Lords Sitting of 17 January 1984

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Norwich.

Alcohol Consumption During Pregnancy
Lord Avebury: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what information they have about the effects of alcohol consumption by the mother on the foetus and on the later development of the child; and what steps they will take to advise women of childbearing age.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security (Lord Glenarthur): My Lords, heavy drinking during pregnancy can undoubtedly harm the foetus, but expert opinion is divided as to the extent to which lighter intakes are harmful, and whether there is a threshold below which it is safe to drink. With the present state of knowledge, it is sensible to keep alcohol consumption during pregnancy as low as possible. However, I am medically advised that strong warnings that pregnant women must cut out alcohol altogether could cause unjustified and possible harmful feelings of guilt and anxiety. Expert opinion has been taken into account by the Health Education Council in preparing their new publications on alcohol and on pregnancy.
Lord Avebury: My Lords, has the noble Lord seen the text of the new advice given by the Health Education Council, which is that to be absolutely safe a woman must not drink alcohol while she is pregnant or while she is contemplating pregnancy? Has the noble Lord seen the evidence that was presented to a recent conference held at the British Medical Association where evidence was presented by, in particular, some general practitioners from Glasgow showing that indeed small quantities of alcohol drunk during pregnancy had an effect on the birth weight of infants?
Lord Glenarthur: Yes, my Lords, I am aware of both the points which the noble Lord makes. The fact remains that expert opinion is divided as to the extent to which lower alcohol intakes are harmful to the foetus and whether there is a threshold below which it is safe to drink at all. But there is no doubt, as the noble Lord will know, that alcohol passes from the expectant mother to the foetus. Regarding birth weight and what effect not drinking alcohol has on it, the answer is that in general the less one drinks, the better. There is no denying that alcohol is harmful; but nevertheless there are other reasons, which I explained in my original Answer, which make it not necessarily correct always to condemn those who drink a little.
Baroness Macleod of Borve: My Lords, can my noble friend the Minister tell the House what are the ages of childbearing for women?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, not off the top of my head; but I think my noble friend knows the answer to that perfectly well herself.
Lord Ennals: My Lords, bearing in mind that it is recognised that there is no fixed level that one can set, may I ask this question. Does not the Minister feel that he ought to be giving rather stronger advice to pregnant women, bearing in mind the report as long ago as 1979 of the Royal College of Psychiatrists which gave some strong evidence about the effect of heavy drinking by expectant mothers on damaging the foetus? It also referred to the fact that about 40 per cent. of the cases that were concerned in the foetal alcohol syndrome were born either abnormally small, had hare-lips or in some other way had a defect. Is it not really beholden upon the Government to give the strongest advice to expectant mothers that drinking of alcohol except at a very modest level is extremely unwise during pregnancy?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I think I indicated when I answered the noble Lord's original Question and his supplementary that drinking alcohol does not necessarily do a great deal of good—in fact it can do harm. However, I also explained that to say out loud that any drinking produces dangerous results for babies also presents difficulties because it can lead to unjustified feelings of guilt and anxiety when a baby is born with some problem which might—or equally well might not—be due to alcohol consumption during pregnancy.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes: My Lords, does the Minister agree that this is part of a larger problem in terms of the effect of alcohol as a systemic poison on women? Has he seen the recent research which makes clear that the alcohol tolerance level of a woman is only half that of a man? Does he not think, in these days of equality, that that is one time where more publicity should be given for the woman to be unequal in attempting to match drinks?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, there are lots of reasons why women have less tolerance—if that is the right word—to alcohol than men. So far as dissemination of knowledge is concerned, the Health Education Council, in the light of their expertise in health education, have been discussing with the department how best the state of knowledge can be passed on to those who need it. I have with me—and I shall put it in the Library—a new publication called A Guide to Sensible Drinking—That's the Limit, and I shall ensure that that is placed in the Library for the noble Baroness to examine at her leisure.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, can my noble friend confirm that at least it is all right for husbands?
Lord Glenarthur: Yes, my Lords, I can certainly give my noble friend that assurance.
Baroness Gaitskell: My Lords, would it not be a good idea to allow a certain amount of alcohol to be consumed during the youngest days of a person's life, and get them a little immune to it? A lot of people make fools of themselves later on in life.
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I think that that flies somewhat in the face of the recommendations of the Royal College of Obstetricians and the British Peadiatric Association. Nevertheless, I shall make sure that they bear in mind what the noble Baroness feels about it.
Lord Gisborough: My Lords, can by noble friend say whether there is any effect when men are drinking when, in his own words, their wives are contemplating pregnancy?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I do not think I shall be drawn any further by my noble friend.
Lord Avebury: My Lords, does the Minister not agree that pregnant ladies are unlikely to see the advice in a publication placed in the Library of your Lordships' House? Therefore, will not the Government take steps to make sure that the Health Education Council's excellent booklet is as widely disseminated as possible, and that in particular the paragraph referring to drinking during pregnancy is prominently displayed in the surgeries of general practitioners?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I will take the noble Lord's suggestion to my right honourable friend to see what can be done. The Health Education Council has published the leaflet to which I have referred; but the fact remains that at the end of the day it is up to the woman concerned whether or not she drinks alcohol.
Lord Blyton: My Lords, is the Minister aware that it is my experience that a pregnant woman will do what she wants to do without any guidance?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I am not quite sure how to reconcile the noble Lord's views on what he feels about being pregnant with what others might feel about it. Nevertheless, I am sure that others will take note of his view.

Renewable Energy Sources: Research
2.46 p.m.
Lord Sandys: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the projected level of Government expenditure on research and development into renewable sources of energy and how this compares with expenditure in 1978–79.
Viscount Long: My Lords, my department expects to spend about £10 million on research and development relating to renewable energy sources in the financial year to 31st March 1984, and hopes for
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a modest increase in this expenditure in real terms in the following financial year. This compares with expenditure in 1978–79 of £3.7 million.
Lord Sandys: While thanking my noble friend for an encouraging reply, may I ask whether my noble friend can tell the House whether Her Majesty's Government are contemplating resubmitting an application to the EEC non-nuclear programme for 1984–89 and whether the work being done in British universities throughout the country and in field studies in Carmarthen will be applicable, my Lords?
Viscount Long: My Lords, regarding the first part of my noble kinsman's Question, the EEC's second non-nuclear R and D programme lasting from mid-1979 to mid-1983 allocated over 60 million ECUs, or about £36 million, to solar, biomass, wind and geothermal energy work. The United Kingdom received 18 per cent. of the total expenditure, of which about one-third was spent in the private sector and the remainder in the public sector. Most went to universities and scientific institutions—for example, the Natural Environment Research Council. The Commissioner's proposals for a follow-up programme are under consideration by the Council of Ministers.
In reply to the question of Wales and Carmarthen, expenditure in Wales on renewables research in 1983–84 is expected to be about £0.4 million mostly on a vertical access windmill in Carmarthen.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, will the noble Viscount confirm that spending on new and renewable sources of energy has fallen by roughly one-third from a peak of £17.3 million in 1981 to an expected £11 million, as he said, in the current financial year? Does this mean that the Government are giving a lower priority at present to renewable sources? Could he also say why Britain spends so little on renewables in comparison with countries such as Germany, France and Italy, which spend, respectively, £50 million, £25 million and £26 million annually on renewable sources?
Viscount Long: My Lords, in reply to the latter part of the noble Lord's question, energy supply problems and strategies to meet energy demands vary from country to country. The United Kingdom's access to indigenous fuel supplies means that we do not have to spend as much on renewables as some other countries.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, will my noble friend agree that no matter how much we spend on research into renewables that is unlikely to help us very much before the end of the century? Will he say whether research into wave power has been disappointing as research into geothermal and wind energy is proving rather encouraging?
Viscount Long: My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend for his supplementary question, because research is encouraging, though rather slow at times.
Lord Leatherland: My Lords, may I ask whether as this Question deals with renewable sources of energy, the Minister can tell us how we get it?
Viscount Long: From Mother Earth, my Lords.
Lord Ezra: My Lords, will the noble Lord the Minister kindly advise us whether there is a broad strategy on research and development into energy and whether the research and development undertaken on renewable sources is related to the research and development effort into other forms of energy? Also, is this kept constantly under review by the Government?
Viscount Long: My Lords, of course, not only with this Government but with any Government, energy—renewables and any other type of energy—is always under consideration.
Lord Sandys: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend in this connection whether, in view of the fact that one of the Severn Barrage schemes was designed in 1846, this is likely to be a very lengthy programme of research and development before fulfilment is achieved?
Viscount Long: My Lords, that sounds a very windy one to me, but the Secretary of State announced on 12th May 1983 that the department would contribute up to £250,000 over two years to a jointly-funded study on the barrage by the Severn Tidal Group—McAlpine, GEC, Taylor Woodrow, NEI and Balfour Beatty—directed towards assessment of the technical and financial viability of a barrage built but not operated by the private sector.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, in view of the fact that the Principality is famous for its windmills, is it not a matter of satisfaction that the Carmarthenshire windmill has come into existence? The fact that it happens to be my native country is purely coincidental. Can the noble Lord say whether this is purely experimental or whether it is intended to produce electricity and, if so, to what extent? And is this to be the first of many, in view of the importance of this development?
Viscount Long: One is hoping, my Lords, that it is going to be one of many. It is a start. There is a certain amount of research still going on since the failure of two of these particular projects, one in the United States of America and one in West Germany. From the skills of the people over there, we have been able to learn a lot more, so that in Carmarthen we are really working from the expert knowledge that we are being given.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, arising from the noble Lord's reply to my previous supplementary question—the reply that this country does not need to spend so much on renewables because of our indigenous sources of energy supply—can he say why in those circumstances we spend £220 million per annum on nuclear research?
Viscount Long: My Lords, because I am on the subject of renewables, I really have to say that that is somewhat outside the Question.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, can my noble friend add this further information? Can he say
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whether there has yet been any serious environmental objection to the experiments with wind turbines in Carmarthenshire and also in the Orkneys?
Viscount Long: My Lords, I cannot give my noble friend that information off-hand. Perhaps I may let him know about that.

Guinea: Diplomatic Representation
2.53 p.m.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they intend to upgrade British diplomatic representation in Conakry, the Republic of Guinea.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Lord Trefgarne): My Lords, we have no present plans to do so.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, can the noble Lord confirm that the present diplomatic representation so far as Guinea is concerned is based on Dakar and Senegal and that that embassy covers Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta and Niger, none of which countries has substantial, if any, trading relations with this country, whereas Guinea is one of the richest countries in Africa and many business interests from various countries are represented there? Would it not be sensible and profitable for this country to have such diplomatic representation in Conakry as would assist the development of British business interests in that country?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I do not think that one wants to overstress the trade relationship between the United Kingdom and Guinea. We constitute only 1.5 per cent. of their supplies and take only about 2 per cent. of their exports.
Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the dictatorship of President Sékou Touré is probably the most appalling of all the régimes under which the unfortunate population of Africa is suffering, and that, according to the United Nations, he has 2 million exiles outside his small country? Is he also aware that the human rights record is quite deplorable, that Sékou Touré has reduced the GNP of what my noble friend described as a rich country almost to its bottom level, that of less than 270 dollars per head; and that it is quite deplorable that we should recognise such a régime at all?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, as the noble Lord will recall, before today I have answered questions about the criteria that we apply in these considerations. It is not for me, today at any event, to pass judgment one way or another on President Sékou Touré's régime; although of course we seek to condemn breaches of human rights wherever they may occur.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, if the noble Lord has told the House that there is such a small

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percentage of Guinea trade connected with this country, is this not a condemnation of this country rather of Guinea in view of the fact that many other industrial countries in the world are highly represented diplomatically and commercially in this developing country? Could the noble Lord tell the House something about the position which he has mentioned in answer to previous questions of mine about the debt situation between Guinea and this country? Have the Government had any thoughts about the barter system which, I understand, other European countries are conducting for the removal of debts with the Government of Guinea?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, as the noble Lord may recall from earlier exchanges that he and I have had on this subject, the Guinean debt was rescheduled, I think in 1976—the debt amounting then, I think, to about £6 million—since which time we have received only one payment under the rescheduling arrangements. They are now substantially in arrears therefore not only with ourselves but with the world at large.

Nuclear Arms Control: U.S. Policy
2.56 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are aware that the United States Government is now committed to a nuclear war-fighting strategy and has abandoned the policy of deterrence and in view of the widely held opinion that this will lead to the destruction of mankind what action they will now take to save themselves and the rest of humanity from this ultimate disaster.
Lord Trefgarne: No, my Lords. The United States Administration have made absolutely clear their commitment to a strategy of deterrence. In his annual report to Congress for the fiscal year 1984, Mr. Weinberger reiterated this strategy. He said:
"First, our strategy is defensive. It excludes the possibility that the United States would initiate a war or launch a pre-emptive strike against the forces or territories of other nations. Second, our strategy is to deter war. We maintain a nuclear and conventional force posture designed to convince any potential adversary that the cost of aggression would be too high to justify an attack".
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the latest air/land battle concept of the American army is even more dangerous than flexible response? Is he further aware that, while it is welcome to hear President Reagan in less belligerent mood, it is necessary for these better words to be followed up by a readiness to discuss the reality of nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the West? Finally, is he aware that the Stockholm Conference can be the start of this process if it is treated seriously on both sides?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I certainly hope with the noble Lord that the Stockholm Conference will produce the sort of results to which the noble Lord has
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referred; but I have no doubt that it will be a long and difficult process. On the general concept of our defence posture I say again, as I have said to your Lordship on many occasions and as many others of my noble friends have said from this Bench, our strategy is one of deterrence. We seek to avoid war, not to fight one.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that the only conceivable point of "deterrence" is to have the assured capacity, on a possible second strike, to inflict totally unacceptable damage on a possible nuclear adversary and that accordingly no attempt should be made to attain what is called "nuclear superiority?"
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, has already said, there is a need to have a strategy of flexible response—although I appreciate that the noble Lord does not agree with that. We have such a strategy within the policy of deterrence to which I have referred and we need to be able to respond at any level.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: My Lords, will my noble friend confirm that the placing on the Order Paper of this House of allegations of this nature against our most important ally can bring no comfort to anybody but the Soviet Union?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the motives of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, are for him and for him alone; although I must say that I share some of the views of my noble friend.
Lord Bishopston: My Lords, will the Minister give the House the assurance that the Government's defence policy is still based on the use of conventional weapons and that the enormous cost of nuclear weapons will not deprive us of those resources? If he cannot give us that assurance, will he therefore be admitting that in the event of a serious emergency the United States and the United Kingdom will be forced to go nuclear right from the start with the terrifying prospects which that would bring?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, as I say, our policy is one of flexible response. That includes the capability to respond with conventional weapons if the occasion so requires.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, should we not now concentrate on the opportunity which the European Security Conference gives us in Stockholm? Would the noble Lord say whether Her Majesty's Government have it in mind to take the initiative in seeking to reconvene the START and INF talks in Geneva, which broke down recently? While we welcome the words uttered by President Reagan yesterday in Washington, would the noble Lord not agree that the important thing is to move away from just words and turn to a real dialogue and a real exchange of views? Would the noble Lord give the House an assurance that that is currently the objective of Her Majesty's Government?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I certainly agree that it would be highly desirable for the INF and START

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talks to reconvene. I am not certain, however, that the position is quite so black as the noble Lord suggests with regard to the START talks, because although a resumption date has not yet been set we hope very much that the Russians will agree to the setting of such a date in due course. They say they are reviewing their position, and if that be so perhaps it is not too surprising that they have yet to agree a date for the resumption.
Lord Peyton of Yeovil: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether he would not congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, on the very deserving effort that he made to turn a mischievous Question into a serious one?
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, is it not the case that the American nuclear posture is of great concern to many reasonable people throughout the country, and that if any noble Lord translates a concern of that sort into a pro-Soviet position it is merely evidence of a closed mind, which itself is dangerous?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I am aware that there is opposition to the American point of view in these matters from some people in this country. I believe it is a tiny minority of our people, as evidenced at the last General Election.

Business
Lord Denham: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that dinner will be available at the usual time of 7.30 this evening. The Committee stage of the Roads (Scotland) Bill will be adjourned at about 7.30 p.m. for approximately an hour.

Restrictive Trade Practices (Stock Exchange) Bill
3.3 p.m.
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Lord Cockfield): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee—(Lord Cockfield.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD ABERDARE in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Exemption of certain agreements relating to The Stock Exchange]:
Lord Bruce of Donington Lord Bruce of Donington had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 5, at end insert ("for the time being").
The noble Lord said: This amendment was put down by me immediately before the Christmas Recess in the knowledge that the Committee stage would be taken shortly after we resumed. The Christmas season gave me occasion to meditate on this particular amendment, and I came to the conclusion that all Bills that come before Parliament are of necessity for the time being, because they can always be amended or
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subsequently replaced by another Bill. Therefore, in strict philosophical terms this amendment is quite unnecessary, and I therefore do not propose to move it.
[Amendment No. 1 not moved.]
Lord Bruce of Donington Lord Bruce of Donington moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 1, line 13, after ("State") insert ("or").
The noble Lord said: Your Lordships will recall that Clause 1(1) of the Bill contains a provision for an agreement in respect of any of the matters referred to in subsection (1)(a) to be made between the Stock Exchange and the Secretary of State, the Treasury or the Bank of England, or any two or more of them. The purpose of this amendment, taken in conjunction, by leave of your Lordships, with Amendment No. 3, is to eliminate one of the four parties from this consultative process.
Amendment No. 3: Page 1, line 13, leave out from ("Treasury") to end of line 14.
In my view—and I hope I may carry your Lordships with me—it should be between three parties only, and without the rather loose option of a selection of any three of them. It is as well, when a Bill goes through Parliament, that all parties to the sections contained within it should know clearly in advance exactly what their responsibilities are. There is no point in having four bodies on continuous alert, as it were, for the purposes of this Bill and then selecting only three of them on an arbitrary basis.
Looking at it from that point of view, as well as from the point of view of some other matters on which I shall address your Lordships, I came to the conclusion that the Bank of England ought not to be involved in this. If there were any agreements to be come to in conformity with what is judged to be the public interest, the Secretary of State, the Treasury and the Stock Exchange would be quite sufficiently important and significant, and would have sufficient resources, to arrive at the necessary agreements. This is, as I say, on the hopeful assumption that when the agreements are arrived at they will be in conformity with the law, as has been the position up to this time.
The Bank of England is a very august institution, and your Lordships will be well aware that it was founded not by an Englishman but by a Scotsman called Paterson, a matter from which my native country can presumably take some comfort. Immediately following the last war the Bank of England was nationalised, and it is in fact a state bank operating for all practicable purposes under the general direction of the Government. But it is a state bank, and in my view it ought to remain aloof from matters of this kind.
The Bank of England enjoys an enormous reputation, and, one would hope, in some ways a reputation for impartiality almost analogous to that of the BBC. I well remember, when I was an articled clerk before the war, looking out of the window and seeing, every afternoon at about 4 o'clock, a small number of guardsmen headed by an officer marching along Queen Victoria Street with bayonets fixed, as they are permitted to do, going to the Bank of England. I can remember being very much impressed in those days,

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being very young at the time, and I thought to myself, "The Bank of England is one of the foundations upon which the country rests". That being so, it ought to be aloof.
I cannot help feeling that, within the general context of this Bill, the Bank of England is being propelled into a situation where it is regarded as part of a general conservative establishment (I use the term with both a big "C" and a little "c")—the City. I think this unfortunate. I have noticed—and I have to mention it in this context here—that over the years, and particularly since the end of the war, the Bank of England, through its spokesmen, has become ever more closely identified with the Conservative Party itself.
I choose my words carefully. I do not wish to suggest that distinguished governors of the Bank of England, whom we are fortunate enough to see here from time to time—it would be difficult for me to state the number, but I can think of at least three distinguished ex-governors of the Bank of England who grace our House with their presence from time to time—are doing anything improper, but they have been known, growingly over these last few years, as identifying themselves with anti-Labour financial policies and pro-Conservative financial policies.
I am bound to say that I have found, as others have found—and I deliberately use this occasion to mention it—on the occasions when Labour Chancellors of the Exchequer turn up at these extremely welcoming and lush functions of City banquets to receive scarcely veiled lectures from governors of the Bank of England as to the inequities of their policies, that that detracts from the reputation for impartiality with which any holder of the office of governor and the Bank itself ought to be associated.
It would be a very good thing if the Bank of England took steps for its governor, and for those who publish its reports, to make it clear that they are aloof from the party struggle. Although they are at liberty to give advice from time to time—and I am bound to say, in parenthesis, that they have not yet taken many steps to dissociate themselves from the disastrous monetary policies that have been pursued over the last four years—it would be a great advantage to the country.
For this reason, it would be wise if we relieved the Bank of England of this responsibility of working closely in association with the Stock Exchange, and left it to the Secretary of State and the Treasury to do this, in the hope that the Bank of England may be able to resume its impartial—perhaps almost aloof—stance, which members of the public, members of all parties and Members of Parliament ought to be able to expect from it. I beg to move.
3.13 p.m.
Lord Cockfield: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, for the complimentary remarks which he made about the Bank of England in the opening part of his remarks, but I cannot, I am afraid, agree with many of the things that he said in the latter part of his speech moving this amendment. I well remember the day when the late Mr. Hugh Dalton—Lord Dalton as he subsequently became—nationalised the Bank of England in 1946. It
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was thought at the time that this would restrict the independence and the independence of mind of the Bank of England. This has not, in fact, happened. The Bank has always shown great independence of mind, I think to the national good, and governors of the Bank have never hesitated to speak their minds in public as well as in private. Of course, it is not always acceptable to everybody to have to listen to things with which they do not agree. Nevertheless, the contribution which the Bank of England has made to many of our debates on economic and financial matters has been of very great value.
There is one particular incident—and I am sure the noble Lord will not mind my drawing his attention to it—which occurred in 1976, when it was the Bank of England which masterminded the financial measures which were taken ultimately through the IMF to bail out this country when it was in quite severe financial difficulty. I remember quite clearly that tribute was paid at the time by senior members of the Labour Government to the part played by the Bank of England. I think that the Bank has proved itself to be an institution of very great value to the country as a whole.
I should like to say, just by way of introduction, that I entirely appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, will not agree with many things said, either by the governor or in the Bank's quarterly review, but I imagine that that equally goes for many things said by bankers in other countries in the world—in the United States and elsewhere.
So far as the amendment itself is concerned, it relates to paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of Clause 1 of the Bill. The purpose of paragraph (b) arises out of the monitoring arrangements which the Government have set up. The Stock Exchange have agreed that they will dismantle certain of their important restrictive practices, and the Government felt that it was not right to leave matters just there, and that progress should be very carefully monitored. It was felt that the right people to monitor it were the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Bank of England. The Bank of England was joined in this monitoring process, because it has great experience and knowledge of the City of London, and it could bring that expertise to bear for the general benefit.
What we are concerned to do here is to ensure that the monitoring is effective, and our feeling is that the inclusion of the Bank of England will make the monitoring more effective than it otherwise would be. If you have a monitoring process of this kind, it is important that any agreement that may be reached between the people who are parties to the monitoring should not itself be subject to the restrictive practices legislation. This, quite simply, is the reason for this provision in the Bill.
There is nothing unusual in associating the Bank of England with a process of this kind. For example, there is an exemption from the Restrictive Trade Practices Act for agreements relating to the Bank's supervision of some other financial institutions and markets in paragraph 6 of the Schedule to the Restrictive Trade Practices (Services) Order 1976. That is an order which was brought into effect, quite properly, during the period of a Labour administration, and in associating the Bank with the present monitoring and

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relieving it from the Restrictive Trade Practices Act in relation to that monitoring—it is important to make the point that the paragraph states
"any agreement with respect to any of those matters";
that is, the matters dealt with in that Act—we are simply proceeding along a path for which there is precedent, which we think is a perfectly sensible and reasonable thing to do.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: We on these Benches will support the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, in his contention, not that we subscribe to everything he said in proposing his amendment. This Bill is designed to permit the Stock Exchange to be exempt from the rules governing restrictive practices, on condition that they apply certain important changes in their practices.
The rate at which these changes are implemented can be the subject of debate in the next few years. This may even be affected by some of the recommendations of the Gower Committee, which will be the subject of a good deal of debate in the next year or two, affecting financial institutions. It is because we desire that the Bank of England should retain its independence, its integrity and the great respect which it enjoys, not only in the nation but internationally, that we are anxious to keep the Bank of England out of this process.
The Council for the Securities Industry might have been involved, but that is not provided for in the Bill. I should have thought, however, that in this country the balance which we have achieved in the Bank of England is just about right. It is the envy of many other countries. It has always been a disaster when a country has made the state bank an instrument of Government political policy. It is because we want to keep the Bank of England out of this contentious area that we would subscribe to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: The noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, was very unfair in his observations with reference to the political impartiality of the Bank of England. Indeed, he indulged rather entertainingly in a curious, subconscious transition of thought when he objected to Governors of the Bank of England (I believe he was referring to their speech at the bankers' dinner at the Mansion House) being somewhat unenthusiastic about the policies of Labour Governments and then went on to say that he thought they ought to be critical of the policies of Conservative Governments. The noble Lord cannot have it both ways. Either the Governor of the Bank of England should be dumb on these occasions or he should be allowed to express the views which, as a responsible and experienced man, he holds, though to express them with the studied moderation which Governors of the Bank of England always use.
I can draw on my own experience. I had two terms of office at the Treasury and dealt with two successive Governors of the Bank of England. I can tell your Lordships that they showed no unnecessary enthusiasm for supporting the policies of the Government of the day. They gave us their honest, experienced opinion, and for that reason it was of the very greatest value.
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I, for one—this is the only reason I am intervening on this motion—would like to say that I regret very much that the noble Lord on the Front Bench opposite should have, however moderately, sought to reflect on the complete impartiality in the discharge of their great office of successive Governors of the Bank of England. I think that on reflection the noble Lord will regret having done so.
Lord Diamond: May I, very shortly, endorse eveything that my noble friend Lord Taylor of Gryfe has said and ask also for some explanation which I think would be appropriately attached to this amendment, which relates to the Bank of England? Paragraph (b)(ii) refers to "any two or more of them". If there were only two—that is, if the Bank of England were not included—on every single occasion the Secretary of State and the Treasury would have to be referred to.
What I am not clear about is the position of the Secretary of State. I find it unusual (although I am sure that the Minister who is to reply will be able to give me precedents for this) that there should be a circumstance in which the Secretary of State is sometimes responsible, and therefore answerable to Parliament, while at other times, without Parliament knowing a thing about it, the Secretary of State does not intervene and is therefore not responsible. I should find it very difficult to understand a situation in which the Secretary of State was sometimes responsible, in having to be a party to this kind of agreement, while at other times, without anybody knowing, because one could just pick on any two of three, he was not responsible. I hope that the Minister will be good enough to say what is likely to happen in practice and how that will be reconciled with the wording of the Bill if it is left undisturbed.
Lord Cockfield: I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter for his intervention. I think that there is—for it came out in most of the speeches which were made—very great respect for the Bank of England and for the part that it has played. There is always a risk that nationalisation of a concern, or its being taken over by Government, may affect its impartiality. One of the things that we have been very appreciative of is the fact that in the case of the Bank of England this has not happened at all. I should like, therefore, to go further and say that I can see no reason why joining the Bank of England in this process of monitoring the progress made by the Stock Exchange in dismantling certain restrictive practices will prejudice the independence of the Bank of England. In fact, on the contrary; the Bank of England comes into this process by virtue of its independence.
It is because an independent view of that kind is so important that we felt that the monitoring ought not simply to be done by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The Treasury comes into so many matters, as the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, knows. As a matter of precaution, one needs to add their name to almost anything. But, instead of the monitoring being restricted to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, we felt that there was also great merit in bringing in an independent mind to look at these matters and that the Bank of England was the pre-

935
eminent authority in the City of London, with the widest knowledge and understanding of these matters.
I assure the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe, that this is not in any way a failure to appreciate the importance of the Council for the Securities Industry, which has done a very good job and still has a part to play in ensuring that all the parties to the monitoring process are informed about the views of institutional investors and others. But if one is looking for an independent body, it is the Bank of England, perhaps, rather than the Council for the Securities Industry, which is the body in point. I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe, that when Professor Gower's report is published tomorrow it may contain a number of points that will require very careful consideration, but that is a matter for the future rather than a matter for today.
The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, said that sometimes the Secretary of State seemed to be responsible for what went on and sometimes he was not—that sometimes he took action for which he was answerable to the House and that sometimes he took action for which he was not answerable to the House. I am not entirely certain just what the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, has in mind, but I imagine that what he means is this. There are occasions when the Secretary of State performs statutory duties under the terms of particular legislation, but there are many, many other things that every Secretary of State does which do not arise directly from the enforcement of specific statutory provisions.
The monitoring process is a non-statutory function. There is no provision in the Bill or in the legislation that there should be monitoring. Therefore the Secretary of State is carrying this out as a non-statutory duty. In the course of this monitoring there is always the risk that something may be done which legally counts as an agreement. The purpose of the paragraph in this particular subsection is to ensure that if this happens the action is not itself a registrable agreement. It is just as simple as that.
If the noble Lord is concerned about the question of Parliament knowing what goes on, there is a simple answer: that it is always open to noble Lords to ask questions on the progress of the monitoring process. We would wish to be as open as possible. Certainly the Government have been, and will no doubt continue to be, pressed to give information on this point. There is no question of trying to avoid revealing what in fact emerges from the monitoring process. On the contrary, the whole point of the monitoring process is to ensure that progress towards dismantling the various restrictive practices is monitored and, in due course, publicly known. Most of it, of course, is known already because the Stock Exchange itself has shown no reluctance to tell people exactly what it is doing. A great deal of progress has been made, and this is a matter of public knowledge.
Lord Bruce of Donington: I am most grateful for the courteous nature of the noble Lord's reply to the questions which have been raised by a number of noble Lords. I must, however, take the slightest
936
possible exception to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter. I do not intend, and never do intend, any personal affront to any Governor of the Bank of England or to any of its personnel. But I am bound to say that I do not regard it as being a cardinal sin to raise misgivings from time to time as to its publicly expressed attitude.
I am fully sensible of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield, concerning the help which the Bank of England was able to give in 1976. It is a matter of some wry reflection that, owing to a Treasury error at that time in its estimate of the public sector borrowing requirement—an error of some £4,000 million too much, and £3,000 million too much the next year—it emerged in the event that the aid we received was not required anyway. In fact, as the noble Lord well recalls, it was very speedily repaid. This is not to deny or to disparage in any way the efforts made by the Bank of England to assist the Government and the country as a whole on those occasions.
One does, however, wish—and I must repeat this, without, I sincerely hope, giving offence—that the economic researchers in the Bank of England, its advisers, and those who are responsible for enunciating its policies showed a rather greater degree of independence from current Conservative economic thought. I trust that in so saying I shall not be regarded by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, as exceeding the bounds of conventional courtesy, or, indeed, real courtesy, in these matters.
The independence of the Bank of England in the present circumstances is under rather peculiar conditions. Your Lordships will be aware that I myself and we on this side of the House consider that certain aspects of this Bill go to the root of this country's constitutional procedures. I shall be dealing with that aspect of the matter in a later amendment. But there is no guarantee by the Government so far that the agreements arrived at ultimately, and in which all these participants are going to take part, will not result in an agreement being reached which, if this Bill had not been passed, would not have been in conformity with the Restrictive Practices Act, Fair Trading Act or Competition Act 1980.
These are controversial matters. If subsequently it were found that it would have been rather wiser for the Director General of Fair Trading to have proceeded with the action initiated by him with the agreement of the Government, it would be unfortunate if the Bank of England as an institution were seen as condoning in the existence of one or two clauses of the agreement which, but for the passing of this Act, would have been illegal.
It is exactly to preserve that degree of aloofness and independence—aloofness from the controversy which, I regret to inform the noble Lord, is certainly not finished in connection with this matter—that this amendment is moved. It is not for any disparagement of the capabilities or the intentions of the Bank of England itself. I beg to move.
3.35 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 2) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 101; Not-Contents, 121.

