkins of Putney
My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that from the Statement it is not possible to deduce exactly whether the Foreign Secretary believes that the visit was useful and progressive and that we are better off than we were before he went? Would the noble Baroness like to say whether the Foreign Secretary thinks that the situation has been improved and that there is more understanding and clarity and a greater possibility of agreement than before he went; or is that not the case?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, my right honourable friend believes that the visit was useful. I think that it is always valuable to talk to people, to try to get a greater understanding of what are their concerns, and to try to get a better clarification of what it is that we want to achieve. As the noble Lord and, indeed, I think, all noble Lords will know, when there are great divisions of opinion on subjects and great philosophical differences, it is very difficult to make rapid progress. However, I believe that the fact that my right honourable friend went to Moscow and had the talks is a positive step. I am not in any way trying to suggest that it is a very great step forward, but it surely must be better to have had the talks than not to have had them. To that extent, it is a step forward.

§ Lord Soames
My Lords, may I suggest to my noble friend the Minister that, perhaps, after this visit, plenty of time be allowed for quiet, consistent, patient and secret diplomacy before there are any other visits of a character that attract a great deal of publicity?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his intervention. His observation is, I believe, a very wise one. My noble friend will know from his own experience that it takes a long time before these kinds of negotiations and discussions can be shown positively to have had an effect.