DIVISION NO. 1

CONTENTS

Allen of Fallowfield, L.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Amherst, E.

John-Mackie, L.

Ardwick, L.

Kilmarnock, L.

Attlee, E.

Leatherland, L.

Aylestone, L.

Listowel, E.

Banks, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Beswick, L.

Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.

Birk, B.

Lockwood, B.

Bishopston, L.

Mackie of Benshie, L.

Blyton, L.

Mais, L.

Boston of Faversham, L.

Mayhew, L.

Bowden, L.

Melchett, L.

Briginshaw, L.

Mishcon, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Molloy, L.

Bruce of Donington, L.

Monson, L.

Caradon, L.

Nicol, B.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Oram, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Peart, L.

Collison, L.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller.]

Cudlipp, L.

David, B. [Teller.]

Raglan, L.

Davies of Penrhys, L.

Rathcreedan, L.

Dean of Beswick, L.

Rhodes, L.

Diamond, L.

Roberthall, L.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Rochester, L.

Donnet of Balgay, L.

Sainsbury, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Seear, B.

Ennals, L.

Sefton of Garston, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Serota, B.

Ezra, L.

Simon, V.

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Stallard, L.

Fulton, L.

Stedman, B.

Gaitskell, B.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Gallacher, L.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Gladwyn, L.

Stoddart of Swindon, L.

Glenamara, L.

Stone, L.

Gormley, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Graham of Edmonton, L.

Taylor of Blackburn, L.

Grey, E.

Taylor of Gryfe, L.

Grimond, L.

Tordoff, L.

Hale, L.

Underhill, L.

Hampton, L.

Wallace of Coslany, L.

Hanworth, V.

Walston, L.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Howie of Troon, L.

Whaddon, L.

Hughes, L.

Wigoder, L.

Irving of Dartford, L.

Wilson of Rievaulx, L.

Jacques, L.

Winstanley, L.

Jeger, B.

Wootton of Abinger, B.

NOT-CONTENTS

Adeane, L.

Clancarty, E.

Airey of Abingdon, B.

Cockfield, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Allerton, L.

Craigavon, V.

Alport, L.

Crathorne, L.

Ampthill, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Annan, L.

Darnley, E.

Atholl, D.

Daventry, V.

Bauer, L.

Davidson, V.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

De Freyne, L.

Bessborough, E.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Blake, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Boyd-Carpenter, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Eccles, V.

Broxbourne, L.

Effingham, E.

Bruce-Gardyne, L.

Ellenborough, L.

Caccia, L.

Enniskillen, E.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Campbell of Croy, L.

Gainford, L.

Chelmer, L.

Gardner of Parkes, B.

938

Gisborough, L.

Mottistone, L.

Glenarthur, L.

Moyne, L.

Gray of Contin, L.

Nathan, L.

Gridley, L.

Northchurch, B.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Harvington, L.

Orkney, E.

Hawke, L.

Orr-Ewing, L.

Hayter, L.

Pender, L.

Henley, L.

Penrhyn, L.

Hornsby-Smith, B.

Peyton of Yeovil, L.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Porritt, L.

Ilchester, E.

Portland, D.

Inglewood, L.

Reilly, L.

Ingrow, L.

Richardson, L.

Killearn, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Kilmany, L.

St. Davids, V.

Kinloss, Ly.

Saltoun, Ly.

Kintore, E.

Sandys, L.

Lane-Fox, B.

Seebohm, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Selkirk, E.

Lloyd, L.

Sharples, B.

Long, V.

Skelmersdale, L.

Lothian, M.

Stamp, L.

Loudoun, C.

Stodart of Leaston, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Sudeley, L.

Luke, L.

Suffield, L.

Lyell, L.

Swinfen, L.

McFadzean, L.

Swinton, E. [Teller.]

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Teviot, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Thomas of Swynnerton, L.

Mar, C.

Thorneycroft, L.

Margadale, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Marley, L.

Trenchard, V.

Merrivale, L.

Trumpington, B.

Mersey, V.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Middleton, L.

Vickers, B.

Milverton, L.

Vivian, L.

Molson, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Monk Bretton, L.

Whitelaw, V.

Montgomery of Alamein, V.

Wise, L.

Morris, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
[Amendment No. 3 not moved.]
3.45 p.m.
The Chairman of Committees: The next amendment is Manuscript Amendment No. 3A. If this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 4 and 5.
Lord Bruce of Donington Lord Bruce of Donington moved Amendment No. 3A:
Page 1, line 15, leave out subsection (2).
The noble Lord said: I am grateful for the noble Lord's co-operation in assenting to the submission of this manuscript amendment. The Committee may be aware that, according to the Marshalled List, I gave notice that I was going to oppose the adoption of Clause 1 of the Bill as a whole. I was advised that that was in effect equivalent to a vote against the Bill on Second Reading, which is not, as I am given to understand, the custom of this House. So as an alternative to doing that, I propose to move the deletion of subsection (2) of Clause 1.
This is the clause by virtue of which Her Majesty's Government seek to abate or in effect withdraw the action which was in process involving the Director General of Fair Trading and the Stock Exchange before the Restrictive Practices Court. On the Second Reading of the Bill I voiced the opinion, which I now

939
reiterate, that this clause makes a complete break with all precedent and is in fact, perhaps not in law, bordering upon the unconstitutional. In his reply to my assertion the noble Lord who wound up the debate—and, therefore, no reply could be made to him immediately afterwards—said this:
"…numerous cases in which action not dissimilar to this has been taken in the fiscal field. May I refer him, for example, to Section 15(7) of the Finance Act 1971 which overturned the decision in Restorick v. Baker (47 Tax Cases, 116)? The law in that case was changed retrospectively, the only exception being where there had been a determination by the commissioners or a court had actually given judgment. Again, Section 86 of the Finance Act 1981 overturned the decision in Berry v. Warnett despite the fact that in that case judgment had been given in the Court of Appeal and that judgment was under appeal to the House of Lords but not then decided. The position simply is that in matters of this kind the decision as to the content of the law is one for Parliament and the Bill therefore is a very proper Bill in that respect."—[Official Report, 15/12/83; col. 380–381.]
Since that debate I have, naturally, refreshed my mind as to the position in the two cases that were referred to by the noble Lord in order that the Committee may judge whether there is the remotest similarity in any way between the two cases cited by the noble Lord and subsection (2) of Clause 1 of this Bill.
In Restorick v. Baker the inspector of taxes in the particular case computed the personal release from income tax to which he was entitled on the footing that under Section 14(4) of the Finance Act 1968 it fell to be reduced by £36. On appeal the respondent contended that since Section 14(4) provided for the personal release to be reduced by £36 for each family allowance, if more than one, it applied only where more than one family allowance was received. The general commissioners allowed the appeal, and the court itself confirmed this.
The alteration to the law was made under Section 15 of the Finance Act 1971, and its effect was to reinterpret just two words. It was to enforce the law as it was thought to be before the case of Restorick v. Baker. In that particular case it was held that because of the words,
"for each allowance if more than one",
there was no clawback where only one family allowance was received. Although the amendment that was made by Section 15 had retrospective effect, it did not affect taxpayers who had obtained a decision from the commission or the courts on or before 16th March. Indeed, all the words of Section 15 were, in fact, designed to reinterpret the Act into something that it had always been assumed to be before. This was therefore a minor technical correction which was made in the taxing statutes on the construction purely of a word, or a series of words, in a section of the previous Finance Act under reference. That cannot in any way be compared with this. Moreover, it should be noted that a judgment had been given. The case had been argued before the commissioners and before the courts; everyone interested had an opportunity of seeing what the evidence was and, as the noble Lord said, it was quite proper for the amending Act to be passed.
Exactly the same considerations apply to the second case, because the Capital Gains Tax Act 1979 provided that,
940
"a gift in settlement is to be treated as a disposal of the entire interest of the transferor in the property which passes into the settlement".
In Berry v. Warnett it was held that the expression "gift in settlement" did not extend to a transfer of property. All that Section 86 did was to substitute the wording in order that a transfer of property was included.
These are very technical matters, which the noble Lord, who has more than a passing interest in taxation matters, and, indeed, myself and other accountants and lawyers, know perfectly well. But they cannot in any way be compared with the action that is proposed in this Bill, which exempts wholesale a particular body of people, or an association of people, from the operation of an Act. Moreover, the subsection itself invokes that exemption prior to the court having reached any kind of decision and prior to any kind of published judgment being made available to anyone. I would say that that is a constitutional impropriety that could create a very undesirable precedent. I could say that in certain circumstances if might favour interests that the noble Lord might not wish to favour. The noble Lord is well aware that Section 26(1) of the Competition Act 1980 provides:
"Where the Court has declared under section 1(3) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 that any restrictions or information provisions in an agreement are contrary to the public interest, any party to the agreement or the proceedings in which the declaration was made may, at any time before the declaration comes into effect, submit a revised agreement or draft of a revised agreement to the Court and the Court may declare that any restrictions or information provisions contained in the revised agreement by virtue of which the said Act of 1976 applies or would apply to that agreement are not contrary to the public interest."
The alternative was always available to allow the case to be heard by the Restrictive Practices Court and to allow the Restrictive Practices Court to make a judgment and then, if there were any further matters arising from that, there was a further procedure that could be embarked upon. I believe that that would have been the correct procedure. In this case it certainly is not being invoked and one is bound to wonder why not.
That there is a constitutional impropriety there can now be little doubt. But the reasons now begin to trouble one. Why, after a period of four years, with the approval of successive Governments of different political complexions, of the rectitude of the actions embarked upon by the Director General of Fair Trading, should this step suddenly have been taken? Why would there be any difficulty in allowing the law to take its course and the result to be made public? If necessary, the Government could say at that stage, "Well, we did not really mean the Restrictive Trade Practices Act to apply in this particular way. We did not really mean that. We will bring in a new law which deals with this peculiar circumstance which has been revealed in the exchange of views between the Stock Exchange and the Director General of Fair Trading and in the judgment of the court." That would have been constitutionally proper. As the noble Lord himself said on Second Reading, and as I admitted somewhat wryly at the beginning of our deliberation this afternoon, all Acts of Parliament are "for the time being", and of course one can amend them. A perfectly proper and constitutional course was open to the Government.
The only inference one can draw—and I do not wish to be offensive; the noble Lord knows that I strive for

941
moderation whenever the circumstances permit—is that this rather smacks of a backdoor deal which has been reached by a Conservative Secretary of State for Trade and interests in the Stock Exchange that he knew to be friendly to his own party. That is what it looks like. I do not think that it is right. If my own party were in Government and contemplating such a step I should take exactly the same view. I regard it as completely undesirable and an abuse of the powers of Government to intervene in the proceedings of a case when they apprehend, for whatever reasons may appear logical to them, that a judgment is going against their friends. That is wrong, and I invite all sides of the House to support my amendment.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: We are in some difficulty on this amendment. It is a manuscript amendment, and is it available to other Members of the Committee? We have been unable to secure a copy of this amendment.
The Chairman of Committees: It is available in the Printed Paper Office and, I imagine, outside.
3.59 p.m.
Lord Cockfield: Perhaps it would be for the convenience of the Committee if I intervened at this stage. This will enable noble Lords who have not done so to read the manuscript amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington.
May I start by saying that the noble Lord is endeavouring on a side wind to challenge the whole principle of the Bill. He has said nothing whatever about the amendment that he has tabled. All he has done is repeat all the arguments he advanced on Second Reading and which were fully and amply dealt with at that time.
The noble Lord has challenged my action in quoting two cases which related to the law of taxation. Perhaps I may start by reminding him of what he himself said in the opening words of his speech on Second Reading:
"It is…an interference with the process of law…Parliament…has…rarely interfered with the process of law once that process is in operation".—[Official Report, 15/12/83; col. 359.]
The cases that I quoted were specifically designed to answer that point. The cases also dealt with the other argument which is so commonly advanced in this field; namely, that the Act is retrospective or is alleged to be retrospective and that is objectionable. In the fiscal field, retrospective legislation, although rarely indulged in, is not at all unknown. The two cases I quoted were both of retrospective legislation.
In the first instance there was not only the case which had actually been decided, but there had been—as the words I then gave to the House indicated—many other cases which were in course of the process of litigation at the time. The effect of the change in the law was to stop that litigation. The second case that I quoted was half-way between the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. So far as Parliament intervening in cases of this sort, it is by no means unknown. I entirely agree that it is the kind of action that needs to be considered very carefully indeed, which is exactly what we have done.
There are other examples of retrospective legislation in this field. I thought that the noble Lord would be
942
interested in them. The first was in the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, which exempted retrospectively certain agreements relating to the granting of credit. There was another one in the Competition Act 1980, which exempted copyright agreements, again retrospectively. To be fair, in the latter case there had been some dispute as to whether the Act did or did not apply; but the Government took the view—and I think very properly indeed—that, rather than allow such a dispute to go to the courts to the great benefit of the lawyers but of nobody else, it was desirable to legislate in order to clarify the position. None of these examples is a direct precedent for the present Bill, which is very much sui generis, but they illustrate the fact that the criticisms and arguments that have been made on the specific grounds of retrospection, and also of interference with the due process of law, simply do not hold water.
The noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, also claimed that the proposal was a constitutional impropriety. I do not know whether he used the popular phrase and described it as a constitutional outrage. But these are merely phrases that are used when one does not like something that the other party is doing. There is nothing unconstitutional about coming to Parliament and to your Lordships' House to propose legislation. There has been much criticism on the opposite ground; namely, that Governments—I am not talking specifically about the present Government—do things without coming to Parliament for authority. In this instance nothing could be more constitutionally correct than the Government coming to Parliament and saying, "This is what we propose doing and we want the assent of both Houses of Parliament". That seems to me to be absolutely and completely correct.
The noble Lord went on to say that there was an alternative course available, that is, to allow the case to be heard, for judgment to be given and then for a decision to be taken on what further action should be pursued. This goes right to the heart of the matter. Of course such a course was open; but on very careful consideration of all the factors the view of the Government was that that was the wrong course to take. I set out at length the reasons in the speech I delivered on Second Reading. We felt that the process of change, which we recognise is very necessary in this field, was actually being obstructed by the case which had gone to the Restrictive Practices Court. That judgment has been confirmed by events. Nothing happened between 1978 or 1979 when this issue first arose and when finally the Stock Exchange agreed in the autumn of last year that it would dismantle some of its more important restrictive practices.
Since that agreement was reached, the pace of change has been very great. The Stock Exchange has accepted that many of the more important restrictive practices which had given rise to legitimate anxiety and concern on the part of the director general and of others should be eliminated on a reasonable time scale. That process is going ahead. This is a matter of judgment. Our judgment is that the course that we have chosen is the better of the two. It is on that basis that I commended the Bill to your Lordships' House on Second Reading, and it is on that basis that I take my stand this afternoon.
4.7 p.m.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, has left the Chamber, no doubt for excellent reasons. On Second Reading he expressed the view that it is impossible to get away from the fact, as stated by my noble friend Lord Bruce of Donington, that the procedure we are examining involves some interference in the operation of the law in respect of a particular case. The noble Lord went on to say that what puzzled him was why it was thought necessary to take the action at this stage. But that raises another matter. I am bound to say that I find myself in accord with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter.
I have suffered from the great battle about retrospective legislation. I observe that the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield, may have been present when I was savaged on the Burmah Oil case. That has left a scar on my mind which still remains—more or less under control, I am happy to say. That case related to retrospective legislation after the termination of proceedings, in the House of Lords on that occasion, and I am happy to say that the then Attorney-General had the support of a former Conservative Lord Chancellor. But that is by the way. It is merely a matter of prejudice that I express in my favour.
Here we are not concerned with mere retrospective legislation. We are concerned with the interference of the Executive, in the form of the Secretary of State, in the processes taking place before the courts. The Director General of Fair Trading had referred the matter to the Restrictive Practices Court, and I should like to know how far the matter had gone. It had been around for an awful long time—about five years. The position arises that the Secretary of State apparently orders and requires the Director General of Fair Trading—for whom, incidentally, he has no ministerial responsibility—to stop the proceedings pending in the Restrictive Practices Court in order to fulfil the purposes of this legislation. It seems to me that that is a very clear illustration of interference by the Executive with the judicial or court process.
I cannot deny that there may be exceptional circumstances of public policy which require that to be done, but I must say that I have listened in vain to hear what exceptional considerations of public policy would require the action to be taken in this case. I did not have the advantage of hearing the speech made by the noble Lord the Minister on Second Reading, but I have read it and I failed to detect any considerations of public policy affecting the public at large—not a particular interest of a group or body—requiring the Executive to interfere with what is going on in the courts in the way which has been proposed in this case. At the very lowest it is highly questionable, and in applying the proper responsibility of Parliament to see that that kind of thing is not done I think it is right that your Lordships' Committee should not only examine what is proposed, but should reject it.
Lord Diamond: What the noble and learned Lord has just said is surely absolutely right in the sense that, though it may be proper, we do not think it wise to interfere as an Executive in the process of law when it is in the stage mentioned unless there is an overwhelming reason which makes it essential to do
944
so. The noble Lord the Chancellor of the Duchy has referred to cases of tax law, as has the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington. I do not know what is the present accepted rule with regard to taxation law, but I know exactly what it was in my time. It was that one could legislate retrospectively in favour of the taxpayer but one could not legislate retrospectively against his interests. That is to say, as the Minister has said, it is perfectly proper for Parliament to legislate on anything at any time, but it is extremely unwise and against all precedent to legislate retrospectively in certain circumstances.
Having made that absolutely clear, I wish to go on to say why we on these Benches will be abstaining in the vote which I imagine will shortly take place. The noble Lord the Minister was absolutely right when he said that the amendment goes to the heart of the matter. That is to say, it is just the same as an amendment to reject the essence of a Government Bill on Second Reading. I hope I have made it absolutely clear how unhappy we are with the way the Government have handled this matter and with the essence of the Bill, and how much I agree with all the arguments in that direction which were put forward on Second Reading. However, I must say that we have had the Second Reading and we felt it right to let the Bill go through at that stage because we took the view that the constitutional position of your Lordships' House is not—I repeat, not—to deny a Second Reading to a Government Bill. We on these Benches take the view that to support in the Lobby—and possibly successfully support—the amendment which has been moved would have the effect which I have mentioned, and we shall therefore abstain.
Lord Bruce of Donington: There remains very little for me to say following the intervention of my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones. I think it has been proved beyond any doubt that in this particular instance there would be an interference with the due process of law.
I am extremely sorry to learn from the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, that he regards a vote against subsection (2) of Clause 1 of the Bill as involving a constitutional principle affecting the conduct of your Lordships' Committee. In point of fact, I sought independent advice officially on this matter before the debate. As your Lordships will recall, at one time I gave notice that I was going to oppose the Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill? I was advised that that would be equivalent to a vote against the Bill on Second Reading, and consequently would not be in conformity with the usage of your Lordships' House. However, I was also advised—and I was advised officially—that a vote against subsection (2) of Clause 1 did not fall into the same category and would not involve any breach of the usages of your Lordships' House. Therefore, I hope that on reflection the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, and his noble friends will take some notice of that position.
I have no desire to prolong this debate for the sake of prolonging it. My noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones has already replied very effectively, and so I simply commend the amendment.
Lord Cockfield: I should like to assure the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, that I was not in any

945
way suggesting that he was not entitled to put down the amendment that he has tabled. The point I was making was that the arguments that he was advancing were arguments against the whole purpose of the Bill. I wonder whether, in relation to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, said, I may, with very great respect, suggest to him that he is wrong on a point of law—
Lord Elwyn-Jones: It is perfectly proper for the noble Lord to do that.
Lord Cockfield: This is not intervention by the Executive at all. If there is intervention, it is intervention by Parliament or the legislature.
4.18 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 3A) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 70; Not-Contents, 123.

DIVISION NO. 2

CONTENTS

Allen of Fallowfield, L.

Irving of Dartford, L.

Ardwick, L.

Jacques, L.

Beswick, L.

Jeger, B.

Birk, B.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Bishopston, L. [Teller.]

John-Mackie, L.

Blyton, L.

Lawrence, L.

Boston of Faversham, L.

Leatherland, L.

Bowden, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Briginshaw, L.

Lockwood, B.

Brockway, L.

Mishcon, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Molloy, L.

Bruce of Donington, L.

Monson, L.

Caradon, L.

Nicol, B.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Oram, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Peart, L.

Collison, L.

Phillips, B.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

David, B.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller.]

Davies of Penrhys, L.

Dean of Beswick, L.

Prys-Davies, L.

Denington, B.

Sefton of Garston, L.

Donnet of Balgay, L.

Serota, B.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Stallard, L.

Elystan-Morgan, L.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Ennals, L.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Stoddart of Swindon, L.

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Stone, L.

Fitt, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Gaitskell, B.

Taylor of Blackburn, L.

Gallacher, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Glenamara, L.

Underhill, L.

Graham of Edmonton, L.

Wallace of Coslany, L.

Hale, L.

Wedderburn of Charlton, L.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Howie of Troon, L.

Wilson of Rievaulx, L.

Hughes, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Adeane, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Airey of Abingdon, B.

Broxbourne, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Caithness, E.

Allerton, L.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Ampthill, L.

Cathcart, E.

Atholl, D.

Chelmer, L.

Bauer, L.

Cockfield, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Constantine of Stanmore, L.

Bessborough, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Blake, L.

Craigavon, V.

946

Crawford and Balcarres, E.

Middleton, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Milverton, L.

Darnley, E.

Molson, L.

Daventry, V.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Davidson, V.

Monk Bretton, L.

De L'Isle, V.

Montgomery of Alamein, V.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Morris, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Mottistone, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Northchurch, B.

Eccles, V.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Ellenborough, L.

O'Brien of Lothbury, L.

Elton, L.

Onslow, E.

Enniskillen, E.

Orkney, E.

Fortescue, E.

Orr-Ewing, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Pender, L.

Gainford, L.

Penrhyn, L.

Gardner of Parkes, B.

Peyton of Yeovil, L.

Gibson-Watt, L.

Porritt, L.

Gisborough, L.

Portland, D.

Glanusk, L.

Reilly, L.

Grantchester, L.

Richardson, L.

Gray of Contin, L.

Rochdale, V.

Greenway, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Gridley. L.

St. Davids, V.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Saint Oswald, L.

Harvington, L.

Saltoun, Ly.

Hawke, L.

Sandys, L.

Hayter, L.

Savile, L.

Hornsby-Smith, B.

Selkirk, E.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Sharples, B.

Ilchester, E.

Sherfield, L.

Ingrow, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Killearn, L.

Slim, V.

Kilmany, L.

Somers, L.

Kinloss, Ly.

Stamp, L.

Kintore, E.

Stodart of Leaston, L.

Kitchener, E.

Sudeley, L.

Lane-Fox, B.

Suffield, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Swinton, E. [Teller.]

Long, V.

Terrington, L.

Loudoun, C.

Thomas of Swynnerton, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Thorneycroft, L.

Luke, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Lyell, L.

Trenchard, V.

McFadzean, L.

Trumpington, B.

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Vickers, B.

Mar, C.

Vivian, L.

Margadale, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Marley, L.

Whitelaw, V.

Merrivale, L.

Wise, L.

Mersey, V.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
4.26 p.m.
Lord Bruce of Donington Lord Bruce of Donington moved Amendment No. 4:
Page 1, line 19, after ("above") insert ("and shall at the same time publish any such particulars, together with any documents relating to such particulars, which he has filed with the Restrictive Practices Court").
The noble Lord said: We on this side do not accept, as a matter of law, that there has been no intervention by the Government in the process of law. In point of fact, directions were explicitly given by the Government prior to this Bill to the Director General of Fair Trading to discontinue the action. All that this Bill does is to seek to legalise what has already been directed by the Government. It is therefore important, as a matter of public interest, that the documents in this case are made public. There is no reason at all why they should not be made public. If the Government are inspired by the nobility of purpose that they put forward, they should regard the production of the

947
documents, the publishing of the documents and the public availability of the documents as vindicating their own fidelity to the rule of law.
What conceivable objection can there be to that? This is a case where, after approximately four years of governmental support, as I have previously stated, for the action taken by the Director General of Fair Trading and following at least three parliamentary public declarations by Governments declining to give any kind of support to the withdrawal of the action, the action has been withdrawn in midstream. Whatever the noble Lord the Minister may say—he always argues his case not only amiably but with some thoroughness—he would surely wish to have his arguments completely vindicated by the documents that are relevant to this case. After all, democracy has been defined as government by discussion—preferably by informed discussion.
Despite the fact that the noble Lord has sought to allay the anxieties of his colleagues—and, with respect, has enunciated one or two extraordinary propositions in law about this matter—the principles behind the action that the Government have taken are not going to lie down. There are going to be further inquiries about this matter because the explanations that the Government have given simply will not wash, and they are still causing anxiety which is not purely confined to this side of the Committee—and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, for indicating in so far as it affects those for whom he speaks—but which is also widely shared elsewhere.
Why should these documents remain a state secret? There are not any security problems involved in their production. Had the case gone to court, the documents would have been put in as exhibits. Evidence would have been given in support of the documentation already submitted to the court and there would have been a public judgment. The arguments could all have been set out as they are normally set out; and of course as the noble Lord well knows, in extreme cases court transcripts are available, on payment of what some may regard as rather a heavy fee, at the conclusion of any case. So had the case taken its normal course, had there been no intervention by the Executive in the proceedings involved in this case, everybody would have known what it was all about.
The Government will have their Bill; they will have all the actions that they want. Why should they conceivably resist this amendment? The noble Lord may dismiss the arguments raised here; he may cast doubt upon them; and he may argue with his customary ingenuity that a different set of principles, of which we have not yet heard, probably apply to this particular case which fully exculpate the Government and vindicate his case. He may do all that, but I still maintain that, in order that Parliament may check and the people may judge whether the Government have really acted with propriety in this case, both in their intervention and in their submission of the Bill to the House, these documents ought to be published. This amendment seeks to do that. Nobody who has behaved properly, sincerely and honourably has anything to fear from the documents becoming available. I therefore urge your Lordships to support
948
the amendment which I sincerely hope that the noble Lord, in vindication of his own arguments, will be only too happy to accept on behalf of Her Majesty's Government.
Lord Cockfield: I wonder whether I might deal first with certain allegations made by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington. He claimed that directions were given by the Secretary of State to the director general to discontinue the action. No such directions were given and nor could they have been given. The position was that the litigation was between the director general and the Stock Exchange, and the application to the court was made by the Stock Exchange, not by the Secretary of State at all.
Having disposed of that matter I now turn to the amendment. The documents currently on the Register of Restrictive Agreements, which will be removed by virtue of Clause 1(2), are already in the public domain because the register is open to public inspection. No purpose therefore would be served by an obligation to publish them. They are already there and they are available.
As regards the documents filed by the director general with the court, these so far consist merely of his answer to the Stock Exchange's statement of case and his further rejoinder. Proofs of evidence have not yet been exchanged. The documents filed by the director general would be meaningless without being read along with the Stock Exchange's own statement of case and its reply to the director general's answer. These were supplied by the Stock Exchange on the basis that they would be used only for a very limited purpose—that is, for the court proceedings. Indeed, Section 41 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 provides criminal sanctions against disclosure of documents of this kind.
Quite apart from this, the director general's documents would not be particularly illuminating; they are technical, legal documents which do not show how the director general's case would have been presented. On all those grounds therefore I must advise your Lordships to reject the amendment.
Lord Bruce of Donington: I am obliged to the noble Lord for his reply. I concede immediately that of course certain documents are already available; but some are not available. There seems no valid reason why the documents and the case filed by the Director General of Fair Trading should not be made public. The noble Lord may think that they will yield but little information.
As regards the documents that have been put forward by the Stock Exchange on the basis of their being confidential, on the basis of their being only used in the case, I point out that if they had been used as exhibits in the case (had the case come to the Restrictive Practices Court and had judgment been given) these documents would have been made public. There does not seem to be any reason therefore why they should not be made public now. Indeed, the noble Lord referred to the criminality of disclosing documents that ought not to be disclosed. If this clause were passed it would cease to be criminal to have them made public because in conformity with the procedure advocated by the noble Lord, if this Parliament passes

949
laws then they become the law although it might be necessary, I willingly concede, to have a separate schedule on the back indicating which particular part of the law had been amended and in what respect.
I do not like—and I do not think that all Members of your Lordships' Committee like—the manner in which all this is evidently going to be hushed up. Nobody will finally know exactly what happened. I do not think that that is good for the country. I do not think that it is good for the reputation of this House. I do not even think that it is good for the reputations of Governments. To the extent to which this amendment does permit the publication of documents not so far published and not so far available to the public, I think that it merits your Lordships' support. I beg to move.
4.39 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 4) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 95; Not-Contents, 118.

DIVISION NO. 3

CONTENTS

Allen of Fallowfield, L.

Irving of Dartford, L.

Amherst, E.

Jacques, L.

Ardwick, L.

Jeger, B.

Attlee, E.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Aylestone, L.

John-Mackie, L.

Banks, L.

Kilmarnock, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Leatherland, L.

Beswick, L.

Listowel, E.

Birk, B.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Bishopston, L.

Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.

Blyton, L.

Lockwood, B.

Boston of Faversham, L.

Mais, L.

Bowden, L.

Mayhew, L.

Briginshaw, L.

Mishcon, L.

Brockway, L.

Molloy, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Monson, L.

Bruce of Donington, L.

Nicol, B.

Caradon, L.

Oram, L.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Paget of Northampton, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Peart, L.

Collison, L.

Phillips, B.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Cudlipp, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller.]

David, B. [Teller.]

Davies of Penrhys, L.

Prys-Davies, L.

Dean of Beswick, L.

Raglan, L.

Denington, B.

Roberthall, L.

Diamond, L.

Rochester, L.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Sainsbury, L.

Donnet of Balgay, L.

Shackleton, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Shepherd, L.

Elystan-Morgan, L.

Simon, V.

Ennals, L.

Stallard, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Fitt, L.

Stoddart of Swindon, L.

Gaitskell, B.

Stone, L.

Gallacher, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Gladwyn, L.

Taylor of Blackburn, L.

Glenamara, L.

Taylor of Gryfe, L.

Graham of Edmonton, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Grimond, L.

Tordoff, L.

Hale, L.

Underhill, L.

Hanworth, V.

Wallace of Coslany, L.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Walston, L.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Wedderburn of Charlton, L.

Howie of Troon, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Hughes, L.

Wigoder, L.

950

NOT-CONTENTS

Airey of Abingdon, B.

Lyell, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

McFadzean, L.

Allerton, L.

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Ampthill, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Atholl, D.

Malmesbury, E.

Auckland, L.

Mancroft, L.

Bauer, L.

Mar, C.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Margadale, L.

Bessborough, E.

Marley, L.

Blake, L.

Marshall of Leeds, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Merrivale, L.

Caithness, E.

Mersey, V.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Middleton, L.

Cathcart, E.

Milverton, L.

Chelmer, L.

Molson, L.

Cockfield, L.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Constantine of Stanmore, L.

Monk Bretton, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Montgomery of Alamein, V.

Craigavon, V.

Morris, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Mottistone, L.

Darnley, E.

Northchurch, B.

Daventry, V.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Davidson, V.

O'Brien of Lothbury, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Onslow, E.

Ebbisham, L.

Orkney, E.

Eccles, V.

Pender, L.

Ellenborough, L.

Penrhyn, L.

Elton, L.

Peyton of Yeovil, L.

Enniskillen, E.

Porritt, L.

Fisher, L.

Portland, D.

Fortescue, E.

Reilly, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Richardson, L.

Gainford, L.

Rochdale, V.

Gardner of Parkes, B.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Gibson-Watt, L.

St. Davids, V.

Glanusk, L.

Saint Oswald, L.

Grantchester, L.

Sandys, L.

Gray of Contin, L.

Savile, L.

Greenway, L.

Selkirk, E.

Gridley, L.

Sharples, B.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Harvington, L.

Soames, L.

Hawke, L.

Stodart of Leaston, L.

Hayter, L.

Sudeley, L.

Hornsby-Smith, B.

Suffield, L.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Swinton, E. [Teller.]

Ilchester, E.

Terrington, L.

Inglewood, L.

Thomas of Swynnerton, L.

Ingrow, L.

Thorneycroft, L.

Killearn, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Kilmany, L.

Trenchard, V.

Kintore, E.

Trumpington, B.

Kitchener, E.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Lane-Fox, B.

Vickers, B.

Lauderdale, E.

Vivian, L.

Long, V.

Waldegrave, E.

Loudoun, C.

Whitelaw, V.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Wise, L.

Luke, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
4.47 p.m.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe Lord Taylor of Gryfe had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 5:
Page 1, line 21, at end insert ("But notwithstanding the above, the Secretary of State shall instruct the Monopolies and Mergers Commission to conduct an enquiry into the practices of The Stock Exchange and to report no later than 31st December 1984.").
Lord Diamond: I hope it will be acceptable to your Lordships' Committee that I move the amendment standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Taylor of Gryfe. He is most anxious to move this amendment and believes that it is important and deserving of the

951
consideration of your Lordships. The slight difficulty under which I labour is that I feel sure that I cannot move it with anything like the distinction of my noble friend—to whom I now give way.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: I apologise to the Committee for being delayed in the corridors. Your Lordships will be glad to hear that, while I propose to rehearse a little of the background of this Bill, I do not propose to make a Second Reading speech on this occasion. Your Lordships will recall that this Bill arises from the deliberations of the Office of Fair Trading, which over a period of six years examined the rule book of the Stock Exchange and concluded that there were 173 cases of infringement of the law as it then stood.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield, that to have referred this matter to the courts would have meant a long process examining each of these infringements. It would have delayed necessary changes in Stock Exchange practices, and the adversarial atmosphere of the court is perhaps not the appropriate atmosphere to secure changes which depend on general agreement. Therefore, in exchange for the withdrawal from the court the Stock Exchange made certain promises to change, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield, has indicated, the changes are already taking place rapidly.
The spin-off from some of the provisions that are now made can be read daily in the Financial Times; the mergers, the changes in associations and the alliances between financial organisations. These changes are matters of great public interest. The public has a substantial interest in what is taking place. While we have arranged that there will be a monitoring of these changes provided in what the Government have said, I believe it would be no impediment to these changes if the Monopolies and Mergers Commission were to have the opportunity in the next year—as is provided in the amendment—to examine the process of change and what is happening in the market as a result of the changes that have been agreed.
The noble Lord, Lord Cockfield, has said that we can monitor these changes and discuss them by Parliamentary Question; but I am sure he will readily agree that this is not an adequate way of monitoring substantial changes of great importance. Since there is a very large public interest in what is taking place affecting important financial institutions, I suggest that it might be worthwhile for the watchdog commission, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, to consider this in connection with industry. References are made regularly to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission where there is some degree of doubt in the public interest. I suggest that what is taking place in the financial sector arising from the Bill might be similarly examined by the commission. I beg to move accordingly.
Lord Cockfield: It may help if I referred briefly to the law on this subject. The restrictive trade practices legislation and the monopolies and mergers legislation are two parallel but rather different régimes. The position is that if an agreement comes under the terms of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act it is thereby
952
excluded from the operation of the monopolies and mergers legislation. This arises as a result of Section 10(1) and (2) of the Fair Trading Act 1973 as subsequently amended and extended. The result therefore of excluding the Stock Exchange agreements from the Restrictive Trade Practices Act is to bring certain of them within the ambit of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. This is true in the case of stockbroking services. It is not true in the case of stock jobbing because in law stock jobbing is not a service.
While it is true therefore that as a matter of law, once the present Bill is enacted stockbroking will come within the ambit of the monopolies and mergers legislation, it does not follow that a reference ought to be made to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. That is a matter which can only be decided in the light of the circumstances which exist at the time. Certainly our view is that at present it would be entirely wrong for such a reference to be made. In effect what the noble Lord's proposed amendment would do would be to substitute an investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission for investigation under the restrictive practices legislation. It would simply be to substitute one form of investigation for another.
As I said at Second Reading, the primary reason why we feel that the Stock Exchange should be exempted from the Restrictive Trade Practices Act is that the operation of that Act is preventing and holding up the very desirable process of change. Under the terms of the Bill now the Stock Exchange will be exempted from the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. Change is going ahead rapidly. If there were to be a reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission that would bring back again the undesirable situation that we had in the past under which the Stock Exchange was quite unwilling to make any change in its rules or in its practices. The really important point is that we should now give the Stock Exchange every encouragement to go ahead and to remove these restrictive practices, as it has undertaken to do. I must therefore advise your Lordships to reject the amendment.
Lord Bruce of Donington: We on this side of the Committee wish to support the amendment put down by the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe. The noble Lord's answer will not do. All he is really saying is that because the Stock Exchange has found it to its own advantage not to take any action so far to bring itself into conformity with the requirements of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, it is to be allowed to get away with it. All one has to do is to do nothing to gain the support of the Government who say that the very act of bringing matters before the Restrictive Practices Court has held up progress. But I ask the Committee to whose advantage? The Stock Exchange would much have preferred not to have come under the restrictive practices legislation at all. It would much have preferred to have gone its own way as it has up to now, and done handsomely out of it, too.
Last year was a bumper year. Of course the Stock Exchange will do nothing and has done nothing until such time has arrived—which must have been hoped for for a long time—that ultimately there would be a Secretary of State for Trade who would give way. That has been achieved and the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of

953
Gryfe, is quite right in his advocacy that the matter now be referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission which, as the noble Lord has willingly conceded, following the passing of this Bill it will be proper and appropriate for it to do, if it is instructed to do so.
Why should it not be instructed to do so? On the basis of the lowest common denominator of argument in this case what has happened in the past four years and the machinations in the minds both of the council of the Stock Exchange and of successive Secretaries of State has so far been hidden from us. Why should these things not be made more public? Why should they not be investigated? What is so sacred about this august institution comprising brokers and jobbers that has for ever to be kept under wraps? Every association could argue the same. Let us say that the Director General of Fair Trading fired a warning shot over the bows of some association somewhere, and said that he thought that that association was infringing the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. The association has a choice of saying that it agrees, and that its members will be good boys and will make some changes. But if they feel that they have a pliant Government behind them, a friendly Government, they will sit back and do nothing in the full knowledge that the Government will then say that the association's inaction has forced its exemption from the provisions of the Act. That is a somewhat bizarre position. I think, with the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe, that it is high time some independent body took a look at that. It can do no possible harm.
I suppose that next we shall hear that that will prohibit any agreement because the Stock Exchange is afraid of the Monopolies Commission. I suppose that the next step of the noble Lord will be to move the abolition of the Monopolies Commission on the ground that the Stock Exchange is doing nothing because an inquiry is going on. This is quite likely in view of the Government's existing attitude, which in my view—and I am quite sure that the noble Lord with his logical processes of mind must agree—is quite untenable. Nobody can logically support this. I sincerely hope that he will accept the amendment. If he does not do so then, on behalf of my own party, we shall certainly sustain the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe, in his amendment.
5.1 p.m.
Lord Cockfield: The noble Lord, Lord Bruce, has made a large number of statements which are quite insupportable. He says that the Stock Exchange have been allowed to get away with it; that the Stock Exchange have done nothing and that inaction justifies their exemption from the Act. The truth of the matter is exactly the reverse of this. What has happened is that the Stock Exchange, far from getting away with it, have agreed to dismantle the most important of their restrictive practices and substantial progress has already been made.
As the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe, referred to the figures that I gave in replying to the debate on Second Reading, perhaps I may repeat them now. There were, in all, 165 restrictions identified by the director general. Of those, he was to challenge 59 as
954
not being in the public interest; although of course the Stock Exchange did not accept that. He was not prepared to challenge the remainder of the restrictions. In other words, out of 165 restrictions, the director general was not prepared to challenge 106. Of the 59 restrictions which were challenged, 52 relate to single capacity, minimum commissions or membership; and those are the three major issues on which the Stock Exchange is now making real progress in dismantling the restrictive practices. That leaves a balance of only seven, six of which concern general regulations and one is an anti tax-avoidance provision to which I think no reasonable objection would be taken—and, if I may add the words, not even by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington. So that the suggestion that the Stock Exchange has been frozen in its tracks is completely untrue.
The point that I was making and which I will repeat, because this may be the point on which the noble Lord wishes to intervene, is that what is happening is that we have the process of change now going ahead. We want that process of change to make as rapid progress as is possible. We do not want it to be interrupted by another inquiry at this stage. The only other point I make is this. The noble Lord speaks as though exempting the Stock Exchange from the Restrictive Trade Practices Act is something quite exceptional, as if nobody else was exempt from it.
May I read from Schedule 4 of the Fair Trading Act 1973 which lists no fewer than 15 categories of people exempt from the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. The list starts with legal services; and I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ellyn-Jones, on the Front Bench opposite. It then goes on to medical services, dental services, ophthalmic services, and so on, right down until we get to architects and accountants—the subject which no doubt interests the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington. And so it goes on and on. There were further exemptions introduced in the order in 1976 and further exemptions in subsequent statutes. There is therefore nothing exceptional on exempting a body or a service from the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. In fact, many others are exempt. The important point is that the exemption should be decided by Parliament, which is exactly what we are doing on the present occasion.
Lord Bruce of Donington: Will the noble Lord answer me one question? If this Bill becomes an Act, the Stock Exchange will be removed from all operations of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. I put forward a possibility without casting any implications on anybody. Let us say that, under the provisions of Clause 1(1) of the Bill, the Stock Exchange, the Treasury, the Secretary of State and the Bank of England (who still remain) do not arrive at agreement. Let us say, without imputing any bad to anybody, that the Stock Exchange stick on a point. The noble Lord has already given 59 instances on which the Office of Fair Trading intend to proceed in conformity, presumably, with the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. Let us presume for the moment that, for perfectly bona fide reasons—and not for pure cussedness—the Stock Exchange declines to arrive at agreement. It has every right to do so. It can plead—and indeed we have had some overtones to that in the most important speeches

955
made by the noble Lord, Lord O'Brien, and others—the exceptional circumstances which sometimes arise in connection with their financial and investment affairs.
What happens if, due to some special circumstances not envisaged by any party—and I impute no ill-faith—the Stock Exchange says that, in the intervening period of 18 months which elapsed since the passing of the Bill exempting them from the operations of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, there have been other developments of vital importance to the country's economy, of vital importance to the Treasury, making it imperative that they retain some rights that they had thought perhaps they would be able to give up? Let us assume that.
What then will the Government do? Will they try to invoke the Restrictive Trade Practices Act again? What kind of pressure can they bring to bear? This, I am quite sure, is what the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, conceivably had in mind. I do not seek to probe into it. But, clearly, as a possible safeguard against such a development, it would be wise for the Monopolies Commission to take a look at the whole thing, to investigate and report. I think the noble Lord should be supported.
Lord Cockfield: The point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, is a perfectly different one from the one covered by the amendment in the name of Lord Taylor of Gryfe. Lord Taylor's amendment provides for an immediate investigation by the Monopolies Commission and a report no later than 31st December 1984. The circumstances that Lord Bruce is talking about are totally different. We believe that the Stock Exchange will proceed along the lines of the agreement that has been reached. It has been reached in good faith. We believe that it will be fully honoured. We have set up a monitoring process to ensure that we know whether or not it is honoured.
If circumstances should arise at some day in the future when it emerges that serious disagreement arose between the Stock Exchange, the Secretary of State and the Bank of England—and we must hope very much that no such circumstances arise, for we are going ahead at the moment very effectively and making good progress, and I trust that that is welcome on both sides of the Committee—then the Government will have to decide what action to take in relation to those circumstances. At the very beginning I made it perfectly clear that the service of stockbroking, once this Bill is passed, will come under the ambit of the monopolies and mergers legislation. There is no question about that. But what action should be taken is clearly a matter which can be decided by the Government only if and when those circumstances arise, and we hope and trust they never will arise.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: I should like to emphasise that we on these Benches, in introducing this amendment, are anxious not to impede in any way the process of change in the Stock Exchange. The provisions which the noble Lord outlined on Second Reading are welcome so far as we are concerned; and I realise that some of them have immediate implications, as can be observed daily from the financial press.
956
There are other aspects of the agreement which will take some time to implement; for example, the single capacity may take a little time to come into effect. I would not have thought that the reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission would in any way restrict this process of change. It is not like a mergers reference, in which you immediately have a freeze on negotiations regarding takeover procedures. This would be alongside what is in fact a voluntary agreement.
The Stock Exchange has already voluntarily agreed, in exchange for this Bill, to certain changes of procedure. There is no reason in the world why these changes should not proceed as promised. A reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission would not necessarily prevent that, or delay necessary changes. I think it would be a poor excuse if in fact that were to be so. It is not our intention to turn the clock back. The Office of Fair Trading looked at this over a period of six years, and we are not anxious to re-open the entire case in that way. But we do say that there is a substantial measure of public interest in this matter, and its full implications should be looked at by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission alongside the rather restricted area of the monitoring process which will go on.
It is because of the degree of public interest in it that we would wish the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, at least for one year, alongside the changes which are taking place, to have a look at this matter; and it is for that reason, if not for all the other reasons adduced by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, in support of his amendment, that we would certainly wish to press this amendment.
5.14 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 5) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 97; Not-Contents, 128.

DIVISION NO. 4

CONTENTS

Airedale, L.

Elystan-Morgan, L.

Allen of Fallowfield, L.

Ennals, L.

Amherst, E.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Ardwick, L.

Ezra, L.

Banks, L.

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Beswick, L.

Fitt, L.

Birk, B.

Gaitskell, B.

Bishopston, L.

Gallacher, L.

Blyton, L.

Gladwyn, L.

Bowden, L.

Glenamara, L.

Briginshaw, L.

Graham of Edmonton, L.

Brockway, L.

Grimond, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Hale, L.

Bruce of Donington, L.

Hanworth, V.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Collison, L.

Howie of Troon, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Hughes, L.

David, B.

Irving of Dartford, L.

Davies of Penrhys, L.

Jacques, L.

Dean of Beswick, L.

Jeger, B.

Denington, B.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Diamond, L.

John-Mackie, L.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Kagan, L.

Donnet of Balgay, L.

Kennet, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Kilmarnock, L. [Teller.]

957

Leatherland, L.

Sainsbury, L.

Listowel, E.

Seear, B.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Segal, L.

Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.

Shackleton, L.

Lockwood, B.

Simon, V.

Longford, E.

Stallard, L.

McIntosh of Haringey, L.

Stedman, B.

Mackie of Benshie, L.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Mais, L.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Mar, C.

Stoddart of Swindon, L.

Mayhew, L.

Stone, L.

Monson, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Nicol, B.

Taylor of Gryfe, L.

Oram, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Paget of Northampton, L.

Tordoff, L. [Teller.]

Peart, L.

Underhill, L.

Phillips, B.

Wallace of Coslany, L.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Whaddon, L.

Prys-Davies, L.

White, B.

Roberthall, L.

Wigoder, L.

Rochester, L.

Winstanley, L.

Rugby, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Abercorn, D.

Killearn, L.

Airey of Abingdon, B.

Kilmany, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Kintore, E.

Allerton, L.

Kitchener, E.

Ampthill, L.

Lane-Fox, B.

Atholl, D.

Lauderdale, E.

Bauer, L.

Long, V.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Loudoun, C.

Blake, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Luke, L.

Broadbridge, L.

Lyell, L.

Broxbourne, L.

McFadzean, L.

Bruce-Gardyne, L.

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Caithness, E.

MacLehose of Beoch, L.

Cathcart, E.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Chelmer, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Cockfield, L.

Mancroft, L.

Coleraine, L.

Margadale, L.

Constantine of Stanmore, L.

Marley, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Marshall of Leeds, L.

Craigavon, V.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Cranbrook, E.

Merrivale, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Mersey, V.

Darnley, E.

Middleton, L.

Daventry, V.

Milverton, L.

Davidson, V.

Molson, L.

De La Warr, E.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Monk Bretton, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Montagu of Beaulieu, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Montgomery of Alamein, V.

Ebbisham, L.

Morris, L.

Eccles, V.

Mottistone, L.

Elton, L.

Newall, L.

Enniskillen, E.

Northchurch, B.

Faithfull, B.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Fisher, L.

O'Brien of Lothbury, L.

Fortescue, E.

Orkney, E.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Pender, L.

Gainford, L.

Penrhyn, L.

Gibson-Watt, L.

Perth, E.

Gisborough, L.

Peyton of Yeovil, L.

Glanusk, L.

Portland, D.

Granchester, L.

Richardson, L.

Gray of Contin, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Greenway, L.

Rochdale, V.

Gridley, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

St. Davids, V.

Harvington, L.

Sandys, L.

Hawke, L.

Savile, L.

Hayter, L.

Selkirk, E.

Henley, L.

Sharples, B.

Hertford, M.

Skelmersdale, L.

Hornsby-Smith, B.

Soames, L.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Somers, L.

Ingrow, L.

Stodart of Leaston, L.

Ironside, L.

Sudeley, L.

958

Suffield, L.

Tryon, L.

Swinton, E. [Teller.]

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Terrington, L.

Vickers, B.

Thomas of Swynnerton, L.

Vivian, L.

Thorneycroft, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Trefgarne, L.

Westbury, L.

Trenchard, V.

Whitelaw, V.

Trumpington, B.

Wise, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
5.23 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Bruce of Donington: I promise not to detain your Lordships for long in regurgitating any of the arguments which have been used so far, but I think it is wise that the House should realise exactly what are the real implications of passing Clause 1 of this Bill. It affects not only Section 11 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act but other sections as well. Section 12 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act enables the Secretary of State statutorily to obtain a whole series of information which ought to be vital to the supervision of the affairs of any institution such as the Stock Exchange. Section 12 of that Act gives him that right and that right is now being taken away. There is no statutory obligation to comply with the sections of that Act or with the Fair Trading Act 1973 which laid down certain conditions. In fact, he is denied the issue of a statutory order which enables him to obtain very vital information, about which there was considerable debate at the time of the passing of the original Act, which was a long time before its consolidation in 1976.
The noble Lord said earlier that it would have been quite easy in the initial stages to have made the Stock Exchange a designated service within the provisions of Section 13 of the Act and, indeed, of a supporting schedule. In the course of the inquiries that I have made since the Bill first came to your Lordships' House—and the Committee will appreciate that individual Members do not have the research facilities that are available as a matter of right, and properly as of right, to Government departments—I have been through the reports of the debates that took place on both the Fair Trading Act 1973 and the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, and I cannot find any representations made by any noble Lord, or by any member of any Government of the time—and these have varied—who has advocated the inclusion of the Stock Exchange among the designated services to which the noble Lord has referred, and who include lawyers like himself, accountants like myself, doctors and so on. Nor, so far as I can find—and I must say that my own researches have had to be limited because of time—can I find any trace of any representations made on behalf of the Stock Exchange to be included among the designated services. I wonder why that did not happen. Nor did it happen at any time during the four years that this has been under review.
Of course, it means that all this has apparently blown up—I put this in parenthesis—since the last election which took place in June. I wonder why it has blown up so late. Section 7 of the Fair Trading

959
Act—and this now no longer applies to the Stock Exchange—refers to two or more persons,
"who whether voluntarily or not, and whether by agreement or not, so conduct their respective affairs as in any way to prevent, restrict or distort competition in connection with the supply of services of that description, whether or not they themselves are affected by the competition, and whether the competition is between persons interested as persons by whom, or as persons for whom, services are supplied".
Hereafter, the Stock Exchange and its members are exempted from those provisions. When the time comes, I think it will be regretted, particularly in view of the fact that there has always been plenty of opportunity for representations to be made for those learned professions of stockbrokers and jobbers to be included in the designated services.
It is not for me to anticipate what the result of those representations might have been, but we could have had the arguments a long time ago and, to use the words of the noble Lord, substantial progress could undoubtedly have been made long before now. There are no new circumstances in the operations of members of the Stock Exchange that could not have been dealt with quite adequately a long time ago.
We cannot part with this clause without referring once again to the intervention into the process of law, after it became established. I shall not rehearse the arguments again, but I am bound to tell the noble Lord that there are circumstances in which this action of intervention could be justified. For example, if a Bill were presented to your Lordships which read substantially in the following terms, your Lordships would understand readily what I mean. If there was a Bill which began:
"The Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 shall not apply—(a) to any agreement between members of a trade union, its members and the activities of its members or (b) to any agreement with respect to any of these matters between (i) the TUC and the Secretary of State for Employment and the Confederation of British Industry; and (ii) any proceedings in respect of any such agreement which are pending before the courts at the passing of this Act shall abate",
one could understand the expressions of opposition by the party opposite concerning the wanton interference with the law. I cite that merely as an example of what might happen, because the precedent has now been set.
Lord Cockfield: The noble Lord is simply rehearsing all the arguments that he put forward on Second Reading. The Bill has only one operative clause, and that is Clause 1. In effect, therefore, Clause 1 is the substance of the Bill itself. The noble Lord said that the Committee should understand the real implications of accepting Clause 1 of the Bill. The real implications are precisely the same as the implications in the case of any other services which are exempted from the restrictive practices legislation. That includes not only the numerous services which are specified in the 1973 Act, some of which I read out because I thought the noble Lord would be interested, but also a schedule to the 1976 order which exempts a whole range of agreements, none of which is particularly professional. They include, for example, international sea transport, air transport, road passenger transport and the building societies interest rate cartel, none of which can be described as professional activities.
960
There are also exemptions in other Acts. Therefore the position is simply that when this Bill is enacted the Stock Exchange will be placed on the same footing as any other body performing services which are exempted either under the 1973 Act or under subsequent legislation.
I really think that it is unnecessary for me to say anything further. We have gone over these arguments time and time again. There are a number of arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, which I find quite astounding. He says that at no time was any move made by the Stock Exchange to demand exemption, while he himself at Second Reading reminded us quite correctly that his right honourable friend Mr. John Smith and my right honourable friend Mr. Nott, as he then was, had both refused to accede to requests by the Stock Exchange. If they refused to accede to such requests, it clearly indicates that such requests were made.
Clause 1 agreed to.
5.34 p.m.
Lord Bruce of Donington Lord Bruce of Donington moved Amendment No. 6:
After Clause 1, insert the following new clause:
("Duration.
This Act shall cease to have effect on the first day of January 1987 unless resolutions to the contrary are approved by both Houses of Parliament during the three months prior to the first day of January 1987.").
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this amendment is in effect to bring the position back under review after three years from now. If the Stock Exchange, the Treasury, the Secretary of State and all the rest arrive at an agreement within the foreseeable future, on the assumption that the time stated in the amendment is reasonable there does not seem to be any reason why the Act should not come into operation again, if only by way of surveillance. If the noble Lord can guarantee that the agreement which is ultimately reached will get rid of all the 59 instances which he cited at Second Reading and that the result of these voluntary negotiations will be to bring the Stock Exchange within the operation of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act as it now stands, he cannot have any possible objection to the Stock Exchange coming within the ambit of the law if the Act becomes operative again in 1987. If, on the other hand, it means that an agreement will be reached which still contains restrictive practices, anti-competitive practices and all the rest which are repugnant to the Restrictive Practices Court and to the Fair Trading Act 1973, I can understand the noble Lord opposing it.
The amendment is being introduced on the assumption that only time is necessary. The Committee is being given to understand that vigorous and most encouraging progress is now being made. We are given the impression that the Council of the Stock Exchange are hell bent on arriving at an amicable agreement with the Government at the earliest opportunity. In this amendment I have allowed until 1987. Surely the noble Lord cannot object to that. I feel quite sure that he would not like members of the Stock Exchange to be submitted to the indignity of feeling that they were special animals who could

961
operate outside the law as they have always understood it in the past. I am sure that the noble Lord would not wish to inflict that indignity upon them.
Everybody has been acting in this matter, we are assured, in good faith. The noble Lord, Lord O'Brien of Lothbury, or perhaps it was the noble Lord opposite, mentioned the Stock Exchange motto, "My word is my bond". I have every reason to believe this to be so. All the matters about which the Director General of Fair Trading has complained will now be dealt with voluntarily. Everybody will be happy. I am giving three years for it, just to act as a little urge on the way in case things get slightly hesitant from time to time. I am trying to help the noble Lord by imposing some kind of deadline. He might feel that it is necessary to turn his deadly invective on members of the Stock Exchange and say, "Look, unless you make a little more progress, remember that you will be liable again under the Act in 1987. Get on with it, boys".
I do not want to put the noble Lord into a position where he has to nag everybody; he is not like that. If this amendment is passed, it will serve notice on all concerned that there is a final date. I am hopeful, therefore, that the noble Lord will accept the amendment and that it will be unnecessary for me to take the matter to a Division. If for some obscure reason he does not feel so inclined, for quite mysterious reasons which he will doubtless explain in his usual very fluent fashion, I shall of course be greatly obliged but will have to advise my colleagues to support the amendment.
Lord Peyton of Yeovil: As this is the first Committee stage in your Lordships' House which I have attended, I wonder whether I could make just two observations at the conclusion of the debates. Both relate to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington. First, the noble Lord has told us on a number of occasions, obviously with great sincerity, that he has no desire whatsoever to be offensive to anybody, particularly to the Government and their friends. He then slipped, although I am sure he did not intend to do so, into being very offensive indeed. As a newcomer to your Lordships' House, I take notice of that technique; while I shall, of course, resist the temptation to try to copy so great a master of it as the noble Lord, I shall nevertheless note it.
The other point which I am sure my noble friend who is to answer the debate will have picked up for himself is the fearful danger in which any man might find himself when threatened with the desire on the part of the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, to help. He threatened my noble friend just now with that form of assistance. I am sure that my noble friend needs no warning from me and no support or help from me—but I will just remind him that those who sup with the devil should take a very long spoon with them.
Lord Cockfield: I am most grateful to my noble friend Lord Peyton of Yeovil for his remarks and also for his warning. On this occasion may I say that I am quite unable for my part to help the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, and I am not able to give him the satisfaction of accepting his new clause. The effect of the clause would be, first, to subject the agreements of
962
the Stock Exchange to a totally different régime from that which applies to all the other agreements which are exempted from the operation of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. I do not believe there is any justification for that at all.
We have an agreement for the Stock Exchange which I think is a good agreement. We believe that that agreement will be honoured. There is every indication that it is being honoured. It is being carefully monitored. I have already said that, in the very unlikely event of anything going wrong, the Government would then need to consider what was the appropriate step to take. I am quite unable to go any further than that. To introduce a provision of this sort under which, in effect, you are switching the restrictive trade practices legislation and the Restrictive Trade Practices Court on and off is entirely undesirable.
Lord Bruce of Donington: I will not detain the Committee very long except to say that it would not be necessary to have switched the Restrictive Trade Practices Court on again if the noble Lord had not switched it off in the first instance. I beg to move.
5.42 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 6) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 63; Not-Contents, 125.

DIVISION NO. 5

CONTENTS

Allen of Fallowfield, L.

Leatherland, L.

Beswick, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Birk, B.

Lockwood, B.

Bishopston, L.

Longford, E.

Blyton, L.

McIntosh of Haringey, L.

Boston of Faversham, L.

Mishcon, L.

Briginshaw, L.

Molloy, L.

Brockway, L.

Monson, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Nicol, B. [Teller.]

Bruce of Donington, L.

Oram, L.

Carmichael of Kelvingrove, L.

Peart, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Phillips, B.

Collison, L.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

David, B.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller.]

Davies of Penrhys, L.

Dean of Beswick, L.

Prys-Davies, L.

Denington, B.

Rea, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Rugby, L.

Ennals, L.

Shackleton, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Stallard, L.

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Gaitskell, B.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Gallacher, L.

Stoddart of Swindon, L.

Graham of Edmonton, L.

Stone, L.

Hale, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Taylor of Blackburn, L.

Hughes, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Irving of Dartford, L.

Underhill, L.

Jacques, L.

Wallace of Coslany, L.

Jeger, B.

Wedderburn of Charlton, L.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

White, B.

John-Mackie, L.

Wootton of Abinger, B.

NOT-CONTENTS

Abercorn, D.

Atholl, D.

Airey of Abingdon, B.

Bauer, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Allerton,L.

Bellwin. L.

963

Blake, L.

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

MacLehose of Beoch, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Broxbourne, L.

Mancroft, L.

Bruce-Gardyne, L.

Mar, C.

Caithness, E.

Margadale, L.

Campbell of Alloway. L.

Marley, L.

Cathcart, E.

Marshall of Leeds, L.

Chelmer, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Cockfield, L.

Maude of Stratford-upon-Avon, L.

Coleraine, L.

Constantine of Stanmore, L.

Merrivale, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Mersey, V.

Craigavon, V.

Milverton, L.

Cranbrook, E.

Molson. L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Darnley, E.

Monk-Bretton, L.

Daventry, V.

Montgomery of Alamein, V

Davidson. V.

Morris, L.

De La Warr, E.

Mottistone, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Northchurch, B.

Drumalbyn, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Ebbisham, L.

O'Brien of Lothbury, L.

Eccles, V.

Onslow, E.

Elton, L.

Orkney, E.

Enniskillen, E.

Pender, L.

Faithfull, B.

Penrhyn, L.

Fisher, L.

Perth, E.

Fortescue, E.

Peyton of Yeovil, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Portland, D.

Gainford, L.

Richardson, L.

Gibson-Watt, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Gisborough, L.

Rochdale, V.

Glanusk, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Grantchester, L.

St. Davids, V.

Gray of Contin, L.

Sandford, L.

Gridley. L.

Sandys, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Savile, L.

Hayter, L.

Selkirk, E.

Henley. L.

Shannon, E.

Hertford, M.

Sharples, B.

Hornsby-Smith, B.

Stodart of Leaston, L.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Sudeley, L.

Inglewood, L.

Swinton, E. [Teller.]

Ingrow, L.

Terrington, L.

Kilmany, L.

Thomas of Swynnerton, L.

Kinloss, Ly.

Thorneycroft, L.

Kintore, E.

Trefgarne, L.

Kitchener, E.

Trenchard, V.

Lane-Fox, B.

Trumpington, B.

Lauderdale, E.

Tryon, L.

Lawrence, L.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Long, V.

Vickers, B.

Loudoun, C.

Vivian, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Luke, L.

Westbury, L.

Lyell, L.

Whitelaw, V.

McFadzean, L.

Wise. L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
5.50 p.m.
Clause 2 agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment.
Lord Cockfield: My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.
Moved, That the Report be now received.—(Lord Cockfield.)
Lord Hughes: My Lords, if this Motion is agreed to, does it not mean that there will be no Report stage on this Bill?
Lord Denham: Yes, my Lords, that is right.
Lord Hughes: I do not think we should accept that.
The Chairman of Committees: The Question is, That this Report be now received?
On Question, Motion agreed to: Report received.

Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Bill [H.L.]
5.52 p.m.
The Minister of State, Scottish Office (Lord Gray of Contin): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Gray of Contin.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD JACQUES in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [General power to prohibit sea fishing in specified areas] and Clause 2 [Use of mobile gear near fixed salmon nets]:
On Question, Whether Clauses 1 and 2 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: On Clause 1, I am disappointed that the noble Lord did not feel that anything had been said on Second Reading that gave him an opportunity to put down amendments to the Bill to give considerably more flexibility to this clause than seems to be in it. We are left with the fact that the Secretary of State will make orders, with very little time for discussion either in this House or in another place, and these orders will be very important to fishing in Scottish waters. We remain unconvinced that this is the best way to settle local differences between fishermen. However, local management has been firmly rejected by the Government and we now have to rely on the sensitivity with which the Secretary of State uses his powers under Clause 1 of the Bill. This is why I wanted to speak now on this clause.
I would agree that the latest set of proposals for the designation of static gear reserves, and thus of the areas shown on the map which is now in the Library, are much more encouraging than we expected: this is much better than the 1981 consultation document. The idea that static gear reserves can be designated on a seasonal basis is also, I feel, quite an advance. I wonder whether the Minister would consider, because I think it could be helpful, looking at the Clyde and Argyll waters as well as the Western Isles waters with the same idea of a seasonal approach: that is, of course, only if there is a local demand for such a method of proceeding.
Having decided to go for central control over the designation of reserves, the Government, through their officials, must now ensure that there is continuing flexibility and responsiveness, so that, in line with changing patterns and developing attitudes to fishing protection, will be given to the static gear interests where it is genuinely needed, without—and this is

965
where the real difficulty arises—unnecessarily inhibiting the trawl fishermen or fishermen using any other method.
I am sure the Minister has read the statements by some of the fishermen's leaders in the West Highland Free Press. I merely mention this point to try and make it clear what difficulties are faced. One of the leaders was quoted in the paper as saying of the static gear reserves that he feared the reaction from trawler men could be, "Don't step out of line here or we will tow your creels away". That is a very severe criticism, or possible criticism, of the Act, unless the regulations are extremely flexible. No one wants anything like this to happen, and that applies, I am sure, to the trawl fishermen just as much as to the creel fishermen. It does put a great responsibility on the Government, and I am sure we all hope the Government will discharge the very great powers given under Clause 1 with diplomacy, caution, and, above all, a great deal of fairness.
Lord Grimond: I wonder whether I may ask the Minister two short questions before he replies to the official Opposition. A certain amount of dismay—if anything the Minister says could cause dismay—has been occasioned in Shetland by some of his remarks on Second Reading. I asked him about the prospects of a management scheme and he was rather dismissive of the possibility of any management scheme, although in the previous Parliament the Government had not been wholly opposed to it. Indeed, it is known that in Brussels it is looked on with some favour. In Shetland and Orkney there is considerable interest, and indeed enthusiasm, for a management scheme. The question I want to put to the Minister is whether he will have conversations with the Shetland and Orkney fishermen about their proposals for such a scheme. If so, it clearly might have an effect upon Clause 1 of this Bill.
The other question I should like to ask is this. As I read Clause 1, the offence is only in fishing. No offence is caused by merely moving through these areas which are to be reserved. There has in the past, as he will know, been a certain amount of trouble with fishing boats moving through areas in which there are fixed and indeed movable fishing gear. As I understand it, the Bill deals only with fishing and not with movement through these grounds which have been designated on the map.
Lord Gray of Contin: I am grateful to the noble Lord who opened for the Opposition on the Question, Whether Clauses 1 and 2 shall stand part of the Bill? The noble Lord, Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove, was very fair in what he said, and the noble Lord, Lord Grimond, also was constructive in his remarks. I shall try to deal with the points raised; but perhaps I may first say to the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, that I very carefully studied all that was said on Second Reading, and the reason why I have not brought forward Government amendments to these clauses is that, quite frankly, I did not see anything which I considered would improve on what the Government intend in them. The noble Lord himself highlighted the point I want to make by asking me to assure your
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Lordships that the Government will be flexible, and that is precisely what we have been so far.
The noble Lord referred to the West Highland Free Press. That is not a publication renowned for its support of the Conservative Party, but in one of its recent issues it was very reasonable and fair in what it said and acknowledged that my officials had gone to a great deal of trouble to take account of local feeling regarding the location of static gear areas, and had responded considerably to local suggestions. That is the way in which we hope to proceed. It certainly is not the intention of the Government to be dictatorial, and we should like to proceed on a basis whereby we take account of local feelings.
The noble Lord, Lord Grimond, again raised the question of local management, particularly as it affects his former constituency of Orkney and Shetland, and that area. The Secretary of State has the power under existing legislation to oversee the regulation and development of the Scottish fishing industry as a whole. We feel that this situation ought to continue. To add a further level of control would run the risk of proliferating administrative bodies and agencies. There would be further rules to be learned by an industry which arguably already has more than enough red tape to face. However, I continue to see a place for local participation, and particularly for local advice, to be provided. The Secretary of State will be perfectly content to listen to the views of local interests before taking managerial decisions on the fisheries.
As regards Shetland, the Shetland fleet itself is a nomadic fleet. It certainly does not do all its fishing around the Shetlands, and I would argue that, although the desire of local fishermen would be for local management, in fact it could well act adversely for them in the long run. I explained on Second Reading that one of my reservations about local management is that there would be a danger that local communities would be so anxious to protect their own interests that they would deprive themselves of participation in other areas. If every local management area took the same view there would be a great restriction of fishing, and that is not in the nature of the fishing industry. The fishing industry in Scotland is a nomadic industry, and likes to move from place to place. I believe that we have found a way in which, by the creation of nursery areas and of static gear reserves, and the removal of the ban within the three-mile limit for bottom trawling, we are now giving everyone a better opportunity to catch fish.
The noble Lord asked about moving through the static gear reserves, and certainly bottom trawling, or trawling of any kind, will be prohibited within those areas. Damage to creels, even when moving through, would be an offence. The offence will be to damage static gear within a static gear area. I hope that answers the two questions which the noble Lord put to me. However, I should like to emphasise to him that of course I shall be very happy to meet fishermen from the area if they care to come and see me, but we are not prepared to change the principle. We believe that what we have in mind is a better solution than local management, but we shall certainly listen to advice from within on how we proceed.
Clauses 1 and 2 agreed to.
6.5 p.m.
Clause 3 [Offences]:
Lord Gray of Contin Lord Gray of Contin moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 2, line 20, at end insert—
("(2A) Proceedings for an offence under this section or section 5 of this Act may be taken in any sheriff court, and the offence dealt with by the sheriff in every respect as if the offence had been committed wholly within his jurisdiction.").
The noble Lord said: This amendment clarifies the position of the sheriff in relation to offences under the Bill. It makes it clear that in this case a sheriff's jurisdiction extends out with the bounds of his sheriffdom to encompass the waters covered by the Bill; in other words, the sea adjacent to the coast of Scotland and landward of the six-mile limit.
The amendment confers jurisdiction on any sheriff court to try offences under Clause 3 or Clause 5. It also provides that these proceedings may be taken in any sheriff court irrespective of where the offence occurred. This is only right since, under the Bill, an offending fishing boat may be taken to the nearest convenient port, which may not necessarily be located within the nearest sheriffdom. Allowing such a flexibility, which is also found in other fisheries legislation, will permit the optimum use of court resources as well as, in many cases, reducing the inconvenience to the fishermen involved. They will not be obliged to return to the scene of the crime, so to speak. I beg to move.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I do not wish to be nit-picking, but I am concerned about the idea that any sheriff court can deal with an offence. I understand the point that because waters do not necessarily exactly correspond to a sheriffdom there may be difficulties, but when I first read this provision I felt it was taking matters too far. One presumes that perhaps the Falkirk sheriff court or the Hamilton sheriff court could deal with an offence. My concern therefore is that, assuming everyone is innocent until proved guilty, there could be a great deal of inconvenience if the port to which a boat is taken is a long way from its base port. I can see considerable difficulties in that respect.
For example, I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Grimond, would find great difficulty if one of the boats from the Shetlands happened to be closer to the mainland. That could involve great expense. Will instructions be given to the fishery protection people to realise how delicate is the whole situation? The amendment may be one way out of the situation, but I would rather that there was a firmer agreement or a designation in the Bill itself.
Lord Gray of Contin: I can understand the concern expressed by the noble Lord, but in fact the purpose is to seek to ensure that for the convenience of the fishermen they are taken to the nearest port. We are very anxious about this and I believe that in moving this amendment we are ensuring that fishermen will be taken to the most convenient port. No one wants them to be taken somewhere that is a long way from their normal route.
The second point that the noble Lord made concerned the fishery protection service. The service will certainly bear the point that he mentioned in mind when it is carrying out its duties.
6.10 p.m.
Lord Hughes: I am not at all clear about the matter. As the noble Lord, Lord Gray of Contin, explained, the effect of the amendment would be to allow the offence to go to any sheriff court. I am not clear about what the position would be if the amendment did not go into the Bill. The clause ends with the words:
"shall be disposed of as the court may direct".
I cannot claim that I have read every word of the Bill. I did not expect to be involved in it. Somewhere in the Bill there may be a definition of the court to which the offences would go, but there was no reference to the sheriff court until this amendment appeared, unless I have missed it. May I ask whether I have missed anything? Is there a reference to the sheriff court elsewhere in the Bill?
Lord Gray of Contin: I am bound to admit that I cannot answer that point until I have advice.
Lord Hughes: If the Minister goes slowly I am sure the advice will come.
Lord Gray of Contin: I shall try to clarify the point a little. The amendment makes it clear that in this case a sheriff's jurisdiction extends out with the bounds of his sheriffdom. The purpose of the amendment is to encompass the waters covered by the Bill, in other words, the sea adjacent to the coast and landward within the six-mile limit. The amendment confers jurisdiction on any sheriff court to try offences under Clauses 3 or 5. The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, asked what the position would be if we did not include the amendment. The reason for the amendment is that the jurisdiction would have been conferred only on specific sheriff courts, but my advice is that because of the sea element it would be more realistic to confer jurisdiction on any sheriff court for the sake of convenience. The offending skipper could then be dealt with at the most convenient sheriff court, which might not necessarily be in the sheriffdom in a landward sense in which the offence was committed.
Lord Hughes: Although the noble Lord accepted my advice and talked slowly, and his noble friend moved fast, it has taken an awful long time for the answer to become available. The noble Lord has not answered my question. Have I missed a reference in the Bill to the sheriff court? If the only relevant words are,
"as the court may direct",
unless there is a definition, it could be any court from what used to be called the local police court up to the High Court.
Lord Gray of Contin: My advice is that if the amendment does not go in in order to do what the Bill intends, the sheriff will not be able to try the offence because his existing jurisdiction is not out with his landward area. That is why this specific jurisdiction is being sought to be given to the sheriff so that the offending skipper can be tried in any sheriff court.
Lord Hughes: If I understand the explantion, the Bill, as it stands, describes the offence in Clause 3(1), and in subsections (2) and (3) it decides what the

969
penalties are. Without the amendment it would appear that no court in the land has authority to deal with the matter. I am certain that that is not the position, but it has not been explained to me what the intention in the Bill was before the amendment was put down. When a Bill defines offences, lays down the penalties that may be imposed and includes both summary trial and indictment, presumably it is expected that some court will deal with the offences. I made it clear that I might have missed the reference, but in the Bill as it stands where does it say that the offence will be tried in a sheriff court?
Lord Gray of Contin: In Clause 3(2) the noble Lord will find that the offence may be tried—
Lord Hughes: No. Clause 3(2) lays down the penalty.
Lord Gray of Contin: It also specifies how the offence is to be tried. Clause 3 states:
"(2) Any person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5,000 or, on conviction on indictment, to a fine.
(3) The court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence under this section may, in addition to imposing any penalty under subsection (2) above".
The normal court to try such an offence would be the sheriff court. There is no need for a specific definition of a sheriff court. In Scotland that is the appropriate court for such an offence. By implication, as it stands, the Bill allows trial in a sheriff court, or, if the offence was very serious indeed, for it to be tried in the High Court. But the normal court to try such an offence would be the sheriff court.
Lord Hughes: If the sheriff court is the normal court, presumably there is provision for that in some other piece of legislation. Things do not fall out of the sky and land in a particular court. Before the next stage of the Bill, I should be obliged if the noble Lord would acquaint me with the legislation which makes the sheriff court the normal court to deal with such offences. I cannot accept that it is reasonable to proceed with a Bill in which, merely by implication, the sheriff court deals with an offence. We do some funny things in legislation, but merely to imply which court will deal with the matter is taking things a little too far. I think that I have harried the Minister enough on the point at this stage. As I said, I did not expect to be involved in the Bill; otherwise, I should have given him notice that I would query that point. I apologise for not giving him notice, but I hope that he can enlighten me further before the next stage of the Bill.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 4 [Powers of sea-fishery officers]:
6.18 p.m.
Lord Gray of Contin Lord Gray of Contin moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 3, line 12, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
("(b) may require any person on board the boat to produce any document relating to the boat, to its fishing operations or other operations ancillary thereto or to the persons on board
970
which is in his custody or possession and may take copies of any such document;
(c) for the purpose of ascertaining whether the master, owner or charterer of the boat has committed an offence under this Act, may search the boat for any such document and may require any person on board the boat to do anything which appears to him to be necessary for facilitating the search;
(d) where the boat is one in relation to which he has reason to suspect that such an offence has been committed, may seize and detain any such document produced to him or found on board for the purpose of enabling the document to be used as evidence in proceedings for the offence,
but nothing in paragraph (d) above shall permit any document required by law to be carried on board the boat to be seized and detained except while the boat is detained in a port.").
The noble Lord said: It is our intention that the powers of enforcement available to British sea fishery officers under the Bill should be the same as those presently available to such officers under other legislation, in particular the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1967 and the Sea Fisheries Act 1968. We have also felt it right to spell out these powers in the Bill rather than have them attracted to it by reference to other Acts.
Unfortunately, in preparing the Bill an amendment to these earlier Acts contained in the Fisheries Act 1981 was overlooked. The amendment widened the powers of British sea fishery officers to search for and seize documents on board fishing boats. It seems appropriate that these wider powers should also be available under the Bill; this intention is given effect by the amendment. The powers of the fishery officers under the Bill will then be aligned with those in other Acts.
The amendment provides that the fishery officer may examine documents relating to the boat and its fishing operations including "unofficial" papers. In some cases these unofficial papers, such as the skipper's private fishing log, may be more revealing than the official papers in the detection of an offence. The amendment also provides for the fishery officer to search for any such documents in order to ascertain whether an offence has been committed. Where there is reason to suspect an offence, the fishery officer may also seize such documents for production as evidence in court. In some cases a copy of the documents may not be sufficient and there may be a risk of the original being destroyed.
The Government believe that these powers are necessary if the provisions of the Bill are to be properly enforced. They are not new but, as I explained, are already available under other legislation, and should be available under this Bill. I beg to move that this amendment be accepted.
Lord Grimond: I should like to raise two points about the amendment before we depart from it. I know that these extremely wide powers are available to fishery officers under other legislation, but I still think we ought to be told whether they are necessary, because they are exceedingly wide. I should like to draw the attention of your Lordships' Committee to the wording of paragraph (c) of the amendment, which states that:
"for the purpose of ascertaining whether the master, owner or charterer of the boat has committed an offence under this Act"
the fishery officer,

971
"may search the boat for any such document and may require any person on board the boat to do anything which appears to him to be necessary for facilitating the search".
I think I am right in saying that no police officer has any such power, In fact do not think that a police officer could carry out any such search without a warrant. I know that these powers are contained in other legislation and perhaps we should pass them, but I think we should raise the point that we are giving to fishery officers powers which I do not think—though I may be subject to correction—the police possess.
I turn to my second point. It is only when we come to Clause 4(5) of the Bill that there is a reference to it appearing to a fishery officer that an offence under the Bill has been committed. That phrase does not appear until half way down the clause and I should have thought that it ought to have appeared at the start of the clause. The officer should have grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed and he should be examinable in court as to his reasons for suspecting that such an offence might be committed before he can exercise the very wide powers given under the clause in general. I should be grateful if the Minister would again look at those two points.
Lord Gray of Contin: I think it is right that we should be absolutely sure that the powers which we seek to give to the British sea fishery officers under the Bill are necessary. Perhaps I may explain to the noble Lord that the powers of British sea fishery officers require to be very widely based because the officers are dealing with immediate situations, which arise at sea or in harbour where the commission of an offence could be easily obscured. The detection of an offence and the collection of evidence can be frustrated unless the fishery officer is able to search a vessel, examine its catch and its gear, question the crew, and take the vessel to port for further investigation or for detention. He must also be able to seize fish, if necessary, and seize gear and documents for evidential purposes. These powers may appear sweeping, but they are necessary for adequate enforcement of the Bill's provisions. The powers duplicate those currently available in other fisheries legislation.
I believe that without thinking very carefully about the matter it is difficult for us to realise the situation in which the fishery officers can at times find themselves. where they have to take very quick decisions. The powers which we are seeking to give the fishery officers are the same as those which are already available in other legislation, and we feel that they are justified for the purpose of their carrying out their duties.
Lord Grimond: Have we any evidence that the powers have been justified? Have the fishery officers said that they could not do their duty without the powers? Have there been any cases in which the powers have been essential? It seems to me that otherwise we shall be writing the powers into statute after statute, without any examination as to whether or not they are necessary. The urgency cannot be so very great; the provision is concerned only with documents. There are plenty of powers to detain a fishing boat in port, to prevent it from taking to sea until the documents can be examined. I should like a little more
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assurance that there has been some investigation of whether these powers have proved to be necessary in practice.
Lord Gray of Contin: Let us take the question of entering premises on shore in order to examine documents relating to fishing activities. This ability and the power to search for documents is important if sufficient evidence to prove an offence is to be obtained. A requirement first to obtain a search warrant would merely serve notice on the offender and provide time for the incriminating evidence to be removed. Existing United Kingdom primary fisheries legislation does not contain a requirement for a search warrant to be obtained, and it would be inappropriate to create such a requirement solely in relation to inshore fishing in Scotland.
In reply to the noble Lord's question as to whether we are satisfied that the powers are necessary, I would say yes, we are satisfied that they are necessary. I know of a particular case where a conviction was obtained only as a result of evidence which was taken from the skipper's private log as opposed to the official log. That is important because if there is available a record, even though it is not an official record, the court should be able to benefit from what it contains.
I find it difficult to convince the noble Lord, and I agree that he is right to question me on the point; but I can assure him that the best advice available to me is that the provisions are necessary in order to enable the officers to carry out their duty effectively.
Lord Grimond: I am sorry that the Minister is having difficulty in convincing me. However, I was thinking that if we were entitled to demand the noble Lord's diary, or if we were to get someone else to produce it, and we were to read in it the appalling things that he does in his spare time, there would indeed be some reaction; but that is what he is holding out as being necessary in regard to fishery law.
Lord Gray of Contin: I do not want to become involved with the noble Lord in points about personalities, but it would be a different matter if there was any question of an offence being committed. If an offence were being committed, by whosoever it may be, personal logs or diaries would be legitimate evidence.
The noble Lord asked whether there is evidence that the fishery officers cannot do their job effectively without the powers. The answer to that question is, yes. Because enforcement is carried out at sea the powers have to be wider than might be necessary on shore, since no additional assistance is available to the fishery officer; he has to act on his own initiative. For all those reasons, we believe that the powers are necessary; they are powers which exist in other legislation.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: I should like to ask my noble friend a question. What is the position if the fishery officer suspects smuggling, or perhaps sees stolen sheep—and I have known that happen on fishing boats—or even drugs? About two years ago there was a case where a boat was full of drugs, and they were jettisoned over the side. Does the fishery

973
officer have authority to exercise such powers, other than in regard to fish, if he suspects smuggling or finds on boats stolen goods and such like?
Lord Gray of Contin: No, I do not think that he does. The power of the fishery officer is restricted entirely to fishery matters.
Lord Boothby: I had my doubts, but the noble Lord, Lord Gray, has convinced me that this amendment is necessary.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: In many ways, when we discuss fishing I am strictly out of my depth, but I feel that the basic point made by the noble Lord, Lord Grimond, is particularly apposite in this year of 1984. The noble Lord made the point that one has to read a fairly long way down the clause before finding that there should be reasonable grounds for believing that an offence has been committed.
There have been plenty of amendments to the Bill so far considering its size. I wonder, therefore, whether the Minister will take the amendment back to consider the possibility of emphasising, before the Bill reaches its next stage, that it is only when there is good reason for the fishery officer to believe that an offence has been committed that this machinery or these actions should be set in motion. As the noble Lord, Lord Grimond, remarked, the fishery officer should be able to prove that he had reasons to believe that an offence had been committed before taking these steps.
Lord Gray of Contin: With respect, I should perhaps explain that there is nothing new in what we are seeking to do. We seek to include in this legislation the same provision as exists elsewhere; so we are not seeking to do anything new. As I have explained, it was purely due to an oversight that this was not included in the original Bill. We are convinced that it is important, and, indeed, that it is essential, for the provision to appear so that under this legislation officers will be acting in the same way as they would act under other fishery legislation. For that reason, I would ask your Lordships to accept the amendment at this stage.
Lord Hughes: We shall note that explanation with interest and keep it in our minds for use on future occasions. So often in your Lordships' Committee, when amendments have been put forward to a piece of legislation, we have been told that they are not necessary because the powers already exist under other legislation. In fact, that was the answer in relation to the sheriff court—that it already exists under other legislation, or by implication. So here is a case where, although the Minister says that it already exists under other legislation, we are going to make sure. We are to have belt and braces, and repeat it in this Bill. It is therefore a useful precedent. Incidentally, the reference to 1984 prompts me to say that I think that the noble Lord, Lord Gray of Contin, would be terribly miscast as Big Brother.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 5 and 6 agreed to.
Clause 7 [Interpretation]:
6.33 p.m.
Lord Gray of Contin Lord Gray of Contin moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 5, line 9, at end insert—
(""master" includes, in relation to any fishing boat, the person for the time being in command or charge of the boat:").
The noble Lord said: This is a simple and straight-forward amendment that rectifies an omission in the present print of the Bill. It provides a definition for the term "master", which is referred to in several clauses of the Bill. The definition given is identical to that used in other modern fisheries legislation, and gives the term its simplest meaning; namely, the master is the person who is presently in charge of the boat whether or not that person is qualified. I beg to move that the amendment be accepted.
Lord Hughes: As the Minister has said, this is a simple amendment. There is no difficulty in under-standing it. That is a merit in itself in the present Government's legislation. I am always anxious to expand my knowledge of legal English, as distinct from everyday usage. The Minister can perhaps tell me the difference between being "in command" of a boat and being "in charge" of a boat, and why it is necessary to have both.
Lord Gray of Contin: I think the noble Lord is nitpicking a little. The amendment provides a definition for the term "master", and it is referred to in several clauses of the Bill. The definition given is identical to that used elsewhere, as I have already explained. The master is the person who is presently in charge. The term "in charge of the boat" is used principally to explain the function of the master, the person who is at the helm, the person who is in charge of the boat at that particular time. If the master has to sleep and someone takes over for him, then, in the terms of this legislation, for that period of time, the person at the helm is deemed to be the master. The term "in charge" is purely to clarify what the master would be doing.
Lord Hughes: That is most interesting. It is also quite amusing to find that the Minister, when asked the difference between being "in command" and being "in charge", used all along the term "in charge" of the boat. He did not find it necessary to talk about someone being "in command" of the boat. This seems to be another example of adding needless words to a piece of legislation, unless there is some legal difference, as I mentioned earlier, between being "in command" or being "in charge". I do not know. But it is certainly not a matter that I would wish to pursue much further unless the latest expedition of the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, has produced an explanation.
Lord Gray of Contin: I do not think that the explanation is any better than the one I gave.
Lord Hughes: That would seem to indicate that there should be some change of the law in the box.
Lady Saltoun: I wonder whether I might offer a word that could possibly clarify the matter. The master of a fishing boat fishing off Scotland often does not command the crew; he often leads them. He is in charge, but not in command.
Lord Hughes: That would seem to be a reason for leaving out "in command", if even the master is not in command of the boat.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 8 agreed to.
Clause 9 [Citation, commencement, transitional provisions and extent]:
On Question, Whether Clause 9 shall stand part of the Bill?
The Duke of Atholl: I wonder whether the Minister can enlighten me as to the date on which this Act is likely to be brought into force. Under Clause 9(2), the Government will need to make orders to bring it into force. Can he give any indication when this is likely?
Lord Gray of Contin: I think I can best answer my noble friend by saying that it will be as soon as possible, and certainly by the summer.
Clause 9 agreed to.
Schedule 1 [Minor and Consequential Amendments]:
Lord Gray of Contin Lord Gray of Contin moved Amendment No. 4:
Page 6, line 4, leave out ("Fishing") and insert ("Fishery").
The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 4, I wish also to speak to Amendment No. 5.
Amendment No. 5: Page 6, line 8, leave out ("Contravention") and insert ("Conservation").
Both the amendment to line 4 and the amendment to line 8 simply correct errors in Schedule 1. In the first case the reference should be to the "Fishery Board" and not the "Fishing Board" as printed. In the second, the Act referred to should be the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1967. I beg to move that both these drafting amendments be accepted.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Gray of Contin Lord Gray of Contin moved Amendment No. 5:
[Printed above.]
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Repeals]:
Lord Gray of Contin Lord Gray of Contin moved Amendments Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9:
Page 7, column 3, leave out lines 7 to 12 and insert ("The whole Act.")
Page 7, column 3, leave out lines 7 to 12 and insert ("The whole Act.")
Page 7, column 3, leave out line 21 and insert ("The whole Act.")
Page 7, column 3, leave out line 25 and insert ("The whole Act.").
The noble Lord said: These amendments simply remove references to specified provisions of certain Acts in the repeals schedule, and replace them with references to the whole Act. In this way authority will be given to remove all reference to these Acts from the statute book. Otherwise all that would be left would be the preamble or short title, the operative provisions having all been repealed. I beg to move that these amendments be accepted.
Lord Hughes: These four amendments are all in the same pattern and would indicate that when the sections which are at present in the third column were removed, there would be nothing left but the preamble or short title. Was the Bill drafted in such a terrible hurry that so many mistakes were made and nobody noticed that if we took out these remaining sections we would be asking the Committee to legislate to leave in four Acts with only a title and a preamble? It certainly does indicate that the usual high standard has hardly been achieved in this Bill.
Lord Gray of Contin: I absolutely defend the draftsmen who prepared this Bill. Certainly from my experience in another place I cannot on any occasion recall a Bill where there were not a number of Government amendments tidying up small matters of this sort which had been overlooked presumably in the anxiety of the draftsmen to make sure that all the major issues were properly covered. I think that the draftsmen have done a very good job in this Bill and I am glad that even at this late stage they have been sufficiently observant to note those small points, and that we are now putting them right.
Lord Hughes: I would not wish it to become the pattern that we should attack people in this House who are doing a job. That was certainly not my intention. I did say that this did not come up to the usual high standard. Frequently perhaps what south of the Border would be regarded as odious comparisons have been made between draftsmen south of the Border and those in Scotland. All I said was that this certainly is not up to their normal standards.
Lord Boothby: Before we end this Committee stage I should just like to say to the noble Lord that I think that at the end of the day, whatever slips the draftsmen may have made, we have a jolly good Bill which can do nothing but good to the inshore fishing industry for which I have fought for 40 years.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with amendments.

Roads (Scotland) Bill [H.L.]
6.46 p.m.
The Lord Advocate (Lord Mackay of Clashfern): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Mackay of Clashfern.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD in the Chair.]
Clause 2 [Powers and duties of Secretary of State as roads authority: management and maintenance]:
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 22:
[Printed earlier: col. 652.]
The noble and learned Lord said: This amendment is similar to the amendment that I moved in respect of Clause 1 and was particularly introduced in order to facilitate the creation of particular roads on which cyclists could cycle. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 23:
Page 3, line 41, leave out ("for the time being").
The noble Lord said: I feel that in this Bill there will be a great many occasions upon which we shall be asking either for words to be taken out or for words to be put in to make the Bill more intelligible to lay people. This particular amendment to page 3, line 41, to leave out "for the time being" is one of those occasions.
I do not understand why there have been quite so many amendments to the Bill. I do not think that we can blame the draftsmen on this occasion; it seems much more as though it was the policy taken at the top level in the Scottish Office not to put down the guillotine at a certain point and say, "That is it. Finish". I am sure that with all this enormous amount of roads legislation we could go on polishing and polishing all the time.
This particular amendment seems to me to be dealing with a matter which is superfluous. I will be interested to hear the noble and learned Lord's interpretation of it. It seems to me that the Secretary of State will, in any case, be keeping a list of roads of which he is actually in control and for which he is responsible. The minute he ceases to be responsible for a road it will be removed from the list. That is why the words, "for the time being" seem to me to be superfluous. The moment he loses control of a road or he gives up control of a road, he is no longer liable to keep it on a list. It may be a small point but I feel that the wording in question is unnecessary unless there is some legal explanation which will clarify it for me. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: As the noble Lord says, most of the amendments are concerned with no deep matter of policy but with just the phraseology in which these particular provisions are expressed. The purpose of using the phrase "for the time being" is precisely to emphasise the need to keep these lists up to date. In fact, at the moment the Secretary of State does have some obligation in this matter, but not in primary legislation. If we are to have a primary legislation responsibility to keep a list, it is very important that it should be a list which is up to date. It is in order to emphasise that, that the phrase "for the time being" is being incorporated.
The noble Lord, with his great experience of transport behind him, will I am sure be very much aware of the necessity for the lists—which have very important consequences—to be up to date. The informal lists have not always been easy to keep up to date. I hope that in the light of that explanation the noble Lord will feel able to agree that it is better to have these words in.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I can see the point made by the Lord Advocate. The only point that arises
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is how does an individual who goes to ascertain whether a road is a Secretary of State road, or whether it is a road that should be on the list "for the time being", is actually up to date? How do we get round this difficulty of the list actually being up to date? Someone may in all honesty go to the Secretary of State, look at the list, see the list of roads and say, "Yes, this is" or "this is not under the responsibility of the Secretary of State". Then he is told, "Ah, but for the time being. It was changed yesterday" or "the day before".
It is a point that I do not want to make too much of, but having been in the position of going to official offices and being told that things have changed since yesterday, I wonder how we can make it clear that the roads will be on the list, and will be taken off the list immediately, or put on to the list immediately they become the responsibility, or not, of the Secretary of State.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: That is precisely the purpose of these words, to put that duty on the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State will have a responsibility to see that the arrangements which he makes through his officials have the effect that the noble Lord says. I agree with him that it is frustrating to go to one of these registers and find that they are out of date. It is misleading. The purpose of this is to ensure that the Secretary of State will have the responsibility, and it will be his job to see that it is efficiently carried out. I am much obliged to the noble Lord.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 24 not moved.]
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 25:
Page 4, line 2, leave out ("free of charge").
The noble Lord said: This is a probing amendment to find out from the Lord Advocate how frequently these lists are actually referred to. Is it a constant business that they are referred to? How is public time to be saved when people make unnecessary demands to look at the lists? While saying this, it struck me to ask where the lists are kept. It may say somewhere in the Bill. Where are they available other than in Edinburgh? Are they available in the roads offices in Glasgow, Aberdeen, Perth, Dumfries, and various places like that? I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: We have no evidence that excessive use is made of such lists as have to be kept at the moment. The Secretary of State is taking this responsibility, and it seems right that the lists should be available for inspection free of charge. Regarding the places that they are kept, the Secretary of State will keep his lists at the Secretary of State's Office, which would normally be I think at New St. Andrew's House, or where the Roads Division office is. The local roads authorities have responsibilities and they will keep the lists at the appropriate offices of the local roads authority.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 3 [Power of Secretary of State to make advances to local roads authorities etc.].
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 26:
Page 4, line 9, leave out ("subject to subsection (2)(b)(iii) below")
The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 26 is a paving amendment for Amendment No. 36.
Amendment No. 36: Page 4, line 36, leave out sub-paragraph (iii).
I wish to say right away that the purpose of these amendments is to seek information. I would therefore go to the substance of Amendment No. 36 to leave out paragraph (b)(iii):
"shall be made only where it appears to the Secretary of State that the whole or any part of the expenditure in respect of which such advances could be made should not fall on the authority."
Would I be correct in assuming that this does not in any way alter the way in which the Secretary of State would be making advances for road purposes? Is it correct that it does not give him power to say in some particular case, "I am sorry, but I am not giving you anything at all on this" although the roads authority might have expected to have substantial grant towards its purpose? Am I right in assuming that this is merely a protection for the ordinary way in which grant would be paid to a roads authority? I beg to move Amendment No. 26.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I am obliged to the noble Lord for making the purpose of these two amendments so clear. The answer is that an advance made under this power would free the local authority altogether from the burden of this particular payment. The purpose of the particular provision is to make it clear that this power is to be used only when the Secretary of State thinks that is the way it should be. It comes exactly from the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975 when this power was introduced, and the noble Lord will perhaps know more about that than I do. This is not changing the existing law, it is merely continuing the conditions under which under the existing law these advances may be made. I hope this answers the noble Lord's question.
Lord Hughes: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 27:
Page 4, line 11 leave out ("(other than advances in respect of the acquisition of land)")
The noble Lord said: This is a series of amendments, the purpose of which is to make the clause more easily understood and to cut down a certain amount of the verbiage. It is perhaps one of the regrettable things that if you want to cut down written verbiage you have to do an awful lot of talking verbiage. The amendments which follow from Amendment No. 27 are Amendments Nos. 29 to 34 inclusive, and Amendments Nos. 36A and 38A.
Amendment No. 29: Page 4, line 18, leave out paragraph (b).
Amendment No. 30: Page 4, line 22, after ("mentioned") insert ("in subsection (1) above may include—
(a) advances in respect of the acquisition of land by them where he is satisfied that the land has been or is to be acquired by the authority with a view to the construction of a new road or the improvement of a road.")
Amendment No. 31: Page 4, leave out line 23 and insert ("(b)")
Amendment No. 32: Page 4, leave out line 29.
Amendment No. 33: Page 4, line 30, leave out ("(i) may include") and insert ("(c)").
Amendment No. 34: Page 4, line 33, leave out ("(ii) may include") and insert ("(d)").
Amendment No. 36A: Page 5, line 3, leave out from ("(3)") to ("above") in line 4 and insert ("The advances mentioned in subsection (2)(a)").
Amendment No. 38A: Page 5, line 19, leave out ("(a) or (b) and insert ("or (2)(a)").
I had looked at the possibility of tabling a new amendment putting all these together and showing clearly how the clause would stand. Then I found that it was impossible because there were other amendments in the course of the consideration of this clause which are not just a changing of the way it is worded but are changes of a different nature.
We start with Amendment No. 27, which is to leave out,
"(other than advances in respect of the acquisition of land)".
I do not understand why the Bill is drafted in this way. I could have understood it if the clause rested only on subsection (1)(a), but here we have in (1)(a) the words,
"advances (other than advances in respect of the acquisition of land)"
taken out. Then go on to (b) which puts back in the words:
"advances in respect of the acquisition of land".
It would be better if we took out the words,
"(other than advances in respect of the acquisition of land)"
and then moved the paragraph related to
"advances in respect of the acquisition of land"
further down the clause along with the items which are mentioned where advances may be included.
If I can go through them, that is effected by Amendment No. 28, page 4, line 14, which takes out from "authority" to the word "to" in line 17. The next amendment leaves out paragraph (b), and so on. The effect of it is to simplify the reading of this clause. It would have been much easier if I could have put them all together, but because there are other amendments inside the clause I could not have rewritten the clause without then tabling amendments to alter what I had already done. It has to be done on this complicated basis.
Perhaps when he replies the Lord Advocate will make it quite clear why it has been found necessary to do it in the way in which it has been done here by, first, leaving out of account advances in respect of the acquisition of land and then putting in the phrase,
"advances in respect of the acquisition of land"
as a new paragraph. It is a complicated way of doing it and most of the amendments which follow arise from changing that particular part. I beg to move.
The Duke of Atholl: Having been a member of the Committee on the preparation of legislation I feel compelled to support the noble Lord. Lord Hughes, in

981
moving his amendment and also the amendments that relate to it. It seems to me that this is an extremely complicated way of expressing a not very difficult idea. I hope that the Lord Advocate will agree to consider it again.
Further, I feel something of an expert on the acquisition of land for new roads; probably I have had more land acquired for new roads in the recent past than anyone else in your Lordships' House. On the whole the system has worked extremely well. But where the system reacts somewhat unfairly is when the line of a road goes through a building, cottage or a farmsteading, because it means that the building has to be replaced before the road is started. One is not paid for what is taken until the road is 90 per cent. completed, when one receives 90 per cent. of the compensation. One is therefore out of pocket for a very long time.
Personally the bank was kind to me when I had to replace a cottage. It was kind enough to loan me the money, but it was for longer than I anticipated because work on the road was delayed frequently and compensation did not turn up until about 18 months after it was originally expected. When I first saw the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, I thought it had something to do with this and I was prepared to support it to the hilt. I now realise it does not, hut I still think it is a very good amendment.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I am grateful to the noble Lord for explaining his amendment so clearly. I sympathise entirely with the difficulty of making such a clear amendment under the mechanisms we have to use, which sometimes make simplicity look complicated. I understand exactly the result he wishes to achieve. There is, however, a problem which also enables me to answer the amendment in the way he suggested by explaining why we have done it this way.
The reason is that we require to treat differently advances in respect of the acquisition of land and advances which are not in respect of the acquisition of land. The noble Lord will see that in subsection (a) of the provision which deals with advances, other than advances in respect of the acquisition of land, the Secretary of State may make the advance to the authority, or—I refer to line 13 on page 4 of the Bill—
"make such advances in conjunction with such an authority…to any person".
That is the reason why one has to treat the two separately. I hope I have followed through the noble Lord's amendment, but I think I am right in saying that he has not made that provision when one follows his amendments through. He does not distinguish between the acquisition of land and the other provision.
There is much legislation on this subject which we have compressed into this provision, but the existing legislation distinguishes in this way. I believe that this is done as simply as it can be, preserving that necessary distinction.
Lord Hughes: I do not think the Lord Advocate is doing me justice in this matter—quite unwittingly, obviously. I do not alter the language being used. Amendment No. 30 moves the wording under
982
subsection (1)(b) down as part of subsection (2). I have used exactly the same wording. Subsection (2) would read:
"The advances mentioned…in subsection (1) above may include"—
and at that point I bring in paragraph (b) as (a) of the second part; thus the distinction is maintained. What are included in subsection (2) are the details of the advances. The other alterations are only changes in paragraph numbers, and so on. The subsection continues:
"may include advances in connection with the exercise of any power…include advances for any purpose incidental, or conducive, to the purposes"—
and so on. It seemed to me that if there were any reason to elaborate on or distinguish between the type of advances that should be contained in the second paragraph, with the first paragraph referring to advances generally. So I have not in any way departed from the distinction by moving it down the page.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: As I understand the position, the only way the noble Lord is able to simplify by changing the order is by obscuring the distinction between paragraphs (a) and (b) in the way I have said. That is how I followed his amendments and my understanding is that as his amendments take effect he has not been able to make it clear how the advance to any person, in the case of a conjunction between the Secretary of State and a local authority, is available. Possibly this is a matter we can consider further. But that is my difficulty about his reformulation.
Lord Hughes: I still do not understand because that formulation remains. I have not altered subsection (1)(a); it remains exactly as worded. What the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has said is reasonable. I am sorry that with the intervention of the Christmas and New Year break there has not been an opportunity for consultation, but if the Lord Advocate is saying that he would be willing to look at this with me to endeavour to improve on or to simplify the way in which this clause is laid out, I should he very happy to withdraw the amendment. In the meantime, at the next stage either the Lord Advocate will table an alternative amendment upon which we may be agreed or I may table an amendment on which we can be agreed or, alternatively, if we cannot reach agreement I will table an amendment.
The Duke of Atholl: Will the Lord Advocate also consider my point? It is a serious point that someone has to put up money for rebuilding steadings, cottages or houses when a new road is threatened to go through them and the building of the new road appears often to be postponed, sometimes for up to 18 months or two years. This means that the landowner concerned is very much out of pocket for much longer than he thinks. The reason why I support the first amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, was that I thought the advance could be made to any person on the acquisition of land when the line of a new road was definitely agreed upon.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: As my noble friend indicated ultimately, he realised that the amendment did not cover his point which was why I did not mention it especially. I am very happy to look into the matter to see whether anything can be done to deal with the difficulty that my noble friend has experienced.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Nugent of Guildford): Does the noble Lord wish to withdraw Amendment No. 27?
Lord Hughes: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
7.8 p.m.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 28:
Page 4, line 14, leave out from ("authority") to ("to") in line 17.
The noble Lord said: This is an amendment seeking advice from the Lord Advocate about whether these words are necessary. They seem to form one of these phrases added to Acts of Parliament:
"(whether or not that authority is the roads authority by whom the road is, or as the case may be will be, maintainable) to any person"
This is one of those points that I feel to be worth considering and testing again at to whether the words are actually necessary.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I believe the words in the existing legislation are necessary in the sense that it may be possible. when somebody else is constructing a road, to make an advance of money which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State and the local authority, will provide public benefit more than just to the particular person who is constructing the road—a private landowner, for example, or an industrialist who may construct a road to his factory. By putting out a little extra money public benefit may be obtained, and it is the power to do that which is here in question. I do not think it is exercised very often, but I believe it is an important power to have in such circumstances. I hope the noble Lord will feel satisfied with that explanation.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I am pleased with the explanation except that perhaps I could raise one point with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate. When he was speaking, I was thinking in terms of airports and perhaps power stations, and places like that. Would such a road, under other legislation, be classified as a public road or a private road? The noble Lord, Lord Nugent, will be aware that in the other place, during the Committee stage of my own Seat Belts Bill, one Member took an entire Committee stage discussing what were public and private roads. These were exactly the points he made. He did it delightfully, but we lost the Bill because of it. He took two and a half hours to discuss whether a road was public or a private road. If a road was helped financially by the Secretary of State in these circumstances—and an airport or a power station were two of the examples given—would that be classified for the purposes of other legislation as a public or private road, or would it, again, depend upon a lot of other quite consequential things?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Among other things, the purpose of this Bill is to try to deal with claims, and a public road will be a road on the appropriate list now, unless it is a special road. The conditions under which it goes on the list are set out. What used to be called "taken over" (and I will come to this later) is now to be clarified as going on the list, with consequences. The mere fact that an advance is given does not necessarily mean that the resulting road will go on the list. It will still enable a public benefit to be conferred if the Secretary of State decides to make such an advance, but he would not make such an advance lightly to any other person. These are the circumstances which might apply; but it would not necessarily mean that the road, when constructed, or the improvement that is being made, when made, would make the road a public road in the sense of its going on the list of roads to be maintained by either a local roads authority or the Secretary of State.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: With that explanation, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes had given notice of his intention to move Amendments Nos. 29 to 34:
[Printed earlier: col. 980.]
The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 29 to 34 were among those to which I spoke, but in view of what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate said in the discussion on Amendment No. 27, I do not wish to move these amendments.
[Amendments Nos. 29 to 34 not moved.]
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 35:
Page 4, line 34, leave out (", or conducive").
The noble Lord said: I have put down this amendment because "conducive" seems to me to be a superfluous word. I am sure the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate will be able to explain the reasons for the inclusion of this word, but it seems that "incidental to the purposes mentioned in those paragraphs" would be sufficient. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The purpose of including this word is to make it a little more flexible than "incidental". Powers to spend money of this sort are apt to be fairly strictly construed. The word "incidental" is a word which is often used in this connection. For example, things like geotechnical surveys to see whether a road is feasible in a particular position might not be regarded as incidental to the road because you might not ultimately' make the road at all. It is necessary to have fairly wide powers in this connection, and we felt that the word "conducive" was an appropriate word to connote some width in this respect. Landscaping is another possible head which might not be regarded as strictly incidental to the purposes of the road itself although very conducive to having a nice road when it is finished.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 36 and 36A not moved.]
7.17 p.m.
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 37:
Page 5, line 11, leave out ("due").
The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 37 and 38 achieve the same purpose. On page 5, starting from line 7, we find the words:
"any amount by which the annual expenditure incurred by the authority in maintaining the land, during the period between its acquisition and the construction or improvement of the road in question, and in the payment of loan charges accruing due".
I cannot understand what is meant by these words. When I put down my amendment, I could not make up my mind whether to leave out the word "accruing" or to leave out the word "due". Either one or the other seemed to me to serve the purpose. I do not know; but if a sum of money has accrued, it is due. If it is due, it is bound to have accrued. This seems to me once again to illustrate the attempt to cover every possible contingency against some smart alec turning up in the courts and saying, "Yes, the money was due but had not accrued", or, "The money has accrued but is not due". I should like to know the legal reason for putting this cumbersome pair of words together.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The first answer is that this is the phrase that we have already. This is in the existing legislation, and we are trying to deal with that. The second point, I think, is that the phrase "accruing due" means more than just accruing, because the theory is that if you have interest on a loan it is accruing from day to day but usually the loan requires actual payments to be made on particular dates.
Let me try to give a very brief example. Suppose that the land for the road was acquired on 1st January, and let us say that the road was constructed even more quickly than is normal and was constructed by 1st April; but the loan was raised on condition that the interest on it is paid six-monthly. Now from 1st January to 1st April the interest has been accruing, but if the payments of interest are to be made only on 31st July and 31st December then interest has not accrued due during the period in which the land has been acquired but the road not yet constructed. So it has accrued but it has not accrued due, the accrual falling due on one of the term days. That is the reason for the phrase.
The noble Lord referred to smart alecs turning up in court. As the noble Lord knows very well from his experience as chairman of a Royal Commission and in other ways, the legislation has to cope with smart alecs. There are always some of these around, however undesirable they may be, and the legislation has to cope with them.
Lord Hughes: The noble and learned Lord has succeeded in convincing me that I left out the wrong word. If I had left out "accruing", the position would have been covered because, on his example, the money would have been due to be paid on 31st July. Incidentally, it would not have been so; it would have
986
been 30th June, because that is six months from 1st January; so his law is better than his arithmetic. By the 30th June the money would be due, so it is the word "accruing" that is not necessary. I therefore hope that at the next stage when I move to leave out the word "accruing" he will than agree with me that we can save two words twice.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I am not certain the noble Lord will necessarily achieve simplification that way. Perhaps he will look at it again.
Lord Hughes: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, on the understanding that I will look at it again and see if this massive alternative form of wording will be more acceptable.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 38 and 38A not moved.]
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 39:
Page 5, line 20, leave out from first ("by") to ("and") in line 21 and insert ("grant or loan or partly grant and partly loan").
The noble Lord said: Again this is an attempt to simplify matters. I should be interested to hear the justification for the wording that is in the Bill. If we look at the wording in the Bill, we see this:
"An advance under subsection (1)(a) or (b) above may be either by way of grant or by way of loan, or partly in one way and partly in the other".
The effect of these amendments would be that the following wording would appear:
"may be either by grant or loan or partly grant and partly loan".
I do not see why it is necessary to have the words "by way of" or "partly one way", and so on, repeated. This is again an attempt to make the wording in the Bill nearer to the everyday language that people would use. If the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate is not going to accept this, I hope he will not tell me that this is the way it has been done before. That is of no value at all in persuading me. If it is wrong I do not see any reason for accepting that even if it has been done 20 times before. If there is a second reason why these words have to be in, apart from the mere fact that they have been in legislation before, I should be glad to hear it. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Perhaps for variety's sake I should say that it appears to me that the present wording is one way in which this could be expressed and the amendment puts it in another way. Both ways are perfectly plain ways of expressing the same idea; but it so happens, the noble Lord will not be surprised to hear, that this phrase is in the legislation that we are seeking to codify. It has been used in Section 8(4) of the Development and Road Improvement Funds Act 1909, so it has been around for a while and that is why we have preferred this particular method. The result is exactly the same.
Lord Hughes: That seems to me a perfectly good reason for accepting the amendment, if fewer words can achieve exactly the same purpose.
On Question, amendment negatived.
Clause 3 agreed to.
Clause 4 [Agreements between authorities]:
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 40:
Page 5, line 36, leave out ("(3) to") and insert ("(4) and").
The noble and learned Lord said: This is a drafting amendment to correct an incorrect reference. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 5 [Trunk roads]:
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 41:
Page 6, line 20, after ("agriculture") insert ("and industry").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 41. On page 6, line 18, of the Bill it says:
"after taking into consideration the requirements of local and national planning, including the requirements of agriculture".
I do not object to that but I think we should include industry because very often industries can be very much affected by the way in which roads are planned. I know from my chairmanship of the New Town of East Kilbride that one of the things in which incoming industry is most interested is the road pattern. It seems to me quite reasonable that the needs of industry should be included as they need to be considered just as much as those of agriculture. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I am very happy to accept this amendment. May I suggest to the noble Lord that a similar passage occurs in Clause 7 on page 8? Perhaps he might feel able on the next occasion to put down a corresponding amendment.
Lord Hughes: May I say that there are a number of occasions where I have only dealt with the first time that some words appear. I took a rather charitable view of the Government's activities in that if they accepted the amendment they would search through the Bill for all the other places where the same thing has to be done. I am a firm believer in the doctrine, "if you have a dog, don't do your own barking."
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 42:
Page 7, line 12, leave out subsection (7).
The noble Lord said: I would point out right away that this is merely an amendment for the purpose of probing what is intended. It is a rather complicated lot of wording. The amendment seeks to leave out subsection (7). The Bill says on page 7, line 18:
"shall become a trunk road is revoked or varied by a subsequent order made at any time before the date on which that road is opened for the purposes of through traffic, the revoking or varying order shall not be deemed for the purposes of this section to be an order directing that a road shall cease to be a trunk road."
Can the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate explain in simpler language what this is meant to do?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: As your Lordships will appreciate, when it is decided that what is a trunk road should cease to be a trunk road, a lot of people have to have their interests considered and there is an elaborate procedure for that purpose. The purpose of
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this subsection is to make it clear that that elaborate procedure is not required if the Secretary of State changes his mind before he has implemented the proposal. Obviously in that situation one does not want to have to go through the elaborate procedure when all that has happened is that he has changed his mind, but it is necessary or desirable that matters should be made public as soon as possible because, as your Lordships know very well, to have the line of a road lying on a map can cause planning blight. The intention is to kill the planning blight at the earliest opportunity without the elaborate procedures that are required for de-trunking, as it is called.
Lord Hughes: I am quite satisfied with that explanation and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 43:
Page 7, line 37, after ("authority") insert ("if they so decide").
The noble Lord said: This is following a point which I raised on Second Reading. As it stands at the present time, Clause 5(9) reads:
"A local roads authority may contribute towards costs incurred by the Secretary of State in the construction or improvement of any trunk road".
I have put down this amendment to insert "if they so decide", but looking at another part of the Bill I see that I ought to have adopted the wording which the Government have used in various places, which is "if they think fit". If the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate is disposed to accept the suggestion, I would beg leave to alter the wording to "if they think fit", because it is desirable when a Bill indicates that discretion might be exercised that the same form of words are used throughout. Otherwise, as the noble and learned Lord would say, you raise a doubt as to why you have used a different form of words.
The indication was given that it would be for the local authority to decide whether they were going to contribute, but, because of the number of times we have been told that in legislation "may" can include "shall", I want to make it quite certain that there is no mandatory requirement on the local authority to contribute, but that they may contribute "if they think fit". I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I am extremely happy to accept this amendment and I should be very glad if the noble Lord would move it in the form of the second alternative that he used, "if they think fit". If your Lordships are prepared to accept the amendment in that form, I am happy to accept it like that for the reasons which the noble Lord has given. I hope that this is a good spirit in which to come to the dinner adjournment.
Lord Hughes: Is it possible within the working of the House to alter the wording from, "if they so decide" to, "if they think fit"?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Nugent of Guildford): If your Lordships wish, I could accept a manuscript amendment to change the words from, "if they so decide" to, "if they think fit".
Lord Hughes: May I put it like that?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees: I will accept it as such. I will put the amended amendment. The amendment proposed is:
Page 7, line 37, after ("authority") insert ("if they think fit").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.
The Earl of Swinton: This might be a convenient time to adjourn for dinner. I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until 8.20 p.m.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
[The Sitting was suspended from 7.33 p.m. until 8.20 p.m.]
Clause 6 [Local and private Act functions with respect to trunk roads]
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 44:
Page 7, line 41, leave out (", repair").
The noble and learned Lord said: This amendment is designed to leave out the word "repair" because it is unnecessary in the light of the general definition of "maintenance". I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 6, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 7 [General provision as to special roads]:
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 45:
Page 8,line 6, leave out (", and to be known as,").
The noble Lord said: It seems to me to be superfluous and slightly confusing to say:
"being roads provided in pursuance of a scheme made under section 1 of the Special Roads Act 1949, shall continue to be, and to be known as, special roads".
I should be pleased if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate could explain whether the words "and to be known as" are really necessary. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: It may be convenient to say something which bears upon a number of the other amendments which the noble Lord has tabled. As the noble Lord will appreciate, the Special Roads Act 1949 created the power to make roads which were called special roads. They have two main features. The first is that the Public Utilities Street Works Act does not apply. In other words, there is no right for public utility undertakings to put works in. The other special feature is that the classes of traffic may be readily regulated. As the noble Lord knows, the principal examples of this type of road are motorways. It is important that the roads authority should have a strong right to prevent people from putting equipment in.
We want to try to bring together as much as possible of the Scottish roads legislation. That is the purpose. We are not going to have the Special Roads Act but we are going to have to have special roads. The point of
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the particular matter referred to in the amendment is to allow those special roads which have already been constructed under the Special Roads Act to continue to enjoy the special features that they already enjoy under the régime in this Bill. I hope that explains the situation to the noble Lord.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate for his explanation. It is important to repeat the very important point that these roads have special traffic designations and that there are no public utilities on them. Furthermore, why do we not call a spade a spade and just call them motorways? Although the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate suggested that motorways are the best known examples, I am wondering which special roads other than motorways have that designation. Ordinary members of the public speak in a particular way, while legally we speak in another way. It all contributes to the mystique of the legal process. I am happy with the explanation which has been given by the Lord Advocate, but I should be most grateful if he could explain why motorways cannot be called motorways.
Lord Drumalbyn:I should be grateful if at the same time my noble and learned friend could say what their abbreviated name is to be. Will some of the "A" roads be included?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: They will continue to be named special roads. Normally they will be roads with a very high designation. The Edinburgh outer by-pass is another example of a special road. This is a matter of history. The Special Roads Act came first. The motorways were created under that Act. People called them motorways, but they were examples of special roads. It might have been possible to change the system and to describe them as motorways, but that would have required a great deal of change. We felt that it would be best to incorporate the existing statutory provisions into this Bill and to use, as the simplest form of continuation, the designation which had previously been used.
The Earl of Selkirk: What really is the difference? I found it very difficult to understand what was meant by a special road. It is referred to rather obliquely throughout the Bill. It means nothing to me except traffic control. Is there any distinctive difference between a special road and any other road, or is it simply a question of the continuation of a name because it is simpler?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The situation is that up to the time of this Bill the special road was provided under the Special Roads Act 1949. Motorways are the principal examples but not the only examples of roads which might he constructed under these powers. A feature of the roads which have been referred to is that you can lay down the classes of traffic which may use them. Pedestrians can be excluded, for example. The other important point is that the public utilities street works code does not apply. Therefore, there is a much stronger right for the road authority to prevent the road being dug up for the sake of public utilities. These are the features of the special road, and that legislation

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has been in place since 1949. The intention of the Bill is to bring together the legislation. We are not making changes for change's sake. We are trying to make it as simple as possible, but that is a special category of road which has proved its usefulness and we regard it as being important to continue that feature.
The Earl of Selkirk: Then are the rules for a special road different from those for "M" roads? Then, are special roads marked as such? Personally I have never seen such marking.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: My noble friend has misunderstood, and I am sure that is my fault. An "M" road is simply one class of special road. The main example of a special road is what has been called a motorway. Motorways were constructed under the Special Roads Act's powers and they are the principal examples. The special roads on which the noble Lord will have travelled will almost all have been motorways. But the Edinburgh outer by-pass is another example. Strictly speaking, it is not a motorway and it does not conform with all that is required of a road to be classified as a motorway. But it is a special road. It has the features that the traffic on it is restricted to particular classes and that the public utility street works code does not apply to it.
The Earl of Selkirk: That means that the rules for the traffic are precisely the same?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: That is true so far as the traffic's use of the road is concerned but the traffic which may use the road can vary according to what the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.
Lord Drumalbyn: I think I have understood that, but would it not be possible to take this opportunity to bring in something that the public could understand without an explanation as to what is an "M" road that is not a special road? One does come across examples of where an "M" road ceases to be an "M" road, and it is not quite clear what happens then and what the difference is; whether a cyclist can use it or not. I know that there are general notices to indicate whether cyclists or motor-cyclists can use the roads, but have we not gone long enough now to have a special classification for a special road that is not a motorway?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The number of these roads is sufficiently small to make it unwise to make more numerous statutory provisions than are necessary. So far as road construction is concerned and special provisions of that kind, there is no distinction between a special road and a motorway from the point of view of relevance under this legislation. So far as I can judge, what we have done is the most appropriate action in the circumstances, and I hope that my noble friend is able to agree with that explanation.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: Although I am greatly in sympathy with the noble Lords who have spoken and who hope that the name could be changed to "motorway", which seems the intelligent thing to do, I accept the argument of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate. I can quote the example of
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the Glasgow ring road, because parts of it are not a motorway and are subject to different speed limits and other regulations. While the public may continue to call them all motorways, I can see the necessity for the legal formula in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 46:
Page 8, line 16, leave out subsection (4).
The noble Lord said: The main purpose of this amendment is to try to ascertain exactly who else but a local authority could be a special road authority, unless this is a throwback to the days when roads—particularly those in the south—were built by agencies in the form of road construction units as against the old local authority. Other than that, I find it difficult to understand how else a special road authority could be anything other than the local authority for the particular area through which the road passes. There may, of course, be a handover period during which the Secretary of State himself may be involved before the road is ultimately handed over to the different local authorities who are responsible for each section of it. I may have all this wrong but this seems to be a slightly confusing subsection and I hope that the noble and learned Lord can help me with it.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: This is just to provide the definition of the special roads authority as being the roads authority responsible for these particular special roads. It may be the local roads authority, or it may be the Secretary of State. In the case of the motorways, it is the Secretary of State, because sometimes local authorities act as agents for him in a particular area—indeed, very often they do. But the roads authority for most of the motorways—indeed, I believe all the motorways—is the Secretary of State. That is the reason for this subsection.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate for that explanation, and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 47:
Page 9, line 23, leave out first ("special").
The noble Lord said: It may be for the convenience of the committee to consider Amendments Nos. 47, 48, 49 and 50 together.
Amendment No. 48:
Page 9, line 25, leave out ("special")
Amendment No. 49:
Page 9, line 26, after ("the") insert ("special")
Amendment No. 50:
Page 9, line 29, leave out ("special")
However, after the explanations given by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate on an earlier amendment,. I propose not to move those amendments.
[Amendments Nos. 47 to 50 not moved.]
Clause 7 agreed to.
Clauses 8 to 10 agreed to.
Clause 11 [Classification of roads]:
8.36 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 11 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Hughes: In clause 11 on page 12 of the Bill, subsection (1) makes reference to a "principal road". In clause 68 there is a reference to a "main road". But I cannot find in all these descriptions of roads in the interpretation clause any statement as to what a principal road is or what a main road is. It may read very simply, but if one does not know what a principal road is, it does not make much sense. It would seem to me that Clause 11 as it stands would be perfectly acceptable if there was a definition somewhere of what a "principal road" is. Similarly, there is the description of a "main road" in Clause 68 which I could not find defined anywhere, either. I do not guarantee that those are the only two places where these words occur; having found one of each, I thought that was enough to go on with.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The purpose of this clause is to give the Secretary of State power to classify a road as, among other things, a principal road. I am not sure that anything more is required. It is for the Secretary of State to decide whether he calls a road a principal road. The classification is that which the Secretary of State decides should be assigned to the road. The purpose of the clause is to give proper power to make such classification both in relation of the provisions of this Bill and to those of any other enactment which refers to a road classified by the Secretary of State.
Lord Hughes: On that basis, may I ask the noble and learned Lord what is the difference between a principal road and a main road? On page 42 there is a reference to a "main road". It may be all very well for the Secretary of State if he is the only person in Scotland who knows what a principal road is and if he is also the only one who knows what a main road is—but some of the rest of us would like to be as well informed on that matter.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I think the distinction is that the "principal road" is a type of classification, and if the Secretary of State exercises his power to classify it as a principal road it will be that for the Secretary of State and for all of us.
So far as a "main road" is concerned, I think that is intended not as a classification of the road. That is a description of a particular function that the road possesses, and of course if a road is a main road in an important sense the Secretary of State may decide to classify it as a "principal road". This clause is for classification, and that is the reason that it is in these terms.
Lord Drumalbyn: Will the Secretary of State automatically be liable to maintain it if it is a principal road; or who will?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: One of the consequences of classification may be the way in which the road falls to be maintained. That is one of
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the reasons why there is a provision for classification, and different classes of grants may arise according to whether the road is classified in a particuar way.
The Earl of Selkirk: May I as: does this make any difference to motorists or road users? Is there any need to mark it to distinguish it as a principal road, or do you behave in exactly the same way as you would on any other road?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Like most of the provisions of this Bill, the main function is to regulate the provision of the road rather than the traffic on the road. The Road Traffic Regulation Act is the one that deals with the use of the road by traffic. The principle purpose of this legislation is to deal with the construction, the financial arrangements for the construction and for the maintenance and so on.
Lord Hughes: On page 91 we have a definition of "private road". It is a beauty. It says:
"'private road' means any road other than a public road".
We have a definition of "public road". It means
"a road which a roads authority have a duty to maintain".
Then we have a definition of "road":
"'road' means, subject to subsection (3) below, any way (other than a waterway) over which there is a public right of passage (by whatever means) and includes the road's verge, and any bridge (whether permanent or temporary) over which, or tunnel through which, the road passes; and any reference to a road includes a part thereof and a proposed road".
I think you are taking a "proposed road" out later on. It would not seem to me to be harmful if we had a definition of what a "principal road" is, if the Secretary of State decides that there should be such a thing, and that we should also have a definition of a "main road". If it is undesirable to define "principal" and "main" road, cannot it be defined in one of the other terms found suitable in other parts of the Bill? Why should it not just be a "private" road or a "public" road as the case may be?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I sought to explain that. The distinction between a public road and private road is that the public authority has a duty to maintain the public road. Any other public right of way is a private road. This clause is dealing with the classification of roads, which is a different matter and may have a bearing on the financial arrangements made between the Secretary of State himself and local authorities for the maintenance of the road. It is not a distinction of the same kind as the distinction between "public" and "private".
I find it hard to see how the Secretary of State could do more than just say that a particular road is classified as a "principal" road. The purpose of this clause is to give him that power. If it would help, I am sure one could add the definition that a "principal road" is one designated as such by the Secretary of State under Clause 11. But I doubt, with great respect, whether that is necessary.
Lord Hughes: Well, again I come back to Clause 68—the stopping up provisions. It says:
"to stop up any private means of access to land or premises adjoining or adjacent to land comprised in the route of the special, or as the case may be main, road".

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This seems to be saying, on the one hand, a special road and, on the other hand, everything else is a main road. Two terms are used, and the thing that first occurred to me was what is the difference between a "principal road" and a "main road". If there is a difference between them, what is the difference? If there is no difference between them, why cannot they be described by the same term?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The answer is that a main road may be a principal road if it is classified as such by the Secretary of State. So far as I can see, the principal function of that classification is to affect the burden of maintenance. The Secretary of State may pay different grants in respect of different classifications of roads, and this clause gives him the power that enables him to do that. It is a different type of distinction from the other distinctions to which the noble Lord has referred.
Lord Hughes: Well, this will be my last shot. I know that very often when one seeks to elaborate on the language used we are told that the more you define the more you endanger the general principle. But when you have these various definitions of roads which at first glance would cover everything, and then you have two other adjectives applied which are not interpreted in any way, I would suspect there is a possible case where somebody goes to the court and says, "I am not covered"; when the judges have to look at the Bill there is nothing in it to help them to say what is a "main road" and what is a "principal road". From what the noble Lord the Lord Advocate has said, it would appear to be perfectly possible to define these roads in such a way as to remove any doubt.
Obviously one of the things we want to do at the present time, in view of the mass of litigation that takes place, is to cut down any possibility of creating new sources of it. I would be content to leave it if the Lord Advocate would agree to have a look at the matter and see if it can be defined without removing one set of problems and creating another.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Certainly I will look at it. I have sought to explain the situation. But I will read what the noble Lord has said and look at it again in the light of that.
Clause 11 agreed to.
Clause 12 agreed to.
Clause 13 [Making up and maintenance of private roads]:
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 51:
Page 14, line 9, leave out ("paving, lighting or drainage") and insert ("or paving").
The noble Lord said: This again is an amendment seeking the guidance of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate. The question I would like to ask him is, under what circumstances a local authority may be liable to install lighting and drainage for a private road,
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which one would assume would have been built—at least the drainage would—as a necessity during construction? The lighting would be something that would be decided by the local auhority later, because they would in any case require in a populous area to provide lighting. It would appear that these words would be superfluous. Either it would need to be provided automatically or it would be provided in the course of the original construction work. I would be pleased if the Lord Advocate would clarify this. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: This clause is designed to deal with the situation in which the authority is faced with a private road and in which there is a question of making it into a public road. The general situation is that under Clause 13(1) the local roads authority may by notice to the frontagers of a private road require them to make it up and to maintain it at such reasonable standard as may be specified in the notice. There are provisions about appeals.
That is the basic idea: the local roads authority may require the people whose road it is to do this. It is a private road with a public right of way over it; the ownership is private, the resonsibility for maintenance is private. There is a right of way. The local authority may require that road to be made up to a reasonable standard. We say in the Bill that "reasonable standard" may include lighting or drainage. There are some circumstances in which it might be unreasonable to require the road to be lit, but there are other circumstances in which it would be reasonable to require it to be lit or drained. If the noble Lord's amendment is accepted the local authority would be unable to require lighting or drainage to be incorporated in the road. I think the noble Lord will be the first to realise that in some circumstances it would be most unfortunate to have a road, as he envisaged, in a populous area without the authority being able to require that it be lit. I hope that in the light of that explanation the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
My understanding is that "drainage" is covered in existing legislation. I think we have changed the word and that "channelling" was the word used in the Burgh Police Acts. But "lighting" has been added in the light of the Government's acceptance of the recommendations made by the Committee chaired by my noble friend Lord Stodart of Leaston that lighting in some circumstances may be desirable and that local roads authorities should have the power to require lighting.
8.50 p.m.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I thank the Lord Advocate for that explanation and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 52 not moved.]
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 53:
[Printed earlier: col. 683.]
The noble Lord said: Clause 13(8) contains the definition of "frontager" and I believe I spoke to this on Second Reading. I draw attention to Clause 15(2) which states that "frontager" has the same meaning as that in Clause 13(8). Moving on to Clause 20, this

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includes in subsection (2)(b)(i) that notice be intimated to,
"the owners of all lands and heritages which would front, abut or be comprehended in".
In this case the Lord Advocate explained to me what was meant by "comprehended in" and I do not object to that particular phrase being there. But I have Amendment No. 134 where I propose the inclusion in the interpretation clause the definition:
"("frontager' in relation to a road means the owner of any lands and heritages fronting or abutting or comprehended in that road;')".
Therefore, it takes in to the interpretation clause the various descriptions which are used throughout the Bill. If that can be accepted it would avoid the very undesirable practice of having definitions at different parts of the Bill. Amendment No. 53 would take out subsection (8) and the reference in Clause 15(2). The language in the Bill would otherwise not be altered. The different meanings that are attributed would be related to the definition of "frontager" in the interpretation clause. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I am obliged for that clear explanation. My way of looking at this is that I think the word "frontager" appears only in Clauses 13 and 15. In that situation—and it is a matter of judgment—it is not usual to have it in the interpretation clause unless the word occurs more often. It is a perfectly acceptable practice, where a word is used only sparingly, to put the interpretation in close proximity to it.
On the second point where this arises, in Clause 20, "frontager" has a different meaning. It is not right to say that it is the same, because "frontager" in the case of the actual road is as described in Clause 13(8), which is the subject of the amendment, but where there is not yet a road it is not quite the same thing. One is not "fronting" or "abutting" on a road but "fronting" or "abutting" or "comprehended in" a place which may ultimately be a road. There is a difference.
The noble Lord proposed a definition of "frontager", but his definition does not apply in the sense that it includes all the various possibilities. Stricly speaking, the meaning of the word "frontager" is not quite the same where there is a road and where there is not yet a road. I feel that it is necessary as a matter of proper drafting to have a different definition where the as yet unformed road is concerned. I hope that in the light of those explanations the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
May I take it, to avoid repetition, that any matter raised by the noble Lord, or any other noble Lord, will be considered by me to see whether any improvement can be made before the next stage. That applies to this amendment. However, as at present advised it seems to me that what we have in the Bill is perhaps marginally better than what is proposed.
Lord Hughes:In the light of what the Lord Advocate has said, I accept that there is some justification for leaving Clause 20 as it stands because it relates to the possibility of a road which might not come into existence. While he is quite correct in the references in Clauses 13 and 15—those are the only places with a reference to "frontager"—there are other
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parts which refer to "fronting" or "abutting". If one defines "frontager" in the way that I suggest, and leaving out the part about being "comprehended in", by the same token one is making perfectly clear what is meant by "fronting" or "abutting". So although the term "frontager" is not used, a definition of it including lands and heritages which front or abut, makes it perfectly clear what "fronting" or "abutting" in the other clauses mean.
Therefore, I shall ask leave to withdraw the amendment. However, it will be on the basis that at the next stage I shall come back to the matter but leaving out the phrase "comprehended in". I think it is generally agreed that if one can find all the definitions in one place it is very much easier, because the definition which is the easiest to lose is the one contained somewhere else in the Bill. On that basis I beg leave to withdraw the amendment. I shall not be moving the others which hang on it but will resubmit them in diminished form at the next stage.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 54:
Page 15, line 3, leave out ("Secretary of State") and insert ("sheriff").
The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 54, it may be for the convenience of the Committee if Amendment No. 55 is discussed at the same time.
Amendment No. 55: Page 15, line 5, leave out ("Secretary of State's") and insert ("sheriff's").
This is a simple amendment suggesting that to ask the Secretary of State to adjudicate on a subject such as the making up of a private road is using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. In the belief that the Secretary of State is, or at least should be, a very busy man, we feel that, as there are many more of them, the sheriffs should be able to stand in and make the decision. We ask that "sheriff" be substituted for "Secretary of State". The same applies in both amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The existing legislation dealing with this point allows an appeal to the sheriff. It was a fairly narrow balance as to whether "sheriff" should be left, or whether "Secretary of State" should be substituted. The view was taken that if the Secretary of State was the appellate tribunal, it might lead to greater uniformity. The balance is extremely narrow. In view of the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove, and the feeling that he has expressed on the matter, I feel disposed to accept this amendment and the following one.
Lord Drumalbyn: I wish to express my satisfaction with that decision, which I am sure is the right one. I am sure that this is a local matter.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 55:
[Printed earlier.]
On Question, amendment agreed to.
9.1 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 13, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Hughes: I have a question. On page 14, subsection (3) (b) states:
"a scheme whereby the cost is to be apportioned among the frontagers (being a scheme which is equitable in the opinion of the authority and which describes for each frontager the proportion of cost to be paid by him)".
On the previous two amendments the Lord Advocate said that one of the reasons for "Secretary of State" was that it was desirable to have uniformity, but as the issue was finely balanced he was content with "sheriff". I wish to ask about the question of uniformity.
Costs could be apportioned in a variety of ways. A fairly common way is to take the length of frontage and total cost, and if one man has 30 feet out of 1,000 feet he pays 30 one-thousandths of the cost of the road. Another way is simply on the number of the houses, when each house pays its share. That method is not commonly used; it could he very unfair. One person may have an enormous house with a frontage of 150 feet, and the man next door may have a little cottage with only 25 feet of frontage. There is no reason why they should pay the same. I do not think that is a starter. Another fairly common method is on the basis of rate able or equivalent value. But the most frequently used method is on the length of frontage, and that will probably continue.
If the matter is left to the discretion of authorities and no guidance of any sort is given, people in one area might feel hard done by if they learn that in another area a different method has been used and on that basis they would have been better off. People always look for comparisons to their advantage and not to their disadvantage. I do not think it is possible to state in the Bill the method of apportionment so that every authority works on the same basis, but I should like the Lord Advocate to consider this. It is common, after a Bill becomes an Act, for administrative guidance to be given to authorities on how to act. I should be content if these two methods, street frontage and rateable value, were referred to, perhaps going so far as to recommend—but not taking the discretion away from local authorities—that the fairest method is street frontage.
I do not expect the Lord Advocate now to say, "Yes, administrative guidance will be given". It is not his department that will be handling it; it will be the Secretary of State. But I hope that thought can be given to that. It would create a better sense of fairness as between one authority and another if as far as possible they apportioned on the same basis. Having said that, I am content that the clause should stand as it is.
Lord Drumalbyn: I wish to make two observations on what the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, says. If guidance were given by the Secretary of State, how easy or difficult would it be for the sheriff to interpret that guidance? How would he find out from other areas what the norm was? Would it make sense for the Secretary of State in a matter of this kind to consult the convention and get a consensus? I should have thought
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that was a good idea. It would not bind the local authority to a particular decision in a particular case, bearing in mind the variations in the circumstances. That seems the sensible approach, and in the end to leave the decision to the sheriff.
Lord Hughes: I do not see where the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, gets his reference to the sheriff. Unless I have missed it, I do not think that there is any appeal against the apportionment. The sheriff would not come into the matter.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The appeal provision is in relation to the notice which is served under subsection (1); that is, the appeal provision in subsection (9). Subsection (3) states that the notice shall,
"without prejudice to the generality…specify".
the scheme, among other things. The basis of the apportionment is a matter on which the frontager may appeal to the sheriff. That is one reason why, as I said, we thought that possibly the Secretary of State was the best person to whom to appeal, but in the circumstances your Lordships felt differently.
The best that we can do is to emphasise equity. It is a scheme which is to be "equitable" in the circumstances. Certainly the Secretary of State will consider what is being said, but I would hope that among themselves local authorities would be able to Arrange generally what they thought was an equitable way of doing this. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Huges, says that in his experience one method is pretty common as it is.
Lord Hughes: Yes, I agree. Whatever method is adopted will be equitable in the area in which it applies. But what I was concerned about was that if different methods were adopted, some people would say, "This isn't equitable. They have done it the wrong way. I am paying an awful lot more than I should have done, because in the adjoining region they have done it another way and on that basis I would have been paying X pounds rather than what I am paying". So I think that there is a point to consider here.
I rather like the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. Perhaps the convention can discuss the matter and agree what is to be the preferred method, but with an alternative method in exceptional circumstances. I think that that is the most that can be expected. If that were done, and if every attempt were made to achieve the greatest degree of uniformity, it would certainly diminish any grievance which an individual might have that he had not been dealt with under the other method. If when the Bill becomes law the Scottish Office ensures that this is one of the matters to be discussed with the convention, that will certainly meet my point.
Clause 13, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 14 and 15 agreed to.
Clause 16 [Security for private road works relating to housing]:
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Hayter): I am instructed that if Amendment No. 56 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 57
9.10 p.m.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 56:
Page 16, line 11, leave out from ("obtained") to end of clause.
The noble Lord said: This amendment is meaningless unless we take with it Amendment No. 57:
Page 16, line 12, leave out paragraph (b).
The purpose here is to elicit from the Government as much information as is possible on the question of what has become popularly known as the road bond that will be required before builders commence a new development. The Scottish Housebuilders' Association is particularly concerned about this matter, and at another level the population in general is concerned because it increases the cost of the house to the ordinary buyer. Nowadays in many cases this applies in particular to the first-time buyer, who in the initial stages is looking for as low a cost as possible. While the Scottish Housebuilders' Association wishes to have the cost reduced as a selling point, we wish to have it reduced principally because it is an unnecessary additional cost to the purchaser in which he should not need to become involved owing to any mistakes which we might have made in this House or in another place.
So we are concerned to ensure that the cost of providing the bond is kept to the absolute minimum. The belief is that this could be achieved by ensuring that the bond is not required prematurely, and, further, that it is released at the earliest opportunity once the roads have been satisfactorily completed. In this connection there is concern that in certain cases local authorities might use delaying tactics, though I do not think that my own local authority or that of my noble friend Lord Hughes could be accused of that. Therefore, Clause 16(4), which enables the local authority, the builder, or anyone involved in a dispute, to refer the matter to an arbiter is of vital importance.
It is important that we straighten out such questions as the date from which a bond should be required. I believe that in Scottish law at any rate no purchaser is at risk until a missive has been signed and work on the dwelling house has commenced, or perhaps in many cases work has actually been completed. Clause 16(2) states that the erection or alteration shall not commence until a bond has been obtained. It is not clear that that concerns only work on the dwelling house itself, and it may be interpreted that the bond is required even before the road work commences.
I am slightly nervous about the whole question, since I recall that when I was much younger, when many private housing estates were built between the wars, the roads were not made up until many years afterwards. There were one or two cases in which occupiers were left to fill in the roads, and there were appalling conditions. Bottoming was impossible, and tons of stuff were thrown in so as to form a surface.
I understand that a working party involving the department and the builders is active in this matter. That is good. The date of the bond is important. It is necessary that there should not merely be an assurance but some sort of statutory assurance that the bond will be surrendered to the builder and therefore, at second-hand, to the owner. We hope that the savings will be passed on to the new mortgagor as quickly as possible.
This is largely a probing amendment. I recognise that there is a long way to go. The best course, following what the Lord Advocate has to say, may be to discuss the matter again on Report. I would, however, be pleased to know whether the Lord Advocate can give some idea of how he proposes to tackle what is an extremely difficult and thorny problem.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, has explained that the purpose of the amendment is not really to delete this part of the Bill but to inquire into our more detailed thinking about it. As the noble Lord said, a power of this kind is extremely important in order to prevent the kind of serious difficulty to which he referred where people have purchased houses and are possibly living in the houses but the roads are never made up, even when there is an obligation in the missive to make them up, because the developer has gone bankrupt or something else of that nature has happened. That is a serious risk. These provisions are intended to provide for regulations whereby the risk may be obviated.
The details of the regulations, as the noble Lord said, are being considered by the Scottish Office in discussion with house builders, COSLA, building societies and others. The work on the detailed regulations will continue. I can assure the noble Lord that the Secretary of State wishes to make regulations that secure that the kind of difficulty to which he has referred does not arise, making the minimum of interference with what otherwise would go on; in other words, he will do his best to secure that the regulations are as free as possible from any unnecessary burden on the developers or the house buyers. The idea is to secure for the house buyers what they need in the way of road construction—that and nothing more. The points that the noble Lord has made will be taken fully into account in framing the detailed regulations.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I am grateful to the Lord Advocate for his explanation, knowing that he will do what he can to try to meet the points that I have raised. They were raised with me by local authorities and by the building industry in Scotland. On the promise that he will look at the matter, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 57 not moved.]
On Question, Whether Clause 16 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Hughes: Subsection (3)(b) deals with the consequences of committing an offence and states,
"is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum and on conviction on indictment to a fine".
I think that I am right in assuming that where the subsection mentions a fine, it is without a limit being fixed. However, in Clause 21, dealing with offences in relation to the construction of new roads, the terms used are a person who,
"commits an offence, which shall be triable either summarily or on indictment".
So far as I can see, this would accomplish the same end as the language used in Clause 16—up to the statutory maximum or, on indictment, to an unlimited

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fine. Why, in these two clauses, are the references to the penalties attaching to the committing of an offence, described in these different ways? Would it not be desirable that either one or the other should stand in both cases?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I think the situation is that the provision to which the noble Lord has referred in Clause 16 is one that does define the penalty. The provision in Clause 21 does not fully define the penalty. It only makes available the two modes of trial, either summarily or on indictment. Then, the situation is provided for in Schedule 7, under the head, "Penalties for Offences", that, on summary conviction, it will be the statutory maximum, and upon conviction on indictment, a fine. So the extra words that he is looking for so far as Clause 21 is concerned are provided by Schedule 7. There might be something to be said for doing the same so far as the clause which we have just been looking at is concerned, and I shall certainly be happy to consider that.
Lord Hughes: From the way in which the noble and learned Lord has explained what would happen under Clause 21 we are brought back to the wording where the maximum would be the maximum statutory penalty and on indictment an unlimited fine. I think that there is merit in using them both. Incidentally, is there such a word as "triable"?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I am certainly under the strong impression that there is such a word, and your Lordships House has certainly passed a considerable amount of legislation in which that word has been used. If it did not exist before, it certainly exists by now.
Clause 16 agreed to.
Clause 17 [Power of local roads authority to take over footpaths associated with development]:
[Amendment No. 58 not moved.]
Clause 17 agreed to.
Clause 18 [Construction of new roads by Secretary of State as roads authority]:
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 59:
Page 18, line 12, leave out subsection (3).
The noble Lord said: I think the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has already dealt fully with the special roads, and, therefore, I shall not move this amendment.
[Amendment No. 59 not moved.]
Clause 18 agreed to.
Clause 19 [Construction of new roads by local roads authority]:
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 60:
Page 18, line 16, leave out ("requisite") and insert ("necessary").
The noble Lord said: This is one of those amendments to which we are becoming accustomed. It is to leave out "requisite" and insert "necessary". It seems that "requisite" is unnecessary in the context of the Bill, and unless there is some very obscure legal requirement I cannot see the reason for using a word that is slightly less common, in the circles in which I move, than the word "necessary". I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The word "requisite" is the word that has been chosen. I think it is a common word. It may not be quite so common in the circles in which the noble Lord moves as the word "necessary", but it is a perfectly common word, and is well understood. The fact is—and this is the second reason—it is the word which has been used in the corresponding section of the Roads and Bridges (Scotland) Act since 1878. I could well see that if the noble Lord was drafting the Bill he might have chosen "necessary" and I would not feel able to press for "requisite" as an alternative. But having chosen "requisite", perhaps the noble Lord will allow us to retain it.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees: The next amendment is No. 61. I have to point out that, as printed in the Marshalled List, in the penultimate line, after the words "the local roads", the word "authority" should be added.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 61:
Leave out Clause 19 and insert the following new clause:
Construction of new roads other than special roads by local roads authority; and entry of such new roads and of special roads in list of public roads.
("19.—

(1) Without prejudice to section 7(3) and (5)(a) of this Act, a local roads authority may construct in their area any new road, other than a special road, which they consider requisite.

(2) When such construction by them as is mentioned in subsection (1) above or in the said section 7(5)(a) is completed, the local roads authority shall enter the road (or as the case may be special road) in their list of public roads.

")
The noble and learned Lord said: I am obliged to the Lord Chairman for pointing that out.
This is a rewrite of the existing Clause 19 to make it clear that, in the same way as special roads are excluded from the Secretary of State's powers to construct roads under Clause 18, so it is necessary to exclude special roads from local roads authorities' powers to construct roads under Clause 19. So this corresponds to the one to which we looked a minute or two ago. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 20 [Requirement of consent for new roads built other than by roads authority]:
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 62:
Page 18, line 28, leave out from ("the") to ("in") in line 29 and Insert ("frontagers")
The noble Lord said: This amendment was covered

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by points we have discussed and which the Lord Advocate and I shall be considering. I do not wish to move the amendment at this stage.
[Amendment No. 62 not moved.]
9.26 p.m.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 63:
Page 19, line 5, leave out from ("heard") to end of line 6.
The noble Lord said: Whenever I see this phrase "by them as regards his application" I always think of a famous series in Private Eye. It seems quite superfluous when we are really considering that "the authority shall allow the person applying for the consent an opportunity to be heard". I am sure he would be ruled out if he tried to speak about anything else other than the subject for which he had asked to be heard, which is about his application. It is a small point, but one of the little points that make the law more wordy and terrifying for people like me who have occasionally to read it. I hope that the Lord Advocate will make what is a minor but a helpful concession. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: We are anxious naturally to reduce the volume of the legislation consistent with clarity. But it is important that the right to be heard is a right to be heard by the roads authority and nobody else—not a deputation or an official of the roads authority. It is a right to be heard by the roads authority, and I regard that as important. The fact that the Bill says, "as regards his application" is possibly wise having regard to how far in advance the phrase is used.
If the noble Lord feels able to accept that, I should be happy. Obviously how far one has to go to obtain precision is a matter of judgment. I have discussed this amendment with the draftsman because I had sympathy with the noble Lord's desire to shorten the subsection. I thought possibly the words "as regards his application" might be deleted. Having considered it carefully with the draftsman, I think it is better to have the phrase in. But the words, "by them" are important, so I hope in the light of this explanation that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I thank the Lord Advocate for that explanation. I agree that the amendment would have been better had it been only to delete "as regards his application". "By them" is rather important. I still feel that "as regards his application" is superfluous and almost lumber. It is not a point that is worth taking any further. With the hope that the Lord Advocate will feel able to do a little tidying up and to make a few concessions by the next stage of the Bill, I would beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 64:
Page 19, line 21, after second ("the") insert ("local").
The noble and learned Lord said: This is a drafting amendment to make it clear that it is a local roads authority, because construction consent applications are made only to local roads authorities, and for accuracy it is better that we should put this in. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 20, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 21 agreed to.
Clause 22 [Power to stop up or temporarily close new road where construction consent absent or not conformed with]:
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 65:
Page 19, line 39, after ("person") insert ("(other than a roads authority)").
The noble Lord said: This amendment is necessary to make it clear that the local roads authority's powers in Clause 22 cannot be exercised in relation to a road built by the Secretary of State who, as a roads authority himself, does not require construction consent. It makes Clause 22 consistent with Clause 20. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 22, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 23 [Alterations of levels of public roads]:
9.31 p.m.
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 66:
Page 20, line 13, leave out ("raise or lower or otherwise").
The noble Lord said: The heading before Clause 23 concerns "levels". The clause says:
"Subject to any order under section 9 or 12 of this Act, the roads authority may raise or lower or otherwise alter, as they think fit, the level of a public road".
My amendment seeks to leave out everything after the word "alter". I think that covers everything. I cannot think of much that can be done to alter the level of a road other than by raising it or lowering it, although it was pointed out at an earlier stage that the alteration might include doing both. It may be raised at one point and lowered at another. That happens often, if one takes the opportunity to eliminate unnecessary rises in a road, it may be accomplished by filling up the adjoining bit as well. However, that would be altering the road. This is part of the campaign upon which we are unashamedly embarking. We shall continue to try to cut out unnecessary language. The next stage is to put it into readable English, but that is too big a hurdle to attempt at this time. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The purpose of the phrase which is attacked in the amendment is to make it clear that the clause includes powers to change the banking or camber of a road as well as raising or lowering the full level of the road as a whole. This is based on a modern provision, the Roads (Scotland) Act 1970. The danger is that if one misses this out at this stage comparison might be made with the previous fairly modern legislation and it might be thought that the intention was somewhat to restrict the power of the road authority.
Altering the camber of a road may be of critical, importance in some situations. If there was any doubt about the power of the authority to alter the camber or banking of a road that would be rather unsatisfactory. This is the sort of thing that is contemplated and I hope that the noble Lord will feel that his campaign may be well directed otherwise, but perhaps in this situation he may feel able to allow the words to stand.
Viscount Hanworth: Time and again—I think it was on another occasion about this time of night—we come to a conclusion that there was possibly something in a Bill which was unnecessary. But in the main we criticise Bills because they are not clear. We cannot have it both ways. If there is a certain redundancy and it might make it a little clearer we should leave the Bill alone. With the number of amendments we have to deal with, I do not think it is very profitable to raise this sort of amendment.
Lord Drumalbyn: I am sure that the Lord Advocate is absolutely right in leaving room to alter the camber
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of a road, but I wonder whether he has thought just how far the words,
"otherwise alter, as they think fit"
could go. We have had legislation about bumps in the road and things of that sort. I wonder whether we have got it quite right and have not made it possible for a local authority which has some unusual ideas to exploit them to the public detriment—not intentionally, of course.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: This legislation has been in place for some time. These words, as I have said, were in the Roads (Scotland) Act 1970 and no such difficult consequences have arisen. It seems to me a reasonable provision and local authorities are given powers to use reasonably. The courts certainly would be prepared to curb unreasonable use of statutory powers.
Lord Hughes: When the noble and learned Lord was making his first reply, he gave as an example altering the camber of the road. I must stress the word "altering". If you alter the camber of a road, will that be included in a definition "altering the road"? Surely, no one could possibly say that altering the camber of a road was not altering the road. If in this Bill the banking is part of the road—because, if it is not, this would not apply even within the meaning of the word "otherwise"—then, if they change the banking, they are also altering the road.
I agree with the noble Lord who spoke from the Alliance Benches that if there is any doubt about the matter it is better to use more words to make it perfectly clear. That is a doctrine to which I would subscribe. But I do not subscribe to the doctrine that you put more words in where there is no necessity for elaboration. I fall back on what Ministers say so often, "The more you specify, the more you destroy the generality". I think that the word "alter" covers everything. If you raise the level of a road, you alter a road. If you lower the level of a road, you are altering it. If you both raise and lower it at different parts, you alter it. If you change the camber of a road, you are altering it. If you change the banking, if the banking is part of the road, you are altering the road. I ask the noble and learned Lord to give some more thought to this matter.
We have had sometimes some funny decisions from sheriffs who are no longer on the shrieval Bench, and I am not criticising any of the present occupants. But I doubt whether even the ones who have made the most peculiar decisions could argue that altering the camber of the road was not covered by legislation which allowed the local authority to alter the road. I am content to leave it that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate will have another look at this aspect, provided that he lets me know whether he is going to do anything about it in time for the next stage of the Bill. This is not the first place where this sort of thing arises. If we cannot find a simpler way of dealing with the matter then I should be anxious to test the feeling of the Committee, but it would be ridiculous to do so tonight. If it is possible to reach agreement on the matter, so much the better.
The Earl of Selkirk: I am a little disturbed by what my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate has said. This is a Bill which is said to,
"codify in modern terms provisions on the road".
That is to be found in the Explanatory Memorandum. If we are going to be tied by the words of former statutes then the words that I have just quoted will mean nothing. My noble and learned friend has said that because these words have appeared in previous statutes it is therefore out of place to alter them. I know that it is a late hour, and of course we can all go to bed and we all want to go to bed; I quite appreciate that. But I think it is a little bit hard to say that better words cannot be used because they differ from the words of previous statutes. That applies all through the Bill. We are trying to make the Bill a little better. I think that we should have a little more consideration from my noble and learned friend.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I am sorry that my noble friend feels he is not getting full consideration. I am giving the fullest consideration to every suggestion. The mere fact that something was in a previous Act does not in any way tie our hands, but where the choice between two sets of words is a very narrow one then I feel that the fact that it was in previous legislation is of some importance. It was in that light that I used that expression. This particular expression is used in what I said was a modern statute, the Roads (Scotland) Act 1970. The more modern the statute, the less necessary it is to change for the sake of modernisation; but we are engaged in the exercise of trying to simplify the whole of our roads legislation. It is quite a big task but I am not ruling out anything. I think I have made it clear that I will consider all matters that have been raised, and this is no exception.
Lord Drumalbyn: I could not help thinking, when the noble Lord opposite was arguing this case and kept leaving out the words "altering the level of the public road", that that is not the same as "altering the road". Altering the road would go very much further than that. But in spite of what I said earlier, I would strongly support what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has said.
Lord Hughes: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 67 not moved.]
Clause 23 agreed to.
Clause 24 [Provision of footways]:
9.42 p.m.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 68:
Page 20, line 18, after ("sufficient") insert ("footpaths or").
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this amendment is to make it more explicit that a roads authority shall provide,
"wherever it appears to them necessary or desirable for the safety or convenience of pedestrians so to do, proper and sufficient footpaths or footways for public roads.".
I am reinforced in moving this amendment by the fact that the Government Amendment No. 70 specifically
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mentions footway, footpath, cycle track and carriageway individually. So obviously, in the Government's interpretation of the terms of the Bill, a footpath and a footway are two different things. Therefore I hope that this is one amendment which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate will be happy to accept as being a clarification of something that he has down later in Amendment No. 70. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: This clause has its origins in the 1930 Road Traffic Act and is primarily aimed at pedestrian safety. A footway, as defined in Clause 143, is that element of a road which is associated with a carriageway and whose provision enables pedestrians to keep out of the way of traffic. Footpaths are places for pedestrians which are not associated with carriageways. While it is not appropriate to extend the duties of road authorities under this clause to footpaths, these authorities will still be able to construct footpaths where they consider them to be requisite under their powers in Clause 19 of the Bill. I would have thought, with great respect, that to insert "footpaths" here is inappropriate. "Footways" are the correct provision for pedestrians, in association with the public road.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I understand the drift of what the noble and learned Lord has said. I wonder whether there is another part of the Bill—I think possibly there is—where they talk about cycle paths and cycle tracks, where there is a space between the road and the cycle track, and then presumably there would be another space between the cycle track and the footpath—or would it be a footway? And where would the difference be? I cannot see that a great deal would be lost by including "footpaths" as well as "footways". I am not very sure whether in Scottish nomenclature we normally say "footway" rather than "footpath". It is more normally "pavement", of course. I should have thought that the juxtaposition was wrong here; but we are splitting hairs.
I know that the Lord Advocate means a road over, perhaps, part of the meadows in Edinburgh, through Kelvingrove Park. A local authority would have power to provide that, yet it would not be a footway; it would be a footpath. It is not a big point, but the noble and learned Lord specifically spells it out in Amendment No. 70, and I understand his reasoning. It is not something about which we would willingly wish to go to the wall, but I hope that the noble and learned Lord will at least give it consideration before Report stage and see whether there is any possibility of accommodating this amendment.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Before the noble Lord says what he is going to do about this amendment, may I say that the important point is that we are talking about public roads, and a footpath, by definition—and we have tried to define these for consistency—is a place for pedestrians. It is, as it were, by itself, and is not associated with anything else. It is not appropriate to put it in here because it is not for a public road. In the case of a footpath, the footpath is the public road.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I take the noble and learned Lord's point, and I will withdraw the amendment, but I will certainly give it some thought before the next stage of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 24 agreed to.
Clauses 25 and 26 agreed to.
Clause 27 [Fences etc. to safeguard persons using public roads]:
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 69:
[Printed earlier: col. 652.]
The noble and learned Lord said: I spoke to this amendment and to No. 70 earlier. Amendment No. 69 is designed to make it easier to provide cycle tracks by making provision for either fences or barriers, and Amendment No. 70 provides for divisions between the various matters that are there specified. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 70:
[Printed earlier: col. 652.]
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 27, as amended. agreed to.
Clause 28 agreed to.
Clause 29 [Works for protecting roads against hazards of nature]:
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 71:
Page 21, line 32, at end insert ("in the road or in land adjoining or lying near to the road")
The noble Lord said: This, again, is an amendment which seeks to find out whether a local authority has power to go out with the contours of the road to build barriers or other works which are necessary to keep out snow or other obstructions. I do not know whether it is implicit in the Bill, but I think it is something which should be made explicit, because in certain areas a little part of the adjoining land lying near the road may be needed in order to protect the road itself. I should be pleased if we could have clarification on this point. Even if the amendment is acceptable, I am sure that the wording is not the best, but I hope that the Lord Advocate will take the amendment in the spirit in which it is proffered. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: We are absolutely at one about what is wanted here. The only question is whether there should be some restriction on the distance from the road that one should go. What we have provided is that the roads authority should be allowed to go as far as may be necessary from the road to provide the necessary protection. For example, to provide effective protection from flooding or landslide, works may have to be carried out at a considerable
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distance from the road. It would be imprudent to restrict it to land adjoining or near to the road. We have tried, therefore, to make it as free as possible. I would point out in particular that Clause 106(3) excepts protective works from the distance limits applied by Schedule 5 to the Bill. We have sought to achieve exactly what the noble Lord is putting forward in this amendment without restricting it to being near the road. The local authority will be able to go as far from the road as is necessary to provide the necessary protective works.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: After that explanation, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 29 agreed to.
Clause 30 [Drainage of roads]:
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 72:
Page 22, line 8, leave out subsection (2).
The noble Lord said: Again this is a subsection which appears to me to be unnecessary. It reads:
"Without prejudice to subsection (1)(c) above, where any drain referred to therein was constructed or laid by the roads authority, they shall scour, cleanse and keep it open".
My reading of the subsection is that this is implicit in the wording of subsection (1). Therefore, subsection (2) is superfluous. I hope that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate will agree with me that subsection (2) is not required. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The earlier words are permissive, enabling a local authority to provide these various facilities. It is very important that the roads authority should have a duty to cleanse and keep open any road drains which are provided by them. The noble Lord's amendment would remove that duty. We regard that duty as important. Therefore, we feel that the provision should remain. This is the distinction between "permissive" and "mandatory" to which the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has already referred. We are trying to make the position absolutely plain. We regard it as important to have both aspects in the clause.
Lord Drumalbyn: They have no duty unless they themselves have constructed or laid the roads.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: That is so, under this clause.
Lord Drumalbyn: There is another reference under which they would have a duty, even though they had not laid or constructed the road.
Lord Makay of Clashfern: The situation is that the drains are to be provided by them as part of the road. Obviously they have the right to provide the road with its drainage up to the proper standard. The purpose of this clause is to impose upon the roads authority the duty to cleanse all the road drains that they have provided for the purpose of draining the roads.
Lord Hughes: If that is the case, and I accept the explanation which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has given, what is the meaning at the beginning of subsection (2) of the words:
"Without prejudice to subsection (1)(c) above …"?
If subsection (1)(c) is only a permissive power to scour, cleanse and keep open all drains in the road or in such land as aforesaid and if it is followed by a mandatory requirement that they should do so, it does a lot more than prejudice something. It knocks it out of the window.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: With great respect, it does not in any way knock out our power to scour all sorts of drains; we then have a duty to scour our own drains. There is no conflict between the two.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 73:
Page 22, line 20, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
("(a) if the roads authority is the Secretary of State he shall not carry out the proposed works without having considered the objection;").
The noble Lord said: The existing wording in the Bill is,
"(a) if the objection is to works proposed to be carried out by the Secretary of State, he shall consider the objection before carrying them out".
One could say that on a strict reading of that language, the Secretary of State receives the objection, considers it, but just goes ahead as he originally intended. I will now refer the Committee to Clause 75(4)(a) on page 48, which states,
"(a) if the roads authority is the Secretary of State, he shall not carry out the proposed works without having considered the objection".
That second form of words implies that the Secretary of State may not carry out the works he originally intended because he shall not do so without having considered any objection. My amendment proposes that instead of the words on page 22 of the Bill, we use those on page 48.
That second form of wording makes it quite clear that the Secretary of State should give due consideration to any objection and that he will not just carry on as if nothing had happened. In view of the way the words are used elsewhere, I am sure it is not intended that the Secretary of State should only pay lip service to consultations. I feel that the Government's second form of words is a better way of dealing with the matter. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I accept that there is a point here. The words proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, may not exactly fit this context either; but if he will leave this matter with me, we shall bring back an amendment at Report stage to cover this.
Lord Hughes: I am quite content with that and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 30 agreed to.
Clause 31 agreed to.
Clause 32 [Snow gates):
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No.74:
Page 23, line 11, leave out ("a precipitation or accumulation of").
The noble Lord said: This amendment questions whether it is necessary to include in the Bill the words:
"a precipitation or accumulation of".
We are all trying to cut out unnecessary verbiage in Bills and I hope that the noble and learned Lord will agree that the words,
"temporarily closing a road to vehicular traffic on any occasion when snow has rendered that road unsafe for such traffic"—
and this is very topical just now—are really sufficient without having to worry about,
"a precipitation or accumulation of snow".
Unless there is some great mystery, I hope that I can get the noble and learned Lord to accept the omission of those words.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: There is a point here of some importance. It is desirable that the authority with the power to close these gates should have the power to do so not in relation only to a danger which has already been created but which that authority anticipates may arise in the immediate future. The clause as drafted is not very satisfactory and I am obliged to the noble Lord for moving this amendment as it has drawn my attention particulary to the drafting of the clause.
We should wish to reconsider this clause in the light of the amendment, but I should certainly want to try ultimately to produce a clause that has those two elements in it. Therefore, I am not absolutely happy with the rather simpler form of wording which the noble Lord proposes because I believe it is quite important that both aspects of the matter are considered when a decision to close is taken. One can appreciate that the decision to close a public road is quite an important one and we must be certain that all the considerations are properly set out. In the light of that, perhaps the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment and give me a chance to consider it in the future.
Lord Hughes: The noble and learned Lord has been very fair and I shall certainly look with great care at the words he puts down in place of those which appear in Clause 32(1). I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 32 agreed to.
Clause 33 [Clearance of snow and ice]:
10 p.m.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 75:
Page 23, line 24, after ("pedestrains") insert ("over footways and in pedestrian ways")
The noble Lord said: I have been asked about this aspect by a surprising number of people, and there have been notes in the press and letters to the newspapers recently. I am asking for information; I am sure the wording of the amendment would not be exactly what the Lord Advocate would accept, but even he would agree with the sentiment of it. What I am concerned about and the people who have approached me have been concerned about is what are the duties on the owners or tenants who are fronting the road as regards the footways or pedestrian ways in front of their premises during periods of heavy snow?
I am informed that there were many old byelaws or perhaps Burgh Police Acts which made it a duty to clear snow away from the front of shops and residences. This seems to have been neglected and is certainly very seldom done now, unless they are very energetic people who occupy the premises. This amendment is an effort to get clarification on what is a very topical subject: what obligations there are on owners or occupants of premises adjoining a road to clear the snow. I should be very pleased if the Lord Advocate could help me. Perhaps he could get the information and pass it to me at a later stage. I beg to move.
Lord Stodart of Leaston: I wonder whether I may put a point to my noble and learned friend. I apologise for my voice; it has an affliction not uncommon at this time of the year. I think the point I wish to raise does deal with the amendment which has been moved. The clause, as I undestand it, deals with preventing snow from endangering pedestrians and vehicles on public roads. Because of the definition of a footway—which I prefer to describe as a pavement—this covers the endangering of pedestrians on the pavement. In the committee which I chaired some two or three years ago we reported that a good deal of confusion had been expressed to us about the responsibility of keeping up public footpaths, as opposed to footways. To my mind, a footpath is probably what the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, is describing as a pedestrian way, which does not, I have ascertained, feature in the interpretation clause; a footpath does but a pedestrian way does not.
My noble friend the Lord Advocate can probably well imagine a case in which there is a housing scheme or a housing development—it may be private or it may be public—through which there is a public road. If it had been a private road it might have been taken over by the road authority. But because the road happens to take a slightly circuitous route there may well be what I would describe as a short cut in the form of a footpath from the housing scheme or development leading to the main shopping centre which is used by pedestrians. That is, of course, a footpath.
So far as I have understood Clause 17,this is dealt with, to a certain extent, with the taking over of a public footpath by the roads authority, if it wants to. I put to my noble and learned friend that it would not be unreasonable, and would perhaps avoid confusion, if it were made clear in this clause, as we certainly thought it should be, that the kind of footpath I have described should be included in the responsibility of the roads authority so far as the clearing of snow and the endangering of pedestrians on it is concerned.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: This clause as it stands provides that:
"A roads authority shall take such steps as they consider reasonable to prevent snow and ice endangering the safe passage of pedestrians over public roads".
Public roads includes everything that is under the responsibility of the roads authority to maintain, whether it be a footpath or a footway which is part of a public road, or otherwise.
The noble Lord's amendment would insert after "pedestrians" the phrase:
"over footways and in pedestrian ways".
That would be a little unfortunate because it would mean that in the road clearing responsibilities the authority would have to take no thought of the safety of pedestrians crossing the carriageway. In other words, this amendment is limiting the responsibility which the clause puts on the roads authority. Therefore, the clause is better as it is without the amendment.
As regards the observations of my noble friend Lord Stodart of Leaston, I think that the important matter is whether or not the footpath to which he refers is a footpath over which there is a public right of way. One may have a trodden path which people choose to tread down because it is a short cut, but unless it is a public right of way there will not be a responsibility to keep it clear. If people care to use a short cut when a provided road is a series of hairpin bends down a slope, minimising a slope that one has to negotiate, the person taking the short cut does so at his own risk. It would be very difficult to impose upon the roads authority an obligation to deal with anything that is not a public right of way. So long as it is a public right of way and a public road in the sense of this Bill, it will be covered.
The noble Lord did not so much speak to his amendment as ask me a question. My understanding of the position is that in the cities—I think in Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Greenock—local enactments provide that the frontagers have a responsibility for snow clearing. When this Bill comes into force, as I hope it will, those provisions will be superseded and it will be the roads authority which will have the obligation to do the snow clearing. Of course, it will be open to frontagers to do what they wish in the way of helping to clear away snow but it will be the roads authority that will have the obligation.
Lord Stodart of Leaston: I wish to ask my noble and learned friend for clarification. The heading of Clause 17 is:
"Power of local roads authority to take over footpaths associated with development".
Suppose that a roads authority comes to an agreement, takes over the footpath and therefore agrees to maintain it, will such a footpath be cleared of snow, even if it is not a right of way?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: As I understand my noble friend's example, that sort of footpath will come within the obligation but it will also in the light of the example have a public right of way over it. When I say

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that the footpath will be cleared of snow, I should perhaps be careful to say that the authority has to,
"take such steps as they consider reasonable to prevent snow and ice endangering"
those who pass over it. That might not require complete clearance. It depends on the circumstances. The authority might not be able completely to clear the snow and ice. It may have to take other steps, such as gritting, and so on. As I understand it, such a piece of footpath would be covered by the obligation.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate for that explanation. I understand the points that he is making and accept most of them. The Bill is largely non-political, but one of the few political points that the Bill brings up is this. If local authorities are now to be responsible, even in the cities that the noble and learned Lord mentioned—Aberdeen, Glasgow, Greenock and Dundee—for clearing snow from in front of commercial premises (which has previously been done by owners or occupiers), it will involve the authorities in considerable additional expense at particular times of the year. But that is a political point which can be taken up at a later date. In the meantime, I am happy with the explanation given by the Lord Advocate and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Earl of Selkirk: Clause 33 is an entirely new provision. I think it is a very' good clause. But when the precipitation is snow the clearing up falls to the region, whereas when the snow turns to dirt it falls to the district. Can the Lord Advocate give us some picture of how he distinguishes between the two? Two authorities are responsible for cleaning up the roads. Snow when it turns to dirt can also endanger people. It is not easy to see the distinction. Do the Government have a clear distinction in mind between the two duties, which are very similar?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: In so far as snow and ice constitute dirt—which I suppose is matter out of place or something of that kind—the district has a duty to take proper steps to remove it. That is a duty which obviously cannot be performed at the same rate in every situation. It might take a long time fully to remove all the dirt. The cleansing function is on the district, or islands, authority, but where there is snow and ice in question—and, as I say, there may be an overlap here—the obligation to take reasonable steps to prevent them from constituting a danger is on the roads authority. That is in accordance with the recommendations of the committee presided over by my noble friend Lord Stodart of Leaston. As I said earlier, that does not necessarily mean that the snow and ice will be removed. It may add to the dirt by putting on grit, and so on. I should not like to attempt to analyse the point at which the obligation passes from one authority to the other. Both obligations can exist together. That is the position that we have adopted.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 33 agreed to.
10.15 p.m.
The Earl of Selkirk The Earl of Selkirk moved Amendment No. 76:
After Clause 33, insert the follwing new clause:
("Provision of signposts. Signposting
.—

(1) A roads authority shall take such steps as they consider reasonable to ensure that all roads and footpaths for which they are responsible are adequately signposted in order to facilitate the pasasge of motor vehicles and pedestrians.

(2) District authorities shall encourage all identifiable communities to display signs showing the name of their community for the benefit of pedestrians and motorists using the footpaths and the roads.").

The noble Earl said: This is a Bill to deal comprehensively with the management of roads, yet there is nothing at all in it dealing with signposting, which is an integral part of the management of roads and without which roads could not properly be used. To my mind this is a very important element. If there are no road signs, there is great additional traffic congestion. The point becomes still more important when we increase the number of one-way traffic schemes, bypasses and M-roads, since if one gets on to the wrong road one might have to go a long way round to get back on to the right one. Further, signposting is extremely helpful to tourists in this country who want to find their way from one place to another.
It seems to me very strange that while the Bill is said to codify and modernise the whole of road management, hose who are responsible for and charged with looking after roads are told nothing whatever about signposting. I do not suppose that the words of my new clause will be particularly appreciated by the draftsman, who has very much had his own idiosyncratic way of writing the Bill, but I think we should not go through our consideration of the measure without emphasising the extreme importance of proper signposting. I agree that signposting has been greatly improved in recent years, but I believe that its importance cannot be over-estimated.
My amendment contains a second point which deals with the identification of small communities. In this regard signposting has improved in certain places, though not in all places, and the only people who can improve it are those who manage the roads.
Quite recently the British Tourist Authority made a statement on what it has in mind for the coming year. I should like to read to your Lordships' Committee part of a report on that statement because it emphasises very clearly the authority's intention. The report states:
"The British Tourist Authority, keen to promote the trend, is emphasising its Heritage '84 theme"—
by which it means areas outside the centres—
"to coax visitors beyond London, Oxford and Stratford-upon-Avon".
In other words, it wants people to go to the small communities in the country, outside the large centres. I think that that is right. Personally, I have always advised foreigners who visit this country not to stay in London. London has its greatness and its smallness, but it has a certain resemblance to all other capitals. If people want to see our heritage, they must go out into the country. Very often they go by car, and if they are to know where they are they must see well-marked

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signs showing the name of the small villages, which in many cases are unique. Signposting is of very great value in regard to the movement of traffic, and there should be incorporated in the Bill provisions relating to the signposting of centres and villages. I am quite sure that the noble and learned Lord will not like the words of my amendment, but I believe that this is an important matter and I would ask him to consider it very carefully. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I entirely agree with the noble Earl in relation to the importance of signposting. However, I earlier sought to explain that the Bill is concerned more with the construction of roads and the financial arrangements in regard to that, as well as the responsibilities of the road authorities regarding construction, maintenance and so on, than with management.
There is another area of road traffic regulation which is important, and that is the area of administration controlled by the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967. In 1981 there was made under that Act a series of regulations and general directions concerning traffic signs which prescribed the signs which may be used by road authorities. Under Section 84 of the 1967 Act, roads authorities have a duty to secure expeditious, convenient and safe movement of vehicular and other traffic, including foot passengers. In fulfilment of that obligation, they have powers under Section 55 of the Act to take such steps as they consider reasonable to ensure that roads for which they are responsible are appropriately signposted. I am therefore glad to assure my noble friend that the first part of the amendment is covered by the 1967 Act and the regulations made under it which is the appropriate place for dealing with road traffic signs.
As regards the second part of the amendment. I should explain—as indeed I think my noble friend pointed out—that it is appropriate that road signing should be exclusively a function of roads authorities, and we certainly think that it should remain so. It would be dangerous to allow anyone other than a roads authority to erect signs on roads and quite wrong for anyone else to be encouraged to do so. The traffic signs regulations to which I have referred prescribe signs for the naming of towns, villages, regional boundaries and even rivers and inland waterways. I am not aware of widespread complaints that such signs are not being provided. The report of the Committee chaired by my noble friend Lord Stodart in effect recommended, as my noble friend Lord Selkirk has also stated in explaining the amendment, that the provision of such signs should remain with the roads authorities.
Obviously, anyone who can obtain the necessary planning consent may be able to erect signs out with the confines of the road. The same applies to signs on those footpaths excluded from the meaning of "road" in Clause 143, covering cases like countryside paths. These would not he road signs, however, and it would be inappropriate to have in the Roads (Scotland) Bill a provision such as that proposed here relating to particular signs of that kind. The main answer that 1 give to my noble friend is that I share entirely his
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concern. I appreciate entirely the importance of the matters that he has raised. But, as he says, it is a matter primarily related to the traffic on the roads, and the Road Traffic Regulation Act is the correct place for that. We have not sought to bring into this Bill anything that is primarily related to road traffic. It is construction of the roads and related matters that are the province of this legislation.
Lord Hughes: I was much impressed by what the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, said. The noble Lord will probably agree that what the Minister has said about the other piece of legislation is helpful. But it is only helpful to the extent that the roads authorities take a reasonable view. The places where purpose signposting is most necessary are the roads that bypass existing communities. These communities have existed for centuries, but suddenly find, due to the policy of the roads department, that their very existence is imperilled. I recall, for instance, the row a year or two ago, when the village of Blackford—I then lived only a few miles away—was by-passed. Within a matter of months, the jobs in that community were almost destroyed.
A great deal of money had been spent on modernising and extending the hotel there. But people travelling along the by-pass had no indication that there was anything there at all. The attitude of the roads authority, when judged from the point of view of making the roads safe to travel along, was perfectly reasonable. It wanted the fewest possible signs so that drivers did not have their attention distracted. However, enabling people to move safely and as fast as safety will permit. is one function of roads. The primary function of roads is to take people to places. If signposting is cut down, tourists to Scotland in the summer can suddenly find that they are past the place where they can have a meal, obtain petrol or go sightseeing. I can well imagine that people had in mind a visit to Blackford but they were not aware that they were past any possibility of getting there. So the roads authorities should keep it in mind that, apart from providing a road for fast, safe moving traffic, there is also the purpose of it leading to communities. I have mentioned Blackford but I could just as easily have mentioned a dozen other places. Years ago Dunblane was complaining about what might have happened.
It should be kept in mind that these are communities which have existed not for decades but for centuries. I can imagine them not paying much attention to something which has just sprung up overnight. Indeed, perhaps there would be a justification for it being ignored. But too often the attitude of the roads department has been that what the road has brought, the road is entitled to take away. That was the argument put forward when people complained that the by-pass would cause them to lose money. The by-pass is desirable and most of the shopkeepers and traders have accepted that it is in the best interests of everybody to by-pass communities with narrow streets and which have vehicles perhaps parked on one side or the other of the street. That is not a safe place for fast traffic to be moving.
Nevertheless, there should be every possible encouragement, consistent with road safety, to let

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people know that they can go to these places. I suggest that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate should convey to his friends in the Scottish Office that a more liberal interpretation of signposting on main roads would be very desirable. If they do that there may not be any need for additional legislation. However, at present I doubt whether anybody in Scotland would agree that the signposting policy which is carried out is entirely satisfactory.
Lord Drumalbyn: There are certain respects in which I agree very much with what the noble Lord opposite said. However, there is one aspect which must always be kept prominently on people's minds when they are planning road signs, and that is prompt advance information so that people will not stop in the middle of the road and start looking for their destination. It is very difficult for people constructing roads and road signs and who know the district, and so on, to put themselves into the minds of people who do not know where they are but who are trying to get to their destination. I put some stress on that aspect. It is particularly important when one is driving on fairly poor roads—that is, poor in comparison with others. Road surfaces have improved greatly in recent times and that has meant that vehicles go faster.
What chance has a person looking for the way to reach his destination, when he is competing with a fairly narrow road with a good surface and inadequate road signs? That is one side of the matter. The other side is to try and anticipate the gaps in the motorist's knowledge. So often the person journeying finds marked only one of the places that he seeks. It is important to try to retain the tradition of showing a number of places all clearly marked on the sign and to try to get them all together so that people will not make mistakes and cause accidents through dithering, as we normally say, through failing to find their way and then getting fussed, and all the rest of it.
There is a science in this which I believe we have not mastered to an extent comparable with the sheer making of the roads. The roads are made for use by people, and it is the people and the places they want to get to which have to be borne in mind. I would add that particular aspect of the problem which I hope my noble and learned friend will consider.
The Earl of Selkirk: I must admit that my noble and learned friend gave me the answer that I expected, but I do not think it answers the point which the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, made with great force and clarity. The Ministry of Transport is responsible for safe driving, but they do not help me to get to Little Puddleton-on-Sea. They do nothing to help me in that way at all. It is nothing whatever to do with them on that side. This is a matter which concerns the convenience of the public and particularly the value to the tourist trade, which we must not underestimate. As the noble Lord said, with the variety of one-way traffic today, and with bypass roads, you can make mistakes which cause you to take hours longer to get anywhere, besides missing points of particular interest in certain villages which may be off the bypass roads.
I am not going to press this matter any further, but I should like to ask my noble and learned friend to look at this carefully. When you come to the naming
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of places it is the road authority's business; it is nothing whatever to do with the Ministry of Transport. They are looking at it through a different set of spectacles altogether. I do not want to press this matter, but I should like my noble and learned friend to look further at it.
I believe this is important, and that more could be done under the heading of management of roads. This is the responsibility of somebody who manages the roads: it is not the responsibility of the traffic code, or of the Ministry of Transport. I am only asking my noble and learned friend to look a little more closely at the points I have sought to raise. Unless he wishes to say something, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.32 p.m.
Clause 34 [Provision of lighting by roads authorities]:
[Amendment No. 77 not moved].
On Question, Whether Clause 34 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Hughes: On lighting,
"A local roads authority shall provide and maintain lighting for roads, or proposed roads, which are, or will be, maintainable by them and which in their opinion ought to be lit".
I do not think I have ever heard of anybody objecting to a local authority deciding to light a road, but what I have heard more than once are objections to a local authority refusing to light a road where people consider it is dangerous. In this clause, however, the matter is left entirely in the local authority's hands, and no matter how dissatisfied people may be there does not seem to be any chance of a second go at it.
Am I correct in thinking that there is no appeal procedure of any sort against a local authority's decision not to provide lighting? Say, for instance, all the residents in a street say that their street is dangerous for a variety of reasons—a child may have been knocked over, somebody may have been attacked in the dark, somebody may have been mugged, and so on—and yet the local authority, perhaps for what may seem to them sound reasons, say, "We have spent all the money we had available for lighting, and we do not have any to do that". There does not seem to be any way of overturning a refusal to provide lighting. Am I right, and is it the Government's intention that this is a case where it must be left entirely to the discretion of the local authority?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: There is no appeal provision or anything of that sort. It might be going too far to say there are no circumstances in which it might be possible to challenge a decision of a local authority in court; an entirely unreasonable decision exercised under statutory powers might be challengeable. That is not necessary to provide; it is already there under the general law. But it is thought that this is a matter which can reasonably be left to the wise judgment of the local authority.
Lord Hughes: In a way that is quite a satisfactory answer, not from the point of view of lighting the road, but to have this statement from the Lord Advocate that there are some cases where the Government are prepared to admit that a local authority can be a good judge in its own case. In recent years there has not been much evidence of the fact that the Government thought that the local authorities had that power to make a proper decision.
The Earl of Selkirk: At one time there was a connection between restricted speed and lighting. Is it still the law that if one does not have lighting one cannot have restricted speed? This adds a further point which should be borne in mind. Does my noble friend know the answer to that?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: My recollection is that the power to impose the 30 mph speed limit is related generally to lighting, but I do not think it is absolutely so. I would need to look into that more fully.
In relation to the last point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, the Government have always taken the view that there are many matters which are properly committed to the wise discretion of local authorities. Parliament has never given an absolutely free hand to local authorities to do exactly what they like. That may be the matter to which the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, is referring.
Lord Hughes: We shall not agree on this because it is a matter of Government policy—local authorities are free to do as much as they like, provided that they do not spend money on it.
Clause 34 agreed to.
Clause 35 [Construction of road humps by roads authority]:
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 78:
Page 24, line 10, leave out ("30") and insert ("20")
The noble Lord said: I am sure that the Lord Advocate realises that this is an amendment merely to allow me to ask a number of questions about road humps. I can clearly see that the amendment is, in many ways, out of place because there must be very few places—I can think of only two or three rather special cases in the City of Glasgow—where there is a 20 mph limit, far less a 30 mph limit.
My noble friends and I are concerned about the use of road humps, and, should road humps come, what speed limits should be authorised on roads that contain road humps? So far as I am aware, there are no statutory road humps in Scotland, although they have been operating south of the border for some time. The only road humps I am aware of are those in one or two colleges and hospitals and such places. As a motorist with some enthusiasm, I admit that seeing a road hump is about the only thing to make a motorist reduce his speed—the safety of his car is involved—and nothing done about signs will affect
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him as long as the road appears to permit a speed well within the capabilities of his car.
We are concerned to ask the Lord Advocate for more information about road humps. Will there be full consultation? I know that this is dealt with in the next clause, but I should like to know how full the consultation will be. How will the House be consulted? It is quite a big breakaway and I do not think that many of the motorists in Scotland really appreciate what is likely to be happening in the next few years. I wonder if the noble and learned Lord has any idea from the department of how urgent is the question of road humps and what speed limit there will be on roads with them. As mentioned in a later amendment, No. 69, will the signs need to be illuminated?
Generally speaking, we feel that this is such a big matter that the House should be given separate opportunity when the regulations are ultimately formulated to discuss them at some considerable length. I should like to have these assurances from the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Advocate. From a purely legalistic point of view, this amendment may appear a nonsense, but I think it provides the only opportunity we can get to ask the Government to make their intentions clear. I think I should emphasise that we agree with the necessity and success of road humps in England; but there will be a lot of questions from the motorists in Scotland that we shall have to answer when humps are introduced. I hope we can have the assurance of the noble and learned Lord that they will be thoroughly discussed, both here and outside, with the various organisations and with the public at large. I beg to move.
The Earl of Selkirk: I wonder if I might support what the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael, is saying, This is an entirely new innovation. I believe I am right in saying. I think that the manner in which it is introduced is extremely important and that what the innovation is exactly should be fully explained. Humps can be extremely dangerous. I personally would not drive over a hump at a speed of over ten miles an hour. They should never be on a road with traffic of more than 30 mph. It will mean that cars will have to slow down to a very low speed. It is extremely important that Parliament should have a very full opportunity of considering what is intended and the public should fully understand the nature of what is contained in Clause 37.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Your Lordships are aware that the Secretary of State would require to make regulations in relation to the authorisation of road humps and to their construction and maintenance. The regulations which are presently in place in England and Wales provide requirements as to lighting, location and spacing of the humps. They also require there to be on the road leading to the hump, and near to it, at least one obstacle such as a bend or junction which will have the effect of reducing traffic speeds. It would be the Secretary of State's intention that equally rigid regulations would be applied in Scotland and it is obvious that, in considering these regulations, he would want to take account of as full a view as he could have of what was appropriate.

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I also very much take the point of my noble friend Lord Selkirk about the need, if and when road humps are introduced, to explain the situation. I was also asked a question about the procedure for such regulations. The procedure is the negative resolution procedure which will apply to regulations made under this provision in terms of Clause 135.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: While I appreciate the answer given by the noble and learned Lord, I was disappointed when he said that it was the negative resolution procedure. This procedure, I believe, allows for no amendment. I reiterate the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk. This has been used in the South but it is absolutely new to Scotland; and anything associated with roads and motor cars is something that raises a great deal of public interest, as I am sure the noble and learned Lord is only too well aware. I hope that great delicacy and great wisdom—which is not always the case with any Government—are used before this innovation is brought before the Scottish people. I hope, for instance, that there will be opportunity for your Lordships to look at draft provisions before final regulations are brought in for a once-and-for-all yes or no in this Chamber.
I am personally enthusiastic about the necessity of road humps but I believe that we should all be giving ourselves a great deal of trouble unless we proceeded with care in the introduction of them. They are something which people are afraid of, to begin with at least, and therefore they have to be treated with great care. I should like people to have the opportunity to study the situation and write to their Member of Parliament, if necessary. I hope that both Houses will make it possible for a wider appreciation of the importance of road humps and of the reasons why they are being put in certain places. We should try to give them a good send-off and I hope that the Lord Advocate will take note of these things. I had a little experience in the other place when the legislation was introduced originally; and it is important to get the public on your side at the beginning, which is not always easy. I think that most people now appreciate the situation when road humps are used wisely and well, and they are accepted. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 35 agreed to.
Clause 36 agreed to.
Clause 37 [Regulations concerning construction and maintenance of road humps]:
[Amendment No. 79 not moved.]
Clause 37 agreed to.
Clauses 38 to 42 agreed to.
Clause 43 [Exercise of powers in respect of cattle-grids etc. by agreement between neighbouring authorities]:
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 80:
Page 29, line 9, leave out ("by the Court of Session; or")
The noble Lord said: This is a very simple point, as I suggested earlier, about the Secretary of State or the sheriff taking responsibility for certain things. It does seem almost pompous to ask the Court of Session to adjudicate or make appointments of this nature. I feel it is unnecessary, as the sheriff would be quite capable of making a decision or disposition on this matter. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The reason for inserting reference to the Court of Session is that these cattle-grids might come at the boundaries of estates, and the boundaries of estates sometimes come at the boundaries of sheriffdoms. To have the grid exactly on the boundary of a sheriffdom means that there is no particular sheriff court to apply to. It is to cover that possibility that the Court of Session is involved. There is no problem in going to a sheriff's court, which is where you would normally go if the sheriff is available. It is only in that event that one would think of going to the Court of Session, and in these circumstances it seems reasonable.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I can see the point which the Lord Advocate is making. It is an "either/or" situation. If it is on a boundary, it will go to the Court of Session, but if there is a sheriff available it will go to him to determine.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: We do not need to provide that, because that would he the practical way in which it would operate. Nobody would go to the Court of Session if he could go to the sheriff in the ordinary circumstances. That is the practical way in which it would happen.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 43 agreed to.
Clauses 44 to 47 agreed to.
Clause 48 [Planting of trees, shrubs and grass or other plants by roads authority]:
[Amendments Nos. 81 to 83 not moved.]
Clause 48 agreed to.
Clauses 49 to 52 agreed to.
Clause 53 [Provision of picnic sites for trunk roads etc.]:
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Simon): I understand that Amendments Nos. 84 and 85 are alternative amendments.
10.52 p.m.
Lord Hughes Lord Hughes moved Amendment No. 84:
Page 33, line 28, leave out ("other than a regional, islands or district council")
The noble Lord said: I suggest that I speak to Amendments Nos. 84, 85, 86 and 87 together, because Amendments Nos. 84 and 86 are one pair of amendments and Nos. 85 and 87 are another pair.
Amendment No. 85: Page 33, line 28, leave out ("other than") and insert ("or")
Amendment No. 86: Page 33, line 30, at end insert ("or council")
Amendment No. 87: Page 33, line 30, at end insert—
("( ) A regional, islands or district council shall not provide meals or refreshments on the picnic site without the consent of the Secretary of State")
The Bill, as it stands, places an absolute embargo on a regional, islands or district council providing meals or refreshments on a picnic site, so that is one extreme method of dealing with the matter. Amendments Nos. 84 and 86 remove the embargo entirely, so that a regional, islands or district council would have total freedom to provide refreshments at picnic sites. I suggest that Amendments Nos. 85 and 87 are an alternative form and are a halfway house. They take out the embargo, which is contained in the Bill as it stands, but then Amendment No. 87 adds a new subsection which states:
"A regional, islands or district council shall not provide meals or refreshments on the picnic site without the consent of the Secretary of State".
So my suggestion is that it is not necessarily reasonable to prevent these local authorities from providing, because there may be very desirable places where refreshments would be desired, but nobody in the area was interested in taking it on. But a local authority may see considerable advantage for their areas in doing so, even although that might involve them in taking it on at a loss, because I am quite certain that if there was a profit to be made, there would be no difficulty in finding somebody outside to do it.
But the Government, if they were prepared to depart from the terms of the Bill, would probably not be enthusiastic about the possibility of an authority embarking on such a project without proper consideration and would want to have some control over it. So on this basis I suggest that our alternative, less radical, proposal makes it possible for this situation to develop.
A picnic site is being created. It is desirable, if it is at all possible, that there should be eating facilities there. The local authority invites tenders for the job. One possibility is that people will expect to be paid something to enable them to provide the service. The Secretary of State would want to know what opportunities had been given to the private operator to provide these facilities. He might come to the conclusion that it was more desirable for the local authority to provide the facilities than to have no facilities at all. If I were to take a dogmatic view I should prefer to give complete freedom to the local authority, but given the extent to which that freedom is restricted in the Bill I would suggest that the Government should at least open the door, provided that the Secretary of State agrees that the door should be open. Therefore, I beg to move, technically, Amendment No. 84.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Our approach to this matter is that local authorities should not be in the hot-dog and coffee stall business. No doubt some of them are capable of providing very good hot-dogs and very good cups of coffee, but we do not consider that that is what they were elected to do. This is a field
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where the private sector can do at least as well—indeed, better, because of their greater awareness of competition and of the link between customer satisfaction and profitability. In our view, local government should be left to get on with the many activities which only it can perform and should not be distracted by venturing into the snack-bar business.
While I appreciate the spirit in which the noble Lord has put these amendments together, I am afraid that I must advise the Committee not to accept them.
Lord Hughes: This is probably one of the few amendments which would affect the principles contained in the Bill. It would be futile to call a Division on it at this stage. However, in withdrawing the amendment and in not moving the other three I give notice to the Committee that I intend to return to the matter at the next stage of the Bill. It may then be possible to deal with it at an earlier stage in the proceedings.
I am amused by the touching faith which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate puts in the ability of private enterprise to provide satisfactory facilities. The facilities provided on the motorways do not always meet with the unanimous approval of those who are unfortunate enough to pick the wrong ones, where the food can be atrocious and the service worse. There is no guarantee that private enterprise will always do it better. If there is the possibility of a great deal of business being done, private enterprise will be interested, but I am thinking about such areas as picnic sites. Private enterprise may not be interested in picnic sites, although there may be a demand by the public for facilities to be provided. As the Bill stands, local authorities would be denied the opportunity to provide those desirable facilities. Therefore, the Government ought to consider opening the door.
I hope that the Scottish Office will give a little more thought to the matter. By saying that it should be only with the consent of the Secretary of State I know that I am giving a hostage to fortune, but I cannot believe that the Secretary of State would allow money to be spent on a picnic site and then, because of a very tight provision in the Bill, would prevent proper use being made of the facilities.
I agree that in almost every case, if not in every case, the first approach would be to try to get the private caterer to take it on. I am seeking to make provision for those cases where that would not be the result, but where there is a desire for something to be done. After all, most of the authorities concerned do have facilities in their school meals provisions, and so on, which could quite easily take on simpler meals. People who stop at picnic sites are not expecting a place having four stars from Egon Ronay, or anything of that kind. They are expecting something quite simple, and it would not be beyond the bounds of some local authorities to provide it.
I hope that the Scottish Office will consider this matter further; but if they do not do anything more about it, then we shall return to this point at the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 85 to 87 not moved.]
Clause 53 agreed to.
11.2 p.m.
Clause 54 [Control of works and excavations]:
On Question, Whether Clause 54 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Hughes: I notice that in the heading to Clause 54 the words "works" and "excavations" both appear in the plural. Then, throughout the clause "works" is always in the plural but in all cases except one "excavation" remains in the singular. The one instance where it is shown in the plural is in subsection (3), where it states
"This section does not apply to works or excavations".
I do not care which way it is done—whether it is in the singular or the plural—but will the noble and learned Lord ensure that it appears in the same form throughout the clause?
The word "excavations" is to be preferred in view of the fact that "works" is in the plural throughout and that the heading of the clause is "works and excavations". I draw this point to the attention of the noble and learned Lord, and perhaps he will make the necessary minor adjustments at a later stage.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Subject to the appropriateness of the context. Sometimes it is not absolutely clear that it would be right to do so, but I shall certainly look at that point.
Clause 54 agreed to.
Clause 55 [Dangerous works]:
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 88:
Page 35, line 37, leave out ("street") and insert ("road").
The noble Lord said: This is a very small amendment which, as the Bill itself now designates everything as a road, attempts to question the Minister why the word "street" has been reverted to in the phrase "street works code" when it is not even "Street Works Code" in capital letters. It appears that in order to keep that subsection in balance with the rest of the Bill it would be easy to replace the word "street" with the word "road". I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: It would of course be desirable, if one could do it, to make the word "road" prevail completely, but the phrase "street works code", to which the noble Lord has referred, comes within the Public Utilities Street Works Act 1950, and we cannot really amend the title of that Act. The code comes from that Act, and therefore I would suggest that it is appropriate to leave that phrase as it stands.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 55 agreed to.
Clause 56 agreed to.
Clause 57 [Control of obstructions in roads]:
The Earl of Selkirk The Earl of Selkirk moved Amendment No. 89:
Page 37, line 10, after ("road") insert ("or on the verge").
The noble Earl said: The greater part of the safety regulations regarding the obstruction of roads concerns what is deposited on the road and what people do who own the land on each side. I am taking a different example here which I believe requires to be covered. It is: what happens on the verge of the road; and, in particular, what happens with the digging of a ditch and the placing of the scourings from that ditch? This can take over the years quite a high level, and in a narrow road with turnings off it, it can very seriously obscure the view.
There is no obligation here on the landowner—because this is the verge of the road, which must belong. I take it, to the road authority. There is very little duty put upon the road authority, in fact there is none, about keeping the verges of roads clear. There are some cases in open land where that does not matter, but in other cases where the roads are narrow this is extremely dangerous and should be put right.
I am suggesting, in this amendment and my following amendment, that in cases where the scourings from a ditch reach a stage where they seriously obscure the vision down the road the road authority should have a duty to deal with it. Although this Bill goes into very great detail on all sorts of subjects, this is an important aspect which is omitted. I ask the noble Lord either to accept these words or to undertake to look very carefully to see that this particular aspect is covered by this very comprehensive measure. I beg to move.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: Perhaps I may support the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, on this point. I have had communication on a very similar point which I would imagine would be included in this particular clause by this amendment. It appears that there is an omission, apparently a gap in the Scottish law, which may be able to be corrected in this Bill. The story I have been sent is that a hedge-cutting machine threw thorns across a road and they burst the tyres of a vehicle; the owner had very great difficulty in getting any recompense from the farmer or in persuading the police to take any action. That is bad enough, but of course there also could have been considerable personal injury; there was none in this case, I am glad to say—but there could have been.
I understand that in England and Wales the position is clearly covered by the Highways Act 1980, Sections 148, 149 and 161. I can summarise these; they provide that if without good reason a person deposits anything whatsoever on a highway to the interruption of any highway user he commits an offence, as he does if a highway user is injured or endangered in consequence of such deposit. Under Section 161 a highway authority has power to remove a deposit which constitutes a nuisance, charging the cost to the person who made the deposit.
I understand that there is a comparable provision in Scottish law in Section 24 of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1970, but this is not carried on to the Bill we are discussing. According to my information, the words in the Bill appear not to contain anything like the existing Section 24. Accordingly, it seems desirable to incorporate into this Bill provisions modelled on the Highways Act 1980 by way of new clauses. I wonder whether at a later stage the Lord Advocate, having

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considered the points made by his noble friend and myself, would consider adding new clauses, unless he can explain that Section 24 of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1970 is in some way covered in the present Bill.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: My impression is that the situation to which the noble Lord, Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove, referred is covered, but since it is a particular case I should like to look at it in more detail and deal with it later.
As regards the amendment of my noble friend Lord Selkirk, the position is that in Clause 143 we have defined "roads" to include the verge because we entirely agree that it is extremely important that matters of road safety are not confined to the carriageway in the situation to which he referred. Therefore, in the interpretation clause, to save repeating it in every case, the definition of "road" expressly states, on page 91, line 15, of the Bill, that this includes the road's verge. That is intended to cope with the problem to which my noble friend referred. It is not necesssary to state every time that the verge is included.
The Earl of Selkirk: Is it clear from this that there is a duty on the road authority, within the meaning which my noble and learned friend says, to clear it away? Under what sanction can that duty be brought into play?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Clause 57 makes it an offence to cause an obstruction except with the consent, in writing, of the road authority, and there is no question of the road authority consenting to something that constitutes an obstruction. Anyone who contravenes that clause commits an offence. The situation would be that if a contractor or employee, or someone of that sort, deposited something on the verge and created an obstruction that person would be committing an offence unless he did so with the authority, in writing, of the road authority—and there would be no question of that.
The Earl of Selkirk: May I put a direct question to my noble and learned friend? Supposing an employee of the road authority does exactly that, and someone using the road wishes to get that obstruction removed. How can he do so? Can a user of the road sue the road authority? I happen to know of a case in point where the local authority has declined to take away something of that nature. Can an action be brought against the road authority?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The situation is that if it is done without the consent of the road authority, an offence is committed. If a danger is created by the actions of the road authority that would certainly be actionable. But the main sanction is a direct one. It is a criminal offence if a person puts an obstruction on the verge without the consent, in writing, of the road authority.
The Earl of Selkirk: I shall not pursue this, but clearly he will be an agent of the local authority and, as such, will be acting on behalf of the local authority.
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The local authority will therefore be responsible for his actions. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Earl of Selkirk The Earl of Selkirk moved amendment No. 90:
Page 37, line 10, after ("obstruction") insert ("or seriously restrict the view of on-coming traffic").
The noble Earl said: There is not a great deal in the Bill about obstructing views as such but more about obstructing passage. I do not say that this part of the Bill is the only place for such a reference, but there is nothing in this clause which deals with this point. It is an important point, and just as important as the actual obstruction of the road. I suggest to my noble and learned friend that it should be better emphasised. Whether or not this is the right place I am not sure, but a view that is obstructed is a matter of importance on any road. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I think that the provisions that particularly relate to the obstruction that my noble friend has in mind are adequately covered by Clauses 80 to 89. But I shall certainly look again at the matter in the light of what he has said. However, that is my impression having looked at his amendment and the Bill.
The Earl of Selkirk: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
11.16 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 57 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord Hughes: I take the opportunity of the debate on whether the clause shall stand part of the Bill to ask the Government what their intentions are for further debating the Committee stage of the Bill. We had an informal discussion about what would be a reasonable time to adjourn. No one can say that we have delayed the legislation. We have been exceedingly co-operative. But with all the remaining amendments there is no way that we can sensibly conclude proceedings on this Bill tonight. Many of the remaining amendments are Government amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate and at least one could be the subject of a major debate. There are large amendments to the schedules and all the amendments to the schedules are Government ones.
I was asked how long we might take if the debate went over to another day. I cannot possibly give an undertaking that we shall finish within a certain time because I do not know how long the Lord Advocate will take on his amendments. It is not in the traditions of the House that we should go on unreasonably. If the Government wish to continue and attempt to finish the Bill tonight, we shall play along, but I cannot guarantee that we shall continue to be so co-operative if there is no co-operation from the Government.
Lord Lyell: As the noble Lord knows, I have borne the heat of the entire afternoon in two previous debates. I have no instructions. The noble Lords, Lord

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Hughes and Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove, could perhaps continue until instructions are obtained through the usual channels. I yield my position to my noble friend Lord Denham to see what he has to say.
Lord Denham: This is the second day that we have spent on this Bill. I hesitate to keep your Lordships short of time on this important Bill. Of course your Lordships must consider it to the fullest extent that you feel necessary. On the other hand, I do not think that it is possible to say that we must have as much time as we want to consider the Bill; but, equally, that we must rise at quarter past eleven in the evening. This is the second day. I remind your Lordships that on the first day we got through 21 amendments in quite a long time.
Lord Underhill: Three and a half hours.
Lord Denham: No, more than that. I then suggested that the House rose at, I think, a quarter to eleven rather than asking your Lordships to stay longer in the hope that we should be able to finish today. We have not made very good progress today, when one considers that we got through 21 amendments on the first day, we have just completed Amendment No. 90 now and there are over 170 amendments. Of course I should not ask your Lordships to sit for long if we could have a reliable indication as to the amount of time longer that we need on the Bill. What is the point in adjourning the House at twenty past eleven, coming back for a third day and having to sit until three o'clock in the morning?
Lord Hughes: The noble Lord says that on the last occasion we debated only 20 or so amendments. I remind him that tonight we did not start consideration of the Bill until ten to six, and we adjourned for 40 minutes for dinner, which is the equivalent of starting at seven o'clock. We have been debating the Bill for four hours and twenty minutes and have dealt with 60 amendments. We are working at least two and a half times the speed that we did on the first occasion.
I was asked whether I could give an undertaking that if we adjourned at a reasonable time we could finish the Bill in two hours. I could not possibly do that. I thought three hours might be possible, but I cannot give undertakings. I am not in charge of the Bill on this side of the Committee. I am playing this part today because my noble friend Lord Ross of Marnock is unable to be here, but any undertaking which I give would not be binding on him. To suggest two hours is quite unreasonable. I would say to the noble Lord: has he looked at the amendments, has he asked his noble and learned friend how much time he is going to take to handle his amendments, because all the amendments to the schedules are Government amendments?
I know that it is not right to quote what has been said, and I am not going to do it. But I shall remind the noble Lord the Government Chief Whip of what he said to me at the close of the last proceedings and of the threat which he made to the Opposition, because of his displeasure at what had taken place the first time out. If this is in fact the carrying out of a threat, then
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we shall have to work on the basis that we are being threatened—and threats have a very nasty habit of rebounding on those who make them.
Lord Denham: It seems to have rebounded on me tonight, if I may say so. But this is not the way that we normally decide things in this House. We normally work through the usual channels and decide how far we should go on a certain occasion on a particular Bill. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, will in future leave it to the usual channels, because this is the way it is normally done.
I have had consultations with the noble Lord the Opposition Chief Whip, and I hope that I shall continue to do so. But if the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, wishes to raise the matter on the Floor of the House, then I must reply as best I can. The noble Lord will realise that in any Administration the difficulty of getting the Government business through is constant. In this House we have to proceed by consent, we have to work through agreement, and we have to come to some kind of arrangement. The noble Lord, in his time as a Minister, will have appreciated that we talk to the other side. As Opposition Chief Whip I have given undertakings to the Government Chief Whip of the day that if we were to rise at a certain time, I would get the business through by a certain time.
The noble Lord says that he cannot give undertakings for one of his noble friends. When the noble Lord is speaking from that Dispatch Box he can give undertakings, because he is giving an undertaking for Her Majesty's Opposition, just the same as I can give undertakings from this Dispatch Box that are binding on my noble friends here.
Let us go on a little longer. The noble Lord the Opposition Chief Whip and I will have a few words about it and see where we can get, but I would ask your Lordships not to feel that I am trying to gag the House in any way about this. We have to work by mutual understanding and mutual agreement here. Time is limited, and we have to ration it out for the business that is to be done.
The Earl of Selkirk: May I make just one observation—
Lord Hughes: If the noble Earl will, permit me, I would say that I do not want to alter the arrangements. As the Chief Whip has said, normally the arrangements work perfectly satisfactorily. But until dinner there was no indication at all as to how far we might go. I doubt very much whether the Lord Advocate would say that the Bill has been handled unreasonably. We have spoken briefly on amendments. The only amendment on which in fact there was any lengthy debate was one from the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, which attracted support from a variety of parts of the Chamber. Apart from that, every single amendment has been handled expeditiously. So I think that we have done our best.
So in the negotiations which he is suggesting the Government Chief Whip should first of all ask the Lord Advocate what would be a reasonable amount of time that he would expect to take on the Government amendments. At the same time my noble friend Lord Carmichael and myself will look at the Opposition

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amendments, and we can tell him what we would want to add to the Government's time as a reasonable basis on which to continue in order to finish the Bill, whether tonight, or on some other occasion. That is reasonable. To expect me to give a guarantee of the time required when two-thirds of the amendments are Government amendments is unreasonable.
Lord Denham: I shall give way to my noble friend Lord Selkirk in a moment because I think, having started this, it is right that we should air all our grievances. I do not think that this is the right way, if I may say so, to conduct the negotiations between the sides. It has never been done this way before, and, if I may say so, it was the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, who raised this point. I have, of course, been in contact with the usual channels. This has always worked very well before. I think that if we could possibly leave it that way, it would be better in the future. I do not know whether my noble friend wants to come in on this.
The Earl of Selkirk: With great respect to my noble friend, we are now in the month of January. It is important to remember that. Secondly, when he had his discussions in the usual way, did he consider that this Bill would start at 6 pm, I think it was—
Lord Hughes: Ten minutes to six.
The Earl of Selkirk: —with something like 150 amendments to get through? Would he really have done that with an English Bill?
Lord Denham: Yes, my Lords. I assure my noble friend that I would have done it with an English Bill or even a Welsh Bill.
Lord Hughes: If it had been an English Bill, there would not have been only one speaker from the Opposition Benches on it.
Lord Denham: That may be so, but he might have been shorter.
Lord Hughes: I suggest that the noble Lord looks at the timing tomorrow to see how long we have spoken.
Clause 57 agreed to.
Clauses 58 to 62 agreed to.
Clause 63 [Regulation of drivers of horse drawn carts etc.]:
11.27 p.m.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 91:
Page 41, line 5, leave out second ("a") and insert ("one or more").
The noble Lord said: This is a drafting amendment which appears unnecessary but with which I suggest that we take Amendment No. 92:
Amendment No. 92: Page 41, line 5, leave out ("(or by draught animals)").
It seems to me neater, instead of saying "or by draught animals", to have the words "by one or more draught animals." I hope that I may achieve some victory on this small point. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I am happy to accept this amendment as an improvement. A minor qualification is that the word "animal" that remains at the end of line 5 on page 41 should be plural. If that can be done by manuscript amendment, I am happy with what is proposed.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment 92:
[Printed above.]
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 63, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 64 [Maintenance of vaults and cellars etc.]:
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 93:
Page 41, line 7, leave out ("things").
The noble Lord said: This is another small point with which the Lord Advocate may be able to help. The word "things" seems superfluous. Apart from that, it does not ring true in an Act of Parliament. Instead of "the following things", the words "the following" would seem to be quite adequate.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I am sorry that I cannot accept this amendment as an improvement, although I have had a good deal of discussion with the draftsmen about it. The difficulty is that the word "following" comes a good deal before the things that are supposed to follow it and are being referred to. We shall certainly look again to see whether the clause can be improved on the lines suggested because I can see that there is possible scope for improvement, but I do not think that the amendment quite meets the point.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 94 not moved.]
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove moved Amendment No. 95:
Page 41, line 12, leave out from ("tunnel") to end of line.
The noble Lord said: This amendment has been tabled in order to get an explanation. Paragraph (b) says:
"every opening into any such vault, arch, cellar or tunnel from the surface of the road".
It appears that it does not cover one that is going under the road, but only covers one that somehow or other moves from the road. I may have totally misinterpreted it. However, it seemed to me that:
"from the surface of the road"
was not only unnecessary, but positively confusing. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The intention is to deal with openings which are within the road boundary. The amendment, I think, would have the effect of obliging owners or occupiers to keep in order entrances to vaults, arches, et cetera, which were nowhere near the road, and that does not seem to be right.
Lord Carmichael of Kelvingrove: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 96 not moved.]
Clause 64 agreed to.
Clause 65 [Power to direct that doors etc. should not open outward into road].
[Amendment No. 97 not moved.]
Clause 65 agreed to.
Lord Denham: I think it is probably the feeling of the Committee that we should come to a convenient stopping place. After consulting the officials and my noble friends I find that we have now reached the place where we are about to start Part VI. So if your Lordships would like to adjourn at this stage, it would probably be a convenient moment to do so.
I beg to move that the House do now resume.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

Aylesbury Vale District Council Bill [H.L.] Bournemouth Borough Council Bill [H.L.] Charing Cross and Westminister Medical School Bill [H.L.] Derwent Valley Railway Bill [H.L.] Hereford City Council Bill [H.L.] Leicestershire Bill [H.L.] London Transport (Tower Hill) Bill [H.L.] Norwich City Council Bill [H.L.] Oxfordshire Bill [H.L.] Southend-on-Sea Borough Council Bill [H.L.] Surrey County Council Bill [H.L.] Swavesey Bye-Ways Bill [H.L.] Warwick District Council Bill [H.L.] Worcester City Council Bill [H.L.]
Presented and read a first time.
House adjourned at twenty-seven minutes before midnight.